Encyclopedia of SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Vincent N. Parrillo
Editor

1&2

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Reader's Guide

The Reader's Guide can assist readers in locating entries on related topics. It classifies entries into 16 general topical categories: Aging and the Life Course; Community, Culture, and Change; Crime and Deviance; Economics and Work; Education; Family; Gender Inequality and Sexual Orientation; Health; Housing and Urbanization; Politics, Power, and War; Population and Environment; Poverty and Social Class; Race and Ethnic Relations; Social Movements; Social Theory; and Substance Abuse. Entries may be listed under more than one topic.

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Baby Boomers
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About the Editor

Vincent N. Parrillo, born and raised in Paterson, New Jersey, experienced multiculturalism early as the son of a second-generation Italian American father and Irish/German American mother. He grew up in an ethnically diverse neighborhood, developing friendships and teenage romances with second- and third-generation Dutch, German, Italian, and Polish Americans. As he grew older, he developed other friendships that frequently crossed racial and religious lines.

Dr. Parrillo came to the field of sociology after first completing a bachelor's degree in business management and a master's degree in English. After teaching high school English and then serving as a college administrator, he took his first sociology course when he began doctoral studies at Rutgers University. Inspired by a discipline that scientifically investigates social issues, he changed his major and completed his degree in sociology.

Leaving his administrative post but staying at William Paterson University, Dr. Parrillo has since taught sociology for more than 30 years. He has lectured throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe and has regularly conducted diversity leadership programs for the military and large corporations. His keynote address at a 2001 bilingual educators' conference was published in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, which normally contains only speeches by national political leaders and heads of corporations and organizations.

An internationally renowned expert on immigration and multiculturalism, Dr. Parrillo was a Fulbright Scholar in the Czech Republic and Scholar-in-Residence at the University of Pisa. He was the keynote speaker at international conferences in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden. He is also a Fulbright Senior Specialist. Through the U.S. Information Agency, he met with government leaders, nongovernment agency leaders, law enforcement officials, and educators in more than a dozen countries as a consultant on immigration policy, hate crimes, and multicultural education. He has done on-air interviews with Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, appeared on national Canadian television, and been interviewed by numerous Canadian and European reporters.

Dr. Parrillo's ventures into U.S. media include writing, narrating, and producing two award-winning PBS documentaries, *Ellis Island: Gateway to America* and *Smokestacks and Steeples: A Portrait of Paterson*. Contacted by reporters across the nation for interviews on race and ethnic relations, he has been quoted in dozens of newspapers, including the *Chicago Sun-Times*, *Cincinnati Inquirer*, *Houston Chronicle*, *Hartford Courant*, *Omaha World-Herald*, *Orlando Sentinel*, and *Virginian Pilot*. He has also appeared on numerous U.S. radio and television programs.

Dr. Parrillo is also the author of *Strangers to These Shores* (9th ed., 2009), *Diversity in America* (3rd ed., 2008), *Understanding Race and Ethnic Relations* (3rd ed., 2008), *Contemporary Social Problems* (6th ed., 2005), *Cities and Urban Life* (4th ed. [with John Macionis], 2007), and *Rethinking Today's Minorities* (1991). His articles and book reviews have appeared in such journals as the *Social Science Journal*, *Sociological Forum*, *Social Forces*, *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, *Journal of American Ethnic History*, *Encyclopedia of American Immigration*, and the *Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Several of his books and articles have been translated into other languages, including Chinese, Czech, Danish, German, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Romanian, and Swedish.

An active participant in various capacities throughout the years in the American Sociological Association (ASA) and Eastern Sociological Society (ESS), Dr. Parrillo was the ESS Robin M. Williams, Jr. Distinguished Lecturer for 2005–06 and is ESS vice president for 2008–09. He has been listed in *Who's Who in International Education, Outstanding Educators of America, American Men and Women of Science,* and *Who's Who in the East.* In 2004, he received the Award for Excellence in Scholarship from William Paterson University.

About the Associate Editors

Margaret L. Andersen is the Edward F. and Elizabeth Goodman Rosenberg Professor of Sociology at the University of Delaware, where she also holds joint appointments in women's studies and black American studies. She is the author of *On Land and on Sea: A Century of Women in the Rosenfeld Collection*; *Thinking About Women: Sociological Perspectives on Sex and Gender; Race, Class and Gender* (with Patricia Hill Collins); *Race and Ethnicity in the United States: The Changing Landscape* (with Elizabeth Higginbotham); *Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society* (with Howard F. Taylor); and *Sociology: The Essentials* (with Howard Taylor). She is the 2008–09 vice president of the American Sociological Association (ASA). In 2006 she received the ASA's Jessie Bernard Award, given annually for a person whose work has expanded the horizons of sociology to include women. She has also received the Sociologists for Women in Society's Feminist Lecturer Award and the 2007–08 Robin M. Williams, Jr. Distinguished Lecturer Award from the Eastern Sociological Society (ESS), of which she is the former president. She has received two teaching awards from the University of Delaware.



Joel Best is professor of sociology and criminal justice at the University of Delaware. He is a past president of the Midwest Sociological Society and the Society for the Study of Social Problems, a former editor of *Social Problems,* and the current editor-in-chief of *Sociology Compass*. Much of his work concerns the sociology of social problems; his recent books include *Random Violence* (1999), *Damned Lies and Statistics* (2001), *Deviance: Career of a Concept* (2004), *More Damned Lies and Statistics* (2004), *Flavor of the Month: Why Smart People Fall for Fads* (2006), and *Social Problems* (2008). He has also edited several collections of original papers on social problems, including *Images of Issues* (2nd ed., 1995) and *How Claims Spread: Cross-National Diffusion of Social Problems* (2001). His current research concerns awards, prizes, and honors in American culture.



William Kornblum conducts research on urban social ecology and community studies. Among his publications are *At Sea in the City: New York from the Water's Edge; Blue Collar Community,* a study of the steel mill neighborhoods of South Chicago; *Growing Up Poor* and *Uptown Kids* (written with Terry Williams); and *West 42nd Street: The Bright Lights,* which during the 1980s became a guide to understanding the street life of lower Times Square. He has served as a social scientist for the U.S. Department of the Interior and worked on the development of national parks and environmental reserves in the nation's metropolitan regions. Kornblum received his undergraduate degree in biology from Cornell University (1961) and his PhD in sociology from the University of Chicago (1971). He taught physics and chemistry as a Peace Corps volunteer in Ivory Coast (1962–63) and was on the faculty at the University of Washington before he came to the Graduate Center of the City University of New York in 1973.

Claire M. Renzetti is professor of sociology at the University of Dayton. She is editor of the international, interdisciplinary journal *Violence Against Women*, coeditor of the *Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence* and of the Interpersonal Violence book series for Oxford University Press, and editor of the Gender, Crime and Law book series for Northeastern University Press/University Press of New England. She has authored or edited 16 books, including *Women, Men, and Society* and *Violent Betrayal*, as well as numerous book chapters and articles in professional journals. Her current research focuses on the violent victimization experiences of economically marginalized women living in public housing developments. Dr. Renzetti has held elected and appointed positions on the governing bodies of several national professional organizations, including the Society for the Study of Social Problems, the Eastern Sociological Society, and Alpha Kappa Delta, the sociological honors society.

Mary Romero is professor of justice studies and social inquiry at Arizona State University and affiliate research faculty of the North American Center for Transborder Studies. She is the author of *Maid in the U.S.A.* (1992, Tenth Anniversary Edition 2002) and coeditor of *Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities* (2005), *Latino/a Popular Culture* (2002), *Women's Untold Stories*: *Breaking Silence, Talking Back, Voicing Complexity* (1999), *Challenging Fronteras: Structuring Latina and Latino Lives in the U.S.* (1997), and *Women and Work: Exploring Race, Ethnicity and Class* (1997). Her most recent articles are published in *Contemporary Justice Review, Critical Sociology, Law & Society Review, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Villanova Law Review*, and *Cleveland State Law Review*. She currently serves on the Law and Society Association Board of Trustees (Class of 2008) and the Council of the American Sociological Association.

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Introduction

Social problems affect everyone. Some of us encounter problems of unequal treatment and opportunity virtually every day as a result of our race, religion, gender, or low income. Others experience problems in their lives from chemical dependency, family dissolution and disorganization, technological change, or declining neighborhoods. Crime and violence affect many people directly, while others live fearfully in their shadow, threatened further by the possibility of terrorism. And these are but a few of the social problems people face.

Because so many actual and potential problems confront us, it is often difficult to decide which ones affect us most severely. Is it the threat of death or injury during a terrorist attack? Is it the threat caused by industrial pollution that may poison us or destroy our physical environment? Or does quiet but viciously damaging gender, age, class, racial, or ethnic discrimination have the most far-reaching effect? Do the problems of cities affect us if we live in the suburbs? Do poorer nations' problems with overpopulation affect *our* quality of life? No consensus exists on which problem is most severe; in fact, some might argue it is none of the above but something else instead.

Developed societies are extremely complex entities. Any attempt, therefore, to examine the many social problems confronting such societies must encompass a wide scope of issues, ranging from those on a seemingly personal level (such as mental health and substance abuse) to those on a global scale (such as economics, environment, and pandemics). Moreover, the myriad of problems challenging both the social order and quality of life encompass so many areas of concern that only an interdisciplinary approach can offer a thorough approach in gaining sufficient understanding into their causes and consequences. This *Encyclopedia of Social Problems*, therefore, utilizes experts and scholars from *19 disciplines* in an effort to provide as comprehensive an approach as possible to this multifaceted field. These subject areas include anthropology, biology, business, chemistry, communications, criminal justice, demography, economics, education, environmental studies, geography, health, history, languages, political science, psychology, social work, sociology, and women's studies.

Although some social problems are fairly new (such as computer crimes and identity theft), others are centuries old (such as poverty and prostitution). Some social problems have been viewed differently from place to place and from one era to another (such as attitudes about poverty and prostitution), while others have almost always drawn societal disapproval (such as incest, although even here—such as in ancient Egypt and in the Hawaiian kingdom—its acceptance among the ruling class once existed). In fact, this last point brings to the forefront an important element about social problems: a social condition, whatever it may be, often does not become defined as a social problem until members of some powerful group perceive it as a problem affecting them in some way—perhaps as a threat to their well-being. A subjective component of moral outrage thus sparks social problem definitions.

Members of a social class tend to see reality from their class's point of view and form a set of moral and lifestyle definitions about themselves and others that is unique to their stratum. Thus what one group sees as important (such as welfare, social security, or tax loopholes), another may not consider valuable to society. People in positions of power tend to value stability, social order, and the preservation of the existing privilege structure. In contrast, people trying to gain power tend to be interested in new ideas, innovative policies, and challenges to the status quo. Sometimes age also influences these differences in perspective.

People in power typically are older and try to maintain the structure that nurtured them, while those beginning their careers see many ways to improve the system.

Another important factor that complicates our understanding of social problems is the fact that none of them exists in isolation from other social conditions and problems. Essentially, a high degree of interconnectivity exists between each social problem and mutually supportive social institutions. Successfully overcoming any single social problem requires examining and changing many others. For example, we can only eliminate (or at least reduce) poverty if we also do something about improving people's life chances through better education in our inner cities and rural communities; increasing job skill training and the jobs themselves; reducing gang activities, street crimes, and drug use; eliminating racism and other forms of prejudice; providing more affordable housing and child care for low-income families; and changing perceptions from blaming poverty on individual character flaws to a realization that almost all poverty results from societal factors that can be altered.

We must also recognize that many social problems persist because someone is profiting from them. Resistance to anti-pollution regulations, for example, is often rooted in producers' or workers' desires to avoid reducing profits or jobs. However, the benefits gained by resisting new policies need not be monetary ones. Many proposed solutions to social problems encounter resistance because they threaten to upset society's traditional authority structure. The resistance to women in upper management (the "glass ceiling") is a recent example. Furthermore, the threat does not have to be direct or powerful or even real to cause a reaction. People resist change if it upsets how they think things should be. Every society's power structure of vested interest groups justifies itself by an ideology that seems to explain why some members "deserve" more power or privilege. It may respond to any solution that contradicts the ideological structure by dismissing the plan as nonsensical or too radical unless the solution enjoys strong enough proof and support to overcome the ideology.

Helpful to our gaining a deeper understanding of the many social problems we face is the utilization of social theories to explain our empirical reality. Some theories are *macrosocial* in nature, employing the larger context of society in their approach, while others are *microsocial,* focusing on some aspect of everyday life, and still other theories are *mesosocial,* taking a middle ground between the two, making use of just one variable (such as differences in power between two competing groups) to understand a problem at the societal level. Just as close-up or wide-angle camera lenses enable us to focus on different aspects of the same reality, so too do the various social theories. Included in these encyclopedia pages, therefore, are entries on these theories, explaining their perspectives and foundations as well as their application in many of the other entries on various social problems.

This brief introduction to the field of social problems gives only an inkling of the topic. Within the pages to follow are hundreds of entries to offer the reader a fuller insight into the many and complex challenges to the human condition.

Rationale for the *Encyclopedia*

Despite the fact that social problems affect everyone and that they occur on so many levels in so many areas, until now, library reference shelves have lacked a current *Encyclopedia of Social Problems.* One may find reference works on many specific social issues (such as crime, education, environment, gender, and race), or on related elements (such as social class and social policy), but because social problems are so complex and interconnected, a real need exists for a single reference work that enables the reader to access information about all of these interconnected elements to gain more easily a complete insight and understanding.

Furthermore, most reference works about particular social issues or problems approach their subject from the area of expertise of their authors or editors. To illustrate, political scientists are likely to write about governmental policy, environmentalists about global warming, and criminologists about crime. Yet, as stated earlier, each of these and all other problem areas are interconnected with additional elements of society, and a multidisciplinary approach to even a single problem will better inform the reader. Thus, after completing a particular entry, the reader will find cross-references that will enable him or her to explore other dimensions of that topic within this *Encyclopedia.*

Also, a simple exposition of historical overviews and empirical data is not sufficient to comprehend the reality of our world. We further require a means to interpret and analyze that information, to gain perspectives into what is happening and why. Here, social theory provides the window into that understanding. No one theory can provide insights into all problems, and each problem can have more than one interpretation.

As mentioned earlier, the various social theories offer different lenses to view the same reality. Accordingly, this *Encyclopedia* applies theory, wherever applicable, within an entry or as a cross-reference to that entry's content.

To offer a systematic approach to such a vast and complex topic, the *Encyclopedia* adopts the following organization of social problem themes:

Aging and the Life Course

Community, Culture, and Change

Crime and Deviance

Economics and Work

Education

Family

Gender Inequality and Sexual Orientation

Health

Housing and Urbanization

Politics, Power, and War

Population and Environment

Poverty and Social Class

Race and Ethnic Relations

Social Movements

Social Theory

Substance Abuse

These topics provide the headings for the Reader's Guide, with all of the articles in the *Encyclopedia* appearing under one or more of these broad themes. As the list indicates, the scope of the *Encyclopedia* encompasses the major subject areas found in social problems textbooks and in current research. As such, it attempts to meet the needs of all who utilize this reference work.

Content and Organization

The *Encyclopedia* is composed of 632 articles arranged in alphabetical order and ranging in length from about 500 to 3,000 words. Although we believe that this reference work provides the most comprehensive coverage possible in its wide range of material, no encyclopedia can possibly include all of the subfields and specific applications of social problems on individual, local, regional, national, and global levels. Nevertheless, we are confident that the reader investigating virtually any social problem will find in this reference work a rich treasure of information and insights.

Because so many of the topics discussed in the *Encyclopedia* relate to other topics, every article has cross-references to other entries in the *Encyclopedia.* In addition, a list of Further Readings accompanies each article. The Reader's Guide will also enable any user of the *Encyclopedia* to find many articles related to each of the broad themes appearing in this work.

Creation of the *Encyclopedia*

A systematic, step-by-step process led to the creation of the *Encyclopedia:*

1. After first developing a prospectus for this project, I identified some of the leading U.S. scholars in various social problem areas, whose highly respected research and leadership would bring much to this effort. I then invited their participation as associate editors and happily succeeded in that quest.

2. The associate editors and I began to develop a list of headword entries. We approached this task by examining all of the leading university texts in social problems to create an initial list of potential headwords. We also reviewed the Special Problems Divisions of the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), as well as the papers presented at SSSP meetings and/or published in its *Social Problems* journal in the past five years, to identify the subject areas of interest to educators and scholars. In addition, we conducted content computer searches of articles published within the past 5 years in other leading journals in all relevant fields. From these varied sources and through a series of brainstorming sessions, we refined and expanded the headword list until we were satisfied that we had a comprehensive list.

3. Armed with the final headword list, the editors collectively began to develop a list of potential contributors for each topic. The associate editors and I first assumed responsibility for certain topics in our areas of expertise. We next identified potential authors from our own network of professional colleagues as well as from the recently published articles and conference paper presenters identified in the previous step. This ever-widening search for the best scholars in the field

eventually resulted in our securing contributors from *18 countries:* Argentina, Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, New Zealand, Romania, Scotland, Singapore, Turkey, and throughout the United States, including Hawaii. This is truly an international effort in addition to an interdisciplinary one.

4. Each author received detailed submission guidelines and writing samples to illustrate the approach, format, style, substance, and level of intellectual rigor that we required. As general editor, I reviewed their submitted drafts for content accuracy and completeness, as well as grammar and style, and suggested revisions (sometimes several revisions) of virtually every article before assigning it final-draft status.

5. In different phases at the next level, Sage editors further reviewed the articles for clarity of expression, objectivity, and writing style to ensure that each entry was of the highest caliber in its content and presentation.

6. This lengthy process of selection, evaluation, constructive criticism, refinement, and review at multiple levels has resulted in not only an encyclopedia about which we are quite proud, but also one that the reader can confidently embrace.

Acknowledgments

This project began when Ben Penner, acquisitions editor for Sage Publications, approached me with the idea of developing a two-volume encyclopedia on social problems. He found in me a receptive audience. As with all sociologists, my teaching, public speaking, research, and writing focus in one way or another on some aspect of this broad subject matter. I am also the author of a social problems textbook that went through six editions. Moreover, I was attracted by the immense challenge of this endeavor, and I believed that such an inclusive reference work would fill an important void in this area by providing, in one work, the reliable information not just on a specific topic, but also on its related and/or interconnected topics. Thus, the idea of creating a major reference work that would be both comprehensive and comprehensible was too enticing a professional enterprise to refuse.

The associate editors—Margaret Andersen, Joel Best, William Kornblum, Claire Renzetti, and Mary Romero—were each important in the development of this *Encyclopedia.* They helped shape the content, suggested names of contributors, offered me encouragement at times when the project seemed overwhelming, and contributed articles as well. Certainly, the many hundreds of scholars and experts who contributed their expertise to the content of this reference work deserve much appreciation. Sharing with me the belief in this encyclopedia's importance to the field, they all took precious time away from their other demands to write for this publication, then willingly worked to improve the articles according to the editing suggestions.

From the moment of my accepting this project and onward throughout its planning, writing, and editing phases, I worked closely with Yvette Pollastrini, the developmental editor for the *Encyclopedia* at Sage. Yvette answered all my questions, or quickly found someone who could, and guided me through my own growth as general editor. With a sharp eye and a keen mind, she read every entry for substance and style and never hesitated to ask for clarification of passages that were too technical or too complex for the average reader. As we moved into production, Tracy Buyan, senior project editor and reference production supervisor at Sage, shepherded the *Encyclopedia* through that phase. I had worked with Tracy previously in the production of the second edition of my *Diversity in America* book for Sage, so I knew that I was in good hands, and indeed I was. In addition, Colleen Brennan and Pam Suwinsky were outstanding copy editors, going far beyond their normal responsibilities to suggest elements to add to enhance the content.

To all of these people, whether old or new friends or colleagues with whom I was delighted to have worked on this project, I owe a large debt of gratitude. However, I would be remiss if I did not especially thank the one person who lived the entire multiyear experience of creating the *Encyclopedia*. My wife, Beth, listened to my ongoing concerns as the project unfolded, was always understanding when work of the *Encyclopedia* consumed so many hours of my time, and provided the necessary support to sustain me through the difficult days.

Vincent N. Parrillo

A

Ability Grouping

Ability grouping is the practice of teaching homogeneous groups of students, stratified by achievement or perceived ability. Among the various forms of ability grouping are within-class ability grouping, cross-grade grouping, and between-class ability grouping, also known as tracking. Several comprehensive research reviews have explored whether or not students benefit from ability grouping methods, with effects varying depending on the method of grouping examined. Within-class and cross-grade grouping share features that appear to benefit a broad range of students. The research shows between-class grouping to be of little value for most students, and researchers widely criticize this practice because, by definition, it creates groups of low achievers.

In cross-grade and within-class ability grouping, students identify with a heterogeneous class, although they are homogeneously grouped for instruction in only one or two subjects, usually reading, math, or both. Flexibility in grouping allows students to change groups based on changes in performance. In cross-grade grouping plans, students, assigned to heterogeneous classes for most of the day, regroup across grade levels for reading and sometimes other subjects. Within-class ability grouping involves teacher-assigned homogeneous groups for reading or math instruction, and evidence shows this produces gains in student achievement when compared with heterogeneous grouping or whole class instruction. Furthermore, because the teacher determines students' group placements, students have more opportunity to move up into higher groups as their skills and abilities improve.

Common forms of between-class grouping include multilevel classes, which split same-grade students into separate classes, usually high, middle, and low. Also included in between-class grouping are accelerated or enriched classes for high achievers and special or remedial classes for low achievers.

In various forms, between-class ability grouping has been a common school practice since the early 20th-century Industrial Revolution, when curricula were increasingly differentiated into vocational and academic tracks. During the 1960s, concern about U.S. students' standing in math and science compared with students abroad increased emphasis on special programs for the top achievers. At the same time, heightened concern about racial discrimination and segregation, poverty, and social inequity fostered the growth of programs aimed at leveling the playing field. A multitude of programs targeting specific categories of children emerged, including gifted education, compensatory education, special education, and bilingual programs. The existence of these programs strengthened convictions that standardized education could not best serve all children, and so schools grew more and more differentiated.

In theory, between-class ability grouping reduces homogeneity, allowing teachers to develop curricula more effectively according to the unique needs of their group. Whereas a teacher of low-achieving students might focus attention on specific skill remediation, repetition, and review, a teacher of high achievers might provide a more challenging curriculum and increased instructional pace. Research findings point to the benefits of accelerated classes for high-achieving students but show mixed results for average and low-achieving students, ranging from

small positive gains to small negative losses in these students' achievement levels.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the effects of between-class grouping came under attack. Although created in the name of educational equality, stratified educational programs may have actually widened the achievement gap between more and less economically advantaged groups. Critics point to the disproportionate representation in low-track classes of children from lower socioeconomic groups, who tend to be predominantly Latin American and African American. Wealthier white students disproportionately populate high tracks. Lower-track students experience a curriculum far less rigorous than their high-achieving counterparts. Lower-achieving students in homogeneous groups lack the stimulation and academic behavior models provided by high achievers. Further exacerbating the problem, the act of categorizing students has a stigmatizing effect: Teachers tend to develop lowered expectations for children in lower tracks. Students in these groups may be denied opportunities to advance academically, and struggling learners consigned to lower tracks often remain there for life.

Efforts at detracking began in earnest in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in 1990 the National Education Association recommended that schools abandon conventional tracking practices, stating that they lead to inequity in learning opportunities. In that same year, the Carnegie Corporation declared that the creation of heterogeneous classrooms was key to school environments that are democratic as well as academic. Courts around the nation ruled that the tracking system segregated students and restricted Latino/a and African American access to high-quality curricula. Despite the detracking movement, many schools continue to sort students based on perceived ability, with students of color disproportionately tracked into the lowest classes in racially mixed schools; racially segregated schools predominantly house either higher or lower tracks.

Objections to detracking come mostly from educators and parents of high-achieving students. Many worry that detracking results in the elimination of enriched and accelerated classes for the fastest learners and that the achievement level of such students falls when these classes are not available. Indeed, the argument for providing special classes for the most academically advanced students is currently regaining strength, with the recent emphasis on standardized testing. Results from research on the effects of accelerated classes on the gifted have been positive and significant.

Studied and debated for almost 100 years, ability grouping still elicits controversy. Flexible grouping based on ability in individual subjects can help struggling learners overcome their academic obstacles, allowing them to learn at an appropriate pace, and can challenge the fastest learners. However, tracking students from an early age leads them to very different life destinations and propagates the inequality and injustice that education is meant to help overcome.

Julie L. Rosenthal

See also Academic Standards; Education, Academic Performance; Educational Equity

Further Readings

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ABORTION

Worldwide, some 46 million women have abortions every year. Of these abortions, only slightly more than half are legal, that is, take place under conditions that are medically safe and where neither the woman nor the provider is subject to criminal prosecution. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), about 13 percent of all pregnancy-related deaths, or 78,000, are linked to complications resulting from unsafe abortions.

In the United States, the legalization of abortion occurred in 1973 with the Supreme Court decision

R*oe v. Wade*. After an initial sharp increase in the number of abortions, the abortion rate steadily declined to approximately 21 abortions per 1,000 women age 15 to 44, which amounts to about 1.3 million abortions annually. This rate falls within the norm of developed nations but is higher than in most of Western Europe, where the Netherlands occupies the low end with an abortion rate of about 8 per 1,000 women. Contrary to popular belief, high abortion rates generally do not correlate with low birth rates. On the contrary, both abortion rates and birth rates are high when the rate of pregnancy is high.

The incidence of abortion is not the same across all social groups, however. Currently in the United States, poor women, women of color, and young women are more likely to have an abortion than women who are in a better position to either prevent an unwanted pregnancy or care for an unplanned child. About 6 in 10 women who have abortions are already mothers. The overwhelming number of abortions (90 percent) takes place within the first 12 weeks of gestation, and all but a very small portion take place at clinics wholly or partially devoted to providing abortion services. Only about 13 percent of all counties in the United States currently have at least one abortion provider.

The legalization in 1973 brought abortion to the forefront of the political and legal agendas where it remains, with supporters and opponents embroiled in conflicts over what kind of problem it is and what can and should be done about it. As a result of these conflicts, the legal status of abortion is a constantly shifting patchwork of national and state law and various judicial injunctions. Currently, in 2006, according to state-level information collected by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, 32 states have a counseling requirement; 24 states impose a waiting period on abortion-seeking women; 34 states require notification of the parents of minors who seek abortion; 31 states ban the abortion procedure called "partial-birth" (the legal status of some of these laws is currently uncertain, especially those that make no exception for the woman's health); 32 states allow for public funding of abortion only in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest; 46 states give health care providers the right to refuse participation in abortion services; 13 states restrict insurance coverage of abortion; 13 states allow for the sale of "Choose Life" license plates; and finally, 16 states have laws against various activities directed at abortion providers, including property damage or threats, intimidations, and harassment aimed at doctors, staff, and patients.

What Kind of Problem Is Abortion?

As a social problem, abortion in the United States, as elsewhere, is only marginally related to variations in the incidence of abortion. During the past century and a half, women's reproductive practices, including abortion, have attracted the attention of a wide range of social actors, including medical professionals, politicians, religious groups, legal experts, scientists, women's rights organizations, and various other groups and individuals taking an active interest in the issue. These various groups approach the issue of abortion from different vantage points, identify different aspects of abortion as problematic, pursue different understandings of the causes and consequences of abortion (for the women who have them as well as for society at large), and propose different kinds of solutions. As a result, abortion has long occupied a contentious position in the sociopolitical landscape, uneasily situated in the intersection of medicine, women's rights, and morality.

Abortion as a Medical Problem

Before the 19th century, abortion as a sociolegal problem was bundled together with other practices aimed at escaping the moral stain associated with illicit sexuality, including the concealment of birth, the abandonment of infants, and infanticide. From a legal perspective, however, abortion was punishable only after *quickening*, that is, after women start feeling fetal movements. During the 19th century, a number of factors coalesced to turn abortion into a problem primarily pursued by the medical profession. The 19th-century campaign to professionalize medicine was, in large part, waged as a war against competing health practitioners, including not only midwives, who hitherto had provided reproductive care to women, but also the rapidly expanding ranks of commercial abortion providers. Claiming professional expertise that nonlicensed practitioners lacked, the medical profession effectively medicalized women's reproductive lives, appropriated the service domain previously occupied by midwives, and removed the medically dubious quickening distinction

that had enabled abortion providers to largely operate with legal impunity. The conclusion of this campaign was a drastically changed landscape in which all abortions became illegal except the ones performed by licensed physicians for the purpose of saving a woman's life (the so-called therapeutic exemption), and women's reproductive lives thus fell almost entirely under the purview of professional medicine. Accompanying this reorganization of the medical context surrounding abortion was a reinterpretation of abortion as a social problem. In short, the doctors argued that abortion was no longer a practice exclusive to the unmarried, no longer an act prompted by social desperation, and no longer a practice engaged in by those women who might be considered unsuitable as mothers. Instead, the doctors emphasized, abortion had turned into a fashionable practice among those upon whom the nation depended for its healthy reproduction, in both numerical and moral terms. In this sense, abortion became increasingly viewed as a moral gangrene of sorts, seducing (by its very availability) middle-class women into abandoning their higher purpose as mothers and moral guardians.

With this definition firmly in place, abortion fell out of the public spotlight and survived for the next several decades primarily as a clandestine and largely invisible practice that operated under the legal radar save for a few widely publicized scandals involving illegal abortion rings. When opposition against restrictive abortion regulations began to mount in the 1950s and 1960s, the impetus for reform was once again spearheaded by doctors and other professionals. Formulated as a set of reforms aimed at bringing the abortion law into greater conformity with modern medical and psychiatric standards, this pressure led to relatively uncontroversial legal reform in at least a dozen states years before *Roe v. Wade.* These laws expanded the grounds for legal abortion somewhat (rape, incest, mental and physical health), but the authority to make abortion decisions remained with the medical profession. This authority effectively ended when the Supreme Court ruled in *Roe v. Wade* that the abortion decision rested with the woman, not her doctor. Since then, the position of organized medicine toward abortion has been ambivalent, even as some of its members have long occupied vulnerable frontline positions in the abortion conflict as service providers.

Abortion as a Problem of Women's Rights

Abortion as a problem of women's rights also has deep historical roots, even if abortion itself was a latecomer to the bundle of issues that women's rights activists long pursued under the rubric of gender equality. The women's rights pioneers of the 19th century, without directly confronting pregnancy and birth, pushed for an expansion of women's social and political roles beyond the confines of the home, thus challenging the widespread assumption that motherhood was destiny and, therefore, that womanhood was incompatible with the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities associated with manhood and full citizenship. The call for "voluntary motherhood" during this time did not encompass a call for reproductive freedom in the modern sense. Instead, it was a response to the proliferation of illicit sexuality among men (expressed in prostitution and the spread of venereal diseases), which was perceived as a threat to the integrity of the family and women's place therein. In the early 20th century, the birth control movement more directly confronted women's efforts at controlling their own reproductive lives but did so without including abortion among the birth control practices they sought to make available to women. Nonetheless, the emphasis on planned parenthood placed reproductive control at the center of women's liberation as well as the well-being of the nation more generally. What the abortion rights movement added to these earlier movements was a reformulation of the foundation upon which women's reproductive agency rested: Whereas motherhood had been a powerful platform of earlier activists and a justification for expanded social and political influence, the abortion rights movement, precisely because it emphasized that motherhood was a choice rather than an inevitable conclusion of womanhood, helped sever the link between women's rights and women's roles as mothers.

When the movement gained political momentum during the 1960s, there was growing recognition that the prohibition against abortion not only was ineffective but also placed women at a distinct health disadvantage precisely because abortion was illegal and therefore often medically unsafe. While the medical solution to the problem of illegal abortion was a modest expansion of the grounds for legal abortion, advocates of women's rights offered a much more profound reinterpretation of abortion. Abortion, they

argued, was not a medical problem to be solved by doctors once they were convinced that women really "needed" them, but instead a collective problem impacting all women. Abortion, in short, was part of a much larger problem of women's rights and, therefore, political at its very core. Hence, according to this movement, only if the abortion decision was placed in the hands of women could the problem ever be solved; that is, women needed full authority over the abortion decision *irrespective* of their reasons.

The tension around abortion as an unconstrained choice captures the fundamental disagreements over motherhood—and, by extension, gender roles—that have permeated the abortion conflict since the early 19th century. These disagreements, then as now, focus less on the extent to which women in fact have abortions than on the extent to which women's reasons for having abortions are justifiable or not.

Abortion as a Moral Problem

Abortion as a moral problem has roots in a traditional religious-based morality that, before the contemporary abortion conflict, constituted a blend of concerns for sexual morality and the sanctity of motherhood. Although the moral force of these concerns eroded somewhat as women's social status underwent an irrevocable transformation, traces still remain of these concerns in the tensions around the meanings of motherhood that permeate much of the abortion conflict. Thus the opposition to abortion, although currently mobilized most overtly around fetal life, captures an amalgam of larger social concerns that broaden the social base of the opposition movement from religious leaders who derive their position from a theological perspective to grassroots activists, many of whom are women, who find justification for their opposition in the circumstances of their own personal and political lives.

The contemporary movement against abortion emerged out of Catholic opposition to the reform movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s but has since expanded to include a range of religious congregations and groups with more or less strong ties to organized religion. Initially mobilized under the rubric of *Right to Life,* this opposition formulated its objection to abortion around the loss of human life and, once *Roe v. Wade* became the law of the land, mounted a vigorous campaign with a multi-institutional focus aimed at (a) undermining public support for women's right to choose, (b) making it increasingly difficult for women to obtain abortion, and (c) once again outlawing abortion. The emphasis on fetal life, in conjunction with a vision of the abortion-seeking woman as freely choosing abortion, has contributed to the "clash of absolutes" that now defines much of the contemporary abortion conflict. In this view, which is quite specific to the U.S. case, abortion is wrong precisely because it involves the deliberate destruction of the most innocent of human lives by a woman who claims it is her right to do so. Thus, from the perspective of the pro-life movement, the relationship between the fetus and the woman sustaining it is potentially adversarial, and, accordingly, the ultimate solution to the problem lies not in efforts to reduce women's abortion needs but instead in prohibition and moral instruction.

Although *Roe v. Wade* still stands, its foundation has eroded, through the courts of law as well as the court of public opinion, by the many challenges launched by this opposition, even if the extreme end of the pro-life position—that abortion is tantamount to murder and hence always wrong—has attracted relatively few adherents among the public at large. Nevertheless, given the emphasis on fetal life, even the expansion of a right to abortion in cases of pregnancy that result from rape or incest is met with tension and ambivalence in some pro-life circles, where sympathy for a woman's suffering is outweighed by concerns for the fetus. When carrying a pregnancy to term would threaten a woman's life or health, the life of the fetus is pitted against the life and well-being of the mother. A similar tension, albeit with very different ingredients, accompanies violent protest tactics, especially the murder of abortion providers in the name of the pro-life cause. While most mainstream pro-life groups distance themselves from such extreme tactics, the moral dilemma they reveal—whose life is more important and why—is central to the definition of abortion as a social problem.

Annulla Linders

See also Contraception; Eugenics; Neo-Malthusians; Religion and Politics; Sex Education; Social Movements; Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting; Women's Rights Movement

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Abuse, Child

The term *child abuse* refers to the multiple ways in which children are victimized by the willful or negligent actions of adults. The abusive victimization of children includes three broad categories of harm: (1) caretaker neglect of children's health and well-being, (2) acts of physical violence by adults against children, and (3) sexual violations of young people's psychic and physical boundaries before "the age of consent" to sex, established by the cultural and legal norms of a given society.

Child abuse is commonly viewed today as a troubling social problem. It is combated by legal punishments, therapeutic interventions, and social reforms. But, from a historical perspective, it is important to recognize that for centuries Western societies ignored, and even authorized and defended, routine assaults by adults upon children. This was particularly the case for harm done to children by their "God given" or legal guardians. Indeed, until recently, according to the patriarchal precepts of ancient Roman law and the common law traditions of Britain and the United States, parents and legal guardians were granted almost limitless power over children placed under their authority. This meant that legal guardians had the right to impose any punishment deemed necessary for a child's upbringing. At the same time, children—even those targeted by severe acts of physical violence—had virtually no rights to protect them against harsh and excessive sanctions of abusive caretakers. As late as the early 19th century, despite a proliferation of all kinds of punishment against alleged social wrongdoings, there existed no formal laws aimed at stemming the caretaker abuse of children. During this time, a major North Carolina court ruled, in the case of *State v. Pendergrass*, that a parent's judgment concerning a child's "need for punishment" was presumed to be correct and that criminal liability was limited to cases resulting in "permanent injury."

Despite the "child saving" efforts of several generations of 19th- and early 20th-century reformers, the precarious legal position of children changed little until the early 1960s. Noteworthy among the relative failures of child reform efforts were the House of Refuge Movement, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (an organization occasioned by the widely publicized 1875 case of "Mary Ellen," a 9-year-old girl viciously assaulted by her foster parents), and the early years of the juvenile court. Despite an abundance of pro-child rhetoric, these early attempts at "child saving" contributed more to strategies of "preventive penology" than to actually curtailing the abusive power of adults over children. As a strategy of social control, preventive penology sought to reduce crime and social unrest by removing delinquency-prone youths from corrupt urban environments and improper homes. Those removed from their homes were placed in public or privately funded child reformatories. Public intervention against abusive adults lagged by comparison. In truth, it was not until the early 1960s that laws were placed on the books against caretaker assaults upon children. These laws resulted from publicity surrounding the "discovery" of the so-called child battering syndrome by pediatric radiologists and their medical allies, pediatricians and child mental health specialists.

The historical "discovery" of child abuse by mid-20th-century pediatric radiologists is a complex and contradictory matter. It suggests as much about the power dynamics of organized medical interests as it does about social concerns for child welfare. Before child abuse was labeled as an illness by pediatric

radiologists, numerous factors may have prevented physicians from both "seeing" and reporting child abuse. Of particular significance were (a) the lack of an available diagnostic category to guide physician judgments; (b) doctors' complicity with dominant cultural norms that paired parental power with images of benevolence, making it difficult for physicians to believe that parents could be responsible for deliberate injuries to their children; (c) fears of legal liability for violating physician–patient relations; and (d) reluctance on the part of the medical establishment to subordinate its clinical expertise to the power of police officers, lawyers, judges, and other agents of the criminal justice system.

Pediatric radiologists were less constrained than other medical professionals by such obstacles. Radiologists were research oriented and gained prominence by discovering new categories of pathology and disease. Unlike clinicians, they were less hampered in their observations of childhood injuries by a lack of existing diagnostic classifications. Removed from direct clinical contact with battered children and their parents, radiologists studied black-and-white X-rays. This made pediatric radiologists less susceptible to denials of parental responsibility rooted in normative or emotional identification with parents. Because their primary clients were doctor colleagues requesting their services, radiologists were also less afraid of betraying patient confidentiality. In addition, until "discovering" child battering, pediatric radiology represented a relatively low-ranking specialty within the medical profession. High-ranking medical specialties were characterized by hands-on life-or-death contact with patients. By engaging with the life-or-death exigencies of caretaker violence, while defining abuse as primarily an illness or syndrome in need of medical treatment, pediatric radiologists were able to move upward within the ranks of the medical profession without compromising medical control over an alleged form of sickness.

Beginning in 1946 with Dr. John Caffey's observations about the "unspecified origins" of various long bone fractures in children, over the next decade pediatric radiologists moved from speculations about the mysterious physiological basis of childhood bone and skeletal traumas to something more troubling. Caffey, like other doctors, had attributed injuries he observed in children to nebulous causes. But by 1957 he had become convinced that parental "misconduct and deliberate injury" lay behind the horrific bone fractures pictured on X-ray screens. Breaking a code of cultural silence concerning violent parental and caretaker behavior, Caffey and other pediatric radiologists joined with pediatricians and child psychiatrists in drawing attention to a new public health menace—*the child-battering syndrome.*

Public response to the medical "discovery" of child abuse was swift and far-reaching. Over the following 10 years, a multitude of professional conferences, newspaper and magazine articles, and sensational media reports directed attention to this new social problem. As a result, between 1962 and 1966 all 50 U.S. states passed laws aimed against caretaker violence. Many laws included mandatory reporting requirements for doctors, educators, and others in regular contact with children. Researchers also labored to survey the scope and causes of child battering. Although plagued by methodological problems concerning the reliability of reports and how to best measure degrees of abuse, studies estimated that more than 1.5 million U.S. children were seriously abused by adult caretakers each year. Data presented by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for 2004 indicate 3 million alleged and 872,000 confirmed incidents of serious abuse. This includes an estimated 1,490 deaths of children at the hands of caretakers.

Researchers have identified a number of factors that appear to increase the likelihood of a child being abused. It is important to recognize that what is known today about child abuse is, for the most part, based on relatively small samples of known offenders. As such, while providing a suggestive picture of conditions contributing to the likelihood of abuse, current knowledge remains tentative and awaits refinement. Moreover, while no single factor is viewed as causative by itself, one thing appears clear: There is little empirical support for the medicalized image of parental violence as a supposed disease or "syndrome." More important are sociological factors affecting the caretaker–child relationship. Of these, the most consistently recognized are (a) stressful social, economic, and emotional situations; (b) the relative powerlessness of the family unit involved (a factor that may lead disadvantaged adults to search for distorted forms of power in violent relations with children); and (c) the prevalence of powerful cultural norms legitimizing the authoritative use of violence as a means of childrearing.

Stress is particularly important in creating a social environment conducive to abuse. Stressful living

situations also amplify the impact of other conditions associated with a higher likelihood of abuse. These include low family income; the presence of premature, unwanted, or handicapped children; families with four or more children; and families headed by single mothers employed in low-paying jobs outside the home. Other factors identified as amplifying the likelihood of abuse are the social isolation of abusive families, unrealistic parental expectations for a child's performance, a parent's own experience of having been abused as a child, and inconsistencies in caretaker approaches to discipline. Together, these factors combine with situations of stress, powerlessness, and cultural support for authoritarian childrearing in making caretaker violence against children more likely.

To combat the routine abuse of children by adults, it is necessary to go beyond existing legal and therapeutic efforts to punish or rehabilitate known offenders. It is important to also uproot deeply entrenched ways of living that amplify stress and reinforce social inequality and to lessen cultural support for violence as a solution to everyday feelings of frustration. Without realizing far-reaching social changes in these areas, it is likely that the tragedy of child abuse will continue to haunt society long into the future.

Stephen Pfohl

See also Abuse, Child Sexual

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Abuse, Child Sexual

Child sexual abuse refers to adult sexual contact with children under the legal age of consent. Whereas caretaker neglect and physical violence against children became major social problems during the 1960s, the sexual violation of children by adults became a focus for public concern from the 1970s to the present. In large measure, this resulted from attention generated by feminist activists and scholars concerned with the psychic and physical well-being of young people reared within sexist or male-dominated social environments. Whereas some non-Western societies permit, or even foster, limited ritual sexual contact between adults and young people, in contemporary Western society nearly all forms of sexual interaction between adults and children are thought of as harmful to children, even when children are said to consent to acts of sex with adults. This is because children are materially, socially, and emotionally dependent upon adult caretakers and, as such, are viewed as never entirely free to choose sex with adults who hold power over them. Thus, in the United States and other Western countries, it is a violation of criminal law for adults to engage sexually with youth below the age of 16, with or without a child's consent.

Although illegal, adult sexual relations with children are not entirely uncommon. Data analyzed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services indicate that 10 percent of approximately 3 million cases of alleged child abuse reported in 2004 involved violations of a sexual nature. This figure rose to 16 percent of all reported cases of abuse when considering children ages 12 to 16. While the most damaging forms of child sexual abuse involve coercion and rape, statistically speaking, far more typical are nonviolent, noncoital sexual exchanges between a child and an adult known to the child. Three quarters of all known cases of child sexual abuse involve offenders who were friends or neighbors of a victim's families. Surveys of college students report even higher

findings, with 11.3 percent of women and 4.1 percent of men reporting having had sex with an adult (18 years or older) while they were under age 13. When sexual abuse or "incest" takes place within the family, surveys indicate that about three quarters of the time the offender is an adult relative, while about one quarter of those surveyed report sexual contact with a father or stepfather. Unfortunately, much of what is known about childhood sexual abuse is based on small clinical studies and surveys of middle-class and mostly white college populations. There is also considerable variation in the estimated incidence of child sexual abuse, although most researchers agree that the vast majority of perpetrators are males and that young women are about 4 times more likely to be victimized than young men.

Many victims of child sexual abuse experience long-lasting bodily and emotional problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder, sleeplessness, depression, eating and anxiety disorders, and difficulties in later establishing meaningful adult sexual relations. Since the mid-1980s, concern with these problems has been amplified by sensational media coverage of father–daughter incest, as well as the sexual abuse of children by educators and coaches in schools and day care centers and by priests and ministers in churches. Dramatic cases of child abduction by strangers and equally dramatic, although often undocumented, reports of ritual and satanic abuse have also fueled public fears. Sometimes reports of abuse are shrouded in controversy. This is particularly the case with regard to "recovered memories" of traumatic sexual violations said to have occurred in the distant past. In such cases, awareness of abuse is said to be repressed until brought to consciousness by suggestive therapeutic techniques, such as hypnotic regression or trance-like imaging.

Although debates surrounding the use of suggestive clinical procedures have raised questions about the verifiable character of some therapeutically "recovered memories," what researchers do know about childhood sexual abuse challenges stereotypes about the prevalence of anonymous child molesters—"dirty old men" who seduce children away from playgrounds with promises of candy, money, or adventure. Although the dangers presented by such predatory pedophiles are real, the likelihood of a child being molested by a stranger pales in comparison with the chance of being sexually abused by a trusted authority figure, male parent, relative, neighbor, or close friend of the family.

What causes adults to impose themselves sexually upon children? In asking this question it is important to remember that there is neither a single profile of types of abuse nor of abusers. Research shows that the most common form of father/stepfather and daughter incest involves situations where an adult male becomes overly dependent on a child for emotional warmth or affection absent in adult world relations. A far smaller number of offenders manifest pedophiliac sexual desires for children, regardless of whether they are related to or emotionally invested in the child. But when considering the wider sexual molestation of children by caretakers, factors affecting other (nonsexual) forms of child abuse also appear relevant. Of particular concern, however, is the equation of sex with power in a society in which dominant forms of both sex and power are governed by the prerogatives of adult males over both women and children. In combination with gender norms that teach women and girls to be nurturing, while instructing men and boys to aggressively assert power, it is no surprise that rates of child sexual victimization remain alarmingly high. In addition, other stresses, such as relative powerlessness in other social realms, may lead adults into what researchers call isolating and "symbiotic" dependence upon their children for affection, warmth, and even sexual gratification. The eroticization of images of children in mass media and consumer society also may be a factor.

Effectively countering the sexual abuse of children will probably require society-wide efforts that reach beyond the targeting of offenders by the criminal justice and mental health systems. To combat the sexual exploitation of children by adults, it may be necessary to also dramatically alter dominant social norms pertaining to gender and sexuality and to reduce the relative powerlessness that adults—particularly adult men—may experience as a result of high levels of stress and social inequality. Without realizing such far-reaching social and cultural changes, it is likely that the sexual abuse of children will remain a social problem well into the future.

Stephen Pfohl

See also Abuse, Child

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Abuse, Elderly

Awareness of elder abuse as a social problem has increased in recent years because of attention to the identification of those who are likely to be abused. As the elderly population in the United States and around the world increases, a greater number will be dependent on others for their care. By 2010 approximately 46.6 percent of the aged will be 75 years of age or over. Also by 2050, more than 55 percent of the aged are projected to be 75 years of age or older.

Definition and Classifications

Broadly defined, elder abuse is the adverse commission or omission of acts against an elderly person. Elder abuse can assume varied forms, including physical, psychological, financial, and sexual abuse as well as neglect.

Physical abuse is the nonaccidental infliction of physical force that results in body injury, pain, or impairment. Physical abuse acts include bruising, punching, restraining, sexually molesting, or force-feeding.

Psychological or emotional abuse is any willful conduct that causes mental or emotional anguish. Examples include verbal or nonverbal insults, intimidating, humiliating, isolating, or threatening harm.

Financial or material abuse refers to the unauthorized or improper exploitation of funds, property, assets, or any resources of an older person. Such acts include stealing money, changing will content, or cashing the elder's social security check.

Sexual abuse involves nonconsensual sexual or intimate contact or exposure of any kind with an older person. Family members, institutional employees, and friends can commit sexual abuse.

Neglect is the deliberate failure or refusal of a caretaker to fulfill his or her obligation to provide for the elder person's basic needs. Examples include denial of food, clothing, or health care items such as eyeglasses, hearing aids, or false teeth; abandoning the elderly for long periods; and preventing safe housing.

Self-abuse or self-neglect is abusive or neglectful behavior of an older person directed at himself or herself that compromises or threatens his or her health or safety. Self-abuse mostly results from the elder person's failure or inability to provide for his or her basic needs, despite being considered legally competent.

Sources of Elder Abuse

Major sources of elder abuse can be categorized as institutional, societal, and familial.

Institutional sources would be intentional or unintentional adverse actions and negative attitudes from professionals, such as workers in nursing homes, physicians, nurses, psychologists, and social workers. Institutional abuses are activities that are not in the best interest of the elderly.

Societal sources are thinking of old age in negative ways, stereotypes, discrimination, and ageism. Society has contributed to the transformation of aging from a natural process into a social problem. Elders can be, for example, targets of job discrimination when seeking employment and promotion.

Familial sources involve families and may be referred to as domestic elder abuse. Familial elder abuse results from increased levels of stress and frustration among caregivers. Caregivers with substance abuse problems and limited resources frequently face

problems in caring for older members and have higher rates of abuse.

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See also Ageism; Domestic Violence; Family; Family, Dysfunctional; Family, Extended; Violence

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Abuse, Intimate Partner

Intimate partner violence (IPV), or abuse, generally refers to violence involving spouses, ex-spouses, and boyfriends or girlfriends and exes. Other phrases sometimes used include wife battering, wife abuse, intimate terrorism, and spousal violence. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define IPV as

> the intentional use of physical force with the potential for causing death, disability, injury, or harm. Physical violence includes, but is not limited to, scratching; pushing; shoving; throwing; grabbing; biting; choking; shaking; slapping; punching; burning; use of a weapon; and use of restraints or one's body, size, or strength against another person.

Estimates of Intimate Partner Violence

Because IPV is usually more private and hidden compared with other violence, its magnitude remains in dispute. The stigma often attached to intimate partner violence, fear of retaliation from the perpetrators, and numerous other safety concerns make estimating incidence rates difficult.

Fatal Violence: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Supplementary Homicide Reports reveal that homicides between ex-spouses and boyfriends and girlfriends remained relatively stable from 1976 through 2005. During this same time, homicides between married couples significantly declined through 2001 but have remained relatively stable since then. Although the overall number of women and men murdered by their intimate partners decreased during the past few decades, this decrease was more significant for males killed by their intimate partners than for female victims. Overall, women are much more likely to be killed by their intimate partners than are men.

Nonfatal Violence: Relying on such reports as the FBI Uniform Crime Reports or the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to estimate nonfatal incidence of IPV is problematic because a high percentage of victims never report these crimes to police. Typically, IPV researchers and policymakers rely on nationally representative surveys to monitor its magnitude. The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, is the only ongoing survey that monitors IPV on an annual basis. To measure IPV incidents, the NCVS cues respondents to think of victimizations perpetrated by "a neighbor or friend, someone at work or school, or a family member," rather than specifically asking respondents about incidents perpetrated by intimate partners such as spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends.

NCVS data indicate that, on average, females are assaulted by intimate partners at a rate of 6.4 per 1,000 every year compared with a rate of 1.1 for their male counterparts. This translates into more than 1 million females age 12 and older violently attacked by their intimate partners annually.

The National Violence Against Women and Men Survey (NVAWMS) asked respondents in 1995 about assaults they experienced as children and as adults, using specific screening questions about incidents of pushing, grabbing or shoving, pulling hair, slapping, hitting, and so forth. In addition to being asked about strangers or known offenders, respondents also were asked about victimizations perpetrated by all possible types of intimate or ex-intimate partners. The NVAWMS obtained higher annual rates of IPV than the NCVS: a rate of 13 per 1,000 women age 18 and over and a rate of 9 per 1,000 adult men. Significantly, this survey also examined how many women and men experienced violent attacks in their adult lives, with over 1 in 5 (22 percent) of women and 7.4 percent of men reporting an assault by an intimate partner. Similar to homicide victimization, then, both the

NCVS and the NVAWMS indicate that females are more likely than males to experience nonfatal IPV.

Several factors contributed to the higher incidence rates obtained by the NVAWMS compared with the NCVS, including behaviorally specific questions, specific relationship cues regarding intimate partners, and the noncrime context of the survey. Thus, the ways in which people are asked about their victimization experiences significantly impact the number of people reporting this violence. Regardless of estimates used, however, intimate partner violence is a significant problem. For all too many women, their partner poses a greater risk for serious harm and death than does the stranger on the street.

Ronet Bachman and Margaret Leigey

See also National Crime Victimization Survey; Uniform Crime Report; Violence

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Abuse, Sibling

Sibling abuse can be defined as inappropriate behavior among siblings related by marriage, blood, adoption, or living arrangement. This conduct constitutes any behaviors that are not considered age or developmentally appropriate. Sibling abuse usually falls in one of three categories: inappropriate sexual behavior or contact, acts of violence or aggression, or psychological maltreatment. These three forms of abuse are not mutually exclusive: Any combination of the three can be found in a sibling abusive relationship. The general assumption is that psychological maltreatment precedes other forms of abuse and often sets the stage for abuse to occur.

Sibling sexual abuse may be defined as a compulsive inappropriate sexual activity toward a sibling extending over a period of time. It may include, but is not limited to, sexual touching, fondling, indecent exposure, attempted penetration, intercourse, rape, sodomy, or any other inappropriate sexual contact. Physical abuse involves repeated acts of aggression toward a sibling that have a high potential for causing injury and are committed with the intention of inflicting harm. These acts could include, but are not limited to, such things as hitting, punching, slapping, or other, more serious life-threatening assaults or violence. Psychological maltreatment, more commonly known as emotional abuse, may involve, but is not restricted to, name-calling, intimidation, ridicule, destruction of property, teasing, rejecting, terrorizing, isolating, corrupting, or denying emotional responsiveness or any acts done with the intention of creating an atmosphere of humiliation.

Minimization of sibling abuse is common and a primary reason why so little is known about this phenomenon. Precursors to sibling abuse are often minimized as behaviors common to age, gender, or both. For example, with regard to sibling sexual abuse, sexual exploration is one of the main precursors to abuse. Likewise, parental unavailability is a widespread family systemic factor contributing to sibling abuse. When parental figures are emotionally or physically absent, there can be an increased motivation to offend. A common instance in which sibling abuse takes place is in situations where siblings are placed in the role of caretaker.

Sibling abuse, not unlike other forms of abuse, may have a significant impact on the victim's psychological health, stability, or both, for many years to come. Sibling abuse victims can experience various forms of mental health and interpersonal issues. Sibling abuse has the potential to increase both a victim's vulnerability to revictimization and an offender's tendency toward more offending behaviors in the future. Recognizing the common warning signs of sibling abuse can effectively help educators and health care

practitioners identify abusive situations. Knowledge about the warning signs and behavior precursors to abuse will aid in prevention and treatment as well. Increasing the functionality of the family system by adhering to the mental, physical, and emotional needs of the children can create an atmosphere that fosters successful prevention of sibling abuse.

Shamla L. McLaurin

See also Abuse, Child; Abuse, Child Sexual; Family, Dysfunctional; Violence

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Academic Standards

Setting high academic standards is a key component in the drive to achieve educational equality today. However, academic standards cannot be separated from the environments in which they exist—in classrooms, schools, districts, and states and nationwide. One important factor in the call for academic standards is political pressure related to the position of the United States in the global society as well as the need to strengthen what the 1983 report *A Nation at Risk* called "the intellectual, moral, and spiritual strengths of our people which knit together the very fabric of our society." A review of the recent history of academic standards reforms is important in understanding how this movement relates to both assessment and standardized curriculum.

Among other reforms, *A Nation at Risk* called for "more rigorous and measurable standards." This early call for academic standards at both collegiate and precollegiate levels was linked to assessment as well as higher curricular expectations. Although the call for academic standards was nationwide, the efforts toward reform were focused within the schools themselves.

In 1994, Congress passed the Goals 2000: Educate America Act, further refining the demand to increase academic standards in U.S. schools. Among other things, Goals 2000 set specific, measurable academic standards, particularly in mathematics and science. Higher academic performance was to be achieved via the development of "voluntary national" content and performance standards. The act encouraged states to become more actively involved in setting performance standards (assessment) while defining content standards nationally. Needless to say, it was easier for states to develop performance standards than it was for diverse groups of individuals to agree on the content of material to be taught in schools. Only content standards for mathematics were established, and even those were debated vigorously.

In 2001, the No Child Left Behind educational reform effort called for increased accountability based upon "state standards in reading and mathematics." As with the two preceding reform efforts, it embedded academic standards in the curriculum, generating an even stronger reliance on assessment under the No Child Left Behind Act. State governments must establish criteria (standardized testing) that the federal government approves, with the explicit end result being either success or failure. Although No Child Left Behind is a national reform effort, the criteria for academic standards vary considerably across states. Thus, while this push toward academic standards is embedded in the curriculum, with a standardized test labeling the school as succeeding or failing, pressure for student success can translate into teaching to tests.

The call for higher academic standards changed over the years as various reform efforts shaped the criteria for setting the curriculum and assessment of academic standards. Colleges and universities, while encouraged to develop higher academic standards beginning with *A Nation at Risk*, have not yet had to conduct rigorous national assessments of curricula. The push for higher academic standards in elementary and secondary education, however, has moved beyond the classroom and schools and is currently embedded in state and national assessment.

Joan Z. Spade

See also Charter Schools; Education, Academic Performance; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; School Vouchers; Social Promotions

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Accidents, Automobile

An automobile accident is defined as a crash that occurs between an automobile and another automobile, human, animal, or fixed object. Automobile accidents are also commonly called traffic collisions, traffic crashes, motor vehicle collisions, and motor vehicle crashes. Among the professionals who aim to reduce the number of traffic crashes and related injuries, use of the word *accident* is often debated as the term suggests that such events are unexpected and unpreventable.

Traffic crashes are a major public safety problem; overall, they are the leading cause of death by injury in the United States. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reports that in 2005, there were almost 6.16 million police-reported crashes, 2.7 million injuries, and 43,443 deaths. Injuries that result from traffic crashes are the leading cause of death to individuals ages 1 through 34 and are the leading contributor to years of life lost due to premature death, surpassing heart disease, cancer, AIDS, and stroke. A 2000 NHTSA report estimated the cost of U.S. traffic crashes at over $230.6 billion annually.

Globally, traffic safety is a rising concern. The World Health Organization projects that by 2020, road traffic injuries and deaths will be the third most important contributor to global health problems, up from ninth in 2000. Eighty-five percent of the traffic deaths around the world occur to pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists in low- and middle-income countries. More than half of these fatalities occur among younger, able-bodied adults; the economic cost of these fatalities to these countries is estimated at $65 billion each year.

Who Is at Risk?

Some populations may be overrepresented in the crash data because of behaviors associated with greater risks or may be overrepresented in injury data because they are less protected in some way. Such vulnerable populations include children, teenagers, older adults, communities of color, and nonmotorized road users (pedestrians and bicyclists).

Child passenger safety seats are key to protecting infants and children from motor vehicle injury. Because of their size and level of physical development, children are extremely vulnerable to injury and fatality as unrestrained passengers. Infants and toddlers are 4 times more likely to be unrestrained with an unrestrained driver than with a restrained driver. Even with the increase in car and booster seat use, many child safety seats are not installed properly.

Per population, the crash involvement rate of teen drivers is higher than that of any other age group. Issues related to human development, personality, peer influence, driving experience, and demographics all contribute to risk. New research in brain development shows that development of the prefrontal cortex, responsible for executive decision making, is not complete until the early 20s. Graduated driver licensing shows promise in reducing the teen crash rate, as do laws targeting underage drinking and driving and enforcing restricted alcohol sales to minors.

Although injury and fatality rates decline dramatically after young adulthood, they begin to rise again in older adulthood. Older adults face more severe injury risk in traffic crashes and are more likely to die from injuries. Some skills (vision, cognition, and sensory motor skills) important for safe driving may decline with the aging process, although age is not a predictor of driving skills and not all older adults experience a decline in skills that affect safe driving. As a percentage of the population, older drivers are least likely to be involved in motor vehicle crashes. However, per mile driven, older drivers have a higher rate of crash involvement. This is an increasing problem, as older adults comprise the fastest-growing age group in the United States. The National Center for Injury Prevention and Control reports that by 2020, there will be more than 40 million older licensed drivers.

In addition to varying across age groups, collision involvement differs by ethnicity. Collision rates are higher among Latinos/as, African Americans, and Native Americans than among whites and Asians.

Safety belt compliance, higher rates of impaired driving, and higher rates of pedestrian injury and fatality have been found to occur disproportionately among communities of color. These racial disparities are partially correlated with lower socioeconomic status and may be partially due to the confluence of many factors, including language and culture barriers, mistrust of law enforcement, insufficient knowledge of relevant laws, and the increased likelihood of rural residence. Focus groups and other research have identified culturally appropriate and sensitive educational materials geared toward special populations. This will be integral in reducing racial disparities in traffic safety.

Pedestrians and bicyclists, in particular, face hazards on the streets. Pedestrian deaths account for just over 11 percent of the country's traffic fatalities. Walking or riding a bicycle reduces road congestion, air pollution, and global climate change and offers other health benefits. However, pedestrians and cyclists frequently encounter problems with a road infrastructure designed primarily for motor vehicles, thereby creating greater risks. Unfortunately, creating reliable estimates of pedestrian accident rates is impossible without adequate information about pedestrian exposure (e.g., how many people walk, how many miles people walk). Currently, no widespread systematic and accessible method exists to estimate pedestrian exposure.

Addressing the Problem

Many traffic crashes result from poor driver behavior. Driving while distracted, driving while under the influence, and speeding are among the leading driver behaviors contributing to traffic crashes. In recent years, alcohol involvement was a factor in about 40 percent of fatal motor vehicle crashes and driver inattention in at least 25 percent of police-reported crashes. In 2004, speeding was a contributing factor in 30 percent of fatal crashes.

Effective in reducing alcohol-related crashes are policies addressing drinking and driving, such as legal blood alcohol content limits set at .08 percent, license suspension laws, minimum drinking age laws, monitoring retail compliance with regard to sales to minors, vehicle impounding, and ignition interlock systems. Besides interventions to prevent crashes by targeting driving behavior, other efforts seek to reduce the effects of traffic crashes through safety devices. One of the most common devices, the seat belt, has a substantial effect on survivability in a crash. The NHTSA reported in 2004 that seat belts saved 15,434 lives. Rates of seat belt use vary among states but climbed between 1975 and 2004 in every state, most dramatically in states with laws requiring seat belt use.

At the national level, the NHTSA has led a sustained effort over the past few decades to reduce traffic crashes and subsequent injuries and death, resulting in greatly increased use of occupant restraints, decreased alcohol-related injuries and fatalities, and a reduction in the death rate per million miles traveled.

Need for a Systematic Approach

Expertise in transportation engineering, enforcement, city planning, public health, policy, and other relevant professions is critical to meeting the nation's complex traffic safety challenges. Reducing the toll that traffic injury takes on society requires a committed and comprehensive approach that covers education, engineering, enforcement, and environmental modifications. A critical element of injury prevention is to reach out to vulnerable populations by tailoring messages and programs to fit specific groups and their cultural norms, backgrounds, and experiences.

A systematic approach to traffic safety that addresses human behavior, vehicle design, and roadway design as interacting approaches to preventing traffic crashes and injury is needed. Cross-training and interdisciplinary work is central. For example, law enforcement must understand how data related to injuries and fatalities can inform formation and enforcement of traffic safety laws. Engineers must understand where and how injuries occur so that they can design roadways that are safe for drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and bicyclists. Planners must understand the traffic safety issues in land use decisions. Teachers and social service professionals need to know how alcohol and other drugs affect driving behavior.

One way of organizing the diverse approaches to traffic safety is in terms of the Haddon matrix, developed by William Haddon, the first director of the NHTSA. The matrix is a tool for describing opportunities for where and when to conduct traffic safety interventions. The Haddon matrix looks at injuries in terms of causal and contributing factors by examining the factors of the driver, the vehicle, and the highway, as well as time phases before a potential vehicle

collision ("pre-crash"), during the vehicle collision ("crash"), and after the collision ("post-crash").

The value of the Haddon matrix is that each cell illustrates a different area in which to mount interventions to improve traffic safety. Intervention designs that apply to the pre-crash phase can reduce the number of collisions. Interventions that apply to the crash phase do not stop the crash, but they reduce the number or severity of injuries that occur as a result. Interventions that apply to the post-crash phase do not stop the initial crash or the injury from occurring, but they optimize the outcome for people with injuries.

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See also Drunk Driving; Traffic Congestion

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ACCOMMODATION

See PLURALISM

ACCULTURATION

Acculturation remains a significant issue in a diverse society. It refers to the process of cultural exchanges as a result of continuous firsthand contact among cultural groups. The primary focus lies in the change occurring among minority group members, particularly immigrants, after adopting the cultural features of the majority group. Change may occur in beliefs, values, behavioral practices, languages, or all of these.

Perspectives

Historically, acculturation is conceptualized with a one-dimensional approach. That is to say, individuals must lose cultural traits of their own group to gain characteristics from other groups for adaptation. This approach fits into the larger picture of the straight line model of assimilation. This model maps the process of assimilation in a linear fashion wherein immigrants relinquish their own ethnic culture before taking on (presumably) more beneficial host cultural behaviors. In a series of stages, immigrants first predominantly retain their own ethnic cultures, and as contacts with host society increase, they enter a stage where aspects of the two cultures combine. Finally, the host culture overwhelms the ethnic culture, and immigrants come to full adoption of the host culture.

The unidimensional perspective on acculturation makes an important assumption that ethnic culture and host culture are mutually exclusive. However, contemporary theorists on acculturation challenge this assumption. Instead, these theorists view acculturation as multifaceted, such that ethnic culture and host culture exist on different dimensions. This perspective believes immigrants have the ability to retain some of their ethnic practices and, at the same time, adopt other aspects of the host society's culture.

Acculturation and Assimilation

Many observers often equated acculturation with assimilation in public discourse and in earlier assimilation theory until 1964, when Milton Gordon eliminated this confusion and provided a systematic dissection of the assimilation concept. In his conceptual scheme, acculturation is only one aspect of assimilation, sometimes called cultural assimilation, and it is the first step toward full assimilation. In his formulation, Gordon made a critical distinction between acculturation and what he called "structural assimilation," by which he meant the entry of members of a minority group into primary-group relationships with the majority group. The primary group relationship refers to institutions or associations such as social clubs and cliques. Because discrimination and

avoidance responses often lead to exclusion of immigrants and even the second generation, structural assimilation is slower than acculturation. Whereas acculturation is an inevitable outcome resulting from continuous contact between ethnic and majority groups, structural assimilation is not, because it requires new members to move out of their own groups or associations into the equivalent associations of the host society, which may not necessarily happen.

Gordon and other assimilation theorists view acculturation as one-directional, meaning that members of an ethnic group adopt the culture of the majority group. This largely fits the reality of the old era of immigration where Anglo-American culture clearly constituted the societal mainstream. Now, as U.S. society becomes more diverse and the demographic proportion of the earlier majority group shrinks, the boundaries of group cultural differences often get blurred. For example, children of immigrant families typically acculturate to the dominant culture and the immigrant culture; therefore, both cultures become important elements of the children's development.

Measures for Acculturation

Language, often the largest initial barrier that immigrants encounter, is the first step and most widely assessed cultural practice associated with acculturation. In the U.S. context, English language use represents the first step toward successful adaptation. Language proficiency can enable immigrants to access the host society's institutions, such as the media; to make friends with members of the host society; and to find better employment opportunities. Retention of native languages is often seen as a key indicator of ethnic identity. Because of the functional and cultural significance of language, many scholars have used language alone as an index for acculturation.

The second major measure of acculturation is participation in cultural practices of both majority and minority groups, which include a wide spectrum ranging from pragmatic activities such as food preferences and modes of dress to pursuits such as religion and artistic inclination. The unidimensional perspective of acculturation holds that retaining traditional cultural practices such as food and dress may alienate immigrants from members of the mainstream, slow down the process of their adaptation to the host society, and ultimately prevent them from full assimilation into the host society. On the other hand, the multidimensional perspective of acculturation holds that immigrants are able to retain their cultural heritage and adopt cultural practices of the host society, and more important, they are encouraged to do so.

The third major measure of acculturation is ethnic identity, which refers to how members of an ethnic group relate to their own group as a subgroup of the larger society.

Ethnic identity is only meaningful in the context of a pluralistic society. In a racially or ethnically homogeneous society, ethnic identity is virtually meaningless. In light of the two perspectives on acculturation, two models emerge to conceptualize ethnic identity. One is a bipolar model, guided by a unidimensional perspective toward acculturation, assuming that ethnic identity and acculturation are in opposition to each other. That is, a weakening of ethnic identity is an inevitable outcome of acculturation. The alternative model views minority group members as having either strong or weak identifications with their own culture and that of the mainstream. Strong identification with both groups indicates biculturalism; identification with neither group suggests marginality. Strong identification with the ethnic group but weak attachment to the host society suggests separation or isolation of the ethnic group.

Acculturation and Psychological Outcome

Researchers on acculturation often concentrate on the consequences of acculturation, particularly, its potential impact on psychological functioning. Two views emerge predicting opposite outcomes of psychological well-being as a result of acculturation.

One school of thought argues that the more acculturated a member from a minority group is, the more psychological distress he or she suffers. This rationale draws from Émile Durkheim's social integration theory, in the sense that adopting the majority group's culture may remove the minority member from the ethnic community and isolate that person from an ethnic support base. The minority member may experience alienation that increases the possibility of psychological distress. Externally, a minority member who attempts to acculturate may encounter resistance and discrimination from the host society, which could exacerbate psychological distress. The result is that members of minority groups do not find acceptance by either their own ethnic group or the majority group. Thus they find themselves experiencing marginality and psychological distress.

The opposing view predicts higher self-esteem and less psychological distress among people who are

more acculturated than those who are less acculturated. This view sees psychological harm in any conflict between host and native cultures. Therefore, acculturation should improve one's self-esteem and reduce psychological distress. When closely tied to the ethnic culture and exposed to conflicting practices, beliefs, and attitudes in the host society, a minority group member may feel confused, challenged, and lost about what he or she believes. In particular, if one is not equipped with strategies to achieve the goals valued by the host society, self-esteem will be damaged.

Empirical evidence exists to support both views. Both do agree that if minority members are not equipped with strategies to reconcile the cultural differences between the host society and their own group, they will experience acculturative stress that might lead to psychological distress.

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See also Assimilation; Ethnic Group; Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism; Multiculturalism; Pluralism

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Acid Rain

Acid rain refers to both wet and dry deposition of atmospheric materials that contain high concentrations of nitric and sulfuric acid. The wet deposition can include fog, hail, sleet, or snow in addition to rain; the dry deposition is usually dust or smoke.

How Does Acid Rain Form?

Acid rain is a secondary air pollutant. It is not released directly into the air; rather, it forms as a result of the discharge of sulfur dioxide (SO_2) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) into the atmosphere. In the atmosphere, SO_2 reacts with other chemicals, primarily water and oxygen, to form sulfuric acid (H_2SO_4); the nitrogen oxides react to form nitric acid (HNO_3). Once formed, prevailing winds can transport these compounds to distances as great as hundreds of miles, across state and national boundaries.

Although natural sources such as erupting volcanoes and decaying plant material can release these gases, most emissions result primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels. In the United States, approximately 67 percent of all the emitted SO_2 and 25 percent of the emitted NO_x come from electrical power plants that burn fossil fuels. Other sources for these gases are also primarily industrial in nature, including ore smelting, coal-fired generators, and combustion of fuel in motor vehicles.

How Is Acid Rain Measured?

All acids, including acid rain, are measured using the pH scale. The pH scale is based on the tendency of a substance to release hydrogen ions in solution; the more readily a substance releases hydrogen ions, the stronger an acid it is. The pH scale runs from a value of 0 for very strong acid (very weak base) to a high value of 14 for a very weak acid (very strong base). Calculating in powers of 10, water with a pH of 4 is 10 times more acidic than water with a pH of 5. Distilled water has a pH of 7, something rarely seen in nature, even with unpolluted rain. This is because naturally occurring carbon dioxide (CO_2) in the atmosphere dissolves into the rainwater, forming weak carbonic acid and lowering the pH to around 5.6. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), as of 2000, the most acidic rain falling in the United States had a pH of approximately 4.3.

Where Is Acid Rain a Problem?

In the United States, acid rain is a problem primarily in the eastern half of the country, in parts of the Northeast and the northern Midwest. The lowest pH values—the result of heavy industrialization in

Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois—are found in New York and central New England, as well as in Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime Provinces in Canada. Except for some localized instances of slightly lower pH values, the problem is less pronounced in the southern and western parts of the United States.

A National Surface Water Survey conducted by USEPA in the mid-1980s investigated more than 1,000 lakes larger than 10 acres and many streams thought to be vulnerable to acidification. The survey found that many of these lakes and streams suffer from chronic acidity, with the water constantly maintaining a low pH. The survey found that of the lakes and streams surveyed, acid rain was the cause of acidity in 75 percent of the acidic lakes and 50 percent of the acidic streams. The survey identified the Adirondacks and Catskill Mountains in New York, the mid-Appalachian highlands along the East Coast, the northern Midwest, and mountainous areas of the West as areas where many of the surface waters are particularly sensitive to acidification.

Ongoing monitoring by the U.S. Geological Survey, as well as a study conducted by the Hubbard Brook Research Foundation, has found that conditions have not significantly improved. In the Northeast, where the soils have little ability to neutralize acids (known as buffering capacity), some lakes now have a pH of 5 or less, with a lowest reported pH of 4.2 in Little Echo Pond in Franklin, New York. The scope of the problem is even greater if lakes smaller than 10 acres are considered.

Eastern Canada has soil quite similar to that in the Adirondack Mountains, and its lakes are extremely vulnerable to chronic acidification. An estimated 14,000 lakes in that region are acidic, according to the Canadian government. Also susceptible to the effects of acid deposition are streams flowing over soils with little buffering capacity. The survey found that 580 streams in the Mid-Atlantic coastal plain are acidic. The highest concentration of acidic streams was found in the New Jersey Pinelands, where over 90 percent of the streams are acidic. In the Mid-Atlantic Highlands, more than 1,350 of the streams are acidic.

In addition to chronic acidification, there can be brief periods, known as episodic acidification, when pH drops because of heavy downpours of rain or runoff from snowmelt. Many lakes and streams in the United States and Canada are susceptible to this episodic effect. USEPA estimates that approximately 70 percent of lakes in the Adirondacks are at risk.

What Are the Effects of Acid Rain?

The environmental effects of acid rain are most clearly seen in surface water environments such as streams, lakes, and marshes. Acid rain falls directly on these aquatic habitats, and acidic runoff flows into them after falling on rural and urban areas. The impact can be disastrous. In the United States, many aquatic species are showing the deadly effects of prolonged exposure to acidic conditions, sometimes to such an extent that the overall populations of whole species are reduced and species that are more sensitive to low pH levels become extinct. All of these effects contribute to a reduction in the biodiversity of the affected systems. Some acid lakes no longer have fish in them.

Aquatic systems are not the only ones affected. Forest systems in Europe, North America, and Asia also show damage from acid rain, negatively affecting seedling production, tree density, and overall viability of the forests. The problem is particularly serious in high-altitude forests, where the trees are exposed to the acidic precipitation for longer periods. The most direct damage is to seedlings and to the tissues of adult trees. However, the higher acidity can leach nutrients from the soil and mobilize metals, such as aluminum, that are toxic to the plants. Furthermore, weakened trees can become vulnerable to insects and diseases.

In addition to damage done to the natural environment, acid rain also causes damage to non-natural objects. In many cities, acid precipitation is destroying numerous historic and contemporary buildings and works of art. Structures of limestone and marble—including the Parthenon, the Taj Mahal, the Washington Monument, and numerous medieval cathedrals throughout Europe—are most vulnerable because of their high reactivity with acids. Additionally, acid precipitation can corrode the steel in reinforced concrete, damaging buildings, bridges, and roads. The Council on Environmental Quality estimates that the economic losses in the United States amount to about $4.8 billion in direct costs every year.

What Can Be Done?

Because acid precipitation is a result of air pollution, the most effective strategy is to reduce emissions of the pollutants to the atmosphere. New technology has allowed factories to decrease amounts of SO_2 in smokestack emissions. However, emissions of NO_x

have increased over the same time period, suggesting the need for more stringent air pollution regulation.

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See also Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Water Organization; Water Quality; Water Resources

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Activity Theory

Activity theory predicts that more frequent social interaction and engagement in society will lead people to attain greater life satisfaction, enhanced self-image, and positive adjustment in old age. By remaining active, elders retain the capability of enhancing both their physical and psychological well-being. According to many activity theorists, the interests of society tend to be antagonistic to those of the elderly. Ageism, or negative stereotypes based on one's age, is a barrier to a more integrated society between younger and older people. Institutionalized forms of exclusion based on age are also a formal means of discouraging the elderly from actively participating in society. These obstacles tend to induce withdrawal from society by people as they advance into old age. Activity theorists contend that by remaining active and resisting this tendency to enter isolation, older members of society can live happier and healthier lives.

Activity in old age can take place in multiple forms. Informal activity would be engagement with relatives, neighbors, friends, or other acquaintances, while formal activities involve established organizations, associations, or clubs. Studies show both types are associated with higher life satisfaction, although ailing health and disability preclude some of the elderly from frequent activity. Social support from both formal and informal sources also improves health outcomes and life chances. Activity theorists claim that these positive results from interactions with others occur because they allow older people to continue carrying out meaningful roles in society. In some cases they permit the continuation of roles carried out in middle age. For others, they enable the initiation of new roles that substitute for (or replace) those that are no longer viable. Most important, they facilitate role stability in the lives of the elderly. Activity theorists believe this is crucial because sudden change in the lifestyles of those in old age is disruptive and potentially harmful.

Critics of activity theory claim that socioeconomic characteristics tend to grant or inhibit entry into the types of associations that foster productive activity. For this reason, the relationship between activity and life satisfaction may be spurious, meaning that those with more education or those of a higher social class might be more active and more satisfied simply because of the elevated position they hold in society. Other criticisms center on the theory's premise that people must play productive roles in society to make their lives seem meaningful. As the distinction between a productive role and an unproductive role is open to interpretation, some argue that the quality of life among those who prefer a life of solitude and contemplation tends to be underestimated.

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See also Ageism; Disengagement Theory; Life Course

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Addiction

Drug addiction as a social phenomenon is a relatively recent construct. That is, despite the use of psychoactive drugs for thousands of years, drug use and abuse only became a social problem when the functioning of

a member of a particular group or the activities of the group itself became impaired through another's drug-taking behavior. Thus, the construct of drug addiction evolved through the interconnectedness and impact that one person's behavior has on another. Although the word *addiction* finds its roots in the Latin *addictus,* meaning "to deliver" or "to devote," it was not until William Shakespeare modernized the word in *Henry V* that it took on a meaning similar to that of today. Still, Shakespeare's reference to addiction referred more to the king's predilections for theology than any drug use. Despite this evolution of the vernacular, the people of ancient Greece and Rome knew that many substances (e.g., opium) were capable of producing varying levels of dependence.

The rise of drug addiction as a significant global social problem began in the 17th century with the emergence of the opium trade between the Chinese and British Empires. Desperate to find a commodity to trade for Chinese tea, the British exported massive amounts of opium from India via the East India Trading Company. In the process, the British opium trade addicted a nation to the drug and eventually sparked two bloody wars, appropriately referred to as the Opium Wars. Trade also became the impetus for other notable drugs introduced to the masses. In fact, the trade of cocaine, tea and coffee (caffeine), and tobacco (nicotine) provided a considerable income for many countries with the ability to deliver these cash crops internationally. Thus, through global trade, many drug-naive populations were exposed to exotic mind-altering drugs.

Other significant changes during the Industrial Revolution also contributed to the global consumption of drugs. During the 19th century, more efficient drug delivery systems became available. For example, the invention of the hypodermic needle allowed for the delivery of morphine, a drug isolated from opium in 1805, in a manner other than by oral administration. Given the prevailing misconception during this era that drugs produced addiction only when administered through the mouth (as in the case of alcohol, nicotine, and snuff preparations of cocaine), the administration of drugs through a syringe lessened the population's anxiety about the addictive potential of newer drug derivatives that, in some cases, were much more potent. Further, industrialization and the ensuing mass production of drugs by a variety of pharmaceutical companies exposed individuals of limited economic means to substances that were once only available to the upper echelons of society. The addictive potential of these drugs now knew neither geographical boundary nor social class, resulting in pandemics of drug abuse.

As drug use increased across the social spectrum during the 19th and 20th centuries, so did the opposition to drug taking. Analysts suggest that this change in society's perception of drug use rested on several key patterns prevalent during this time. For instance, as excessive drug use increased, so did other risk-taking behaviors. This phenomenon resulted in an increase in mortality rates for drug addicts. Second, the loss of productivity resulting from drug use affected not only the individual's ability to survive in an increasingly competitive world but also societal functioning, particularly in lost work hours, production, and sales. In addition, the association of drugs with certain minority groups shifted attitudes about their social acceptability. For example, during the expansion of the railways in the United States, a cheaper and more abundant immigrant Chinese labor force replaced domestic workers. Chinese immigrants also engaged in opium smoking, which by this time was a cultural practice. The job loss that resulted from the influx of Chinese immigrants sparked many prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviors against this minority group. Merely through association, recreational drug use became a frowned-upon practice, only committed by members of an undesirable group. As such, the conditions were ripe for a significant shift in international and domestic drug policy during the early 20th century.

In response to the emerging threat of increased drug misuse, many governments worldwide reacted by enacting regulatory and prohibitive drug legislation. For example, in the United States, the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 levied a tax on narcotics. This tax was aimed at decreasing the open distribution and consumption of many drugs like cocaine and opium, even though taxes on other drugs (e.g., cigarettes and alcohol) provided considerable sources of revenue. Thus, in some respects governments relied on the drug trade for profit. Another example of legislation aimed at affecting the drug market was Prohibition (the Volstead Act of 1919). Rather than taxing alcohol, the purpose of Prohibition was to eliminate its consumption altogether. In retrospect, all this legislation accomplished was creation of a black market for alcohol and criminalization of a rather large population of individuals. In 1970, the Controlled Substance Act provided a more measured reaction to drug use. Although it severely restricted the use of many drugs,

threatening large fines and prison time for those caught possessing or distributing drugs with abuse potential, it also allowed for many drugs to remain available within a medical setting.

A second response to increasing drug use was the proliferation of treatment options for the drug abuser. Notable psychiatrists like Sigmund Freud (despite being addicted to cocaine himself) and Carl Jung attempted to develop theories of, and treatments for, drug addiction. The U.S. government created the first prison farm/hospital in 1929 dedicated to the treatment of addiction. Bill Wilson devised the 12-step program for alcohol addiction in the 1930s, the significance of which was that drug misuse would be framed as a problem that was largely outside of the abuser's control, rather than a moral failing of the individual. Methadone maintenance emerged in the 1960s as a viable option to heroin detoxification programs. Other opiate substitution and antagonist programs remain active and effective today.

Educating the populace about the dangers of drug addiction was a third front in the battle against drug use and abuse. Films like *Reefer Madness* attempted to scare the public into discontinuance. Such efforts, however, were largely uncoordinated and not rooted in any cohesive domestic or international policy. Attempting to focus the nation on the dangers of drug use, President Richard Nixon formally declared a "War on Drugs" in 1971, a war that still continues.

One beneficial product from increased public awareness of drug addiction as a significant social problem was the increase in efforts to understand its causes and consequences. If scientists could understand both the behavioral and biological bases of drug addiction, then better treatments could be devised. U.S. Addiction Research Centers, founded in the 1930s, sought to develop such viable treatment options. In the 1970s, the divisions of the National Institutes of Health, namely, the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, took on this task. These institutes, in conjunction with many academic scientists, would provide the public with many groundbreaking discoveries about drug addiction.

Although the resulting research postulated multiple models of the etiology of drug addiction, people nonetheless use recreational drugs because they make them feel good (or, in some cases, different). Specifically, drugs produce a sense of euphoria by hijacking the natural reward structures within the brain (e.g., the ventral tegmentum, nucleus accumbens, and medial prefrontal cortex). Through the pharmacological action of drugs, these structures become active when they might otherwise lie relatively dormant. Recreational drugs, either directly or indirectly, increase the levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine within these brain regions. As dopamine levels increase, so does the sense of reward. Interestingly, these same neurophysiological systems are the ones thought to underlie the transitions from drug use to abuse, as neuroplasticity becomes associated with escalated and problem drug use. Not surprisingly, much research focusing on treating drug addiction attempts to devise new medications that either alter or block the action of recreational drugs at this level of the brain. In addition, other research efforts are also attempting to uncover why some individuals are more responsive than others to the effects of drugs within this system. Is the propensity to move from casual drug use to drug abuse a function of genetics, environment, or a combination of these factors? These questions, among others, continue to drive research efforts on addiction. Current understanding of addiction rests, in large part, on assessment of times past and the status of drug addiction in the present.

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See also Cocaine and Crack; Culture of Dependency; Drug Abuse; Methadone; Organized Crime; Prohibition; Psychoactive Drugs, Misuse of; Twelve-Step Programs

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ADOPTION

Few in the United States have not been touched by adoption—either as members of the adoption triad (biological parents, adoptive parents, and adopted

persons) or being related to or having (had) an association with adoption involving others. *Adoption* is the legal and permanent placement of a child with an adult who is not the child's biological parent. Once an adoption is legally finalized, adopted children have all the rights accruing to biological children, including the right to inherit.

Characteristics

Adoption may involve stepchildren, biologically related children, previous foster children, and children who are strangers to (have never met) the adoptive parents. Adoptions may be *closed* (sharing no information between the biological parents and adoptive parents); *semi-open* (sharing limited information, such as medical history or pictures at certain occasions, between the biological parents and adoptive parents); or *open* (making provision for ongoing contact between the biological parents and adoptive parents, and possibly the adoptee). Adoptions may be *matched* (for similarity between adoptive parents and adopted person in such areas as race, religion, physical features, nationality, and ethnicity), *transracial* (historically involving U.S. Caucasian parents and African American, Hispanic, or Native American children), *international/intercountry* (historically involving U.S. Caucasian parents and children of countries other than the United States—generally developing countries or economically impoverished countries), or *transcultural* (involving differences between adopted parents and adoptee in any aspect of culture such as religious background, sexual orientation background, or ethnic background).

Incidence

Based on the 2000 census, an estimated 2.1 million adopted children live with U.S. householders. These children are distinguished from stepchildren (the biological children of the householder's spouse or partner).

While U.S. parents generally complete the largest number of international adoptions, these adoptions also occur among families in such countries as Canada, Denmark, England, France, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. In some countries, laws in force for religious reasons prohibit the adoption of children by foreigners, although in some cases foreigners may become guardians of a child who is subsequently adopted in the country of origin of the adoptive parents.

Historical Overview

Adoption originated in Rome for the purpose of providing an heir to families without a male heir. Even with legalized adoption for this purpose, the adopted child continued to reside with the biological family and maintained the usual relationship with, and rights accorded biological children of, the biological family as well as the inheritance rights and responsibilities associated with membership in the adoptive family.

During and shortly after the Great Depression of 1929, agencies transported street children of large cities like New York, whose parents were financially unable to care for them, to foster-care-like families, mostly in the Midwest—a period that, because of the method of transporting them, became known as the period of the orphan trains. Although the purpose was usually to provide care in exchange for work by the children, some families adopted these children.

Following the period of the orphan trains, the adoption of children born to unmarried mothers became prevalent. Increased social freedom of adolescents and young adults occurred at a time when effective methods of preventing or terminating unwanted pregnancies were not yet available. Accompanying this relaxing of social norms were substantially increased numbers of pregnancies among unwed women. Social stigma surrounding these pregnancies and prohibition of governmental assistance to unmarried mothers left many women little choice but to relinquish their children for adoption. A private social welfare system for placing the children with more advantaged, mostly Caucasian married couples ensued, and adoption became an avenue to family formation for married couples for whom infertility prevented biological births. Children born out-of-wedlock to minority group mothers, particularly African American children, were generally informally adopted and raised by the mother's extended family.

Adoptions of infants born to unmarried mothers were generally closed and birth certificates changed to reflect the child's birth to the adoptive parents. Children were matched with adoptive parents according to race, religion, and physical features—all aimed at increasing the likelihood that children would look as if they were the biological children of the adoptive parents. European children orphaned in World War II also became a source of adoption for U.S. couples. For the first time, however, some children were placed with adoptive families who could not be matched on

physical features (as in the case of orphaned children from Japan). The ending of the Korean War and the placement of large numbers of Korean War orphans with U.S. families further restricted the possibility of matching children and adoptive parents.

Effect of Social Changes

Effective artificial birth control methods beginning in the 1960s, followed by a decrease in social stigma associated with unwed pregnancy and, finally, the legalization of abortion in 1973, substantially reduced the number of healthy, Caucasian infants available for adoption. Although some infants remained available through private, independent adoptions, numbers were much smaller and biological mothers had increased control over the selection or eligibility determination of adoptive parents. Costs associated with these adoptions increased.

Already accustomed to seeing international adoptees in their communities and supported by public policy changes, Caucasian couples began to embrace the adoption of Native American, Hispanic, and African American children. A number of federal, state, and private agency policies provided financial, medical, tax, and employment incentives for the adoption of children considered otherwise hard to place. (These children were frequently older, members of sibling groups, and troubled by behavioral or developmental disabilities.) Support for these transracial adoptions eventually reopened interest in the international adoption of children who were frequently much younger than children available for domestic adoption, leading to an increase in international adoptions. In addition, same-race adoptions by minority group parents were encouraged, along with support for adoption by single parents and parents with limited incomes and resources.

Trends and Future Directions

Controversy still surrounds the adoption of children. Adults who were products of closed adoptions frequently search for their biological parents and, in the case of adoptions that occurred in this country, with some success. These adults have also sought policy changes aimed at opening information between biological parents and adoptees. Birth mothers have organized to support each other in searching for their relinquished children, to call the public's attention to the circumstances surrounding their early decisions, and to effect laws more responsive to openness in adoption records. While open adoption is more common than previously, there is substantial variation in the structure and success of these arrangements.

For numerous reasons, adopted children more frequently than their nonadopted peers have behavioral problems and receive psychiatric treatment. Some adoptions disrupt (terminate before adoption finalization) or dissolve (terminate after the adoption finalization). Questions arise regarding the existence of loss and grief experiences associated with adoption; the effect of transracial, international, and transcultural adoption on the identity of adopted children; and whether, and under what circumstances, adoption is in the best interest of children. Design and sampling difficulties hinder the use of research in addressing these questions. At the same time, adoption continues to be a positive reality in many U.S. families, and adopted children are more likely to be economically advantaged, excel academically, and advance socially than their nonadopted counterparts.

New reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization and donor insemination, surrogacy, and embryo donation have increased alternatives to traditional adoption although they involve various ethical, legal, and social questions. Support for transracial adoptions reopened interest in the international adoption of children who are frequently much younger than children available for domestic adoption, leading to an increase in international adoptions.

Altruism or Commodification?

From its earliest practices, adoption has been recognized as an altruistic act—whether to provide a loving family to a child born to a young, unmarried mother; or to provide a life rich in social, economic, and educational resources and potential freedom from discrimination to impoverished biracial or minority group children who were often also victims of abuse or neglect; or to provide an alternative to abandonment, existence in the emotionally stark atmosphere of an orphanage, or even death, in the case of international adoptees. Some, however, call attention to the fact that in many cases, the adoption provides both a child and the opportunity to parent to individuals and couples who would otherwise be biologically unable

to do so. These persons point to the extensive market that exists for adoptable children, particularly healthy infants, and to private adoption agencies and independent adoption facilitators as businesses that provide jobs and economic profit. Critics apply such terms as *colonialism* and *cultural imperialism* to international and transcultural adoptions.

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See also Adoption, Gay and Lesbian; Adoption, Transracial

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Adoption, Gay and Lesbian

Some people see the adoption of children by gay men or lesbians as a threat to the social fabric of society, whereas others view it as an appropriate placement resource for children awaiting an adoptive family. With more than 500,000 children in the nation's foster care system and 100,000 of them needing adoptive homes, the need for such homes has never been greater. As a result, this debate, which centers on the appropriateness of allowing children to be raised by gay men or lesbians, has received great attention in recent years, although it has been at the forefront of the cultural divide for several decades.

Gay and Lesbian Adoptive Parents

According to the 2000 U.S. Census, many thousands of same-sex couples live with adopted children. However, because data on gay or lesbian single persons who are also parenting adopted children were not also collected, this number is thought to be significantly under-reported, especially when one realizes that most states allowing gay or lesbian persons to adopt only allow single persons to do so. Parental sexual orientation is not systematically collected in the adoption process. As a result, although the actual number of new adoptions of children by gay or lesbian adoptive parents is unknown, best estimates place it at more than several hundred each year from international or domestic, private or public adoption sources.

Many who oppose adoptions by gay or lesbian persons argue that such adoptions are ill-advised at best and destructive at worst. They hold that adoption by gay and lesbian persons holds substantial risks for children. Little research purports to demonstrate these risks, and scholars widely condemn those few as misinterpreting and misrepresenting sociological research. Nonetheless, these studies have been the basis for many debunked myths about gay and lesbian parenting, including, for example, that children of gay parents are at risk for confusion about their sexual identities and more likely to become homosexual, or that their parents are more likely to sexually abuse these children.

Most studies indicate that parental homosexuality does not give rise to gender identity confusion, inappropriate behavior, psychopathology, or homosexual behavior in children. These studies further revealed that children of gay or lesbian parents were virtually indistinguishable from children of heterosexual single or divorced parents. In addition, research consistently notes the lack of a connection between homosexuality and child molestation. Studies point out that the offenders who select underage male victims either always did so or regressed from adult heterosexual relations. Research demonstrates that homosexuality and homosexual pedophilia are not synonymous and are, in fact, almost mutually exclusive. This is because the homosexual male is attracted to fundamentally masculine qualities, which are lacking in the prepubescent male.

The empirical literature on such adoptive family forms consistently illustrates that no significant

differences exist between homosexual and heterosexual adoptive parents in their parenting success, or lack thereof. In fact, children appear to develop healthy bonds with their gay or lesbian parent(s).

Adoption Laws

Despite the removal of homosexuality from the American Psychological Association's list of mental disorders in 1974, Anita Bryant led a "Save Our Children" campaign in 1977 to repeal a gay rights ordinance in Dade County, Florida. The spin-off effect prompted Florida legislators to subsequently pass a law banning adoptions by gay and lesbian persons. The law is still in effect today and is the most restrictive in the nation, the only law specifically denying consideration of an adult as a potential adoptive parent specifically because of his or her sexual orientation.

In general, individual states outline who may and who may not adopt children, with relevant case law also setting the precedent. As such, it is often difficult to determine a particular state's position because many jurisdictions do not publish adoption decisions. Nevertheless, the laws and policies of four other states (Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Utah) have followed Florida's lead and currently prohibit or completely restrict gay or lesbian persons from adopting. Other states either allow such adoptions by statute or do not specifically ban them.

Professional and Organizational Policies

For 3 decades the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Association of Social Workers have had official policy statements stating that an adoptive parent applicant's sexual orientation should not be a factor that automatically rules someone out for becoming an adoptive parent. More recently, the American Academy of Pediatrics released a policy statement endorsing not only adoptions by gay men and lesbians but also adoptions by same-sex couples, asserting that children who are born to, or adopted by, one member of a same-sex couple deserve the security of two legally recognized parents. The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and the American Psychoanalytic Association have taken similar positions.

In addition to major professional discipline-focused organizations, other entities have also supported such adoptive placements. The Child Welfare League of America, the nation's oldest and largest child advocacy group, explicitly asserts that lesbians and gay men seeking to adopt shall be judged by the same standards applied to heterosexuals. Also, the North American Council on Adoptable Children adopted a policy that children should not be denied a permanent family because of the sexual orientation of potential parents. Thus, virtually all major professional organizations in the mental health, child health, and child welfare fields take affirmative positions on allowing children to be adopted by gay or lesbian persons or couples.

Although the exact number of adopted children residing with parents who are gay or lesbian is unknown, both sides in this debate agree that many thousands of such family forms exist. To date, not one study of such adoptive families shows any negative outcome for any member of those families. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Nevertheless, this topic continues to polarize many around the concept of parenthood and what characteristics make a "good" parent.

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See also Adoption; Sexual Orientation

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Adoption, Transracial

Transracial adoption (also known as inter-racial adoption) refers to adoptions that occur across racial boundaries. At the level of biology, no adoption is transracial because race is a meaningless category;

however, because race is socially significant, transracial adoption remains a controversial method of family formation.

In the United States, much of this controversy centers on the two streams that feed transracial adoption. Adoption itself is one such stream: Why are children placed for adoption? Adoption solves the problem of infertility for so many people, yet it is not just a solution but also an indicator of a larger social problem, for its need results from forces and policies that push women into giving birth to babies that they cannot rear. Consequently, countries with good social services, readily available and culturally accepted contraception means, safe and legal abortion, and support for single mothers have the lowest adoption rates. For example, in 2005, only 48 domestic nonstepchild adoptions took place in Norway.

Racism is the other stream: More women of color than white women are forced to relinquish their children. This is best illustrated by the overrepresentation of children of color in the U.S. foster care system: In 2005, almost 60 percent of U.S. children served in foster care were minorities. One driving force for this is poverty, specifically a lack of access to contraception, abortion, and the resources to rear children. However, it is not just that people of color are more likely to be poor. Many still face the remnants of institutionalized discrimination and lack the resources to overcome the resultant disadvantages, and thus a much greater percentage are found living in poverty than is the case among whites. In fact, U.S. Census data indicate that, whereas approximately 8 percent of whites are poor, more than 20 percent of both the black and Hispanic communities are similarly impoverished. Consequently, race and poverty work together to push and pull children of color out of their families of origin and to limit the number of racially similar families able to absorb them. As such, children of color are disproportionately available for adoption, and white middle-class families disproportionately have the wherewithal to adopt.

This phenomenon also operates at the global level, with the children of greatest poverty disproportionately found among the darker children of the world. Among families formed by adoption that crosses any color line, it is almost always children of darker skin going to lighter-skinned parents. For example, in 2006, children of color represented approximately 80 percent of the "orphans" relinquished by the top five sending nations (China, Guatemala, Russia, South Korea, and Ethiopia, respectively) and adopted by (mostly white) U.S. families. Yet, unlike the domestic adoption of black children by white families, in most cases of international adoption, the children are perhaps less valued but not racially disvalued. In other words, while international adoptees are not white, they usually are not black either. Oftentimes, it is this almost-whiteness that makes international adoption, particularly the adoption of children from Asian nations, so appealing for American would-be adopters.

When navigating the streams and controversies of domestic transracial adoption, most Americans take one of three positions on these placements. The first position advocates for color blindness in adoption, meaning the random assignment of children available for adoption to potential adoptive parents. Given the current demographics of adoption, this position would result in some black families ending up with white children, more white families with black children, and some families accidentally "matched." The second position encourages moderate race matching in adoption, as long as a same-race match can be arranged in a timely manner. The third position promotes only race matching in adoption. Most often this position develops in response to the cultural and structural intricacies of racism, not out of ideologies of racial purity or separatism.

The most famous articulation of this third position can be found in the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) 1972 statement against transracial adoption, which decreed that the history and existence of white racism require race matching for black children. According to the NABSW, these children need the support and socialization of black families just as much as the black community needs to maintain and sustain its children and families. Yet, in contrast to the whitening processes of international adoption, the transracial adoption of black children appears predicated on the children returning in adulthood to the black community. In fact, one of the definitions of success in these placements is the formation of an appropriate (i.e., black) racial identity. Significantly, data indicate that transracially adopted black children and adults tend to meet this measure; most do well psychologically and socially, and most develop strong identities as black Americans.

Research also indicates that white people raising black children in America, whether they have given birth to them or adopted them, need assistance from the black community. However, participating in, or

even just being supportive of, transracial adoption inevitably puts one in an impossible situation. Placing a child or helping the family formed by transracial adoption implicitly supports the formation of such families. One issue is whether such actions encourage the removal of black children from the black community. The adoptive family and particularly the child do need support, but the circumstances creating such a situation also require attention and correction. In this way, transracial adoption is a Band-Aid resolution that calls out for a more satisfactory solution.

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See also Abortion; Adoption; Adoption, Gay and Lesbian; Biracial; Civil Rights; Contraception; Family; Family, Blended; Fertility; Foster Children, Aging Out; Intermarriage; Miscegenation; Multiracial Identity; Race

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Affirmative Action

Affirmative action refers to programs designed to assist disadvantaged groups of people by giving them certain preferences. Affirmative action goes beyond banning negative treatment of members of specified disadvantaged groups to requiring some form of positive treatment in order to equalize opportunity.

In the United States, beneficiaries of affirmative action programs have included African Americans and women, as well as Latinos/as, Native Americans, and Asian and Pacific Islanders. In India, members of "scheduled castes" (the lower-status castes) are the beneficiaries. Preferential treatment is also afforded to women in the European Union, "visible minorities" in Canada, the Māori in New Zealand, and the Roma in eastern Europe. Some affirmative action programs involve small preferences (such as placing job advertisements in African American newspapers to encourage members of a previously excluded group to apply for a job), whereas others can be substantial (going as far as restricting a particular job to members of disadvantaged groups). A quota is when a job or a certain percentage of jobs is open only to members of the disadvantaged group. Not all affirmative action programs involve quotas, and, indeed, in the United States quotas are generally illegal in most situations. Even without quotas, however, affirmative action has been an extremely contentious issue, for what is at stake is the allocation of a society's scarce resources: jobs, university positions, government contracts, and so on.

Moral and Political Arguments

Some critics of affirmative action, of course, openly want to maintain the subordinate position of the disadvantaged group. But many critics condemn the discriminatory and unfair policies of the past that have harmed the disadvantaged group and call for the elimination of such policies. To this end, they favor vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, prohibiting discrimination in such areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, and educational institutions. What they do not support, however, are policies that give preferences to the disadvantaged. To give advantages to anyone—even the previously disadvantaged—departs from the important moral principle of equal treatment. In the past, jobs were allocated on the basis of race, gender, or some other morally impermissible characteristic, rather than merit. Now, according to this view, jobs should be given out on the basis of merit alone. Employers should be "color-blind" (or "race-blind") and "gender-blind": That is, they should act as if they do not know the race or gender of the applicants. Just as it was wrong to pay attention to people's race or gender in order to discriminate against them, so it is wrong to be "color-conscious" or "gender-conscious" in order to help them.

Critics of affirmative action point out that discriminating *in favor of* the previously disadvantaged

necessarily entails discriminating *against* those from advantaged groups, a form of reverse discrimination that is morally unacceptable. This is especially so given that any particular member of a disadvantaged group may not have personally experienced discrimination, and any particular member of an advantaged group may never have engaged in any act of discrimination.

Supporters of affirmative action, on the other hand, argue that while a color- and gender-blind society is an ultimate ideal, in the short run color- and gender-conscious policies are necessary and justified for remedying past and present discrimination. There is no moral equivalence, in this view, between discrimination intended to keep down some oppressed groups and the discrimination intended to help provide equality—to level the playing field—for these victims of past societal discrimination.

Advocates note that various studies (using matched pairs of job applicants, interviews with employers, and other methodologies) reveal the persistence of discrimination, even after its legal prohibition. Anti-discrimination laws alone are insufficient to eliminate discrimination. How, for example, would an unsuccessful job applicant know that she has been the victim of discrimination unless she had access to the application files of her competitors? Moreover, according to affirmative action supporters, even if all discrimination ended, the harm caused by previous discrimination continues into the present. For example, much hiring occurs through word of mouth, personal connections, and referrals. Many colleges and universities give preferences to those whose parents attended the institution. All of these mechanisms reproduce in the present whatever employment or educational imbalances may have existed previously due to discrimination.

Supporters of affirmative action insist that they too value merit, but not the narrow meaning of merit as measured by standardized tests. If merit is correctly defined as being best able to help an organization achieve its goals, it will often be the case that color- or gender-conscious factors ought to be considered. For example, if the goal of a police department is to serve and protect its community, and if in a particular multiracial city with a history of racial tension the police department is all white because of previous discrimination, it may well be that a new black officer will better help the department serve the community than would a white officer who scored slightly higher on some standardized test.

Many workplaces and educational institutions consider diversity a positive value, and therefore, according to advocates of affirmative action, favoring applicants who further the diversity of the workforce or student body involves no conflict with the principle of merit. For example, a college applicant from an under-represented minority group might be more qualified than someone with slightly better color-blind credentials when qualification is viewed as including the extent to which the applicant will help the college in its mission of exposing all its students to people from different backgrounds and giving them the experience of interacting with such people. Critics of affirmative action, on the other hand, argue that seeking out applicants with diverse *political* views would do more for the diversity of a student body than would granting preferences to racial or ethnic minorities.

Critics of affirmative action note that, to decide preferential treatment entitlement, it is necessary to determine the race or ethnicity of applicants. Sometimes the determination is straightforward, but given the prevalence of people with multiracial backgrounds and the ugly history of how racist societies judged which racial category people belonged to, critics charge that it is morally objectionable to assign racial labels to people. Yet without such labels, affirmative action would be impossible. In fact, true color blindness demands that the government not ask for or collect information that distinguishes people by race or ethnicity at all.

Supporters of affirmative action agree that categorizing people by race or ethnicity is morally awkward. However, they note that even minimal enforcement of anti-discrimination laws requires categorizing people. (How can we determine whether a landlord has been discriminating if we don't know the race of prospective renters?) In an ideal society, there would be no need to gather data on any morally irrelevant category. But when a society has a long history of oppressing certain groups, data broken down by group is necessary if we are to measure and judge our progress in overcoming that past oppression. When a society does not collect information on the differential circumstances of dominant groups and oppressed groups, such action may be a sign not of color blindness but of trying to hide ongoing mistreatment.

Considerable debate exists as to the appropriate beneficiaries of affirmative action. In the United States, supporters of affirmative action hoped that, by expanding the coverage to apply to many minority groups, they would broaden the political base favoring such programs. In practice, however, the wider coverage has diluted, in the minds of some, the moral argument in favor of a program intended to help the most obvious victims of governmental discrimination: African Americans and Native Americans. Some argue that the context matters. Thus, because Asian Americans and women are generally not underrepresented among university student bodies, affirmative action admissions for them would now be inappropriate (though they should not be singled out for restrictions). On the other hand, among corporate executives or university faculties, blacks, Asians, Latinos, and women all faced exclusion in the past and remain under-represented today; therefore, in these areas all four groups ought to be beneficiaries of affirmative action.

Some argue that "class-based" affirmative action ought to replace race-based programs, both for reasons of equity (why is the son of a black doctor more deserving of university admissions than the son of a white coal miner?) and to avoid provoking a backlash from poor and working-class whites who might be natural political allies of poor blacks. Many supporters of race-based affirmative action support class-based preferences to supplement, but not supplant, race-based preferences. They note that programs intended to benefit the poor and the working class provoked a political backlash (e.g., "welfare" or equalization of education funding). More important, they argue that race-neutral criteria will still leave minorities—who have been the victims of both class and caste discrimination—under-represented.

Impact

Measuring the impact of affirmative action is difficult and controversial. Some critics argue that worldwide the record of affirmative action has been disastrous, even driving some societies to civil war (e.g., Sri Lanka), but given the history of ethnic and racial conflict in societies where affirmative action has been introduced, it is not simple to isolate cause and effect.

Most U.S. studies agree that affirmative action has redistributed jobs, college admissions, and government contracts from white males to minorities and females, though only to a small extent. A more substantial shift occurred in minority enrollments at elite colleges and universities and in graduate programs, law schools, and medical schools.

Critics claim that departure from the principle of merit led to positions being filled by less-qualified people, with a corresponding loss of quality and efficiency in the economy. Most studies found no evidence of weaker performance by women relative to men in those sectors of the economy with mandated affirmative action. And though substantial evidence exists that minorities have weaker credentials than whites, their actual performance is only modestly weaker. On the other hand, some counterbalancing benefits also occur, such as many minority doctors locating their practices in poor and underserved communities, leading to a gain in the nation's health care.

Opponents argue that affirmative action is harmful to its supposed beneficiaries by creating a "mismatch" between the skills of minority employees and students and the skills that their positions require. For example, one study found that affirmative action *reduced* the number of African American lawyers because minority students admitted through affirmative action did worse in law school (and then drop out or fail the bar exam) than they would have if they had gone to easier law schools where they had not received admissions preferences. Critics of this study challenge it on methodological grounds, finding that affirmative action actually increased the number of African American lawyers. Also contradicting the mismatch hypothesis is the fact that blacks who attend elite colleges and universities (where affirmative action is most prevalent) have higher graduation rates and greater future success than do those who attend less competitive institutions.

Another way in which affirmative action is said to harm beneficiaries is psychologically, on the grounds that those admitted into schools or jobs on the basis of preferences are likely to suffer in terms of self-esteem or ambition. Others view them as not really qualified, and worse yet, they may view themselves that way as well. Supporters of affirmative action reply that white men did not feel undeserving during the years of open discrimination, even though they earned their credentials in a contest where many of their competitors were severely handicapped. Although some minority individuals may wonder whether they got their position based on color-blind credentials or because of preferences, unemployment and lack of promotion are

surely more serious blows to anyone's self-esteem. As for stigmatization, stereotyping the abilities of subordinated minorities and women long predated affirmative action. Limited survey data suggest that blacks (male and female) and white females at firms with affirmative action programs do not have any lower scores on various psychological variables than their peers at other firms and that blacks at affirmative action firms have more ambition than blacks at other firms.

History

In the United States, legislation was passed in the aftermath of the Civil War to affirmatively assist African Americans, but with the end of Reconstruction, race-conscious measures were enacted exclusively for the purpose of subordinating blacks. Much of the ensuing struggle for civil rights involved attempts to remove legal impediments to equal rights; these efforts culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The first official use of the term *affirmative action* was in 1961, when President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925, requiring that federal contractors not only pledge nondiscrimination but also "take affirmative action to ensure" equal opportunity. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson promulgated Executive Order 11246, establishing the Office of Federal Contract Compliance to enforce affirmative action requirements. In a speech at Howard University, Johnson explained the rationale for such programs: "You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains, and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line, and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the others.'" In 1967, Executive Order 11246 was expanded to cover women. The 1969 "Philadelphia Plan" under President Richard Nixon required government contractors to set numerical goals for hiring minorities, particularly in the construction industry where blacks long experienced exclusion from labor unions.

Court challenges to affirmative action resulted in rulings that often left the question unsettled. In *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* in 1978, a divided Supreme Court ruled that a medical school could not set aside a fixed number of seats for minority applicants, but it could use race or ethnicity as a plus factor in admissions. The next year, in *United Steelworkers v. Weber,* the Supreme Court allowed private companies to enact affirmative action programs for the purpose of overcoming traditional patterns of racial segregation. And in 1980, in *Fullilove v. Klutznick,* the Supreme Court upheld the setting aside of 10 percent of government public works funds for minority-owned businesses. A decade later, however, a more conservative court narrowed the scope of permissible affirmative action; while agreeing that strict color blindness was not required, the court—in *City of Richmond v. Croson* in 1989 and *Adarand Constructors v. Pena* in 1995—held that affirmative action programs must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that interest.

In 1996, voters in California passed Proposition 209, outlawing race-conscious programs in any state institution, thus ending affirmative action in the state's college and university system. At California's top universities, black enrollment declined from 6.6 percent in 1994 to 3.0 percent in 2004. In two cases decided in 2003, *Grutter v. Bollinger* and *Granz v. Bollinger,* the Supreme Court affirmed that race or ethnicity could be considered as one admissions factor among many others, provided that it was not done in a mechanistic way.

Stephen R. Shalom

See also Civil Rights; Discrimination; Equal Protection; Jim Crow; Race-Blind Policies; Racism; Segregation; Sexism; Skills Mismatch

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Affirmative Defense

The structure of criminal liability or guilt in Anglo-American law is straightforward. (The same structure of liability applies in general in civil suits, but this entry focuses on criminal law.) Crimes are defined by their criteria, which lawyers call the "elements." Most crimes require some prohibited action and an accompanying mental state (the *mens rea*). For example, one definition of murder is the intentional killing of a human being. The prohibited action is any type of killing conduct and the required mental state is intent, the purpose to kill. The State has enormous discretion concerning what behavior to criminalize and what the specific elements of crimes should be. The State (prosecution) must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the prosecution is able to prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may nonetheless avoid criminal liability and be found not guilty (or less guilty) by establishing a defense. These defenses are termed *affirmative defenses* and, like the definitions of *crimes*, have definitional criteria. Affirmative defenses may be grouped into three categories: justifications, excuses, and policy defenses. The former two focus on the defendant's culpability or blameworthiness. The State creates the latter to serve goals other than adjudicating guilt. The State has enormous discretion concerning what affirmative defenses to establish, if any, and what their criteria should be. In the United States, it is in the State's discretion to allocate the burden of proof on affirmative defenses to either the prosecution or the defense.

Behavior that would otherwise be criminal is justified if it is right or at least permissible in the individual circumstances. For example, the intentional killing of another person is typically criminal homicide, but if someone kills in response to a wrongful and imminent threat of deadly harm, that person will be justified by the affirmative defense of self-defense. Other traditional justifications include the defense of another, the defense of property, law enforcement, and the general justification of "necessity" or "balance of evils," which is often established to address cases in which the more specific justifications do not strictly apply. The defendant will be justified only if he or she actually believes that the justifying circumstances exist and that belief is reasonable. There is often substantial dispute about the criteria for a reasonable belief. A defendant found not guilty because his or her conduct was justified is freed outright from state control.

Criminal behavior is excused if the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the crime. For example, suppose someone intentionally kills because severe mental disorder produces a delusion that he or she is about to be killed. The individual is not justified because the belief is mistaken and unreasonable, but this person is sufficiently irrational to be considered nonresponsible, and the excuse of legal insanity applies. Other traditional excuses include infancy, which excuses from criminal responsibility juveniles below a certain age, and duress, which excuses an individual who is wrongfully threatened with death or serious bodily injury unless he or she commits a crime and a person of reasonable firmness would have yielded to the threat under the circumstances. A defendant who is excused may be subject to further state noncriminal control if the person remains dangerous. For example, a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity may be civilly committed to a secure hospital if he or she remains dangerous and may be kept there until he or she is no longer mentally disordered or dangerous.

Considerable dispute exists about the rationale for the excusing affirmative defenses, but most depend on a finding that the defendant was not capable of rationality or that the defendant was compelled to act. Legal insanity is an example of the former; duress is an example of the latter. An important question is whether the law should establish new affirmative defenses of excuse for newly discovered variables, such as new mental syndromes or brain abnormalities that seem to play a causal role in criminal behavior. Advocates argue for such excuses, but causation alone is not an excusing condition. At most, such causes can support the existence or expansion of a genuine existing excuse, such as legal insanity.

Although the distinction between justifications and excuses can be stated clearly, it can be very blurry. For

example, suppose a homicide defendant actually believed that he was in deadly danger, but he made a reasonable mistake and was not in danger at all. Has this person done the right thing, or was it wrong but he was not responsible? For another example, suppose the defendant kills for no justifying reason, but he would have been justified if he knew all the facts, such as that the victim had a hidden weapon and was about to kill the defendant wrongfully. Justification or excuse? On the one hand, the defendant's conduct was "objectively" justified, but, on the other, the defendant subjectively acted for a nonjustified reason.

Such questions divide criminal lawyers and raise important theoretical and practical issues about culpability. Justified and excused defendants are both found not guilty, but the former have done the right thing; the latter have done the wrong thing and, in some cases, may still be dangerous. The criminal law is a teacher that educates and guides citizens. It should therefore announce clearly what behavior is right or permissible and what is wrong and forbidden. Defendants also care about whether their conduct is justified or excused because any defendant would prefer to have his or her harmful conduct authoritatively labeled right, rather than wrong but excused, and justifications do not trigger state control.

Policy affirmative defenses do not negate the defendant's blameworthiness, but permit exoneration for other good reasons. The statute of limitations and diplomatic immunity, for example, bar conviction of a defendant who has undoubtedly committed a crime. The State concludes, respectively, that the defendant may not be able to defend himself adequately after a certain period of time, or that good international relations require that we not convict the diplomats of other nations residing in the United States.

Stephen J. Morse

See also Crime; Justice; Juvenile Justice System; Social Control

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AFROCENTRICITY

Afrocentricity is a paradigm based on the idea that African people should reassert a sense of agency to achieve sanity. During the 1960s a group of African American intellectuals in the newly formed black studies departments at universities began to formulate novel ways of analyzing information. In some cases, these new ways were called looking at information from "a black perspective," as opposed to what had been considered the "white perspective" of most information in the American academy.

In the late 1970s Molefi Kete Asante began speaking of the need for an Afrocentric orientation to data and, in 1980, published a book, *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change,* which launched the first full discussion of the concept. Although the word existed before Asante's book and many people, including Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, had used it, the intellectual idea did not have substance as a philosophical concept until 1980.

The Afrocentric paradigm is a revolutionary shift in thinking proposed as a *constructural* adjustment to black disorientation, decenteredness, and lack of agency. The Afrocentrist asks the question, "What would African people do if there were no white people?" In other words, what natural responses would occur in the relationships, attitudes toward the environment, kinship patterns, preferences for colors, type of religion, and historical referent points for African people if there had not been any intervention of colonialism or enslavement? Afrocentricity answers this question by asserting the central role of the African subject within the context of African history, thereby removing Europe from the center of the African reality. In this way, Afrocentricity becomes a revolutionary idea because it studies ideas, concepts, events, personalities, and political and economic processes from a standpoint of black people as subjects and not as objects, basing all knowledge on the authentic interrogation of *location.*

It thus becomes legitimate to ask, "Where is the sistah coming from?" or "Where is the brotha at?" "Are you down with overcoming oppression?" These are assessment and evaluative questions that allow the interrogator to accurately pinpoint the responder's location, whether it be a cultural or a psychological location. As a paradigm, Afrocentricity enthrones the centrality of the African, that is, black ideals and values, as expressed in the highest forms of African culture, and activates consciousness as a functional aspect of any revolutionary approach to phenomena. The cognitive and structural aspects of a paradigm are incomplete without the *functional* aspect. There is something more than knowing in the Afrocentric sense; there is also *doing.* Afrocentricity holds that all definitions are autobiographical.

One of the key assumptions of the Afrocentrist is that all relationships are based on centers and margins and the distances from either the center or the margin. When black people view themselves as centered and central in their own history, then they see themselves as agents, actors, and participants rather than as marginals on the periphery of political or economic experience. According to this paradigm, human beings have discovered that all phenomena are expressed in the fundamental categories of *space* and *time.* Furthermore, it is then understood that relationships develop and knowledge increases to the extent that we are able to appreciate the issues of space and time.

The Afrocentric scholar or practitioner knows that one way to express Afrocentricity is by *marking.* Whenever a person delineates a cultural boundary around a particular cultural space in human time, this is called marking. It might be done with the announcement of a certain symbol, the creation of a special bonding, or the citing of personal heroes of African history and culture. Beyond citing the revolutionary thinkers in history; that is, beyond Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, and Nkrumah, black people must be prepared to act upon their interpretation of what is in their best interests, that is, in their interests as a historically oppressed population. This is the fundamental necessity for advancing the political process.

Afrocentricity is the substance of African regeneration because it is in line with what contemporary philosophers Haki Madhubuti and Maulana Karenga, among others, have articulated as in the best image and interest of African people. They ask, What is any better than operating and acting out of one's own collective interest? What is any greater than seeing the world through African eyes? What resonates more with people than understanding that Africans are central to their history, not someone else's? If Africans can, in the process of materializing their consciousness, claim space as agents of progressive change, then they can change their condition and change the world.

Afrocentricity maintains that one can claim this space only if one knows the general characteristics of Afrocentricity as well as the practical applications of the field.

Five General Characteristics of the Afrocentric Method

First, the Afrocentric method considers that no phenomenon can be apprehended adequately without locating it first. A *phenom* must be studied and analyzed in relationship to psychological time and space. It must always be located. This is the only way to investigate the complex interrelationships of science and art, design and execution, creation and maintenance, generation and tradition, and other areas bypassed by theory.

Second, the Afrocentric method considers phenomena to be diverse, dynamic, and in motion, and therefore it is necessary for a person to accurately note and record the location of phenomena even in the midst of fluctuations. This means that the investigator must know where he or she is standing in the process.

Third, the Afrocentric method is a form of cultural criticism that examines etymological uses of words and terms in order to know the source of an author's location. This allows for the intersection of ideas with actions and actions with ideas on the basis of what is pejorative and ineffective and what is creative and transformative at the political and economic levels.

Fourth, the Afrocentric method seeks to uncover the masks behind the rhetoric of power, privilege, and position to establish how principal myths create place. The method enthrones critical reflection that reveals the perception of monolithic power as nothing but the projection of a cadre of adventurers.

Fifth, the Afrocentric method locates the imaginative structure of a system of economics, bureau of politics, policy of government, and expression of cultural form in the attitude, direction, and language of the phenom, be it text, institution, personality, interaction, or event.

Analytic Afrocentricity

Analytic Afrocentricity is the application of the principles of the Afrocentric method to textual analysis. An Afrocentrist seeks to understand the principles of the Afrocentric method so that he or she may use them as a guide in analysis and discourse. It goes without saying that the Afrocentrist cannot function properly as a scientist or humanist if he or she does not adequately locate the phenom in time and space. This means that chronology is as important in some situations as location. The two aspects of analysis are central to any proper understanding of society, history, or personality.

Inasmuch as phenoms are active, dynamic, and diverse in society, the Afrocentric method requires the scientist to focus on accurate notations and recording of space and time. In fact, the best way to apprehend location of a text is to first determine where the researcher is located in time and space. Once the location and time of the researcher or author are known, it is fairly easy to establish the parameters for the phenom itself. The value of etymology, that is, the origin of terms and words, is in the proper identification and location of concepts. The Afrocentrist seeks to demonstrate clarity by exposing dislocations, disorientations, and decenteredness. One of the simplest ways of accessing textual clarity is through etymology.

Myths tie all relationships together, whether personal or conceptual. It is the Afrocentrist's task to determine to what extent the myths of society are represented as being central to, or marginal to, society. This means that any textual analysis must involve the concrete realities of lived experiences, thus making historical experiences a key element in analytical Afrocentricity. In examining attitude, direction, and language, the Afrocentrist is seeking to uncover the imagination of the author. What one seeks to do is to create an opportunity for the writer to show where he or she stands in relationship to the subject. Is the writer centered, or is the writer marginalized within his or her own story?

Afrocentric Philosophy

The philosophy of Afrocentricity as expounded by Molefi Kete Asante and Ama Mazama, central figures of the Temple School, is a way of answering all cultural, economic, political, and social questions related to African people from a centered position. Indeed, Afrocentricity cannot be reconciled to any hegemonic or idealistic philosophy. It is opposed to radical individualism as expressed in the postmodern school. But it is also opposed to *spookism,* confusion, and superstition. As an example of the differences between the methods of Afrocentricity and postmodernism, consider the following question, "Why have Africans been shut out of global development?"

The postmodernist would begin by saying that there is no such thing as "Africans" because there are many different types of Africans and all Africans are not equal. The postmodernist would go on to say that if there were Africans and if the conditions were as described by the querist, then the answer would be that Africans had not fully developed their own capacities in relationship to the global economy and therefore they are outside of the normal development patterns of the world economy. On the other hand, the Afrocentrist does not question the fact that there is a collective sense of Africanity revealed in the common experiences of the African world. The Afrocentrist would look to the questions of location, control of the hegemonic global economy, marginalization, and power positions as keys to understanding the underdevelopment of African people.

Molefi Kete Asante

See also Race; Racism; Social Bond Theory; Social Constructionist Theory

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AGEISM

Ageism is a form of prejudice directed toward older members of a society. Like other forms of negative group stereotyping, ageism can vary in both its intensity and its effect on the targeted group. People who possess unflattering dispositions toward the elderly may not cause them direct harm if their feelings are unexpressed. When these sentiments are more severe or very commonly held by dominant groups, however,

they may take institutionalized forms as in the case of discriminatory labor practices. Many sociologists believe that these practices are responsible for the subordination of the elderly in an age-stratified society.

Theories on Age Prejudice

Cognitive theorists believe that people develop mental images of what it means to be old that guide their understanding of the late stages of the life course. According to communication accommodation theory, these images tend to induce the young to expect certain behaviors from the old, and to act according to these expectations when they are in their presence. The communication predicament of aging model further predicts that these encounters between the young and the old will tend to result in the reinforcement of age-based stereotypes among both the old and the young. For example, as younger people attempt to assist older people with tasks that they are capable of handling on their own, both may experience frustration at the lack of perceived compatibility with one another. These frustrating experiences may then influence their expectations for future encounters, which can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Elders may also be the targets of prejudice due to what social constructivists describe as a bias toward the young in a society's stock of knowledge about old age. The social constructivist perspective identifies ways in which people interpret old age through language, culture, and social behavior. The media are also actors in this process because they influence popular beliefs about old age by promoting age-based stereotypes in literature, film, and news reporting. The constructivist paradigm has been used to support the notion that elders in society make up a minority group that suffers from the control that younger people hold over the dissemination of legitimated knowledge.

Ageism in the Workplace

In 1967, the U.S. Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibited discrimination against Americans over the age of 40 in hiring, promoting, compensating, or any other action that affects entry or favor in the workplace. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for the enforcement of this law as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and other laws that protect the equal rights of U.S. workers. As awareness of the ADEA grew in recent decades, the number of complaints increased. Some critics charge, however, that the commission does not prosecute enough cases to make a real difference in U.S. society. The EEOC settled over 14,000 age discrimination cases in 2005, totaling approximately $77 million in settlements.

These statistics cannot measure the full extent of age discrimination in the workplace, nor do they suggest that the system adequately addresses the problem. Most analysts believe that the number of actual cases is far higher than the number of complaints made to the EEOC. The trend of early retirement among the elderly may be an indirect sign that older Americans experience difficulty staying employed as they advance in age. Although full Social Security retirement benefits are only available to those who begin collecting at the age of 65 (plus a few months at present), many workers, especially men, are applying for reduced early retirement benefits in their early 60s. Even though the ADEA prohibits mandatory retirement policies for most jobs, many older workers face subtle disincentives from their employers to continue working beyond certain ages.

Are the Elderly a Minority Group?

Debate among sociologists on the subject of ageism often centers on the classification of the old as a minority group. Proponents for the application of the minority group paradigm contend that older members of society tend to be judged on the basis of overgeneralizations about their personalities, behavior, and health. Social scientific research reveals that many younger people believe that the elderly generally possess characteristics such as being stubborn, obstinate, and weak. Although normally false, these stereotypes may lead to group prejudice and discrimination against older people. Another common belief is that elders see themselves as members of a subculture in society, as evidenced by the leisure groups and political action organizations that recruit many elders. In fact, some people label such groups in political arenas as "greedy geezers" who seek to unfairly maximize their government pensions and benefits. Organizations such as the AARP, formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons, represent the interests of elders in

a formalized way, helping to improve their quality of life.

On the other hand, some insist that age cannot be used as a basis for a minority group, offering several arguments to support their position. Some contend that minority group status cannot depend on age because all people would enter into or out of it over the course of their lives. Also, because age is an arbitrary measure, the exact point at which one would become a member of the aged minority group is naturally subject to debate. In response to the claim that the aged are victims of prejudice, critics of the minority group paradigm have pointed out that many surveys also show that the young hold very positive images of the old in some important ways. For example, psychologists and communications theorists have found that despite the prevalence of negative aging stereotypes held by the young, they actually see many positive characteristics in the old, such as dependability, pride, loyalty, and patriotism. Finally, political science research shows that, despite high levels of voter turnout among the aged, most tend not to vote in a bloc, which some define as evidence that older people do not see themselves as members of a minority group.

Christopher Donoghue

See also Discrimination; Elderly Socioeconomic Status; Life Course; Minority Group; Stereotyping

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Aid to Families with Dependent Children

From 1935 to 1996, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the major government-funded means-tested public assistance program for low-income children and their caretakers. Its antecedents were states' mothers pension programs, which reflected the child-centered, "maternalist" philosophy of the Progressive Era.

Originally a relatively minor component of the Social Security Act targeted at poor widows and their children, AFDC was a federal–state cost-sharing partnership. States retained the authority to determine eligibility requirements and benefit levels and to administer the program. However, the program lacked specific safeguards against racial discrimination, particularly in determination of eligibility. It was not controversial until the size and racial composition of caseloads began to change in the 1950s.

In 1961, amendments to the Social Security Act created AFDC-UP, giving states the option of extending benefits to families with unemployed fathers and creating an extensive set of rehabilitation and prevention services. Five years later, other amendments emphasized work as an alternative to welfare, establishing the Work Incentive Program and allowing AFDC recipients to keep the first $30 in monthly earnings and one third of subsequent earnings without a cut in benefits. Although judicial decisions in the 1960s struck down "suitable home" and "man-in-the-house" provisions and states' residency requirements, efforts by advocates to establish a constitutional "right to welfare" through the courts failed. Proposals to establish a guaranteed annual income, such as the Family Assistance Plan of 1970, were defeated in Congress by an unusual coalition of conservatives and liberals.

The dramatic increase in welfare costs and caseloads in the 1960s led to calls for welfare reform. The proponents of reform, however, generally overlooked the small percentage of the federal budget (1 percent) that AFDC consumed, the low level and wide variation of benefits, and the percentage of Americans who received AFDC (about 5 percent). They also significantly overstated the extent of long-term dependency and welfare fraud and ignored the fact that about 70 percent of recipients were children.

Failure to reform AFDC in the 1970s led to further changes in 1981, restricting access to benefits and encouraging states to establish work incentive demonstration programs. Families with fathers absent due to military service and caretakers who participated in strikes were now ineligible. The definition of *dependent child* was narrowed; states could require employment searches at the time of application. An income limit of 150 percent of states' need standard was set and the sequence of the earned income disregards changed. States could also count previously excluded income sources available to some families.

Between 1970 and 1996, through benefit cuts and failure to keep pace with inflation, AFDC grants lost between 18 percent and 68 percent of their value. By 1995, states' maximum AFDC grants ranged from 8.6 percent to 46.1 percent of per capita income, and the combined benefits of AFDC and food stamps ranged from 41 percent to 85 percent of the federal poverty threshold.

Michael Reisch

See also Culture of Dependency; Culture of Poverty; Poverty; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

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Alcoholism

Alcoholism is a type of substance addiction characterized by a preoccupation with alcohol and impaired control over alcohol consumption. Alcoholism is similar to illicit drug addiction in its association with physical and psychological dependence. However, as alcohol consumption is legal and socially accepted, problematic use often goes unrecognized and lacks the same social stigma as illicit drug use. Alcoholism falls into two separate but overlapping categories: dependence and abuse.

Alcohol abuse is more prevalent among youth and young adults and is characterized by binge drinking, often resulting in legal problems such as drunk-driving arrests or interpersonal problems such as failure to fulfill employment responsibilities. In this entry the chronic and degenerative form of alcoholism—dependence—is the primary focus. Characterizing alcohol dependence is long-term abuse and the degradation of health caused by sustained long-term use. Onset of dependence can be slow, often taking years. The major criteria for diagnosis are increasing tolerance to the effects of use, loss of control over consumption, unsuccessful attempts to control use, continued drinking despite negative consequences stemming from use, the experience of withdrawal symptoms (the shakes, nausea) when consumption ceases, and drinking alcohol to relieve such symptoms.

History

The alcohol temperance and prohibition movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries had some moderate success in framing alcoholism as a moral and social problem. Shortly after the repeal of prohibition, the foundation of *Alcoholics Anonymous* and the *Yale Research Center* played a key role in changing the definition of alcoholism from that of a personal defect and moral weakness to one based on the "disease model" that is dominant today. The *American Medical Association* (AMA) officially recognized alcoholism as a nonpsychiatric disease in 1956. This acknowledgment was an important step in reducing the social stigma previously associated with alcoholism. The creation of the *National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism* (NIAAA) in 1971 and the passing of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act in 1970 were instrumental in the increased proliferation of treatment and counseling services that began in the 1970s, as well as further reducing social stigma by protecting alcoholics from job discrimination.

Whereas the adoption of a disease model of alcoholism is generally viewed as a progressive development in medical science, it should also be viewed as a significant social and political accomplishment. By increasing the scope of institutions such as the AMA and giving rise to new government bureaucracies such as the NIAAA, the disease model laid the foundation for the birth of a multimillion-dollar "alcoholism industry" devoted to the scientific study and treatment of alcohol use.

Demographics

Among the U.S. working-age population, an estimated 24.5 million meet the criteria for alcohol dependence, and lifetime prevalence rates among adults are between 14 percent and 24 percent. Generally speaking, rates of alcoholism decline as age increases. With respect to sex, alcoholism is at least twice as prevalent in males as females. Alcoholism is somewhat more prevalent among those of lower socioeconomic status groups and those with lower levels of educational attainment. That is, as income and education level increase, the likelihood of alcoholism decreases. Finally, with regard to race, research consistently finds higher levels of alcoholism in whites than in blacks. Prevalence among Asians and Hispanics is generally lower than in whites, whereas Native Americans generally display higher levels of both dependency and general use than other racial or ethnic groups.

Causes

Reliably identifying the causes of alcoholism is challenging. Twin and adoption studies found evidence of a hereditary predisposition, but a genetic basis for alcoholism has not been consistently established. Other research suggests that a family history of alcoholism is largely dependent on race and ethnicity. For example, alcoholism among Native American families is twice as common as among white, black, and Hispanic families. However, such research is socially controversial and widely criticized. In addition to research elucidating genetic and biological correlations, numerous social variables are also linked to alcoholism. Factors such as family structure, peer networks and the reinforcement of alcohol use, and alcohol availability are key contributors. Additionally, cognitive factors such as increased stress or strain, combined with an inadequate ability to effectively cope with emotional distress and other problems, can play a role.

Associated Problems

The physical health risks resulting from alcoholism are numerous. Such risks include death from alcohol poisoning, heart disease, brain damage, nerve damage leading to impaired mobility, various types of liver problems, poor nutrition, severe and prolonged depression, insomnia, and sexual dysfunction. Withdrawal from sustained alcohol dependence is similar to withdrawal from heroin and is occasionally fatal. Symptoms can include nausea, severe headaches, seizures, the shakes, and hallucinations.

In terms of social health, alcohol is a major contributor to motor vehicle accidents, violence, and assaults, as well as such problems as drunk driving and public disorder. Alcoholism also correlates highly with homelessness, and research indicates that over half of the homeless population in the United States meets the criteria for alcoholism. With respect to violent crime, research consistently notes that the psychopharmacological effects of alcohol significantly increase the propensity toward aggressiveness and violent behavior, particularly among males. Research indicates that a substantial number of homicide and assault offenders are drunk at the time of their crimes. With respect to domestic violence and abuse, roughly two thirds of those who experienced violence by a partner reported that alcohol was a contributing factor. Among victims of spousal abuse specifically, roughly 75 percent of incidents involve an offender who had been drinking. Excessive alcohol use among offenders is also common in various acts of sexual assault, including rape.

Other research specifies a negative association between alcoholism and employment opportunities and wages for both males and females. Alcohol dependence also decreases the likelihood of full-time work and educational attainment. The broader social and economic costs of alcohol dependence are also substantial. The NIAAA estimates that the annual economic cost of alcoholism in the United States is approximately $150 billion. The cost includes health care for physical and mental problems related to alcoholism, abuse and addiction treatment services, and lost work potential and productivity.

Economists and other researchers strongly criticize the NIAAA cost estimates in the areas of medical care, social services, and lost productivity, asserting that estimates in the hundreds of billions of dollars are grossly overstated. Still, even using conservative estimates, alcoholism is one of the most widespread and costly substance abuse problems in the United States. With the exception of nicotine addiction, alcoholism is more costly to the United States than all drug problems combined.

Philip R. Kavanaugh

See also Addiction; Binge Drinking

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ALIENATION

Alienation is related to social problems both in substance and in terms of how we look at social problems. In the context of modern everyday language and "commonsense" perspectives and views, the term *alienation* frequently is employed to express a feeling of separation—ranging from one's experiences with others, work, nature, social environment, political process, and system, all the way to "the world as it is." Yet this feeling of being separated links concretely to the prevalence of myriad social problems (unemployment, drug abuse, poverty, mental illness, domestic violence, etc.). Understood in this latter sense, alienation can serve as a means to express and describe a certain type of experience and, more important, as a tool to address and dissect the nature of everyday life and to identify its origins and causes. Depending on how the concept is employed, momentous implications result for the orientation and purpose of social research and social scientists' perspectives on social problems.

At its most basic level, the concept served to verbalize the experience of individuals who were alienated, or "estranged," from their social environment. Though dating back to the ancient Romans, the modern use of the concept originated, above all, in the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel and the early writings of Karl Marx. Hegel argued that it is not possible for enlightened individuals to identify fully with a society as a concrete sociohistoric reality. Throughout history, religions purported to offer a solution to individuals' experience of separation—solutions that had to be illusory, because religion as an institution is contingent on individuals being unable to grasp how the experience of separation is a corollary of life in increasingly complex aggregates of human beings. Yet, Hegel argued, the modern age promises the reconciliation of individuals and society through the development of institutions that reflect the values of individuals as citizens and their ability to recognize that those values cannot be translated directly into social, political, and economic reality, but instead are implemented in a mediated fashion, through a dialectical process.

In Marx's critical theory, alienation served to capture the highly problematic condition of social life in the modern age. Marx's use of the term *alienation* went beyond that of Hegel, as he argued that individuals experience in "bourgeois society" an alienation from the product of their labor, from themselves, from nature, from each other, and from the species, which is thus a new form of alienation that is qualitatively different from the past history of human civilization. Though it is widely acknowledged that Marx's theoretical agenda began with his critique of alienation as a by-product of the economic processes that made possible the rise of bourgeois society—the price society must pay to make possible the continuous pursuit of prosperity—there is less awareness of the extent to which his entire critical project is built around his concern about alienation as a feature of modern social life. In his 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, Marx famously laid the foundation for his later critique of political economy, in whose context he reformulated his earlier critique of alienation as the critique of "commodity fetishism."

Marx came to understand that, to grasp the nature of the link between the capitalist mode of production and alienation, as both a societal condition and a social mechanism, he had to develop the tools to identify the specific process that generated alienation and thus followed his step toward the systematic critique of political economy. In the process, he came to appreciate how successive generations of people internalize compounded levels of alienation, interpreting them as "natural" to human existence on Earth. Consequently, commodity fetishism is both a more theoretically sophisticated mode of capturing alienation and a means to capture a more subtle, historically later form of alienation—"alienation as second nature." If it was Marx's initial philosophical goal to conceive of strategies to overcome alienation, his later work turned around the realization that the capitalist mode of production undercuts opportunities to bring about desirable qualitative change. Marx's critiques of political economy, from *Grundrisse* to *Das Kapital*,

thus should be read as a sustained explanation for why it is increasingly difficult to reconcile norms and facts in modern society, even though the latter postures as the kind of society that makes reconciliation more conceivable and realizable than any other.

Among the implications of perspectives on modern society through alienation is the realization that we are naturally positioned neither to recognize alienation as a by-product of the pursuit of prosperity nor to conceive of the detrimental impact it has on our ability to acknowledge and make explicit the dynamics that are at the core of modern society. These implications apply in particular with regard to the relationships between, first, science—especially social science—and society, and second, individual and society. If we are not able to recognize that modern society is constituted through sedimented layers of alienation, we interpret its concrete forms as expressions of human nature and the logic of social order, independently of the social forces that may actually generate alienation: the capitalist mode of production that creates the logic of a particular social order. While we must be concerned with whether the logic of social order in complex and contradictory societies can be conceived independently of alienation, in both cases, the challenge is recognizing the sway of alienation. If we assume that modern complex societies are not possible without alienation and conclude that there is no need to acknowledge the sway of alienation, we further amplify alienation. If we assume that our nature is what it is with or without alienation and that because without alienation we would not have become who we are, it is not necessary to acknowledge alienation as a crucial force, we not only neglect its actual power, but double it. We are *how* we are to a large extent because of alienation. As we try to grasp how we have been shaped by the prevalence of alienation, efforts to theorize truly alternative forms of social life become all the more daunting. Can social scientists escape the vicious cycle—and if so, how?

Despite frequent assertions that the theoretical preoccupation with alienation is outdated, the agenda posed by alienation remains central to the very possibility of social science. Many of the most problematic features of modern society—the exaggerated orientation toward economic considerations, the perpetuation of path-dependent developments without acknowledging how they limit our ability to confront the actual complexity and contradictory nature of modern society, and so forth—are not becoming less pronounced under conditions of globalization, but much more so. If we were to eliminate the concept of alienation from the sociological vocabulary, we not only would deprive ourselves of one of the most powerful tools to scrutinize the flawed character of the modern world. By default, we also would assert that the current trajectory of sociohistorical change is as desirable as it is necessary. Thus we would support, de facto, the neoliberal conceit that pushing ahead as far and as fast as possible the process of globalization will bring "the end of poverty" and increasing control over social problems. Yet this conceit is contradicted by overwhelming empirical evidence indicating that economic inequality (along with forms of social, political, and cultural inequality) is increasing not just globally, but especially nationally around the globe. We also have at our disposal theoretically grounded explanations of why and how growing inequality, within the modern framework of purportedly self-regulating market economies and democratic nation-states, does not expand the ability of citizenries and institutions to tackle (not to mention *solve*) the myriad social problems but solidifies their "quasi-natural" character and air of inevitability. Holding on to, and sharpening further, the concept of alienation for analytical purposes neither implies, nor must it be based upon the expectation, that eliminating alienation is a realistic goal for the foreseeable future. At best, strategies directed at "overcoming" alienation may achieve some limited successes if they are not directed at radically transforming the current system of global transnational capitalism, as this system keeps driving its ability to immunize itself against scrutiny as well as collective action to ever greater heights. Rather, endeavors to overcome alienation as a determining factor in the lives of individuals, social groups, institutions, organizations, and nation-states must be directed at identifying and preparing the necessary preconditions for efforts to reduce the prevalence of alienation to be minimally successful. Basic income-related proposals, for instance, provide an example for endeavors that are directed at creating circumstances that allow for forms of action, solidarity, and organization that point beyond alienated conditions.

From Psychoanalysis to "Socioanalysis"

Individuals cannot actively overcome alienation, because it is an inherently social condition that is at the very core of modern society. Yet we may be able to take steps toward *recognizing* the power of

alienation over our lives and existence. Because alienation first and foremost is manifest in concrete practices, relationships, and ways of thinking, altering each and all of those will be necessary first steps. Sociologists seek to help the rest of us conceive of, and to scrutinize rigorously, who and what we are as individuals, as a reflection and representation of specific, defining features of modern society—both in general and in particular. As long as individuals are oblivious to this fact, our lives—more than not—are reenactments of practices related to values which, in the interest of social stability and integration, we must regard as our very own, but which are, in fact, imprinted onto our selves as an integral part of the process of identity-formation, well before we become conscious of our own selves. The nature of the relationship between self and society is becoming increasingly problematic proportionately to the degree to which the configuration of modern society itself is becoming problematic. Compounded layers of alienation undermine our ability to recognize the intrinsic relationship between the growing potential for destruction that comes with the pursuit of prosperity. In analogy to psychoanalysis, sociology must embrace the possibility of and need for *socioanalysis* as one of its greatest yet unopened treasure troves. Socioanalysis in this sense involves therapeutically enabling the individual to recognize how, in addition to psychological limitations and barriers, there are societal limitations and barriers that both are built into and constitute our very selves as social beings. As long as these limitations and barriers are not recognizable as necessary preconditions for the possibility of social order and integration, individual efforts to achieve freedom and to engage in agency will be thwarted by the (socially imposed) imperative to interpret the disabling consequences of those limitations for individuals' efforts to construct meaningful life histories as "personal" and "psychological" in the language of mental illness rather than of "false consciousness." Whether sociologists in the future will make a truly constructive contribution to the lives of human beings and their efforts to overcome social problems indeed may depend on our ability and willingness to meet the challenge of circumscribing the thrust and purpose of socioanalysis, above and beyond the confines of what Freud erroneously ascribed to psychoanalysis, neglecting that many mental problems are expressions of the contradictions of the modern age.

Harry F. Dahms

See also Mental Depression; Socialism; Stressors

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American Dream

For an immigrant, the American Dream is to achieve economic well-being and a good quality of life through hard work, entrepreneurship, and perseverance. It is the driving force behind most immigration, and its realization is the achievement dimension of the incorporation process. A main topic addressed in immigration literature is the high variance of intragenerational mobility. Why do some immigrants advance quickly while others remain at the bottom end of the economic ladder?

Essentially, incorporation along one dimension speeds up incorporation along another. For example, better command of the native tongue allows for better-paying jobs that involve day-to-day use of the native tongue, which in turn enhance language improvement. This mechanism, together with others, gives rise to two incorporation tracks: a fast and a stationary one. As a result, incorporation outcomes, particularly achievement, tend to be dichotomous.

Another mechanism is the one that causes growing income inequality in any capitalist system:

money accumulation. The returns on previous investments allow for subsequent larger investments with greater returns. This is, of course, true for any participant in a capitalist society, immigrant or native. For the special case of immigrants, accompanying this core mechanism is a host of additional mechanisms that further widen the gap between rich and poor.

When immigrants find better-paying jobs outside their ethnic economy, this is often through a referral by someone already participating in the mixed economy. Migrants with a friend outside the ethnic group more likely receive news about jobs outside the ethnic economy. Those who lack such a friend will more likely continue to work in the ethnic economy. Given that cross-ethnic friends are more likely to know about jobs in the mixed economy than co-ethnic friends, economic incorporation is contingent upon incorporation along the friendship dimension. Vice versa, some colleagues and their contacts—who most likely also work outside the ethnic economy—become friends. Incorporation in multiethnic friendship networks is therefore also contingent upon economic incorporation. The new friends will further enhance job opportunities. This spiraling process will increasingly distinguish economically a group of people with largely co-ethnic friends and co-ethnic colleagues and another with largely cross-ethnic friends and cross-ethnic colleagues.

Cross-ethnic contact facilitates language improvement, and, vice versa, cross-ethnic contacts more readily develop if one speaks the host language better. The former is true because conversations with those of a different ethnicity are more likely in the host language. Language skills then develop more rapidly if more contacts are cross-ethnic. Conversely, because a better command of the spoken language facilitates conversations, cross-ethnic contacts develop more rapidly with improved language skills. Those who barely speak the host language, by contrast, find it difficult to maintain such contacts and tend to lose even the few they may have. This feedback process causes a greater and greater divergence between those with both language skills and a network entrance into the mixed economy and those who are incorporated along neither dimension. The former's economic opportunities become better and better than the latter's.

Interaction breeds similarity and similarity breeds interaction. These tendencies are known as *influence* and *attraction*. Attraction is the tendency of people to interact with similar others more than with dissimilar others. Influence concerns the opposite causality and is the tendency of people to grow similar to interaction partners. Together these two pervasive tendencies produce the phenomenon of homophily. In the case of immigrants, those who interact with members of other ethnic groups more often acculturate faster, more readily adopting norms, values, and traditions widely shared across society and losing ethnic-specific norms, values, and traditions. Frequent cross-ethnic contact may erode ethnic traditions and encourage identification with those from another ethnicity, whereas continuous participation in co-ethnic friendship networks, colleagueship, and neighborhoods enhances ethnic solidarity. Conversely, the sharing of norms, values, and traditions eases interaction, decreasing social distance. In combination, they produce a dichotomy between those who, with increasing speed, drift away from their ethnic traditions and contacts and those who maintain strong bonds and cherish ethnic traditions.

Immigrants with higher incomes can more readily find housing outside the ethnic neighborhood. Economic incorporation thus facilitates spatial integration (the spatial assimilation hypothesis). These more affluent neighborhoods, in turn, are perhaps closer to better-paying jobs and have resources that facilitate economic advancement. Again, a spiral is present that, in combination with the previously described spirals, breaks up the immigrant population into those who incorporate along all dimensions and those who continue to cherish ethnic norms, values, and traditions; have friends in ethnic networks; work in the ethnic economy; reside in the ethnic neighborhood; and speak the host language poorly.

These polarizing mechanisms provide a simple theoretical account of polarization in immigrants' economic advancement. Thus, economic success, on the one hand, and incorporation along other dimensions (residential integration, native language improvement, acculturation), on the other hand, affect each other positively. At least three counteracting mechanisms weaken this correlation of economic success with noneconomic incorporation. First, dense and exclusive ethnic networks can function as a resource rather than as a restriction in immigrant economic advancement, as fellow ethnic group members, building on trust and friendship ties, provide startup funds for a business in the ethnic economy. Second, cross-ethnic contact may increase rather than decrease ethnic awareness, a phenomenon called *reactive ethnicity.* Third, critics of the spatial assimilation hypothesis say it

neglects the ethnic barriers that, through discrimination and in-group favoritism, prevent income increases from automatically translating into neighborhood integration.

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See also Acculturation; Assimilation; Discrimination; Ethnic Group; Immigration; Inequality; Intergenerational Mobility; Labor Market; Mixed Economy; Norms; Segmented Assimilation; Social Capital; Social Networks; Values

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Americanization

The term *Americanization* generally refers to the assimilation of immigrants into U.S. society, a meaning now endowed with negative connotations. The unpopular interpretation rests on its association with the Americanization movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This movement, particularly during and after World War I, advocated immediate and coercive assimilation through English language and citizenship programs to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, then considered by nativists to be superior. Thus, the Americanization movements became synonymous with forced assimilation, nationalism, and xenophobia.

Historically, several factors led to the escalation of nativist fears. First, specific circumstances in Europe, like the Irish famine and the change in British government policies, sent immigrants to the United States in exponentially increasing numbers. Between 1841 and 1860, over 1.7 million persons arrived. Second, the discovery of gold in California in 1848 initiated yet another new immigration stream, that of the Chinese. By the early 1900s, technological improvements and increased trade made travel much more affordable, leading to an unprecedented increase in the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The lack of knowledge about the new groups, as well as their different appearance and customs, brought about heightened concerns among native whites, particularly on the eve of World War I.

Nativist sentiments and social movements like the Know-Nothing Movement, established in 1850 with the motto "America for Americans," defined a path for the first policy restrictions on immigration. In 1875, the U.S. government passed the first law directly restricting immigration by prohibiting the entrance of "convicts and prostitutes." A few years later, in 1882, the Chinese Exclusionary Act passed, after the urging of California voters who overwhelmingly agreed with their Republican senator, Aaron Sargent, that "Chinese immigrants are unwilling to conform to our institutions, to become permanent citizens of our country, to accept the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and have indicated no capacity to assimilate with our people."

On a larger national scale, the Immigration Restriction League, founded in 1894 by a group of Harvard College graduates, many of whom believed in eugenics and Anglo-Saxon superiority, became among the first groups to demand the establishment of an entrance literacy test for all immigrants. They considered people from southern and eastern Europe (Greeks, Italians, Slavs, and Jews) to be an inferior race. American Federation of Labor leaders, believing that a large flow of immigrant workers could jeopardize the labor movement, supported the literacy test, which passed as legislation in 1917. Nevertheless, it did not inhibit immigration much, as most immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were literate by then.

Parallel with the push for immigrant restrictions were attempts to "absorb" the immigrants. The absorption process built upon the melting pot idea, at the time associated with a "pressure-cooker" Americanization. The public schools offered classes in English language and citizenship to new immigrants, with evening classes sponsored by businessmen, who did not want immigration restrictions but feared a radicalized labor force, given the rise of Bolshevism and the "red scare." Private immigrant groups also offered educational programs that stressed the teaching of English and

"civics" as the most secure road to Americanization. Creating further an atmosphere of urgency and necessity, the Americanization movement took upon itself to institute English language classes in factories. The first phase, starting in 1907 under the auspices of the YMCA, combined the process of naturalization with an industrial safety campaign. Employers supported this process, because it was essential that workers understand simple safety instructions to minimize work-related accidents. The second phase started in 1915 and became a central part of the "Americanization crusade."

One of the most influential persons in the militant phase of the Americanization movement was Frances Kellor, an "authority" on immigration and immigrant legislation, advising Roosevelt on immigrant matters. In 1914, Ms. Kellor became vice chair of the Committee on Immigrants in America and, a year later, editor of its journal, *Immigrants in America Review,* which was devoted to Americanization. In the *Yale Review* of 1919 she wrote, "Americanization is the science of racial relations in America, dealing with the assimilation and amalgamation of diverse races in equity into an integral part of the national life." This point of view was the apogee of the model of Anglo-conformity and the epitome of the Americanization movement, which, during and after World War I, called for the immediate "100 percent Americanization" of immigrants. Notably, most of these discussions of immigrant Americanization and assimilation excluded blacks as participants and as a topic in the debates. Consequently, Americanization became associated with racism, nationalism, and xenophobia.

Two additional historical processes solidified the unfavorable connotations of the term *Americanization*: the treatment of American Indians and the annexation of Puerto Rico. The process of naturalization for American Indians included destroying tribal organizations, repressing religious ceremonies, allowing only English in schools, and teaching about only white culture and history. The occupation of Puerto Rico was followed by discouraging Spanish cultural identification and traditions and enforcing the English language.

Whereas *Americanization* relates to a difficult history of coercion in the United States, the contemporary view of the adaptation, incorporation, and assimilation of immigrants into U.S. society is one of a voluntary process, through which immigrants make choices guided by rational strategies to improve their own lives. However, even the most sensitive approaches to immigrant incorporation cannot "save" the term *Americanization*. In more international interpretations, Americanization now means imposing U.S. culture, traditions, and the capitalist economic system on other countries around the world. It may thus be one rather daunting task to restore this term to a more lasting and positive meaning.

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See also Acculturation; Assimilation; Cultural Imperialism; Cultural Relativism; Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism; Melting Pot; Multiculturalism; Nativism; Pluralism

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Anomie

Anomie refers to the improper operation or relative absence of normative regulation in an aggregate entity or environment, ranging from groups and communities to entire societies and the globe. Most conceptualizations of anomie stress normative breakdown, making this aspect critical to understanding any form of anomie. Its importance lies in the impacts and effects of inadequate regulation on individual, group, and societal pathologies. For these and other reasons,

anomie has been an integral part of philosophical and social science debates about the nature of modern individuals and societies. Anomie-related research is thus prominent in multiple disciplines, including psychology, sociology, criminology, criminal justice, and political science.

Anomie varies by duration, intensity, source, and location. Some of its main types and typologies incorporating space and time elements include chronic, acute, simple, political, economic, institutional, cultural, social, and psychological anomie. Anomic conditions create unstable and uncertain environments where individuals face difficulties in coordination and cooperation and in determining whether or which formal and informal norms to follow. Generally, all types of anomie are consequential for the viability and predictability of social relationships, in the functioning of societal institutions and groups, and in producing crime and other pathological and deviant behavior. Although sometimes viewed in absolutist terms, anomie is a relative phenomenon with particular spatial and temporal referents.

The origin of anomie traces back to the notions in classical Greece of *anomia* and *anomus*, defined respectively as lawlessness and "without law." The use of anomie in Renaissance England debates about human nature, religion, and the law rested on these earlier Greek roots. The view of anomie in these debates was as a condition of society with a lack of, or a lack of compliance with, laws and as representing a situation that might emerge without a rational foundation of law.

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) presented the most widely known historical use of anomie, borrowing the term from French philosopher Jean Marie Guyau (1854–88). Guyau advocated an individual-based notion of anomie, viewing it as a positive condition countering the dominance of religious dogma and morality. Although Durkheim's interpretation offered some positive features and a few similarities to Guyau's individual-level anomie, Durkheim's work is largely negative and emphasized social institutions and societal changes as responsible for anomie. Durkheim's activist side emphasized restoration and repair of society's normative systems using social institutions to counter any negative aspects of anomic conditions. Academically, Durkheim's applications of anomie exemplify early positivistic sociological methodologies.

Anomie, for Durkheim, is a moral judgment on the condition of society and the basis for normative prescriptions on needed changes, rather than a moral or psychological state of an individual. Sociological and social science conceptualizations of anomie differ specifically on this point with their psychological and philosophical counterparts. Most macro-sociological conceptions of anomie build upon the work of Durkheim in viewing societal conditions as having a reality independent and distinct from the mental and emotional characteristics and actions of individuals. Further, these conditions including anomie were external to individuals and constrained individual behavior. Durkheim saw modern individuals with natural egoistical desires but with inherently social attributes that required cultivation and regulation.

Some sociologists unduly emphasize the individualistic side of Durkheim's view of human nature to develop social control, bonding, and disorganization theories to examine individual-centered and institutionally mediated deviance. These interpretations of anomie are incompatible with Durkheim's societal and functional focus on the necessity of extra-individual organs to counter anomic tendencies accompanying modernization. High levels of controls and regulation were also problematic for Durkheim. Micro conceptualizations of anomie exclusively focus on the individual manifestations, origins, and effects of anomie as well as on its subjective aspects.

U.S. sociologist Robert K. Merton developed his conceptualization of anomie through extension of the macro-sociological tradition built by Durkheim. For Merton, anomie was a cultural imbalance between cultural goals and norms, with emphasis of promoted goals over approved means. A poorly integrated culture was one of the critical ingredients producing a nonrandom, but patterned, distribution of deviant behavior. Unlike Talcott Parsons and other functionalists bent on advocating social engineering of institutions to achieve regulation of individual goals to meet predetermined societal ends, Merton examined these ends and accompanying regulatory norms as empirical and contingent outcomes dependent on individual decisions and societal structures. When institutionalized expectations do not guide behavior and individuals do not use the prescribed norms, some individuals choose to use nonprescribed means attenuating the already imbalanced culture. For Merton, anomie becomes a more permanent fixture in society for these reasons.

In Merton's analysis, the organization of society and normal operation of societal institutions created the conditions of deviant behavior. Merton promoted the notion that nonconformity is rooted in society rather than in human nature and is a result of normal (not abnormal) conditions. Unlike Durkheim, Merton emphasized the distributional consequences of anomie in a stratified society, stressed the magnification and intensification of anomie through individual adaptations, and recognized the plurality of social controls and individual normative commitments that inhibited single-cause, general explanations of anomie and deviant behavior. Extensive debates about the broader application and testing of both Merton's and Durkheim's concepts of anomie and the labeling of both theorists as functionalists are responsible for the distortion of their theories and for misapplications and empirical testing of anomie at individual levels of analyses.

Anomie is not a unitary concept; it is subject to varying interpretations depending on the theories and partialities of the academic disciplines. The most prominent current application of anomie is in developmental contexts of societies undergoing dramatic transformations and adaptations to a globalizing world. While this is consistent with the macro-sociological tradition of anomie, anomie has emerged as a psychological concept requiring individualistic responses rather than as a social problem with societal implications and effects. Anomie as a cultural/societal phenomenon has little visibility to many segments of a society's population. Further, defining anomie as a truly societal problem is unlikely because those greatly impacted by anomie may not be aware of its sources and effects. Moreover, anomic arrangements are not necessarily incompatible with the structures of society.

Sanjay Marwah

See also Deviance; Norms; Role Conflict; Role Strain; Social Change; Social Disorganization

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Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 enacted mandatory minimum prison sentences designed to provide severe penalties for violations involving the possession or distribution of crack cocaine. Inspired by the hysteria surrounding the national crack and AIDS epidemics in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration reintroduced mandatory minimum sentencing laws, making them broader and more rigid than earlier drug laws. This act subsequently led to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which approved the death penalty for drug traffickers and gave the military the authority to pursue and apprehend those individuals smuggling drugs into the United States.

The act imposed severe penalties for high-profile drugs (i.e., crack cocaine): a prison sentence of 5 to 40 years for possession of the substance. These newly enacted laws ranked drug crimes among the most severely punished offenses in the United States. Sentencing guidelines adopted a 100:1 quantity ratio, treating 1 gram of crack cocaine the same as 100 grams of powdered cocaine. Also, new mandatory minimum sentences, without the possibility for probation or parole, were adopted for drug violations that involved even small amounts of crack cocaine. Conversely, individuals convicted of possession or distribution of considerably larger amounts of powder cocaine were not subject to mandatory minimum sentences. This disparity ended in December 2007, when the Supreme Court ruled that federal judges can impose sentences for crack cocaine users that are more in line with those for powder cocaine users. Because the majority of crack offenders are black, this decision eliminates an unintended racial bias embedded in the legislation.

As a part of the Reagan administration's War on Drugs, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 led to substantial increases in the arrests of drug offenders and inadvertently targeted minority offenders for the possession and sale of crack cocaine. New legislation prevented judges from looking at the individual circumstances surrounding the offense when sentencing drug offenders and gave an unparalleled amount of power to federal prosecutors; these changes had devastating effects on minority defendants. Although one of the ultimate goals of the mandatory minimum sentencing legislation within the Anti-Drug Abuse Act

was to target the foremost drug traffickers, it was actually the low-level contributors to the drug trade (i.e., street dealers, lookouts) who were most severely penalized. Recent data illustrate that roughly 70 percent of those prosecuted for crack offenses were only involved in this low-level activity within the drug trade.

Although the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was sparked by the crack epidemic, it was actually the death of Len Bias, a promising University of Maryland basketball prodigy, that quickly pushed the new laws through Congress. Bias died of a drug overdose subsequently following his selection in the National Basketball Association draft by the Boston Celtics, which instigated a sensational media campaign focused on the drug crack cocaine, which was erroneously believed to have killed him. Although it was later discovered that it was actually powder cocaine, not crack cocaine, that killed Bias, his death pressed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into legislation, making it one of the harshest and most controversial drug laws ever enacted.

Nicholas W. Bakken

See also Cocaine and Crack; Drug Abuse; Drug Abuse, Sports; Zero-Tolerance Policies

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Anti-Globalization Movement

The anti-globalization movement is a broad-based popular struggle involving workers, environmentalists, youths, peasants, the urban poor, indigenous people, and other actors across the developing and industrialized worlds striving for social and economic justice and greater democratic control over their daily lives. Activists come from diverse spheres, including nongovernmental organizations, political parties, trade unions, mass movements, informal networks and collectives, and revolutionary fronts. Moreover, anti-globalization activists combine diverse forms of action, including nonviolent civil disobedience, marches and rallies, public education, and lobbying. With this movement perhaps more aptly known as the global justice movement, participants do not oppose globalization per se, but rather corporate globalization, or the extension of corporate power around the world, undermining local communities, democracy, and the environment. The movement addresses the root causes of various social problems linked to free-market capitalism, including poverty, inequality, social dislocation, hunger, poor health, and ecological destruction.

Background

Over the past several decades national governments and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO), have implemented free-market policies such as privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, export-oriented production, and cuts in social spending and basic subsidies. These neoliberal measures have brought new regions into the global economy, while transforming social rights, such as health care and education, into commodities. Although some areas and groups have benefited, for many others the results have been disastrous, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. During the 1990s, for example, the number of people living in poverty around the globe increased by 100 million, even as world income grew 2.5 percent per year, while more than 80 countries had per capita incomes lower than the previous decade.

Over the past 10 years, corporate globalization has faced increasing opposition. Building on previous IMF food riots, grassroots mobilizations against the World Bank, anti–free trade campaigns, radical ecology and squatter movements, anti-sweatshop activism, the Zapatistas, and solidarity struggles, anti-globalization activists have built broad-based networks for social and economic justice. The movement burst onto the public radar screen in Seattle, where 50,000 protesters shut down the WTO Summit on November 30, 1999. Counter-summit actions soon spread around the world, including blockades against

the World Bank/IMF meetings in Prague in September 2000 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas Summit in Quebec City in April 2001. Protests reached an explosive crescendo with violent clashes in Gothenburg, Barcelona, and Genoa in summer 2001. Since then, activist focus has shifted toward world and regional social forums, as tens of thousands have converged at mass gatherings in cities such as Porto Alegre, Mumbai, Quito, Florence, Paris, and London to discuss alternatives to corporate globalization.

New Information and Communication Technologies

The anti-globalization movement is characterized by the innovative use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) to organize actions, share information and resources, and plan and coordinate activities. Although activists primarily employ e-mail and electronic listservs, during mobilizations they also create temporary Web sites that provide contact lists, information, and resources; post calls to action and other documents; and house discussion forums and real-time chat rooms. Particular networks also have their own Web pages, where activists can post reflections, analyses, updates, links, and logistical information. Interactive Web sites offering multiple tools for coordination are increasingly popular, including open publishing projects such as Indymedia, which allow users to freely post news and information without editorial selection and control.

Local/Global Networks

The anti-globalization movement is primarily organized around flexible, decentralized networks, such as the former Direct Action Network in North America or Peoples Global Action at the transnational scale. Anti-globalization networks are locally rooted, yet *globally* connected. Local/global activist networking is facilitated by new ICTs, which allow for coordination and communication across vast distances among small, decentralized units. In contrast to traditional parties and unions, networked movements are spaces of convergence involving a multiplicity of organizations, collectives, and networks, each retaining its own identity and autonomy. Such grassroots forms of political participation are widely seen as an alternative mode of democratic practice. Anti-globalization movements thus promote global democracy, even as they emphasize autonomy and local self-management.

Creative Direct Action

More radical anti-globalization activists have developed innovative forms of direct action protest. Found in different contexts, these activists use tactics to create theatrical images for mass media coverage, while the overall blockade strategy, where activists "swarm" their target from multiple directions, produces high-powered social drama. The performances staged by activists, including giant puppets and street theater, mobile carnivals (Reclaim the Streets), spectacular protest involving white outfits, protective shields, and padding (White Overalls), and militant attacks against the symbols of corporate capitalism (Black Bloc), are designed to capture mass media attention while expressing alternative political identities.

Lived Experience and Process

Finally, more grassroots sectors within the anti-globalization movement view social transformation as an ongoing collective process. Rather than focusing on messianic visions or an already established project, activists focus on day-to-day practices. The collaborative, interactive nature of the new ICTs is thus reflected in the rise of new political visions and forms of interaction. These combine elements of certain traditional ideologies, such as anarchism, an emphasis on internal democracy and autonomy (feminism and grassroots movements such as the Zapatistas have been particularly influential in this respect), and a commitment to openness, collaboration, and horizontal connections. Younger activists, in particular, emphasize direct democracy, grassroots participation, and personal interaction within daily social life. Meetings, protests, action camps, and other anti-globalization gatherings thus provide spaces for experiencing and experimenting with alternative ways of life.

Despite their numerous differences, anti-globalization activists from diverse political backgrounds are struggling to regain democratic control over their daily lives, wresting it back from transnational corporations and global financial elites. The anti-globalization movement points to a democratic deficit in the current global political and economic order as corporate globalization has disembedded the market from society.

What makes the anti-globalization movement unique is its capacity for coordinating across vast distances and high levels of diversity and difference, overcoming many of the political and geographic obstacles that have stymied past mass movements.

Jeffrey S. Juris

See also Countermovements; Social Conflict; Social Movements

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Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism is the active or passive, individual or collective, hatred of either empirically existing or purely mythological Jews, such that the signifier "Jew" functions as a representational substitute for social conduct or institutions deemed by the anti-Semite to be abnormal and pathological. Especially important is the manner in which "the Jew" stands in for excesses and deficiencies in social relations such that "Jews" embody a simultaneous "too much" and "not enough" logic. For example, Jews have been criticized for being simultaneously too egoistic and too altruistic or agents of both anomie (deregulation or normlessness) and fatalism (excessive regulation); in other words, "Jews" personify social imbalances.

Anti-Semitism may manifest itself in religious, political-economic, ethnoracial, and cultural terms and is typically correlated positively with psychological authoritarianism and political models such as fascism, Nazism, right-wing populism, nativism, and other movements that scapegoat a pernicious "other." It can find expression in reactions ranging from stereotypical insults at one end of the spectrum to all-out genocide at the other. More than routine bias or simple prejudice, anti-Semitism is a demonizing ideology that attempts to explain events, crises, inequalities, exploitation, and villainy by exposing the malevolent intentions of Jews as the primary, visible or invisible, causal factor. The Jew, in other words, becomes the master key to unlock the mysteries of all social problems and can therefore shade off into a freestanding worldview. In Western political culture, references to "the Jew" are frequently veiled in populist and fundamentalist currents with codes such as "European bankers" or anti-Christian, international "money barons" in order to preserve a veneer of respectability.

As a social problem, anti-Semitism fluctuates in intensity, depending on changes in social organization and social dynamics. After the Holocaust, for example, anti-Semitism was inextricably associated with Nazism and, as such, was relegated to the fringes of society in the industrialized West, and, by the 1960s, anti-Semitism was believed to be, if not nearly extinct, then definitely on the list of endangered ideological species in the United States. Since the mid-1990s, however, anti-Semitism appears to be making a comeback in the United States, especially among minority groups that, in previous generations, were relatively immune to the abstract demonization of Jews. Also, through the Internet, many hate groups have found a way to maximize their anti-Semitic diatribes. Globally, levels of anti-Semitism may be at an all-time high, especially in the Middle East, where demonological anti-Semitism has reached hysterical proportions and Jews are fully identified with Israeli state policies. Any attempt to further explain anti-Semitism must, first, distinguish between concrete anti-Jewish bias and abstract demonization and, second, between premodern and modern forms of anti-Semitism.

Routine Bias and Demonization

Garden-variety recriminations ("My Jewish landlord is cheap") fall short of true anti-Semitism. It would be unsurprising to learn, for example, that some landlords are in fact cheap and that some cheap landlords are Jews. Accusations of this concrete and specific nature frequently intersect with routine prejudice and racism. One way in which anti-Semitism and other forms of simple prejudice do coincide is in their essentializing constructions of the other, such that, keeping with the above example, "cheapness"

becomes identical with Jewishness itself—from "*This* Jew is cheap" to "*All* Jews are cheap." But anti-Semitism is not conceptually reducible to routine bias or prejudice. In simple racism or bigotry, we do not find paranoid fantasies pertaining to global domination, secret world governments, or the hidden hand of global finance and international communism. Anti-Semitism is capable of embodying any and all accusations and moves toward its pure form the closer it comes to expressing purely otherworldly and abstract conceptions.

Distinguishing between abstract and concrete forms of anti-Jewish animosity is in keeping with the main currents of critical social scientific and historical analysis over the past few generations that treat "the Jew" of anti-Semitic propaganda as a socially constructed object of hatred. Theodor W. Adorno, Maurice Samuel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Norman Cohn, Gavin Langmuir, David Norman Smith, and Stephen Wilson have all put forward authoritative, constructionist explanations that distinguish between concrete and demonological *Judenhass.* Abstract demonization came of age in medieval Europe and was expressed primarily in religious terms.

Premodern and Modern Anti-Semitism

Under the sway of Augustinian doctrines, European society conceived of itself as an organic whole, incorporated on the basis of God's free gift of grace and morally regulated through the Church. Those who did not recognize Christ's claim, it was thought, may have been evil, but, in Augustine's *Enchiridion,* evil represented only a wound or defect in the social body and, as such, was not substantively apart from good. This was important for Jews, because their not recognizing Christ's charisma led to their portrayal as defective but still human. As defective aliens within the body of Christian society, Jews were nonetheless important for their political-economic functions, especially as sources of loans, and for this reason they were subjects of alternating tolerance and persecution. The resulting arrangement between Jews and Christians was tense and often violent yet nothing like wholesale genocide in the modern sense. This situation began to change as early as the first Crusade in the 11th century and accelerated as the 14th century approached. Medieval anti-Semitism evolved in conjunction with the Black Plague, as the Catholic Church transformed itself into a cult of death and Christians persecuted Jews for their expiatory value. The 14th century represented a decisive transformation in the way European anti-Semites thought about Jews: from defective humans to devils. This period also marked the beginning of what can be called a fully developed, abstract Christian anti-Semitism and ushered in the era of spasmodic genocide against Jews that lasted for approximately 500 years.

Modern European anti-Semitism spoke French and German in the final quarter of the 19th century, but even though France delivered the spectacle of the Dreyfus Affair, French anti-Semitism was deeply contradictory and in many ways derivative. Perhaps one could make a similar assessment in the case of Russia, which contributed the pathetic *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and a wave of pogroms yet was riddled with deep internal contradictions and influenced by external sources. The French also lacked the deadly seriousness that marked the spirit of *Judenhass* that developed in Germany, where the reactionary Wilhelm Marr purportedly coined the term *anti-Semitism* during a period of profound, turbulent modernization and economic convulsions, most dramatically represented by the crash of 1873.

A crucial development in the German variety was the shift from a religiously oriented hatred toward, on the one hand, a pseudoscientific attack against Jews as an inferior racial category and, on the other, a class-based criticism of culture, capital, and liberalism. In short, Jews were no longer just "Christ-killers" or petty "loan sharks" but also biologically inferior though cunning masters of modern economic institutions sucking the lifeblood out of the Fatherland through the treachery of compound interest, political corruption, domination of administrative units, and international intrigue. Jews had been identified with capitalism before, but with the ascendancy of finance capital and speculation mania in the 1870s, the criticism of capital acquired new elements that would prove crucial in the 20th century. The key was the conservative Catholic formulation of two distinct species of capital: good, productive, Christian capital on the one hand and rapacious, parasitic, Jewish finance capital on the other. This spurious compartmentalization of capital was of paramount importance in the development of modern anti-Semitic propaganda and arguably functions today as the dominant theme among anti-Semites and as the basis for world domination conspiracies.

The consequences of organized anti-Semitism were nowhere more catastrophic than in Nazi

Germany, yet the United States represents a more instructive sociological laboratory in the study of anti-Jewish hatred. In colonial times anti-Semitism was virtually unknown, but successive waves of immigrants brought Old World prejudices. Anti-Semitism became an obvious social problem with the third wave of eastern European Jewish immigrants. Although elite snobbery existed, the greatest threat to Jews was posed by Catholic arrivals. During the Great Depression, demagogues such as Father Coughlin harangued against Jews with a Euro-Catholic style of fascist propaganda, yet the message resonated best with older Catholic males with low levels of education and weak ties to the Church, and lacking the oft-noted conditioning called "Americanization."

Mark Worrell

See also Americanization; Ethnocentrism; Prejudice; Racism; Religion and Conflict

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Apartheid

Apartheid (literally "apartness" in Afrikaans and Dutch) refers to a system of racial segregation enforced in South Africa by the white National Party from its election in 1948 until the first election open to all races in 1994. A high degree of de facto racial separation existed before 1948, including controls on black movement originally introduced by the British in the Cape Colony during the 19th century, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 limiting black land rights, and the "civilized labor" policies introduced in 1924–26 to protect poor whites, leading some to use the term *apartheid* in relation to earlier periods. More recently, the term also describes policies or systems of racial segregation elsewhere in the world, but it remains associated primarily with South Africa, where its application amounted to an ambitious attempt to remold the country's social, economic, and political geography to enable "separate development" of four designated race groups—white, colored (mixed-race), Indian, and black African or "Bantu"—in a manner that ensured continuing white domination.

The Nature of Separation

Separation affected all spheres of life, including marriage and sexual intercourse (illegal between whites and other races), health and welfare, education, job opportunities, recreation, transport, and much more. Inter-racial social mixing was difficult and, when it did occur as in some of the English-speaking churches, was often self-conscious, given the essentially separate lives that people led. Geographically, apartheid was applied at three spatial scales, all of them distinguishing primarily between white and non-white. Micro-scale or "petty apartheid" measures segregated facilities and amenities such as transport, beaches, post offices, cinemas, and even park benches. Meso-scale segregation involved racial zoning in urban areas, using the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966 to segregate whites, coloreds, and Indians. Macro-scale segregation allocated 10 *Bantustans* ("homelands") to the officially recognized black ethnic groups and attempted to minimize the black population elsewhere to that which was indispensable to the white economy. Rural black spots—small areas of black settlement surrounded by white farms—were excised, with their inhabitants resettled in the homelands, while many blacks were expelled from urban areas if they did not qualify to remain there. Altogether, 3.5 million people were forcibly relocated under apartheid policies between 1960 and 1983.

The homelands gradually became self-governing, and four of them became officially independent but recognized only by South Africa. As descendants of

earlier colonial policies creating reserves for those depending on subsistence agriculture, all the homelands were peripheral to the major centers of the South African space economy and, with the partial exception of Bophuthatswana (a significant platinum producer), all remained economically dependent on South Africa for both financial subventions and employment.

Macro-scale territorial segregation of coloreds and Indians was impracticable given their high levels of urbanization, although interprovincial movement of Indians was restricted until 1975, and Indians were prohibited from living in the Orange Free State and northern Natal until 1985. The policy of parallelism established colored and Indian political institutions whose representatives were initially nominated and subsequently elected but essentially advisory to an all-white national government elected only by whites. In 1984, a new constitution created separate Indian and colored houses of parliament with sovereignty over their own affairs, including education, health, and welfare. These houses depended on budgetary allocations from the national government, and their territorial authority, based on the Group Areas Act of 1950, was highly fragmented. Only a small minority of eligible Indians and coloreds voted in elections for these bodies in 1984 and 1989.

Urban segregation involved the forcible movement of some 125,000 families, mainly colored and Indian, under the group areas legislation, together with an unrecorded but probably larger number of blacks moved under pre-apartheid legislation to designated townships. Whites received disproportionately large areas of each city or town, including the most desirable parts, with blacks typically located close to the industrial areas where they worked. Attempts also at ethnolinguistic segregation of black groups met with limited success. Some blacks—5.5 million by 1986 when racially discriminatory influx controls were repealed—acquired rights to permanent urban residence, giving them better placement in terms of employment. For the majority, the operation of influx control strongly discouraged in-movement to the cities, with large numbers arrested under the pass laws. Special restrictions applied to black movement to the western Cape Province, home to most colored people and designated a colored labor preference area between 1962 and 1985. Elsewhere, blacks from homelands or white rural areas could seek employment in the mines or the towns only as migrant laborers, leaving their families behind in their designated homelands. However, many managed to stay in urban areas illegally, lodging with township families, while natural increase led to continuing growth of the black urban population. From 1968 onward, municipalities were expected to meet black housing needs across homeland boundaries wherever possible. This led to large black formal and informal settlements in homeland areas close to major cities, such as Mdantsane (Ciskei, near East London), and in the Winterveld of Bophuthatswana, where nearly half the homeland population lived within 50 kilometers of Pretoria. Frontier commuters who crossed daily into white South Africa to work numbered 773,000 by 1982.

Pressures Leading to Transition

President P. W. Botha attempted to reform apartheid in the 1980s, to make it more acceptable to blacks as well as coloreds and Indians who had benefited materially from the "own affairs" budgets of their new houses of parliament. The main incentives were rapid increases in black education spending (but no end of segregated schools), repeal of influx control and major indirect state support for black housing, and the creation of regional services councils mandated to spend new sources of taxation where the need was greatest.

Such material improvements were unlikely to satisfy black aspirations, both economic and political. Black resistance, hitherto largely repressed by the banning of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1960 and harsh security laws within the country, increased massively from 1984 to 1986. It not only tested the state security apparatus but attracted world attention, leading to the escalation of sanctions and other pressures against the apartheid regime. The refusal in 1986 by American and European banks to roll over short-term loans led to a net outflow of capital in the late 1980s and accelerated already serious economic problems. A new president, F. W. de Klerk, stunned the country in February 1990 by announcing the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and SACP and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners with a view to negotiations on a new political dispensation. These negotiations took 4 years, with many setbacks and much violence, some of it probably sponsored by the dying apartheid regime, but South Africa's first open elections in April

1994 ended the apartheid era and ushered in a Government of National Unity comprising the ANC, which won 62 percent of the poll, the National Party, and the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party.

The legacy of apartheid will pervade South Africa for many decades. It remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with class gradually replacing race but intra-racial inequalities increasing since 1994. Desegregation is certainly occurring in residential areas and schools, but almost entirely "up" the apartheid racial hierarchy, leaving most blacks as poor (or poorer) and as segregated as before. Politically, however, the achievement of relatively peaceful political transition has been consolidated through three democratic general elections, in 1994, 1999, and 2004.

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See also Discrimination; Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism; Hypersegregation; Nation Building; Pluralism; Race; Racism; Segregation; Stratification, Race; White Supremacy

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Arms Control

Arms control is a means of addressing a major and enduring global social problem: arms proliferation. This entails the production and spread of weapons, ranging from small arms and light weapons, through missiles and military aircraft, up to weapons of mass destruction. Arms control involves a variety of efforts to restrict or ban the development, stockpiling, proliferation, and use of these weapons. While much of the literature on arms control focuses on formal negotiations and treaties, this should neither refute the importance of claims making by peace and disarmament organizations nor obscure the importance of informal controls and, at the extreme, the use of force to prevent proliferation.

States arm themselves because of what is called the "security dilemma." States exist in an anarchical international system where there is no central authority capable of providing them with security. Hence they must try to protect themselves against external foes as well as the threat of civil violence (by guerrillas, warlords, etc.). Security measures can take many forms, but typically they involve maintaining armed forces and forging alliances. Other states may see arms and alliances as a threat, and they in turn normally seek their own arms and alliances to protect themselves. The upshot is to augment general mistrust and insecurity and to foster arms races.

Arms are easily available, as about 100 countries manufacture small arms. Virtually every industrialized country manufactures an array of weapons to supply its own military; most of these countries also sell arms internationally, with the United States in particular, followed by European nations, Russia, and China, as the major world suppliers of armaments. The global arms trade—legal and illegal—is, by some estimates, approaching a trillion dollars annually, and arms industries are clearly of major economic and often strategic importance to supplying countries.

Here we see a further manifestation of the security dilemma. While selling arms potentially serves the national interest of seller states—beyond profit, there is the hope of strengthening allies—this is not the case when opposing states buy arms or contribute to regional or national instability. Hence arms-supplying nations often try to curb the sales of specific weapons to particular countries by a mixture of collaboration and the exertion of pressure. Such informal arms controls work reasonably well with advanced computers and sensitive electronic components but have minimal impact on small arms and light weapons. Selective sales, which can be considered a primitive form of arms control, sometimes backfire. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States supplied the latter with anti-aircraft missiles and other sophisticated weapons that subsequently became part of the arsenal of groups that the United States came to regard as enemies.

At the other extreme is the use of force to impose arms controls. Perhaps the outstanding example is the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. Saddam Hussein started a clandestine nuclear

program in the 1970s and likely would have acquired nuclear weapons if the reactor had not been destroyed. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was supposedly motivated by the fear that Saddam had developed weapons of mass destruction after having expelled UN weapons inspectors in 1998. The inspections, however, proved to have been effective. The possibility that Iran might be developing nuclear weapons has generated pressure from the United Nations as well as implied threats of military action by the United States and Israel.

Beyond selective sales and force, arms control has been effectuated mostly through multilateral treaties. Arms control agreements are meant to check the security dilemma by providing transparency, (relative) equality, stability, and trust among participating states. While the ultimate aim is to prevent war, arms control can arrest the development or spread of particular weapons, limit the damage done in conflicts, obviate arms races, and reduce military spending. Although there are many problems in getting nations to ratify treaties and to adhere to them, arms control has proven to be effective in at least some instances.

Looking at past successes, the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of poisonous gases was signed on June 17, 1925. Although it took many years for the protocol to be ratified by most nations, the prohibition has generally held, and it has been updated by Biological (in 1972) and Chemical (in 1993) Conventions. All of these examples involve weapons of mass destruction. Notably, most arms control treaties since the end of World War II deal with such weapons rather than conventional ones. This is significant and relates to the sociology of social problems.

Sociologists studying social problems commonly observe that responses to issues are often independent of their "objective seriousness." Whereas 10 cases of mad cow disease in England became a global celebrity issue, close to 3 million annual deaths from tuberculosis attract almost no media attention. With arms control, most of the negotiations and the vast majority of media coverage focus on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear arms. The latter draw on deeply embedded anxieties (the mushroom cloud, invisible radiation poisoning), as well as the risk of almost unimaginable numbers of deaths should such weapons ever be used. Yet small arms and light weapons—think of the Soviet/Russian AK-47 assault rifle—are responsible for the vast majority of combat deaths in recent wars and are central to civil violence. Still, it has proved almost impossible to get any agreements to regulate such arms. Thus the United Nations Conference to review the implementation of the Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons ended on July 7, 2006, without agreement on an outcome document. The original UN Programme of Action, adopted in 2001, is still in operation, but it has inadequate controls. Indeed, the United States has vetoed UN attempts to limit international trade in small arms, citing the right of citizens to bear arms for self-defense.

A significant exception is the 1997 Ottawa Convention that bans anti-personnel land mines. The Mine Ban Treaty became binding under international law in just 2 years, doing so more quickly than any treaty of its kind. This success was due in good part to the extensive publicity the issue received, with claims-making by celebrities that included Princess Diana, as well as by a host of nongovernmental organizations from around the world. Most arms control agreements, in contrast, gain limited publicity and are engineered mostly in closed meetings among government bureaucrats. The United States, China, and Russia are among 40 countries that have not signed the Ottawa Convention. Another nonsignatory, Pakistan, has generated so much opposition to its plan to land mine its border with Afghanistan that it appears to have backed away from the idea.

The bulk of arms control agreements deal with nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. Since the United States and the Soviet Union conducted scores of atmospheric nuclear tests, public pressures led to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, limiting testing to underground sites. Subsequent treaties aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation and have had mixed success in the context of several dilemmas. A key dilemma is how to prevent arms proliferation while allowing countries to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Although this was the goal of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it created the further dilemma of enshrining a monopoly by the original nuclear weapons club—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China, and France. While most countries have joined the NPT, others, such as Israel, India, and Pakistan, have developed their own nuclear weapons. There is now concern about a "second nuclear age," as North Korea and Iran pursue nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia maintain about 2,000 launch-ready strategic nuclear missiles, and unsecured nuclear materials in Russia feed

fears of a terrorist bomb. Were Iran to develop the bomb, it is likely that neighboring countries would also go nuclear.

Because states are sovereign entities, the security dilemma plays out again in the difficulties in verifying and enforcing arms agreements. States can carry on unauthorized nuclear or other arms activities, and they can always abrogate treaties. In its efforts to develop a Star Wars defense against missiles, the United States is jeopardizing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. China's apparently successful test of an anti-satellite missile in January 2007 points to the vulnerability of arms control agreements as the security dilemma drives efforts to develop newer and more sophisticated weapons. Arms control will never be completed but will remain a challenging endeavor requiring constant input and monitoring. Thus, as a result of an arms buildup by China and a possible North Korean atomic bomb, Japan is contemplating changing the pacifist constitution it adopted after World War II.

Sheldon Ungar

See also Claims Making; Demilitarization; Nuclear Proliferation; Peacekeeping

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Arson

Arson is the willful or malicious burning of property, and arson fires also entail the risk of intentional or inadvertent personal injury, including risk to firefighters. In the United States, at least 20 percent (and as much as 50 percent) of fire-related property damage is due to arson. This proportion has been declining due, at least in part, to increased vigilance and investigation.

Considerable scientific knowledge now supports forensic fire investigation, including determination that the cause was arson. Nevertheless, conviction rates for arson are extremely low (2 percent to 3 percent), and about 80 percent of arson cases remain unsolved. Although profit is probably the most common motive for arson, little is known about its perpetrators because of their low likelihood of apprehension. Most of the academic literature has focused on juveniles and mentally disordered firesetters whose actions had little to do with monetary gain. Vandalism is the most common motive among juveniles, whereas among adults apprehended for arson, the leading motives are revenge, anger, and excitement, with fraud accounting for less than 10 percent. The overwhelming majority of apprehended firesetters are male, and at least half are juveniles.

Psychodynamic perspectives dominated the early professional literature on mentally disordered firesetters and declared that pyromania (the recurrent inability to resist impulses to set fires) was a specific disorder responsible for the majority of fires not set for monetary gain. Pyromania was believed to have a sexual root, and clinicians' writings frequently noted the triad of firesetting, cruelty to animals, and enuresis. More recently, empirical approaches to mentally disordered firesetters show that pyromania, as defined in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, is extremely rare. Moreover, although mentally disordered adult firesetters frequently set fires as children, little evidence exists that enuresis or cruelty to animals is especially related to adult firesetting.

Compared with other mentally disordered offenders, firesetters are younger, less intelligent, more socially isolated, less assertive, and less physically attractive. Although mentally disordered firesetters have a slightly lower risk of violent recidivism than other mentally disordered offenders, the available research suggests that approximately one third committed subsequent violent offenses over an 8-year period, while another third committed only nonviolent offenses. Although treatments designed to improve assertion and social competence show promise, no convincing evidence yet exists that any therapies reduce arsonists' criminal, specifically firesetting, recidivism.

Marnie E. Rice and Grant T. Harris

See also Juvenile Delinquency; Property Crime; Vandalism

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Assault

Assault is a type of violent crime against a person, its degree classification based on the use of a weapon, the seriousness of the injury sustained, and/or the intent to cause serious injury. Whereas battery is the application of physical force, assault is the attempt or threat to commit battery. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) distinguishes between aggravated assault and nonaggravated assault, the latter of which may include simple assault and intimidation. Aggravated assault refers to the unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. Typically accompanying this type of assault is the use of a weapon or means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Attempted murder is an example of aggravated assault. Nonaggravated simple assault refers to assault that does not involve the use of a dangerous weapon and in which the victim does not suffer apparent serious injury. Intimidation is a form of assault wherein a person threatens the victim without actually using or displaying a weapon.

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program tabulates aggravated assaults reported to law enforcement and provides a basis for examination of trends across time as well as across geographic areas, such as cities, states, or metropolitan areas. However, because the UCR program is voluntary and provides data on only aggravated assault, it may not reveal the true extent of assault in the United States. To gauge the incidence of assault, both reported and not reported to law enforcement, one can use the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The NCVS is the primary source of data on assault victimization for households in the United States.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the assault rate increased, and then declined sharply beginning in 1994 for both simple and aggravated assault. Historically, simple assault occurs at higher rates than aggravated assault. However, of the four types of violent crime classified by the FBI (murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), aggravated assault accounts for the greatest percentage. According to UCR data, aggravated assault accounted for 60.7 percent of all violent crime in 2006. Victimization rates of assault by sex, race, and age show that in 2005, males had a higher rate than females (21.5 vs. 14.3); blacks had a slightly higher rate than whites (20.6 vs. 17.2); and young adults ages 20 to 24 had the highest rate of all age-groups (40.3), while older adults (50 to 64 and those 65 and older) had significantly lower rates (9.3 and 1.9, respectively).

Danielle C. Kuhl

See also National Crime Victimization Survey; Uniform Crime Report; Victimization; Violent Crime

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Assimilation

Assimilation is making a comeback as a major concept in the study of immigrant groups' processes of

adjustment to a receiving society. This development is most evident in the United States, but it is to some extent occurring in western Europe as well, where multiculturalism is declining sharply in favor. This comeback reverses the trend at the end of the 20th century, which saw assimilation frequently criticized as an outmoded, ethnocentric notion.

Reconceptualizing Assimilation

Assimilation's return is associated with significant changes in the way it is conceptualized, reflecting an updating to take into account the criticisms of the recent past. Earlier versions of the concept originated with the studies of early 20th-century immigrants in American cities conducted by sociologists of the Chicago school, who saw immigrants and their children, usually called the "second generation," changing in tandem with upward social mobility and migration away from immigrant residential enclaves into better and more ethnically mixed neighborhoods. This view crystallized in the book *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* of 1945, by W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, which, however, added the jarring note that assimilability depended crucially on skin color and that, therefore, the assimilation of southern Italians, for instance, would require six generations. The assimilation of African Americans, according to Warner and Srole, was not foreseeable without revolutionary changes in U.S. society.

The concept originating with the Chicago school received its canonical post–World War II formulation at the hands of sociologist Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life* of 1964, a book still widely cited. Gordon conceived of assimilation as a multidimensional process, in which two dimensions, cultural and structural assimilation, are the most determinative. Cultural assimilation is a largely one-way process, by which immigrants and their children divest themselves of their original cultures and take on the cultural features of the mainstream society, which are those of middle-class white Protestants, in Gordon's view. Structural assimilation refers to the integration of immigrant-group members with their majority-group counterparts in friendship circles, neighborhoods, and other forms of noneconomic relationship. Gordon hypothesized that in the United States, (a) cultural assimilation is inevitable in all domains other than religion; and (b) once structural assimilation occurs, then the overall assimilation process is destined to complete itself in short order. With this last hypothesis, Gordon had in mind the collapse of prejudice and discrimination against the group, a surge of intermarriage involving group members, and the disappearance of salient differences between the immigrant group and the host majority.

In this brief account, one can readily see some of the problematic aspects of the older concept that critics attacked. First, assimilation seems to require a complete transformation by the *immigrant-origin group* (a term used here to refer to the immigrants and their descendants), which must drop all of its original characteristics to become carbon copies of the host society's majority group, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Second, assimilability depends upon skin color, and thus the older concept reserves full assimilation for European-origin groups, which could be seen as racially "white" (although there were initially doubts about the whiteness of some of the southern and eastern European groups). Hence, the verdict of many critics was that assimilation was hopelessly racist and ethnocentric.

A new version of the assimilation concept, developed by Richard Alba and Victor Nee, adapts it to the multiracial America of the 21st century, while remaining faithful to the historical experiences of integration into the mainstream that gave rise to it in the first place. Alba and Nee define assimilation, a form of ethnic change, as the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences. *Decline,* in this context, means that a distinction attenuates in salience, and more specifically, that the occurrences for which it is relevant diminish in number and contract to fewer and fewer domains of social life. As ethnic boundaries become blurred or weakened, individuals' ethnic origins become less and less relevant in relation to the members of another ethnic group (typically, but not necessarily, the ethnic majority group), and individuals from both sides of the boundary mutually perceive themselves with less and less frequency in terms of ethnic categories and increasingly only under specific circumstances. Assimilation, moreover, is not a dichotomous outcome and does not require the disappearance of ethnicity; consequently, the individuals and groups undergoing assimilation may still bear a number of ethnic markers. It can occur on a large scale to members of a group even as the group itself remains as a highly visible point of reference on the social landscape, embodied in an ethnic culture, neighborhoods, and institutional infrastructures.

One important aspect of this definition is that it leaves room for assimilation to occur as a two-sided process, whereby the immigrant minority influences the mainstream and is not only influenced by it. The degree to which the assimilation process is in fact two-sided is an empirical question to be answered in specific cases and not a matter to be settled a priori. But there can be no question in the U.S. context that the mainstream culture has taken on layers of influence from the many immigrant groups who have come to U.S. shores, as seen, for instance, in the impact of 19th-century German immigrants on American Christmas customs and leisure-time activities.

The ramifications of the influence of the immigrant minority on the mainstream are developed conceptually by Alba and Nee through the idea of "boundary blurring." A social boundary is an institutionalized social distinction by which individuals perceive their social world and divide others into categories that have the character of "us" or "them." However, not all boundaries are sharply delineated; when boundaries become blurred, the clarity of the social distinction involved has become clouded, and other individuals' locations with respect to the boundary may appear indeterminate or ambiguous. Boundary blurring can occur when the mainstream culture and identity are relatively porous and allow for the incorporation of cultural elements brought by immigrant groups; that is, two-sided cultural change. Under such circumstances, the apparent difference between the mainstream culture and that of the immigrant group is reduced partly because of changes to the former. Assimilation may then be eased insofar as the individuals undergoing it do not sense a rupture between participation in mainstream institutions and familiar social and cultural practices and identities. Assimilation of this type involves intermediate, or hyphenated, stages that allow individuals to feel themselves simultaneously to be members of an ethnic minority and of the mainstream.

A Theory of Assimilation

A reconceptualization of assimilation is not enough: Understanding the potential role of assimilation for contemporary immigrant groups and their descendants also requires a theory of assimilation—an account of the causal mechanisms that produce it. Positing such a theory implies that assimilation is not an inevitable result of the intergroup contacts resulting from migration—an assumption that was unfortunately shared by many of the early 20th-century scholars of the phenomenon—but requires a specification of the circumstances under which it emerges as an outcome. According to Alba and Nee, the pace and success of assimilation depend principally on three factors or mechanisms. First is the crucial effect of informal and formal institutions—customs, norms, conventions, and rules—that establish the underlying framework of competition and cooperation in a society. Second are the workaday decisions of individual immigrants and their descendants—which often lead to assimilation not as a stated goal but as an unintended consequence of social behavior oriented to successful accommodation. And third is the effect of network ties embedded in the immigrant community and family, which shape the particular ways in which their members adapt to American life.

The institutional portion of this account calls attention to the fundamental changes in the societal "rules of the game" that have occurred since the 1960s. Prior to World War II, the formal rules and their enforcement bolstered the racism that excluded nonwhite minorities from effective participation in civil society. For example, Asian immigrants were ineligible for citizenship until 1952 and faced many discriminatory local and regional laws that restricted their property rights and civil liberties. But these blockages have yielded as a result of the legal changes of the civil rights era, which have extended fundamental constitutional rights to racial minorities. These changes have not been merely formal; they have been accompanied by new institutional arrangements, the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of which increased the cost of discrimination.

Institutional changes have gone hand in hand with changes in mainstream values. One of these is the remarkable decline in the power of racist ideologies since the end of World War II. An examination of more than half a century of survey data demonstrates unequivocally that the beliefs in racial separation, endorsed by a majority of white Americans at midcentury, have steadily eroded. Such institutional and ideological shifts have not ended racial prejudice and racist practice, but they have changed their character. Racism is now outlawed and, as a consequence, has become more covert and subterranean, and it can no longer be advocated in public without sanction.

At the individual level, assimilation is frequently something that happens while people are making other plans. That is, individuals striving for success in

U.S. society often do not see themselves as assimilating. Yet the unintended consequences of practical strategies taken in pursuit of highly valued goals—a good education, a good job, a nice place to live, interesting friends and acquaintances—often result in specific forms of assimilation. It is not uncommon, for instance, for first- and second-generation Asian parents to raise their children speaking only English in the belief that their chances for success in school will be improved by their more complete mastery of the host language. Likewise, the search for a desirable place to live—with good schools and opportunities for children to grow up away from the seductions of deviant models of behavior—often leads immigrant families to ethnically mixed suburbs (if and when socioeconomic success permits this), because residential amenities tend to be concentrated there. One consequence, whether intended or not, is greater interaction with families of other backgrounds; such increased contact tends to encourage acculturation, especially for children.

The network mechanisms of assimilation emerge from the dependence of immigrants and their children on the social capital that develops within immigrant communities and extended family networks. In this respect, it is rare for immigrant families to confront the challenges of settlement in a new society alone, and they frequently go along with the strategies of adaptation worked out collectively within the ethnic group. Frequently enough, these collectivist strategies advance assimilation in specific ways. For instance, Irish Americans, in their effort to shed the stereotype of "shanty Irish," socially distanced themselves from African Americans as a group strategy to gain acceptance from Anglo-Americans, ostracizing those who intermarried with blacks. More recently, South Asians who settled in an agricultural town in northern California evolved norms encouraging selective acculturation, while discouraging social contact with local white youths who taunted the Punjabi youths. The Punjabi immigrants' strategy, according to the anthropologist Margaret Gibson, emphasized academic achievement in the public schools as a means to success, which they defined not locally, but in terms of the opportunity structures of the mainstream.

Alternative Conceptions

The Alba and Nee theorization of assimilation is not the only new approach. Other sociologists have also attempted to reintroduce this concept in ways that overcome the deficiencies in the older versions and adapt it to the contemporary realities of immigration. Thus, Rogers Brubaker has described assimilation as a process of becoming similar to some population, indicating his preference for a population-based approach.

The alternative conception that is most challenging to the Alba and Nee version is "segmented assimilation" as formulated by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou. Portes and Zhou argue that a critical question concerns the segment of U.S. society into which individuals assimilate, and they envision that multiple trajectories are required for the answer. One trajectory leads to entry into the middle-class mainstream; this is conventional assimilation, compatible with the Alba and Nee conceptualization. But another leads to incorporation into the racialized population at the bottom of U.S. society. This trajectory is followed by many in the second and third generations from the new immigrant groups, who are handicapped by their very humble initial locations in U.S. society and barred from entry into the mainstream by their race. On this route of assimilation, they are guided by the cultural models of poor, native-born African Americans and Latinos/as. Perceiving that they are likely to remain in their parents' status at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and evaluating this prospect negatively because, unlike their parents, they have absorbed the standards of the American mainstream, they succumb to the temptation to drop out of school and join the inner-city underclass.

Portes and Zhou also envision a pluralist alternative to either "upward" or "downward" assimilation. That is, Portes and Zhou claim that some individuals and groups are able to draw social and economic advantages by keeping some aspects of their lives within the confines of an ethnic matrix (e.g., ethnic economic niches, ethnic communities). Under optimal circumstances, exemplified by the Cubans of Miami, immigrant-origin groups may even be able to attain, within their ethnic communities and networks, socioeconomic opportunities equivalent to those afforded by the mainstream. In such cases, the pluralist route of incorporation would provide a truly viable alternative to assimilation.

The contrast between the Alba and Nee conceptualization and that of Portes and Zhou frames the state of debate and discussion about the trajectories of contemporary immigrant groups and their second generations in the United States. The evidence is far from

definitive at present, but what there is seems to indicate that the predominant pattern among the children of immigrants remains that of assimilation toward, if not into, the mainstream as described by Alba and Nee. Although the evidence remains provisional for the time being, it leaves no doubt that the assimilation pattern is certain to be important for contemporary immigrant-origin groups, and any reflection on the American future must take it into account.

Richard Alba and Victor Nee

See also Acculturation; American Dream; Americanization; Pluralism; Segmented Assimilation

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Asylum

Asylum refers to a form of sanctuary in which an asylum seeker is granted protection to remain in a host nation after fleeing persecution in his or her homeland. More commonly the term used is *political asylum*, whereby the applicant must complete two major phases within a much more complex set of proceedings carried out by immigration authorities. First, upon arriving at a port of entry (e.g., an international airport), the applicant must clearly identify him- or herself as an asylum seeker, a claim that initiates an interview to determine whether the individual can establish a credible fear of persecution (based on race, ethnicity, religion, political opinions, gender, or sexual orientation). That interview is conducted by a relatively low-ranking officer in the immigration system but one with the authority to admit the applicant for further proceedings in an immigration court or else issue an order for expedited removal (i.e., deportation). In the second stage, the asylum seeker appears before a series of panels or hearings to verify further his or her need for sanctuary. Should the case prove convincing, the judges award asylum along with a range of legal protections. In some instances, entire groups of refugees gain entry and asylum under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State, for example, during periods of humanitarian crisis (e.g., war, genocide, or natural disasters).

Asylum seeking is a social problem due to its social, ethical, and political implications. In the United States and in Western Europe, officials commonly view asylum seekers not as desperate people fleeing persecution but rather as economic migrants abusing the asylum system to gain entry. Influences on the perception of asylum seekers falls along lines of social constructionism shaped by forces such as economics, politics, and public opinion, much like the suspicion about nonwhite immigrants. Indeed, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, asylum seekers face an even greater challenge in attaining asylum because of the power of labeling stemming from anxiety over threats of terrorism.

Greatly informing the social construction process is the societal reaction perspective, more specifically the concept of moral panic: an exaggerated and turbulent response to a putative social problem. Moral panic theory allows sociologists to refine interpretations of negative societal reaction aimed at people easy to identify and dislike because of differences in race, ethnicity, religion, and so forth. Cross-national studies have unveiled the subtleties of moral panic, noting that even though the prevailing notion of such unrest resides in its noisy features (e.g., public outrage), constructions also occur under the public radar. Despite similarities among Western nations in their harsh treatment of those fleeing persecution, differences persist in social constructionism. Recent research extracts the nuances in this moral panic by

identifying distinctions between American and British constructions. Among the most striking features is the fact that the invention and dramatization of so-called bogus asylum seekers as a popular stereotype is much more of a British phenomenon than an American one.

Cultural divergence affects a discursive formula of moral panic: Some panics are transparent and others opaque. Societal reaction to asylum seeking in the United Kingdom manifests as a transparent moral panic because "anyone can see what's happening." Whereas spikes of panic occur in the United States over foreigners (most recently those perceived as being Arab and Muslim) and undocumented workers (generally Latino/a) before and after September 11, the putative problem of asylum seeking does not resonate in the public mind. However, U.S. government officials quietly embarked on a detention campaign similar to those in Britain. Although such detention practices were in place prior to 9/11, the War on Terrorism provided U.S. authorities with an urgent rationale for greater reliance on that form of control; specifically, U.S. government officials insist that policies calling for the detention of asylum seekers serve national security interests.

Particularly when of long duration, detention is among the gravest measures the state can take against an individual. Its seriousness is even greater when the person is held not on criminal or immigration charges but rather on fleeing persecution. The detention of asylum seekers, especially when stemming from moral panic, receives wide criticism as costly, unnecessary, and, under many circumstances, a violation of international laws intended to protect those in need of sanctuary. By its very nature, detention compounds a criminalization process by lumping asylum seekers together with prisoners charged or convicted of criminal offenses. Many asylum seekers are held in county jails because the immigration system lacks proper detention capacity. Again, the labeling process figures prominently under such conditions, adversely influencing their cases for asylum. These asylum seekers are not only confined in a correctional facility but must wear a prison uniform and be shackled with handcuffs during visits and transfers to court. Human rights advocates complain that the criminal justice model now dominating that asylum procedure unfairly undermines a system designed to protect people seeking sanctuary.

Finally, issues pertaining to asylum ought to be contextualized in a more global setting that attends to worldwide migration alongside political, economic, and military events that produce refugees in search of sanctuary. At the heart of those developments is the politics of movement, also known as the global hierarchy of mobility, in which freedom of movement is a trait of the dominant, forcing the strictest possible constraints upon the dominated. In the wake of globalization, borders still sustain their symbolic and material impact against the circulation of some classifications of people, most notably asylum seekers (and underprivileged non-Western workers). Therefore, borders are not disappearing; rather, they are fragmenting and becoming more flexible. Borders no longer operate as unitary and fixed entities; instead, they are becoming bendable instruments for the reproduction of a hierarchical division between so-called deserving and undeserving populations, wanted and unwanted others.

Michael Welch

See also Refugees; Resettlement

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Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a behavior problem that is characterized by hyperactivity, inattention, restlessness, and impulsivity and, until

recently, was diagnosed primarily in children. It was first defined as Hyperkinetic Disorder of Childhood in 1957 and was commonly known as hyperactivity or hyperactive syndrome until it was renamed ADHD in 1987. The renaming also represented a shift in focus from hyperactive behavior to the inattention as a major characteristic of the disorder.

In the United States the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates 7 percent of school-age (6–10) children have ADHD, with a ratio of 3 to 1 boys to girls. White children tend to have higher rates of ADHD diagnosis than minority children. In recent years the definition of ADHD has broadened. Now, in addition to school-age children, ADHD is diagnosed in preschool children, adolescents, and adults, which contributes to the rising prevalence.

The most common medical treatment for ADHD is with psychoactive medications, especially ethylphenidate (Ritalin) and other stimulant medications (Cylert, Adderall, and Concerta). Treatment rates have increased enormously in recent years; in 2004 the Department of Health and Human Services estimated 5 million children ages 5 to 17 were treated for ADHD in 2000–02, up from 2.6 million in 1994. The diagnosis and treatment of ADHD is much higher in the United States than in other countries, but evidence suggests that since the 1990s it has been rising in other countries as well, for example, in the United Kingdom.

The causes of ADHD are not well understood, although various theories have been offered, including dietary, genetic, psychological, and social ones. In the past 2 decades, medical researchers have reported genetic susceptibilities to ADHD and found differences in brain imaging results from individuals with ADHD and individuals without ADHD. Although biomedical theories of ADHD predominate, the causes of ADHD are still largely unknown. Some contend that even if there are biological differences between children with ADHD and other children, what is observed may be a reflection of differences in temperament rather than a specific disorder.

ADHD and its treatment have been controversial at least since the 1970s. Critics have expressed concern with the drugging of schoolchildren, contending that ADHD is merely a label for childhood deviant behavior. Others grant that some children may have a neurological disorder, but maintain that there has been an overdiagnosis of ADHD. From time to time some educators and parents have raised concerns about adverse effects from long-term use of stimulant medications. Child psychiatrists see ADHD as the most common childhood psychiatric disorder and consider psychoactive medication treatment as well established and safe. Parent and consumer groups, such as CHADD (Children and Adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder), tend to support the medical perspective of ADHD.

Since the 1990s there has been a significant rise in the diagnosis and treatment of adult ADHD. Whereas childhood ADHD is usually school or parent identified, adult ADHD seems to be largely self-identified. Some researchers have noted that many apparently successful adults seek an ADHD diagnosis and medication treatment as a result of learning about the disorder from professionals, the media, or others, and then seeing their own life problems reflected in the description of ADHD (e.g., disorganized life, inability to sustain attention, moving from job to job). Adult ADHD remains controversial, however. Many psychiatrists have embraced adult ADHD as a major social problem, with claims of tens of billions of dollars in lost productivity and household income due to the disorder, whereas critics have suggested it is "the medicalization of underperformance."

Sociologists view ADHD as a classic case of the medicalization of deviant behavior, defining a previously nonmedical problem as a medical one and the treatment of ADHD as a form of medical social control. Whereas some have pointed out that when a problem becomes medicalized it is less stigmatized, because its origin is seen as physiological or biomedical rather than as linked to volitional behavior, others point to the social consequences of medicalizing children's behavior problems. Some have suggested that medicalizing deviant behavior as ADHD individualizes complex social problems and allows for powerful forms of medical social control (medications) to be used. Secondary gain, accruing social benefits from a medical diagnosis, is also an issue with ADHD. There are reports of adolescents seeking an ADHD diagnosis to gain learning disability status in order to obtain certain benefits, such as untimed tests or alternative assignments. From a sociological view, the definition of ADHD is a prime example of diagnostic expansion, the widening definition of an accepted diagnosis. For many individuals, ADHD is now deemed a lifelong disorder, with an expanding age range for diagnosis (from preschool to adult) and a reduced threshold for psychoactive medication

treatment. Although it is possible that the behaviors characteristic of ADHD are increasing because of some kind of social cause, it is more likely that an increasing number of individuals are being identified, labeled, and treated as having ADHD.

Peter Conrad

See also Deviance; Labeling Theory; Learning Disorders; Mental Health; Psychoactive Drugs, Misuse of; Social Control; Stigma

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AUTOMATION

Automation is the substitution of self-operating machinery or electronics for manual or animal effort to support or control a broad spectrum of processes. Examples range from automatic teller machines, to robotic farm tractors, to securities transactions, and beyond. Henry Ford's use of the conveyor belt to produce Model T Fords in the early 1900s was a precursor to today's assembly lines that feature robotic assembly stations and automated inventory control, testing, and defect detection, all of which can be quickly reconfigured to accommodate variations of car models. Information technology is a form of automation used to process data, transmit information, or handle transactions, such as to order merchandise, buy or sell securities, or make hotel reservations.

Automation and the technology change that it represents have transformed economic arrangements and human lives in numerous ways. It has profoundly impacted production processes by increasing speed, accuracy, and sheer output volume, while eliminating some kinds of tedious, repetitive work. Automation that extends the reach of information transmission, processing, and control generates economies of scale that lead to firms being larger and allows production in more disparate regions, thereby increasing the intensity of global competition.

Automation has far-reaching consequences for employment opportunities. It generally substitutes for unskilled labor while complementing skilled labor. As such, automation results in the elimination or outsourcing of some jobs and the creation of new ones. As skill requirements change, members of the labor force must be retrained, and across the board, educational demands are raised.

Automation generally has positive impacts on productivity, economic growth, and the quality of life. It also has far-reaching impacts on the consumer side, lowering the prices of existing products and services, while increasing their quality, and creating entirely new products and services such as digital entertainment (CDs, DVDs, MP3s, etc.). Automation also increases the productivity of consumption within the home, contributing to the quality of leisure time. Examples are dishwashers, microwave ovens, and automatic lawn sprinklers.

Automation commonly involves the substitution of prespecified, codified rules for human judgment. This might be fine during normal times, but anomalies can cause breakdowns, and under stressful conditions in particular, human judgment retains its importance. Automation duplicates human actions with machines and electronic technology, but when automated, tasks themselves can change. For example, many secretarial jobs morph into administrative functions in an automated office environment. Electronic technology can blur national boundaries and, in the words of Thomas Freedman, create a flat world. For example, a phone call from New York City to Akron, Ohio, can be routed through India without either party to the conversation knowing it. Automation can accelerate the speed with which events occur. While it is desirable to get tasks done quickly, production processes must be synchronized; thus timing must be coordinated, and speed can have negative consequences. Faster cars, for example, are not necessarily safer cars, especially if they are cruising down the highway at great speed. All told, automation presents new challenges to public policy and governmental regulators.

In recent years, automation has affected many industries in general and some in particular. One of the most important and complex industries, that involving the securities markets, has moved in the

past quarter century from the horse-and-buggy era to the jet age. Equity markets are a good example.

In the early 1970s, equity trading was, for the most part, a manual, human-intermediated process. Orders were transmitted to brokers who physically met each other (face-to-face or by phone) to trade shares of a stock. Then, gradually, automation entered the picture. The first role for the computer was to deliver trading instructions and information about the prices (quotes) at which people were willing to buy and to sell, along with the prices and sizes of realized trades. In the United States, in 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers introduced NASDAQ, its automated quotation system.

Then came automation of the act of trading itself. In 1977, the Toronto Stock Exchange introduced an electronic trading system. Over the following 20 years, European exchanges, from Stockholm to Madrid, including London, Paris, Switzerland, and Germany, replaced antiquated floor-based systems with electronic systems. In the United States, Instinet in 1969 and Archipelago in 1997 were among the first to introduce electronic trading. NASDAQ rolled out its own automated trading system in 2002, and in January 2007, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) substantially completed instituting its Hybrid Market, which combines an electronic system with its traditional trading floor. The replacement of manual broker/dealer intermediation functions with electronic systems owned by the exchanges paved the way for exchanges to convert their organizational structures from not-for-profit memberships to privatized, for-profit entities.

Automation in the equity markets facilitated the rapid calculation of price indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500. Virtually continuous information about these continuously changing indices supported the trading of new financial products, such as index futures and options, and exchange-traded funds. Real-time index values are also valuable pricing guides for individual shares. Automated trading provides a faster, more error-free transmission of trade data into clearance and settlement, thereby increasing the efficiency of post-trade operations. The electronic capture of intra-day records of all quotes and transactions facilitated the overview and regulation of trading and enhanced academic equity market research.

Nevertheless, when it comes to equity trading, automation continues to be a challenge. Delivering orders to the market and reporting back quotes and transaction prices are the easy parts to trading; the difficult part is handling orders at the most critical part of the process, when buys meet sells and turn into trades. Trading involves more than simply transferring something (share ownership) from one participant to another at a pre-established price (as is the case when a passenger books an airline seat); it also entails finding the prices at which trades are made, a complex process referred to as "price discovery."

Automating the point of trade for small, retail orders (perhaps 1,000 shares or less) for big capitalization stocks is not difficult. A large trade (perhaps 500,000 shares), on the other hand, can be very difficult to handle. Time, skill, and risk taking are all required. The difficulty of handling large orders for all stocks, and all orders for mid and small cap stocks, explains in part why automation has proceeded slowly in the equity markets and why, as of this writing, the New York Stock Exchange still retains its trading floor.

In general, an electronic environment differs greatly from a human-to-human environment (either telephone connected or face-to-face), and replacing people with machines and computers is not necessarily a simple matter of having computers take over tasks that were previously performed by humans.

In markets around the world, human agents staunchly resist the introduction of electronic technology that, by automating activities, eliminates otherwise profitable jobs. Slowly, however, resistance may be overcome as the role of human agents is transformed.

Electronic information transmission is lightning fast; human-to-human information transmission is considerably slower but can include a broader spectrum of thoughts and emotions (a tone of voice or facial expression can itself convey important information).

Automation that enables people from disparate parts of the globe to access a market virtually instantly with virtually equal facility has flattened the world of trading and commerce.

In equity trading, automation has driven down commission costs, and volumes have exploded. Orders get delivered and trades executed within fractions of a second. However, the sequence in which orders arrive remains important, and subsecond time frames are of no substantive importance per se. Concurrently, large block orders are commonly being shot into the market in protracted sequences of smaller tranches. This practice of "slicing and dicing" and the speed with which events can happen in the automated environment have pressured traders to use new computer tools to time and otherwise handle their order submission. The automated, rules-based

procedures, referred to as "algorithmic trading," are both a product of automation and a symptom of the complexities that electronic, high-speed trading can introduce.

Automation offers much promise and, driven by technology developments, impacts economic activities around the world. Automation is indeed a powerful tool, but it can also be a harsh taskmaster. Throughout history, and even today as seen in the equity markets, automation's introduction has rarely escaped controversy. Its transformative power disrupts the status quo and can create new sources of friction even with significant reductions in time, effort, and mistakes.

Robert A. Schwartz and Richard D. Holowczak

See also Cyberspace; Social Change

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B

Baby Boomers

Baby boomers are Americans born between 1946 and 1964. Birth rates fell in the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s (when uncertain economic prospects discouraged many people from having children) and World War II (when millions of men were away from home serving in the armed forces). When the war ended in 1945, marriages increased and the birth rate rose. In 1946, births jumped to 3,411,000 (up more than half a million from the previous year); they continued rising until 1957, when they hit 4.3 million, and remained above 4 million per year through 1964. Nearly 76 million babies were born between 1946 and 1964.

The baby boom, then, consists of a set of unusually large birth cohorts (those born in a given year). Most people pass through social institutions at roughly the same ages, so that most children attend school from ages 6 to 17, most adults work from sometime in their 20s through their 60s, and so on. Larger cohorts strain institutions: When the baby boomers were of school age, new schools were needed; similarly, when they enter retirement, the baby boomers will place greater demands on Social Security, Medicare, and other services used by the old.

People who belong to the same set of cohorts are sometimes called generations, and they share some historical experiences. The baby boomers grew up in the long period of prosperity that followed World War II, a period marked by the cold war. Television became nearly universal during their childhood, just as personal computers spread during their adulthood. Commentators contrast these experiences with those of the preceding cohorts, born between, for example, 1925 and 1940, who experienced the hardships of economic depression and wartime. Many commentaries on baby boomers suggest that their common histories led to shared outlooks on life.

Such claims ignore important differences among the baby boomers. Although the oldest baby boomers were in high school when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, the youngest were not yet born. The oldest males were subject to the draft during the war in Vietnam, but the draft ended before the youngest baby boomers came of age. Thus, baby boomers did not all have the same experiences at the same points in their lives. In addition, every age cohort contains people of different ethnicities, income levels, political affiliations, and so on. If the baby boomers share some things, they remain a diverse population.

Although commentators also generalize about other generations, such as "Generation X" (those born following the baby boom, roughly 1965–80), similar qualifications are in order. People born at about the same time experience major historical events at roughly the same point in their lives; still, every birth cohort contains people from diverse social circumstances. Yet the sheer size of particular cohorts affects social institutions: Large cohorts will, at different times, require many schoolrooms and nursing home beds, whereas smaller cohorts may require institutions built for larger client populations to shrink.

Joel Best

See also Pensions and Social Security

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Backlash

Backlash is a term used to describe action taken by individuals and groups to counter an existing social or political development. Although the term may be used to describe efforts seeking progressive effects, such as the move to reform health care in the United States, it is more often used to denote a countermovement aimed at narrowing a group's access to rights and benefits. The point of a typical backlash is to prevent a targeted group from obtaining, or continuing to obtain, certain rights or benefits bestowed through policy or law. The action can take various forms, including voter initiatives, court challenges, demonstrations, and violence.

Among those targeted by recent backlashes in the United States were welfare mothers for existing on welfare, gays and lesbians for seeking the right to marry, women and people of color for having affirmative action policies, and women for legally obtaining abortions. The backlash against welfare mothers led to a federal law, the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,* which reversed longstanding policy by limiting the time a family could receive welfare and mandating that adult recipients work. The move against gay and lesbian rights resulted in the legalization of same-sex marriages in Massachusetts, the refusal of several other states to acknowledge those marriages, and an unsuccessful, proposed constitutional amendment to ban such marriages throughout the nation. Successful efforts to dismantle affirmative action included voter referendums in California, Washington, and Michigan and several rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, including *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena* and *Texas v. Hopwood.* Less successful, but considerably more violent, with abortion clinics bombed, several physicians murdered, and scores of women physically and verbally harassed, was the backlash against legalized abortion.

An early example of a backlash in U.S. history involved the federal rights granted to former slaves and their descendants in the aftermath of the Civil War. Among these were the right to vote, for men, through the Civil Rights Act of 1870, and access to public accommodations for all, through the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The backlash against these and other rights included the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, the institution of Jim Crow laws and social practices by state and local governments, and the support of such laws by the U.S. Supreme Court beginning with its 1896 ruling in the case *Plessy v. Ferguson.* The Supreme Court also invalidated key sections of the 1870 act in *James v. Bowman* in 1903 and the 1875 act in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883. It was not until decades later that the court overturned the separate but equal doctrine established by *Plessy v. Ferguson* through *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954. Congress eventually restored most of the rights that had been rescinded by the Supreme Court in *James v. Bowman* and the Civil Rights Cases through provisions located in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, respectively.

Dula J. Espinosa

See also Abortion; Affirmative Action; Jim Crow; Same-Sex Marriage; Welfare

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Bail and Judicial Treatment

Bail is providing security, usually in the form of money, to guarantee a defendant's return to court for subsequent court dates. When an offender is arrested, that individual must appear before a lower court judge (e.g., a municipal court judge) for an initial appearance or for the first court appearance after arrest. During this court appearance, the judge determines whether or not the defendant is required to make bail to be released pending the defendant's next court date. If a defendant can pay the bail amount, the defendant is released into the community and ordered to return for future court dates. If the defendant cannot pay the bail amount or bail is denied, the defendant is placed in jail for the duration of the case. There is no

constitutional right to bail; in fact, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only prohibits the use of excessive bail.

A judge's bail decision rests on four primary factors. Perhaps most important is the seriousness of the offense. The more serious the offense is with which the defendant is charged, the higher the bail amount will be. In most cases, bail is denied for defendants who are charged with first degree murder. Second, flight risk is an important consideration in bail decisions. If the defendant is not a resident of the area in which the offense was committed or if the defendant has been arrested in the past and has not shown up for court dates, the judge may set a high bail amount or deny bail altogether, regardless of the seriousness of the offense. Third, a defendant's prior criminal record plays a role in bail decisions. Defendants with more extensive prior records will typically have higher bail amounts. Finally, public safety is a concern if the defendant appears to be a risk to others if released. If the defendant has made specific threats or has demonstrated risky behavior in the past, bail could be denied.

Defendants have several ways to secure their release while awaiting trial. The first method is a cash bond, in which the defendant pays the entire bail amount up front. If the defendant appears for all court appearances, the money is returned to the defendant. If court appearances are missed, the defendant forfeits the money. Cash bonds are uncommon, as most defendants cannot afford to pay the full bail amount. A second method is a property bond, in which assets are used as collateral. Those who own homes may cash out equity to pay the bail amount. As with a cash bond, a property bond is uncommon, as most defendants do not own any, or enough, assets to use as collateral. A third method uses a bail bondsman, who pays the bail amount to the court in exchange for a fee that the defendant must pay to the bondsman, usually 10 percent of the bail amount. This fee is nonrefundable. The bondsman basically promises the court that the defendant will make future court appearances. A final method does not involve a specific bail amount. A defendant can be released on his or her own recognizance, in which no bail amount is set, but the defendant is released with a promise to return to court for future court dates. Defendants who are released in this manner are usually charged with minor offenses, have strong ties to the community, or both.

Judges have considerable discretion in bail decisions, with the ability to set any bail amount as long as it is not excessive. Critics charge that this discretion allows the decision of one person to have an impact on numerous aspects of a case. For instance, a judge has limited information at the initial appearance and must make a prediction about the defendant's future actions. A judge may underpredict and release a defendant who should not be released. On the other hand, a judge may overpredict and incarcerate a defendant who should be released. This has implications not only for the defendant but also for the judge, the criminal justice system, and the public.

Other criticisms of bail decisions include the issues of preventive detention, jail overcrowding, and social class. Regarding preventive detention, a judge may deny bail to a defendant who he fears would be a risk to public safety if released and place the defendant in jail for the duration of the case. Some critics feel that preventive detention is a form of punishment without trial, in that a judge makes a decision to incarcerate a person for something that might occur, not for something that already has occurred. Sometimes judges face constraints in bail decisions based on the conditions of the local jail. If the jail is overcrowded, the judge may have to lower bail amounts or release defendants on their own recognizance to avoid further overcrowding. Finally, critics complain that, because it is based on a monetary system, those who can afford their bail amounts are able to enjoy release pending their case dispositions, whereas those who cannot afford bail are forced to stay in jail. Those in jail may not be able to assist with their defense and must endure the conditions of the jail even though they have yet to be convicted of a crime. Consequently, critics feel that the criminal justice system, through the use of a bail system, draws distinctions between the rich and poor and makes it more difficult for the poor to defend themselves.

Marian R. Williams

See also Class; Judicial Discretion; Justice; Plea Bargaining

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Bankruptcy, Business

Business bankruptcy occurs when a commercial organization does not have sufficient readily available funds (capital) to pay its current debts. Further, the business is either unable or unwilling to sell its assets, or to use debt (by borrowing capital) or equity (by selling ownership shares), to pay such obligations. As a result, the owner(s) declare(s) the business to be bankrupt. This declaration in most developed countries invokes laws and procedures designed to protect the interests of both the owner(s) and the creditor(s) in an orderly fashion. In the United States, the declaration and resolution of a business bankruptcy is most often governed by the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the U.S. Commercial Code. Hence, although a business may also file under the provisions of Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, reference is usually made to a business being "in Chapter 11."

Business bankruptcies are a fact of the life cycle of some businesses and of the economic cycle in general. During the decade from 1995 through 2004, despite such high-profile filings as WorldCom (US$104 billion) and Enron (US$63 billion), the relative rate of business bankruptcies in industrialized countries worldwide decreased by almost 10 percent. The typical rate of business bankruptcy filings worldwide is less than 1 percent of all organized businesses, although it is often difficult to discover data separately reporting business and personal bankruptcy filings. In the United States, bankruptcy filings of all types—both business and personal—from 2000 through 2005 ranged between 1.3 million and 1.7 million each year.

Direct and Indirect Effects

U.S. bankruptcy filings directly affect tens of millions of new persons annually and many more tens of millions of persons indirectly. Those directly affected are generally the laborers, managers, long-term lenders of secured capital, and owners, including shareholders. These individuals and organizations, as direct participants in the business, have a vested interest in the vitality of the business. Thus a business failure usually impacts them more immediately and more severely. However, a business bankruptcy may also harshly affect indirect participants in the business, such as suppliers of raw materials, customers down the supply chain, and especially the residents of the cities, regions, and national economies of the bankrupt business.

The direct effects of bankruptcies are usually reported first, as they are the easiest to measure. Among these are the impacts on the financial investment in and the human capital of the business. The effects on the financial investment tend to be the loss of capital invested, including reductions in revenues and profits and, if it is a publicly traded company, the drop in share pricing. The effects on the human capital are, bluntly, the job losses associated with the bankruptcy and subsequent restructuring or sale of the business.

As an example of indirect effects, an automotive industry analysis stated in June 2006 that 24 percent of parts suppliers to the world's automobile companies themselves faced fiscal danger as a result of the near bankruptcy of their clients, in addition to the US$60 billion in parts supplier company bankruptcies since 2001 in North America alone.

As a specific example of some of the human fallout of a business bankruptcy, consider that all 21,000 Enron employees were eventually fired—5,000 of them the day after the bankruptcy filing. All had their company-paid health insurance coverage terminated upon dismissal, and none of those under the age of 50 was able to sell any of the Enron stock held in his or her pension plan until that stock had lost over 98 percent of its value. While this is dire in itself, the larger picture includes all those persons and their families who had invested their savings directly in shares of Enron or in pension and similar funds that invested heavily in the company. It also includes all those creditors and their employees and their families who had extended credit to Enron. Two years after the bankruptcy filing, the company still owed more than US$31 billion and ultimately never paid most of that debt.

Related Social Problems

While it seems clear that the most obvious effects of a bankruptcy are economic, it also seems reasonable to project that many social ills—physical and mental abuse, development of chemical dependencies, heightened racial or ethnic tensions, criminal activity, and self-destructive behavior—may find key sources in the direct and consequential effects of business bankruptcies. However, little research is readily available that investigates the "social cost" of bankruptcies. Despite the many studies conducted on social

issues arising from unemployment and depression, few, if any, link these issues directly to bankruptcy. It is tempting to extend these results to stress, long-term depression, and other ailments that may arise from unemployment, financial uncertainty, or social unease experienced by a person affected by a business bankruptcy.

A recent Harvard University study concluded that illness and medical bills caused half of the nearly 1.5 million personal bankruptcies in the United States in 2001 and affected a total of nearly 2 million people. However, this is the inverse of a research finding that reveals clearly identified cause-and-effect data showing that business bankruptcies create social problems.

A paper published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development puts forth the concept that bankruptcy is one of the clearest indicators that an economy is open and market oriented. The rationale is that bankruptcy is the result of the community limiting credit to ventures that do not succeed in producing marketable goods at a sustainable return on investment. It is worthy of note that this rationale is somewhat circular, in that the bankruptcy of a going business concern has multiple and usually profound effects on both the economy in which the business is organized and the lives of those involved in its activity. Further, focused study might help estimate the total cost of a business bankruptcy—not just the financial loss—that the entire community endures.

Jeffrey Whitney

See also Bankruptcy, Personal; Debt Service; Economic Restructuring; Globalization; Outsourcing; Social Capital

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Bankruptcy, Personal

Personal bankruptcy occurs when a court of law approves and grants the person's (debtor's) petition or application to legally declare an inability to pay and satisfy monetary obligations (debts) to those owed monies (creditors) for the purpose of eliminating or reducing those debts. In contrast to ongoing income-providing social safety nets, such as welfare or unemployment insurance, to prevent individuals from entering into poverty, bankruptcy has historically been viewed as a means to provide debtors in financial hardship who cannot pay their debts a chance for a fresh start. For example, a person has debts that include credit cards, car loans, a mortgage, and medical bills; loses his or her job; depletes his or her savings; and can no longer meet these debts. The debtor applies to, and seeks the protection of, the bankruptcy court to wipe clean, or at least reduce, those debts. On the opposite side of bankruptcy are creditors and other providers that will not be paid for goods or services already provided, with the result that paying consumers bear the costs of those who cannot, through higher loan and credit card interest rates and prices. Bankruptcy petitions, or filings, have tripled on an annual basis over a 10-year period, culminating in 1.6 million filings in the year 2004.

Social scientists and public policy makers are interested in personal bankruptcy for several reasons: whether or not the factors that contribute to and cause bankruptcies can be identified and somehow lessened; bankruptcy's relationship to other social concerns such as job volatility, income, and family life; the bankruptcy process and its ensuing result as to its fairness, role, and inter-relationship with other social safety nets; and its costs to business in terms of lost revenue, all of which affect social and economic stability.

The factors that contribute to bankruptcy are varied and inter-related. Excessive debt is increasingly a primary factor but is usually not sufficient on its own to trigger a bankruptcy. When coupled with major adverse events like job loss, disability, loss of health care, or other income disruption and additional shocks such as increased medical expenses from illness or

injury, the potential for bankruptcy increases significantly. Divorce can also contribute to bankruptcy potential in two-income households that split and become separate economic entities trying to maintain a similar living standard. These factors create a financial vulnerability that increases as individuals save less, reducing their own personal safety net. The vulnerability is compounded as means-based social safety net programs, such as unemployment insurance, health care, and welfare, are restricted due to public policy. Resulting middle-class stability is threatened, and choice of bankruptcy as the final safety net increases in incidence. Research shows that 80 percent of bankruptcy filings result from adverse events like job loss, illness, injury, or divorce and those who filed for bankruptcy were predominantly middle class, with earnings above the bottom 20 percent and below the top 20 percent. This is in contrast to the stereotypical bankrupt debtor who is often viewed as a so-called deadbeat, unwilling to meet his or her debts.

The factors that create personal financial risk and vulnerability are consistent in modern societies, but how a society deals with these risks varies. If the risks are to be socialized and borne collectively, stronger safety nets—before the last resort of bankruptcy—are implied, coupled with laws that restrict bankruptcy. Such is the case in the United Kingdom, with its generally regarded wider safety nets and similar consumer debt levels relative to the United States yet with lower levels of bankruptcy. If the financial vulnerability is to be borne individually, which is consistent with the U.S. open market–based society, bankruptcy remains the final safety net that must distribute debt relief and a fresh start opportunity.

In the United States, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 was passed into federal law and is the most significant change in personal bankruptcy since 1978. As personal stigma regarding bankruptcy has lessened and consumer debt has grown, the act was passed to prevent so-called abuse and fraud bankruptcies by debtors who borrow heavily without regard to meeting scheduled obligations while retaining the historical intent of providing those in true financial hardship a second-chance start. The act's most significant provision both limits debtors' ability and makes it more difficult for debtors to completely wipe clean all debts (referred to as a Chapter 7 filing), than previously allowed. It also requires those debtors who can afford to make some payments to do so while having the remaining debts erased (referred to as a Chapter 13 filing). Under a Chapter 13, the court stops creditors from seizing income and assets of the debtor and assists in devising a repayment plan for up to 5 years. The result is that creditors receive some of the debts owed and more than if the debtor had been allowed to file under Chapter 7. The determining factor of whether a debtor can file under Chapter 7 or is required to file under Chapter 13 is the individual's income level relative to the median income in the state in which he or she resides and excess income after allowable expenses. If the debtor's income exceeds the median income of the debtor's resident state and the debtor has excess income above allowable expenses of $100, that person must file under Chapter 13. The result is that the choice of filing is means-based testing that is consistent with other means-based programs like welfare and unemployment insurance. The means test, however, will not prevent debtors from overextending their credit and may not do much to decrease the need to seek bankruptcy relief as the skills and knowledge required to avoid bankruptcy are not addressed.

Alky A. Danikas

See also Bankruptcy, Business; Living Wage; Means-Tested Programs; Underemployment; Unemployment; Wealth, U.S. Consumer; Wealth Disparities

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Basic Skills Testing

Basic skills tests measure the knowledge and skills examinees have in core areas that will impact future performance. These core areas typically include reading, mathematics, language arts, and sometimes other prerequisite skills.

A fine line exists between exit requirements from one level and entrance requirements to the next level. Basic skills testing straddles that line and can cross over in either direction. Minimum competency tests, especially those required in high schools as part of No Child Left Behind, include basic skills assessment as an exit requirement. College entrance tests, taken at the same time and with similar items and content, serve as predictors of future success based on performance in basic skills areas.

The most common use of the term *basic skills* relates to the 3 R's—reading, writing, and arithmetic—also known as literacy and numeracy. Speaking and computing are sometimes added to the generic list, with the term occasionally expanded for specific jobs. For example, a computer operator would need basic knowledge of computer systems, and a welder would need to know about welding equipment. The military provides basic skills training and tests these skills for future success in the armed forces, particularly in officer candidate schools. Thus, basic skills can be viewed as survival skills ensuring that test takers have the skills for future survival.

Basic skills may be tested at almost any time from elementary school through entrance to upper-division undergraduate training to entrance into a job market. One of the most common tests of basic skills is the Iowa Test of Basic Skills for K–8 students. Three of its fundamental purposes are to describe each student's developmental level, to identify a student's areas of relative strength and weakness, and to monitor year-to-year growth. Skills tested include reading, writing, listening, math, social studies, science, and reference materials.

States also use basic skills tests under a variety of names as an exit requirement from high school. Minnesota calls it a basic skills test, Georgia a high school graduation test, and New Jersey a high school proficiency test. These minimum competency tests use a cutoff score for sorting examinees into dichotomous categories—pass/fail.

College entrance tests also test basic skills, with the most common developed by Educational Testing Service and the American College Testing Service. While these tests are for initial admission at the freshman level, additional tests measure competency in basic skills for exit from sophomore standing and entrance to upper-division standing as well as entrance/exit from some professional programs such as teacher education. Some states develop their own tests, such as the CLAST exam in Florida; others use national tests.

Basic skills testing has become particularly popular as an entrance requirement in teacher education. The most widely used test is PRAXIS I, published by Educational Testing Service, which focuses on reading, writing, and mathematics. National Evaluation Systems also has a teacher basic skills test. Some states, such as Florida, developed their own test for professional licenses, using it not only as an entrance requirement into a professional program but also as an exit requirement from lower-division coursework or a community college program.

Basic skills for professionals and employment are sometimes expanded to include critical thinking skills such as problem solving and decision making. Leadership skills may be included as basic in business, military, or other contexts. Some basic skills tests even incorporate affective traits such as a positive attitude.

When used properly, basic skills tests can be highly effective in diagnosing student needs and ensuring that examinees have the prerequisite skills for future success. Many agencies examine passing rates for these tests as a measure of program or school effectiveness, even though this is controversial. For example, children can become lost if their weak areas are not diagnosed and remediated. Children can also be harmed by teachers who have deficits themselves in the basic skills. Further, when poorly developed or used improperly, basic skills tests can have negative social consequences for low-income, minority, and special needs students, as is most evident when these tests are used as minimum competency tests.

Judy R. Wilkerson

See also Academic Standards; Education, Academic Performance; Educational Equity; Minimum Competency Test

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Bereavement, Effect by Race

The increased risk of death among individuals who have lost their spouse is known as the "bereavement" or "widowhood effect." The bereavement effect originates from the difference between the health benefits of marriage and the negative consequences of widowhood. Research shows a strong and long-lasting bereavement effect among white men and women in the United States but no evidence for a bereavement effect among black men and women. The size of the widowhood effect for spouses in black–white interracial marriages may depend on the race of the wife. No research presently exists on the widowhood effect among Asian and Hispanic individuals in the United States.

Among whites married to whites, the death of one spouse increases the risk of death for the surviving spouse by over 50 percent during the first month of widowhood. For at least the first 3 years of widowhood, widowed individuals continue to face a risk of death that is more than 10 percent higher than that of comparable married individuals. The bereavement effect is the same for men and women, at least in old age. Research attributes the bereavement effect among whites to a variety of mechanisms, including emotional distress, difficulties with adjusting to new daily routines, the loss of spousal support, and the loss of health supervision. Traditionally, men lose their primary caregiver, whereas women suffer from reduced economic resources. Widows and widowers report less healthy lifestyles than married individuals and reduced access to high-quality medical care.

As mentioned, research has found no bereavement effect among blacks married to blacks. Because blacks derive similar health benefits from marriage as whites, the absence of a bereavement effect among blacks is likely due to racial differences in the experience of widowhood. Research suggests three possible explanations for this absence. First, blacks are twice as likely as whites to live with relatives in old age (40 percent vs. 20 percent). Coresident relatives may provide care for bereaved individuals, thus effectively substituting for the health services previously rendered by the spouse. Second, the gendered division of labor in marriages among blacks is, on average, less rigid. This may instill greater self-sufficiency, reduce spousal task dependence, and consequently better prepare blacks for widowhood. Third, greater religiosity and religious participation among blacks may provide bereaved individuals with spiritual comfort and social resources for dealing with loss that are less available to whites.

One study suggests that the bereavement effect for men in black–white intermarriage may depend entirely on the race of the wife: Elderly black men who lose a white wife suffer a bereavement effect, whereas white men married to a black wife do not suffer a widowhood effect. This may be explained by differences in kin involvement of racially intermarried spouses, but strong evidence for this or other explanations is presently unavailable.

Felix Elwert

See also Life Course; Life Expectancy; Stressors

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Bilingual Education

Bilingual education, the use of two languages to educate children in a school, is very complex in its nature, aims, approaches, and outcomes. So much as its philosophy and practices vary across schools, regions, states, and nations, the controversial issues and arguments surrounding bilingual education have bewildered not only the general public but also bilingual researchers and practitioners, especially in the United States.

For example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 encourages schools to abandon bilingual instruction, even though researchers have continuously demonstrated the value of bilingual programs for educating language-minority children. English-only advocates do not necessarily deny the effectiveness of bilingual education, but they view bilingual education or bilingualism as a threat to upholding national identity and a trigger to dividing people along ethnolinguistic lines; some of them even question whether anything was wrong with the old "sink or swim" approach that worked for earlier immigrants.

What the anti-bilingual backlash suggests is that many perceive bilingual education as a political issue

rather than an educational one. However, unlike the general public's perception, the academic field of bilingual education heavily rests on rigorous empirical research as well as in-depth studies and theories on language acquisition and academic development of bilingual children.

The Field of Bilingual Education

Bilingual education is a multidisciplinary field with various areas of research focusing largely on three areas: (1) a linguistics-based psychological and sociological foundation, (2) a micro-classroom pedagogy and macro-education, and (3) sociolinguistic perspectives.

The area of linguistics-based psychological and sociological foundations examines historical backgrounds and develops and integrates various theories. Researchers in this area emphasize the child's bilingual and cognitive development and the effect that home and neighborhood play in this development; they investigate ways of interfacing bilingual education with minority language maintenance as well as language decay and language revival. The area involving micro-classroom pedagogy and macro-education deals with the effectiveness of bilingual programs of different types. Researchers examine essential features of bilingual classrooms that foster bilingualism and academic learning, investigate various teaching methodologies, and analyze different views of the overall value and purpose of bilingualism in conjunction with the nature of multiculturalism in society, schools, and classrooms. The sociolinguistic perspective concentrates on language planning and policy, raises critical issues reflecting diverse viewpoints about language minorities and bilingual education, investigates factors that generate disparity in preference between the assimilation of language minorities and language diversity, and examines language policies.

In dealing with the previously mentioned areas at the individual and societal levels, the field of bilingual education evolved into various types of bilingual programs. For example, a *transitional bilingual program* facilitates the transition from the language minority's home language to the majority's language. It is important to note that publicly funded U.S. bilingual education is, broadly speaking, transitional in that it aims essentially to move children into English-only instruction within 2 or 3 years. However, some schools offer a *self-contained bilingual program* in which a bilingual teacher provides instruction in two languages in all subject areas. Another interesting form of bilingual education is a *two-way bilingual program* (also named *dual language program*) in which the classes are evenly divided between students who speak English and those who speak another language. Such programs use two languages more or less equally in the curriculum so that both language-majority and language-minority children become bilingual and biliterate. Some ESL (English as a second language) programs are a form of bilingual education in that all the students speak the same language other than English and the teacher speaks the students' home language yet little or no instruction is given in a language other than English.

Bilingual Education in the Political Arena

The field of bilingual education is academically well established, but its conception and operation closely inter-relate with immigration, societal changes, and political movements such as civil rights and equality of educational opportunity. Interestingly, U.S. society generally accepted language diversity, which was encouraged through religious institutions and newspapers, until World War I. In addition, bilingual education was practiced in some states (e.g., German–English schools in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Wisconsin). However, when the United States entered World War I, a wave of patriotism led to a fear of foreigners, and aliens' lack of English language skills became a source of social, political, and economic concern. Consequently, public and governmental pressure mounted to require all aliens to speak English and to become naturalized Americans, and for schools to conduct all classes in English.

Societal changes in the mid-20th century led to a more favorable public attitude toward bilingual education. For instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a significant marker that symbolized the beginning of a less-negative attitude toward ethnic groups and their linguistic heritage. What may be a most noteworthy landmark in U.S. bilingual education in this period was a lawsuit brought on behalf of Chinese students against the San Francisco School District. This case, known as *Lau v. Nichols*, involved whether or not non-English-speaking students received equal educational opportunities when instructed in a language they could not understand. In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the students, thereby expanding the language rights of limited-English-proficient students nationwide.

Society keeps changing, and language-related affairs and education assume different forms accordingly. Since the late 20th century, bilingual education has faced political adversity in varying degrees. Senator S. I. Hayakawa of California teamed up with other activists to found the advocacy group U.S. English in the early 1980s. This lobby headed the Official English offensive in Congress, state legislatures, and ballot campaigns. In 1996, the House of Representatives approved a bill designating English as the federal government's sole language of official business, but the Senate did not act, ending the proposed legislation. In 1998, California voters approved Proposition 227, mandating the dismantling of most bilingual education in the state. Voters in Arizona in 2000 and Massachusetts in 2002 also approved similar measures; in Colorado in 2002 voters rejected this initiative. More recently, the trend toward "holding schools accountable" through high-stakes testing, primarily in English as mandated by the No Child Left Behind Act, discourages schools from providing bilingual programs.

Sociopolitical and Educational Outlook

Although high-stakes testing has become a threat to bilingual education, it recasts a fundamental issue: the benefits of a bilingual program. Recently, advocates of bilingual education promoted two-way/dual bilingual programs by stressing their benefit. Unlike the transitional bilingual programs or self-contained bilingual programs initially developed and implemented for children with limited English language proficiency, the dual language program is designed for both language-minority and language-majority students. Each class would be equally composed of students who speak English and those who speak another language, as bilingual teachers aim to keep the two languages separate in their classroom. This dual language program is an interesting sociopolitical challenge in that bilingual education benefits students of the dominant language group as well as language-minority students.

However, interested observers note that the dual language program is limited in serving the school population "at large" because the non-English language in such a program may not be the language that the entire school population wants. For example, a school with many Spanish-speaking immigrants' children may consider offering a Spanish–English dual language program, but parents who are not Spanish-speaking descendants may not want to choose Spanish as the second language for their children: They may want Italian, French, or Polish, for example, which may not be financially or logistically practical.

Bilingual education, then, involves multifaceted issues. Its continuity or discontinuity and the choice of program types are sociopolitical issues as well as educational ones. No doubt consistent efforts will attempt to educate the general public about the societal benefits of developing native-language skills of language-minority children. Yet, U.S. education policy, driven by high-stakes testing and accountability demands, will continue the trend toward all-English programs. Thus the challenges that schools, communities, states, and bilingual professionals face vis-à-vis bilingual education are enormous. The challenges include establishing criteria about programs and services to ensure language-minority children's equal access to education, overcoming the mistaken perception that bilingual education threatens the existing social order, and expanding bilingual education to the dominant language group—the English-speaking children—to enhance their foreign language and intercultural communication skills.

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See also Education, Academic Performance; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; English as a Second Language; English-Only Movement; Immigration, United States

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Binge Drinking

Most alcohol treatment clinicians use the term *binge drinking* to mean a drinking spree that lasts several days—an episode known colloquially as a "bender." Such drinking is often a diagnostic sign of alcoholism or severe alcohol dependence.

In recent years, medical and public health researchers have defined binge drinking more broadly as the consumption of five or more alcoholic drinks on a single occasion. Some researchers specify a threshold of four or more drinks for women, who typically experience alcohol-related problems at lower consumption levels.

Researchers classify a person as a *binge drinker* if that individual has five or more (or four or more) drinks at least once during a particular time period, typically pegged at 2 weeks or a month. Critics call this research definition too expansive, especially in light of its pejorative connotations. One problem is that the definition fails to differentiate between a true bender and lower levels of heavy alcohol use, which can lead to public misunderstanding when news headlines proclaim binge drinking rates.

In addition, the definition does not account for the drinker's body weight, the pace of alcohol consumption, or whether food is eaten at the same time. As a result, a man of 240 pounds who had one drink per hour would still be labeled a binge drinker even though his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) would remain below high-risk levels commonly associated with mental and physical impairment.

Accordingly, in 2004, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), a U.S. federal agency that sponsors alcohol research, redefined a binge as a pattern of drinking alcohol that brings BAC to .08 percent (i.e., .08 gram of alcohol per 100 grams of blood) or above. This level was chosen because all 50 U.S. states have laws that define a BAC of .08 percent or higher as impaired driving. For the typical adult, a binge would result from consuming five or more drinks (male), or four or more drinks (female), in about 2 hours. NIAAA also distinguished binge drinking from both *risky drinking*, which involves reaching a peak BAC between .05 percent and .08 percent, and a *bender*, which involves 2 or more days of sustained heavy drinking.

Although the NIAAA definition is more precise, researchers have not yet embraced it, in part because of its complexity but primarily to ensure that their research can be compared with prior studies. Growing numbers of researchers no longer use the term *binge drinking* when describing alcohol use that merely exceeds the five-drink (or four-drink) threshold, but no alternative term has taken its place. The *Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, a leading periodical in the field, requires authors to use the term *heavy, episodic drinking*, but this is too cumbersome for everyday use. In this entry the phrase *heavy drinking* is used.

The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), a health survey organized and supported by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), defines heavy (binge) drinking as having five or more drinks on at least one occasion in the preceding month. The BRFSS for 2001 found that an estimated 14 percent of U.S. adults 18 years and older (22 percent of men, 7 percent of women) engaged in heavy drinking.

The heavy drinking rate for persons ages 18 to 20 years, who are younger than the U.S. legal drinking age, was 26 percent. Among persons of legal age, those ages 21 to 25 years had the greatest heavy drinking rate at 32 percent. The rate declined with increasing age: For those ages 26 to 34 years, the rate was 21 percent; for those 35 to 54 years, 14 percent; and for those 55 years and older, 4 percent. Heavy drinking rates by racial/ethnic group were as follows: Hispanic, 17 percent; white, 15 percent; and black, 10 percent.

The Monitoring the Future Study (MTF), an annual survey of U.S. middle school and high school students, defines heavy (binge) drinking as having five or more drinks in a row in the past 2 weeks. In 2005, the MTF reported that 28 percent of high school seniors (Grade 12) had engaged in heavy drinking, compared with 21 percent of students in Grade 10, and 10 percent of students in Grade 8. Historically, heavy drinking reached its peak in 1979, with a rate of 41 percent among high school seniors.

Heavy drinking is of particular concern at U.S. colleges and universities. The Harvard School of Public Health's College Alcohol Study (CAS) defines heavy (binge) drinking using the 5/4-plus standard. In 2001, an estimated 44 percent of students attending 4-year institutions reported drinking at that level at least once during the 2 weeks preceding the survey. About one half of these students (23 percent) drank heavily three or more times during that period.

Heavy drinking is associated with increased mortality and morbidity. For example, an estimated 1,700 U.S. college students die each year from alcohol-related causes, including alcohol poisoning, interpersonal

violence, and unintentional injury. Roughly 80 percent of these deaths are due to alcohol-related traffic crashes. Heavy drinking is also associated with poor academic performance, unprotected sex, vandalism, and other problems.

Several environmental factors are known to affect heavy drinking rates. Higher alcohol prices—brought about by increasing state excise taxes or eliminating "happy hours" and other low-price promotions—result in lower consumption and fewer alcohol-related problems. Likewise, communities with fewer alcohol retailers per capita also experience fewer alcohol-related problems. Responsible beverage service programs—involving identification checks to prevent underage customers from obtaining alcohol and procedures to avoid overservice—can also lead to lower alcohol use.

Based on data from the CAS, heavy drinking by underage U.S. college students is lower in communities where age 21 is the legal minimum age to buy alcohol. Heavy drinking by underage students is also lower in those communities where four or more of the following six laws are in place: keg registration, a .08 percent BAC per se law (that defines the legal limit by which alcohol-impaired driving is defined), and restrictions on happy hours, open containers, beer sold in pitchers, and billboards and other advertising.

William DeJong

See also Addiction; Alcoholism; Drunk Driving; Fetal Alcohol Syndrome; Gateway Drugs; Temperance Movement; Twelve-Step Programs

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Bioethics

Bioethics refers to an interdisciplinary approach used to address quandaries and moral dilemmas that arise from applied biology and medical science. It involves applying societal mores, philosophical principles, religious values, and human judgment to making decisions about human life and death, health and medical treatment, environmental issues, and the relationship of humans to other organisms on our planet. Principles of bioethics arose from secular and religious ethical principles. As medical science and biological technology developed and enabled humans to change their natural environment in dramatic ways, consideration of bioethics principles became more critical to guide applications of the technologies and human behavior.

History of Bioethics

Religious traditions served as the earliest sources to guide individuals and communities in decisions vis-à-vis medical practice, treatment of animals, and the environment. For instance, Judeo-Christian sources such as the Bible address bioethics issues, including injunctions to heal the sick and prohibitions regarding wanton destruction of property. The humane treatment of animals is also emphasized, as are mechanisms to provide reparations for personal harm. Healers and medical practitioners find guidelines in other ancient codes of law and thought as well, including those of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism.

The Hippocratic tradition, developed in ancient Greece approximately 2,500 years ago, includes guidelines for doctors in their relationships with their patients. The sections of the oath most influential for modern medicine include the prohibition against giving patients deadly drugs, directives against euthanasia and abortion, and most important, the core principle of the oath, the pledge to improve the health of the patient.

Modern codes of medical ethics include Percival's Code, developed by Thomas Percival of Great Britain in 1803, which also emphasized the physician's duty to the patient. With the founding of the American Medical Association in the mid-19th century, that group developed a code of ethics that focused on doctors benefiting their patients, in addition to the physician's role in benefiting society. After World War II, at the Nuremberg trials, the world learned of the

unspeakable violations of human rights carried out by Nazi doctors in the name of science. Nazi medical practitioners performed grievous experiments on Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals—innocent victims and unwilling subjects—imprisoned in concentration and death camps. The Nuremberg Code of 1946 was developed in response to the testimonies at the Nazi doctors' trials. That code stipulated, for the first time, the principle of voluntary and informed consent. The medical community, represented by the World Medical Association, also reacted to Nazi violations of human rights by developing a code in response to Nazi atrocities. Their document, the Declaration of Geneva of 1948, states that the health of the patient is of paramount importance and should be the doctor's first consideration.

Biotechnology and Bioethics

The advent of biotechnology and its myriad new applications in the 1970s and 1980s created a need for reconsideration of bioethics issues. In 1998, the Biotechnology Industry Organization developed a statement of principles to address some of the issues by reaffirming the basic principles of bioethics and declaring that biotechnology should be used in only beneficial ways. It emphasizes the importance of respect for animals, protection of the environment, and observance of the principle of informed consent for patients and the research subjects. The statement recommends that the power of biotechnology be applied to endeavors that lead to improvements in food production and the cleaning up of toxic wastes. The organization also emphasized its opposition to the use of the new technology to develop weapons. These noble concepts of the biotechnology industry clearly arose from general principles of bioethics and from previous codes guiding applied science and medicine.

The Roots of Bioethics

Bioethics rests on a foundation of ethics thousands of years in the making. Codes of law and other guidelines for human behavior have traditionally involved two major approaches: principle-based ethics and casuistry.

Principle-based approaches to ethics are top-down ("here are the rules, follow them"), whereas casuistry is a bottom-up type of ethical approach, which involves the application of case studies ("here are the situations, figure out the rules for yourself"). Exclusive use of either approach limits flexibility and adaptability to new situations. Thus, many ethicists find combination approaches more acceptable. One such approach, reflective equilibrium, developed by John Rawls in 1971, combines theories, principles, rules, and judgments about specific cases. Many legal and ethical systems are based, at least in part, on casuistry. For instance, legal precedents play important roles in determining the decisions of U.S. courts. But legal and ethical systems also combine case-based reasoning with a clear set of rules. Bioethics likewise developed from both approaches—from a set of principles, and from analysis of cases.

Major Principles of Secular Bioethics

In 1979 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress proposed four principles of modern secular bioethics: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. The principles, developed specifically to address issues in medical and environmental science, serve as cornerstones for the development of bioethical codes of behavior.

The *principle of respect for autonomy* includes the patient's or research subject's right to freely choose or reject treatment, and the liberty to act accordingly. Every patient's autonomy is of paramount importance. The right of informed consent represents one aspect of this principle. Accordingly, patients should be educated and allowed to participate in decisions regarding their fate; patients should retain authority to determine what their course of treatment is. However, even patient autonomy has limits; for instance, many would agree that patients must be prevented from harming themselves. Euthanasia on demand is not legal in the United States.

The *principle of nonmaleficence* means that the physician or scientist should do no harm. Patients should not be injured in the course of treatment. This could also be expanded to include the environment and be understood as a directive to protect our natural world.

The *principle of beneficence* directs medical practitioners and researchers to do good, promote patient welfare, devise ways to improve quality of life, and repair the world.

The fourth principle, the *principle of justice*, focuses on fairness in allocating resources. For instance, social benefits such as health care services,

including pharmaceutical drugs, diagnostic tests, donated organs, and medical expertise, should be distributed in a just manner. Likewise, social burdens such as taxes should be assessed fairly.

Major Issues in Bioethics

Most bioethics issues fall into five major themes: beginning of life, end of life, rights of patients, animal rights, and environmental protection and preservation.

The beginning of life category includes traditional areas of controversy (such as contraception and termination of pregnancy) and issues that more recently arose as a result of biotechnological advances. The latter category includes cloning, embryonic stem cell research, fetal experimentation, fetal surgery, multifetal pregnancy reduction, artificial reproductive technologies, eugenics, genetic screening, and gene therapy.

End-of-life issues include the injunction to preserve human life, assisted suicide and euthanasia, futility of end-of-life care, and allocation of medical resources.

The rights of patients involve issues such as voluntary participation and informed consent for medical treatment, truth-telling (i.e., sharing all information with patients), doctor–patient confidentiality, autonomy of patients, research on human subjects, the rights of the insured and the uninsured, and the fair allocation of limited resources.

Animal rights issues include questions regarding the use of animals as research subjects, the respectful and humane treatment of laboratory animals, domesticated farm animals and pets, and proper treatment of animals in the wild.

Environmental protection and preservation focus on minimizing the destruction of natural resources and habitats, preserving species, recovering and cleaning up fouled habitats, and reintroducing endangered species. Biotechnological advances have also led to novel bioethical conundrums, such as whether to alter species by genetic engineering and how to safely utilize genetically modified plants and animals so as not to harm humans or the environment or wreak havoc with the natural process of evolution.

The Future of Bioethics

As new technologies evolve, humankind will continue to grapple with new ethical dilemmas that arise. Increased human life expectancies will further stretch limited medical resources. As neonatal medicine improves, fetuses will be viable outside the womb at earlier stages, making abortion issues even more challenging. Genetic screening and gene therapy will permit parents to choose or reject offspring with particular traits, permitting humankind to change the course of evolution. Thus, in bioethics, the breakthroughs of today become the daunting dilemmas of tomorrow.

Miryam Z. Wahrman

See also Abortion; Contraception; Environmental Degradation; Eugenics; Euthanasia; Fertility; Genetically Altered Foods; Genetic Engineering; Genetic Theories; Genocide; Health Care, Access; Life Expectancy; Suicide

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Biracial

The term *biracial* refers to a person with parents of two different races. The 1967 *Loving v. Virginia* Supreme Court decision that invalidated laws forbidding inter-racial marriage, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and the opening up of Asian and Latin American immigration in 1965 all contributed

to an increase in inter-racial unions and biracial offspring. In the U.S. Census 2000, when people were given the opportunity to identify with more than one race for the first time, 2.4 percent of all Americans did so. The Census 2000 finding that 4 percent of Americans under 18 are biracial (compared with 2.4 percent of all Americans) is an indication of the relative youth of biracial Americans.

Increasingly, the word *multiracial* is replacing the term *biracial*. However, 93 percent of people who checked off more than one race on the 2000 census checked off only two races. It is also important to remember that the U.S. Census considers Hispanic/Latino an ethnic, rather than a racial, category. So, Latino/a Americans listed as "more than one race" checked off "Hispanic or Latino" *and* two or more racial groups. Most biracial Americans have a white parent because two thirds of Americans are non-Hispanic whites and, therefore, most inter-racial unions consist of a white person and a person of color. However, as a group, white people are least likely to marry outside of their racial group and have biracial offspring.

Most biracial Americans live in states with relatively high levels of diversity and metropolitan centers. According to the 2000 census, 40 percent of biracial persons reside in the West, 27 percent in the South, 18 percent in the Northeast, and 15 percent in the Midwest. Hawaii has the most multiracial persons, with 21 percent. In descending order, the other states with above-average biracial populations are Alaska, California, Oklahoma, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Texas. Each of these states has a biracial population greater than the 2.4 percent national average.

The literature on biracial Americans was primarily negative before the post–civil rights era "biracial baby boom," focusing on problems biracial Americans might have fitting into a monoracial society. However, recent social science research and popular writing on the topic of biracial Americans provide a much more positive view. Most of today's published work on biracial Americans stresses their ability to bridge racial divides and see both sides of racial issues. The popularity of biracial stars like Mariah Carey and the "Cablinasian" Tiger Woods has also done much to promote the benefits of a mixed-race background. As their numbers and presence grow, more and more biracial Americans are questioning the traditional racial hierarchy in the United States and embracing all sides of their racial heritage.

Kathleen Korgen

See also Race; Racial Formation Theory

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Birth Rate

Birth rates are measures used by social scientists and journalists to provide some indication of the role that new births contribute to a country's total population growth each year, as well as potential future increases when the new cohort reaches childbearing age. The most common form is the crude birth rate (CBR), which is crude in the sense that it compares the number of births to the number of men, women, and children in a given society even though only women of certain ages can reasonably be expected to give birth. The CBR is usually expressed as the number of births in a given period for every 1,000 live persons counted in the midpoint of that period and must not be confused with the total fertility rate (TFR), which includes only women of childbearing ages in the denominator.

In 2006, CBRs ranged from a high of 50.7 births per 1,000 in Niger to a low of 7.3 births per 1,000 in Hong Kong. Birth rates reflect two factors: the proportion of the population composed of fertile women (ages 15 to 44) and the prevalence of childbearing among them. (The TFR is based only on the latter of these). When women of childbearing age constitute a large proportion of the population and exhibit a high prevalence of childbearing, the outcome is predictable: significant population growth due to high levels of childbearing. Small proportions and low

prevalence of childbirth among such women will naturally lead to population stagnation or decline due to low levels of childbearing. However, in some instances low prevalence of childbearing among fertile women is offset by their over-representation in the population; sometimes high birth rates are driven not by the high prevalence of childbearing among fertile women but simply by the high number of fertile women in a given society.

In 2005, birth rates were slightly higher in Ireland and Chile (14.4 per 1,000 and 15.2 per 1,000, respectively) than in the United States (14.1 per 1,000) even though childbirth was more common among American women of childbearing age than among women in the other two countries. This paradoxical finding is attributable to the fact that larger proportions of Irish and Chilean women are of childbearing age (45 percent and 46 percent, respectively) compared with women in the United States (41 percent).

Through the 20th century, birth rates fell precipitously throughout the industrialized world, and less developed countries have begun to follow suit. Sudden drops in birth rate have a cumulative effect: The fewer babies born now, the fewer potential mothers there will be later. This has led to stagnant and even declining populations in some countries. This situation is aggravated by the simultaneous decrease in death rates, which has left relatively small birth cohorts charged with providing for larger birth cohorts who are surviving to retirement age, and well beyond, in unprecedented numbers. Immigrants have kept population growth robust in many such countries. However, by 2050 Mexico and other developing countries will experience similar population shortfalls; only time will tell if they can count on immigrants to span the difference between the number of native-born workers and the number needed to support burgeoning senior populations.

Amon Emeka

See also Baby Boomers; Fertility; Life Expectancy; Total Fertility Rate

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Bisexuality

Situated within the heterosexual versus homosexual binary, bisexuality is a sexual orientation or preference consisting of more than incidental amounts of sexual feeling, sexual behavior, or romantic desire for persons of both one's own and the other sex. The term encompasses those who self-define as bisexual, whether or not currently active with both sexes. It also refers to others who experience dual attractions or behavior but identify as heterosexual, gay, or lesbian, or simply reject the use of a sexual label altogether.

Although estimates vary widely and remain unresolved, representative national survey data indicate perhaps 6 percent of men and about 4 percent of women in the United States have had bisexual experiences from adolescence onward. Far fewer report recent sexual activity (in the past year) with both sexes. Likewise, a considerably smaller percentage self-defines as bisexual. Nonetheless, more people across the life course report bisexual behavior than exclusive same sex behavior, but fewer men and women self-define as bisexual than as gay or lesbian.

People who think of themselves as bisexual or who are actively bisexual often are not equally attracted to or equally sexual with both sexes. Evidence suggests there are more heterosexual-leaning bisexuals than homosexual-leaning bisexuals. Among self-defined bisexuals, more report heterosexual attractions and behaviors earlier in life than homosexual attractions and behaviors. The label *bisexual* often is adopted years later, after a period of identity drift and confusion, which results from a lack of acceptance of bisexuality in the larger world.

Bisexual lives are diverse. Serial bisexuality involves switching from a partner of one sex to another one at a time. Simultaneous bisexuality consists of ongoing sexual relationships with partners of different sexes. Whereas some bisexually oriented people practice monogamous relationships, others prefer multiple partners in a group relationship structure, and yet others live with a core primary partner with casual partners outside. Regardless of the structure, heterosexual marriage is common, involved partners of bisexuals often are not bisexual, and outside sex may or may not be openly agreed upon.

People in both the heterosexual and gay and lesbian communities view bisexuality in problematic terms, though for different reasons. On the one hand, during

the 1980s, the AIDS crisis emerged and bisexual identified men were viewed as a threat for transmitting the disease to the straight world. In response to the AIDS crisis, many openly identified bisexuals turned to practicing safer sex—using condoms or latex, screening partners, avoiding exchange of bodily fluids, and so forth. Today, AIDS research focuses on men who have sex with men, recognizing that bisexual behavior may occur among gay or heterosexual identified men as well, creating a more complex picture of risk.

On the other hand, despite the proliferation of more inclusive GLBT (gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender) groups on college campuses and elsewhere, bisexuality still holds a marginalized status in the gay and lesbian world. Perceptions persist that bisexuality is nothing more than a transitional fence-sitting sexuality. Bisexuals are likewise stereotyped as prone to jumping ship and as less capable of forming committed relationships. Additionally, bisexuals who live with or who are married to partners of the other sex are said to hide behind heterosexual privilege and to be politically incorrect. For example, while the issue of same-sex marriage is currently being contested, the question in the case of heterosexual coupled bisexuals is whether or not they are equally involved politically in this debate.

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See also Gender Identity and Socialization; Homosexuality; Sexuality; Sexual Orientation

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Black Codes

The term *Black Codes* refers to a collection of laws passed to restrict the civil rights of freed slaves and other persons of African descent. These are most commonly associated with an assortment of local and state laws passed in the Southern states between 1865 and 1866 following the abolition of slavery at the end of the U.S. Civil War. The purpose of these laws was threefold. First, the laws curtailed the social, occupational, and spatial mobility of African Americans. Geographically varying by state and local jurisdiction, these laws generally denied freed slaves the right to vote, marry whites, bear arms, or assemble after sunset. Other laws proscribed areas where African Americans could purchase or rent property or prohibited them from testifying against whites in court.

Second, the Black Codes operated to reproduce slavery in a disguised form. African Americans who quit their jobs, for example, could be arrested, imprisoned, and leased out as convict labor. Likewise, African Americans could be arrested and fined for other infractions, such as curfew violations or making insulting gestures. Through unfair imprisonment and debt bondage, Southern politicians tried to replicate slavery as closely as possible.

Third, the intent of the laws was to reinforce white supremacy and symbolically reflect the inferior status of blacks in the United States. In Mississippi, for example, railroads forbade "any freedman, negro, or mulatto to ride in any first-class passenger cars, set apart, or used by and for white persons." In short, the Black Codes ensured that African Americans "knew their place" in U.S. society.

President Andrew Johnson, being a white supremacist and supporter of states' rights, encouraged the South in its drafting of the Black Codes. Indeed, every governor whom Johnson appointed to head the new state governments in the South opposed black suffrage and worked to curb the civil rights and civil liberties of African Americans. However, the Republican-dominated Congress, angered by the imposition of the Black Codes, subsequently established a military governance of the Southern states. In effect, this repealed the 1865–66 Black Codes and led to the radical Reconstruction of the South (1867–77).

The postbellum Black Codes were not unique. Indeed, these codes had as antecedents a long history of laws discriminating against African Americans that dated to the founding of the United States. Most obvious, for example, is the congressional decision in 1790 to limit citizenship to whites only. Other legislation limited occupational attainment of African Americans, as seen in the 1810 law barring persons of African descent from carrying the U.S. mail.

Many laws, however, were more local, with the intent of controlling where African Americans could live. In 1717, for example, free blacks were prohibited from residing in any town or colony in Connecticut, and an early North Carolina law required free blacks

to register and to carry papers testifying to their legal status. Free blacks were also required to wear patches that read FREE. Any free black who failed to register, or was found without his or her proper paperwork, could be arrested and sold into slavery.

Laws prohibiting inter-racial marriage exhibit an even longer history. In 1662 the Virginia Assembly passed an act that black women's children were to serve according to the condition of the mother. This ensured that children of white fathers and black slave mothers would be assigned slave status. In 1691 Virginia amended this act, specifying that any free English woman who bore a mulatto child would pay a fine of 15 pounds or be sold as a servant for 5 years; the child would be a servant until age 30. These laws were replicated in other colonies. In 1664, for example, Maryland passed a law prohibiting white women from marrying black slaves. Any woman found in violation of this act was to serve the master of the woman's black slave husband during the lifetime of the husband. In addition, any children resulting from the marriage would themselves become slaves.

The Black Codes are not synonymous with the Jim Crow laws. Although similar in intent and practice, Jim Crowism began in 1890 as a response to the ending of radical Reconstruction. These latter laws, which built on and expanded the discriminatory practices of the Black Codes, were accompanied by informal measures of control, including lynchings, beatings, and other forms of harassment. They would continue, legally, until the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.

James Tyner

See also Jim Crow; Lynching; Miscegenation; Racism

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Black Nationalism

Often misunderstood and misplaced historically, Black Nationalism (most often directly or indirectly interwoven with Pan-Africanist thought and practice) has its U.S. origins in the 19th century with Paul Cuffe's (1759–1817) "Back to Africa" voyage of 1815, whereby he sailed to Sierra Leone and founded a colony with 38 free African Americans. This form of self-determination received further emphasis over the following 100 years with the works and lives of several key Black Nationalists: David Walker (1795–1830), Martin R. Delany (1812–85), Henry Highland Garnet (1815–82), Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832–1912), and Bishop Henry McNeil Turner (1834–1915). However, unlike those who wanted to resettle in Africa, Walker felt a strong desire for his people to stay and fight in North America. He contended that African Americans contributed to its growth and development and deserved to be rewarded for that labor and human misery.

Moreover, Frederick Douglass (1818–95) and, later, W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) could not be deemed separatist Black Nationalists, as they spent much of their lives fighting for the democratic rights of African Americans to have a stake primarily in U.S. society. However, they each provided impetus to the Back to Africa discussion and debate. Indeed, Du Bois would eventually become a prominent player in the Pan-Africanist movement.

Black Nationalism and its key ideas in the Back to Africa and Black separatism themes often coexisted with appeals for integrationist strategies for African American progress. In other words, some Black Nationalists argued for a homeland back in Africa, whereas others argued for integration into the U.S. mainstream. Black Nationalists thus do not fit into a tidy theoretical box.

Arguably, Marcus Garvey (1887–1940), a gifted Jamaican orator, encapsulates the breadth of modern Black Nationalism. Garvey led the largest movement involving the black masses (both urban and rural) on a global scale in the 1920s. In 1914, he established the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the African Communities League to unite peoples of African descent. His attempts to provide Africans in the Diaspora with a passage back to Africa and an African continent free from European colonial rule, promote black pride and knowledge of black history, and argue for economic independence and empowerment emboldened subsequent generations of Black Nationalists.

The legacy of Black Nationalism and its meandering path includes Elijah Muhammad (1897–1975), a Garveyite who would model much of the Nation of Islam on the methods used to build the Universal

Negro Improvement Association, and Malcolm X (1925–65), whose father was a staunch Garveyite, who articulated the need for black economic, cultural, and political empowerment in black communities throughout the world. Finally, the mid-20th century brought forth the independence movement in Africa, led by Kwame Nkrumah (1909–72), and the Black Power and Black Panther movements, led by Kwame Ture (aka Stokely Carmichael, 1941–98), Bobby Seale (1936–), Huey P. Newton (1942–89), Angela Davis (1944–), and many other activists. Crucially, then, Black Nationalism today represents an evolution of thought and practice in the notion of African American self-determination.

Mark Christian

See also Black Power Movement; Race; Racism

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Black Power Movement

Black Power signified both a departure from, and a continuation of, the ongoing civil rights movement. Prominent during the late 1960s and 1970s, Black Power promoted an activist-oriented strategy to challenge racial oppression and exploitation. Various individuals and groups identified as part of the Black Power movement include the Black Panther Party, the Republic of New Africa, US, and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.

The term *Black Power* originated in June 1966. During that year James Meredith, the first African American permitted to attend the University of Mississippi, conducted a one-man march against fear across the state of Mississippi. Two days into the march he was shot by a sniper and unable to complete the march. In his stead, Stokely Carmichael (1941–98), then chair of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), encouraged supporters to continue the march. As state troopers attacked the marchers, SNCC organizer Willie Ricks (now known as Mukasa Dada) advocated that African Americans adopt a strategy of Black Power. In response, Carmichael rallied the marchers with chants of "Black Power."

Within a year Black Power had emerged as an activist-based strategy to challenge white supremacy and to promote self-determination. A critical event in the maturation of Black Power as a strategy occurred in 1967 with the publication of Stokely Carmichael (later known as Kwame Ture) and Charles Hamilton's book *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America.* This book not only defined a phrase, it presented the movement with a political framework and encapsulated the idea that social justice was not forthcoming through traditional political processes but rather through more radical practices.

That said, Black Power did not encompass a single ideology, and its proponents did not advocate a single political strategy. Rather, the political orientations included the ideas of Marcus Garvey (1887–1940), Malcolm X (1925–65), Frantz Fanon (1925–61), Mao Zedong (1893–1976), and Karl Marx (1818–83). Drawing on Malcolm X, for example, many advocates of Black Power eschewed integration. Both politically and economically, integration was theorized as a means of retaining and reaffirming racial inequalities and injustices. Likewise, for Carmichael and Hamilton, integration was "a subterfuge for the maintenance of white supremacy."

Common to the many variants of Black Power was a commitment to racial equality and racial pride, as well as self-defense and self-determination. Black Power was thus about putting ideas into practice. This translated into various self-defense and community-empowering projects. The form in which Black Power was put into practice reflected the local conditions confronted by activists. The Black Panther Party, for example, initiated a series of locally based and locally derived programs. These neighborhood programs—later termed *survival programs*—were designed to satisfy the immediate needs and concerns of community residents. Specific programs included petitioning for community control of the police, teaching Black history classes, promoting tenant and welfare rights, establishing health clinics, and investigating reports of police brutality.

An ideology of self-determination did not translate into isolation. Instead, many Black Power proponents, including Huey Newton, cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called for inclusion while advocating autonomy and black liberation. The argument was based on the belief that black equality could not come about while other groups were simultaneously oppressed and exploited. As a result, Black Power advocates established crucial linkages with other organizations, including those supporting women, gays, and lesbians. Furthermore, Black Power proponents, as well as specific Black Power organizations, served as templates for other organizations demanding equality and liberation from oppression and exploitation. The Black Panther Party, as an example, catalyzed other organizations, not only in the United States (e.g., the Brown Berets, the Young Lords, and the American Indian Movement) but in other countries around the world. These later organizations included the Black Beret Cadre (Bermuda), the White Panther Party (United Kingdom), the Black Panther Party of Israel, the Black Panther Party of Australia, and the Dalit Panthers (India).

Black Power should not be seen as the militant counterpart of the broader civil rights movement. To be sure, Black Power, unlike the civil rights movement, focused more attention on racial pride, empowerment, self-determination, and self-defense. Certain proponents of Black Power, moreover, contradicted the goals set forth by mainstream civil rights leaders. Those supporting Black Power, for example, favored a variant of separatism as opposed to integration. There was also a tendency among Black Power proponents to view the United States not as a land of opportunity but rather as a land of racism, prejudice, exploitation, and oppression. Indeed, many participants of the Black Power movement viewed African Americans as living under a form of domestic colonialism.

Despite these differences, however, it is best to conceive Black Power as a locally derived alternative to the civil rights movement. Although its roots stretch to the south, the Black Power movement increasingly was defined by, and focused on, the northern and western portions of the United States. The Black Power movement, consequently, initiated a shift in focus from the rural agrarian South to the more urban industrialized North. This geographic transformation highlighted the spatial variations in racist practices. Whereas African Americans in the South largely confronted de jure racist practices and policies (e.g., Jim Crow laws), those in the North and West more often experienced de facto racism. Consequently, different strategies for racial equality and social justice were required.

Black Power also entailed an important cultural component. Whereas the promotion of racial pride was vocalized through popular slogans such as "Black Is Beautiful," the movement also experienced a flourishing of the arts. Poetry and paintings, songs and novels: All promoted the ideas of black liberation and freedom. The influence of Black Power is especially seen in the changed music styles of the late 1960s. Building on the rhythm and blues of James Brown, Sam Cooke, and Ike Turner, Black Power contributed to the emergence of a distinctly "black" sound: soul music. Influential groups and musicians included the Last Poets, the Isley Brothers, Rusty Bryant, the Temptations, Edwin Starr, Marvin Gaye, Stevie Wonder, and the aforementioned James Brown. Indeed, Brown's 1968 song "Say It Loud (I'm Black and I'm Proud)" served as an official anthem of Black Power.

James Tyner

See also Chicano Movement; Civil Rights; Jim Crow; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure

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Blaming the Victim

Victim blaming is the act of attributing fault, in whole or in part, to a person or group damaged by a social or physical context or situation. It can include those hurt in an accident; victims of crime, mental illness, poverty, or nonfunctional education; and those with

"undesirable" physical or cognitive characteristics. Victim blaming can be an inherent side effect of societal and professional remediation, treatment, or both. The act of blaming the victim rests on the belief that individuals are at least partially responsible for safeguarding themselves against foreseeable threats and dangers; therefore, from this perspective, individuals who fail to protect themselves are at least partly responsible for their status.

This premise operates as the basis for many social attitudes, practices, and policies regarding culpability in several spheres. For instance, home buyers are expected to inspect prospective properties for structural damages and weaknesses before finalizing purchases. If a home buyer fails to do so, such an individual must bear some responsibility for any problems with the house predating its purchase. Another example, in the case of natural disaster, is victims who failed to avoid a foreseeable catastrophe. This is also exemplified in cases of critique targeting refugees who are displaced by war and civil unrest yet had refused to abandon their homes in earlier periods of convenience or peace. More generally, it is the act of attributing culpability to individuals who suffer in a variety of contexts. Further, this process may be exacerbated by ameliorative or rehabilitative interventions. This act of attributing fault to victims because of perceived negligence or lack of vigilance against preventable damages is derogatorily referred to as "blaming the victim," especially when organizations are attempting to "help."

William Ryan coined the phrase "blaming the victim" in a 1971 book with that title in a criticism of *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* by Daniel Moynihan. The so-called Moynihan Report attributed the social conditions and problems of black Americans to poor family structure and the overdependence of blacks on formal social systems, the latter of which Moynihan traced back to slavery. Ryan explained that in the context of the Moynihan Report, which was written by a liberal ideologue, blaming the victim is an ideological process that excuses or even justifies injustices and inequities by focusing on the imperfection of the victim. Blaming the victim then ultimately serves the group interests of those who practice it by displacing culpability for social problems from themselves and allowing the practitioner to enjoy the privileges resulting from sustaining the status quo.

Victim blaming has also received considerable attention from the social psychology field. In the 1972 work *Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process*, H. H. Kelley supposed that individuals can make one of two causal attributions for a person's behavior or circumstance. Individuals can identify personal characteristics as causes for negative outcomes, or they can attribute their conditions to environmental or situational factors. People tend to make external attributions when referring to their own failures or misfortunes yet make internal attributions when referring to their accomplishments or good fortunes. The tendency is the opposite when referring to the successes or failures of others. Victim blaming is therefore a fundamental attribution error, meaning individuals overemphasize personal characteristics and de-emphasize environmental factors in making judgments of others.

Theoreticians later proposed that the tendency to make this error is greater for individuals who strongly believe in a "just world." In a classic just-world experiment, a woman was supposedly subjected to electric shocks while working on a memory problem while participants observed her performance. Observers rated the woman's character more negatively than did observers who had not witnessed the experiment. Such individuals are thus inclined to believe good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people; therefore, when others find themselves in a bad predicament, more than likely it is through some fault of their own. Another explanation for attribution errors like victim blaming is that observers only have the victim as a point of reference and not the external forces that affect that victim. Therefore, they focus on the factors that they are aware of, such as character flaws, and not factors they are not privy to, for example, external systems and behaviors.

Researchers in the 1970s and 1980s studied the extent to which specific groups of people were believed to be responsible for social problems endemic to their group. Researchers found that most participants believed personal characteristics of impoverished individuals were greater factors in poverty than were societal attributes. Researchers later conducted a factor analysis of proposed internal and external attributes, deriving individualistic and structuralist scales that respectively blamed poverty on individual or societal characteristics. Similar findings were reported in 1989, suggesting that people were still more likely to choose individualistic attributes in explaining poverty. In a 1985 study of causal attributions regarding racial inequalities, researchers

found results that were akin to the studies on perceived causes of poverty. Participants cited differences in levels of personal effort and values required for advancement in society as the root cause of economic and social disadvantages for minorities. In 1992, social scientists conducted a victim-blaming study regarding AIDS victims. Participants were more likely to attribute blame for the disease to individuals than to external factors. Victim blaming in cases of domestic violence and rape has also been extensively studied, with many researchers reporting that individuals with a "just-world" orientation believe victims provoke or somehow deserve an assault.

Victim blaming is contextual and moderated by several factors. Some theoreticians suggest that persons from individualistic cultures—that is, cultures that focus on individuals rather than groups—are more likely to blame the victim. Researchers have also found that moderating victim blaming is the level of tolerance for victim characteristics, social support, age, degree of one's identification with the victim, and severity of harm to the victim. One may identify acts of victim blaming as society blaming, which is also an attribution error, in that individuals overemphasize external factors as the cause of their circumstances. Moreover, one may identify efforts to prevent social problems on behalf of individuals as victim focused rather than change focused on the part of society.

William S. Davidson II and Eyitayo Onifade

See also Domestic Violence; Poverty

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Body Image

Body image refers to a person's self-perception of his or her body type and body size. This image is sometimes in keeping with the reality of a person's body size but often quite disparate from that actuality. When a disconnect exists between perceived and actual body size, harmful eating and dieting behaviors can ensue. Understanding body image provides insight into the underlying cause of severe eating disorders and unhealthy obsession with weight control. These problems are often very severe, especially for girls and women.

Standards of attractiveness have changed in U.S. culture. In the 1940s and 1950s, predominantly full-bodied women and tall, dark-haired men were seen as the most attractive. In the 1960s, a shift to much thinner body types became the norm in the fashion and entertainment industries. Since this shift, popular culture images consistently show thin, or often extremely thin, women as the standard of beauty. For men, muscle strength remains the predominant physical feature of attractiveness. The prevalence of attractive models and characters influences consumers to compare themselves to these images, and this increased focus on ultra-thin women affects the body image of young girls and women.

Gender differences in body image are the focus of much social science research, which consistently shows that compared with men and boys, women and girls are more susceptible to poor body images and the problems associated with a poor self-image. Women are far more likely to be diagnosed with anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa. These are harmful, often life-threatening, diseases leading women to cause serious damage to their digestive and central nervous systems by extreme dieting and eating behaviors. Although men and boys are also diagnosed with eating disorders, the statistics show women and girls are at much greater risk.

Some of the risk-taking behaviors associated with eating disorders are self-induced vomiting, excessive use of laxatives and appetite suppressants, and self-starvation. Some unhealthy eating and dieting practices are also associated with weight gain. Overeating (or bingeing) and steroid use cause the individual to bulk up. Overeating leads to obesity, a major cause of disease in North America. Steroid use is associated with myriad health problems and is far too common among athletic males who desire to bulk up their muscle mass. Social science research must consider the different techniques used to control weight, including the consumption of food, the use of drugs, and exercise habits.

Media representations of beautiful people continue to show men and women differently. For women and girls specifically, we see a demand for thin women

with big breasts and little tolerance for overweight women. For men, on the other hand, popular culture images of overweight men meet with much less resistance. Studies show that women in the entertainment industry must achieve and maintain thin waistlines, large breasts, toned skin and muscles, perfectly coiffed hair, and well-defined facial features. This ideal is largely consistent across all media of popular culture. Women who do not meet these criteria are hidden from public display. Men, however, may be overweight and short, yet featured prominently on television and in film. Although product advertisements still rely heavily on male models who are tall, thin, and muscular, more roles in television and film exist for men who do not fit into those images than for women not fitting the attractiveness standards. This leads to an overabundance of popular images of thin women.

The media images of thin women, combined with the increased attention to health concerns regarding weight, result in an increase in women engaging in extreme measures to become or stay thin. Women may also overexercise in an effort to obtain the ideal body size. A woman suffering from anorexia nervosa can achieve an overly thin body size by excessively exercising and undereating. While self-starvation has historically been the major symptom of anorexia, counselors and doctors now also pay attention to extreme exercising habits.

Health professionals and organizations, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, highlight the problem of overweight Americans because of their concern about obesity and related diseases. For children, especially, problems associated with obesity are increasing in number. Critics call the United States a "culture of excess," with large meals and food portions, easy access to fast foods and sweets, and little time for physical activity. In an effort to combat obesity, specifically among children, experts advocate physical fitness and exercise. Gym memberships, exercise programs, and diet plans are big business. For women with poor body image, extreme efforts to be thin hide behind the guise of healthy lifestyle. For others, of course, this health-conscious approach to life is a welcome change and a needed benefit for health improvement. Society should give more attention to the contradictory messages regarding weight and appearance, particularly the unrealistic images of thin women as portrayed in popular culture. Combined with a societal "push" to be active and physically fit, these unrealistic images contribute to a nation of women engaging in unhealthy eating and dieting behaviors. Whether overweight and overeating, or super thin, starving, and overexercising, women and girls struggle with their body image.

In other parts of the world, similar beauty standards exist. While some variation occurs between cultures of how women and men display beauty, thin bodies prevail in both Western and non-Western cultures as the female ideal. Skin tone, facial features, hair texture, and overall figure also determine beauty according to cultural standards. Given the global diversity of men and women, standardizing these individual features becomes problematic. The Western model woman is typically tall and thin, with straight hair and smooth skin tone. Facial features are proportionate with a small thin nose, with full lips and white straight teeth. Eye color is usually a light blue or green. For men, specific facial features receive less attention. Tall men with dark hair, white teeth, and muscular yet thin bodies remain as the standard of attractiveness. In essence, the Westernized image of attractive is now a global one.

One standard of attractiveness—based on a white ideal of beauty—results in problems for women and men of different racial/ethnic identities. Early research concluded that African American women value a larger female body type than do white Americans. The explanation purported that the black culture prefers full-figured, overweight, black women; therefore, black women were less susceptible to eating disorders. Several problems exist with this conclusion. First, even if we accept the assumption that there is a fundamental difference in the African American culture regarding attractiveness, black women may still be at risk for unhealthy eating and dieting. Obesity is statistically higher among the black American population, putting black men, women, and children at much greater health risk. Additionally, the "cultural differences" conclusion precludes continued discussion of racial/ethnic differences in body image.

Social science research must continue to address the racial/ethnic differences in body image and efforts to modify or maintain appearance. More research, for example, needs to be done on Asian Americans, Latinos/as, and other groups to uncover the influence of the popular image of attractiveness on body image. Finally, the earlier conclusions about black America dismiss the increased pressure on African American women, and *all* women, to obtain the thin, white ideal

body size and type. Hair straightening, teeth whitening, skin toners, and plastic surgeries all exist in a society that overvalues appearance and undervalues achievement.

Body image is a complex issue. The personal trouble of an unhealthy or unrealistic self-image can lead to serious mental and physical health concerns. The larger concern, however, is the social problem of competing pressures and ideals that result in a culture of poor self-worth and body image dysfunction. Social science must focus research on an improved understanding of the gender and racial differences in body image and efforts to achieve the cultural standard of beauty. With this improved understanding should come improved efforts to address the problems of negative body image and unhealthy eating and dieting behavior.

Kim A. Logio

See also Eating Disorders; Mass Media; Media; Obesity; Social Constructionist Theory

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Boomerang Generation

The Boomerang Generation refers to a trend in North America of young adult children, generally between the ages of 18 and 30, returning home to reside with their middle-aged parents in greater numbers than young adults in previous generations. Tied closely to social psychological life course theory, the concept offers a visual metaphor of young adults who "boomerang"—returning to and leaving the family home on several occasions before forming their own households. This pattern violates age-norm expectations that children separate physically from their parents and make their own lives sometime between age 18 and age 24.

If the transition to adulthood is defined by a series of milestones that include completing education or training, achieving economic independence, and forming long-term partnerships or establishing one's own family, the young adult who lives at home can be seen as not fully adult. Delays in home leaving, and returns home after one has left, signify new expectations about adulthood and what it means for the different generations in the household. Research on the family life course examines several questions about this phenomenon: To what extent are young adults today more likely to live at home with their parents? To what extent does this family arrangement represent something new? Who is helping whom with what; that is, what is the familial exchange (parents to child, child to parent, mutual aid)? Finally, what is the impact of such a family arrangement on coresident adults of different generations?

The most recent U.S. Census Bureau figures show that of the youngest young adults, 18 to 24 years old, more than 50 percent of young men and 43 percent of young women lived at home in 2000. Among "older" young adults, 25 to 34 years old, 12 percent of men and only 5 percent of women lived with a parent. This continues a trend first noted in the 1980s when the age of home leaving increased. It is harder to ascertain how many young adults leave home and then return home more than once, but their chances of doing so doubled between the 1920s and the 1980s. One group of researchers estimate that 40 percent return home at least once. The younger the young adult, the greater the likelihood that he or she will return on several occasions, suggesting a more nuanced pattern of establishing independence than in the past.

Why are young adults today more likely to live with their parents? The timing and frequency of standard reasons for leaving home have changed. Generally, adult children still leave home to take a job, to get married, to go to college or university away from home, or to join the military. The typical permanent path to home leaving—getting married—is occurring later, around age 25 or 26, which means more young adults than ever before have never married. Other reasons that may contribute to young adults returning home include economic ones: poorly

paid employment, high cost of housing, and the trade-off between the child's loss of privacy and the ability to save money while living with parents. Leaving home expressly because the adult child wants to be independent, which can include cohabitation with a lover or roommates or living alone, is more likely to lead back to living with parents at a later date. There are also marked cultural differences within some immigrant groups, where children are expected to live at home well into adulthood, and across native-born racial/ethnic groups.

The presence of adult children has implications for middle-aged parents or older parents whose children return to live with them. Except for the frail elderly, parents are more likely to provide the home, help, and support to their adult children than the reverse. The likelihood of being welcome at home depends on the parental situation as well as the reasons why the child lives at home. Those parents in intact, first marriages are more likely to welcome adult children back than are divorced or remarried parents. Parents who have small families are more likely to offer an adult child support than those who have large families. The unhappiest parents are those whose children have left and returned on several occasions, returning because of failure in the job market or in pursuit of education. Otherwise, parents of younger adults do not report marital problems or unhappiness specifically related to having their children back in the nest.

Thus, the idea of middle-aged parents, sandwiched between their elderly parents and demanding young adult boomerang kids who refuse to grow up or who are unable to do so, may overstate a gradual trend in families and households. Leaving home sooner or later and leaving home for good are largely related to changes in marriage patterns and to specific historical events that shaped the young adulthood of particular generations, such as world wars or access to higher education. Although some young adults will take a longer time to leave the nest completely, returning and leaving on occasion, and others will stay longer than in earlier generations, most young adults continue to endorse the norm of living independently as soon as possible.

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See also Cohabitation; Family; Family, Extended; Life Course; Sandwich Generation

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Boot Camps

Correctional "boot camps" have existed as part of the U.S. penal system for the past quarter century. In most states, young, first-time offenders participate in lieu of a prison term or probation; likewise, in certain jurisdictions, an adolescent can be sentenced to serve time (ranging from 90 to 180 days) in a boot camp instead of being given a prison sentence of up to 10 years. How the offender serves his or her time (either in jail or at a penal boot camp) differs among facilities and individual states. Prisoners not finishing a program must serve the original prison sentence.

Although still considered punishment, being sentenced to a boot camp became accepted as an alternative sentencing choice because many pundits felt it offered a better outcome (for adults and adolescents) than did traditional sentencing. It was hoped that by inserting nonviolent, low-risk offenders into a highly disciplined environment for a short time, these perpetrators (as envisioned) would learn new skills that would help prevent them from returning to a life of crime. Depending on the specific program, a boot camp's composition involved inmates learning discipline, experiencing regimentation and drill, physical conditioning, hygiene and sanitation, work, education, treatment, and therapy.

The average individual thinks of the military model when hearing the term *boot camp*, though other approaches exist as well. To recognize the wide range of methods, the definition expanded to include "work-intensive correctional programs" that did not technically qualify as boot camps but had related features: for instance, a 16-hour workday filled with laborious work, arduous physical training, studying, and

counseling. Experiential programs (camps providing young offenders with a mixture of physical activity, athletic contests with fellow detainees, and challenging outdoor experiences) were the norm, not the exception. However, when the public thought about boot camps, the concept centered on military discipline to generate respect for authority while emphasizing good support services once an inmate was released—with an overriding purpose of reducing recidivism.

Boot camps were referred to as "shock incarceration" (someone becomes so frightened that he or she voluntarily obeys the law). Usually, drill instructors forced inmates dressed in army fatigues to perform push-ups, chin-ups, and pull-ups for breaking any of the many rules. The program's primary goal was to give young offenders a "taste" of prison for a short period and then release them back into the community under supervision.

Even at the beginning, boot camps' success was guarded. Evaluation research produced mixed results, suggesting that the boot camp approach did not achieve its objective as originally hoped. Evaluations in Louisiana and Georgia indicated that boot camp graduates did no better in terms of re-arrests than inmates freed from prison or on probation and were, in fact, more likely to have parole revoked for technical violations. More serious, however, were deaths that were caused by drill instructor negligence, for example, thinking an adolescent was "malingering" when he or she was dying from dehydration.

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See also Juvenile Delinquency; Juvenile Justice System

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Bootstrap Theory

Bootstrap theory refers to social practices and laws dedicated to helping people help themselves; these practices range from the Puerto Rican industrialization project titled "Operation Bootstrap" in the mid-20th century to U.S. ideology and social policy in the post–welfare reform state.

Bootstrap theory was first intimated in an official policy called Operation Bootstrap (Operación Manos a la Obra), an ambitious project to industrialize Puerto Rico in 1948. The architect of Operation Bootstrap was Teodoro Moscoso (1910–92), a supporter of the then recently established Popular Democratic Party, who argued that a densely populated island like Puerto Rico could not subsist on an agrarian system alone. Therefore, U.S. companies were enticed to build factories that provided labor at costs below those within the United States, access to U.S. markets without import duties, and profits that could enter the mainland free from federal taxation.

To entice participation, tax exemptions and differential rental rates were offered for industrial facilities. As a result, Puerto Rico's economy shifted labor from agriculture (food, tobacco, leather, and apparel products) to manufacturing and tourism (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, and electronics). Although initially touted as an economic miracle, Operation Bootstrap, by the 1960s, was increasingly hampered by a growing unemployment problem and global free-market competition.

In more recent years, bootstrap theory reached a high level of mainstream acceptance as welfare came to represent an unpopular token commitment to a poor, disproportionately minority population that was thought to unfairly usurp government resources and tax dollars. After President William J. Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act on August 22, 1996, welfare was abolished and replaced with a bootstrap theory–motivated structure called "workfare." First, workfare forced people who had been on welfare to enter the labor market, and second, it shunned the "paternalism" of welfare by allowing citizens to remove themselves from a possible cycle of dependency.

Under these circumstances, "bootstrap capitalism" became a main rationale for ending federal or state support for the impoverished. Bootstrap capitalism was manifested in three distinct modalities: wage

supplements, asset building, and community capitalism. First, bootstrap theory was realized in wage supplements from tax credits for both low-wage workers and their employers. Second, asset building from promoting institutional development accounts to microenterprises was a key facet of bootstrap theory. Third, bootstrap theory relied upon the idea of community capitalism whereby federal aid gave earmarked funds to create community financial institutions, as well as *block grants*—federal funds given to individual states for applications of their choice. Bootstrap theory is an overall commitment to individualism, meritocracy, a strong work ethic, free-market competition, and private ownership.

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See also Welfare; Welfare Capitalism

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Bracero Program

The U.S.–Mexico Bracero Program was a temporary worker program that began in 1942 and lasted until 1964. Designed to be a wartime labor relief measure, agricultural producers successfully pressured the United States into extending the program for 22 years. During that time, 4.5 million individual work contracts were signed by approximately 2 million Mexican farmworkers. During World War II, the U.S. railroad industry also employed *Braceros* (a term referring to arms or *brazos* in Spanish and translating as "worker"). Although the vast majority of workers went to three states (California, Arizona, and Texas), 30 U.S. states participated in the program, and every state in Mexico sent workers northward. Workers were severely disempowered in their attempts to secure the rights guaranteed to them in the agreements made between both governments.

The Bracero Program began on August 4, 1942, in Stockton, California, as a result of the U.S. government responding to requests by southwest growers to recruit foreign labor. Nine months later the railroad industry secured the importation of Mexican laborers to meet wartime shortages. The agreement between the federal governments of Mexico and the United States laid out four general guidelines for the Mexican contract workers: (1) no U.S. military service; (2) protection against discriminatory acts; (3) guaranteed transportation, living expenses, and repatriation along the lines established under Article 29 of the Mexican labor laws; and (4) their employment would not displace domestic workers or reduce their wages.

The first guideline quelled Mexican popular discontent and apprehension based on earlier abuses (during World War I) of Mexican labor that occurred during the first Bracero Program. The second guideline, which explicitly banned discrimination against Mexican nationals, served as the key bargaining chip that the Mexican government utilized to promote the decent treatment of Braceros by U.S. growers. From 1942 to 1947, no Braceros were sent to Texas because of documentation of such mistreatment. Only after a series of anti-discrimination assurances by the Texas government were growers there allowed to import Braceros. The Mexican government also blacklisted Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming until the 1950s because of discriminatory practices documented in those states.

The third guideline guaranteed workers safe passage to and from the United States as well as decent living conditions while working in the United States. Braceros thus did not pay transportation costs from the recruitment centers in Mexico to the U.S. processing centers and eventual job sites. They did shoulder

the traveling costs from their hometowns to the Mexican recruitment centers, and these costs varied depending on where the recruitment centers were located and how long men waited before receiving a contract. The U.S. government preferred recruitment centers near the border to reduce their costs, whereas the Mexican government wanted centers in the major sending states of Central Mexico where the majority of Braceros originated.

The final guideline reduced competition between domestic and contracted labor. To ensure that Braceros received the same wage as U.S. citizens, determination of the prevailing wage in each locale prior to the harvest season established the wage that Braceros received. Labor organizer Ernesto Galarza noted that although the Department of Labor set the prevailing wage, it was growers who collectively determined the prevailing wage they were willing to pay.

With regard to all four guidelines, workers experienced a much different Bracero Program than the one designed on paper. Scholars have documented the inadequate housing; dehumanizing treatment; substandard wages; exorbitant prices for inedible food; illegal deductions for food, insurance, and health care; inadequate and unsafe transportation; and lack of legal rights and protections.

After potential Braceros secured the necessary paperwork from their local officials, their first stop was in Mexico at a recruitment center designed to assemble a qualified labor force of experienced, male workers, who were assigned numbers and processed by those numbers. Next, in the U.S. processing centers, the men stripped for inspection for hernias, sexually transmitted diseases, and communicable diseases such as tuberculosis. If they passed, a delousing spraying with DDT followed before they dressed. The weeding out of "undesirables" even included inspections of workers' calloused hands to ensure they were adept at agricultural tasks. Representatives of growers' associations then chose which men they would employ as workers and what work they would do.

The transportation, housing, and boarding of Braceros were an extension of the batch-handling. Living conditions for Braceros were similar to the military, as Braceros typically lived in barracks complete with a mess hall that served institutionally prepared meals. Less-desirable living arrangements included tents, chicken coops, barns, Japanese internment camps, high school gymnasiums, and stockyards. If Braceros lodged a complaint about negative treatment, they had to fear reprisal in the form of deportation. No shifts to other jobs were possible because contracts explicitly tied them to a specific employer, and Braceros were powerless to negotiate with their employers.

Given limited options for active protest, Braceros' main form of resistance was the exit option. Low wages, bad food, excessive deductions from paychecks, poor housing, domineering supervisors, or on-the-job injuries prompted many Braceros to leave their contracts. An estimated 20 percent to 33 percent exited the Bracero Program. A significant (but uncounted) number who stayed refused to return to the United States for other crop seasons.

Since 2000, former Braceros have organized to recoup losses suffered during the program. A march on Mexico City first brought the savings program issue to the Mexican public (10 percent of their wages were deducted automatically and placed in Mexican national banks to encourage men to return). A more recent pilgrimage to the border, like the former march to the original soccer stadium where Braceros were processed during World War II, followed the earlier path north to the border recruitment centers. *Alianza Braceroproa,* National Assembly of Ex-Braceros, and the Binational Union of Former Braceros are the main social movement organizations placing pressure on the Mexican government for monetary redress.

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See also Chicano Movement; Discrimination; Labor, Migrant; Social Movements

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Brown v. Board of Education

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a landmark Supreme Court case that overturned the "separate but equal" doctrine of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 169 U.S. 537 (1896), ruling that blacks and whites be allowed to attend the same public schools. The decision was a major blow to the system of southern de jure segregation, which required by law that blacks and whites be separated in all areas of public facilities, such as waiting rooms, restaurants, hotels, buses and trains, drinking fountains, and even cemeteries.

Racial segregation in public schools was especially problematic because it was clear that schools for white children and schools for black children were not equal and could not be made equal if they were to retain racial separation. The average amount spent by southern cities for each black pupil was usually less than half that spent on each white pupil. In many parts of the South, black children were forced to travel long distances to attend schools lacking basic facilities and qualified teachers. Some rural schools provided instruction for only 3 months out of the year; others provided no high school for black children. Even in urban areas of the South, schools were overcrowded and lacked the amenities of whites-only schools.

The case of *Brown v. Board of Education* rested on a class action suit filed in 1951 against the Board of Education of the City of Topeka, Kansas, by the local NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) on behalf of 13 plaintiffs. Among those plaintiffs, Oliver Brown—for whom the case is named—served on behalf of his daughter, Linda Brown. Miss Brown lived in a racially mixed neighborhood but had to travel more than an hour to attend school because her neighborhood school was segregated white. Because Kansas was a border state, and Topeka was not racially segregated in all areas of public facilities (e.g., waiting rooms), the NAACP strategically chose the city as its next battleground in the effort to desegregate public life. It was just one of five cases decided within the *Brown* decision, which included cases from South Carolina (*Briggs v. Elliott*), Delaware (*Gebhart v. Belton*), Virginia (*Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County*), and Washington, D.C. (*Bolling v. Sharpe*). Out of the five cases, *Brown v. Board of Education* was the only case predicated on black parents' constitutional right to send their children to local neighborhood schools. This was a major shift in the argument for dismantling a system of racial inequality and segregation: that racial segregation is inherently unequal regardless of the quality of public facilities.

One of the compelling arguments used in the *Brown* decision against segregated schools was that segregation causes psychological harm to individuals forced into segregation by the dominant group. This argument was based on the social scientific work of psychologists Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie Phipps Clark. Clark and Clark conducted experiments in which they showed black children in segregated schools and nonsegregated schools pictures of brown and white dolls. A majority of black children tested in a southern segregated school said that they preferred white dolls over brown dolls, leading the researchers to conclude that segregation caused self-loathing and acceptance of racist stereotypes in these black children.

Clark and Clark also argued that the lack of cross-status contact inherent in segregation causes hostility and suspicion between races. The historical assumption behind racial segregation was that segregated groups are intellectually and socially inferior and thus should be separated from the dominant group. The Clarks and other social scientists questioned this assumption by making the point that segregation produces inequality by creating different and unequal environments resulting in observable differences between races. This was effectively argued in an appendix (signed by 32 prominent psychologists) to the appellants' briefs in the *Brown*, *Briggs*, and *Davis* cases. A number of other social scientific works were cited in these briefs, including Gunnar Myrdal's famous work on U.S. racial inequality, *An American Dilemma*, of 1944.

Brown v. Board of Education was decided in a unanimous 9–0 vote on May 17, 1954, in favor of the plaintiff. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the court. He argued that public education was an increasingly important right of U.S. citizens and that individuals who are denied equal access to education are denied full citizenship in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees equal protection under the law. Although the separate facilities for black and white children in Kansas were not measurably different, Warren argued that forced legal segregation makes black children feel inferior, retarding their "educational and mental development," and concluded that separate but equal facilities in education are inherently unequal.

The *Brown* ruling was a victory for civil rights, but it was not until 1955 that the Supreme Court ordered states to comply with the ruling "with all deliberate speed" (in an ambiguous, open-ended ruling often referred to as *Brown II*). Not until the 1970s did many southern schools become desegregated, by which time many white students had fled to private schools. Subsequent critiques of the *Brown* ruling question the effectiveness of public school desegregation, which some argue did nothing to solve the problem of racial inequality, institutional racism, and segregation in other, nonpublic areas of life.

In 2006, the Supreme Court reassessed Brown's legal interpretation in two cases, dealing with Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky. Both cities had color-conscious policies that specifically sought to create a more balanced and racially integrated school system. Although students in each city had school choice, they could be denied admission based on race if their attendance would disrupt the racial balance in the school. On June 27, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled by a 5–4 vote along ideological grounds that school admission programs in Seattle and Louisville violated the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection to individuals. Because this decision stipulates race cannot be used to decide where students go to school, educators believe it may lead many districts to drop efforts at racially balancing schools.

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See also Jim Crow; *Plessy v. Ferguson;* Racism; School Segregation; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure

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Budget Deficits, U.S.

Demographic conditions profoundly affect the U.S. federal budget. Roughly one half of spending outside of interest on the debt and defense goes to people age 65 and over. In 2006, combined Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending averaged over $30,000 per capita for the older population. The first baby boomer will apply for Social Security in 2008 and for Medicare in 2011, and shortly after, spending pressures will soar.

Just as spending pressures will accumulate rapidly, tax revenue growth will decline because of a slowing in the growth of the working population. The slowdown will be the result of baby boomer retirements and a scarcity of younger entrants into the labor force. Simply put, the boomers did not have enough children to support them comfortably in their old age.

The combination of accelerating spending and decelerating revenue growth will place enormous upward pressures on budget deficits unless spending programs for the elderly are reformed, tax burdens are raised far above historically normal levels, or other government programs are cut to almost nothing. If deficits are allowed to drift upward continually, international financial markets will eventually become concerned about the future of the U.S. economy. At best, international and U.S. domestic investors will then demand higher interest rates and higher returns on U.S. equities before they are willing to buy U.S. bonds and stocks. At worst, investor concerns could cause a financial panic and do grave harm to the U.S. economy.

It is important to differentiate two very different types of economic cost imposed by deficits. Mild deficits erode a nation's wealth and therefore its standard of living in the long run. That is because deficits are financed by selling debt to either Americans or foreigners. If Americans did not use their savings to buy this debt, they probably would invest in housing or in business equipment and buildings in the United States and that would add to American wealth and productivity in the long run. Added productivity results in higher wages and therefore higher U.S. living standards.

To the extent that foreigners buy the debt, the United States will have to pay them interest in the future. The U.S.-generated income used for this purpose will not be available to Americans, and again, U.S. living

standards will suffer. The erosion of U.S. living standards caused by mild deficits occurs slowly and is barely noticeable in the short run. But over the long run, it slowly accumulates and eventually becomes quite significant.

However, the negative effect on living standards is not the main concern raised by growing deficits. As deficits grow, the nation's debt will eventually start to grow faster than its income. Then interest on the debt will also grow faster than income. If a nation starts to borrow to cover a growing interest bill as well as a portion of its noninterest spending, it can quickly get into very serious trouble. An ordinary household would too under similar circumstances. The interest bill begins to explode, and at some point, a household declares bankruptcy. A nation has another recourse. It can print money. But then inflation explodes and can easily reach 10,000 percent per year, or even more than 1,000,000 percent, as it did in the case of the Weimar Republic in the 1920s.

At what point should investors become worried about a debt explosion leading to hyperinflation? The ratio of the government's debt to the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) is an important indicator. If a government borrows enough every year to cause its debt to grow faster than the nation's total income, there is some reason to worry. Of course, this need not be an intense worry if the nation starts with a very low ratio of debt to GDP, and the United States' ratio is quite low relative to that of most other developed nations. Nevertheless, if the United States does nothing to reform its programs for the elderly or to raise taxes dramatically, the ratio will begin to rise at a very rapid rate after about 2015.

At what point do deficits raise the national debt faster than income? Economists focus on something called the *primary surplus* or *deficit*, which is noninterest spending minus revenues. Why is interest spending ignored in this calculation? In the long run, the interest rate on the public debt gravitates toward the growth rate of the economy. Let us assume that both the interest rate and the economic growth rate equal 5 percent. If the government borrows just enough to cover the interest bill on the debt, the debt will grow 5 percent. With the economy also growing at 5 percent, the ratio of debt to GDP will be constant. If the government borrows less than the interest bill, that is to say, runs a primary surplus, the ratio of debt to GDP is likely to fall in the longer run. Thus, it is considered prudent to always strive for a primary surplus.

That does not mean that government should never allow the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise over limited time periods. It would be very wasteful to raise and lower tax rates with every wiggle in expenditures. If a country is confronted by a temporary surge of spending because of a war or a major investment project, it makes sense to borrow temporarily even if the ratio of debt to GDP rises for a time. The same is true when a recession temporarily reduces revenue. Raising taxes could worsen the recession, although that theory is more controversial than it once was.

The budget duress caused by the aging of the population is not temporary. The problem will persist and worsen rapidly if there is no significant change in policy. It would be better to implement the necessary policy changes gradually and deliberatively rather than hastily when frightened by a panic in financial markets.

Rudolph G. Penner

See also Bankruptcy, Business; Bankruptcy, Personal; Debt Service; Population, Graying of

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Bullying

Bullying refers to aggressive behavior intended to harm the physical well-being of the victim or to create a feeling of fear and intimidation. Bullying includes physical assaults, physical intimidation, psychological intimidation, name-calling, teasing, social isolation, and exclusion. Two characteristics distinguish bullying from other forms of aggressive behavior. The first is the repetitive and prolonged nature of the bullying act; hence, not all name-calling is a form of bullying. Many students experience verbal insults by their peers, but the name-calling does not rise to the level of bullying until the student experiences it

regularly over a period of time. The second characteristic that distinguishes bullying from other forms of aggressive behavior is the status inequality between bully and victim. In comparison, the victim is physically, psychologically, and socially more vulnerable, which allows the bully to engage in the behavior with little concern for reprisals or other consequences. For example, physical assaults might be classified as acts of bullying if the victims were selected because they lacked the resources to defend themselves due to their physical stature, psychological profile, or social skills.

Until the 1970s, the problem of bullying received little attention from educators, researchers, or the general public. Bullying behavior was viewed as almost a rite of passage that most young people experience at some point during their childhood, adolescence, or both. Such a perception led to the belief that bullying behavior had no long-term consequences for either the victim or the bully. Today, the research suggests that neither perception is true. Both bullies and their victims are socially and psychologically different from their peers, and there are lasting implications for both. Not only has the traditional view of bullying as a rite of passage undermined our understanding of the causes and consequences of bullying; it may also have supported a "culture of bullying" within our education system.

A Culture of Bullying

Research suggests that the environment within schools is inadvertently supportive of bullying, thus creating a "culture of bullying." For a school's environment to be so described, it must possess two critical components that undermine the school's ability to act as a protector against bullying and instead allow development of a milieu that not only tolerates bullying behavior but also allows bullies to enhance their social standing through aggression without fear of consequences. First, it must possess an administration and faculty that are unaware of the extent of bullying behavior and therefore fail to effectively protect vulnerable students from being victimized or to punish those students who engage in bullying behavior. The research is consistent in suggesting that the schools' response to bullying is often ineffective in curbing the problem. In addition, schools rarely hold bullies responsible for their behavior when their behavior is brought to the attention of the faculty. This lack of effective response may be due to other social problems to which the schools must respond, such as teen pregnancy, alcohol and drug use, and other forms of violence. However, by focusing on these more "serious" problems within the schools, administrators may be ignoring an important precursor to these behaviors.

The second component that creates a culture of bullying within the educational system is the reaction of the student witnesses. Although some student eyewitnesses will intervene on behalf of the victim, the majority of students either become passive bystanders or else active participants in the bullying. Students who act as passive bystanders usually fear the consequences for themselves in an environment where the adults cannot be relied on to punish the bullies. Therefore, victims of bullying usually cannot depend on their fellow students to act as capable guardians against bullying behavior. Students who become active participants in the bullying act do so because the victim may be viewed by their peers and the faculty as an acceptable target because of an outcast status within the school social system. The culture of bullying evolves because both the school and the student body fail to send the message that bullying behavior is unacceptable behavior. Instead, they may be sending the message that aggression against a social outcast is tolerated, if not condoned, as a means of resolving problems and improving one's social standing.

The Bullies

The psychological profile of bullies suggests that they suffer from low self-esteem and a poor self-image. In addition, bullies can be described as angry or depressed and tend to act impulsively. In comparison to their peers, bullies possess a value system that supports the use of aggression to resolve problems and achieve goals. Finally, school is a negative situation for the bullies, who tend to perform at or below average in school and are unhappy in school. Further, teachers and peers view them as a disruptive influence. Due to their psychological profile, value system, and attitude toward school, bullies rely on aggression to solve school-based problems and to establish their position in the school hierarchy. While the research clearly demonstrates that bullying behavior is most common among middle school students and steadily declines with age, bullies may nonetheless graduate into more serious anti-social behaviors, including drug and alcohol use/abuse, delinquency, spousal abuse, and adult criminal behavior.

The Victims

Bullies do not select their targets at random; rather, they select targets specifically for their vulnerability. Victims are typically shy, socially awkward, low in self-esteem, and lacking in self-confidence. Furthermore, these characteristics reduce the victims' social resources and limit the number of friends they have. This makes them a desirable target for the bullies because the victims are unlikely to successfully defend themselves or have the social resources to force the bullies to cease their behavior. They are also less likely to report the behavior to an authority figure. In contrast, bullying victims who are successful in terminating the victimization typically rely on friends to intervene on their behalf with the bully or report the behavior to an authority figure. For victims, the act of bullying can have lasting consequences, including persistent fear, reduced self-esteem, and higher levels of anxiety. In addition, the research suggests that those students targeted by bullies in school are more likely to experience adult criminal victimization than those students who were not bullied in school.

Ann Marie Popp

See also Juvenile Delinquency; School Violence

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Bureaucracy

A bureaucracy is a form of organization with designated rules, hierarchy or chain of authority, and positions. Max Weber identified bureaucracy as a particular ideal-type, or an abstracted model, with the following characteristics: a division of labor in which tasks are specified and allocated to positions, a hierarchy of offices, a set of rules that govern performance, a separation between personal and official property and rights, the assignment of roles based on individuals' technical qualifications, and membership as a career. These specifications allow members to perform tasks without awaiting approval from a central authority, build organizational memory through routines, coordinate individual expertise, and ascend a career ladder. Rather than drawing upon authority based on tradition (such as a monarchy) or charismatic leadership, a bureaucracy relies on rules and formal positions to exert control over its members.

Bureaucracy's Spread

Weber argued that the bureaucracy exhibited greater technical efficiency, stability, and "fairness" than other organizational forms. He and others attributed bureaucracy's spread to its superior effectiveness at coordinating large numbers of members, inputs, and outputs. Some have attributed the proliferation of contemporary bureaucracies not to efficiency but to normative pressures. When confronted by the demands of governments, regulators, suppliers, vendors, and other actors in the organizational environment, organizations tend to adopt accepted organizational forms, namely, bureaucracy. Whereas most researchers categorize the majority of modern, complex, and large organizations as bureaucracies, cross-cultural studies document the existence of other organizational forms.

Drawbacks of Bureaucracy

Although a few argue that the effects of bureaucratic structures are contingent, much research has critiqued bureaucracy as inevitably exerting undesired consequences. Most notably, Weber lamented increasing bureaucratization as subjecting individuals to an "iron cage" of control. Others warn that bureaucracies consolidate and legitimize corporate or elite control at the expense of individuals and minorities. Using their access to resources and power, leaders can redirect organizing efforts toward elite interests. Oligarchy, or "rule by a few" may thus overtake collective interests. Organizational maintenance activities such as fundraising further divert efforts away from substantive goals.

Unchecked bureaucratic rationality can also generate suboptimal outcomes. Under a chain of authority, members' efforts may benefit only their immediate supervisor and unit, rather than serve larger organizational interests. Lower-ranking members may have little recourse for expressing dissenting views or protesting superiors' orders. To do their work, members may have to break the rules. If members mindlessly apply rules, then rules can become an end rather a means of reaching an end. This means–ends inversion can worsen goal displacement. Setting rules and procedures may only temporarily alleviate conflict between management and employees about appropriate activities. In addition, bureaucratic procedures can foster depersonalization. Bureaucracies ignore, or try to minimize, informal relations, or relationships among members that are not based on formal positions. They also fail to provide a group identity and meaning, aspects that some members seek. Although a division of labor and rules offer members some protection against intrusive requests by superiors and clients, they can also restrict members from applying their talents and interests. Those who labor in repetitive, assembly line work may experience their limited activity as particularly stultifying. Specification and standardization can generate "trained incapacity" or difficulties dealing with change intended to improve organizational performance.

Some critics blame bureaucratic dysfunction for imposing high societal costs. Hierarchy and a division of labor allow members to disavow responsibility and knowledge of problematic activities. Members may also use bureaucratic practices to normalize rather than correct deviance. For instance, repeatedly overlooked problems contributed to the NASA space shuttle disasters and chemical and nuclear plant accidents, corporate misconduct allowed for unsafe products and white-collar crime, and abuse of power sustained genocide and other atrocities. Furthermore, bureaucratization can homogenize the production and distribution of goods and services worldwide, thus eliminating local diversity. Finally, bureaucratic structures can reproduce and exacerbate larger societal inequality, including gender, ethnic, and class divisions.

Attempts to Redress the Ills of Bureaucracy

Collectivist Organizations

To counter bureaucracy's negative effects, some practitioners have designed organizations to respond to the interests of their members and the communities served. Known as co-operative, collective, democratic, or collectivist organizations, these organizations endorse practices that are explicitly antithetical to bureaucratic practices. Instead of a strict division of labor, members rotate tasks. Rather than establishing a hierarchy with top-down decision making, members practice consensual or democratic decision making. Flexible and modifiable rather than set rules govern performance. Blended personal and group property and rights afford members collective ownership of the organization. Members can learn skills "on the job" rather than having to qualify for positions. A reliance on a "value-rational" form of authority binds members through a collective commitment to the organization's mission.

Collectivist organizations face both external pressures and internal pressures to adopt standard organizational forms. Ironically, practices intended to support participation and group solidarity, such as decision making by consensus or reliance upon expressive friendship ties, exert their own unintended consequences and reproduce larger societal inequalities. Many collectivist organizations have dissolved or replaced collectivist practices with bureaucratic practices, although a few exceptions—the Mondragón cooperatives, the two-party International Typographical Union, the Burning Man organization, and Open Source projects—suggest that collectivist organizations can persist.

Contemporary Organizations

Contemporary organizations are increasingly adopting modified collectivist practices, such as worker participation, flattened hierarchy, and organizational missions. During the 1980s and 1990s, small decentralized organizations were heralded as superior to large bureaucracies in innovating and responding to change. To improve production, "lean production" practices capitalized on workers' otherwise untapped experiences and innovation by giving workers more control over their work. Corporations also attempted to instill meaning in employees' work through corporate culture and mission statements. However, some critics deem these changes symbolic and as masking exploitation under the guise of worker empowerment. Researchers recommend larger structural changes, such as establishing stronger unions and worker councils to represent employee interests. Others propose that professional and team forms of organizations can increase member input and autonomy and that such

organizations can work in tandem with conventional bureaucracies to improve both organization and production.

Katherine K. Chen

See also Corporate Crime; Inequality; Oligarchy; Total Institution; White-Collar Crime

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Burglary

The crime of burglary, also called "breaking and entering," is rooted in common law, originally designed to protect both the property within the home and the safety of its occupants. Modern-day burglary has expanded from a common law definition of entering the dwelling house of another during the night with the intent to commit a crime to now include illegal entry of any structure with criminal intent. The intent is most typically to commit a larceny, but it can be for assault, rape, vandalism, or any other criminal transgression. Most state criminal codes delineate degrees of seriousness based upon factors such as time of day, whether the structure serves as a dwelling, and whether the burglar is armed.

Burglary is a rather widespread crime with more than 2 million offenses recorded by the police annually and more than 3 million reported in victimization surveys. The gap between these measures is rather large because burglaries are rarely solved. If not for supporting insurance claims, the rate of reporting to the police would undoubtedly be even lower. The average take in a burglary is around $1,200, and the total annual loss is more than $4 billion.

Burglars vary widely in their skills, planning, and success. Criminologists generally identify several subsets of offenders. One sizable group is those with drug addictions looking for quick sources of funds to support their habit. Juvenile offenders constitute another significant group. Neither of these sets of offenders plan very well, and consequently, their risk is high and profits tend to be low. On the other hand, a segment of the burglar population plans quite carefully, gathering information about items present in a home or business and the occupying patterns of the residents or proprietors.

The single most important criterion to burglars is that persons are not present in the premises to be burglarized. Whether there is careful planning or only cursory observation of indicators, the goal is to break into unoccupied sites. Once entry is gained, a second dictum of the burglar is to work fast to minimize the risk of being caught. The most prized targets of the burglar are items that are portable, of high value, and readily convertible to cash. Jewelry, silver, and guns are prime examples. The overwhelming motivation for burglary is to profit from the theft to fulfill needs, or perceived needs, for money.

Many criminologists portray burglars primarily in terms of rational choice theory, whereas others view them as often impacted by emotion and other factors that undermine rational decision making. Offenders motivated by less-rational factors such as a desire for revenge, being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense, or desperation are at greatest risk of discovery. Those who are more rationally motivated are more likely to take environmental cues regarding the susceptibility of sites and their own risks into account.

Stephen E. Brown

See also Crime; Property Crime; Rational Choice Theory; Theft

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Burnout

Job burnout is one of the top 10 health problems in today's workplace in the United States and is a persistent problem in other developed nations. Although definitions of *burnout* vary, generally it is a chronic and persistent feeling of emotional exhaustion related to stressful job conditions. The personal and organizational costs associated with burnout can be quite high. The factors related to the onset of burnout and to associated job and personal changes are discussed in this entry, as are ways to ameliorate burnout.

The Nature of Job Burnout

Use of the term *burnout* helps researchers describe a state of emotional exhaustion caused by overwork. Burnout can be seen as a negative outcome of excessive levels of perceived stress on the job. During the 1970s, researchers examined burnout in the context of early findings about its connection to decreased performance, particularly as identified in the helping professions (e.g., counseling). Recent research reports burnout in a broad array of jobs. Since the early 1990s, U.S. workers have reported a dramatic increase in their experiences of job stress, and the general public has embraced the term for those experiencing a high degree of stress or feeling frazzled, at their wit's end, and so on. The common thread is the feeling of emotional exhaustion.

Burnout as a Construct

Christina Maslach has been one of the major proponents of a three-pronged theory of burnout, in which the three prongs are emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and diminished personal accomplishment. Emotional exhaustion still remains the most fundamental component of burnout. Individuals experiencing depersonalization start to see and treat people as objects, and individuals experiencing a diminished sense of personal accomplishment are unable to take pride in what they do. Current research suggests that burnout should once again be viewed as a single concept highlighted by emotional exhaustion. Recently, some attempts to study job burnout focused on exhaustion. Some theories expand the concept of exhaustion to include physical, emotional, and cognitive aspects. Other recent studies focused on both exhaustion and disengagement from personal relationships as job burnout symptoms, dropping only the diminished sense of personal accomplishment from the three-pronged approach.

Precursors of Job Burnout

Research has identified a variety of factors that contribute to the development and severity of job burnout. These problems fall into two major areas: work factors and personality factors.

Work Factors Related to Burnout

The most common work responsibility factor is work overload: having too much to do over an extended period of time. It depletes an individual's physical, cognitive, and emotional resources and leads to exhaustion. A second major contributor to burnout is the loss of personal control in the job environment. The final set of problems relates to the roles established and maintained by individuals at work: role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload. Role difficulties often link closely to both work overload and control problems. These role-related difficulties lead to increased stress levels. Clearly, these are areas where organizations have the ability to change and thereby reduce the potential for burnout. However, such changes are in potential conflict with organizational trends like downsizing and cost-saving adjustments.

Interpersonal relationships in the workplace are another major source of stress and, therefore, burnout. Most of these problems fall into the categories of lack of social support and conflict. Interactions with supervisors, peers, subordinates, and clients are all potential sources of stress and may range from lack of support to interpersonal conflict. Whereas in its lesser forms interpersonal peer issues are often mild and produce lower levels of stress, their more conflict-laden forms are a major source of stress to people.

Personality Factors Related to Burnout

In addition to the job environment, individuals have certain traits, conditions, and histories that may further heighten the effects of certain job factors leading to burnout. These traits are often referred to as "personality" factors and can range from work–family issues to transportation problems. Substantial evidence exists

about the association of certain personality traits with increased incidence of job burnout. The most consistently found traits include Neuroticism, which predicts greater degrees of burnout, and Hardiness, which buffers the effects of burnout. Clearly, some people have predispositions to burnout, but job factors remain the most potent predictors of burnout.

The potential list of general conditions that affect workers' tendency to experience burnout is long. Several factors seem particularly potent in today's workplace. Work–nonwork balance is one of those factors. Individuals who are unable to balance their nonwork and work commitments are more likely to experience job burnout. Nonwork factors, such as financial difficulties, commuting time, multiple jobs, personal relationships, worries about war and terrorism, and even more "positive" stressors such as getting married or having children, are just a few of the issues that can elevate stress levels and contribute to burnout. The most likely outcome of these factors is a higher incidence of stress and burnout over time. However, job factors remain the major predictor of stress and burnout.

Consequences of Burnout in the Workplace

Job burnout creates problems with workers' performance and attitudes about their jobs. These problems on the job fall into three broad categories: emotional, biological, and behavioral.

Consistent with the emotional exhaustion associated with burnout, other psychological changes occur. The most consistent job attitudes where declines occur include job satisfaction, job involvement, job commitment, organizational commitment, and increased job frustration. These negative attitudes often connect strongly to negative health outcomes (e.g., hypertension), behavioral changes (e.g., wanting to leave the organization), and, at the most extreme end, aggression and violence.

As with all negative stress-related circumstances, physical problems occur. These problems result in increased health care costs for the individual and possibly increased health care rates. Clearly, the organization can incur increased costs from these consequences of burnout.

Finally, stress and burnout may create additional behavioral changes in workers which directly affect organizational productivity. Burnout has been linked to increased accident rates, which result in decreased productivity and, in some cases, increased health care costs. Burnout decreases job performance, with individuals accomplishing less. In some cases, burnout can lead individuals to engage in negative activities that can cause decreased unit performance (e.g., being rude to customers). Because burnout is a health problem, companies may have difficulties firing a "sick" individual.

Coping With Burnout

While burnout is a negative outcome of stress, the question still remains: Why are some individuals more likely to experience burnout than others do when they experience the same sources of stress? Current research suggests that coping strategies and resources may reduce an individual's risk of experiencing burnout. Different ideas abound regarding identification and categorization of these different coping strategies and resources. These varying categories and definitions of coping strategies find conflicting support for models, suggesting coping decreases the perception of stress and, thus, burnout. Coping plays a sizable role in explaining why some individuals experience burnout whereas others do not. However, it remains unclear just how coping works.

Future Directions

The previous focus on individual stress reduction techniques, such as coping, health promotion, and counseling, may place too much responsibility for stress reduction on the individual versus the organization. Needed are more programs directed at primary organizational causes of stress and burnout. Such programs could be directed at identifying factors affecting stress and burnout, such as selecting, training, and developing supervisors and managers; providing interpersonal communication training to all levels of employees; and reducing work and role overloads.

Future research could examine such factors as how resilient a person will be to stressors (the hardy personality) and matching people and environments (organizational fit). The key might be to design programs that are flexible and that recognize the important individual differences that influence job burnout.

Alternatively, along with psychology's recent refocus on positive psychology, a new way to view this situation has emerged: focusing on individuals who are *engaged* in their jobs. Current debate centers on

the construct definition of engagement between engagement as simply the opposite of burnout and engagement as an entirely separate and distinct construct. This view provides a way to apply the knowledge gained from the burnout literature without risking negative consequences that may be seen as stemming from employers admitting to possibly having a stressful work environment.

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See also Job Satisfaction; Role Conflict; Role Strain; Stressors

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C

Capital Flight

The phenomenon of capital flight refers to the movement of money—as capital—across national boundaries. This can be money leaving one country to be invested in financial assets in another country, or it can be foreign direct investment, whereby a company invests directly into a foreign country's domestic structures, equipment, and organizations (nonfinancial assets). What makes capital movement "flight" is either the magnitude of the movement or the reason for the movement; that is, that the capital is "fleeing" something. However, no consensus exists on either what this magnitude or these reasons must be for capital movements to constitute flight. Thus, in general, *any* cross-national movement of capital may be considered capital flight.

When capital moves between countries, opposite economic impacts occur in the two affected countries. There are primarily positive effects for the country that is receiving the invested capital. For them, money is pouring into their economy, pumping it up and expanding economic activity. If the capital is invested only in financial assets, however, the money may just get lost in a speculative bubble of some sort, with no real net benefit for the economy. For the country from which capital is leaving, on the other hand, there are mainly negative effects. Falling investment will tend to retard economic growth, reducing the demand for labor and increasing unemployment. The money flowing to another country is that much money that cannot be used to expand the economy.

A striking example of capital flight is the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. This world region was greatly expanding for a generation leading up to this debacle, with capital pouring in from the rest of the world. At some point, however, investors became wary and started to pull out, trying to jump from what they perceived as a sinking ship. For the five countries of South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the net private capital flow for 1996 was +$93 billion, and in 1997 it dropped to –$12 billion, which represented a 1-year turnaround of $105 billion in capital flowing out of these countries—in other words, capital flight. The economic consequences for these countries were severe. Indonesia's economy, for example, grew 4.9 percent in 1997 and contracted 13.7 percent in 1998, while Malaysia's growth rate fell from +7.8 percent in 1997 to –6.8 percent in 1998. Reversals of growth of these magnitudes can only be devastating for an economy. In addition, for these five countries, real wages dropped, unemployment increased significantly, and poverty rates rose dramatically; in Indonesia the poverty rate nearly tripled from 1997 to 1998.

The threat of capital mobility can be used as a tool of capitalists both to keep labor in line and to keep environmental costs in check. If workers demand higher wages and benefits, or better working conditions, the owners of capital can respond by threatening to move to a more congenial location, preferably one with lower wages and more docile workers. Given the extremely unequal distributions of income and wealth in the world, this threat is more than credible. For example, a U.S. worker making $20 per hour is effectively competing against a Chinese worker who makes perhaps 50 cents per hour. If that U.S. worker fights for a wage increase, the Chinese worker may become irresistible to the U.S. manufacturer—50 cents an hour can offset all sorts of financial obstacles to relocating abroad.

Further skewing this asymmetric relationship is the fact that workers do not have the same sort of mobility that capital has. It is legally very difficult and not very desirable to a worker to emigrate to another country simply to find a better job: Animate workers do not have the same mobility as inanimate capital. There is no "labor flight" comparable to "capital flight." The difficulties encountered by Mexican workers in their movement to the United States underscore this asymmetry.

Within a country, the consequences of capital flight can be quite localized. For example, during the past 20 years U.S. auto companies shut down many assembly plants in Michigan to shift production to low-cost locations abroad. A well-known example of this is the city of Flint. Once a vibrant city where General Motors (GM) employed over 80,000 workers, Flint now has a poverty rate of over 25 percent, an unemployment rate of 12 percent, and only a few thousand workers still at GM. The devastation wreaked by capital flight has been overwhelming in Flint.

The ability of capitalists to move capital freely between countries is enhanced by free trade agreements. For example, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) lifted trade restrictions not only on goods and services but also on capital flows between Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The removal of nearly all cross-border restrictions on both financial investment and foreign direct investment opened the door for capital to go wherever capitalists desired in order to reduce costs and increase profits. Restrictions on the movement of labor, in contrast, were not lifted: Most Mexican workers still have to enter the United States illegally to take advantage of the higher U.S. wages.

One result of NAFTA's elimination of restrictions on the movement of financial capital was the Mexican financial debacle of 1994. Investors poured money into Mexico in the early 1990s, but with the enactment of NAFTA, it was very easy for these investments to flee Mexico as the speculative bubble burst. Reductions in Mexico's output and employment followed this capital flight.

The dictates of the free market point toward unrestricted capital mobility. Along with arguing for free trade in goods and services, proponents of the free market generally argue for complete capital mobility. This, in turn, increases the probability of capital flight, especially of the sort associated with financial speculation. Capital flight thus becomes a logical result of international free trade.

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See also Globalization; Multinational Corporations; Urban Decline

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Capital Punishment

Unlike most industrialized nations that severely restrict or have banned the practice completely, the United States continues to use capital punishment. Despite international pressures, internal protests, and some compelling arguments against this practice, the United States remains the only industrialized democracy still executing prisoners.

Historical Use of Capital Punishment

The death penalty was used widely in the ancient world. In the 18th century BCE, Babylon prescribed the death penalty for 25 crimes. Even the celebrated ancient democracy in Athens relied heavily on capital punishment in its legal code developed in the 7th century BCE. Roman law is well known for its executions, using various methods, including crucifixion. In England, during the reign of King Henry VIII in the 16th century, approximately 72,000 people were executed.

In Britain during the 1700s, there were more than 20 crimes punishable by death, including many trivial property offenses. Because of this severity, juries often refused to convict many of these offenders. Britain ultimately abolished capital punishment in 1971. France joined in abolishing its execution method by guillotine in 1981. Indeed, currently the

European Union prohibits its member states from maintaining death penalty legislation.

This European aversion to capital punishment may well have something to do with the millions of Jews executed by the Nazi state in Hitler's gas chambers. In addition, 200,000 to 300,000 of the disabled were murdered as were nearly 25,000 homosexual men, 226,000 "Gypsies," up to 200,000 Freemasons, 5 million Russians, 3 million Ukrainians, 1.5 million Belarusians, and 1.8 million non-Jewish Poles. With these staggering figures in mind, one can understand why the new free German state (Federal Republic of Germany) abolished capital punishment in 1949, shortly after the end of the war. As soon as East Germany (the German Democratic Republic) joined the West in 1990, the death penalty was abolished there was well. The remnants of Nazi concentration camps scattered around Germany remind all residents of the horrors of state executions.

Contemporary International Use of the Death Penalty

Amnesty International reported in 2006 that 86 nations had abolished the death penalty for all crimes, while an additional 37 had abolished the death penalty in actual practice. Seventy-three nations still retain the death penalty, but the number actually executing prisoners is much smaller. The list of abolition states (together with their year of abolition) is long and impressive. It includes Iceland (1928), Austria (1968), Sweden and Finland (1972), Poland (1976), Portugal and Denmark (1978), Norway, Luxemburg, and Nicaragua (1979), the Netherlands (1982), Australia (1985), New Zealand (1989), Ireland (1990), Switzerland (1992), Greece (1993), Italy (1994), Spain (1995), and Belgium (1996). Forty countries have abolished capital punishment since 1990, including nations as diverse as Cyprus, Armenia, Serbia, Samoa, Senegal, Canada, Mexico, and Greece.

At the other extreme, the People's Republic of China (PRC) executed at least 3,400 people in 2004, most by shooting. Indeed, one PRC government representative claimed that nearly 10,000 were executed per year in China. Other leaders include Iran (at least 159 executions), Vietnam (at least 64), and the United States (59 executions). The death penalty is typical of dictatorships such as China, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia.

Contemporary U.S. Death Penalty Debates

Arguments for and against the death penalty revolve around two issues: the constitutionality of such punishment and how effective a deterrent it is.

Constitutionality

U.S. Supreme Court decisions have weighed in on this issue. The 1972 *Furman v. Georgia* decision ruled that existing death penalty laws were unconstitutional as representing cruel and unusual punishment. Yet, in 1976, the *Gregg v. Georgia* decision determined that there was a constitutional formula allowing states to resume executions. In 1986, *Ford v. Wainwright* banned executions of the insane. Most recently, in 2005, *Roper v. Simmons* banned the execution of those who have committed their crimes before the age of 18.

Deterrence

Although the issue is still hotly debated, there is no scientific evidence that the death penalty is a deterrent to murder or that it results in lower homicide rates. Attempts to correlate capital punishment statutes or actual executions to murder rates have been unsuccessful. The United States is the only industrialized democracy using capital punishment and has far higher rates of homicide than any of these nations. Among U.S. states, most that abolished capital punishment have low murder rates, although Alaska and Michigan have relatively high levels of murder. Texas executes far more than any other state and still has a high rate of homicide. In the New York state legislature, the death penalty was debated annually from 1977 through 1995. Arguments primarily revolved around whether the death penalty was a deterrent to murder. Every year there were enough votes to approve the death penalty but not enough to override a gubernatorial veto. A new pro–death penalty governor took office in 1995 and he signed the bill into law.

Death Rows

In the United States it is not unusual for prisoners under sentence of death to remain on death row for more than 20 years. A convict may even come within days, hours, or a few minutes of being executed only

to have the execution stayed by court decision. Opponents argue that preparing to die, then being temporarily spared, only to die later, represents extreme cruelty. Although U.S. legal authorities may not intend this, the long isolation under sentence of death nonetheless provides for a special torture not found anywhere else in the modern world.

Innocence and Reversal of Sentence

In 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted the death sentences of all state prisoners on death row. He did this because others awaiting execution had been released after their innocence was determined from DNA analysis. Investigations revealed that some innocent people have been executed in the United States in recent years, due in part to the illegal acts of police and prosecutors in withholding evidence or asking prosecution witnesses to give false statements. The innocent have also been sentenced to death on the basis of the incompetence and dishonesty of some forensic scientists working in state crime laboratories. U.S. legal authorities have yet to realize the political consequences of such error. Once a death sentence is carried out, there is, of course, no way of rectifying the error.

Economic Costs of Capital Punishment

It is generally agreed that the cost of administering the death penalty as punishment for murder is greater than the cost of life in prison without parole. These costs are a consequence of protracted trials, appeals, and increased security expenses for those under sentence of death. An increased guard-to-prisoner ratio is often found on death rows to prevent the embarrassment to government officials of suicides by convicts. In those cases when death-sentenced prisoners attempt suicide, the prison staff makes heroic attempts to save their lives so they can survive to be properly executed as specified by law.

Public Versus Private Executions

During much of the 19th century, most U.S. executions were conducted in public. Hangings often occurred in the county seat in the middle of the day to attract the maximum number of onlookers. The logic was that these ceremonies provided warnings to all would-be felons and thus were significant deterrents. However, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, executions in the United States began to be conducted behind prison walls and typically in the middle of the night to attract as little attention as possible. Further, American courts have ruled that there is no legal right for a prisoner to insist on a public or televised execution. Some argue that if U.S. policymakers took the deterrent effect of executions seriously, executions would be conducted with a maximum amount of publicity rather than in secret.

Racism and the Death Penalty

There is widespread evidence that the death penalty is much more likely to be imposed on those convicted of murder when the victim is white than when the victim is black. This pattern indicates that white life is valued more highly than the lives of black citizens. One counterpoint that is sometimes mentioned is that the courts, prosecutors, and juries should be encouraged to use the death penalty more in cases with black victims rather than abandon executions involving white victims.

Religion and the Death Penalty

Many Christian denominations publicly oppose capital punishment, including the Roman Catholic Church, whose leadership has become especially active since it joined the American anti-abortion wars beginning in the 1970s. The Roman Catholic emphasis on being "pro-life" gives this body little choice but to oppose the death penalty. Many Protestant denominations also oppose capital punishment, including Baptists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and the United Church of Christ. Yet Evangelical, Fundamentalist, and Pentecostal churches support the death penalty, citing the Old Testament as support.

Methods of Modern Execution

During the 19th century most U.S. executions were by hanging. Shooting was also an option used in several states. As technology advanced, electrocution became an option, and in 1888, New York became the first state to use this technique. Lethal gas was introduced in Nevada in 1924. By the late 20th century lethal injection had become the dominant method of

execution. Every new method of execution has been justified as a more humane method of killing. Lethal injection is sometimes seen as more humane than other execution techniques because it uses the antiseptic techniques of medicine, including a hospital gurney, drugs, and an intravenous line. Still, it is the object of current litigation as the source of suffering and cruel and unusual punishment.

History of U.S. Capital Punishment

From the beginning of the American colonial experience, the New World has been no stranger to capital punishment and reflected variation from colony to colony. A prime example of enthusiastic execution is found in the killing of those suspected of witchcraft in the Massachusetts Bay Colony during the 1600s. On the other hand, in colonial Maine the death penalty was never very popular.

The United States is unique it that it allows its member states choice in use of this most extreme punishment. At this writing, 9 of the 50 states (Michigan, Wisconsin, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, Alaska, Hawaii, West Virginia, and Iowa) have abolished laws allowing capital punishment, 5 have had their death penalty laws declared unconstitutional (Vermont, Rhode Island, New York, Kansas, and Massachusetts), and 2 have a moratorium on executions (Illinois and New Jersey).

Michigan and Wisconsin were the first states to abolish capital punishment, in 1847 and 1853 respectively. In 1876, Maine abolished its death penalty, reinstated it in 1883, and finally abolished capital punishment in 1887. In all three states there existed great concern about racial and ethnic discrimination in the application of the death penalty.

Progressive Era Abolition, Lynching, and Reinstatement

The Progressive Era is generally defined as the first 2 decades of the 20th century and was a time when many legislative reforms were initiated. Two states abolished their death penalty laws and have made no changes since that time. Minnesota abolished its death penalty in 1911; North Dakota followed suit in 1915 and, with one of the lowest crime rates in the nation, it has had little motivation to resume executions. In some other states that abolished the death penalty during this era (Colorado, Arizona, Missouri, and Tennessee), post-abolition lynching typically went unpunished until reinstatement of capital punishment as the better of two "bad" alternatives. Political radicals and economic depressions were responsible for reinstatement in Washington, Oregon, Kansas, and South Dakota.

When Alaska and Hawaii joined the union in 1957, both exercised their option to abandon capital punishment. Legislators in both states worried that, if a death penalty were established in law, local ethnic minorities would bear the brunt of such executions, as this had been the pattern prior to statehood.

Iowa abolished the death penalty in 1872, reinstated it in 1878, and then abolished it again in 1965. Iowa has both a low crime rate and a homogeneous population. Like Iowa, West Virginia abolished its death penalty law in 1965 and, with its similarly low crime rates and largely white population, reinstatement is seldom an issue.

Ambivalent States

Several urban states with large, heterogeneous populations have high homicide rates and many death row prisoners, yet drag their feet when it comes to actual executions. This profile applies to California, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. All three states have hundreds of prisoners awaiting execution, but each state has executed only a few since the Supreme Court found a constitutional formula for capital punishment statutes.

The South

In many Deep South states of the former Confederacy, there has recently emerged some respectability for those opposing capital punishment. In many of these states, calls have recently been made for a moratorium on executions until research can determine if the state's death penalty laws are being fairly administered. This is significant because the death penalty has been more frequently used in this region than in other parts of the nation. In these regions the Roman Catholic Church and others have become increasingly vocal critics of executions.

Texas

In the "Lone Star State," there is a sizable death row population, but that state has also executed more than

a third of all prisoners in the United States since 1977. While other states have been slowing the execution process, Texas moves forward, ever increasing the percentage of American prisoners put to death there. Over the past 30 years, a Hispanic member of the state legislature has regularly introduced death penalty abolition bills that have been routinely ignored. An African American member of the legislature who sponsored such abolition fared worse, getting condemned by the press, the state Bar Association, and the Internal Revenue Service.

Predicted Future of U.S. Capital Punishment

Many social observers predict that the death penalty will be abolished in a few years. There are several grounds for this prediction rather than simple wishful thinking.

1. All other Western nations have abolished this practice, putting pressure on the United States to rise to the same standard.
2. Numerous states in all sections of the nation have passed or are seriously considering moratorium bills.
3. In some states many prisoners are being released from death rows because of serious legal questions about the quality of their trials.

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See also Innocence Project; Murder; Prison; Subculture of Violence Hypothesis

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Carjacking

Carjacking is the theft of a motor vehicle from another person by force, violence, or intimidation. Although often viewed as a hybrid offense—maintaining elements akin to both robbery and auto theft—carjacking is counted as a robbery in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports because force is used to accomplish the theft. Defining carjacking in this way is problematic because it hinders systematic understanding of the prevalence, distribution, and nature of the offense. Although some states (e.g., Maryland and New Jersey) collect statewide carjacking data each year, most data about carjacking come from victimization surveys and offender interviews.

Recent estimates from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) indicate that carjacking is a rare offense. On average, 38,000 carjackings occurred annually between 1993 and 2002, a rate of 1.7 carjackings per 10,000 persons. This compared with 24 robbery victimizations per 10,000 persons and 84 motor vehicle thefts per 10,000 households in 2005. As with other forms of violent crime, carjacking has declined in recent years. For example, the NCVS reported an annual average of 49,000 carjackings between 1992 and 1996, a rate of 2.5 per 10,000 persons. From 1998 to 2002 the rate dropped to 1.3 per 10,000 persons.

As in other types of robbery, weapon use is inherent in carjacking. About 75 percent of carjacking victims interviewed by the NCVS between 1993 and 2002 reported that their assailant was armed. The most common weapon was a firearm (45 percent of cases). Despite the high likelihood of weapons, only 24 percent of all victims reported an injury and only 9 percent reported serious bodily injuries. Those most vulnerable to carjacking tend to be male, young, African American, never married or divorced/separated, and living in urban areas. The carjackers themselves are much like their victims: male, young, and African American. The NCVS reports more than half of carjackings involve two or more assailants, and interviews with offenders indicate that carjacking is a crime of opportunism and spontaneity rather than carefully planned, probably due to the mobility of their targets.

The term *carjacking* was virtually unknown until the early 1990s when several atypical, albeit, well-publicized and horrific carjacking cases brought national attention to the subject. In the wake of these

events, media reports described carjacking as a national epidemic brought on by a new type of auto thief whose misdeeds resembled a symbolic attack on the fabric of people's lives. Such depictions helped to legitimize carjacking as an important social problem and acted as an impetus for passage of the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, which made carjacking a federal offense punishable by sentences ranging from 15 years to life. In 1994, an amendment included the death penalty in carjackings resulting in homicide. Several states also enacted legislation. For example, Louisiana passed the "shoot-the-carjacker" law, giving citizens the right to use lethal force during a carjacking. Florida passed a law to protect its tourism industry after media reports suggested carjackers were purposely targeting tourists in rental cars.

Michael Cherbonneau

See also National Crime Victimization Survey; Property Crime; Theft; Violent Crime

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Charter Schools

Charter schools are publicly funded schools that operate under a legally binding agreement or "charter" between an independent stakeholder (charter operator) and an authorizing agency (charter sponsor). Stakeholders may be, among others, a group of parents, a team of educators, a community organization, a university, or a private nonprofit or for-profit corporation. On the other hand, the charter authorizing agency is usually a public entity such as a state department of education or local school district. The charter, usually lasting 3 to 5 years, exempts a school from various rules and regulations that normally apply to district-operated public schools. In this way, a charter school receives increased control over school governance and management in areas such as budget, internal organization, staffing, scheduling, curriculum, and instruction. In exchange for this increased autonomy, however, the school must comply with the stipulations outlined in the charter document, including goals related to student academic achievement.

Minnesota lays claim to opening the first charter school in 1992. Since then, the number of charter schools has steadily increased. According to the Center for Educational Reform, as of September 2006, about 4,000 charter schools were serving more than 1 million students in 40 states and the District of Columbia. Nonetheless, charter school legislation varies widely from state to state, affecting the number, characteristics, and level of autonomy of charter schools in each state.

A charter school may be established for numerous reasons. Nonetheless, realizing an alternative vision of schooling, serving a specific population, and gaining greater autonomy have been among the most common reasons cited for starting a new charter school or converting a preexisting public or private school into a charter school. Seeking to support the growth and development of the charter school movement, the U.S. Department of Education created the Public Charter Schools Program in 1995 to help schools deal with costs associated with planning, start-up, and early operation—stages at which charter schools seem to face their most difficult challenges.

In practice, charter schools implement a hybrid design that combines elements traditionally associated with either public or private schools. As public schools, charter schools are nonsectarian and tuition free. These schools have no mandatory assignments of students; instead, parents or guardians voluntarily choose them to enroll their children. Also, charter schools tend to be much smaller and have greater control over internal educational philosophies and practices than district-operated public schools. Because charter school legislation frequently allows flexibility in hiring and other personnel decisions, charter school teachers are also less likely than their counterparts in district-run schools to meet state certification requirements and to have membership in a labor union. Furthermore, some charter schools may tailor their programs to emphasize a particular learning approach

(e.g., back-to-basics, culturally relevant curriculum) or to serve a specific population (e.g., special education students). In addition, charter schools often contract out services with educational management organizations (EMOs). An EMO may be nonprofit or for-profit, and contracted services may range from the management of one to all of a school's operations.

For supporters, charter schools, by expanding the options currently available in public education, foster healthy competition and thereby encourage innovation, efficiency, and greater response to "consumer" preferences. In this form, accountability is not only to a public body granting the charter but also to parents and students who, by choosing enrollment, ultimately decide a school's survival. Opponents, however, contend that charter schools represent a stepping-stone toward full privatization and see the introduction of market dynamics in the education system as a threat to democratic values endorsing universality and equal access to educational opportunity. Furthermore, as the market dictates the range and quality of educational services, some critics fear that charter schools may add layers of stratification and exacerbate class and racial isolation.

As charter schools continue to strive for a permanent space in the U.S. educational landscape, their impact on student academic achievement is still uncertain. As of today, studies have produced mixed results. Whereas some show that charter schools outperform district-run public schools, others indicate just the opposite or no significant differences. A reason for these discrepancies is that charter schools are relatively new in most states, so not enough data are available to properly evaluate their effectiveness and draw definite conclusions. Similarly, the influence of charter schools on their surrounding districts remains vague. Although advocates expected that districts would enhance their systems and practices in response to competition from charter schools, little evidence supports this claim. Systemic effects, if any, may emerge in the future, but at this point it is still too early to identify any. Several opinion surveys, nonetheless, show that, overall, teachers, students, and parents are satisfied with their charter schools.

Victor Argothy

See also Education, Academic Performance; Education, School Privatization; School Vouchers

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Chicano Movement

Understanding the Chicano movement requires an understanding of the past. Often heard among Mexican Americans is the saying, "We did not cross the border; the border crossed us." This refers to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the war between the United States and Mexico and ceded much of the Southwest to the U.S. government for a payment of $15 million. The treaty guaranteed the rights of Mexican settlers in the area, granting them U.S. citizenship after 1 year and recognizing their property rights. However, the Senate would not ratify the treaty without revisions. It eliminated articles that recognized prior land grants and reworded articles specifying a timeline for citizenship. The result was the eviction of Mexicans from their lands, their disenfranchisement from the political process, and the institutionalization of more than a century of discrimination.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, mutual aid societies and other associations in Mexican American communities advocated for the rights of community members and provided social solidarity. In 1911, the First Mexicanist Congress attempted to unify the groups under a national organization. The assembly resolved to promote educational equality and civil rights for Mexican Americans, themes that would reemerge in the Chicano civil rights movement of the mid-1960s.

Between the 1930s and the 1950s, numerous local, regional, and national organizations were socially and politically active in promoting the rights of Mexican Americans. A few key organizations included the Community Service Organizations (CSO), the G. I. Forum, and the League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC). In California, community service organizations were successful in sponsoring Mexican American candidates in bids for local and state offices. The G. I. Forum, limited to Mexican American war veterans, was involved in politics and anti-segregation class action suits. Founded in 1929, LULAC fought against discrimination in education, law, and employment. LULAC was involved in several landmark civil rights cases including *Mendez v. Westminster* of 1947, which legally ended the segregation of Mexican American children in California schools. LULAC was also involved in *Hernandez v. Texas* of 1954, which affirmed the 14th Amendment rights of Mexican Americans to due process and equal protection under the law.

El Movimiento: The Chicano Civil Rights Movement

The 1960s Chicano movement criticized these earlier organizations as largely urban, middle class, and assimilationist, who neglected laborers, students, and recent migrants. Like other ethnic social movements of the time, the Chicano movement embraced the culture and identity of Mexico. Leaders of the movement initiated many legal and political maneuvers, union strikes, marches, and student protests.

César Estrada Chávez (1927–93) joined the CSO in California as a community organizer in 1952. He rose to the position of regional director by 1958. Chávez resigned from the CSO in 1962 when they voted not to support the Agricultural Workers Association led by a former CSO founding member, Dolores Huerta. Together, Chávez and Huerta formed the National Farm Workers Association, which later became the United Farm Workers of America. Chávez became famous in the late 1960s with a series of work stoppages, marches, boycotts, and hunger strikes centered on the working conditions and low pay for grape pickers and other farmworkers. Chávez and the United Farm Workers launched a 5-year strike against grape growers (1965–70), successfully convincing 17 million people to boycott nonunion California grapes. In the 1980s he led protests against the use of dangerous pesticides in grape farming. Chávez became a symbol of the movement and was supported by other unions, clergy, student activists, and politicians such as Senator Robert F. Kennedy. He died in 1993, and in the years since, he has been honored by the naming of many streets, schools, and community centers, as well as with murals and a commemorative stamp.

After Pentecostal minister Reies López Tijerina (1926–) failed in his attempt to create a utopian religious cooperative in Arizona, he moved to New Mexico and established the *Alianza Federal de Mercedes* (Federal Land Grant Alliance) in 1963, with the goal of regaining legal ownership of land lost since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. After failing to petition the courts to hear its case, Tijerina and *Alianza* members claimed a part of the Carson National Forest previously held by members in a land grant. They detained two forest rangers and declared the land an autonomous state but surrendered 5 days later. While out on bond, Tijerina and 150 *Alianza* members stormed the county courthouse to free imprisoned members of their group. In the raid they shot two officials and took two hostages. The largest manhunt in New Mexican history ended a week later when Tijerina surrendered. Achieving his goal of drawing attention to the land-grant cause, he represented himself at trial and won an acquittal in the courthouse raid but was later sentenced to 2 years for charges related to the occupation of the Carson National Forest. While confined, he became a symbol of the Chicano movement. Released in 1971, Reies Tijerina continued to press for recognition of Chicano land rights; he has resided in Mexico since 1994.

Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales (1929–2005) was a leader of the urban youth movement. First known as a professional boxer in the late 1940s and early 1950s, he became active in the Democratic Party as a district captain and coordinator of a *Viva Kennedy* club in 1960. By 1966, he left the Democrats and founded *La Crusada Para la Justicia* (the Crusade for Justice), an organization that supported Chicano civil rights, education, and cultural awareness. He authored *Yo Soy Joaquín* (I Am Joaquín), one of the most defining writings to come out of the Chicano movement. The poem voiced the conflicted nature of Chicano identity and inspired the nationalist tone of the movement. Gonzales also organized the First National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference in 1969 in which *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán* (Spiritual Plan of Aztlán) was adopted. The goals of this manifesto were to promote Chicano nationalism and a separatist Chicano

political party. In 1970, Gonzales helped to organize the Colorado *La Raza Unida* Party, and in 1972 he attempted to create a national *Raza Unida* Party. However, Gonzales left the party in 1974 after it had become factionalized into those wanting it to promote Chicano political candidates and those who wanted radical social reform. Gonzales continued to work on behalf of Chicano rights issues until his death in 2005.

Legacy

The civil rights movements of the 1960s established legal and political rights of minority ethnic groups in the United States. The Chicano movement also had the effect of broadening the class structure of existing Mexican American social and political organizations to recognize migrants, laborers, and urban youth. It also brought about a reversal of the assimilationist goals of previous decades and an acute awareness of Chicano identity and nationalism. Several of the institutions of that period are still active today, including numerous Chicano and Mexican American Studies programs at major universities that began as a result of those earlier student protests. Vestiges of the movement were also evident in the marches and rallies of the National Day of Action for Immigrant Rights on April 10, 2006.

Stephen J. Sills

See also Assimilation; *Brown v. Board of Education;* Civil Rights; Labor Movement; Racism; Social Movements

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Child Abduction

Child abduction occurs when, in violation of lawful authority, a child is transported or detained, even if for a short period of time. Whereas news media often focus on dramatic stranger kidnappings, the problem of child abductions is more complex, often involving noncustodial family members. Despite this, much of the impetus for studying child abductions has been in response to public outcry in the wake of noteworthy abduction cases. In the past 2 decades, missing children emerged as a public concern, leading to the increased study of child abductions and the variety of missing children.

Although abducting a child is typically a criminal offense, the family court, a branch of the civil court system, determines custodial rights. Except for the most clear-cut cases, this distinction makes development of policies to combat abductions rather complex. In recent years, authorities quickly instituted action programs designed to combat child abductions, such as AMBER Alert and Code Adam, both named after kidnapped and murdered children.

Child abductions fall into three varieties. Familial abductions occur when, in violation of a custody order or other legitimate custody right, a child's family member absconds with or fails to return a child in a timely fashion. A nonfamily abduction occurs when, without parental consent, a nonfamily perpetrator takes a child by force or coercion and detains that child for at least 1 hour. Stereotypical kidnapping, a subcategory of nonfamilial abduction, occurs when a stranger or slight acquaintance holds a child overnight with the intention to hold the child for ransom or to physically harm the child.

Much of what is known about the child abduction problem comes from studies known as the National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children, or NISMART. An estimated 68,000 to 150,000 cases of child abduction occur each year in the United States, although the three types of abductions occur with varying frequency. Familial cases are by far the most common, occurring an estimated 56,000 to 117,000 times annually. Nonfamilial abductions also occur with high frequency, between 12,000 and 33,000 cases yearly. Although they are most frequently covered in the news media, stereotypical kidnappings are extremely rare, occurring 90 to 115 times each year.

Research indicates that children themselves often thwart attempted abductions, and this reinforces the importance of teaching "stranger danger." In a series of partnerships between mass media and law enforcement, AMBER Alert plans now exist in all 50 states. When a child is abducted, law enforcement may broadcast the description of the victim and perpetrator on television and radio, via highway signs, and via

cellular phones. In addition, many large retail chain stores have instituted Code Adam plans, restricting people from exiting from the premises until a lost child is found.

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See also Abuse, Child; Family, Dysfunctional; Missing Children

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Child Abuse

See Abuse, Child

Child Care Safety

Child care safety refers to children's safety from injury or death from accidents or acts of violence, or from emotional or sexual abuse, while in child care settings. Child care is defined as paid care provided by nonrelatives.

Nearly 8 million children of employed mothers in the United States are in some form of child care provided by nonrelatives. Despite this large enrollment in child care, little has been known until recently about children's level of safety in care, as no national government or private agency collects data on injuries or fatalities in child care. Whereas extensive research exists on issues such as airline safety and risks posed in the nuclear or chemical industries, much less is known about safety issues in human services.

The United States lacks a developed child care system, instead relying on a patchwork of arrangements differing in their level of formality and government oversight. Child care arrangements involve nannies or babysitters in children's own homes, 7 percent; family day care providers in the caregivers' homes, 27 percent; and children enrolled in child care centers, 66 percent. Care in the child's home involves the least regulation, with parents hiring caregivers on their own and with no caregiver licensing or required training. Family day care homes may be regulated but may also be exempt because of small size or may operate underground. Child care centers are more formal organizations, the great majority licensed and inspected by the states and with professionally trained directors.

These markedly different organizational types of child care lead to different patterns of risk. This in turn suggests that researchers studying safety in human services can benefit from considering organizational factors that affect the routine circumstances in which care is offered.

Risks by Type of Care and Age of Child

Fatalities are the most serious caregiving failures in child care and the most likely to be reported. The first national study of child care safety of 1,362 fatalities from 1985 to 2003 showed that overall child care was quite safe compared with other environments in which children spend time. It also revealed, however, striking differences in the safety of different types of child care and among children of different ages.

Infants are by far the most vulnerable children in care. Their fatality rate from both accidents and violence is nearly 7 times higher than that of children ages 1 to 4. Equally striking are differences in infant fatality rates across types of care. The infant fatality rate for children in the care of nannies or family day care providers is more than 7 times higher than in centers.

The most dramatic differences across types of care occur in rates of infant deaths from violence. Remarkably, no reports of deaths of infants from violence in centers occurred between 1993 and 2003. Deaths from accidents are more evenly distributed across types of care, although centers also have a safety advantage in this area among the youngest children.

Overall, child care centers offer greater safety than care offered in private homes and, in particular, offer a high level of protection against fatalities from violence, with the protection extending even to infants. The safety of infants is striking: Within children's own families, as well as in types of child care offered in private homes, these are the children at greatest risk of fatalities from abuse or violence.

Risk and the Organization of Child Care

The safety of child care centers does not arise from overall higher-quality care than that offered in family day care or by nannies or babysitters in the child's home. Researchers find that, on average, center care for infants is of lower quality than that offered in the more intimate modes of care provided in private homes. Centers have organizational features, however, that offer multiple forms of safety protection to children even when the centers themselves do not offer particularly responsive or sensitive care.

Most important, staff members in centers do not work alone. They have others watching them and helping them cope with fussy infants or whining toddlers. This helps them maintain their emotional control. It also helps identify an unstable or volatile worker. Center teachers also have more training than most caregivers in private homes, and they are supervised by professionally trained directors. Finally, centers control access by outsiders more effectively to keep out people who might pose risks.

These protections help reduce risks of accidental deaths, such as suffocation and drowning, but they are especially important in preventing violent deaths. Not a single shaken baby fatality occurred in a child care center, whereas 203 happened in private home arrangements. Child care centers are almost completely protective against this impulsive and often lethal form of violence against infants. In types of care offered in private homes, however, it is the single most important mode of death from violence. The stress of an infant crying, in particular, can drive caregivers to impulsive violence. With little professional training, without supervisors or coworkers, and with low earnings for long hours of work, even experienced caregivers can lose control. They can cause serious injuries or death to infants from just 20 seconds of violent shaking. Other members of providers' households can also shake or otherwise abuse infants when confronted with their crying.

Child care centers do not protect against all forms of violence against children or against inattentiveness that can lead to accidents. Children in center care are at greatest risk when they are taken out of the center and lose the organizational protections the institutions provide. Fatalities can occur when children are taken to pools and adults do not notice a struggling child in the water; they can also occur when young children are forgotten in center vans. Children can also suffer injuries in centers when angry or poorly trained teachers grab or push them, but these forms of assault almost never rise to the level of fatal violence.

Improving Child Care Safety

Child care safety could be improved by the provision of more resources and closer regulation of care. In particular, the safety advantages of centers could be recognized and more funding provided for the expansion of center care to the most vulnerable children, infants. In addition, caregivers working in private homes could receive more training and support to increase their empathy toward crying or difficult children. Resources could be expanded for licensing and regulation so that "bad apples" in child care who commit repeated acts of abuse could be more easily identified and excluded from the field. Finally, safety data could be collected so that parents could choose care arrangements wisely, and preventive measures could be developed on the basis of comprehensive information.

More broadly, research on child care safety shows that safety in human services depends crucially on organizational features of care. These may be distinct from the features that determine quality levels. Even the lowest-quality child care centers, for example, provide very high levels of safety protection for infants and almost complete protection against fatalities from violence for all children enrolled in them. By collecting and analyzing data on safety violations in human services, a better understanding can be gained of ways to reduce risk as to well as to increase quality.

Julia Wrigley and Joanna Dreby

See also Abuse, Child; Child Neglect

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Child Neglect

Child neglect is the most frequent form of child maltreatment and results in more fatalities than all other types of child maltreatment in the United States. Child

abuse often involves acts of commission, but child neglect often involves chronic acts of omission in care by a parent or caregiver which cause (the harm standard) or create an imminent risk (the endangerment standard) of serious physical or mental harm to a child under 18 years of age. Neglect may be physical, medical, educational, or emotional. It may involve a failure to provide for a child's basic needs of nutrition, clothing, hygiene, safety, or affection. It may involve abandonment, expulsion, inadequate supervision, permitted substance abuse, chronic school truancy, or failure to enroll a child in school. Many neglected children experience various forms of abuse as well. School personnel, law enforcement officers, and medical personnel are the most frequent reporters of child neglect.

Epidemiology

The youngest (most dependent) children are the most frequent victims of neglect, with boys being significantly more emotionally neglected than girls. Mothers (birth parents) are the most frequent perpetrators, given that women tend to be primary caregivers. Studies using the most varied and nationally representative sources of information report no significant race differences in the overall incidence of child maltreatment. Children from single-parent families, those from the lowest income strata (less than $15,000 in the 1990s), and children in the largest families (four or more children) are most likely to be neglected.

Correlates of Child Neglect

A systemic perspective (including the society, community, family, and individual) best encompasses the variety of factors correlated with child neglect. Poor parenting knowledge and skills, such as not engaging in discussions of emotional issues and showing a high degree of negative emotions; parental psychological disorders, especially depression and substance abuse; and a family history of maltreatment are often observed in neglectful parents. When the mother's partner is not the child's father, when there is domestic violence, and when the parents lack support or are socially isolated, the possibility of child neglect increases. Many of these factors are highly correlated with social class and neighborhood characteristics and are more often observed in individualistic than in collectivistic cultures and in societies, such as the United States, which have lower levels of systemic supports (e.g., national health care) for families.

Effects of Child Neglect

Effects of child neglect depend on the severity, duration, and type of neglect; the age, temperament, and other characteristics of the child; the number of risk factors; and the strengths of the child, family, and larger context.

Child neglect correlates with many physical and psychological problems. Research findings include delayed body and head circumference growth, increased rates of infection and failure to thrive, somatization (expressing emotional problems through bodily ones), and a higher frequency of heart and liver disease in adults who were maltreated as children.

Delayed intellectual, motor, and linguistic development often characterizes neglected children. Neuropsychological tests show deficits in attention, executive functions (e.g., planning), memory and learning, visual–spatial abilities, and sensorimotor functions. Research findings also include poor school performance and lower IQ and academic achievement in adults who were maltreated as children.

Neglected children exhibit both externalizing and internalizing problems. Externalizing problems involve acts that adversely affect others (e.g., aggression). Internalizing problems involve those that adversely affect primarily the child (e.g., depression and anxiety). Neglected children often have difficulty with behavioral and emotional regulation (e.g., the ability to inhibit impulsive behavior) and are more prone to substance abuse as adults.

Neglected children are at a higher risk of social–relational problems. They often demonstrate lower levels of emotional understanding, withdrawal from social interactions, excessive attention seeking, or attachment problems. Childhood neglect is a risk factor for violence against a dating partner and for difficulty in forming intimate relationships in adulthood. The psychological assaults on the child's sense of safety, trust, and self-worth can have long-term consequences for interpersonal relations with peers and adults.

Child neglect is a risk factor for psychopathology. Diagnoses include post-traumatic stress disorder, hyperactivity and inattention, and oppositional-defiance, conduct, and separation anxiety disorders. Various anti-social behaviors also occur in adolescence

and adulthood. Adult victims of child neglect use medical, correctional, social, and mental health services more frequently than do non-neglected individuals. People with childhood histories of trauma and maltreatment make up almost the entire criminal justice population in the United States.

Results of recent neuroimaging studies suggest that the brains of children may be negatively impacted by maltreatment. Negative environmental circumstances, such as neglect, may cause anxiety and distress, which impact the neurotransmitter, neuroendocrine, and immune systems. These systems impact the brain's development, adversely affecting the child's psychological and educational development.

Intervention

Most studies on intervention address abuse rather than neglect. However, findings of multisystemic contributions to the etiology of child neglect suggest that intervention has to be multisystemic as well. Earlier intervention enhances the likelihood of success.

Given that children are emotionally attached, even to neglectful parents, intervention work should first help the parents become more caring and responsive caregivers. Intervention starts with an assessment of a family's strengths as well as the factors that contribute to child neglect. Strengths need to be supported and used to address any deficits. Basic needs, such as jobs and housing, and parental problems, such as substance abuse, domestic violence, and psychopathology, need to be addressed. Multidisciplinary teams are often necessary, and intervention work is difficult.

Support is fundamental in effective parenting. Fathers and father figures need support to be involved in child care and to learn appropriate parenting. The availability of supportive others (e.g., relatives, neighbors, teachers) needs to be explored and supported. Provision of child care or parent aides can reduce the stresses on parents; parent support groups can be helpful as well. Provision of opportunities for family fun can also be healing.

Once parents feel supported, they may be more able to address their children's needs. Parenting classes, video feedback, and direct intervention in the family may be helpful. A therapist can observe family interactions and interpret the child's actions for parents in ways that clarify the child's developmental needs for support and limits and age-appropriate ways that parents can address these needs. The parents' own past experience of neglect can be an obstacle that needs to be therapeutically addressed as well.

Therapeutic work with the child varies with the child's age. Identification of children's strengths is important. Play and art therapy allow for nonverbal means through which younger children can express themselves and work through their anxieties or depression. Storytelling techniques can help older children. Adolescents and adults, with more developed verbal skills and rational thought, can work through their experiences in a more traditional verbal therapeutic setting. Children can be taught to express their needs clearly and appropriately and can be offered sources of support in addition to their parents. Big Brother and Big Sister programs can offer attachment opportunities. Peer relations can be fostered through the teaching of social skills and through support groups. Positive experiences with other adults and children and opportunities for pleasure and mastery can provide reparative experiences for neglected children.

Various states have developed time limits for parental change in the cases of child maltreatment. If neglect is severe or if changes are not sufficient or rapid enough to ensure the child's safety, the child may be placed in foster care or placed for adoption. At these times, psychological issues related to separation, reunification, and termination need to be addressed.

Prevention

Prevention programs should reduce risk factors and promote protective factors in the society, community, family, parent, and child. Community-based service programs that help at-risk families in their homes and neighborhoods, even for only 3 months, have shown positive effects in reducing risk (e.g., parental depression) and in promoting protective factors (e.g., parenting competence). These programs offer information, emergency services, parenting support, and education, and they also address existing mental health and substance abuse problems.

Realignment of national budget priorities toward more support for families is vital. Social changes, such as fair living wages and increased availability of quality low-income housing, address poverty issues that affect many neglectful parents. A national health (including mental health) care system and universal quality child care will ease pressures that make it more

difficult to be a caring parent. Child Protective Services investigate only a fraction of children reported to them, suggesting that they need additional resources. Increased services to families, such as home visits, early childhood and parenting education, and heightened awareness and resources for work with domestic violence and substance abuse, are essential, as is educating the public about child neglect.

Behnaz Pakizegi

See also Abuse, Child; Family, Dysfunctional; Poverty; Role Conflict; Role Strain; Runaways; Stressors

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Child Sexual Abuse

See Abuse, Child Sexual

Chronic Diseases

Chronic diseases are illnesses that characteristically have a slow, progressive onset and a long duration. Chronic diseases impact every aspect of the individual's and family's life and usually result from repeated or prolonged exposure to an environment or substance that does not support the normal structure and functioning of the body.

Chronic diseases are those illnesses that are part of a person's life, with little or no chance for full recovery. In acute disease, treatments focus on returning the individual to full health. With chronic disease, the medical focus is to limit the progression of the disease or to delay any secondary complication that might arise because of the disease.

The body's normal structure and function work like a well-coordinated machine, with each part vital to the whole. The structure and function of the human body of a person with a chronic disease, on both the cellular and systemic levels, is permanently altered. It is due to this permanent, and often progressive, cellular change that the person with the chronic disease has an altered ability to function in activities of daily living. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) statistics reveal that 1 out of 10 Americans (25 million people) have severe limitations in their daily activities because they have a chronic disease.

According to the CDC's 2004 data on death in the United States, the current four leading causes of death are heart disease, cancer, stroke, and chronic lower respiratory disease, all chronic diseases. Of the 10 leading causes of death in the United States, only three are not due to chronic illness. More than 1.7 million American deaths, or 7 out of 10, each year are due to a chronic disease. More than 75 percent of the $1.4 trillion spent on U.S. medical care costs is to treat chronic diseases.

Although some chronic diseases transmit during gestation or at birth and others have a genetic link predisposing a person to be more likely to develop that disease, most of the existing chronic diseases are preventable or manageable through lifestyle choices and changes.

Mortality and Morbidity

Mortality refers to the rate of deaths in a given population, and morbidity is the rate of illnesses occurring. These statistics are important when evaluating chronic diseases because we are able to identify trends and shifts in norms. For example, before the discovery of antibiotics, the leading cause of death in the United States was infection, not heart disease. As the population continues to age, the causes of death will change. In the United States, the highest mortality and morbidity rates are due to chronic diseases.

Heart disease, cancer, stroke, upper respiratory disease, diabetes, Alzheimer's disease, kidney disease,

liver disease, hypertension, and Parkinson's disease are among the top 15 causes of death. Deaths attributed to accidents, suicide, and pneumonia/influenza may also reflect the impact of chronic diseases such as epilepsy, depression, and AIDS.

According to the 2002 *Chartbook on Trends in the Health of Americans,* life expectancy for Americans increased during the past century from 51 to 79.4 years for females and from 48 to 73.9 for males. Despite this increase, however, the United States still lags behind other developed countries in life expectancy. This gap may be due, in part, to the fact that more Americans live longer with chronic diseases but not as long as healthy people.

Contributing Factors

Contributing factors for chronic disease are those situations, environments, or lifestyle choices that increase the likelihood of developing a chronic disease. Aging is one of the leading contributing factors; other factors are environmental exposure to toxins, secular trends, genetics, stress, diet, race, socioeconomic status, access to health care, and level of education.

This entry divides risk factors into four groups: genetic/familial, social, environmental, and behavioral. For each group, the common factors, associated disease(s), and prevention or containment methods are discussed. Some overlapping occurs between groups, as many factors related to the development of chronic diseases are codependent. Historically not considered contagious, some chronic diseases—particularly newly emerging long-term diseases—have causative agents transmitted through the mixing of body fluids or sexually, such as herpes, HIV, and hepatitis.

Genetics and Heredity

Aging is the process that begins at birth and continues until death. As a person ages the cells mature, reach their peak performance, and then begin to decline or degenerate. As medical science discovers more ways to prolong the healthy life of our cells, the aging process appears to slow down, hence the recently coined phrase "60 is the new 40," allowing baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) to maintain the illusion of youth as they age. The primary way in which we have extended our life expectancy is the reduction of the number of deaths related to infection and accidents and the development of medical interventions to treat chronic diseases.

Some theories propose that aging is genetically programmed into the cell. Symptoms of aging cells are wrinkles, gray hair, and even menopause, demonstrating that aging can be considered a degenerative chronic disease. The process of aging incorporates the issue of prolonged exposure to toxic elements in the environment, increases the risk of organic failure, and raises the likelihood of degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's.

As a normal part of the aging process, a person becomes more susceptible to illness, is at increased risk of coronary disease and stroke, and has a depletion in bone mass. The aging cell is more vulnerable to opening the door to other acute and chronic diseases, which in turn can accelerate the aging process. In reviewing chronic diseases, it is important to keep in mind that, as our population lives longer (by 2030 one in five Americans will be over age 65), the prevalence of chronic diseases will grow.

Hereditary, Congenital Diseases, and Intrauterine Injury

Birth defects and intrauterine injury may produce chronic diseases such as hemophilia, muscular dystrophy, sickle-cell anemia, congenital heart disease, Tay-Sachs disease, cerebral palsy, and Down syndrome, to name a few. Chromosomal abnormalities genetically determine some diseases and can be tested for during pregnancy. A congenital disease is one that is present at birth but is not necessarily caused by a chromosomal abnormality. Environmental factors during pregnancy can result in birth defects and subsequent chronic diseases, as in fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), where the child's exposure to the mother's alcoholic intake alters the normal cellular growth and development of the fetus. FAS often results in lifelong, chronic ailments. Any toxic environment or harmful drug or chemical taken by a pregnant woman can result in fetal injury. The best-known case of this was the 1960s use of the drug thalidomide (a tranquilizer), which resulted in very serious congenital malformations.

Essential Hypertension, Stroke, and Coronary Disease

Research revealed an inherited trait predisposing a person to building up fats in major arteries, thus increasing the individual's susceptibility toward stroke and heart disease. Families with a history of cardiac or vessel disease may be more likely to

develop heart and vessel disease with aging. Race is also linked to heart disease, with statistics indicating that African Americans are at higher risk for developing heart disease and stroke than people of other races.

Social Factors

Secular trends, or behaviors shared by a group of people over a specific period, demonstrate the ability to change disease patterns over time. Secular trends can increase or decrease the risk of developing or exacerbating a chronic disease. Often, positive secular trends will follow a change in policy or legislation, such as the smoke-free workplace laws, which encourage a decrease in the amount of smoking by employees.

A secular trend increasing the likelihood of developing chronic diseases is Americans' choice of eating at fast food restaurants. As more women enter the workforce, more families eat fast foods. One out of every four Americans reports eating fast food once a day. Research indicates that lower income and lower education levels correlate to higher intake of fast foods. The consumption of deep-fried, high-calorie meals over time increases an individual's likelihood of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.

Income and Education

As mentioned earlier, income and education often dictate behavioral choices, as well as environmental hazards. Individuals of a lower income and lower educational level do not have the same choices in access, ability to pay, choice of safe shelter, and understanding of health hazards. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, poorer, less-educated Americans have shorter life spans than their rich, well-educated counterparts. Income and education, although listed as a social factor, also impacts behavior, genetic/familial, and environmental factors.

Stress

The body adapts to stress, and that adaptation corrupts multiple normal body functions. The brain, sensing stress, releases hormones to deal with the event and then allows for a recovery period. If stress is a chronic condition, however, the absence of recovery means the body's major organs continue to react as if in jeopardy. This heightened level of readiness can ultimately result in high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and even cancer.

Environmental Factors

The environment is a leading risk factor for developing chronic inflammatory disease. Environmental risk factors include any exposure that presents a danger to health, such as airborne toxins, toxins in foods and paint, radio towers and other electromagnetic energy sources, exposure to sun and other weather-related situations, and access/availability to harmful and beneficial health aids. Prolonged exposure to environmental pollutants increases the likelihood for specific cancers.

Airborne Toxins

Particles in the air that can cause chronic diseases can be a result of ongoing large-scale pollution, like car and factory emissions, can arise from an acute event like the demolition of a building, or may be due to exposure to secondhand smoke. The inhalation of toxins released into the air causes the lung tissues to change, resulting in upper respiratory compromise. Diseases commonly associated with air pollution are lung cancer, asthma, allergies, emphysema, sarcoidosis, and other breathing disorders. Multiple sclerosis has been linked to exposure to heavy metals, which are also found in car exhaust.

Disaster-Related Pollutants

The long-term effects of natural and non-natural disasters that release pollutants into environments can include increased prevalence of chronic diseases. Exposure to gases and other nuclear and non-nuclear toxins during wartime resulted in lifelong medical support to treat both emotional and physical ailments in veterans and affected populations. The stress of experiencing a natural disaster (like a tsunami or Hurricane Katrina) increases the likelihood of developing stress-related diseases or chronic diseases occurring as the result of an acute infection.

Access to Medical Care

The slow onset and long duration of chronic diseases make crucial the access to health promotion education and medical management. Some diseases, like rheumatic heart disease, can result from poor medical treatment of a primary throat infection. Access to medical care, preventive health education, and ongoing monitoring and treatment of chronic disease are the primary methods of handling chronic diseases.

Exposure to UVA and UVB

The reduction in the ozone layer has resulted in an increased exposure to the sun's ultraviolet rays, leading to increased skin cancer rates. The secular trend of using tanning beds further increases a person's susceptibility to developing melanomas and other types of skin cancer. Although some risks for skin cancer link to familial traits (including skin color and family history of skin cancer), the CDC states that skin cancer is the most preventable cancer. Methods to prevent skin cancer are reduction in exposure to UVA and UVB rays and use of sunscreen.

Behavioral Factors

Chronic diseases often relate to our behaviors and personal life choices, which in turn are often influenced by environment, social issues, genetics, and family. However, the ultimate responsibility for what to put into the body rests with the individual.

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drugs

Long-term use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs increases the likelihood of developing cirrhosis of the liver and associated liver diseases like hepatitis, as well as specific types of pneumonias and brain deterioration. Tobacco is the leading causative agent for lung cancer, emphysema, and asthma, and secondhand smoke is itself a carcinogen (i.e., cancer-producing agent). Prolonged use of drugs, illegal and recreational, increases the risk for brain degeneration, hepatitis, and mental illness. Infection with HIV, transmitted through the use of infected needles or unsafe sex, can result in multiple chronic diseases.

Food and Exercise

Data from the 1999–2000 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey and the 2005 CDC reports reveal that almost two thirds of U.S. adults are overweight, and 30.5 percent, more than 60 million people, are obese. Nine million children in the United States are overweight. Chronic diseases related to increased weight and decreased physical exercise are hypertension, high cholesterol, diabetes, heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, respiratory problems, and some cancers (endometrial, breast, and colon). In fact, experts attribute most chronic diseases today to physical inactivity and improper diet.

Sexually Transmitted Diseases

HIV and herpes are two incurable sexually transmitted diseases that can be precursors to other chronic diseases, such as cancer and specific types of pneumonia. Although HIV and herpes are not chronic diseases, their chronic, ongoing nature and the secondary chronic diseases resulting from them make them appropriate for the list. Sexual abstinence and the use of condoms for those who engage in sexual acts can prevent the transmission of these diseases.

The Challenge

Chronic disease is the leading cause of death in the United States. Its treatment affects us on a national and individual level, impacting our economics, emotions, and daily life. Health care costs continue to rise, the population continues to age, and the responsibility for taking care of family members with chronic diseases falls more frequently on the nearest relative. The more risk factors a person has, the greater the likelihood will be that he or she will develop one or more chronic diseases.

Chronic diseases are the most preventable diseases, according to the CDC, as development of a chronic disease requires repeated exposure over time. Removing the toxins negatively affecting the body, replacing unhealthy behaviors with healthy ones, exercising more, and reducing or stopping the use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs can prevent, or at least control, some of the effects of these chronic diseases. Improving health education and increasing access to medical care and information can also reduce or eliminate some of the prevalent chronic diseases.

Many chronic diseases seen in adulthood begin in childhood. Learning proper diet, encouraging physical exercise, removing secondhand smoke and other environmental toxins, and educating youth to make wiser, healthier decisions related to their personal habits and their environment will help combat the development of chronic disease.

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See also Environment, Pollution; Environmental Hazards; Health Care, Access; Life Expectancy; Secondhand Smoke; Sexually Transmitted Diseases

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Citizen Militias

Since September 11, 2001, public and political concerns have focused primarily on international terrorism and Al-Qaeda. It is surprising that domestic terrorism has been ignored, considering that it was an important social problem after the Oklahoma City bombing. Timothy McVeigh was a right-wing extremist, and when he murdered 168 people on April 19, 1995, the government focused their terrorism efforts on domestic extremism generally and the militia movement specifically. Although there was clear evidence of the establishment of the militia movement in the early 1990s, one can conclude that the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the erroneous inference that McVeigh was a member of the militia movement, led to a public panic regarding this newly discovered group of domestic extremists.

The militia movement emerged in the 1990s, fueled by several significant policy issues and two tragic events. Key policy issues included federal legislation that limited gun rights. The two legislative initiatives of particular concern were waiting period legislation (the "Brady Bill") and the semiautomatic assault weapons ban. Other salient political issues included the election of Bill Clinton as U.S. president, passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, enforcement of legislation to protect endangered species and the environment, and other statutes that limited individual property rights. Two events that were critical to the emergence and growth of the militia movement were the law enforcement–citizen standoffs at Ruby Ridge, involving Randy Weaver and his family in northern Idaho, and of David Koresh and the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas. These two events, both of which involved federal law enforcement agents attempting to enforce gun laws, numerous people killed, and evidence of attempted government "cover-ups" to hide mistakes, solidified anti-government concerns and provided the early leaders of the militia movement with convincing evidence in support of their concerns and rhetoric.

Structural and Ideological Characteristics

The militia movement was influenced by key extremist leaders and borrowed well-known extremist traditions. The most influential traditions were adapted from the Ku Klux Klan, Posse Comitatus, the Order, the Aryan Brotherhood, and the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord. Generalizations are difficult, as research indicates that the militia movement is quite diverse, but it is sage to say that there are two types of militia organizations. First, most militia groups are above-ground, paramilitary organizations. The Michigan Militia, for example, has a hierarchical command structure, conducts frequent training exercises, and has public meetings. Such groups criticize the media for demonizing them and claim they are simply community help organizations that focus on community service and preparedness. They discuss how they are preparing to assist the community in times of natural disasters and other crises. Their ideology is moderate—they are less likely to embrace conspiracy theories, are more likely to decry racism and nativism, and claim that they are willing to work within the political system and with extant political leaders to achieve change. Second, a smaller percentage of militia groups operate underground. These groups tend to embrace conspiracy theories and racism and usually intensely distrust government. Many of these groups organize in small underground

cells. They have limited contact with other militia organizations and are fearful of being infiltrated by federal law enforcement officers. A very small percentage of these militia groups and their supporters attempt to engage in preemptive strikes against their "enemies" in the government and wider society. Most of these plots have been foiled and the perpetrators arrested by law enforcement before any harm has occurred.

Variations in the ideological commitments of these different types of organization exist, but there are some common themes. Both are interested in celebrating local community rights and protecting the sovereignty of the United States. They are fearful of a growing federal bureaucracy, intrusive government activities, and job-stealing multinational corporations. Some militia members argue that international troops have already invaded American territories as part of a global conspiracy to create a "new world order." They seek to protect "fundamental" rights of individual liberty, property, and gun ownership and are willing to use whatever force is necessary to protect these interests. Militia groups are critical of the news media, blaming them for demonizing them and destroying the minds of the American public. Other prominent issues that flow from these core ideas include federal land regulations, jury nullification, educational and political reform, immigration, anti-abortion, and anti-homosexuality.

Size of the Movement

Members are recruited in several ways. First, many are recruited informally: Contacts are made at hunting and gun clubs, at job sites, and through social networks. Second, some groups publicize their agenda at public meetings and through newsletters, Web sites, and letters to the editor; they also organize public demonstrations. Many groups attend gun shows and gun events to share ideas and recruit members. Third, high-profile celebrity figures of the movement tour the country or appear on talk and radio shows to discuss the beliefs of the movement, encourage involvement, and guide interested parties toward relevant literature. Fourth, some groups have shortwave radio programs to share the militia message and recruit new members.

Because data are not collected about the militia movement (or any other extremist group) in any systematic way and there are legal limits on what law enforcement is able to collect and retain about such groups when lacking a criminal predicate, there is a very limited understanding of the number of groups and membership in these organizations. The only available information about the size of the movement is provided from watch-group organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and the Anti-Defamation League. Both watch-groups acknowledged that a new movement had emerged and grown rapidly in the early 1990s, but mass media and politicians simply ignored the movement. The SPLC, through its Intelligence Project, claimed that the movement appeared in the early 1990s, grew dramatically after the Oklahoma City bombing, and then declined in the late 1990s. The SPLC claimed that militia groups existed in 20 states in 1994, 42 states by late 1995, and all 50 states by 1996. In 2005, the SPLC estimated that there were 152 "patriot groups" in approximately 30 states.

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See also Countermovements; Gun Control; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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Citizenship

Citizenship is both a legal status and a social identity. Legally, citizenship refers to an individual's political status, rights, and obligations in a nation, for example, the right to political representation or participation in the judicial process in that nation. Socially, citizenship refers to an individual's membership in a political

organization or community. Whereas legal citizenship is closely linked to nationalism, the social conception of citizenship focuses on individual or group political ideology. In both, however, notions of morals, good standing, and social responsibility elements of so-called active citizenship are central to what it means to be a citizen.

Legal citizenship comprises several types. For example, in the United States, citizenship occurs through birth, naturalization, or, rarely, through an act of Congress and presidential assent. Any person born in a U.S. territory or from U.S. citizen parent(s) automatically becomes an U.S. citizen. In other countries, such as Japan, citizenship is based on *jus sanguinis* (bloodline) rather than birth. Subsequently, only those with biological Japanese parents or ancestors may automatically receive Japanese citizenship. In contrast to citizenship through birth or bloodline, in most countries, the naturalization process is lengthy and citizenship awarded only upon fulfillment of a set of cultural and financial requirements. These requirements measure the applicant's degree of social, moral, and financial responsibility and, thus, worthiness of citizenship status.

Only legal permanent residents who have resided in the United States continuously for a minimum of 5 years, with no single absence of more than 1 year, can initiate the naturalization process. Exceptions are for non-U.S. citizens who have served in the U.S. military since September 11, 2001. These individuals can apply for expedited naturalization, which shortens by 3 years the time period non-U.S. citizen military personnel normally must wait before they can apply for citizenship. Also, expedited naturalization allows applicants to apply without being physically present in the United States during the application process. Nonmilitary applicants must be physically present in the United States for at least 30 months out of the preceding years. All applicants must be persons of "good moral character" for the preceding 5 years (1 year for military applicants and 3 years for applicants married to U.S. citizens). The government defines "good moral character" as lack of a criminal record. Noncitizens are ineligible for naturalization for criminal offenses ranging from murder conviction to involvement with terrorist organizations and for noncriminal activities including alcoholism or testing HIV-positive.

Nationalism is a central element of naturalized citizenship. Applicants must demonstrate proficiency in the English language and a fundamental knowledge and understanding of U.S. history and the principles and form of U.S. government. They must also show "attachment to" (i.e., a willingness to honor and obey) the principles of the U.S. Constitution. Taking the Oath of Allegiance legalizes this attachment. During this oath, applicants officially renounce any foreign allegiances and commit themselves to serve in the U.S. military (e.g., during a draft) and perform civic services (e.g., jury duty) when needed. Whereas some nations—such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—allow dual citizenship, most require applicants to surrender one in favor of the other. Whether citizenship is achieved through birth or naturalization, in both instances U.S. citizens have both legal rights (e.g., of political representation) and legal obligations (e.g., jury duty). To date, however, only U.S. citizens by birth may run for presidential office, a stipulation that reflects a deterministic (biological) view of nationalism and citizenship.

Supranational citizenship extends the idea of national citizenship to an international level, as in, for example, the European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 grants EU citizenship to citizens of all EU member countries and entitles them to supranational legal benefits, such as freedom of movement within the EU, the right of residence within any EU member nation, and the right to vote in EU elections. However, supranational citizenship is not a substitute for national citizenship; rather, both coexist. Last, *honorary citizenship* is, on rare occasions, bestowed upon non-U.S. citizens of extraordinary merit through an act of Congress and presidential assent. To this date, only six individuals have been awarded honorary U.S. citizenship, among them Winston Churchill in 1963 and Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu (Mother Teresa) in 1996.

The legal definition of citizenship focuses on legal and political rights, representation, and obligations. Social citizenship also involves rights and obligations, but within a social context; it can be used to indicate membership in a particular political community, for example, the lesbian and gay community. Within this social context, citizenship refers to identity politics, political ideology, and the perceived responsibilities that are associated with these politics, such as engaging in political activism or a particular lifestyle. Another form of social citizenship is corporate citizenship. Corporate citizenship does not refer to a corporation's legal status but to its perceived contributions to (particularly the betterment of) a society. Corporate

citizenship, like its legal counterpart, is synonymous with social responsibility, and it incorporates notions of "good" and "active" citizenship.

While legal citizenship is more deterministic in nature than is social citizenship, as witnessed in the birth-citizenship requirement to run for presidential office, ultimately both are socially constructed. Legal citizenship requirements and definitions of socially and morally responsible behaviors are culturally and historically specific. Therefore, the main purpose behind legal citizenship is the construction of national identity by forming ingroups and outgroups. Similarly, citizenship of political communities differentiates a specific community's ideological thought or lifestyle from others in a society.

Ultimately, citizenship is as much a legal as it is a social concept and is often used in both contexts. What links the two conceptions together is the centrality of ideas such as social responsibility, political rights, and identity politics.

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See also American Dream; Assimilation; Civil Rights; Identity Politics

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Civil Rights

Governments grant civil rights to those considered citizens through birth or naturalization. When rights are not distributed evenly, conflicts arise. The first stage is often a struggle for citizenship and against laws that create and delimit access to citizenship and related rights and privileges. The 1790 Naturalization Law that established whiteness as a requirement for citizenship is a good example.

Throughout U.S. history, women and minorities have been excluded from full participation in civil rights. They protested their exclusion, using the founders' articulations of equality and democracy as American ideals to draw support. Passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 was the culmination of a long history of protest. This set into law both the requirement for protection against discrimination and the creation of agencies to oversee the expansion of civil rights.

The federal government, generally responsible for protecting citizen rights, created the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights as an oversight agency. This commission is charged with monitoring other agencies, such as the Department of Education and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to ensure that they enforce the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect civil rights and combat discrimination. However, their ability to do so remains dependent on political will and the resources given to study and document discrimination and the violation of civil rights.

An Enduring Problem

The acquisition of civil rights for all groups remains inextricably linked to issues of inequality, discrimination, and social justice still plaguing the United States. The denial of civil rights led to mass protest in the country, particularly in the second half of the 20th century. Much of that protest centered on problems of voting and political representation. Protest groups saw political representation and voting as keys to accessing educational opportunity and employment and as a means for confronting discrimination in housing and real estate practices, police brutality, and bias in the judicial system.

Despite substantial progress in the expansion of civil rights to previously disenfranchised groups and dismantling de jure forms of segregation, patterns of social inequality remain. According to recent census data, minorities continue to lag significantly behind the majority group in educational attainment, wealth, occupational prestige, income, and quality of life as indicated by health and longevity. These patterns of inequality remain after controlling for similar educational and occupational standing. Despite increasing political integration, gaps remain. This is especially the case for African Americans, Latinos/as, and Native Americans. These groups are disproportionately impoverished, incarcerated, and underrepresented

among political and economic leaders. Despite being citizens, the "first" Americans—members of the American Indian nations—suffer the worst poverty and the greatest marginalization.

Also, jobs in the United States are gendered. Gender segregation in occupations lead to women being relegated to jobs that do not ensure their future economic vitality and are characterized by lower wages. This pattern persists in each racial group. Women also suffer from media treatment that sexualizes and diminishes them. Substantive change in the striking gender imbalance that characterizes economic, political, and cultural institutions has been slow. It is not surprising, then, that sharp gender differences continue in income, wealth, and poverty, as well as in political representation. However, scholars vary significantly, as do the public and policymakers, in how they interpret these figures.

To some, it seems that the struggle for civil rights is no longer as pressing a social problem. However, the new millennium witnessed an expansion of both the definition of civil rights and those calling for their enactment. In the recent media spotlight on officials issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples and in the massive demonstrations protesting immigration policies that restrict immigration, it is clear that civil rights remain a pressing social problem for those marginalized and excluded from rights and protections extended to others. Given the counterprotests to both these campaigns, it is also clear that civil rights concerns continue to produce conflict over what is meant by citizenship rights and who shall have access to them.

Ideology Versus Reality

Cemented into the founding documents of U.S. society, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, was an ideology of liberty and equality. Yet, as many scholars and activists note, social practices that work to reproduce structural inequality contradict this ideology. Because of this, much of the struggle to expand civil rights rests on the notion that U.S. society has not lived up to its creed of equal treatment before the law. Areas of concern include the right to citizenship, the right to vote, the right to own property, and rights to protection from employment and educational discrimination as well as harassment and violence based on group membership. Major leadership emerged from the African American community, who felt keenly their government's abandonment following the abolition of slavery and the promise of reconstruction.

Despite amendments to the Constitution that (a) abolished slavery (13th Amendment), (b) granted citizenship to those born or naturalized in the United States and provided for "equal protection under the law" (14th Amendment), and (c) granted the right to vote to all *male* citizens (15th Amendment), the southern states were allowed to enact a series of Black Codes that consigned African Americans to a continued diet of repression and exploitation. Chicanos and Asians fared little better, as they too received no protection from segregated schools and relegation to the most exploited forms of labor, while experiencing violent repression and social exclusion.

In a period that had the potential for radical change in modes of political and economic distribution, the government instead opted for containment. It moved swiftly to relocate and relegate native peoples to reservations and to exclude wave after wave of Asian immigrants from settlement. It was not until massive social protest in the 20th century that civil rights became actualized for many.

The Civil Rights Movement

The 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* that rendered segregation in public schools unlawful was a dramatic reversal of the 1896 "separate but equal" doctrine announced in *Plessy v. Ferguson,* which legalized segregation. In the decades following *Plessy,* W. E. B. Du Bois's prediction that the major U.S. social problem of the 20th century would be the "color line" was borne out: Social life was characterized by division of the races into segregated and *unequal* schools, neighborhoods, churches, clubs, recreational facilities, and jobs. Whites alone enjoyed privileged access to political representation and the means for simple wealth accumulation through home ownership. The *Brown* decision represented a challenge to this privilege system. As activists responded, despite the widespread effects of race-based oppression, it was African Americans who were the mainstay of the multiracial civil rights movement.

Dramatic confrontations with Jim Crow legislation reveal the courage of activists such as Rosa Parks. Her

refusal to cede her bus seat to a white man led to the Montgomery bus boycott, which delivered a significant victory in the battle for desegregation at the start of the civil rights movement. A young Martin Luther King, Jr. rose to leadership of the movement, built upon a coalition of activist groups that included the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Congress for Racial Equality, and established groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League. However, it was the everyday citizens who risked their lives whose heroism should be realized for its contribution to social change. They braved bombings, beatings, police dogs, fire hoses, and jails, laying their lives on the line for justice.

They established a base of support in black churches and drew media attention as they successfully framed the civil rights movement as a moral crusade and recruited a wide base of supporters that included many students. Dr. King drew upon the practice of nonviolent confrontation that Mahatma Gandhi initiated in India's struggle against British colonialism. Involvement in the civil rights movement politicized a nation with tactics of nonviolent, direct disobedience including marches, sit-ins, and arrests that followed consciousness-raising through "rap sessions" and generated international support for the cause.

Civil Rights Legislation

The civil rights movement of the mid-20th century culminated in passage of a broad civil rights act that assured the right to vote and outlawed discrimination in public areas, education, employment, and all federally funded programs. Eventually, protection against discrimination extended to social group membership by race, color, national origin, religion, sex, and age, later expanding to include disability. Related legislation removed the long-standing white preference in immigration quotas, required equal pay for equal work, and established oversight agencies.

Identity Politics and Mass Protest

A host of disenfranchised groups adapted tactics and ideological frames of the civil rights movement as they struggled for equitable treatment and social justice. New social movements emerged based on social group membership, or "identity politics." African Americans organized for Black Power and national liberation, Native peoples organized as the American Indian Movement to create a coalition of indigenous nations that protested the federal government's refusal to honor their treaties, and a Chicano movement also emerged. Women, politicized by their experience in the civil rights movement, organized as feminists to force attention on gender and sex in society. A gay rights movement, accompanied this examination of gender and sex in society. These efforts by activists to extend the agenda initiated by the civil rights movement paralleled the expansion of the scholarly discourse and research on civil rights.

Theorizing Civil Rights

Sharp divisions mark the discourse on civil rights. Scholars debate over how to define the correlation between stratification and differential access to civil rights protections. They interpret outcomes of civil rights legislation differently, leading to contemporary arguments over whose access to civil rights shall be guaranteed and what rights the state shall be bound to protect. Moreover, scholars debate whether a successful conclusion to the campaign for civil rights, their extension and enforcement, can bring about social justice and equality.

Assimilationist scholars dominated the discourse on racial/ethnic inequality and its resolution throughout much of the 20th century. Their prediction of a harmonious outcome to conflicts that accompanied social marginalization based on group membership rested on assumptions that once ethnic minorities adopted the cultural patterns of the dominant group, they would find acceptance throughout society. They saw the denial of full participation in society as the result of irrational prejudices that produced discriminatory treatment and social marginalization, as well as periodic violent confrontations.

For such scholars, passage of the Civil Rights Act resolved inequality based on racial prejudice. Inequality could be legislated away by outlawing discrimination. Any vestiges of inequality were the outcome of individual capabilities, motivation, and training. Where patterns of social inequality persisted, they could be interpreted as arising from cultural differences—not exclusionary practices.

Liberal feminist scholars' positions on the effectiveness of civil rights legislation to resolve women's inequality parallel those of assimilationist scholars. Their central premise is that women should advance in what they view as a meritocratic society without being hampered by discrimination. Civil rights legislation led to the removal of legal barriers to women's education and employment opportunities, thereby resolving their main problems. Further, they argue that resistant problems of occupational segregation and the gender wage gap may result from choices women make due to their socialization as mothers and wives that suppress their human capital.

Critical race scholars, on the other hand, argue that race shapes social institutions and culture, leading to the social construction of race categories imbued with notions of capacity and behavior that emanate from an ideology of white male supremacy. These "racializing" notions are culturally embedded, so legislation is insufficient to counter their effects on social interactions and cultural representations. Given white hegemony, whites would need the will to counter their own privilege for anything to change, and no evidence suggests that this exists. Discrimination continues, though somewhat abated, in covert forms. Segregation in schools and neighborhoods, persistent poverty, police brutality, and mass incarcerations of young men of color are outcomes of a racial hegemony that reproduces white privilege and racial oppression. These problems, they argue, reflect a flawed social structure and mandate social change, but the society instead has exhibited backlash tendencies against the gains of civil rights legislation in the decades that have ensued. Contemporary discourse promoting a color-blind approach to race will only retard struggles for justice. Neither civil rights legislation nor color-blind policies negate the effects of globalization and deindustrialization on the inner cities that remain disproportionately peopled by African Americans and Latinos/as.

Radical feminists, socialist feminists, and multiracial feminists argue, similarly, that legislation can ease, but not resolve, structural inequalities. Though discrimination has been outlawed, women face occupational sex segregation, the "second shift," and sexual violence nurtured by patriarchal culture. Though, like racial minorities, they have benefited from removal of barriers to education and employment, they still do not net the same rewards as white men for their efforts. For example, men who enter feminized occupations such as nursing and education enjoy a swift ride to the top via "glass escalators" while women are shunted into dead-end careers such as clerical work, under a "glass ceiling."

Despite documentation of civil rights complaints and evidence of practices that maintain race and gender stratification, public discourse suggests that civil rights legislation has resolved related problems except those residing within the cultures of marginalized groups. Given recent allegations that African Americans were disenfranchised in the first two presidential elections of the new millennium amid disputes over race and redistricting, even the central civil rights movement promise of voting rights remains in question.

Sharon Elise

See also Affirmative Action; Black Codes; *Brown v. Board of Education*; Citizenship; Disability and Disabled; Discrimination; Educational Equity; Identity Politics; Inequality; Jim Crow; Justice; *Plessy v. Ferguson*; Same-Sex Marriage; Segregation; Women's Rights Movement

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Claims Making

Claims making entails the activities by which groups of people (such as advocacy or social movement organizations, community groups, legislators, or journalists) attempt to persuade an audience (such as Congress, other government officials, or the general public) to perceive that a condition is a social problem in need of attention. The concept of claims making originates from the social constructionist theory, which rejects the perception of social problems as objective realities. Rather, conditions, which may or may not exist, or are currently considered the normal state of affairs, are defined or redefined as social problems via social interactions between interested groups and audiences. Consequently, of analytical interest is how or why a condition is or is not constructed as a "social problem" via claims making, and what features of the claims-making activities are likely to facilitate public support of the claims makers' cause.

Using this perspective, social scientists examine various social problems, such as child abuse and abduction, domestic violence, prostitution, and cigarette smoking. Researchers analyzing claims and claims-making activities might explore such questions as follows.

About Claims Makers

Who is making the claims, and what stake do they have in the successful construction of their issue as a social problem? How do their different statuses (such as gender, class, race/ethnicity, political affiliation, professional affiliation, and religion) influence their decision to make claims, the rhetorical features of their claims, and the likelihood that their claims will be heard and either accepted or rejected? How are their claims different or similar to other claims makers approaching the same issue? Do they adjust their claims in response to others' reactions to their claims? What modes of communication (such as television, newspapers, Web sites) are they using to convey their claims, and how do the modes influence the claims?

About Claims

What are the rhetorical features of the claims being made, and what about them are or are not compelling? What types of evidence (e.g., statistics, expert testimony, victims' stories) are being given regarding the nature, magnitude, and reach of the social problem? What solutions are being proposed as a way of addressing the social problem? What values or interests are being reflected in the claims? Are the claims constructing "victims" and "victimizers," and, if so, who are they? What motifs or themes (such as good/evil, right/wrong, justice/injustice, or morality/immorality) are being conveyed in the claims? Do the claims contain broader or localized social, historical, or cultural themes (such as civil rights, value of or protection of freedom), and will these resonate with the target audience(s)? What emotions or ideologies are being appealed to in the claims (such as anger, sympathy, patriotism and freedom, or social/moral responsibility)?

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See also Moral Entrepreneurs; Social Constructionist Theory

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Class

In its broadest sense, class refers to group inequalities based on economic attributes. The specific economic attributes used to define class vary by theoretical

perspective, with some focusing on ownership or control of wealth-producing property, and others emphasizing material and cultural holdings, such as income, wealth, occupational prestige, and lifestyle. Class is thus a primary concept for analyzing social inequality and, as such, provides insight for almost all social problems.

Class denotes both a social group and a social force. As a social group, class is researchers' categorization of people by the various economic attributes. Class as a social force refers to its micro- and macro-level patterned influences. Class shapes myriad inequalities experienced individually, such as those in health, health care, residence, vocabulary, speech, crime, criminal justice, education, employment, marriage, family life, and many more. It may also develop, in some, a sense of class identification that may create macro-level social change, as exemplified by business owners' shaping of national tax laws and global trade pacts or workers' achievement of the right to unionize and the 8-hour workday.

Two Main Perspectives on Class

The relationship between class and social problems is explained differently in numerous theories on class. Most of these theories can be arranged into two main camps, notwithstanding differences within and broad areas of agreement between them: one broadly defined as Marxian, the other as distributional.

Marxian Perspective

Based on the ideas of Karl Marx, the Marxian perspective emphasizes class-based exploitation, struggle, and social change. From this perspective, classes are distinct groups defined by relations of production, that is, the roles the groups have in the way a society produces its goods and services. Industrial societies form two major classes based on the relations of production: the capitalist class, which owns and controls the means of production (i.e., production facilities and raw materials) and which employs and manages others for purposes of profit making, and the working class, or proletariat, which owns only the capacity to produce for the capitalist class. Other classes are recognized (e.g., landlords, small-business owners, intellectuals), but it is the capitalist and working classes that are central to the way societies operate and change.

Most important is the unequal and antagonistic relationship between the two main classes: Capitalists need workers to produce goods and services, and workers need capitalists for wages, but capitalists exploit the working class, which means they appropriate more value from the workers than they give them in the form of wages and benefits. Owing to this economic power of exploitation, the capitalist class attains greater social, cultural, and political power. It has a greater ability to ensure that its interests are represented in the public policy, legal order, and dominant values of society, such as the primacy of economic development policies, laws upholding private property, and the social norm of profit maximization. However, Marx saw class relations as the resolution as well as the source of social inequality. Because of its subordinate position, the working class would form strong class solidarity, or class consciousness, and initially struggle against the capitalist class for workplace reform. Ultimately, this class struggle would expand to create an entirely new social order based on public ownership and control of production, thereby abolishing exploitative and antagonistic relations between classes and thus the classes themselves, so defined.

Distributional Perspective

The distributional perspective is an amalgamation of diverse approaches, most of which derive in some measure from Max Weber's notions of class and status. For Weber a social class is a group that shares similar life chances, that is, chances of achieving a socially valued living standard. Life chances are determined by one's income and ownership of various types of material property, including the means of production, but also by the possession of what Weber referred to as status, that is, social prestige and related cultural attributes, such as educational attainment, type of occupation, and lifestyle. In this view the Marxian relations-of-production approach is too broad to address inequalities rooted in the distribution of these multiple cultural attributes. Thus, in the distributional view classes are nuanced social groupings based on distributions of numerous economic and cultural attributes that shape life chances, and identified generally as lower class, middle class, and upper class. Each designation may be further modified (e.g., lower middle class) or alternatively titled to recognize tradition or prestige (e.g., "old money").

The class borders are less distinct and more permeable than as seen in the Marxian view; upward social mobility is both possible and socially expected. Poor life chances, however, are a major obstacle to upward mobility, and they may result from social closure, that is, conscious attempts by groups to control and exclude others from resources, and from weak internalization of achievement norms. In addition, social-psychological problems of class and mobility are examined, such as perceptions of low self-worth or uncertainty of social standing. For example, one may attain the income of a higher class but still be excluded by its members because the important attributes of lifestyle, taste and speech, do not automatically follow.

Class-Based Social Problems

Exploitation

In the Marxian perspective, exploitation of the working class produces surplus value, which is the value workers create during production that goes uncompensated. It is the source of profits for the capitalist class but also the source of economic inequality. This inequality is evidenced in 2004 Census Bureau data showing that after production costs, manufacturers received a value-added total of $1.584 trillion, but the total wages for production workers was $332 billion. This means the average U.S. production worker made about $35,500 per year in wages but created about $170,000 in surplus value for the business owner, thus enabling the capitalist to sell commodities for a profit. The capitalist class keeps the lion's share of its profits for its income, and this share has grown over the past quarter-century, as seen in the ratio between the average pay of chief executive officers and the average pay of workers: from 35:1 in 1978 to 185:1 in 2003. Thus, an average chief executive officer in 2003 could earn in about one and one-half days what the average worker made in the entire year. Working-class families use most or all of their incomes for personal consumption (e.g., food, utilities, clothes). However, the capitalist class may use much of its vastly higher income for further profit-making, such as reinvestment in its operations and investment in other businesses. Ownership of significant (over $5,000) direct stock is dominated by the capitalist class, whereas the wealth of the working class is mainly in the form of houses, cars, or pensions. The capitalist class is positioned to generate more wealth; the working class is more likely to own more personal debt.

Unionized workers have higher compensation compared with non-unionized workers, but since the 1970s the capitalist class has taken strong and successful anti-union measures, a form of class struggle that has included illegally firing or disciplining more than 20,000 pro-union workers each year since the 1990s. A problem the capitalist class faces from exploiting the working class and from the consequent disparity in income and wealth is a weakened ability to sell the very goods on which its profits depend.

Unequal Life Chances

Since the 1970s, as income and wealth inequality have increased, as union membership has declined sharply, and as employers have reduced health care benefits for their workers, life chances have diminished for most Americans, be it absolute or relative to the upper or capitalist class. From the distributional standpoint, the inability to attain socially valued goods in socially accepted ways poses a threat to the social order, as evidenced by such social problems as crime, decline in community ties, and withdrawal from electoral processes. Higher education, health, and residence are some important yet unequally distributed life chances.

Regarding higher education, the likelihood of applying, being admitted, and graduating, and the type of college considered are influenced by class. The lower the average income of parents, the less likely the children are to apply, and average Scholastic Aptitude Test scores have varied directly by family income brackets since the 1990s. In 2004, 71 percent of students from families in the top income quartile received a bachelor's degree, but the rate was only 10 percent for those from families in the bottom income quartile. Moreover, an early 21st-century trend is that more students from high-income families are admitted into prestigious private colleges, while the number of students from low-income families admitted is declining.

Lower-class families report they are in poor health more often than do upper-class families, and in fact are more likely than upper-class families to suffer morbidity, such as lung cancer and hypertension, and to experience infant mortality, and their members die an average of 7 years earlier. Employer-provided

health insurance coverage varies directly by wages: In 2003 more than 3 times as many top-fifth wage earners had job-based health insurance as did those in the bottom fifth.

Homeownership varies directly by income. In 2001, just half of those in the lowest income group owned homes, while in the highest income group the figure was 88 percent. Moreover, the geographical distance between homeowners by income has been growing since 1970 in U.S. metropolitan areas. Upper-class families have the ability to move farther away from central cities and form homeowner associations which help maintain their isolation from the lower classes by such means as "gated communities" that limit residence to those with similarly high levels of income, education, and occupational prestige. Because of such distancing, municipal services (such as education and recreation) for the lower classes in urban centers may be reduced.

Class Reproduction

The Marxian and distributional perspectives see class reproduction as a problem, that is, that most stay within their class position and the class structure tends to remain stable over time. The Marxian view sees class borderlines as mainly impermeable; the possibility of a worker becoming a capitalist is very weak. Through inheritance of wealth-producing property and financial wealth, the offspring of capitalists have the advantage to remain in the capitalist class, while children of working-class families are less likely to accumulate enough capital to become big business owners and employ others. According to this view, education does not resolve this problem because school curricula vary by social class and prepare students for work roles consistent with their class origins.

Given its emphasis on cultural as well as economic attributes, the distributional perspective finds more possibilities for movement between and within classes. For example, movement from the lower class to the capitalist class is unlikely, but attaining income and prestige higher than one's parents is common. Yet, while research has long found intergenerational upward mobility, especially from manual work to white-collar work, most children remain in the same occupational and status group as their parents or move down.

Some researchers attribute this to the ways parents socialize their children for work and future, which is shaped by features of parents' work. Middle-class occupations typically require self-direction (independent judgment and autonomy), whereas working-class occupations are usually closely supervised and require much rule following. Middle-class parents tend to internalize values of self-direction and, in turn, impart these values to their children. Working-class parents, on the other hand, internalize and socialize obedience. Consequently, middle-class parents tend to socialize their young to be curious and attain self-control, which thus leaves them well prepared for middle-class work; working-class parents tend to socialize their young to obey rules and maintain neatness and cleanliness, and thus they are ill prepared for middle-class work. Another explanation for class reproduction concerns the role of cultural capital, which refers to cultural possessions, such as credentials, artifacts, and dispositions. The cultural capital of upper-class families, which includes professional degrees, taste for "high" art, and a reserved disposition, is more highly valued by educators, employers, and other gatekeepers than is the cultural capital of lower- and working-class families. Because children embody the cultural capital of their parents, upper-class schoolchildren tend to receive higher rewards in school, thus gaining better chances for admission into prestigious colleges, which ultimately ensures their upper-class position in adulthood.

Challenges to Democracy

From the distributional and Marxian standpoints, unequal class power threatens democracy. In the distributional view, those with high income and social status wield disproportionate political power, especially at the federal level: Most U.S. presidents were wealthy; about two thirds of cabinet appointments by Presidents John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush were of people from top corporations and law firms; three fourths of Congress in 2001 was composed of business executives, bankers, realtors, and lawyers; and 81 percent of individuals who have donated to congressional candidates since the 1990s had incomes over $100,000, and almost half in this group had incomes over $250,000.

Some hold a pluralist view, finding that those with high socioeconomic status form more powerful lobby groups and raise more money through political action committees than do those from the lower classes and are thereby more successful in achieving legislation favorable to their interests, such as reduced capital gains taxes. Others find that a tripartite elite composed

of a small group of wealthy corporate owners, the executive branch of the federal government, and the top military officials form a power elite in the United States. Members of the power elite share similar perspectives and dominate national-level decision making, such as foreign policy, for their unified interests.

The Marxian perspective holds that it is the capitalist class that dominates national political power and is a nation's ruling class. Some with this view find that a segment of the capitalist class purposefully dominates the three branches of the U.S. government financially and ideologically. This is evidenced by their strong financial support of candidates and officeholders and by their creation and domination of large foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation), policy-formation groups (e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations), and national news media. Others find that the interests of the capitalist class for profit accumulation are so deeply embedded in the culture that little direct influence by the capitalist class is necessary for public policy and legislation to express its interests, as is evidenced in the conventional wisdom that business expansion is the national imperative and must be facilitated by business deregulation.

Vincent Serravallo

See also Class Consciousness; Cultural Capital; Deindustrialization; Economic Restructuring; False Consciousness; Inequality; Intergenerational Mobility; Life Chances; Social Mobility; Socioeconomic Status; Stratification, Social; Underclass Debate

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Class Consciousness

Class consciousness is an awareness of one's position in the class structure that can be shared by members of the same class. It enables individuals to come together in opposition to the interests of other classes and, therefore, can be important for people challenging inequality and exploitation. Although members of any class can have class consciousness, it is particularly important for those in the working class because they are at the bottom of the class hierarchy and have the most to gain from being unified.

The concept of class consciousness originates in the work of Karl Marx, who emphasized that it is important for the working class (proletariat) to see itself as a group with shared interests in order for workers to come together and overthrow the dominant capitalist class (bourgeoisie) and to take control of the means of production in a revolution. Although Marx never actually used the term *class consciousness,* he distinguished between "class in itself," where workers merely have a common relation to the means of production, and "class for itself," where they organize to pursue common class interests.

In *The Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Friedrich Engels encouraged workers to unite by informing them of their exploitation by 19th-century capitalists who forced them to endure bad working conditions, long working hours, and wages so low that many families had to send their children to work to supplement the family income. Marx and Engels wrote that proletarians faced alienation—estrangement from both their work and the world in general. *The Communist Manifesto* states that because the dominant classes control major social institutions like education and religion, they can shape cultural norms and values so that members of the proletariat will blame themselves for their misfortunes. An individual who blames him- or herself will fail to recognize that others have the same problems and will fail to see a collective solution for them. Thus, Marx and Engels thought that an awareness of the increasingly exploitative nature of capitalism would make class consciousness inevitable and that it would help workers around the world to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

Marxists express concern about the lack of class consciousness among workers, particularly in the most developed nations, where Marx predicted that communist revolution would occur first. Engels introduced the concept of false consciousness to explain how workers can develop a mistaken or distorted sense of identity and their place in the social hierarchy. Because people with false consciousness identify with the bourgeoisie rather than with other workers in the same class, they do not develop a true class consciousness that would disrupt the social order. For example, waiters employed in a five-star hotel may associate and identify with their wealthy customers and fail to recognize that their interests are more aligned with the interests of the hotel's kitchen workers, security and maintenance staff, housekeepers, or other people who make a similarly low wage. This would make waiters less likely to see themselves as working class, to recognize that their wealthy customers and the owners of the hotel mistreat them, to participate in efforts to organize for better pay or working conditions in the hotel, and to support social policies that challenge inequality in society. In contrast, waiters with a class consciousness, who recognize other hotel workers as fellow members of the working class and have interests opposed to those of wealthy customers and owners, would be more likely to work together to demand change.

Michael Mann's work further developed the idea of working-class consciousness by specifying varying levels of class consciousness. He identified four different elements of working-class consciousness: *class identity,* one's self-definition as part of a working class; *class opposition,* the perception that the capitalist class is an enemy; *class totality,* the acceptance of identity and opposition as the defining characteristics of one's social world; and *having a vision of an alternative society without class.* These elements help us to contrast class consciousness in different settings. For instance, Mann compared the working class in Western economies and said that workers in Britain were likely to see themselves as members of the working class, but they were not likely to envision a classless society or work toward worker revolution. In contrast, Italian and French workers were more likely to participate in unions that directly oppose capitalism in favor of socialist or communist platforms. Mann's arguments can help explain why class organizing has been more prominent in some countries than in others, and why socialist or communist parties have been supported only in some societies.

Despite these conceptual advances, class consciousness is considered difficult to study: It is hard to measure using common survey methods, and it is always changing because classes themselves are always in flux as people interact with one another. Class consciousness may change as people learn about their positions in society, about the status of others, and about social stratification in general. What it means to be working class can vary across time and space, making it hard for workers to have a common awareness of class. Recently, some sociologists argued that class consciousness is an overly rigid concept. Instead, they proposed class formation; that is, the dynamic process of interclass relations and how class is practiced, represented, and constructed in daily life. To study class formation, scholars might examine how class is part of the organization of workplaces, family traditions, and neighborhoods, paying attention to how class images and identities affect other perceptions of society and how evolving class formation can increase or decrease the potential for resistance and social change.

Elizabeth Borland

See also Alienation; Class; Countermovements; False Consciousness; Identity Politics; Inequality; Oligopoly; Social Change; Social Conflict; Socialism; Social Movements; Social Revolutions; Stratification, Social

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Club Drugs

MDMA (methylenedioxymethamphetamine), more commonly called ecstasy, is the most popular in a category commonly called "club drugs." Others are Rohypnol (flunitrazepam), GHB, and ketamine. First synthesized in Germany by the Merck Company in 1912, ecstasy is both a mild stimulant and a hallucinogen. The medical community initially embraced this drug for appetite suppression and psychotherapy.

However, research could not document any reliable benefits, and ecstasy fell out of favor by the late 1970s, only to reappear as a recreational drug about a decade later.

In the United States and Europe in the 1980s, a rave scene emerged featuring all-night dancing to various forms of electronic or "sampled" music (e.g., house, techno, and trance) at unconventional locations (warehouses and abandoned buildings). The scene embraced a community ethos of peace, love, and unity, not unlike the hippie subculture of the 1960s. As an empathogenic, ecstasy promoted the PLUR (peace, love, unity, respect) ethos. "Ravers" were typically between the ages of 13 and 21 (the so-called Generation X children of the baby boomers), and they sought to break down social barriers through the universal language of music at all-night dance parties. Ecstasy, with its stimulant and affective properties, fit perfectly.

Ecstasy's Impact on Public Health

Rates of ecstasy use are relatively low compared with those of marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine. In 2004, about 4.6 percent of the U.S. population over 12 years of age had tried ecstasy at least once, but less than 1 percent in the past month. However, ecstasy use is more prevalent than heroin, particularly among those ages 18 to 25. Although no studies have established an addictive potential, evidence exists of such psychosomatic complications as mood disorders, depression, anxiety, short-term memory problems, and physical problems such as nausea, increased heart rate, and overdose.

Social Control and Crime

Extensive adolescent presence at raves and reports of extensive drug use ignited fear in parents and officials that Generation X would fall victim to drug addiction or suffer other consequences. The anti-rave movement started at the community level. Cities passed ordinances designed to regulate rave activity, including juvenile curfews, fire codes, safety ordinances, and liquor licenses for large public gatherings. Also, rave promoters had to provide onsite medical services and security to prevent drug use.

Several federal measures early in this century took action against the rave scene and club drug use. The Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 increased penalties for the sale and use of club drugs. In 2003, the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act, or the Rave Act, focusing on the promoters of raves and other dance events, made it a felony to provide a space for the purpose of illegal drug use.

To date, relatively few arrests and convictions for ecstasy use and sales have occurred, compared with those for drugs such as marijuana, crack, cocaine, and heroin. One reason is that, unlike other drug users, ecstasy users and sellers generally do not engage in much criminal activity other than illegal drug use, although theft, assault, and vandalism have reportedly occurred at raves or dance music events. Also, the drug is sold privately in informal networks that are difficult for police to penetrate, unlike the street-level sales of drugs like crack and heroin.

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See also Addiction; Drug Abuse; Drug Subculture; Therapeutic Communities

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Cocaine and Crack

Cocaine hydrochloride (a white powder) and crack (a solidified version of cocaine hydrochloride) come from the coca leaf, grown mostly in the mountains of South America. Cocaine and crack are Schedule II stimulants that produce intense but short-term euphoria and increased energy levels. The chief active ingredient in coca leaves is the alkaloid cocaine, which was isolated in pure form in 1844.

Cocaine and crack produce dependency, addiction, and many other physical and psychological problems. They increase the heart rate and can lead to death by cardiac arrest. Both cocaine and crack also spur anxiety, paranoia, restlessness, and irritability. Because of

the obsessive use patterns they produce, cocaine and crack increase the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and physical assault and victimization among their users.

History

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States experienced its first cocaine epidemic. Soldiers took it to improve their endurance for battle. Cocaine was packaged in tonics and patent medicines to treat sinus illnesses or for eye, nose, and throat surgery. It was also administered to slaves to secure longer workdays and used as a cure for morphine addiction. Rampant addiction followed, with the drug outlawed in 1914 by the Harrison Narcotics Act.

Cocaine reemerged as a popular recreational drug during the 1970s among the upper class, celebrities, and fans of disco. Significant problems, such as the loss of jobs, savings accounts, and family trust, as well as increased health risks, such as overdose and cardiac arrest, soon followed.

Crack cocaine appeared in the early 1980s in the inner city among the lower class. It was packaged in small pieces called rocks (for as little as $5 each), which could be smoked in a small pipe. Users found themselves bingeing for hours or days, smoking up hundreds of dollars of the product and resorting to crime to fund their habits.

Crime and Social Control

The explosion in these two forms of cocaine, and the related social problems that followed, stunned U.S. public and government officials. Sophisticated criminal networks emerged in the inner city to control crack sales. Their use of violence to protect their profits produced significant spikes in rates of homicide and assault. Users resorted to all kinds of theft and sex work to fund their habits.

The federal government responded with numerous laws. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 increased funds to reduce the sales and supply of the drug and broadened mandatory minimum penalties for cocaine sales and possession. The Omnibus Drug Abuse Act of 1988 expanded mandatory minimum penalties for drug users and sellers and established a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. These laws filled U.S. prisons with small-time crack cocaine users and did little to curb the cocaine crime problem. In December 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that federal judges could impose shorter sentences for crack cocaine cases, making them more in line with those for powder cocaine. This decision reducing the disparity in prison time for the two crimes had a strong racial dimension, since the majority of crack offenders are black.

Prevalence of Cocaine and Crack Use

Use of cocaine powder persists in the United States, although less so since its reemergence in the 1970s. Although scholars note a drop in crack use as well, they caution against its future escalation because its use also persists in inner-city pockets.

In 2005, approximately 33.7 million Americans reported using cocaine or crack at least once in their lives. This is about one third the amount who ever used marijuana (97.5 million) and 3 times the 11.5 million who ever used club drugs (ecstasy, ketamine, GHB, or Rohypnol). However, cocaine and crack continue to be the most often mentioned illicit drugs in emergency room visits, indicating the problematic nature of their use.

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See also Addiction; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; Club Drugs; Drug Abuse; Marijuana

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Codependency

The term *codependency* has two related uses. The first originated in the addiction treatment and family therapy discourses. Until the 1980s, the term described a person involved in a relationship with an alcoholic or

drug addict. The codependent engaged in considerable effort, mostly unsuccessful, to manage the problems associated with the partner's addiction. The spouse of an alcoholic might find him- or herself making excuses and telling lies to employers and family members, hiding liquor, struggling with issues of blame, and often trying in vain to figure out how to "fix" the addicted spouse. Domestic violence, as well as verbal and emotional abuse, might also characterize such relationships.

Over time, many nonaddicted spouses and partners came to believe that they had no sense of self apart from the addiction. Whereas the addict depended on substances, the spouse depended on the presence of the addiction for his or her self-worth. Treatment professionals began to label such clients "codependents." Because of the original connection with substance abuse, particularly alcohol, the therapy of choice for codependency was the twelve-step program called Al-Anon, which offers support to relatives and close friends of alcoholics.

In addition to the connotation of "co-alcoholic" or "co-addict," another use of the term *codependency* evolved during the 1980s. The newer use of the term connotes the same relationship difficulties and lack of a sense of self but without the necessity of substance abuse.

During the late 1980s, family therapists claimed to see increasing numbers of clients who felt that their identities were based largely in relationships with problematic spouses. The problems did not necessarily stem from substance abuse or addiction. A person who was drawn to emotionally distant partners, or partners who were consistently unfaithful, might continually attempt to change or fix the undesirable behavior in the other person. Similar to the spouse of the alcoholic or addict, the "codependent" partner began to base his or her sense of self-worth in trying to fix problems in the relationship, while losing touch with his or her own goals and plans. Codependents claimed not to know who they were and reported feeling out of touch with their emotions. Family therapists attributed this behavior to "dysfunctional" families.

According to the systems approach of the therapeutic discourse, all families have secrets and embarrassments, and all create rules to hide them from outsiders. Children internalize these rules, at the expense of trust and self-confidence. The dysfunctional family system results in relationships that lack true intimacy because the child purportedly has no self in which to base that intimacy. Children tried to please parents who could not be pleased. As a result, they did not develop a sense of self-worth apart from trying to please others. Within the therapeutic discourse, this constitutes a form of abuse, regardless of the presence of physical or emotional violence. Children grow up to reenact the various unresolved conflicts and abuses of childhood. They become what family therapists refer to as "adult children," codependent on the dysfunction and abuse much as the co-alcoholic had depended on alcoholism.

Because alcohol and substances did not necessarily play a part in the problems that adult children felt, those seeking therapy felt unwelcome in Al-Anon, with its focus on living with active alcoholism. In 1986, two enterprising codependents noticed this lack and started Codependents Anonymous, or simply CoDA. The group describes itself as a place for people with an inability to maintain functional relationships. CoDA adopted and adapted the twelve steps and traditions of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), as well as its voluntaristic, democratic organizational structure. However, the two groups have strong ideological differences stemming from the therapeutic origins of codependency and AA's exclusive focus on alcohol. In any case, therapists began sending clients with codependency to CoDA meetings to supplement therapeutic sessions or to replace sessions when insurance would no longer cover them.

The recovery program for codependency differs from that of other addictions in that it does not require abstinence from the presumed cause: relationships. However, the more accurate term is not *recovery* but *management*, for the discourse claims there is no complete recovery. Codependent tendencies never disappear completely, but they can be recognized and addressed before they cause problems again. Doing so depends on finding ways to "get in touch with" one's true self, known in the discourse as the "inner child."

Codependency is a self-diagnosed condition. It does not appear among the disorders listed in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.* Regardless of whether codependency constitutes an actual disease, the complaints do respond to real social concerns prevalent during the time. Most people who claim to be codependent are baby boomers, having come of age in a period during which many Americans valued "getting in touch with" the self and understanding one's "true" emotions. In addition, the increase in varieties of therapy and the

popularity of self-help literature lionized and democratized self-actualization. Moreover, most codependents have experienced at least one divorce and several other uncouplings, which could lead one to question one's ability to maintain "functional" relationships. Many are single parents, and some struggle with custody arrangements. The resulting disillusionment can understandably produce a suspicion of marriage and other mainstream social institutions. However, these very institutions can offer a context for the strong sense of self that codependents claim to lack.

In short, codependency is a disease of its time. It reveals much about late 20th- and early 21st-century social circumstances.

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See also Abuse, Child; Abuse, Intimate Partner; Addiction; Alcoholism; Divorce; Drug Abuse; Family, Dysfunctional; Twelve-Step Programs

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Cohabitation

Cohabitation is a tentative, nonlegal coresidential union that does not require or imply a lifetime commitment to stay together. Perhaps as a result, cohabiting unions break up at a much higher rate than do marriages. Cohabitors have no responsibility for financial support of their partner, and most do not pool financial resources. Cohabitors are more likely than married couples both to value separate leisure activities and to keep their social lives independent and are much less likely than husbands and wives to be monogamous. Cohabitors may choose this arrangement because it carries no formal constraints or responsibilities.

A substantial proportion of cohabiting couples have definite plans to marry, and these couples tend to behave like already-married couples. Others have no plans to marry, and these tentative and uncommitted relationships are quite fragile. The tentative, impermanent, and socially unsupported nature of this latter type of cohabitation impedes the ability of this type of partnership to deliver many of the benefits of marriage, as do the relatively separate lives typically pursued by cohabiting partners. The uncertainty about the stability and longevity of the relationship makes both investment in the relationship and specialization with this partner much riskier than in marriage, for the partners themselves and for their extended families, friends, and communities. The lack of sharing typical of cohabitors disadvantages the women and their children in these families relative to the men, because women typically earn less than men; this is especially true for mothers. Cohabitation seems to distance people from some important social institutions, especially organized religion. Young men and women who define themselves as "religious" are less likely to cohabit, and those who cohabit subsequently become less religious.

Parenting and Sex

Cohabitation has become an increasingly important—but poorly delineated—context for childrearing. One quarter of current stepfamilies involve cohabiting couples, and a significant proportion of "single-parent" families are actually two-parent cohabiting families. The parenting role of a cohabiting partner toward the child(ren) of the other person is extremely vaguely defined and lacks both social and legal support.

Cohabiting men and women report slightly more sexual activity than married people. But cohabiting men and women are less likely than those who are married to be monogamous, although virtually all say that they expect their relationship to be sexually exclusive.

Commitment and Housework

Studies show that cohabiting people with no plans to marry are significantly less committed to their partner and to the partnership itself than are husbands and wives. Cohabiting men score lower on commitment than any other group.

One study found that married women spend 14 hours more on housework than married men do, while women who are cohabiting spend about 10 hours more on housework than cohabiting men. On this dimension, then, cohabitation is a better "deal" for women than marriage. Some economists argue that husbands compensate their wives for their time in work for the family by sharing their income with them. But cohabiting women generally do not share their partner's earnings, so they may be doing extra housework without extra pay.

Wealth and Emotional Well-Being

Married couples link their fates—including their finances. Among families with children, cohabiting couples have the lowest average level of wealth, comparable to families headed by a single mother. Intact two-parent families and stepfamilies have the highest level of wealth, followed at a distance by families headed by a single father. Unlike single-parent families, cohabiting couples have two potential earners, so their very low levels of wealth are a cause for concern, especially for the children living in these families. Financial uncertainty, especially low male earnings, reduces the chances that cohabiting couples will marry.

Cohabitors report more depression and less satisfaction with life than do married people. The key seems to lie in being in a relationship that one thinks will last. Marriage is, by design and agreement, for the long run, and married people tend to see their relationships as much more stable than do cohabitors. Relationship instability is often distressing, leading to anxiety and symptoms of depression. Thus, cohabitors with no plans to marry tend to show lower psychological well-being than similar married people. Worrying that one's relationship will break up is especially distressing for cohabiting women with children, who show quite high levels of depression as a result.

Who Cohabits?

Most cohabitors say that ensuring compatibility before marriage is an important reason why they wanted to live together. But people who cohabit and then marry are much more likely to divorce than people who married without living together. People who cohabit tend to have other characteristics that both lead them to cohabit in the first place and make them poor marriage material, accounting for the higher divorce rates for those who cohabited. But some scholars argue that the experience of cohabitation itself makes subsequent marriages less stable.

Couples who live together with no definite plans to marry are making a different bargain than couples who marry or than engaged cohabitors. The bargain is definitely *not* marriage and is "marriage-like" only in that couples share an active sex life and a house or apartment. Cohabiting men tend to be quite uncommitted to the relationship; cohabiting women with children tend to be quite uncertain about its future. Cohabiting couples have lower earnings and less wealth than married couples, perhaps disadvantaging the children in them. Cohabiting couples with plans to marry, on the other hand, are indistinguishable on most dimensions from married couples.

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See also Divorce; Domestic Partnerships; Role Strain

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Collateral Damage

The obligation to distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand and military objectives on the other is a central tenet of international humanitarian law (the law that applies during an armed conflict). Collateral damage is inflicted when a party to the conflict intends to attack a military objective but kills or injures civilians or destroys civilian objects in addition to, or instead of, destroying the military objective.

Significant collateral damage is a particular risk with respect to aerial bombardment campaigns. There are several ways in which a conflict bombing of legitimate targets may kill and injure civilians. The civilians

may be working inside the target, such as workers in a munitions factory, or they may live next to, or simply be passing by, a military target. An example of civilians killed and injured as a result of living near targets is the deaths of, and injuries to, civilians in the 2003 Iraq conflict, when houses in the vicinity of military objectives collapsed as a result of the shock of explosions.

Another risk is that missiles may simply go off course. In the 2003 Iraq conflict, Amnesty International reported that a U.S. missile hit a bus in Western Iraq, killing five civilians and injuring others. A U.S. spokesman reportedly stated that the real target was a nearby bridge. A further threat to civilians from aerial bombardment is the risk of damage caused by defensive measures such as anti-aircraft missiles, which may fall back onto civilian areas.

Collateral damage does not necessarily occur immediately following an attack on a military objective. During the 1990–91 Gulf conflict, many more deaths occurred as a result of the long-term effect of the targeting of power grids, as sewage plants and water purification facilities broke down, than were caused contemporaneously during the bombardment.

An important question in relation to the threat of collateral casualties resulting from aerial bombardment is whether this threat has become practically negligible as a result of the advent of precision-guided missiles. Unfortunately, although precision-guided missiles have the capacity to greatly reduce collateral damage, risks to civilians remain. Weather may affect the accuracy of such missiles, and countermeasures such as smoke or jamming devices may interfere with their targeting system.

International Armed Conflicts

Although treaties and customary international law regarding armed conflicts (i.e., law that results from the general practice of nation-states coupled with the belief that they are legally obliged to so act) prohibit the intentional targeting of civilians, they accept that civilians may be incidentally affected. Part of the reality of war is that innocent people are killed and injured and their property is damaged. International humanitarian law would never be respected if it established unrealistic rules.

The modern expression of the legal restriction on collateral damage in international armed conflicts is set out in Article 51(5) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It is prohibited to launch any attack with expectations that it will cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This means that the death and destruction of innocent civilians and their property which is incidental to an attack on a legitimate military target (i.e., collateral damage) is prohibited only if it is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the attack. In a recent study on customary international humanitarian law, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) opined that this rule represents customary international law and so is binding on all nation-states.

Therefore, any commander who authorizes an attack in an international armed conflict which causes excessive collateral damage may be criminally responsible under international law for the commission of a war crime. Indeed, the statute of the International Criminal Court (created in 1998) prohibits, under Article 8(2)(b)(iv), intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. This only criminalizes very clear incidents of excessive collateral damage when the accused person realizes that the attack would cause such excessive civilian casualties.

Noninternational Armed Conflicts (Civil Wars)

International humanitarian law is generally less extensive and less specific when it comes to noninternational armed conflicts. Historically, nation-states have been jealous of their sovereignty and unwilling to countenance any interference in domestic affairs. Humanitarian law in noninternational armed conflicts is governed by Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (universally accepted by nation-states). However, owing to the generality of this article, it appears that the only possible bearing on collateral damage is the duty to treat noncombatants humanely, which arguably would be breached by intentionally attacking a target which would cause excessive civilian casualties.

The other treaty which may apply during noninternational armed conflicts (for those nation-states accepting it) is the 1977 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions. However, although this prohibits intentionally attacking civilians and attacking objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, it does not expressly prohibit excessive collateral damage. The statute of the International Criminal Court also fails to refer to excessive collateral damage in noninternational armed conflicts. Therefore, the issue arises as to whether or not customary international law prohibits excessive collateral damage in noninternational armed conflicts. The ICRC study proclaimed that the rule prohibiting excessive collateral damage applies in both international and noninternational armed conflicts, but the extent to which nation-states accept this finding remains unclear.

Christine Byron

See also Arms Control; War; War Crimes

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Collective Consciousness

Collective consciousness, also known as *conscience collective,* refers to a shared, intersubjective understanding of common norms and values among a group of people. The concept was developed by eminent French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). In his magnum opus, *The Division of Labor in Society,* Durkheim employs the term *collective consciousness* to describe a determinate social system in which the totality of beliefs and sentiments are common to the average members of a society. According to Durkheim, collective consciousness possesses a distinctive reality because it is a nonmaterial social construction, which is external to, and coercive of, individuals in a particular social order. Therefore, Durkheim distinguishes collective consciousness from the individual consciousness. Collective consciousness of a given society operates as an external force over the group members and autonomously exists outside of the individual's biological and psychic sphere. Nonetheless, the collective consciousness can only be operationalized through consciousness of the individuals in the community because it is a *social construct.* Thus, although collective consciousness is something totally different from the consciousness of separate individuals, it can be realized only through individual consciousness.

Collective consciousness is a significant concept for the Durkheimian theory of solidarity because it constitutes the basis of social systems of representation and action. Durkheim believes that an act is considered as unlawful when it offends the collective consciousness. He claims that a certain behavior is not condemned because it is criminal; instead, it is criminal because people condemn it. Thus, it is collective consciousness that regulates all social worlds and defines accordingly what is acceptable and what is deviant within the community. Here, Durkheim's discussion over *social facts* is a key text to be considered. According to Durkheim, manners of acting, thinking, and feeling that are external to the individual and exercise control over him or her constitute *social* facts, which are observable in two forms: "normal" and "pathological." Normal social facts are simply the social facts that can be found in almost all cases in a social life, whereas pathological forms can be found in a very few cases for brief transient periods. Durkheim regards a certain rate of crime as a normal fact; however, he considers high crime rates in a certain society as a pathological fact that needs sociological explanation. In this sense, Durkheim sees collective consciousness as a cure for a society that suffers from the mass similarity of consciousness, which may give rise to legal rules imposed on everybody by (re)producing uniform beliefs and practices.

Conscience collective is also a key term to grasp Durkheim's typologies in *The Division of Labor in Society,* where he argues that the degree of collective consciousness varies in regard to characteristics of the solidarity in a certain collectivity. For Durkheim,

mechanical solidarity, in which similarity of individuals who share a uniform way of life is predominant, is distinguished by its high degree of collective consciousness; on the other hand, *organic solidarity,* which is based on extensive social differentiations and development of autonomous individuals, reflects the reverse characteristics. As Durkheim foresees, as modern societies renounce the mechanical solidarity of their past and transform into societies based on organic solidarity, the collective consciousness declines in strength. As collective consciousness gets weakened in a particular community, the society suffers from a total social disorder, what Durkheim calls *anomie,* wherein the shared meanings of norms and values become nullified. This particular context enables an individual to act as a free rider agent. Durkheim associates, for example, the weakened collective consciousness with an increased rate of anomic suicide. Thus, when individual consciousness does not reflect the collective consciousness, the individual loses a clear sense of which action is proper and what an improper behavior is. Then, the threat of *anomie* in a society emerges from a lack of mechanical solidarity and strong collective consciousness.

Durkheim regards every society as a moral society; thus, his concept of collective consciousness is much related to his theoretical analyses of the sociology of religion as well. For Durkheim, the *conscience collective* manifests itself through totems in a primitive society. Religion plays a remarkable role in the creation and consolidation of the similar consciousness among group members. First, religion provides the necessary link between individual consciousness and the collective consciousness. Second, radical changes in the collective consciousness generally occur during historical moments of transformation in beliefs in the community.

Nevertheless, as Durkheim developed his theory of religion, he began to overwhelmingly emphasize systems of symbols and social representations over collective consciousness. In his subsequent writings during the late 1890s, Durkheim modified the concept of collective consciousness and replaced the concept with a more specific notion: *collective representations.* Durkheim never rejected the term *conscience collective* completely, but his reformulated concept of collective consciousness was remarkably different from the original concept developed in his specific theory of solidarity in *The Division of Labor in Society.* The modification made the individual consciousness relatively less significant and overemphasized the systems of belief. Thus, it may be concluded that Durkheim abandoned the specific theory of collective consciousness but retained the concept of *conscience collective* as a part of his larger theory of social solidarity.

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See also Anomie; Religion, Civil; Suicide

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COLONIALISM

Both the global magnitude of colonialism's expansion and its abrupt, fragmented demise place colonialism at a pivotal phase in human history. Colonialism normally refers to the conquest and direct control of other land and other people by Western capitalist entities intent on expanding processes of production and consumption. In this context, colonialism is situated within a history of imperialism best understood as the globalization of the capitalist mode of production. While colonialism as a formal political process managed through state entities began to unravel following World War II, the global expansion of capitalism continues as a process that informs and often structures national, corporate, and human entanglements on a global scale.

Historically, *colonialism* is a term largely restricted to that period of European expansion lasting roughly from 1830 to 1930. By the early 20th century, Britain,

France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and Portugal together claimed control of nearly 84 percent of the earth's surface. The British alone ruled over one fourth of the world's land and one third of its population.

European expansion did not begin, of course, in 1830. It was arguably the Iberian navigators of the 15th century, reaching the Americas in 1492 and India in 1498, who inaugurated the age of colonialism. Furthermore, other empires outside of Europe clearly rose (and fell) prior to the colonial period. By the 1830s, however, a new period of empire building had erupted, sparked by a volatile combination of technologies (of travel, production, and health) and ideologies (including liberalism, enlightenment, scientific racism, and capitalism) that entangled human relationships within the distinct and asymmetrical identifying categories of colonizer and colonized.

Colonial expansion was related to technological advancements driven by the rise of industrialization. Processes of commodity production that required ever larger quantities of raw material and unskilled labor, along with advances in travel technologies, pushed European powers into untapped spaces of labor and material around the world. In the process, colonized lands were reconfigured as spaces of manufacture or plantations for cash crops, and newly landless colonial populations were introduced to the wage economy.

Travel technologies helped make this possible. From the large-hulled sailing ships that took the Portuguese into Southeast Asia during the 1500s to the steam engines that followed 300 years later, people and products began to move through space at a pace the world had never before seen. At the same time, medical discoveries, such as quinine, allowed for relatively sickness-free travel into tropical climates that had before caused great illness for Europeans. In addition, the arms revolution at the end of the 19th century allowed for relatively small forces to take and hold large blocks of land and indigenous populations.

Ideologically, the impetus for colonialism might rest with what has been called capitalism's tendency to expand beyond the confines of a single political system. Yet this push outward was buttressed not only by a belief in the logic of capitalism but also by a belief in the racial and cultural superiority of the colonizers. Colonialism as a "civilizing" project was fueled by Enlightenment beliefs in reason and progress, ideas thought capable of leading humanity out of the darkness of tradition and superstition and into the light of objective truth.

A concurrent scientific obsession with "race" further differentiated between populations already divided by an economic system of exploitation and helped legitimize feelings of superiority for the colonizers over the colonized. In short, an expansion in travel, combined with an ideology of racial difference, resulted in a cultural confusion of space for time, locating indigenous populations temporally behind Europeans in an evolutionary scheme that went beyond biology to include culture and intellect.

The confluence of these ideologies worked to create, at least in the mind of the colonizers, legitimacy for their actions. Colonialism as the "white man's burden" was, for a time, perceived as a legitimate and benevolent enterprise of Europeans civilizing others.

A central component of the colonial project was the production of knowledge about other populations by European powers. To dominate and educate a population, one must construct that population as needing domination and education. Thus, colonialism brought with it a description of indigenous beliefs and behaviors that codified populations in terms of race, culture, tradition, religion, and economy. Knowledge of the world's populations, created within a colonial context, highlighted differences to the benefit of the colonizers and, perhaps more important, continues to inform global relations as well as more intimate understandings of self and other. Area studies and anthropology departments, for example, owe their existence, at least in part, to the colonial process of knowledge production.

The demise of colonialism was in many ways of the colonizers' own doing. A focus on liberalism and nationalism, in particular, had devastating effects on colonial projects in that indigenous populations were being introduced to Enlightenment concepts such as self-attainment and national identity. These ideas gave ideological weight to nationalist youth movements in colonized spaces. These movements often served to organize resistance that eventually turned into postcolonial nationalist projects.

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See also Global Economy; Globalization; Imperialism; Race; Racial Formation Theory; Racism

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Communitarianism

Communitarianism, as a coherent body of thought, is a movement that seeks to resolve social problems by strengthening individual commitment to the broader society. The movement began to coalesce in the early 1990s among predominantly U.S. social scientists. Its chief proponent is sociologist Amitai Etzioni (president of the American Sociological Association, 1994–95), who, along with political scientist William A. Galston, among others, formed the Communitarian Network in 1990. One of the major components of that network is the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, which began publishing *The Responsive Community* in 1990. Publication ceased in 2004 after 54 issues.

Communitarianism, in broad terms, is a partial rejection of the liberal ideology that has been a cornerstone of Western political and social thought for approximately 200 years. Liberalism maintains that the rights of individuals supersede the rights of the group and that governments are formed to secure individual liberties. Communitarians claim that the responsibilities individuals have to each other and to the larger society have taken a backseat to individual rights, and this has led to a downward spiral of selfishness, greed, and conflict. In U.S. society, and throughout much of the modern world, rights have trumped responsibilities. Individuals have gained a strong sense of entitlement but with a rather weak sense of obligation to the broader group—whether it be family, community, or society.

However, the communitarian rejection of liberalism is not wholesale. The Responsive Communitarian Platform, adopted in 1991, states that the communitarian perspective "recognizes both individual human dignity and the social dimension of human existence." Communitarians emphasize the need to understand that individual lives are inextricably tied to the good of communities, out of which individual identity has been constituted.

Etzioni's 1993 book, *The Spirit of Community,* details the communitarian perspective on U.S. social problems and offers a prescription for strengthening moral values. Etzioni argues that law and order, families, schools, and the individual's sense of social responsibility can be restored without the country becoming a police state and that the power of special interests can be curtailed without limiting constitutional rights to lobby and petition those who govern.

The Responsive Communitarian Platform states some of the major principles of the movement:

- Community (families, neighborhoods, nations) cannot survive unless members dedicate some of their attention and resources to shared projects.
- Communitarians favor strong democracy. They seek to make government more representative, more participatory, and more responsive.
- Communitarians urge that all educational institutions provide moral education, that they should teach values that Americans share.
- The right to be free of government intervention does not mean to be free from moral claims. Civil society requires that we be each other's keepers.
- The parenting deficit must be reduced. Parents should spend more time with their children; child care and socialization are not responsibilities that other institutions should take on large scale.
- Education for values and character formation is more "basic" than academic skills.
- Reciprocity is at the heart of social justice.

Gerald Kloby

See also Collective Consciousness; Community; Identity Politics; Social Networks

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COMMUNITY

Theorists do not agree on the precise definition of *community*. Referents for the term range from ethnic neighborhoods to self-help groups to Internet chat rooms. What is broadly agreed upon is that community is a locus of social interaction where people share common interests, have a sense of belonging, experience solidarity, and can expect mutual assistance. Communities are the source of social attachments, create interdependencies, mediate between the individual and the larger society, and sustain the well-being of members. When locality based, such as in a town or neighborhood, they also provide a place for people to participate in societal institutions and, as such, are linked with democracy. Because community is recognized as socially imperative, community absence or weakening becomes a social problem.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, social theorists, looking at different types of places (a typological approach), observed the shift of population from rural areas to larger, denser, more diverse urban-industrial places. They noted a transition also occurring in the way people related to one another. In smaller, traditional villages, people were bound together by their similarities and sentiments; in cities their ties were based on contracts and they lived a more anonymous existence. The concept of community became identified with that smaller, more intimate locality and the types of relationships within it. In the 1920s the theoretical framework of human ecology, using the city of Chicago as a laboratory, further reinforced the notion of community as a geographic entity.

As a result, community became a social concern as the proportion of the population living in urban areas increased. Social scientists depicted urban dwellers as bereft of involving social ties, emotionally armored against a world of strangers. They were detached individuals, lacking the necessary social supports for psychological well-being. The city thus had a disorganizing effect.

By the mid-20th century, however, research documented the existence of ethnic villages within cities, but more important, in a new conceptualization, community was described as "liberated" from place. Community was reframed as a network of individuals connected to each other possibly in a particular locale or possibly widely dispersed geographically. Researchers sought to uncover the locus of attachments, whether in the neighborhood, workplace, or religious institution. Network theorists gave assurances that people enjoyed necessary social supports but in a more far-flung manner.

Communitarianism

With advances in technology, increased geographic mobility, and the expansion of later-stage capitalism, a concern has emerged among community theorists that societies are becoming dangerously privatized, individualized, and atomized. With a fragmented diversity in postmodern society, no longer is there a consensus on fundamental rules of order. Individuals construct their own social worlds and escape into hedonistic pleasures and narcissism. As civic engagement and social capital decline, the emphasis on individual rights strengthens while the sense of obligation and community responsibility weakens. As the tradition of community disappears, society becomes corroded by self-interest. Atomized individuals become at risk for totalitarian leadership and vulnerable to exploitation by hegemonic market forces." Theorists, defining themselves as "communitarians," call for a reversal of these trends, stressing individual responsibility for the greater common good and the re-assertion of shared values and norms.

Critics call communitarianism morally authoritarian, failing to grapple with questions of social diversity and inequity in the establishment of a normative order. Opponents charge that dominant institutions and power holders are not sufficiently challenged, and in consensus building, some groups could potentially be excluded and differences suppressed, leading to recent attempts to confront differences within and between communities as a starting point for political discourse. Pluralism is at the core, and democratic participation and power differentials are part of the debate. A more radical communitarianism encourages participation in multiple communities—to create dense social networks of solidarity—and attempts to incorporate a theory of social justice.

Most research, however, does not find people isolated and atomized. They still have family and friends and broader organizational contacts. Alarmist calls about declining civic engagement are countered by the assertion that the associations of today are not copies of the Rotary and Lions clubs of the 1950s. People today are more likely to have "loose connections," temporary involvements in a range of social networks, each of which may have a different

instrumental end and varying degrees of social solidarity. All institutional realms have become more porous as people, resources, and information flow across their boundaries. Individuals may join self-help groups, which they can abandon at will or reattach with in some other location. Internet connections allow individuals to establish new social contacts, often organized around particular interests or similarities, or to reinforce existing social ties as in e-mails among family members. Still the Internet community can be deleted with a click, subject to individual will. So there are new forms of connecting, reflective of and adaptive to present-day realities. By holding these new types of attachments to the standards of an earlier, geographic place-bound community, they seem weak and decidedly more individualized. The newer conceptualizations leave open to debate whether or not they should be called communities. Research questions remain on whether the essential conditions of democracy and citizenship are served by them.

Security or Freedom

Tension will always exist between the individual and the collective on how much individual freedom must be surrendered for the security and support of the latter. Amid the individualism described by the communitarians, other social theorists describe a contemporary trend where individuals choose to live in enclaves, whether by race, ethnicity, lifestyle, or social class, raising questions about whether these are true communities. The physical boundaries around these enclaves may be arranged on a continuum of permeability, from gated communities (fortresses) with guardhouses and elaborate security systems, to those with streets or other geographic features serving as symbolic borders. Each enclave distinguishes members from outsiders. Individuals are willing to forgo some individual freedoms for the security of knowing their properties are hedged against depreciation and that their neighbors are likely to be similar to themselves. People are fearful of those they perceive as different, especially in a post-9/11 world of terrorism, and seek the security of the homogeneous. In the face of globalization some may retreat into parochial localism.

Locality-Based Actions

With the bias in community research defining it as locality based, it can be studied as the site where social problems occur. Groups tend to be most concerned about their own spaces. At the neighborhood level they may organize to address social problems and their consequences, such as crime or environmental pollution. Community power differentials come into play as to who is claiming that a problem exists. Social class differences may also be prominent in certain kinds of issues, such as those pitting environmental concerns against economic opportunities. The community becomes a geographic arena where a threat elicits a unified response or coalitions form.

Given the multidimensionality of *community,* community development is an umbrella term. Community development may reference early historical designs to plan new communities; more often it has meant an action course to identify problems within a geographic community, assessing the needs of members, locating resources, and coordinating agencies to deliver the necessary goods and services. Earlier community development programs were more paternalistic where governments identified needs and problems and helped local people find solutions. A shift occurred toward an empowerment model where local people—taught necessary organizing skills and encouraged by activists and practitioners—identify their own needs and challenge centers of economic and political power to remedy the situations. Coalitions emerge and social movements begin. As centers of decision making become more distant from localities, especially in transnational corporate boardrooms, community development strategies may require widely dispersed social networks and cybermobilization. The Internet may be an effective means to organize geographically distant parties.

The notion of community development, given the concern about the absence or breakdown of community, may also refer to efforts to strengthen social capital. The communitarian platform urges and applauds strategies to encourage local interaction, civic involvements, and solidarity.

Questions for Research

In the postmodern world, the meaning of community is likely to remain fluid. People's lives are less determined by place, but at the same time, there is more concern about environmentally sustainable local areas. Individuals have more freedom to choose their social attachments. Researchers and community

theorists are consequently challenged by at least three questions:

1. Are people connected? What is the nature and degree of their social attachments?
2. Do the multiple communal forms fulfill the prerequisites of a democratic society in terms of citizen participation and social justice?
3. Are contemporary communities able to respond to the major challenges of a globalizing world, particularly the increased diversity and global interdependencies, the retreat of the state from the public sector, the ascendancy of market forces, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor?

Some theorists see ominous trends, whereas others see evolutionary change. Ongoing research will assess whether contemporary social attachments are indeed communities, and whether their presence or absence or the nature of the bonds constitute a social problem.

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See also Collective Consciousness; Communitarianism; Identity Politics; Postmodernism; Social Networks

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Community Corrections

Community corrections refers to the supervised handling of juvenile and adult criminal offenders, convicted or facing possible conviction, outside of traditional penal institutions. It includes a wide range of programs intermediate between incarceration and outright release, such as probation, parole, pretrial release, and house arrest. It includes diversion from criminal justice to rehabilitative programs, day reporting, and residential centers. Community corrections measures include restitution, community service, fines, and boot camps. Whereas probation and parole are the predominant forms of community-based corrections, they often are considered separately, having long been parts of mainstream criminal justice practice. The resources available for community corrections and the forms they take vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Community-based correctional programs stand in contrast to jails or prisons—institutions with large numbers of inmates incarcerated for extended periods in enclosed, formally administered settings, apart from society. The goals of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation through exclusion and isolation prevail in jails and prisons. Physical abuse and other inhumane conditions, including overcrowding and convict-dominated peer cultures, are undesirable aspects of these "total institutions." Incarceration also leads to resentment over perceived unfairness and discrimination in the criminal justice process, the loss of hope and positive aspirations, and inmates further committing themselves to criminal lives as they accept their deviant social identities (social labels) and redefine themselves as essentially criminal. Inmates' isolation from their families and inability to engage in productive work can also foster intergenerational criminogenic patterns. Consequently, the community-based correctional movement sought to alleviate these consequences of traditional correctional practices.

The modern movement toward community-based corrections began in the 1950s and gained impetus in the late 1960s, sparked by a holistic reassessment of the purposes and processes of criminal justice. It was initiated with hopes of achieving restitution, rehabilitation, reintegration, and restorative justice. Low-risk offenders would reap the benefits of remaining in the community. Higher-risk offenders would be subject to more supervision than if simply released into open society. Community-based practices provided levels of punishment intermediary between simple release and confinement, practices allowing for more proportionate responses to both the crimes involved and offenders' individual circumstances. Offenders would

receive means by which to reassess their actions and to positively direct their lives. Community corrections programs would offer structured paths by which offenders could reintegrate into the larger society. The threat of alternative punitive criminal justice regimens would encourage offenders to take advantage of rehabilitative regimens.

Financial considerations also prompted interest in community-based programs. By the 1970s, prison expansion and the economics of housing and supervising inmates put severe strains on state budgets, and community correctional programs are much less costly than those involving total confinement. With their diversity of midrange sanctions, community-based programs offered a relatively low-cost panacea to crime problems.

Community-based correctional programs take numerous formats. Pretrial release prevents unneeded jailing of offenders posing no flight risk (e.g., because they have established roots in the community) or threat to society. Offenders may be released on bail or on their own recognizance prior to trial, often under supervision and with restrictions on travel. Pretrial release without bond (release on recognizance), with a penalty incurred only if a court appearance is missed, benefits those who might be jailed simply because they could not afford to put up bond.

Diversion programs may be offered to offenders both before and following criminal justice processing. Either way, the aim is to provide individualized assistance in resolving the problems that generate unlawful behaviors. Offenders may be directed to conflict resolution programs, including mediation services, which focus on the issues that led to criminal charges. Some locales maintain community courts, in which neighborhood residents partner with criminal justice agencies to offer nonadversarial adjudication of low-level offenses and controversies. Diversionary approaches with predominantly rehabilitative aims combine release with participation in a problem-specific diversion program such as substance abuse treatment, mental health counseling, and job training and assistance. In some jurisdictions, substance abusers are initially referred to drug courts. These specialized courts have been successful particularly in providing supervision and treatment for drug offenders, while freeing up criminal justice resources for more serious crimes. Offenders are monitored and face immediate sanctions for continued drug use. Other offenders may be directed to educational programs, as much of the traditional inmate population is not literate and not apt to have completed high school. Some rehabilitation programs work with all affected family members.

House arrest, another in-community criminal sanction, requires offenders be in their residence during specified times each day. Offenders might be allowed to leave home for work, counseling, education, and other rehabilitation activities. Enforcement of house arrest may be manually through phone calls or electronically through sensors locked to the offenders' ankles or wrists. The latter tracking devices alert authorities when offenders venture from a prescribed territory. These practices allow offenders to engage in legitimate occupations, raise children, and avoid entanglement with criminogenic influences, as would be the case if they were incarcerated.

Offenders assigned to day reporting programs live at home but report regularly—often daily. This regimen allows for rehabilitative treatment and continued employment while under supervised punitive sanctions. Day reporting programs may be based in stand-alone centers or in residential correctional facilities, such as halfway houses or work-release facilities.

Offenders in residential centers have limited freedom to positively engage in the larger society. Centers range from small, secure, community-based facilities providing a full range of correctional programs, including drug and alcohol abuse treatment and mental health counseling, to loosely structured programs that simply provide low-custody shelter. Programs dealing with participants having multiple personal and social deficiencies have met limited success. The most successful targets of support programs are offenders who want to redirect their lives but need assistance to do so. Some agencies offer "mutual agreement programs," contracts stipulating goals offenders are to achieve and the freedoms they will gain for doing so. Recurrent problems of residential centers include rebellion against rules participants regard as petty, offender codes (similar to inmate codes in prisons) that set offenders against staff, and facilities and neighborhoods offering few opportunities for successful personal upgrading. Virtually all community-oriented correctional formats face common problems of underfunding and understaffing. In nearly all forms of community-based corrections, participants face the risk that relatively minor violations of program and release conditions will lead to reincarceration. The more closely they are supervised, the more likely minor offenses will be discovered.

Day reporting and residential centers may function as halfway houses, intermediary between total incarceration and living at large in the community. Some provide halfway-out measures to increase the mobility of probationers and inmates who are being released early from prison yet still require intensive supervision. Or they can be used as halfway-in programs for offenders found in violation of probation or parole conditions.

Boot camps usually are designed for younger offenders perceived to lack self-restraint and respect for authority, thus requiring external structuring. Camps are typically set in natural settings. Their living conditions, organizational structures, and emphases on discipline and physical fitness are modeled after military training. Advocates of boot camps hope to give participants a sense of accomplishment and to get them off drugs. Critics argue the boot camps are often overly harsh and abusive, leave participants with few additional skills, and bear limited success. Such programs may need to be coupled with extensive postrelease supervision to effectively change offenders' lifestyles.

Fines, restitution, and community service provide retribution and can act as rehabilitation and deterrent. Restitution may require that offenders make reparations for the losses they have caused their victims, or it may require offenders do community service in amends for harms caused society. Setting appropriate financial penalties can be problematic, both in determining amounts proportionate to the offense and in setting amounts appropriate to the economic status of the offender. Some jurisdictions solve such dilemmas by imposing day fines, proportionate to the amount of the offender's earnings. Collecting such debts is problematic: Offenders often are in poor financial state to begin with or come to feel their obligations unfair. Financial penalties can be used to underwrite the criminal justice process.

One of the initial impetuses for community-oriented corrections was the notion of restorative justice, the view that criminal proceedings should focus on the predicaments of all parties involved in a criminal incident, should repair the harm done the actual people involved in a criminal incident, and should focus on the future rather than the past. Restorative justice sees crime as an act that violates individual victims, their families, and the community, rather than the state. It places primacy on offender accountability and responsibility and on reparations rather than punitiveness. Critics contend that restorative justice processes jeopardize such defendant rights as the presumption of innocence and the right to assistance of legal counsel.

Since the 1980s, in response to shifts in popular sentiment, there has been a trend toward using community-based correctional formats for more traditional correctional ends. Programs that initially sought to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders have become more concerned with community safety. Some even take on a punitive cast. One of the predicaments of community-based corrections is that it has not necessarily led to a reduction in the number of offenders going to jail or prison. Because of their lower cost and ability to handle more people without increasing prison capacity, community treatment efforts are now sometimes used to bring more people within the scope of criminal justice treatment. Pressure "to do something" has led to community-based programs being used to expand sanctioning to less serious offenders.

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See also Deterrence Programs; Juvenile Institutionalization, Effects of; Parole; Prison; Prisons, Pregnancy and Parenting; Probation; Restorative Justice; Total Institution; Victim–Offender Mediation Model

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Community Crime Control

Community crime control refers to the use of criminal justice mediums in solving social problems or preventing crime. Examples of this proactive approach to crime control include neighborhood watch, community watch, and beautification projects. A primary

assumption is that crime is a social problem, rather than an individual problem, disrupting the community structure.

The goal of community crime control is to empower the community by decreasing the fear of victimization and to foster positive participation in the community through the reduction of crime. These goals connect to theories of social control and social disorganization. Travis Hirschi's social control theory suggests that desistance from offending requires attachment to others, commitment to conformity with pro-social facets, involvement with conventional norms, and the belief that a commonality exists within the community. A corollary is Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay's social disorganization theory, which proposes that community disorder fosters crime.

The propensity to crime is not an innate individual characteristic; rather, crime is a function of the individual's environment and level of social interaction. If marked by vague ties to community members and a disconnect from the mainstream culture, interaction with community members is often superficial, thus hindering the achievement of social capital. *Social capital* refers to pro-social interaction that fosters conformity to the conventional norms of a community. This lack of interaction may lead to a decrease in trust and cooperation with community organizations and law enforcement and, thus, a decrease in social capital.

This trust that is imperative to the success of community crime control, also known as *collective efficacy,* includes how community members share expectations of social control. The goal of collective efficacy is to increase trust and the level of social control in the community, as community disorder usually indicates a lack of informal social control. With disintegration of the family and isolation from the community and the mainstream comes a greater reliance on formal social control, or the presence of a guardian. The guardian need not be a physical entity, such as a police officer, but could also include surveillance and tracking mechanisms, as well as neighborhood watch.

Decriminalization is an aspect of community crime control. Instead of criminalizing disorder such as homelessness, drug abuse, and mental illness, it seeks to increase positive integration into the community. Otherwise, neighborhood disorder has a threefold impact: the undermining of social control, the increased fear of victimization, and the destabilization of the housing market. As a result, trust and commitment to the community decreases. Also hindering collective efficacy is overcrowding, demoralization, and hopelessness. The resulting neighborhood instability—linked with socioeconomic status—can foster criminal activity.

One approach in community crime control is *broken windows policing.* Broken windows policing, also known as disorder policing, seeks to rid the community of crimes that diminish the quality of life, which in turn should reduce other crimes. Although this is a popular focus of policing, no data yet show its use actually improves the quality of life or stops the downward community spiral. Another approach, *community policing,* used at least partially by approximately 80 percent of law enforcement agencies, includes participation within the community, citizen empowerment, and partnership with community agencies. Because community crime control is most effective when citizens' opinions and views are considered, community policing focuses on involving the public in defining what disorder is, solving community problems by promoting communication, and increasing decentralization and police responsiveness to the needs of the community. The elements of community policing include protecting citizens' rights, maintaining order, relying on the cooperation of citizens for information and assistance, and responding to community issues.

Because the organization of the community affects voluntary efforts and interaction with law enforcement, the use of these policies differs depending on the neighborhood, with poor, minority neighborhoods tending to be the least involved. Frustration with the frequent changes of policy, the conflicts among community organizations, and distrust of the police are factors that undermine community cooperation.

Another facet of community crime control is community prosecution, such as when the community acts as agents in stopping quality-of-life offenses such as drug involvement. Such community participation, however, is limited to members acting as witnesses. This reactive approach, unlike a proactive one, ignores the root causes of problems such as prostitution, gambling, drug abusing, and loitering.

Community dispute resolution councils and community corrections are also aspects of community crime control. Community dispute resolution councils are neighborhood committees that include residents, attorneys, and service providers in solving community

problems. Parole and probation are examples of community corrections. Both refer to methods of sanctions in which the offender serves time within the community while still being responsible to the court. This method helps facilitate offender reentry into the community. Due to get-tough-on-crime policies, intermediate sanctions now include intensive supervision, home incarceration, and electronic monitoring.

The jury is still out on the value of community crime control. The research shows mixed results, with some authorities citing the decrease of fear and others citing an increase of isolation. Critics contend that, instead of helping, community crime control weakens communities and diminishes social capital. Those benefiting from collective efficacy are those who need it least: white, middle-class communities. The challenge is not just to protect the rights of community members but also to find better ways to foster community involvement.

LaNina Nicole Floyd

See also Community; Community Corrections; Community Service; Conflict Resolution; Parole; Policing, Community; Policing, Strategic; Probation; Social Capital; Social Control; Social Disorganization

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Community Service

Community service is compulsory, free, or donated labor performed by an offender as punishment for a crime. This requirement is a community service order. An offender under a community service order must perform labor for a certain length of time (as determined by the crime) at charitable not-for-profit agencies or governmental offices. Community service involves many different types of work, both skilled and unskilled. Most work is physical in nature, such as graffiti and debris removal or outdoor maintenance. Offenders must complete the work within a certain amount of time, such as 3 months. Community service closely aligns with restitution; the offender engages in acts designed, in part, to make reparation for harm caused by the criminal offense, but these acts are directed to the larger community rather than to the victim.

The first documented community service program in the United States began in Alameda County, California, in the late 1960s, when traffic offenders who could not afford fines faced the possibility of incarceration. To avoid the financial costs of incarceration and individual costs in the lives of the offenders (who were often women with families), judges assigned physical work in the community without compensation. The idea took hold, and the use of community service expanded nationwide through the 1970s. Today, community service is a correctional option in every state and at the federal level. Because of the lack of a national survey, exact numbers of offenders with community service orders remain unknown. In Texas alone, more than 195,000 adults participated in community service in 2000.

Community service serves as a criminal sanction for adults and juveniles, males and females, felons and misdemeanants, offenders on probation, offenders in prison or jail, and offenders on parole. Most states use four models for community service. First, community service can be a sole penalty for very minor or first-time offenders, for instance, traffic violators. Second, and most commonly, community service is a special condition of probation or parole, something required of the probationer or parolee in addition to other sentence stipulations. Third, community service may replace incarceration as an intermediate sanction, usually for misdemeanants. Fourth, community service works in conjunction with incarceration, for example, when inmates form work crews removing litter from roads and other public service works.

When enforced properly, community service can serve as meaningful punishment for misbehavior while improving the quality of life in communities. To the benefit of offenders and their families, community service is less intrusive than most other sanctions, and the structured work routines may prove beneficial in the lives of offenders. Even if a community service program does not aim to treat their needs, when

offenders remain in their communities performing unpaid labor as a criminal sanction, they are able to maintain their familial, social, and work-related responsibilities and ties. When available to replace short jail terms, especially for repeat but minor property offenders whom the system finds hard to deal with, community service sentencing may also bring relief to overcrowded jails.

Gail A. Caputo

See also Community Corrections; Parole; Probation; Restorative Justice

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Comparable Worth

Until the late 1970s, an acceptable workplace practice was to pay men more than women, even if they did the same or essentially the same work. The 1963 federal Equal Pay Act mandated equal pay for equal work. Although this law helped those women who did the same or essentially similar work, it had limited impact, because rarely do men and women do the same work. Indeed, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that not only do women do different work than men, but the work they do is paid less, and the more an occupation is dominated by women, the less it pays. Occupational segregation is pervasive and is a major factor accounting for the gender-based wage gap.

Comparable worth, also known as pay equity, focuses on correcting the gender-based wage gap that is a by-product of occupational segregation. It requires that dissimilar jobs of equivalent work for the employer be paid the same wages. Comparable worth also encompasses a technique for determining the complexity of dissimilar jobs and the value of these jobs to the major mission of a work organization. Comparable worth addresses wage discrimination, that is, the systematic undervaluation of women's work simply on the basis that primarily women do it. Because some men also work in historically female jobs, such as nursing, they too suffer from gender-based wage discrimination because they choose to work in female-dominated jobs.

Systematic undervaluation or wage discrimination means that the wages paid to those who perform female-dominated work (FDW) are lower than they would be if the typical incumbent of that job were a white male. Thus, wage discrimination involves adjusting the wages paid to those performing female-dominated jobs by removing the negative effect of "femaleness" on the wage rate independent of the complexity of tasks and responsibilities of that job. If implemented, comparable worth would require employers to base their wages solely on the skills, effort, responsibilities, and working conditions of the job.

How, then, is it possible to measure the content of the job and determine its complexity relative to other jobs? The use of job evaluation to determine wages goes back more than 100 years, but those systems in use today have their roots in systems first developed in the 1940s and 1950s. Approximately two thirds of all employers in the United States use some form of job evaluation to establish their wage structure—that is, ranking jobs from lower to higher in job complexity and paying people who work in these jobs less or more money.

Although job evaluation systems rest on the argument that they are scientific and objective in their assessment of job content, they actually embed assumptions about work that contain significant gender bias. Specifically, these systems, developed more than a half-century ago, evolved at a time when approximately 25 percent of all adult women worked, with their wages treated as secondary incomes or "pin money." To develop these systems, evaluators would take existing wage rates, examine the job content of high-wage jobs, and treat the characteristics of those jobs as complex. As a result, either they did not recognize the job content found in historically low-paid women's work as complex, or they did not even define the job content. In these traditional job evaluation systems, there was no explanation or justification provided for either the description of certain job characteristics or the definition of certain characteristics as more complex. Conceptually, the breadwinner–homemaker ideologies of the mid-20th century became institutionalized into the wage structure through conventional job evaluation systems.

Technically, job evaluation orders jobs as more or less complex and, therefore, as more or less valuable

to the employer for the purpose of paying jobs according to some systematic procedure. It follows three steps: describing jobs with respect to the characteristics to be evaluated; evaluating jobs as more or less complex relative to the established hierarchy of complexity; and assigning wages based on how many job evaluation points a job receives and what other firms pay for such jobs. The more job evaluation points there are, the higher the wage will be.

Job evaluation is the institutional mechanism that perpetuates wage discrimination, especially in medium-sized and large workplaces. The gender bias of these systems is pervasive. Those pay equity advocates who attempt to measure wage discrimination seek to cleanse traditional job evaluation systems of gender bias. To achieve this objective requires recognition of the social construction of systems of job evaluation and the need for social reconstruction to achieve gender neutrality.

One aspect of gender bias in job evaluation is ignoring or taking for granted the prerequisites, tasks, and work content of jobs historically performed by women. For example, working with mentally ill or dying patients and their families or reporting to multiple supervisors is not treated either as stressful job content or as involving any effort. By contrast, working with noisy machinery is treated as stressful, and solving budgetary problems is treated as involving significant effort. The work of a secretary or office coordinator in running an office remains invisible, especially if she performs her job competently.

Another aspect of gender bias is the assumption that the content of historically female work is innate to all females and does not require skills, effort, or responsibilities. For example, the emotional labor of nurses, nursing assistants, day care workers, and even flight attendants is treated as stereotypically female; thus, it is not necessary to remunerate those who perform these types of jobs. By contrast, those who perform the occupation of math professor—a historically male job—do not receive lower pay because men are supposedly innately good at math.

Gender bias also manifests itself in descriptions of work performed in female-dominated jobs that assume its lesser complexity compared with the content of male-dominated jobs. For example, both women's and men's jobs require perceptual skills and effort. Male-dominated jobs are more likely to require spatial perceptual skills, and female-dominated jobs are more likely to require visual skills. In traditional job evaluation systems, spatial skills are treated as more complex than visual skills without any explanation or justification.

Comparable worth advocates do not question the established hierarchy of complexity as it relates to male work. Rather, they seek to adjust the way women's work is described and evaluated, so that FDW is paid fairly in relation to the actual complexity and value of the work performed. Technical comparable worth advocates first attempted to modify traditional job evaluation systems; now they have begun to design new gender-neutral job evaluation systems to measure job content.

These gender-neutral systems, one of which was developed by Ronnie J. Steinberg, measure both male-dominated work and FDW more accurately, making the invisible components of FDW visible and thus rewarded for the actual work performed in two important ways. First, gender-neutral job evaluation builds new dimensions of job complexity or job factors to capture and positively value the skills, effort, responsibilities, and undesirable working conditions of FDW. An example is the construction of a new evaluation factor for emotional effort, which measures the intensity of effort required to deal directly with clients or their families or coworkers in assisting, instructing, caring for, or comforting them. Within emotional effort, hierarchies of complexity are built and applied consistently to both FDW and male-dominated work. Thus, the work of police officers, as well as of client-oriented direct service workers, is recognized and compensated for this important dimension of their work.

Second, gender-neutral job evaluation includes and revalues unacknowledged or undervalued job content by broadening definitions of job dimensions or factors that already exist in traditional job evaluation. For example, the measurement of human relations skills would not only measure supervision of subordinates but also include and value highly the skill and effort required to deal effectively with, to care for, or to influence others.

However, gender-neutral systems of job evaluation are almost never used in pay equity initiatives undertaken in the United States, and whereas most states have taken some action to assess wage discrimination in public sector employment, only Minnesota has made wage discrimination illegal for all public sector employers. Thus, gender-neutral job evaluation is a technical solution in search of a radically different

political climate as well as a political base with sufficient power to implement it.

Why have comparable pay initiatives not used gender-neutral job evaluation and instead used gender-biased traditional job evaluation to measure and correct for gender bias? First, when trendsetter states such as Minnesota and Washington conducted their job evaluation studies, no design for gender-neutral job evaluation yet existed. The studies did find some unexplained wage differences—enough to result in modest wage increases. Politically, women earned more wages and all but a few believed that the problem of wage discrimination had been solved. These first studies set the limits for future studies.

By the time that the second phase of initiatives emerged—partly as a result of these early successes—advocates were developing new job evaluation systems. But, given the previous studies, there was no commitment to do more than states had already done. So the studies were conducted, the results fell far short of removing gender bias from compensation practices, and gender-neutral job evaluation remained on the shelf.

In addition, states conducting studies developed advisory committees or task forces as well as several political strategies to give the appearance of advocate involvement while undercutting advocate power to affect study design or outcomes. In other words, advocates were contained, making it possible to limit the impact of the study on wage adjustments. For example, study directors would pretend that political decisions were technical decisions, thereby blocking advisory committee members from deliberating on key aspects of the study design, or the study directors would withhold information from the task force. Also, comparable worth advocates were in the minority of the advisory committee and, as a result, were unable to garner sufficient votes when a disagreement arose. Yet, their presence on the committee contributed to the legitimacy of the study. Directors often divided proponents from each other, especially representatives from labor organizations and women's groups. Finally, in some states, advocates were completely excluded from a task force, on the argument that they were not directly involved in the wage-setting process.

Truly cleansing compensation systems of their gender bias could put an extra $2,000 to $7,000 per year in the paychecks of those performing FDW. Even flawed studies with gender-biased evaluation systems have resulted in approximately $527 million dispersed in 20 states, according to the Institute for Women's Policy Research. For many employed in FDW, these adjustments represent the difference between poverty and economic autonomy. Along with raising the minimum wage and the success of the movement for a living wage, comparable worth is a very effective strategy for moving working women out of poverty.

Comparable worth is a matter of economic equity. It affects the political and social power of women. Above all, it is a matter of simple justice.

Ronnie J. Steinberg

See also Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational; Wage Gap

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Computer Crime

The global growth in information technology—alongside unparalleled advances in productivity, commerce, communication, entertainment, and the dissemination of information—has precipitated new forms of antisocial, unethical, and illegal behavior. As more and more users become familiar with computing, the scope and prevalence of the problem grow. Computers and the Internet allowed for the modification of traditional crimes (stalking, fraud, trafficking of child pornography, identity theft) and the development of novel crimes (online piracy, hacking, the creation and distribution of viruses and worms).

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police define *computer crime* as "any illegal act fostered or facilitated by a computer, whether the computer is an object of a crime, an instrument used to commit a crime, or a repository of evidence related to a crime." A computer

is an object of a crime in instances of Web site defacement, denial of service, network security breaches, and theft or alteration of data. A computer is an instrument used to commit a crime in activities of credit card fraud, auction fraud, phishing, identity theft, counterfeiting and forgery, digital piracy, illegal use of online services, and cyberstalking. A computer is a repository of evidence used to commit a crime when data stored on a system aids or abets traditional criminal activity, as with tax evasion or drug trafficking.

Fiscal and Social Consequences of Computer Crime

As one of the fastest-growing criminal movements in the country, computer crimes cost society and private industry billions of dollars, an amount steadily increasing. Compared with the cost of traditional "street" crimes, the cost of computer and white-collar offenses is astronomically high. Experts estimate that the average bank robber nets $2,500, the average bank fraud nets $25,000, the average computer crime nets $500,000, and the average theft of technology loss is $1.9 million. Moreover, financial losses do not fully capture the extent of harm done to victims and society through such incidents.

Detection and Response

Computer crime is extremely difficult to detect, in part because of the power of computers to process, and the Internet to disseminate, electronic information rapidly and the fact that many people have access to the Internet at universities, businesses, libraries, and homes. When data communications take place at high speeds without personal contact, users are left with very little time to consider the implications of their actions online. Moreover, many computer crimes are relatively effortless and can be accomplished via a few keystrokes or by a simple "drag and drop" mouse maneuver that takes mere seconds. Additionally, temporal and spatial limitations are largely irrelevant in cyberspace, and both personal and property crimes can occur at any time and place because the Internet provides global interconnectivity.

Because they can use chat room pseudonyms, temporary e-mail accounts, multiple Internet venues, and even instant messaging programs, electronic offenders have an advantage in shielding their true identity. Relative anonymity perhaps frees potential and actual perpetrators from traditionally constraining pressures of society, conscience, morality, and ethics to behave in a normative manner. Also, words and actions that an individual might be ashamed or embarrassed to say or perform in a face-to-face setting are no longer off-limits or even tempered when they occur from behind a keyboard in a physically distant location from a personal or corporate victim. Many individuals may actually be emboldened when using electronic means to accomplish wrongdoing, because it perceivably requires less courage and fortitude to commit certain acts in cyberspace as compared with their counterparts in real space.

Furthermore, supervision is lacking in cyberspace. Many of the actions taken and electronic words exchanged are private and outside the purview and regulatory reach of others online or off-line. Both informal (e.g., parents, teachers) and formal (law enforcement) arms of social control have little ability to monitor, prevent, detect, and address instances of computer crime because it occurs largely from locations geographically removed from the privacy of one's personal home or office computer.

There are a host of traditional problems associated with responding to computer crime. First, the law often does not address the intangible nature of the activity and location. Second, it is difficult to foster communication and collaboration between policing agencies on a national or international level because of funding issues, politics, and divergent opinions on criminalization and punishment. Third, prosecutors are also often reluctant to go after all computer criminals because they are limited by few or no resources, societal or political ambivalence, victim uncooperativeness, and the difficulties in case preparation for crimes that occur in cyberspace. Fourth, individuals and business victims are often hesitant to report the crime to authorities. Fifth, law enforcement entities often lack training and practice in recognizing, securing, documenting, and formally presenting computer crime evidence in a court of law.

Sameer Hinduja

See also Cyberspace; Piracy, Intellectual Property; Property Crime; White-Collar Crime

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Conflict Perspective

The theoretical foundation of the conflict perspective is the philosophy of Karl Marx and its expression in various schools of intellectual thought that include conflict theory, critical theory, historical Marxism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, and radical feminism. At the center of Marx's analysis is an economic perspective of social life that conceptualizes people's ownership of and control over the products and processes of their labor as the origin of social organization (society). In capitalist societies, the unequal distribution of property ownership and control and autonomy over one's work underlies a social organization characterized by inequality, social conflict, subordination, and domination. Individuals similarly located and influenced by particular economic positions constitute a social class and act in their interests. The upper-income classes ensure their privilege over the lower-income classes by influencing and controlling significant components of society—namely, the political, ideological, and cultural spheres. Theorists of the conflict perspective critique these capitalist class relations of production and examine their influence on idea systems (i.e., ideologies), history, politics, gender, race, culture, and the nature of work.

Conflict Perspective and Women

Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, and radical feminism are theoretical strands that employ a conflict perspective in the study of the relations between men and women (gender). Marx and Friedrich Engels's essay titled *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* serves as a theoretical basis for their work. Influenced by Marxism and feminism, these theoretical strands examine the interplay between capitalism and gender relations. Marxist and socialist feminists believe that *patriarchy,* defined as a system of power in which males have privilege and dominance over women, emerges as a result of the men's ownership of and control over the economic resources of society. Radical feminists believe that patriarchy and a division of labor based on sex preceded, and is the origin of, capitalism. Therefore, Marxist and socialist feminists argue that the transition from capitalism to communism will ameliorate gender inequality, and radical feminists believe a challenge to patriarchy is the solution to women's subjugation.

According to Marxist and socialist feminists, the identification of women with domestic life (e.g., reproduction, childrearing, cleaning, socialization) is a product of capitalist class relations. Marxist and socialist feminists conceptualize the emergence of the association of women with the domestic sphere in the transition from hunting and gathering societies to capitalist ones. During this transition, women's role as the producers of goods and economic providers for the family and community diminished.

In hunting and gathering societies women collected for their social group the greatest portion of the daily sustenance by gathering berries, nuts, fruit, and so on. In agrarian societies women often farmed side by side with men. However, the development of agrarian societies coincided with men's interactions away from home and the creation of a public life in which men controlled politics and the production and sale of goods and services. Consequently, the economic (productive) power of farming women was diminished, and women came to be increasingly associated with domestic life and work.

Capitalism exacerbated the split between private (domestic) and public life by shifting the production process completely away from farming, thereby relegating women completely to the domestic sphere. This split is referred as *the separation of spheres.* As women's role and control over production diminished, so did their social power.

Because poor white women and many black and immigrant women always worked in the public domain, the theory of the separation of spheres has been criticized. Nonetheless, women's public work mirrors, and is an extension of, this association of women with domestic work, for example, women employed as domestic workers, nurses, nannies, secretaries, and so on. Furthermore, Marxist and socialist feminists argue that because capitalism positions women into the private sector of domestic work, women reproduce capitalism by providing food, shelter, and the socialization necessary to maintain an able-bodied and willing workforce.

Conflict Perspective: Race and Ethnicity

Theorists who hold a conflict perspective attribute racial and ethnic prejudice to the operation and benefit of capitalism. According to historical Marxists, racism (and racial consciousness) emerged at the precise historical time in which capitalism developed—in the 15th century. They argue that before the capitalist period, social group differences were not based on race but rather on culture (language, values, and customs), religion, and citizenship/property ownership. Racism emerged as an ideology (i.e., a system of values members of a society believe) to justify the exploitation of African slaves. In other words, the cultural belief in the racial inferiority of black people (racism) enabled capitalists and slave traders in pursuit of economic profit to enslave and subjugate people of African descent. In the Marxian analysis, racism is a fabrication, mythology, and ploy to maintain capitalist power relations. Thus the ideology of racism results from the underlying conflict between capitalists and laborers.

According to the conflict perspective, racism and ethnic prejudice emerge as a result of economic conflict between lower-income groups competing for the same jobs. For example, during the early period of U.S. industrialization (the mid-19th century), Irish and African American conflict over socially desirable factory work resulted in conflict expressed in racial and ethnic terms. The Irish secured their positions in the working class by pointing to their "whiteness," denouncing the abolitionist movement, and sometimes initiating violence against blacks. This racism supported capitalism by diverting potential conflict away from the Irish workers and capitalists and toward the Irish and African Americans. The intraclass conflict between the Irish and African Americans thwarted their development into a unified and class-conscious social group, thereby quelling a working-class rebellion. This competitive situation is called a *split labor market.*

This type of economic competition occurred during the period of U.S. industrialization and mass immigration. From the conflict perspective, ethnic and racial prejudice resulted as Chinese and Japanese immigrants competed with the native-born Americans over mining and laundry work, respectively, and as southern and eastern European immigrants competed with the native-born over factory work in the Northeast. In sum, according to the conflict perspective, racism and ethnic prejudice originated in economic capitalist relations.

Vaso Thomas

See also Class Consciousness; Feminist Theory; Postmodernism; Racism; Sexism; Social Constructionist Theory; Split Labor Market

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Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution refers to a process for ending disputes. A broad spectrum of mechanisms for dealing with conflicts exists across all levels, from interpersonal disputes to international armed engagements. These processes enlist a variety of problem-solving methods to resolve incompatibilities in needs, interests, and goals. Variations in both the methods used and outcomes achieved characterize the differences between conflict resolution and other processes, such

as conflict settlement, conflict management, or conflict regulation.

Conflict resolution is an approach to ending conflicts rooted in a normative framework that sees conflict as a normal part of human interactions and thus argues for a particular understanding of resolution. Conflict resolution, when done well, should be productive and maximize the potential for positive change at both a personal and a structural level. Thus, what distinguishes conflict resolution from other dispute resolution processes is its emphasis on participatory processes, party control of solutions, and self-enforcing, integrative solutions. Typical aspects of the conflict resolution process include getting both sides to listen to each other, providing opportunities for parties to meet each side's needs, and finding the means to address both sides' interests to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome.

Designing a conflict resolution process requires a broad definition of "parties" to the conflict. This would include people impacted by the conflict, or those who could be impacted by potential solutions. More narrow definitions of parties, limited to decision makers or power brokers, are insufficient because they often ignore parties who can block decisions or who, if excluded, may choose to wage their own round of the conflict.

Getting to resolution also requires the use of participatory processes in which parties have both voice and vote. Third parties may help facilitate a process, but parties should maintain control over both the development and selection of viable solutions. Conflicts may be settled or regulated when powerful third parties dictate or enforce solutions, but this seldom results in eliminating the causal factors.

Conflict resolution further requires the addressing of the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. Processes that address symptoms rather than underlying causes may temporally manage a conflict, but they do not result in full resolution. Although there can be significant trade-offs in the agreement, these must not sacrifice the key issues and needs.

The final criterion for achieving the resolution of a conflict is the building of integrative solutions. To achieve a successful resolution, both parties must have at least some, if not all, of their underlying needs and interests satisfied. If one side leaves the process feeling it has lost, the actual achievement of resolution did not occur.

Celia Cook-Huffman

See also Social Conflict

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CONGLOMERATES

A conglomerate is a company engaged in often seemingly unrelated types of business activity. Two major characteristics define a conglomerate firm. First, a conglomerate firm controls a span of activities in various industries that require different managerial skills. Second, a conglomerate achieves diversification primarily by external mergers and acquisitions rather than by internal development.

There are three types of conglomerate or diversifying mergers: (1) product extension mergers that broaden the product lines of firms, (2) geographic market extensions that result in nonoverlapping geographic areas, and (3) pure conglomerate mergers that involve combining unrelated enterprises. Common motives for conglomerate mergers include financial synergies, taxes, and managerial incentives.

Conglomerate mergers were popular in the 1960s because of low interest rates and favorable economic conditions. Small- or medium-size firms facing diminished prospects for growth and profits decided to diversify into more promising industries. Acquiring firms borrowed low-cost funds to buy businesses outside their traditional areas of interest. The overall return on investment of the conglomerate appeared to grow as long as the target company had profits greater than the interest on the loans. In practice, much of this growth was illusory and profits fell as interest rates rose. During this merger wave, about half of the firms considered as conglomerates were based in the defense and aerospace industries.

In 1968, Congress moved against conglomerate firms by passing hostile anti-trust policies and punitive tax laws. These factors plus declining stock prices brought an end to the conglomerate fad. Because of

the lack of success of many conglomerate mergers, managers shifted their focus from diversification to a firm's core competency.

Various arguments exist for and against the diversification achieved by conglomerates. Proponents argue that the conglomerate organizational form allows for allocation of capital in a more efficient way. Other potential advantages include stabilizing earnings, cost and revenue economies of scope, lower tax burdens, sharing of managerial "best practices," and better monitoring and control of capital expenditures. Arguments against diversification include cross-subsidization across business lines, overinvestment in certain projects caused by excess free cash flow and unused borrowing capacity, and conflicts of interest among various activity areas.

An important issue is whether conglomerates create or destroy value. Although some mixed evidence exists, research suggests that diversification does not increase the firm's value in most cases. That is, diversified firms are worth less than the sum of their individual parts. For example, empirical studies of financial conglomerates suggest the presence of a financial discount caused by diversification. Thus, the impact of functional scope is predominantly value destroying. However, the benefits of geographic diversification appear to outweigh its costs and lead to value enhancement.

Today, examples of large conglomerates include Time Warner, AT&T, General Electric, News Corporation, and Walt Disney Company in the United States; Sony and Mitsubishi in Japan; and Siemens AG in Germany. For instance, Time Warner is a leading media and entertainment company, whose businesses include interactive services, cable systems, filmed entertainment, television networks, and publishing.

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See also Economic Restructuring; Global Economy; Globalization; Multinational Corporations

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Conservative Approaches

The U.S. welfare state and its relation to domestic labor markets changed dramatically at the close of the 20th century. A new group of conservatives shifted the terms of welfare debate away from the logic of need and the logic of entitlement, promoted by Democratic politicians and the social movements of the 1950s and 1960s, to install a new social policy agenda that highlighted the obligations of citizenship. In 1996, after 20 years of political campaigning and policy advocacy, neoconservatives, supported by new conservative think tanks, succeeded in replacing the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC), first enacted in 1935, with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF).

By crafting a synthetic reform program that would both buttress conservative social norms and limit access to public assistance that mitigated the pressures of labor market competition, the neoconservatives succeeded in mobilizing a powerful coalition of social conservatives and free-market proponents discontented with the welfare state expansions that had been enacted as part of the War on Poverty. In contrast to the Nixon administration, which had failed to pass a major welfare reform initiative because its Family Assistance Plan divided these two political factions, by uniting them behind a single reform agenda, neoconservatives were able to pass the Family Support Act in 1988 and then the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.

Neoconservative authors dubbed the first publication laying out their collective reform program the New Consensus, suggesting that by 1987 the nation was ready to reach a new agreement on social policy to replace the previous consensus institutionalized in the New Deal programs of the 1930s. The neoconservatives' new consensus articulated an alternative vision of citizenship from that underlying the New Deal and the subsequent finding by the Supreme Court that the Social Security Act of 1935 had entitled poor, single mothers to public assistance. In contrast to the previous logic of citizenship, which considered entitlement to assistance necessary to protect individual freedom, the neoconservatives called on the state to use public programs to reinforce work and domestic norms that they reformulated as obligations of citizenship.

According to the "New Consensus," social programs should discipline poor family members receiving public assistance to prepare them for incorporation within the polity. Poor single mothers should be required to assist government agencies to identify the biological fathers of their children, and fathers who do not pay child support should be subject to enforcement measures. To be eligible for assistance, poor parents should be required to attend school or to participate in work or work-preparation activities. Anticipating liberal objections to extending government regulation into areas of life that are protected from state intervention if citizens are not poor, neoconservatives noted that once poor parents mastered the skills now considered prerequisite for citizenship, they, like other citizens, would be free to pursue their desires through the market. Neoconservatives also suggested that as the new paternalist poverty programs succeeded in preparing the poor for market entry and citizenship, the number of parents claiming public assistance would decline and the state would transfer fewer resources from taxpayers to poor families.

However, regulating family life and work activities in ways that satisfied both free-market proponents and social conservatives proved problematic. Unlike the Nixon administration's Family Assistance Program, which promised to eliminate the financial incentive for family dissolution by extending benefits to poor families with working fathers, the "New Consensus" proposed eliminating the incentive to remain a single parent by requiring that poor single parents work to receive benefits. But this new policy direction conflicted with social conservatives' aspirations of returning to a family model in which the mother stayed at home to care for the family. The conflict between the demands of capitalist labor markets for low-wage service workers and the caregiving needs of the traditional family posed a problem for the writers of the "New Consensus" that they were unable to resolve, except by prioritizing the needs of the market over those of the family. Unlike earlier Christian defenders of the family who had lobbied for a family wage at the beginning of the 20th century, neoconservative welfare reformers asserted that two wage earners working at the minimum wage were needed to keep working-class families above the poverty line. Because this solution and reliance on paid child care was unsatisfactory to some conservatives, the authors of the "New Consensus" remained silent on how the new "citizen-mothers" were to balance the demands of the market and domestic work, leaving the problem to be addressed by politicians, government bureaucrats, welfare case managers, and poor parents.

In contrast to matters of family care, the neoconservatives were explicit about how to foster economic self-reliance. The policy challenge, according to neoconservative policy scholar Lawrence Mead, was to build a new institutional network that would replicate, for parents receiving public assistance, the same balance of support and expectation that other Americans face in supporting their families by participating in the labor market. This required conditioning the receipt of assistance on the completion of work or work-preparation activities much like an employment relationship. It also authorized a reorganization of the state and state–citizen interactions to conform to the norms and practices used to govern market interactions. In passing the Family Support Act of 1988, national policymakers created the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program to engage parents enrolled in AFDC in work or job search activities. As part of the JOBS program, lawmakers suggested that states introduce new employability plans (similar to employment contracts), which specified the conditions parents had to meet to receive public assistance. However, unlike an employment contract that can be voided if an employee fails to meet the stipulated conditions, states could only sanction parents who did not participate; states could not deny financially eligible parents from enrolling in the program until Congress eliminated the entitlement to assistance in 1996. Freed by the PRWORA to develop state-specific TANF programs that no longer included an entitlement to assistance, some states, such as Wisconsin, reorganized their poverty programs to resemble more closely employment practices commonly used in low-wage labor markets, such as making benefit amounts insensitive to family size, issuing benefit payments only after several weeks of participation, and sanctioning parents for each hour of assigned activity they failed to complete at a rate equal to the federal minimum wage rate.

By revoking the entitlement to assistance, Congress authorized state and local agencies to exercise new forms of discretion. Eliminating policies and practices designed to guarantee equal treatment under the previous welfare program and creating new rules to regulate poor mothers' domestic lives, lawmakers

reorganized poverty policy to be more like private charitable giving. Under the new TANF policies, states can require poverty agency staff to make distinctions among parents, based on their perceptions of the applicants' ability to work and parents' domestic situations. In some states case managers use these evaluations to determine who can enroll in the program and what types of services and requirements will be incorporated within individualized participation agreements. The 1996 federal poverty legislation also limited the time parents could be eligible for federally subsidized assistance to a total of 5 years and allowed states to impose even shorter time limits.

In addition to recommending that lawmakers restructure government policies and practices to resemble norms and practices exercised by market actors and private charities, neoconservatives also recommended granting new regulatory authority to nongovernmental institutions to supplement the supervisory capacities of the governmental sector. Governments already contracted with for-profit firms and community-based organizations for other types of services, so federal guidelines were in place to regulate contracts with these types of organizations. However, federal and state lawmakers had to pass new legislation to allow state and local governments to contract with faith-based organizations to provide guidance to parents enrolled in the new poverty programs. In addition, some state governments went further in reorganizing the network of local agencies administering the state's new TANF program, shifting from the standard fee-for-service contract arrangement to new market-like fixed-sum contracts or performance-based contracting.

Pursuing changes that remade agencies administering the new poverty programs more like market actors and private charities changed the boundaries between the state, civil society, the market, and the home. Eliminating the entitlement to assistance freed the state from the previous obligation to provide poor parents with cash assistance. This opened the way for new forms of discretion and for a new understanding of receiving assistance as a contractual act in which poor citizens voluntarily agree to new forms of state regulation in exchange for access to cash assistance and other services. However, because U.S. society currently holds public and private institutions accountable for different kinds of performance, the shift to market contracts with an array of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, in the context of new forms of discretion, also raises questions concerning the level of public representation in policy making, the degree of transparency in program implementation, and appropriate fiscal and employment practices.

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See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Culture of Dependency; Culture of Poverty; Poverty; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Welfare; Welfare Capitalism

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Conspicuous Consumption

The term *conspicuous consumption* was coined by Norwegian American sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) in his 1899 book titled *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions.* Conspicuous consumption refers to an individual's public or ostentatious use of costly goods or services to indicate his or her wealth and high social status. In capitalist societies, this practice includes purchasing and publicly displaying expensive goods (commodities or status symbols) that are luxuries rather than necessities. Conspicuous consumption goes beyond simply fulfilling an individual's survival needs (food, shelter, clothing) and is characterized by what Veblen described critically as wastefulness. Veblen conceived of conspicuous consumption as a practice in which men engaged to demonstrate their wealth. However, he also described women as conspicuous consumers whose actions indexed the wealth of their husbands or fathers (in Veblen's time, women did not have a recognized separate social status).

Conspicuous consumption can be a social problem because it has the effect of reaffirming social status

boundaries and distinctions based on access to wealth. In some cases, such as the conspicuous consumption of elites in developing countries, this practice can lead to social unrest and even political violence.

Conspicuous consumption is a peculiar feature of industrial and postindustrial capitalism that reflects social inequalities within societies characterized by this system of production. In precapitalist societies, an individual's status within his or her social group could be indexed in a variety of ways: for example, through the exertion of physical force or the size and quality of landholdings. According to economists and sociologists, feudal societies had clear distinctions and direct relations of domination between high-status and low-status individuals, precluding the need for elaborate or symbolic demonstrations of wealth, status, and power on the part of the elite. With the advent of industrial capitalism, however, traditional bases of social power and authority (such as land ownership and titles of nobility) became unstable, and status within a society or social group became increasingly tied to the accumulation of money.

The urbanization that accompanied industrialization in Europe and elsewhere increased population density, placing in close contact individuals and families who were previously unknown to each other and who did not have a basis for judging the social status of their new neighbors. Conspicuous consumption allowed people in urban areas to project a certain degree of wealth or status to those around them. Veblen identified this practice with the *nouveau riche* (newly rich), a class of capitalists who tended to lack traditional status markers, such as noble bloodlines, and who compensated for this fact by buying and ostentatiously displaying consumer goods, such as clothing. In the context of the sudden instability of social status and the crumbling of traditional social distinctions (such as those in the feudal system), conspicuous consumption also became a way for the upper-class elites to reaffirm their place at the top of the social hierarchy.

In the 20th and 21st centuries, conspicuous consumption has become identified not only with the wealthiest members of society but with the middle class as well. In the United States, where no feudal system, nobility, or aristocracy has existed, consumption is the primary manner in which to indicate social status to others. The expansion in consumer purchasing power and the increased availability of a wide range of goods in the United States in the past century enables more individuals to practice conspicuous consumption.

Popular culture encourages conspicuous consumption through magazines, television programs, and films that glorify the lifestyle of the wealthy and celebrities, a lifestyle often emulated by the masses. Scholars have examined critically the increasing links between consumption and identity, stating that in capitalist societies, what one has is often seen as what one is. Some intellectuals view this link between consumption of commodities and identity negatively, lamenting the "commodification" of social relationships and the seemingly never-ending pursuit of the biggest, newest, most expensive goods. This common view sees as futile the attempt to achieve personal happiness or satisfaction or to obtain social mobility by purchasing high-status products. Other scholars do not object to people expressing their sense of self through consumption, seeing instead an element of creativity and fulfillment in the practice of buying and using products. In the current period, with identity and consumption linked, conspicuous consumption not only serves to signal social status but also indicates an affinity with a social group or subculture (a specialized culture within a larger society). For example, consumers may see their driving a Harley-Davidson motorcycle or using a Macintosh computer as situating them within a social group of like-minded people who consume the same goods.

A related concept introduced in Veblen's work is that of conspicuous leisure. Individuals engaging in conspicuous leisure demonstrate to those around them that they are privileged or wealthy enough to avoid working for extended periods of time. A good contemporary example of this practice is tourism, in which people show that they can afford to travel and to be away from work (or that they are wealthy enough to not have to work). When a newly married couple is asked where they will spend their honeymoon or an individual brings in vacation photos to share with his or her coworkers, the logic of conspicuous leisure may be in play.

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See also Class; Social Bond Theory; Social Mobility; Stratification, Social

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Contingent Work

In the United States controversy over contingent work—called precarious work or atypical work in other industrialized countries—has focused on definitions and numbers. Coined in the mid-1980s by economist Audrey Freeman, the term *contingent work* connotes instability in employment. As originally used, contingency suggests an employment relationship that depends on an employer's ongoing need for an employee's services. Applied broadly, however, contingent work has been equated with a range of nonstandard work arrangements, among them temporary, contract, leased, and part-time employment. All are notably different from the standard, regular full-time, year-round job with benefits as part of compensation and the expectation of an ongoing relationship with a single employer.

Much contingent work is far from new. Rather, the workforce has long encompassed work arrangements that are in some way nonstandard. Among these arrangements are on-call work, day labor, seasonal employment, and migrant work, all of which involve intermittent episodes of paid employment and much mobility from one employer to the next. The more recent identification of contingent work as a social problem stems from the perception that many of these forms of employment are expanding, affecting new groups of workers and new sectors of the economy and, therefore, creating greater inequality and new social divisions.

Estimates as Evidence of a Problem

Estimates of the size and scope of the contingent workforce reflect a controversy over the definition of contingent employment. In 1995, the U.S. Census Bureau began collecting data on specific work arrangements, including expected duration of employment and related conditions of work such as earnings, benefits, and union membership. Data were collected several more times in alternating years. Yet analyses of the data have yielded widely divergent counts. Applying a series of narrow definitions, which excluded independent contractors and workers whose arrangements had lasted more than 1 year, researchers at the Bureau of Labor Statistics first estimated that contingent workers comprised 2.2 to 4.9 percent of the total workforce. Using the same data, however, another team of researchers applied a different definition—including most nonstandard work arrangements, regardless of duration—and determined, in contrast, that 29.4 percent of the workforce was in some way contingent.

The debate over numbers and definitions represents different views about the significance of contingent work and, in turn, whether these work arrangements are indeed a social problem. Analysts who apply a narrow definition—and imply little problem—suggest that nonstandard work arrangements provide expanded opportunities for certain segments of the workforce. They focus on workers' social characteristics and identify women, younger workers, and older workers near retirement as those most likely to choose contingent status. Analysts who equate contingent work with a broad range of nonstandard arrangements, in contrast, see evidence of worker subordination and limited opportunity. Comparing the characteristics of standard and nonstandard employment, they identify lower compensation, fewer employment benefits, and lower levels of union membership among contingent workers. Noting that these workers are disproportionately women and racial minorities, they further see contingent status as perpetuating economic inequality and social marginality.

Researchers concerned with inequities in employment, therefore, more often characterize nonstandard, contingent work as "substandard" and equate contingent status with a proliferation of poor-quality jobs. Many further relate contingent work to restructuring across industries, occupations, and sectors of the economy. With employment increasingly unstable and workers insecure, they note, more jobs are temporary—many mediated and controlled by staffing agencies—and a great many entail greater uncertainty, few formal rights, little legal protection, and greater individual responsibility for finding ongoing employment. With these concerns at the forefront, analysts and advocates who see contingent work as a social problem equate it broadly with a shifting of risk from employers to employees and from institutions to individuals. Workers assume greater risk, they argue,

because the standard job, which once provided security for a large segment of the workforce, has become increasingly unstable or unavailable to more and more workers.

Framing the Problem

Determining what counts—and who should be counted—depends, in large measure, on framing the problem that contingency creates. Most analysts, advocates, and policymakers point to deepening divisions between social groups. Some have focused on the proliferation of triangular employment relations, in which workers are hired through staffing agencies or contracting companies, as a source of increased control and subordination for some workers. Many identify the flexibility associated with some forms of contingent work as an advantage principally to employers who seek to adjust the size of a workforce as needed. Contingent status, these assertions conclude, leaves large numbers of workers vulnerable and insecure.

Although they continue to disagree about definitions and numbers—and hence about whether contingent work is indeed a problem—most researchers do agree about two key points. One is that that employment in general is undergoing major change, so that the standard job has increasingly eroded as an employment norm. The other is that the size of the contingent workforce, however defined, did not change significantly over the course of an economic cycle, from the boom of the late 1990s through the recession that followed. The contingent workforce thus appears to comprise a stable segment of overall employment. Those analysts and advocates seeking to frame a social problem, therefore, see several main trends associated with contingent work arrangements.

Cost Cutting and Inequality

Analysts agree that contingent work often comes with lower wages, so that employers can cut costs by replacing standard jobs with nonstandard work, sometimes by laying off "regular" employees and replacing them with contingent workers. The result, overall, leads to lower living standards and rising inequality between rich and poor. Good jobs—that is, those that provide living wages and employer-sponsored benefits—are thus harder to find. More people are working for less or are working several jobs. Contingent work may, therefore, trap workers in low-wage jobs that provide few opportunities for advancement over time.

Legal Loopholes: Gaps in Labor and Employment Law

Many analysts also point to legal loopholes associated with contingent work, arguing that legal rights and guarantees fail to protect many contingent workers. The reasons for these exclusions depend on the specific work arrangement. Most statutes explicitly exclude some workers, especially those classified as independent contractors. Other legal rights become hard to access when workers are employed through a staffing agency, which typically claims legal status as the worker's employer. When staffing agencies divide legal liability with their client firms, workers may find that neither the agency nor its client assumes responsibility under the law.

Disparate Impact on Women and Minorities

Related to a concern over legal rights is evidence of a disparate impact on women and racial minorities. Many contingent workers are employed in temporary or part-time arrangements, which in many cases earn them proportionately less than their counterparts with comparable standard jobs. In some settings, therefore, nonstandard, contingent work may be a pretext for sex or race discrimination, which would otherwise be illegal. Workers who seek flexibility to meet personal or family needs, this reasoning suggests, should not be forced to trade part-time or part-year schedules for equal income and opportunity.

Threat to Competitiveness

A more general concern associated with contingent work is an overall threat to the national economy. Short-term employment, some analysts argue, leads to limited loyalty and lower productivity. Temporary work also rationalizes lower employer investment in the workforce, with limited on-the-job training. The eventual result may, therefore, be an overall lack of skilled labor or the shifting of training costs to the public sector. In a global economy, these analysts suggest, the erosion of workforce skills may mean a

falling standard of living in certain countries or regions, as employers can increasingly seek skilled labor in many parts of the world.

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See also Downsizing; Inequality; Labor Market; Outsourcing; Segregation, Occupational; Split Labor Market; Underemployment; Working Poor

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Contraception

Contraception refers to the numerous methods and devices used to prevent conception and pregnancy. For millennia, women and men have relied on such folk and medical methods as condoms, herbs, vaginal suppositories, douching, and magic rituals and potions—along with abortion and infanticide—as means to control the birth of children. Today contraceptives include medically prescribed hormones for women; condoms, diaphragms, and other barriers; behavioral practices, including withdrawal and the rhythm method; and irreversible male and female sterilization. Although there are a number of contraceptive options with varying levels of reliability and effectiveness, use is circumscribed by access and availability, as well as by legal and cultural restraints.

Because contraception separates intercourse from procreation, it raises moral and legal issues. The Catholic Church and some other religious institutions have long morally condemned contraception as a mortal sin. However, legal prohibitions in the United States against contraception and the advertisement and sale of contraceptives did not arise until 1873 with the passage of the Comstock Law. This law made it illegal to distribute "obscene" material through the mail, thus effectively banning contraceptives for Americans.

In 1914, Margaret Sanger, who would go on to found Planned Parenthood, was charged with violating the Comstock Law when she urged women to limit their pregnancies in her socialist journal, *The Woman Rebel*, coining the term *birth control* to emphasize women's agency in procreative decision making. Sanger, along with other birth control advocates, promoted contraception in publications, distributed contraceptives in birth control clinics, lobbied for their legalization, and urged the medical establishment to develop more effective methods. The birth control movement described contraception as a "right" of women to decide if, when, and how many children to bear (a right that would be echoed in the abortion rights movement) without intervention from the state or religious institutions.

Eugenicists were also advocates of contraception in the first half of the 20th century. Contraception, including permanent sterilization, was heralded as a solution to social problems such as poverty, insanity, and criminality because it would ensure that indigent, mentally ill, and otherwise "undesirable" populations would not reproduce. Thus one aspect of the history of contraception in the United States and worldwide has been its link with eugenic programs. Furthermore, just as the term *birth control* emphasized an individual's contraceptive choice, *population control* emphasized contraception as a policy issue for entire populations.

Although the Comstock Law had been overturned in most states by the early to mid-20th century, it was not until the 1965 Supreme Court case of *Griswold v. Connecticut* that the use of contraceptives was legalized throughout the United States. The court decided that couples had the right to privacy and that contraception was a decision that should be left to the individual couple, not the state. The *Griswold* decision was followed 8 years later by *Roe v. Wade,* which legalized abortion in the United States.

Along with the overturning of the Comstock Law, another major development in contraception of the 1960s was the invention and widespread use of the oral hormonal contraceptive known as "the pill." Indeed, demand for the pill precipitated the *Griswold v. Connecticut* decision. The pill further cemented the separation between intercourse and procreation because it is highly effective (between 90 and 99 percent), and its timing is separated from the sexual act.

In the 1990s and 2000s, long-term contraceptive solutions were developed and marketed as scientific breakthroughs. Instead of ingesting pills on a daily basis, hormones could be implanted under the skin of a woman's arm, injected right into her bloodstream, or worn as a patch on her body. Although these methods are highly effective, lasting for anywhere from 1 week to 3 years, and are less subject to user error than is the pill, critics have raised concerns about their side effects. Others emphasize that long-term contraceptives have the potential to be used as coercive or eugenic measures against marginalized populations, such as poor women of color. Furthermore, critics argue that scientists should prioritize developing male contraceptives, lessening the burden on women to be responsible for contraception.

Thus it is largely women today who have a wide range of contraceptive options. According to a 2004 report released by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 98 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 44 who have ever had sexual intercourse with a male partner have used at least one contraceptive method or device, and 62 percent are currently practicing contraception. Use of contraceptives, however, varies by socioeconomic status, ethnicity, age, religion, education, and many other factors.

Differences in contraceptive use bear out globally, as well. The UN 2005 World Contraception Report indicates that 60.5 percent of married women of reproductive age worldwide are currently practicing some form of contraception. Contraceptive use is highest in northern Europe (78.9 percent) and lowest in western Africa (13.4 percent).

Contraception continues to be an important issue throughout the world. As indicated by UN data, global disparities exist in use of, access to, affordability of, and availability of contraception. Birth control and family planning may be linked to global development by controlling population growth and by providing women in the developing world with more sexual agency, yet contraception sometimes conflicts with traditional norms about sexuality and childbearing.

In the United States, controversy has arisen around the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval of the over-the-counter sale of emergency contraception—a pill that is taken after unprotected sexual intercourse—because some religious figures view it as a method of abortion. Those with even more conservative views continue to see all contraception as immoral and aim to restrict it in the United States once again.

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See also Abortion; Birth Rate; Eugenics; Population Growth

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Corporate Crime

Corporate crimes include secretly dumping hazardous waste, illegally agreeing to fix prices, and knowingly selling unacceptably dangerous products. These offenses, like other corporate crimes, are deviant outcomes of actions by people working in usually nondeviant corporations.

Identifying true rates of corporate crime is problematic because victims and their victimization are difficult to establish. Toxic dumping, for instance, does not leave maimed or dead bodies at dump sites, and victims of price fixing seldom know they were illegally overcharged. Knowingly selling hazardous pharmaceuticals is particularly difficult to determine because often the harms are insidious—they kill only a tiny fraction of consumers, and harms do not appear until decades after exposure.

Motives for such crimes are equally difficult to predict or identify. Thus, some ordinary employees of one ordinary corporation, Goodrich, on multiple

occasions knowingly produced and sold faulty aircraft brakes, although nothing in their biographies would have led observers to predict that they would do so. Likewise, some Enron and Equity Funding Corporation employees violated laws and personal morality by misleading investors into thinking that their failing corporations were profitable.

The structures, cultures, and incentives of their large organizations encouraged these people to commit such anti-social acts. People in these organizations know they are replaceable, and so they are surprisingly malleable. Most of them are average (and sometimes well-intentioned) people committing their crimes in the course of meeting their everyday occupational responsibilities. No data suggest that, as they started their careers, these people were less law-abiding than their peers. And, like other criminals, most devote only a small part of their total time and effort to criminality.

Corporate-generated beliefs, motives, and incentives can help explain their criminal behaviors (just as life experience can help explain street crimes), but these explanations do not absolve participants of their moral or legal violations. They merely explain why participants participated. Research over the past 50 years offers some convincing explanations for the corporation-generated environments that allow or encourage employee participation in corporate crime. It also offers some insights into the social responses that label and penalize some corporate actions as criminal, while ignoring others.

Corporate-Generated Employee Beliefs, Motives, and Incentives

Beliefs, motives, and incentives that employees acquire over many years working in criminogenic occupations greatly increase the chances that they will become criminal participants. Philips Petroleum's chief executive officer, for example, learned the skills and beliefs needed to make illegal $100,000 Watergate-era political contributions as he ascended the corporate ladder over decades in the company.

Beliefs

Employees learn corporate criminal (and noncriminal) beliefs from people like themselves with whom they work and socialize, a pattern known as "differential association." Through differential association, employees create and acquire excuses and justifications for their behaviors. They can attempt to *excuse* their crimes by emphasizing—even exaggerating—their personal powerlessness in large organizations. Like all employees of large corporations, they know they are replaceable cogs filling assigned positions until they retire or are terminated, so they can emphasize their replaceability to justify participating in schemes they consider unsavory. Excuses permit them to participate while believing that their participation is not their fault.

They also learn *justifications* from coworkers. These crime-facilitative rationalizations may be wholly or partly accurate. Thus, price fixers frequently justify their actions as stabilizing unstable markets and protecting employee jobs, which may be true. Nonetheless, their acts are illegal and harm the economy. Justifications facilitate participation because they help participants believe that extenuating circumstances make their actions permissible.

These beliefs do not cause criminal participation—they only provide suitable conditions that make participation more likely. They allow employees to respond reflexively to supervisor authority, standard operating procedures, corporate culture, and patterns that their predecessors established. A learned or innate tendency to obey authority encourages them to participate without serious reflection. Furthermore, the homogeneity, cohesiveness, and differential association of their work worlds can produce "groupthink," a striving for unanimity so strong that it can override recognition that behaviors are criminal. Finally, each of the involved employees, none of whom individually plays a major part or has full knowledge of the crime, might correctly (but immorally or illegally) believe that the crime would occur regardless of his or her personal decisions. And each might conclude that personal interests would be served best by participating, because of perceived rewards for participating or penalties for refusing. This applies even when (as in the cases of Enron and the Dalkon Shield) the crime they didn't expose caused the bankruptcy of their employers and the loss of their own jobs.

Motives and Incentives

More immediate forces also encourage criminal participation, such as pressure to provide a product on time despite unforeseen problems that undermine its safety. Hoping that problems will not be detected or

can be corrected before they are detected, employees faced with deadlines conclude that corporate crime is their best available option. Production pressures to meet demand and keep costs low for the disastrous Dalkon Shield, a poorly designed and manufactured intrauterine contraceptive device for which testing was woefully inadequate, thus led to killing at least 33 women, injuring 235,000 others, and bankrupting the device's producer.

"Bounded rationality" limits employees' ability to collect all needed information, foresee consequences of their actions, or act rationally in light of what they believe. Few employees can make individual criminal decisions that would substantially increase their employers' stock prices, and few own so much stock that they would benefit greatly even if their crimes did increase stock prices. Furthermore, employees' rational self-interests seldom favor stockholder interests. Employees at all but the highest ranks have little incentive to risk fines, their jobs, or even prison sentences, by committing crimes altruistically for the benefit of the company's stockholders. Though profit-seeking to maximize shareholder income undoubtedly encourages some corporate crimes, its importance in today's large corporations is easily overstated.

Thus, the job incentives of involved Dalkon Shield and Dow Corning breast implant employees encouraged them to please immediate supervisors by making small cost-reducing choices for products contributing relatively minor profits. Lawful incentives encouraged these employees to produce outcomes harmful to stockholders and customers alike. Ultimately, lawsuits caused unforeseen bankruptcy of their employers, making stockholders' investments in the companies worthless.

In corporate crime cases, incentives are usually indirect. Employees believe their participation may ingratiate them to their supervisors, and their refusal might result in them being passed over for promotion. Rarely is a promotion or raise explicitly conditional on participation in a specific crime. In sum, corporate crimes may be directly, indirectly, or unknowingly encouraged by situations, supervisors, and coworkers.

Separation of corporate ownership from corporate control provides additional incentives for crime. In theory, corporate employees act only as agents for corporate owners (i.e., stockholders), maximizing, whenever possible, the profits that go to those owners. In practice, however, an "agency problem" exists, because employees cannot be counted on to act as agents of their stockholders. Employees' interests generally conflict with stockholder interests; stockholders do not make management decisions, and increased employee incomes can readily reduce stockholders' profits. Employees' personal interests may be best served by participating in crimes, even if the end result of exposure might be the demise of the firm, because the perceived likelihood of rewards for participating exceeds penalties for not participating. Employees thus may run corporations in their own self-interests and against the interests of distant and uninvolved stockholders.

Enron employees thus knowingly "cooked the books" with encouragement from their bosses, receiving large bonuses while deceiving stockholders into thinking that the company was so successful that it had become the seventh largest U.S. company. These employees were concealing disastrous failures that ultimately cost Enron's stockholders $60 billion in savings and most of its 21,000 employees their jobs. Similarly, hundreds of corporations recently were investigated for back-dating stock options, a procedure that illegally and secretly showers on corporate elites millions of dollars each at stockholder expense.

Corporate crime motives frequently are defensive attempts to solve intractable problems. Companies in declining industries face extraordinary pressures to solve problems beyond their immediate control, so they are more likely than others to fix prices. Participants in such cases feel they lack noncriminal options, and they often believe that their illegal acts are temporary. Similarly, executives at companies dependent on federal government rulings (e.g., airlines, pharmaceutical companies, and petroleum producers) acquiesced to illegal political contribution solicitations in the Watergate scandal. They feared unspecified future harm to their firms by President Nixon's administration if they did not make requested large cash payments. Executives at firms with less to fear because they were in industries less dependent on the federal government (e.g., retailers) were less likely to acquiesce.

When reasonable decisions produce unexpected failures, managers often gamble by making corporate criminal decisions because they already are deeply committed to a course of action. Escalating commitment encourages participants who have so much ego or time invested in the product that they don't feel free to quit. In fact, almost all known cases of corporate bodily harm crimes are best described as the product of

escalating commitment. The many pharmaceutical company decision makers at Merck and elsewhere who concealed adverse drug reactions did not expect those drug reactions when they began marketing their products.

Participants, in many cases, are novices unfamiliar with actual industry norms, so they can exaggerate the degree to which crimes occur elsewhere in their industries. They are highly trained in business or science, leading to a "trained incapacity" to consider everyday rules of behavior. Employees with recent graduate business degrees are generally assumed to be ambitious people who favor the short-term, quantitative, and data-manipulating skills they learned, while ignoring long-term, nonquantifiable, and ethical issues they should also consider.

Such participation illustrates the "banality of evil," where crimes are committed comfortably by a cross-section of normal, malleable, and ambitious individuals who were not recruited for their criminal tendencies or skills. Most of these people would not commit corporate crimes if they were employed in roles that lacked incentives, opportunities, or cultural support for these crimes. Furthermore, their sense of personal responsibility is reduced by "authorization" from their bosses, as they unthinkingly conform to what they think their bosses want.

Whistleblowers

Whistleblowers are encouraging exceptions to these tendencies. Corporate whistleblowers are employees or former employees who risk being demonized and ostracized, or in a few cases fired, for informing outsiders about their employers' wrongdoing. They manage to avoid the groupthink, fear, loyalty, escalating commitment, and other banal tendencies to which ordinary employees submit, thereby retaining their independence of action. Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, for example, was a tobacco company vice president for research who braved the anger of seemingly invincible tobacco companies by disclosing that his employer knowingly manipulated and enhanced the addictive power of nicotine.

Emergent Corporate Crimes

Many firm, industry, and societal traits appear to encourage corporate crime. Crimes are more common in unusually hierarchical firms that enhance employees' fears or need to operate on tight schedules. Crime is further encouraged by having weak controls and lucrative and contradictory incentives. Industries with low profit potentials, only a handful of companies, or undifferentiated products (e.g., business envelopes, where brand loyalty is minimal) are particularly susceptible to price fixing. Also, poor societies with histories of corruption and natural resources needed by large multinational corporations are prone to corporate bribery of local officials.

No person founded a tobacco company intent on selling a dangerous product. Tobacco producers were well-established corporations for 2 centuries before tobacco's health hazards were recognized by even the harshest critics of smoking. Each employee hired filled a narrowly defined organizational role and could rightly assert that his or her contribution was minor. Even if a person left the company for moral reasons, his or her activity would continue as another person readily filled the vacancy. As a collection of positions, not of persons, the corporation thus has a dynamic all its own.

Social Responses to Corporate Crimes

The current American penchant for incarcerating offenders increasingly applies to corporate employees. In 2002, an otherwise divided Congress overwhelmingly approved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to Enron and similar corporate financial frauds. The act mandates that corporate financial reporting safeguards be strengthened, with most attention directed to its felony provisions making corporate elites legally responsible for the accuracy of their firms' financial statements. And it tries to provide significantly longer jail sentences and stiffer fines for violators. Attention to it has been great—a Google search in early 2007 produced 12.2 million hits—and its future impact on corporate financial criminality may be significant. Such stiffer penalties in response to scandals is not new; similar penalty and prevention changes occurred earlier in response to Dalkon Shield contraceptive device deaths and to preventable coal mine accidents.

Nonetheless, the law remains a limited tool for gaining corporate legal compliance. For punishment to effectively deter, prospective criminals must consider possible discovery and punishment *before* deciding whether to commit crimes. But much corporate crime results from a "slippery slope" where egos, time

investments, or fears encourage participants to gradually escalate the illegality of their actions.

These criminals know that their crimes are likely to go undiscovered and unpunished because, for example, pollution takes time to kill, and price fixing is usually hidden. Limiting enforcement is the imbalance of resources favoring the aggregate of corporations over the government. (But this imbalance can be overstated—the Food and Drug Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, and other sanctioning bodies have significant resources, dedicated personnel, and strong interests in showing their effectiveness.) Punishment is limited despite survey results showing public outrage toward corporate crime in general, because members of the public who happen to serve on juries are relatively sympathetic toward accused well-spoken middle-class and wealthy executives with no known previous violations and exemplary family, community, and occupational biographies. Jurors view defendants' transgressions as caused by their jobs because they received no direct or immediate personal financial gain for their criminality.

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See also Deviance; Environmental Crime; Groupthink; White-Collar Crime

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Corporate State

The concept of the corporate state closely relates to pluralist philosophy. As opposed to monist philosophy, pluralist philosophy claims the existence of more than one ultimate principle that may serve as the basis of decision and action at the same time. Monist philosophy, in contrast, recognizes that all decisions and actions proceed from one consistent principle; otherwise, action would be impossible.

The core of state corporatism is to integrate different social classes and groups—often with contradictory interests—into the policy-making process. As a theory of social partnership closely connected historically to Catholic social theory, it also served as a basis for utopian socialists such as Saint-Simon to argue that the working classes should be included in decision- and policy-making processes. Catholic social theory seeks to reconcile social classes and conserve the existing social order by mitigating the radicalism of social conflicts. Utopian socialists, however, want to overcome social classes by establishing, in the long run, a socialist society.

During two periods in modern history, the concept of the corporate state became popular. In the 1890s, under pressure from growing working-class and socialist movements, the Catholic Church tried to popularize the concept against the opposing concept of class conflict or war. In the 1970s the concept (neocorporatism) again became popular, particularly among academics responding to the growing influence of international socialist and communist movements. Each time the goal was to incorporate the usually excluded working classes, subordinate cultural groups, and extra-parliamentary movements into the decision- and policy-making processes.

The concept of the corporate state found voice among fascists. Mussolini, for example, claimed to have a corporate theory of the state. Similar but less explicit claims may be found in German fascist theories of the state. Marxists, however, find this to be merely demagoguery to conceal the real aims of fascism. They maintain that, if neoliberalism is the most radical polity under representative democracy to enforce the interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie, then fascism is the most radical and open polity with military force and violence to the same end. In other words, fascism is the most radical conservative and monist theory of politics, despite its efforts to conceal its ideology.

Marxism explores a monist theory of politics also. However, it differs from fascism radically in that it wants, like utopian socialists, to change the existing social order rather than to conserve it. It seeks to take political power in the name of the working classes and subordinated groups to establish a socialist society without any subordinated social classes or groups. In this view, socialism is the essential solution to all structurally caused social problems, offering the kingdom of freedom as opposed to the kingdom of subordination and suppression.

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See also Class; Collective Consciousness; Communitarianism; Socialism; Social Revolutions

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Corruption

Corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit. Corruption occurs if a government official has the power to grant or withhold something of value and—contrary to laws and normal procedures—trades this thing of value for a gift or reward. Among corrupt acts, bribery gets the most attention, but corruption can also include nepotism, official theft, fraud, certain patron–client relationships, and extortion.

Examples of corruption would include cases in which a high-level government official accepts cash bribes from firms to reduce competition from imports, middle-level bureaucrats favor suppliers who promise them jobs after they leave government service, a judge rules in favor of an organization because it employs his child, a customs official speeds up the administrative processing of an import shipment in return for receiving part of the shipment, or a junior health inspector accepts free meals to ignore a restaurant's sanitary violations. Some researchers extend the definition of corruption to include violations of private trust such as insider trading. Although it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between where public corruption ends and private violations begin, the usual understanding is that corruption is limited to violations of public trust.

The World Bank further divides corruption into "state capture" and "administrative corruption." State capture occurs when firms or persons pay officials to revise laws in the favor of the bribe payer, whereas administrative corruption refers to the payment of bribes to distort the execution of existing laws. Another common distinction is that "grand corruption" involves major programs at the highest levels of government, whereas "petty corruption" is associated with less important programs and officials.

Costs of Corruption

At the individual level, corrupt acts are inequitable. They allow some to avoid laws, regulations, and practices that others must follow. Thus, corruption undermines people's confidence that success results from individual effort rather than from bribery or political connections. In addition, a growing body of research shows that corruption tends to have an adverse impact on a country's economy.

Besides its adverse impact on democratic processes, widespread corruption tends to reduce economic growth and worsen the distribution of income (the poor must pay bribes but rarely receive them). It tends to increase government spending and reduce tax receipts. Because great opportunities for bribery exist in new construction, excessive unproductive investment in infrastructure often occurs at the sacrifice of necessary maintenance of existing infrastructure. Resources are diverted into the negotiating, paying, and, if necessary, attempting to enforce bribes. Finally, corruption tends to reduce the confidence of people in their own government as well as the willingness of foreigners to invest in, lend to, or trade with firms in the corrupt country.

Even crude analysis points to a significant negative relationship between corruption and the level of economic development. Figure 1 shows the relationship between Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index and income per capita adjusted for differences in the cost of living (purchasing power parity [PPP]) for 150 countries.

There are no very corrupt rich countries and there are no very honest poor ones. In fact, the correlation between perceived corruption and income per capita is –.8. Of course, correlation is not causation, and it



Figure 1 Relation of Perceived Corruption to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Income per Capita

is possible that the causation runs the other way (low incomes provide a fertile environment for corruption).

Corruption is rarely static; in the absence of an effective anti-corruption drive, it tends to worsen over time (the "ratchet effect"). Corrupt officials continuously attempt to increase the inclusiveness and complexity of laws, create monopolies, and otherwise restrict legal, economic, or social activities in order to extract even larger bribes or favors in the future. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of corruption is that it increases the level of uncertainty and forces individuals and organizations to expend extensive effort in attempts to reduce this uncertainty. For example, investors must worry not only about changing market conditions but also whether various unknown officials will seek to block their investment to extract additional bribes.

Measuring Corruption

Estimating the amount of corruption in a society is difficult because this offense often lacks a victim. For example, private citizens may find themselves excluded from business opportunities because of the length of time, expense, or complex procedures required to pursue the opportunity legally. If, to speed up the bureaucratic process, citizens either offer bribes or agree to a public official's demands, then the citizens often see the officials as doing favors—not imposing burdens. Even if bribe-paying citizens feel victimized, they may hesitate to report corruption for fear of retaliation or legal sanction. Under most legal systems, both the public officials and the private persons who engage in corrupt transactions are legally vulnerable if the corrupt acts are uncovered.

Because victims rarely report the crime of corruption, almost all studies of corruption rest on either publicized corruption investigations or surveys. Publicized investigation reports tend to grossly underestimate actual levels of corruption because only a fraction of corruption cases are investigated. Further complicating the analysis is the fact that in many countries, decisions to institute corruption investigations are political in nature.

For these reasons, most of the widely accepted studies deal with the perception of corruption as measured in surveys. Probably the best known is Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (TI/CPI), an annual listing of the perception of international business people and country analysts of the degree of corruption in more than 160 countries. The TI/CPI is a survey-of-surveys and excludes some of the most corrupt countries where few surveys are available (e.g., North Korea). The TI/CPI score ranges from 10.0, most honest, to 0.0. In 2006, Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand were perceived as the least corrupt countries with a TI/CPI score of 9.6, while Haiti had the dubious honor of placing 163rd (last) with a score of 1.8. Other subjective estimates of corruption are the International Country Risk Guide and Control of Corruption measures.

Although important methodological differences exist among these three measures, their results tend to correlate closely.

Determinants of Corruption

Although no consensus exists on why some nations suffer more from corruption than others, researchers can identify certain national attributes that correlate with greater amounts of corruption: low levels of income per capita, low literacy, hostile or disease-ridden physical environments discouraged from effective oversight of colonial administrators by their home governments, noncommon law (Napoleonic code) legal systems, socialist/statist economies, Catholic or Muslim religious beliefs, weak press, lack of economic competition (either internal [monopolies] or external [trade restrictions]), misvalued currency, and lack of political competition.

When corruption is viewed as an economic decision, the willingness of officials to accept or solicit bribes becomes a function of both the size of the bribe and the consequences of being caught. The size of the bribe relates to the scale of the benefit sought by the bribe payer, whether the official must share the bribe with colleagues, and whether other officials might provide competition by offering to provide the same illegal benefit for a smaller bribe. The consequences of being caught accepting a bribe are a function of the likelihood of being discovered, investigated, prosecuted, and convicted as well as the seriousness of the punishment if convicted. In many developing countries, although statutes may call for extremely severe punishment for bribery, the chances of being caught and convicted are effectively zero.

Fighting Corruption

Not only is the eradication of corruption impossible; many attempts to reduce it to tolerable levels have also failed. Anti-corruption policies primarily composed of exhortations to virtue and a spurt of well-publicized investigations tend to have little long-term effect. Often, various political factions will usurp the anti-corruption campaign to settle scores with their opponents.

Successful anti-corruption campaigns, such as Hong Kong's, take into account the particular country's cultural, social, political, historical, and economic situation. Successful campaigns include institutional changes to reduce the economic incentives for corruption combined with improved governance, transparency, and an aggressive effort to communicate the purpose and progress of the campaign to the public. Successful anti-corruption campaigns must have widespread support for them to move forward in the face of tenacious covert opposition. Finally, lasting results require a serious effort to change the culture of corruption. A free press that uncompromisingly seeks to expose corruption at every level and improved political competition are critical to changing this culture.

However, even well-designed anti-corruption campaigns tend to stall. A common cause of failure is a weakening of political will brought about by a corruption "J" curve effect. A J curve effect occurs when the announcement of a new anti-corruption campaign initially causes corruption to worsen. Corrupt officials, who believe that they will lose opportunities for future bribes, will seek to maximize their current corruption earnings. Such corrupt officials may also attempt to "capture" a new anti-corruption campaign by inserting themselves or their clients into the investigation process and turning it into another means of extracting bribes from the guilty (or innocent).

International Anti-Corruption Efforts

The international community, through its technical advice and financial aid, can either encourage or discourage corruption in developing countries. Foreign aid or loans that are granted without appropriate conditions give corrupt officials other funding streams to divert into their own pockets. Over the past decade, the World Bank and other international and nongovernmental organizations have increased their efforts to ensure that their aid is not stolen and that recipient countries improve their anti-corruption efforts.

Since 1977, U.S. companies that pay bribes abroad have faced legal sanctions in U.S. courts. Although other developed countries are gradually imposing similar restrictions, it is not clear whether such efforts will have a significant impact. Not only does the nature of the restrictions differ dramatically with respect to activities forbidden; as well, analysts suspect that such restrictions simply shift bribe-paying activities from the parent company to subcontractors in the developing country. International efforts can assist but not substitute for a country's effective anti-corruption campaign.

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See also Capital Flight; Corporate Crime; Economic Development; Global Economy; Multinational Corporations

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Countermovements

As social movements gain strength, they almost inevitably spark opposition, which can become organized as countermovements. These oppositional groups typically become active when a social movement's success challenges the status quo, threatening the interests of a cohesive group with its strong potential for attracting political allies. The emergence of an opposition group and the complicated dance of actions and reactions with the original movement that results can change the trajectory of a social movement's path and even derail it.

Countermovements emerge in many different kinds of social movements, such as abortion rights and civil rights. Operation Rescue and other anti-abortion groups formed in the years after *Roe v. Wade* to battle with pro-choice groups, sometimes violently, to stop women from obtaining legal abortions. The civil rights movement gained not only legislative and judicial successes in the 1960s but also a cadre of opponents, who staged their own protests and lobbying efforts to stop desegregation efforts made possible by *Brown v. Board of Education* and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By advocating for change and threatening established interests, social movements also stir up a reaction among those established interests, who aim to fight back as vigorously as possible.

What factors lead to the development of opposition groups, and when are they most effective at blocking the social change advocated by a social movement? What tactics do opposition groups usually take, and what impact do those activities have on the course and outcome of a social movement?

When Do Countermovements Form?

Looking at the history of social movements that sparked intense opposition reveals three factors that tend to lead to the formation of a countermovement. Opposition groups are most likely to develop and become active when a social movement gains some measure of success, though not a total victory, that threatens the interests of a population who are unable to block the social movement through normal institutional channels and when political elites are available and willing to support the countermovement.

A social movement must meet some measure of success in attaining its goals to be taken seriously enough to spawn an opposition movement. Advocates of the availability of safe and legal abortions did not attract much reaction until the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Roe v. Wade,* which overturned state laws banning the procedure. Fierce opposition formed in the wake of the court ruling, as the movement's goals became attainable. But total victory would squelch opposition by making resistance seem hopeless. The success of the civil rights movement in light of the landmark ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education,* which outlawed segregated public schools, led to the creation of several countermovements, such as the citizens councils in the South. The councils vanished after mobilization of federal marshals to enforce school desegregation efforts.

Countermovements are also more likely to develop if those threatened by a social movement's goal cannot block the threat through existing institutions. For example, agricultural growers, frustrated by the inability of law enforcement officials to stop labor strikes and protests staged by farmworkers seeking to unionize in California in the 1930s, formed an opposition group known as Associated Farmers (AF). Farmworkers staged more than 200 labor strikes between 1933 and 1939, but these were so peaceful that the local sheriff had no grounds to break them up. Frustrated growers, whose economic interests were at risk, formed the AF and organized vigilante groups to terrorize and intimidate the farmworkers.

The brutal AF illustrates a third factor often found in the formation of countermovements: support of political elites. The opposition group was made up of

members of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, wealthy growers, groups such as the American Legion, and industrial organizations. In fact, the local power elite formed the core of the AF, which originated as a subcommittee of the Chamber of Commerce. It was able to draw on the support of transportation and power companies, whose economic fortunes were linked with the growers.

Boston city officials were active in the anti-busing movement that mobilized in the 1970s to block the use of busing to achieve school desegregation. City officials held key positions in the organizations that opposed busing, and many countermovement activities were held in city buildings. But although city officials provided the necessary resources, they were able to dissociate themselves from the sometimes violent actions taken by more militant members. Those protestors hurled rocks at buses carrying black students and taunted the students as they went in and out of school, but city officials did no more than offer tacit support.

Elite support, however, can be a double-edged sword, as pro–nuclear power groups formed by nuclear power industries learned in the 1970s. The pro-nuclear movement was spawned largely by companies involved in the production of nuclear equipment and trade associations in the face of the anti-nuclear protest movement. Demonstrations at Seabrook, New Hampshire, Rocky Flats, Colorado, and Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, drew hundreds of protestors. Opposition groups launched a major campaign to counter those voices but were often publicly scorned as shills for the nuclear industry. The active engagement of companies, such as Westinghouse, affected their legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Actions and Reactions

The interaction between movements and countermovements is a dynamic, fluid process of thrusts and parries, as each side attempts to disarm and delegitimize the other. Countermovements can try to raise the costs of mobilization for social movements by blocking their access to resources, damaging their public image by casting movement goals in a negative light, and directly intimidating and threatening movement activists.

Pro-nuclear organizations responded to the anti-nuclear movement by organizing “truth squads” to promote their position that nuclear power was safe and discredit their opponents as wrongheaded. The pro-nuclear movement also tried to block activists’ access to federal funding to intervene in regulatory proceedings, and several campus chapters organized efforts to block the use of student fees to fund the activities of campus anti-nuclear groups. The pro-nuclear organizations also tried to intimidate protestors by hiring security firms to photograph license plates at rallies, disseminating derogatory information about activists, and pursuing trespassing charges against activists protesting at nuclear power plants. More recently, conservative groups such as the Capital Research Center have tried to discredit anti-corporate globalization groups by writing derogatory articles about them and embarrassing foundations that fund movement groups into cutting off their financial support.

Anti-abortion groups worked hard to reframe the abortion debate to discredit their opponents. A movement that thought it was advocating for safe and legal medical procedures for women seeking to terminate a pregnancy was eventually recharacterized as “baby killers” as the terms of the debate shifted from the rights of women to the rights of the unborn. Demonstrators ringed abortion clinics with signs showing gruesome pictures of aborted fetuses, and some abortion opponents turned to violence by bombing abortion clinics.

Countermovements also use conventional political methods to block social movements. The AF not only physically attacked striking farmers but also worked to convince state and local governments to pass anti-picketing ordinances, withhold relief payments from striking farmworkers, and prosecute labor leaders for their organizing activities. Anti-abortion groups have turned to the courts to seek favorable judicial rulings to uphold limits on the availability of abortion through such avenues as requiring minors to obtain parental consent or mandating counseling before a procedure can be performed. Opponents of the civil rights movement created private academies for white children in the South in the 1970s to circumvent federal demands that public schools be desegregated.

Opposition movements such as the anti-abortion movement can change the path of a social movement by changing the terms of the debate and can even ultimately defuse an activist group. A countermovement formed by scientists and professional associations to battle against animal rights activists in the 1980s was eventually able to prevail, blocking activists from shutting down animal experiments. A group of animal protectionists was able to stop two animal research projects in the 1970s and 1980s, but opposition groups formed to defend the use of animals in research.

Professional associations began discussing ways to counter the animal rights movement and to counsel research institutions to defend their practices. They were able to reframe the issue as one of helping the sick, particularly children, giving support to other universities and research centers.

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See also Anti-Globalization Movement; Black Power Movement; Chicano Movement; Fathers' Rights Movement; Social Movements; Transnational Social Movement; Women's Rights Movement

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Crime

Recent figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) report that violent and property crime are declining. For example, from 2003 to 2004, the index for violent crime indicates a drop of 2.2 percent. Perhaps more telling is that between 1995 and 2004 the same index reports an overall decline in violent crime of 32 percent. The trend for property crime is equally noteworthy. Figures from the NCVS report a 2.1 percent decrease from 2003 to 2004. Moreover, the rate of property crime from 1995 to 2004 fell by 23.4 percent. Clearly, these data suggest that the problem of crime is increasingly under control and that the mechanisms to contain it are working effectively. However, interpreting the data reveals another story.

For instance, if the focus is on the incarceration rate, the BJS reports that the number of persons in federal and state prisons rose by 1.9 percent in 2004. While this rate of increase is lower than the average rate of growth during the past decade (3.2 percent) and slightly lower than the growth rate during 2003 (2 percent), the total convict population is currently in excess of 2.4 million (approximately 1.5 million in federal and state facilities, another 800,000 in local jails, and another 100,000 in juvenile settings).

Complicating these incarceration trends are the increasing number of overcrowded facilities and concerns related to both the types of offenses committed most frequently and those identified as responsible for them. As of the end of 2004, 24 state prisons were operating at or above their highest capacity. Additionally, 40 percent of federal facilities were operating above their capacity. According to the BJS, half of those persons serving time in state prisons were incarcerated for violent crimes, 20 percent for property crimes, and 21 percent for drug offenses. Moreover, as of December 31, 2004, 104,848 women were confined in state and federal prisons. This is an astonishing 65 percent increase when compared with the 68,468 women in prison in 1995. The BJS also indicates that women represented 7 percent of all persons incarcerated in 2004. This is a 6.1 percent increase from the figure reported in 1995.

When tracking race, the incarceration trends are also quite revealing. The BJS reports that as of December 31, 2004, approximately 8.4 percent of all black males living in the United States who were between the ages of 25 and 29 were incarcerated. Hispanics made up 2.5 percent for this same age group, and whites constituted 1.2 percent for this age cohort. When combining the figures for male and female convicts, 41 percent were black, 19 percent were Hispanic, and 34 percent were white. The remaining percentage was composed of people who were either of another race or of some grouping of two or more races.

What these incarceration data suggest is that the story behind recent declining rates of crime is related to the swelling number of people criminally confined. Overwhelmingly, these individuals are poor, young, and of color. Moreover, state and federal trends in arrest, prosecution, and conviction show that persons

subjected to these criminal justice practices are typically males who also are disproportionately poor, young, and of color. How should the problem of crime be understood, given society's emphasis on incarceration?

The Problem of Definition

Different approaches to crime result in different interpretations for when (and by whom) a violation has occurred. This creates a problem with defining criminal behavior. Broadly speaking, three approaches or paradigms are discernible. The first of these is the legalistic view. The legalistic paradigm argues that if an action violates the criminal law, then that action is a crime. For example, if a federal, state, or local code exists prohibiting the smoking of cigarettes in places of business, then engaging in this behavior violates the criminal law. Thus, if a law exists banning murder, rape, torture, or school violence, then behavior that is consistent with these actions represents a transgression against the law. Criminal sanction can follow. This legalistic paradigm on crime dominates the field.

Critics identify three shortcomings with this approach. First, given that the legalistic view is the most prevalent, this means that politicians, the media, and other agents of socialization focus the general public's attention on certain types of criminality often to the near exclusion of other types of criminality. For example, most people believe that victimization brought about by person-on-person violence is the most rampant and damaging to the long-term well-being of society. Although this sort of criminality is certainly worth noting, the societal harm that follows in the wake of corporate, white-collar, and environmental wrongdoing is far more devastating. This is because the number of persons affected is considerably greater than the number affected by street crime. Thus, the legalistic view acts much like a "blinder," because those with power and influence draw our attention to some crimes and criminals (e.g., street crime, inner-city gang members) while distracting us from the illicit activities of governments, industry, and corporate America.

Second, by focusing only on those behaviors officially defined by law as criminal, actions that are harmful but not defined by law this way can continue to exist and, quite possibly, flourish. This would include actions that amount to social harm or social injury, not the least of which would include violations of human and moral rights. If the definition of crime encompassed this standard (as opposed to the strictly legalistic view), then the presence of poverty, racism, sexism, and other expressions of discrimination; the absence of safe, fair, and clean working conditions; and the lack of access to food, clothing, shelter, housing, and medical care all would be criminal.

Third, the legalistic definition of crime includes some behaviors that are not fundamentally harmful or behaviors in which there is little consensus on the extent of injury, if any, that occurs. Whereas most people would agree that rape, murder, robbery, arson, and burglary are crimes, there is far less agreement on such things as prostitution, drug use, pornography, and gambling. In most sectors of society, however, these actions are recognized as criminal. Despite this, some criminologists suggest that these latter behaviors are victimless, especially as there is no clear indication of an offender or a victim. Instead, what typically exists are willing consensual participants. Critics thus contend that the legalistic paradigm does nothing more than legislate morality in these instances.

Two alternative approaches have emerged in response to the limits of the legalistic paradigm. One of these is the social construction perspective. In this view, crime does not exist independent of what people think or how people act. Instead, crime is a product of human construction. Consequently, the "reality" of crime (e.g., definitions of lawbreaking, types of criminal offenders) is regarded as an artifact of culture and history and, thus, subject to change. Further, the social construction paradigm maintains that because these definitions vary, no act, in and of itself, is categorically or universally lawful or unlawful. Changing societal views on abortion, homosexuality, prostitution, alcohol consumption, and slavery amply demonstrate this point. These views may be linked to shifting political, economic, and social influences. In each instance what changes is not the behavior itself but how people collectively define and act toward the behavior at different periods, given the pressure from various societal influences. What changes, then, is the construction of what these actions mean supported by people's thoughts and feelings as linked to several societal forces that then reinforce these constructions as if they were objective, stable realities. Eventually, changes in language, custom, habit, socialization, and education institutionalize favored ways of perceiving these constructed realties.

The other approach that has developed in response to the shortcomings of the legalistic view is the critical

paradigm. This perspective endorses the social reality of crime but adds to it the notion that definitions of law, of criminal wrongdoing, and of criminals function to support status quo interests. These interests advance the aims of powerful segments in society. Examples of these segments include government, business, the military, industry, the medical establishment, and the media. According to the critical paradigm, certain types of offenses are less likely to be identified as crime (e.g., unfair labor practices, medical malpractice), and certain types of offenders are less likely to be arrested, prosecuted, and punished for harmful actions (e.g., corporate executives, government officials), because those with economic and political influence shape such definitions in favor of their own material and symbolic needs. There are various strains of thought within the critical paradigm (e.g., feminist criminology, left realism, anarchism, critical race theory, postmodernism); however, each emphasizes the way that those who represent the status quo structure definitions of crime so that they do not lose their accumulated power, despite committing acts that are unlawful. Supporters of the critical paradigm suggest that one example of how the crimes of the powerful are concealed, distorted, or minimized is through the reporting of the media. Television, radio, print, and various other electronic outlets—owned and operated by elite business interests—disseminate the message that certain types of crimes and criminals warrant the public's attention. The media's selective attention to these behaviors, then, dramatically shapes public sentiment such that the public is led to believe that the "real" crime problem is that which has been defined for them. As proponents of the critical paradigm explain, the selective attention on such offenses as murder, robbery, arson, and rape diverts the focus away from those social harms (criminal acts) that are the most devastating to the health and welfare of society (e.g., toxic waste dumping, global warming, corporate fraud, governmental abuses).

The Problem of Theory

The problem of crime is not limited to the choice of definition. Closely linked to this issue is the type of theory employed to explain, predict, prevent, and control offender behavior. Contemporary theories of crime fall into one of three approaches. These include neoclassical criminology, the positivist school, and the critical/postmodern orientation. Each of these three approaches focuses on certain aspects of understanding crime to the exclusion of other considerations.

Neoclassical criminology maintains that crime is a rational choice best understood through the routine activities of victims upon whom offenders prey. These activities include the availability of suitable targets (e.g., homes, businesses), the absence of capable guardians (e.g., police, pedestrians), and the presence of motivated offenders (e.g., unemployed, semiskilled, and undereducated workers). The interaction of these three conditions produces "hot spots" for criminality. Neoclassical criminology suggests that informal mechanisms of deterrence (e.g., neighborhood watch groups, community policing efforts) and shaming practices (e.g., public apology, compensation, and the victim's forgiveness) are essential to preventing and controlling crime.

Positivist criminology draws on insights from biology, sociology, psychology, religion, politics, and economics. The positive approach argues that crime is an objective, concrete reality that can be defined as such. Emphasis is placed on understanding the causes of criminality that are said to determine one's behavior. Supporters maintain that the application of the scientific method (hypothesis generation, theory testing, and empirical observation) results in the researcher's ability to explain these causes and to prevent and predict their likely reoccurrence. Adherents of positive criminology draw attention to such things as genetic predisposition, social disorganization, personality deficiencies, development failures, poor self-control, differential opportunity, and group affiliation to account for criminal wrongdoing. Positivist criminology dominates the contemporary study of crime.

The critical/postmodernism approach emphasizes the presence of differential power found among various segments of society. Power assumes many forms. Examples include economic wealth, social standing, patriarchy, heterosexist norms, race privileging, and dominant systems of communication (e.g., law, medicine, science). Critical criminological theories demonstrate how different segments in society (especially white, well, and straight men of privilege) use their power to shape a reality supportive of their group's interest, invalidating, dismissing, or otherwise controlling the needs of other, less powerful societal collectives. Consistent with this orientation, postmodernists show how the exercise of power is mediated by dominant forms of speech; this is language that structures and regulates how people think, act, feel, and exist.

This disciplining of identities supports those in positions of power.

The Problem of Research Focus

Concerns for both an agreed-upon definition of crime and the dilemma associated with the utilization of a criminological theory that best expresses this definition leads to a third fundamental issue. This is the problem of research focus. The concern for research focus addresses what criminologists should study. Several responses have been put forth, but three appear most promising: These are (1) an emphasis on conceptual models of integration, (2) strategies for restoration and offender reentry, and (3) a return to the philosophical foundations of crime.

Integration considers whether there are strategic ways to unify various (and competing) criminological theories so as to increase overall explanatory and predictive capabilities. One noteworthy recommendation along these lines argues that the multidisciplinary nature of crime requires the development of models that synthesize discipline-specific theories based on shared assumptions. Efforts at restorative justice and offender reentry attempt to make peace with crime by pursuing interventions that reconnect offenders, victims, and the communities to which both belong. One solution consistent with this logic encourages ex-offenders to engage in personal, intimate storytelling as a way of owning harm to self and others, and as a way of reconstituting their identities. The return to the philosophical foundations of crime entails a reconsideration of the rationale that informs definitions of crime and theories pertaining to it. One proposal supportive of this strategy suggests revisiting the ontological, epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions of the crime construct, especially as understood in ultramodern society.

Bruce A. Arrigo

See also Class; Crime, Fear of; Crime Rates; Crime Waves; Drug Abuse, Crime; National Crime Victimization Survey; Policing, Strategic; Postmodernism; Power; Race; Restorative Justice; Subculture of Violence Hypothesis; Victimization; Victim–Offender Mediation Model

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Crime, Drug Abuse

See Drug Abuse, Crime

Crime, Fear of

Fear of crime is widespread among people in many Western societies, affecting far more people than the personal experience of crime itself, and as such, it constitutes a significant social problem. Although researchers note that it is a somewhat problematic measure, the question most frequently used to assess fear of crime is "Is there anywhere near where you live where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" Over the past 3 decades, roughly 40 to 50 percent of individuals surveyed in the United States responded affirmatively to this question (or slight variations of it). An international survey conducted in 17 industrialized nations in 2000 found that overall, 17.5 percent of respondents expressed moderate to high fear of crime, ranging from a high of 41 percent in Switzerland to a low of 5 percent in Finland and Sweden.

The single most common reaction to fear of crime is spatial avoidance—that is, avoiding places perceived to be dangerous. In some situations, fear can serve as a beneficial, even life-saving, emotion. However, in other circumstances, fear is an emotion that unnecessarily constrains behavior, restricts personal opportunity and freedom, and, ultimately, threatens the foundation of communities. In addition to generating avoidance behaviors, fear of crime can also lead to significant attitudinal changes—including support for more stringent criminal justice policies and negative attitudes toward members of minority groups, who are frequently portrayed by the media as the main perpetrators of crime.

One of the first large-scale studies of the fear of crime, conducted under the auspices of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in the late 1960s, found that fear of crime was based less on actual personal victimization and more on inaccurate beliefs about the extent of crime. This study suggested that individuals assess the threat of victimization from information communicated to them through a variety of interpersonal relationships and the media, and from interpretations of symbols of crime to which they are exposed in their local environments. Recent studies of the fear of crime show that, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, individuals who experience the lowest actual rates of criminal victimization (women and the elderly) tend to report the greatest fear of crime, whereas those with higher rates of victimization (especially young minority males) express significantly less fear.

The majority of the general public obtains the bulk of their information about crime from the mass media—including movies, crime drama shows, and news reports. One of the first sophisticated theoretical explanations of the effects of media consumption on individuals was posited by George Gerbner and Larry Gross, whose cultivation hypothesis asserts that television viewing cultivates a "mean world view" characterized by a heightened fear of crime and inflated estimations of personal risks. Although more recent studies have refined this hypothesis and pointed out that media effects are somewhat more nuanced and vary according to the sociodemographic characteristics of media consumers, this mean world view is generated by the media's exaggeration of the frequency and seriousness of crime and major emphasis on violent crime, particularly murder. For instance, although the U.S. murder rate decreased by 20 percent between 1990 and 1998, during the same period the major television network newscasts increased the number of their stories about murder by 600 percent. In addition to a disproportional focus on murder, at various points in time, the media have generated moral panics (and hence fear among the general public) surrounding alleged threats to elderly people's safety, child abductions, and sex offenders, among others. These media depictions also frequently portray the perpetrators of crime as members of marginalized groups such as racial minorities and homeless people, when in reality these individuals most frequently demonized in the media are more likely to be victims than perpetrators of crime. Perhaps even more problematically, the media's disproportional focus on young black males as the perpetrators of crime can serve to justify more stringent criminal justice policies and expenditures and the elimination of social support systems, such as welfare and job creation programs.

In addition to the role of the media in generating fear of crime, it is important to note that politicians and legislators exploit fear of crime as a political tool. One of the first elections in the United States to utilize crime and fear of crime for advantage was the 1968 campaign of Richard Nixon. Similarly, influencing the 1988 election of George H. W. Bush in the United States were advertisements implying that presidential candidate Michael Dukakis was soft on crime. The political uses of generating fear of crime have been particularly manifest in the post–September 11, 2001, period, during which the governments of several Western countries, especially the United States and Britain, have emphasized their vulnerability to terrorism, thereby often generating fear among the general public and to justify the passage of several laws that eroded civil liberties. Similar to the depictions of crime being associated with members of minority groups, the portrayal of terrorists as primarily Muslim and Arab has led to increased incidents of racism against members of these groups.

Clayton Mosher and Scott Akins

See also Community Crime Control; Crime; Crime Rates; Crime Waves

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Crime Rates

Crime rates are standardized measures of crime levels. In mathematical terms, a crime rate can be expressed as $(M/N) \times K$ where M is an estimate of the amount of crime occurring in a particular setting during a specified period of time, N is an estimate of the population at risk, and K is a constant determined by the analyst. So, if for hypothetical Community A, we determine that for the last calendar year, there were 9,300 crimes committed against property, and if the population of Community A is 458,000, the property crime rate per 100,000 for this community for the year in question is calculated as $(9{,}300/458{,}000) \times 100{,}000 = 2{,}030.6$. Using this general approach, crime rates can be calculated for any size social unit from the neighborhood to the nation-state and for any temporal period.

Unlike raw counts of crimes, rates take the size of the at-risk population into account. Whereas a comparison of the raw or absolute numbers of crimes across communities or within any particular community over time might suggest significant variations, a comparison of crime rates allows the analyst to determine whether the differences are real or merely a function of differences in population size.

Crime rates are useful for a number of reasons. As standardized measures of crime levels, they can serve as useful indicators of the quality of community life. Policy planners utilize crime rate measures to assess the need for social interventions and the relative success of crime control policies. Academic investigators rely on crime rate data as they attempt to investigate the relative value of empirical predictions associated with competing criminological theories.

In a fundamental way, the value of crime rate measures is reliant upon the appropriateness of the estimates of the numerators and denominators used in rate construction. Estimates of the former tend to be derived from one of three sources: the data collected by police, the reports of members of the general public who are asked about their victim experiences in surveys, and the reports of offenders. It has been well established in the research literature that each of these sources of crime data has characteristic flaws. As a result, it is prudent to think of these numerator estimates as somewhat biased samples of all crimes occurring.

The denominators of crime rates also present some formidable problems. Although so-called crude crime rates (like the hypothetical example given in the first paragraph of this entry) offer several advantages over the use of raw numbers, they fail to take account of information regarding the internal structure of the at-risk population. For instance, because most crime is committed by people in early adulthood (ages 18–26), it might make more sense to standardize the rates with reference to the size of this segment of the population rather than with reference to the overall population. Thus, two communities of similar size might differ with respect to their crude crime rates because one is truly more lawless than the other, or because one of the communities might have much more of its population clustered in younger age groups. A comparison of age-specific crime rates would permit an assessment of the value of these two accounts.

Vincent F. Sacco

See also Crime; Crime Waves

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Crime Waves

The term *crime wave* has two distinct (but related) meanings in criminological and popular discourse. The most familiar meaning associates the term with relatively rapid and abrupt upward (and subsequent

downward) shifts in rates of crime. A second usage suggests that the term refers not to actual crime rate increases—in any narrow sense—but to changes in levels of public fear, anxiety, and publicity surrounding the problem of crime. Whereas the former usage emphasizes an understanding of crime waves as "objective" phenomena, the latter emphasizes their "subjective" character.

As a measure of actual crime rate change, this concept has no specific, agreed-upon meaning. However, most commonly, it references crime rate variations occurring over the shorter term rather than the longer term. In this respect we can speak of crime waves in reference to relatively distinct, historically specific episodes, such as the increases in gangsterism in the Midwest during the 1930s, the nationwide post–World War II urban crime rate increase, or the rapidly escalating rates of extortionate crime that plagued Italian neighborhoods in large American cities during the first decades of the 20th century. We can assess crime waves objectively as mathematical entities through several key dimensions, including length (How long does it take crime waves to rise and fall?), shape (Do crime waves rise and fall with equal rapidity?), linearity (Do the factors that affect crime rate development have consistent effects?), and synchronicity (Is the crime wave just a local or is it a more general phenomenon?).

Efforts to explain sudden and rapid shifts in crime levels focus on processes of social change. Researchers have shown three major types of relevant variables. One group of explanations relates to various social dislocations, such as war, rapid economic change, or institutional breakdown. A second explanation focuses on the diffusion of cultural patterns. So-called copycat crimes are perhaps the clearest example of such a dynamic. A third type stresses the ways in which the various kinds of social and technological innovations facilitate the commission of crimes posing a serious challenge to the existing social control apparatus. An alternative way of thinking about crime waves is as social constructions. In other words, crimes waves can be said to exist when there are widespread public perceptions that they exist—irrespective of what more objective measures of crime level variation might indicate. In this sense, crime waves imply increased public anxiety, higher levels of media attention, and eventually more coercive forms of social control reactions. Although this meaning of crime wave might be less intuitive, it is actually the formulation with which the term has been most often associated in recent years.

A naive interpretation of the relationship between these two kinds of crime rates might suggest highly correlated empirical realities. However, this does not appear to be the case. The social dynamics that drive changes in crime rate levels appear, in many cases, to be only tangentially related to the dynamics that drive shifts in fear and perception.

Vincent F. Sacco

See also Crime; Crime Rates

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CULTS

Cults, more appropriately called "new religious movements" in sociology, have emerged since the 1950s in the United States (and elsewhere) and have gathered much media attention. Many of these faiths provide religious alternatives to mainstream Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism and are popular with young adults. New religions, such as the Unification Church ("the Moonies"), Scientology, Hare Krishna, and the People's Temple, garner negative press and public antipathy for three primary reasons.

First, many people—especially family members of these young adults—are concerned about the nature of their conversion. Have they freely decided to convert, or has the cult pressured them to join? Worse, has the cult brainwashed these new members, robbing them of free will? With little information forthcoming, from the faith or the convert, family members often perceive that brainwashing has occurred. It seems impossible that their beloved has freely chosen such an odd faith, so the group must have done something nefarious. If or when family members are able to question these new recruits, they cannot articulate their new faith's theology clearly, and the family members' worries grow.

But conversion theories would predict such a problem. Although there is some debate, much sociological research on conversion states that adults convert not for theological reasons but because they have developed social bonds with members. Individuals

who convert often meet the new faith at an emotionally perilous moment, such as a romantic breakup, the first year away at college, and so on. The new religion tends to envelope the person with hospitality (pejoratively, this was known as "love bombing") and praise for seeking the correct path to spiritual enlightenment. Conversely, as these affective bonds grow with the new faith, ties to family and friends not involved in the new religion weaken. Families often feel isolated from their loved ones once they convert and wonder how much of the isolation is ordered by the new religious movement to hide them away from those who might talk them out of the faith. When families reunite, questioning about the conversion is often the topic of conversation, and new converts feel interrogated by those who claim to love them. They respond by further reducing contact, which only increases their families' suspicions.

The second reason that cults are perceived as worrisome is the range of behaviors members pursue after they have been converted. Caught up in the fervor of saving the world, practitioners of new religious movements often engage in constant recruitment. Even worse, at least one new religion (the Children of God, now known as The Family) encourages female members to use their sexuality to convert wealthy men, a practice known as "flirty fishing." Fundraising is viewed suspiciously by outsiders, especially practices such as selling flowers in airports. After some members of The Family left the group and went to the press, nearly all complained about exhausting schedules, wherein they would rise before dawn and not return home until late. Questions were raised by family members and in the press about where all the money had gone; was it financing extravagant lifestyles of the charismatic leaders?

Other behaviors that are perceived by outsiders as odd are dietary practices, such as vegetarianism (Hare Krishna); the use of chemicals/drugs (the Love Israel family's ritual use of toluene); the practice of spiritual counseling using E-meters to become "clear" (e.g., Scientology); unfamiliar clothing norms and trance possession (e.g., Bhagwan Shree Rasjneesh); the belief in extraterrestrial life (e.g., Heaven's Gate), and so on.

Even more serious allegations have been raised about some new religious movements. Children who grew up in the Children of God told of horrific physical and sexual abuse in the boarding schools used by the group. While never proven, allegations of child sexual abuse were among the reasons the government used to justify its 1993 raid against the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas. Female ex-members of many movements have given accounts of being asked to sexually service leaders, in part to demonstrate their religious commitment. Undoubtedly physical and sexual abuse occurred in the People's Temple, led by Jim Jones, especially during its time in Guyana. Perhaps the best-known examples of new religious movements using violence are Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 attack on the Japanese subway system and the 1978 People's Temple assassination of a U.S. congressman, Leo Ryan, followed by the murder-suicide of the nearly 1,000 members.

The third reason that cults are perceived as worrisome concerns if and how members are able to leave: Are they free to simply walk away? Or must families hire experts, called deprogrammers, to help members leave? In part, the debate over leaving these new religious movements mirrors the conversion debate. Those who feel that cult members freely choose to belong tend to believe that they are free to leave. Those who feel that the group has nefariously done something to the convert to facilitate joining the cult, naturally assume that the person will need intervention to leave. Initially, deprogrammings were often forcibly accomplished, by kidnapping the member and taking him or her to an undisclosed location prepared for the intervention. The deprogrammer, assistants, and the family engaged in emotional dialogue with the believer, until the member chose to leave (adherents to the brainwashing hypothesis tend to use the phrase "snapped out of the cult" to express what happened during the deprogramming). After some members of various cults, who had been kidnapped but managed to escape, sued the deprogrammers and their families for kidnapping, a "gentler" form of deprogramming, called "rational evaluation," emerged.

One of the many misconceptions about the emergence of these so-called cults is that this was a unique time in U.S. history and that they burst forth, primarily in the post–Vietnam War era, as young adults struggled in the changed sociopolitical landscape. This claim, notwithstanding its popularity, is false. A careful examination of religious history has shown that new religious movements have long been a part of U.S. history, as any student of the First and Second Great Awakenings knows. While many movements arose, only to die off, others evolved into established

religions, such as the Church of Latter-day Saints (the Mormons).

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See also Anomie; Social Exclusion

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Cultural Capital

The concept of cultural capital, which examines the interactions of culture with the economic class system, originated with French sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron. Although conceived within the context of French culture, much of Bourdieu's writing has been translated into English, resulting in the extensive use of his concept in sociological and educational research in the United States and elsewhere.

In "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction" Bourdieu sought to understand why children from different social classes in the 1960s exhibited unequal scholastic achievement. He examined how children from the upper class profit in school settings from the activation and distribution of cultural knowledge their parents directly transmitted to them.

In a subsequent writing, "The Forms of Capital," in 1983, Bourdieu discussed three interrelated and inextricably linked types of capital—economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital. Cultural capital similarly encompasses three forms: the embodied state, the objectified state, and the institutionalized state.

Embodied Capital

In its most fundamental form, cultural capital is "linked to the body," partly unconscious and acquired early on in life. Individuals must often exert effort to incorporate it. In his description of embodied cultural capital, Bourdieu borrowed a related concept, "habitus." Habitus can be understood as culturally learned performances that take the form of taken-for-granted bodily practices, ways of thinking, dispositions, or taste preferences. Embodied capital includes such things as manners, habits, physical skills, and styles that are so habitually enacted as to be virtually invisible. Embodied capital enacts values and tendencies socialized from one's cultural history that literally become part of the individual. Knowledge itself, Bourdieu suggested, is actively constructed as habitus, influenced by individual cultural history, and available to be mobilized by experiences in everyday life.

Objectified Capital

Things or possessions owned or acquired by people are objectified capital, but the objectified form of cultural capital cannot be understood without acknowledging its relationship to embodied capital and habitus. This form of capital is not of the body but rather lies outside of the body. The concept is similar to the Marxist or economist concept of capital: things that can be used, exchanged, or invested and may provide an advantage in societal interactions. Individual persons are not the only possessors of objectified capital. Social institutions and social systems acquire objectified capital that affects their value and social status, for example, the built environment of schools and the social networks and connections of students, faculty, and alumni. Objectified capital operates to maximize benefits in a wide variety of social situations.

Institutionalized Capital

Institutionalized cultural capital manifests as academic qualifications that recognize and legitimate the embodied and objectified forms of cultural capital possessed by a person. Institutionally sanctioned capital implies what Bourdieu called "cultural competence." Therefore, persons possessing academic qualifications can be compared and exchanged, and monetary value can be placed on their qualifications. Bourdieu asserted that the value of institutionalized cultural capital is determined only in relation to the labor market, where the exchange value of cultural capital is made explicit.

Cultural Capital and Societal Consequences

In all its forms cultural capital is an accumulation of resources that cannot be acquired as instantaneously as economic capital. Resources acquired over time can, theoretically, be mobilized and invested to gain an advantage in various fields. *Fields*, or *social contexts*, in Bourdieu's use of the term, are complex and fluid institutions, customs, and social rules. Depending on the field in which one is operating, the value of the person's cultural capital changes. The social issues where the concept of cultural capital is helpful include social class, education, inequality, power, and exclusion.

Cultural capital becomes mobilized and reproduced through primary and secondary socialization processes. For this reason childrearing practices and parental involvement in schools have been extensively investigated. Various forms of cultural capital, when activated through interaction with social institutions, may be valued unequally. For example, schools may not reward the embodied capital of working-class parents who practice rigid distinctions between work and play. Social institutions reward, ignore, or punish different types of cultural capital, thereby creating and perpetuating inequality.

Uses and Misuses of Cultural Capital

Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital is fluid and multidimensional, with various forms nested in such a way that they are inseparable within the individual; however, the concept also evolved over time in his writings. Moreover, as a "grand theory" in the sociological tradition of Karl Marx and Talcott Parsons, cultural capital has been critiqued for the overabundance of definitions and lack of empirical referents. Application and misuse of the concept of cultural capital has led to confusion and a lack of clarity as to what the term actually means.

The use of the concept of cultural capital, as intended by Bourdieu, is paramount to the explanation and description of one vein of influential factors relating to social problems and issues in the social sciences and in educational research, in particular. Cultural capital harnesses the intrapersonal as well as the extrapersonal knowledge and experiences that help shape a person's interaction with others and with social institutions, such as the school. However, if defined too narrowly, as in the case of deeming valuable only the cultural capital of the upper class, maximal potential of the concept cannot be reached. Given the social diversity of U.S. society, what constitutes cultural capital should be examined in context and both inside and outside the boundaries of social class.

One major weakness with respect to the use of cultural capital in the exploration of social problems is that so many people misunderstand the concept and use it within a deficit paradigm to point out the failures of working-class parents to properly educate their children. Therefore, it is important for researchers and practitioners to identify both the positive and negative aspects of cultural capital from all types of social groups. This practice can give these aspects value, broaden the understanding of an individual's interactions with social institutions, and give strength to the concept of cultural capital.

The versatility of the concept of cultural capital provides fertile ground for future research across disciplines and is especially useful in the fields of education and sociology. The notion of cultural capital is also connected to discussions of social, intellectual, and human capital. Future research that examines these connections will further develop the concept of cultural capital and its potential value for understanding current social issues.

Gina Pazzaglia and Eric Margolis

See also Class; Cultural Values; Social Capital

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Cultural Criminology

Cultural criminology combines theories of culture, subculture, and crime. This field of crime study draws on a mixture of classical and contemporary theoretical and methodological perspectives. In doing so, cultural criminology provides a holistic approach to the study of crime, not only to gain insight into the social construction of crime but also to analyze the intersections of subculture, popular culture, politics, and institutions where meanings about crime and criminals are shaped and produced.

One area of cultural criminology thus focuses on the construction of criminal subcultures, categories of criminal conduct, and crime control strategies through media portrayals and how each influences the others. Analysts view the media as playing an important role in shaping, but not creating, shared understandings of crime and criminals. An ongoing process of image and information dissemination creates meaning about crime and criminals, continually reinventing and reinforcing stories about illicit subcultures, crime, and criminals, thereby establishing identity within these situated media portrayals.

It is not that crime has become fashionable as a result of the media attention given to certain subcultures and crimes. Rather, the media play a role in shaping what crimes and deviant behaviors become popularized and associated with particular populations. Of interest is the extent to which the popular culture adopts those representations. It is popular culture—shaped but not created by the media—that influences the construction of criminal identities and vice versa. This interplay constructs meaning about crime and deviance. Cultural criminologists thus analyze this interplay to understand how the situated meanings of subcultural groups evolve and also how this process informs debate about deviant and criminal categories and control strategies.

The influential power of the media and popular culture is not limited to their ability to shape and influence styles of crime. Cultural criminologists also view the media as politically oriented, promoting elite perspectives through stereotypes about marginalized groups. Cultural criminologists point to the selection of certain subcultural styles to be criminalized, even though the behavioral characteristics of these groups often do not differ significantly from other subcultural movements and actions. Enterprises acting as moral entrepreneurs mediate social control and thus favor the control of certain groups over others.

The media subsequently produce shared understandings about the intersections of criminals and institutions of control. Crime control strategies are the product of a media-saturated culture influenced by selected portrayals of deviance, crime, and criminals. As a result, cultural criminologists focus on how the media and popular culture shape a culture of crime and how this, in turn, influences the culture of policing and policing strategies.

T. Patrick Stablein

See also Crime; Deviance; Mass Media; Racial Profiling; Rational Choice Theory; Scapegoating; Self-Fulfilling Prophecy; Social Constructionist Theory; Subculture of Violence Hypothesis

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Cultural Diffusion

In its simplest form, cultural diffusion is the borrowing of cultural elements from one culture by another. Aspects of material culture include clothing styles, musical structures, medicine, and agricultural practices, whereas normative traits such as ideas, behavioral patterns, religion, language, and values are another component of culture. Borrowing occurs either between two different cultures (intercultural) or within the same cultural grouping (intracultural). For example, in the case of intercultural borrowing, a nondemocratic developing country can borrow the political processes and structures of democracy and feminism to change tyrannical rule. Intercultural diffusion is a result of patterns of involuntary and voluntary migration. On the other hand, an example of intracultural borrowing would be baby boomers adopting iPod technology from the MySpace Generation. Ideas and material culture can also spread

independently of population movement or direct contact between the inventor and receptor cultures.

Process of Cultural Diffusion

Borrowing from one culture to another is common although the donor culture is not necessarily the original inventor. For example, of the many new academic books and articles published every year, an analysis of these "new" texts and themes will reveal few ideas that can be labeled "original." The history of thought and creativity must thus be taken into consideration while exploring the parameters of cultural diffusion. Does the borrowing culture fuse or merge with the contributing culture wherein both cultures lose their single identity? Why, in fact, do cultures have a need to borrow from other cultures? Is it out of necessity? An underlying assumption is that borrowing makes a culture better, stronger, more evolved as in adapting to constantly changing physical environments, more modern, and hence, more civilized. This assumption leads to the observation that some cultural elements do not diffuse.

Several social issues are important when considering the process of diffusion. Is the borrowed cultural element a basic need, such as technology that harvests food crops for human consumption? Does it enhance the quality of life, as in the case of people who use in vitro fertilization as a family planning option? Just because the scientific community argues the importance and immediate use of stem cell research, does it mean that a culture's normative structure needs rules on sanctions for this technology? What has happened to individuals' civil liberties around the world in a post–9/11 world surveillance culture? Also, when religious institutions televise their services, are these efficient means to reach and shepherd larger congregations? Perhaps an even more fraught argument to technological intervention in social institutions would be the tenuous use of teaching social science classes online or offering them through televised satellite centers. What happens to the affective, effusive, volatile, provocative, soul searching, compassion, and empathy building in both of these cases? The impulse for efficiency is positive, but an arguable consequence is the loss of accountability and a diminished sense of human connectedness. Guiding the adaptation of the imported cultural element are evaluative considerations, the mechanics of implementation, and the terms of transfer decided upon by the receptor culture.

If the cultural element under consideration is not compatible with the values of the dominant culture, key decision makers, or gatekeepers, its importation is unlikely. This power elite can also force change on groups not in agreement with the imported practice. Obliging elderly people not computer literate to order their medication online and have it delivered to their homes is a good example of borrowed cultural elements forced on receptor cultures. Although this process may eliminate the need to pick up medicine in person, the reality that the elderly are more familiar with typewriters than with computers suggests that there are some overlooked details in implementation. Subcultures thus can retain their identity, while losing their autonomy, with a borrowed element used as a social control mechanism.

Cultural diffusion occurs quickly, given the speed and reach of telecommunications. For example, other countries as well as U.S. cities addressed post–9/11 security strategies through cultural borrowing facilitated by the immediacy of ubiquitous mass-mediated communication. Instant communications also enable inventor cultures to advertise and market their ideas to receptor cultures who feel compelled to borrow so they can keep apace with swiftly changing world trends in a competitive post–9/11 global economy.

The Politics of Cultural Appropriation

Cultural diffusion is not devoid of political ramifications. For example, when a dominant group steals from a minority through diffusion and still controls and oppresses the subordinate group, this is exploitation. Consider the case of white rappers in America borrowing from the black hip-hop culture. With its cultural elements stolen, co-opted, appropriated, and uncredited, the contribution of the subordinate (inventor) culture becomes diminished and diluted to the point of lacking social significance. However, it could also suddenly have social meaning because the dominant group now engages it.

The appropriating culture can take the borrowed element and apply new, different, and insignificant meanings compared with its intended meaning, or the meaning can be stripped altogether. Examples of cultural appropriation through diffusion are naming athletic team mascots, musical subcultures borrowing or

stealing from one another, and baggy clothing in urban culture becoming mainstream in suburban America. Once again, this also raises the issue of how original the culture of invention is and who owns certain cultural elements. Some practices are transcontinental, and no one should own or claim them as exclusive and profit from them, although these things do, indeed, happen.

Cultural diffusion is not always political. When cultures borrow from one another, they can develop and refine the element that they are adopting. They can also fall on new discoveries as they customize elements for use within their own culture. Creative development becomes a part of invention and is a result of serendipity rather than of calculated intent and design. For example, labanotation is a system of notation for dance movement, but architects can borrow elements of this system to design spatial models for creative urban architectural design. Whether it is U.S. football borrowing from British rugby by allowing players to touch the ball, Impressionist musical composers borrowing from medieval modal scale structures, Elvis Presley or Eminen borrowing from black musical subcultures, or cotton developed and refined from one culture to another, the idea and politics of borrowing from cultures is not new and will continue.

H. Mark Ellis

See also Cultural Lag; Cultural Relativism; Cultural Values; Culture Shock; Culture Wars; Social Change

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Cultural Imperialism

Cultural imperialism refers to the practice by which one society forwards or imposes its cultural beliefs, values, normative practices, and symbols on another society. Generally, cultural imperialism involves a power relationship, because only those groups enjoying economic, military, or spatial dominance have the ability to inflict their systems upon another.

The roots of cultural imperialism are commonly traced to the ancient regimes of Greece and Rome. The Greeks, for example, built amphitheaters, gyms, and temples in the lands they conquered, attempting to centralize these distinctly Greek cultural rituals in the lives of those they controlled. Likewise, the Romans worked to "Romanize" every land they annexed. As they invaded new regions, the Romans bombarded the conquered with the glittering standards, towering temples, and marble statues that embodied Roman ideals. Coins bearing pictures of Caesar kept the chain of command fresh in the minds of the conquered, while official rituals and festivals replaced the religious practices of non-Romans.

After 1500, when the exploration of the Americas, Africa, and Asia thrived, Western European nations worked aggressively to expand their economic bases. Cultural imperialism often served as the tool by which these nations secured resource-rich lands. Language was key in this regard. England, for example, imposed the Book of Common Prayer on all peoples it conquered. They did so in an attempt to obliterate native languages such as Cornish, Manx, and Gaelic and establish English as the official tongue of new "acquisitions." The English believed that as the languages of the conquered slipped into obscurity, so too would many elements of the non-English cultures that sustained them. The Spanish took a similar position, going so far as to rename the populations of the regions they colonized. In the Philippines, for example, a Spanish governor replaced the surnames of native peoples with Spanish names taken from a Madrid directory. He viewed the strategy as a means of forcefully imposing Spain's cultural standards on those whom he now administered. In the 20th century, the Japanese implemented a similar strategy in Korea. After years of occupying Korea, the Japanese mandated a policy which replaced traditional Korean names with those of Japan, and mandated Shinto worship in place of Korean religious practices. The Japanese viewed these strategies as a way of absorbing Korea, giving Japan an additional workforce and strength as it pursued the imperialist policies that contributed to World War II.

Of course, cultural imperialism is not always forced. Often, the culture of a dominant power is

voluntarily embraced by those exposed to it. Corporations such as Coca-Cola or McDonald's are often accused of homogenizing diverse cultures and inflicting an ethos of consumerism across the globe. Others, such as Estee Lauder and Christian Dior, are accused of imposing Western values of beauty. Yet, these products are often welcomed by populations as symbols of progress and modernization. For many, these products represent complements to the host culture rather than replacements of it.

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See also Cultural Diffusion; Cultural Values; Hegemony; Multinational Corporations; Social Change; Values

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Cultural Lag

Cultural lag occurs when the proliferation of technological and material advancement outpaces the normative dimensions of a civilization's blueprint for social existence. When technology advances more quickly than the social expectations and considerations surrounding new innovations, cultural lag is present.

Although technological development and knowledge for knowledge's sake are indicators of heightened human evolution, without shared rules and understandings to govern such creations, these developments can nullify any potential social improvement. Without social consensus of new folkways, mores, and laws to understand, contextualize, and utilize new technology, knowledge without immediate application or without foresight of consequences prior to its development and introduction into a society can be deleterious to a culture's well-being. For example, computerizing tollbooth collections can result in more efficient highway vehicular movement and aid in the reduction of environmental pollution, but changing the behaviors of drivers to convert and conform to this change cannot be done with technology. In fact, driving accidents and billing mishaps may initially increase at the onset of implementing this technological innovation.

Technological change and advancement encompass all areas of social life, including warfare, engineering, transportation, communication, and medicine. Social beliefs and the need for immediate change often dictate the rate of introducing these changes into a society. When considering the merit of these changes, one must take into account the consequences of displacement of the old with the new. Does the innovation offer more utilitarian value, and are moral and ethical conditions improved? Are innovators producing change without regard to consequences? For example, is the rate of semiskilled labor displacement considered when computerizing tollbooth collections or retooling workers to keep pace with technological change? What happens to the profit margin when calculating a cost–benefit analysis, and what happens to unemployment rates in society? At what rate can new technology be introduced into a society without having adverse effects? Also, if human embryonic stem cells provide better material for fighting degenerative diseases than do adult stem cells, does the potential of curing and understanding chronic disease outweigh the extinguishing of the embryo during the stem cell harvest? Who gets to define and put a value on life? Who gets to prioritize various stages of the life course? Is society better and more efficient as a result of these changes and possessing this type of technical know-how?

Proponents of technological development view technology as advancement and key to improving social conditions, for example by reducing poverty and economic dependence. They see technology as making social processes more efficient, where individuals would have access to better living conditions and more leisure time, thus providing expanded opportunities for all under the banner of democratic idealism. Individual citizens would also benefit by having more freedom and not having to rely on traditional social arrangements and interactions within socially established institutions.

For example, the introduction of in vitro fertilization (IVF) as an alternative in the procreative process and in family planning led to contested legal issues and trials. IVF forced society to reconsider the definitions of family, fetal ownership, motherhood, and parenthood. Another new definitional reconsideration was using the body for economic gain (prostituting

oneself), as some thought that renting out a womb and being a gestation mother (also called "surrogate mother") for the money or the joy of allowing a childless person or couple to experience parenthood were honorific uses of the body. Yet traditional sex workers who used their bodies (sex/reproductive organs) for financial gain in the name of sex for recreation remained stigmatized as morally debased. At the same time, many people consider gays and lesbians who use this reproductive technology as contributing to the decay of the traditional family, morally scrutinizing them differently than they would a single and financially successful female who might choose single parenthood. However, to be a gestation/birth/surrogate mother, an egg donor, a sperm donor, and so on was not considered sexualized or corrupt. Instead, the initial issues raised by this technology were embedded in the threat to the traditional family structure, fetal ownership, and adoption law.

Just because a society possesses this knowledge and skill, does it make life better? Single people do not have to wait for marriage, do not need a partner to rear a child, and infertile couples can have more alternatives to traditional adoption. While these technologies give adults more personal choice in family planning, what are the long-term effects on children who enter family structures under these technologies? Is the fact that we possess this knowledge a precursor to other forms of genetic engineering and manipulation where we will see other eugenics movements? Will such medical innovations fall into nefarious hands? The fact that we can know the sex of a fetus in utero also should not lead to selective abortion because some believe that it is harder to rear girls or that girls are of a lower social status than boys. Is this dangerous knowledge, or is it information for individuals to make informed personal choices? Should a couple have the option of whether or not to bring a special-needs child into this world, or should they simply play the hand that they are dealt?

Advancements in medical technologies continue to raise unaddressed social expectations and sanctions. What social issues must be taken into account when considering the priority of organ, facial, and limb transplantation or vaccine testing on human subjects? As social adaptations to new technologies occur, adjustments also occur in the context of public debate where regulatory agencies oversee public safety while not interfering with economic profitability. For technological advancement to benefit society, it must evolve alongside a social system that sees its full potential.

When we consider the benefit of offering online degrees promoting extra hours in the day by minimizing transportation to traditional classrooms, we must also consider the impact that distance learning has on academic integrity, intellectual ownership, and the potential decline of conflict resolution skills in face-to-face encounters when experiencing highly effusive, affective, and emotive subject material and real-life situations. Creating more hours in the day creates more opportunity for self-definition around the acquisition of things. When we do not achieve these new and heightened standards of success, we have more ammunition to contribute to a poor self-image.

Making printed books available on audio should not increase illiteracy or aliteracy. Televised religious services should not promote social disconnection and isolation, nor should the availability of fast food be blamed for weakening familial relationships. The military strategy during time of war to eradicate oppressive political regimes while minimizing collateral damage is not an exact science. Civilian casualties are bound to happen. Is technological advancement in warfare a just endeavor to bring about political change? Are condoms now a form of birth control and death control (with respect to AIDS)? How do we currently understand and utilize this technology? Is the warehousing of knowledge without immediate application and full public understanding and awareness of this knowledge contributive to anomie (the social condition in which behavioral expectations are not present or are unclear or confusing, and people do not know how to behave or what to expect from one another)? Technological advancement, its rate of infusion into a society, and how willingly, quickly, and thoughtfully a society addresses the social consequences and implications of these innovations will dictate the level of cultural lag that a society experiences.

H. Mark Ellis

See also Anomie; Cultural Diffusion; Cultural Values; Genetic Engineering; Social Change; Social Control; Social Disorganization

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Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism is a methodological concept rooted in social theory. The term indicates that a society's beliefs, values, normative practices, and products must be evaluated and understood according to the cultural context from which they emerge. No society should be evaluated with reference to some set of universal criteria, and no foreign culture should be judged by the standards of a home or dominant culture. Based on these ideas, cultural relativists would never deem a particular thought or behavior to be "right" or "wrong." Rather, they would argue that rightness or wrongness is *relative to* a specified group or society.

Roots of the Concept

Cultural relativism can be traced to the writings of philosopher Immanuel Kant and, later, works by Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt. These scholars defined the mind as a critical mediator of sensate experience. They argued that when the mind apprehends stimuli from the environment, it molds perceptions with reference to (a) the specifics of one's spatial surroundings, (b) the cultural practices and artifacts that define those surroundings, and (c) the temporal or biographical lineage that places one in those surroundings. From this perspective, reality cannot be defined as a universal or objective phenomenon. Culture and biography add a subjective dimension to reality.

In the mid-1900s, anthropologist Franz Boas took the aforementioned ideas and used them to establish a formal research methodology. Under his methodology he urged a rejection of universal evaluative criteria. He advised researchers to adopt an objective, value-free stance, to free themselves from the conscious and unconscious bonds to their own enculturation. Boas also demanded that no culture be considered superior or inferior. Rather, all cultures must be viewed as equal. For Boas, the purpose of research was not moral evaluation but the discovery and understanding of cultural differences.

Boas's ideas stood in direct contrast to popular comparative methods of the day—methods more concerned with the evolutionary foundations of cultural similarities. But cultural relativism was steeped in political issues as well. Its tenets directly addressed what many believed was a Western European tendency toward "ethnocentrism." Ethnocentrism, as defined by sociologist William Graham Sumner, refers to the perception of one's group as the center of civilization and, thus, a gauge by which all other groups should be judged. In the 1900s, a period in which international contact was becoming increasingly routine, distinguishing between observation and evaluation proved a critical task.

Examples From the Field

One can invoke many concrete examples to illustrate the usefulness of cultural relativism in field research. Consider a common gesture—sticking out one's tongue. Americans commonly interpret this gesture as a sign of defiance, mockery, or provocation. Yet, if American researchers applied this meaning while engaged in global studies, they would likely miss important information about their object of inquiry. Anthropologists tell us, for example, that in Tibet, sticking out one's tongue is a sign of polite deference. In India, it conveys monumental rage. In New Caledonia, sticking out one's tongue signifies a wish of wisdom and vigor. And in the Caroline Islands, it is a method of banishing devils and demons. To garner the variant meanings of this single behavior, researchers must immerse themselves in the culture they are studying. They must draw meaning from the target culture's inhabitants as opposed to making assumptions drawn from their own cultural dictionaries.

Cultural relativists claim that language is at the center of their studies, in that a society's structure emerges from the structure of its language. British explorer Mary Kingsley forcefully illustrated this idea in her writings on Samoan culture. As an unmarried woman, Kingsley discovered that spinsterhood was

a foreign concept to Samoans. A woman alone was viewed as a taboo presence. Once discovering this belief, Kingsley proved able to circumvent the problem. When she needed to travel, she would tell the Samoans that she was looking for her husband and point in the direction she wished to travel. By presenting herself as a married woman wishing to reunite with her spouse, she conformed to the social structure established by the Samoan language. With Samoans now happy to facilitate her reunion, Kingsley regained her ability to move throughout the country.

Demographer David Helin notes that failing to consider the relative nature of culture can prove costly. Many American businesses have learned this lesson the hard way. For example, ethnocentrism blinded General Motors to the reasons behind the poor international sales of its Chevrolet Nova. Within Spanish-speaking nations, the automobile's name *Nova* translated to the phrase "No Go." A similar disaster befell American chicken mogul Frank Purdue. While his slogan "It Takes a Tough Man to Make a Tender Chicken" enjoyed success in the United States, when translated to Spanish, Purdue's slogan became "A Sexually Excited Man Will Make a Chicken Affectionate." With these examples, we learn the importance of avoiding simple translation of one's ideas to cultures with different meaning systems.

The Moral Debate

The objectivity to which cultural relativists aspire is admirable for some. Yet, many feel that the method introduces problems of its own. For example, Robert Edgerton asks, If practices such as cannibalism, infanticide, genital mutilation, genocide, and suicide bombings are normative to a particular cultural context, does that make them right? The cultural relativist position, taken to its extreme, would frame events such as the Holocaust, the 9/11 attacks, torture at Abu Ghraib, and ethnic cleansing in Darfur as normative to the cultures from which they emerge and, thus, morally justifiable. Edgerton supports the notion of objective evaluation. But he also argues that once such data are gathered, researchers must carefully review their findings. If a culture's values, beliefs, and behaviors are different yet beneficial and adaptive, then they must be respected. But according to Edgerton's point of view, if values, beliefs, and behaviors endanger people's health, happiness, or survival, ranking cultures in terms of their moral health becomes necessary.

Karen Cerulo

See also Cultural Values; Ethnocentrism; Relative Deprivation

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Cultural Values

The notion of "cultural values" brings together two powerful social science concepts to produce a concept that is seductive yet slippery and contentious. It is seductive in that it purports to explain or interpret human behavior, especially differences in behavior between groups, through an emphasis on how human lives are also differently valued moral lives. It accomplishes this through deploying the concept of value as that which makes people conceive of what is right, beautiful, and good and, hence, what is desirable. Thus, groups with behavioral differences are viewed as different because of differing values or cultural values. The concept of value becomes further sharpened by distinguishing the desirable from the desired; the former is based on a strong notion of moral justification, whereas the latter restrictively refers to nothing more than a preference. Such an emphasis on value as valuable for the understanding of social action assures a critical space for cultural approaches to human behavior as distinct from conventional sociological, political, and economic approaches, which emphasize social institutions, social relations, power, and market or nonmarket commodity transactions.

Nevertheless, the carefully crafted notion of value, when qualified as cultural value, quickly becomes slippery and contentious when used uncritically. Whereas intense debate over the precise scope,

meaning, and valence of the concept "culture," especially within the discipline of anthropology and the sociology of culture, makes its users mindful of overstating its explanatory value, the same cannot be said for the concept "cultural value." While debate over cultural values usefully seeks to distinguish between moral evaluation and factual cognition, or between the desirable and the desired, seldom does one encounter questions as to whether and how values relate to structures of power. For example, can one indeed separate a cultural value from, say, a political value? Those knowledgeable in social and anthropological thought have pointed out that to value is to introduce hierarchy. Hence, values are very much political, concerned with the organization of power and inequality by definition. In what sense, then, can a value be cultural? In other words, the problem with the concept "cultural values" is not that people do not operate with values that influence their actions, but rather that it is difficult to demonstrate what exactly is a cultural value, and hence it is intellectually misleading to assume that this is self-evident. That such fundamental distinctions are not clear in the use of the term is not due to an oversight in the development of the concept but is more a result of overstating the case for cultural values by treating the concept "cultural" uncritically. Consequently, it fatally leaves open fundamental questions about its own explanatory or interpretive validity.

Even a cursory appreciation of the debates around culture (taking this to be somewhat more problematic than the use of the term *value* by itself) ought to, at least minimally, caution us against using the term *cultural values* easily. This entry first delineates the development of the concept "culture," then highlights examples of how cultural values frame popular discourses on social problems, and finally poses the problem of human rights as an example of how cultural values may not be the best way to look at social problems. Throughout this entry, the term *cultural values* is viewed as problematic.

Culture has surely earned its place among the most difficult terms in history. Etymologically related to the sense of *cultivate* as in *agri-culture*, this early sense of culture denoted an activity, a production (one needs to work on cultivation), and simultaneously a product or set of products—the cultivated or cultured artifacts. However, this dual sense was gradually repressed over the following 2 centuries as 18th- and 19th-century European theorists of the cultural "Other" emphasized only the sense of culture as product. Culture came to be viewed as a kind of property that humans possessed (or not) and in varying degrees. It is crucial to note that these latter theorizations were intimately associated with the experience of Europeans with colonialism in the Americas, Asia, and Africa, and the emergence of new forms of class divisions and patriarchy within European societies.

This classic notion of culture, most clearly represented by the 19th-century English literary critic Mathew Arnold, held that culture referred to the best achievements and thoughts of humans, in short the set of perfect values or perfection itself that emerged from a people. This, of course, left the issue of who decides what is perfection or what is the best of values relatively unexamined, leading to a notion of "high culture" and its obverse, "low culture," that proved useful for the civilizing mission of colonialism as well as for the ruling elites in any society. Culture, in the Arnoldian sense, was then viewed as "property of the few," as some people were deemed to have more of it than others, and a large number of wretched were thought not to have any of it at all. Notions of "savage" and "barbarian" as the opposite of "civilized" were strengthened in this view of culture. More generally, culture came to mean the finer products of any group, specifically referring to the products in the realm of ruling-class understandings of art, music, literature, dance, poetry, sculpture, and so on.

It was in this classic context that some anthropologists explicitly developed another notion of culture as distinct from the elitist notions of culture. At least three breaks (or waves) can be identified over the next century or so. The first break in the mid-19th century was symbolized by the Tylorian view of *culture* as an all-inclusive term for all human beliefs and behavior that are learned rather than inherited biologically. Culture in this sense was an entire way of life—beliefs, practices, ideals, norms, and values that spanned the economic, political, kinship, religious, and aesthetics. One still possessed culture, and hence culture was still viewed as property, except that culture was now considered as a property of all. All have culture, albeit of different kinds. Such a notion of culture as an entire way of life contained an evolutionary sense, as now there were "primitive" cultures and advanced ones—qualitative evaluation rather than a quantitative measure. This sense of culture was further developed in a nonevolutionary direction by the Boasian anthropological enterprise, which seriously

built up "scientific" ways to study different cultures. Notably, the Boasian sense of cultures, in the plural, assumed cultural difference along the same racial lines it was designed to refute, leading to a problem of the culturalization of race, wherein culture comes to play the same classificatory function as the now scientifically dubious notion of race played. Thus, what distinguishes one race or ethnicity or nationality from another is its purported culture, and also, what distinguishes one culture from another is its different race, ethnicity, or nationality. This problematic with the Boasian notion of culture continues despite the fact that it strenuously distinguished biological ideas of race from culture.

A second break from the classical view of culture distinguished the *cultural* from other aspects of life. Culture acquired its own experiential and analytical sharpness, and this move was akin to the earlier Durkheimian carving out of a special space for "the social." This break was best exemplified by Clifford Geertz, who used culture to refer to those human activities specifically engaged with meaning construction via symbols. According to Geertz, humans are suspended in a web of meaning that we have spun ourselves, and this web is culture. The Geertzian turn made it possible for culture (in the singular) to be viewed widely not as a property that one has or not, but as an aspect of living, an ordinary condition of being for all humans. We thus have two different notions—cultures and culture. The former refers to groups that are culturally different, whereas the latter refers to an aspect of how all humans live.

Although the Geertzian understanding of culture succeeds brilliantly in demarcating a distinct realm of culture as concerned with meaning, it failed to answer some questions. Whose web was it? Who makes the web? Do all people who are suspended in it contribute equally to its production? Most important, Geertz's view was critiqued for not taking into account the—fact that culture was not only a product—the web—or a production—the weaving of the web but actually a struggle or a contest over production. In other words, the Geertzian emphasis on culture as shared unfortunately masked the fact of power, as culture is not simply shared by all within its boundaries but is actually a dynamic site of contestation over meanings including the question of cultural group boundaries. Consequently, over the past 2 decades, we have seen a third break from the classical view of culture that has now made the notion of different cultures itself problematic.

In this third break, a culture is no longer assumed to be a group that shares a cultural way of life. Instead, culture (the activity) and culture (the group) are viewed as constituted by power (struggles over meaning making), thus making margins and borders between cultures blurred or contested, highlighting interstitial spaces, making the hybrid into the normal condition of being, and turning the focus of anthropologists to the process of Othering rather than simply the study of the already existing Other. It is now a "normal" anthropology (in the Kuhnian sense) that speaks of the production of the Self and the Other and hence views culture itself as a production of, among other things, difference. Difference is thus historicized and shown as both constitutive of and constituted by group formation and identities in such a discourse of culture. An example of such a use of the term *culture* is that of the Mexican anthropologist Nestor Garcia Canclini, who views culture as the social production of meaning through symbolic (semiotic) representation of material structures to understand, reform, and transform the social system. Culture is thus a dynamic concept that reminds us that claims of tradition are always constructed through sites of power and struggle over meanings.

Returning to the concept of "cultural values," we see that this concept is used popularly as an explanatory device for a wide range of social problems, such as poverty, modernization, ethnic and religious conflict, gender and racial inequality, and, most recently, democratization. Despite being roundly critiqued for their scholarly content, many theses based on cultural values abound in the popular imagination. Examples of such theses include the Huntington thesis, or the clash of civilizations thesis, which invokes cultural values in the guise of civilizational units to explain all kinds of conflict on a world scale; the culture of poverty thesis, which holds the value-based actions and decision-making behavior of the poor as explanations for their poverty; the modernization thesis, which identifies "backward," or the more euphemistically termed *traditional*, values of people in developing countries as the shackles that prevent them from enjoying the fruits of modernization and modernity; and the endless discussions on gender and racial differences that, while taking care not to seemingly biologize gender or naturalize race, actually come very close to doing so by speaking in particular ways of the essentially different values embraced by men and women, or by members of so-called different and

hence separate races. The most dubious and pernicious misuse of the concept is in the debates over family values, where no awareness seemingly exists about the constructed nature of any such claims. It all seems to naturally flow from an unspecified human nature that is insidiously raced, classed, and gendered.

None of these uses of the term *cultural values* take account of the intellectual backdrop of the term *culture* discussed earlier in this entry. The term *cultural* in the notion "cultural value" operates in two senses—as an aspect of life (connected with production of meanings) and as a reference to the basis of group difference. In this discourse of cultural values, each group is assumed to share a cultural way of being or values, and groups are differentiated from each other purportedly on the basis of these given values. Both of these are problematic assumptions. In other words, cultural values, by definition, are never universal. They are always particular because they are associated with groups of people who supposedly operate as a group because they share cultural values.

Such a formulation of the self-evident existence of cultural groups (based on different cultural values) has led to intense debates over the claim to cultural rights, especially in the context of more universalizing human rights. This debate is crucial in an era of globalization where borders seem to be crossed with impunity by flows of finance, goods, services, and images, even as they are newly (re)erected as barriers to the flow of people viewed as cultural Others and the diversity of interpretations of what it means to be democratic. In such a context, social problems such as child labor or female genital mutilation get to be viewed too easily as differences of cultural values of cultural groups. The dual pitfalls of ethnocentrism or plain bigotry, and its obverse of cultural relativism, both share the assumption that these problems are indeed manifestations of cultural values as opposed to sociopolitical and economic problems. While the former position condemns such practices based on a racist and bigoted prejudging of all cultures different from one's own, the latter position majestically refuses to condemn even those practices that oppressed members within any cultural group struggle against. The result is that particular groups are assumed to be the cultural Others of a panoptic Self that only observes and is never observed. Both ethnocentrism and cultural relativism share dubious assumptions about culture and social problems. Both of them are incapable of implicating the Self in the degradation of the Other. While one is triumphalist in proclaiming its own superiority, the other is many times a weak call for viewing all practices with equanimity and ultimately runs into both ethical and logical problems.

Alternative approaches call for understanding such social problems as the effects of historically constructed and contingent struggles over meanings and material control of economic, political, and legal conditions of existence of culturally hybrid groups. The problem then becomes one of viewing cultural values as serious and discursive claims rather than actually existing facts of social life. Consequently, the task becomes one of evaluating claims to cultural rights in the context of how group norms are shaped in complex ways by power differentials within and between groups, and how dispositions to act are cultivated among individuals experiencing power and values in ways that are difficult to separate in the din of everyday life.

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See also Cultural Relativism; Culture of Poverty; Culture Wars; Ethnocentrism; Postmodernism; Power; Values

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Culture of Dependency

A culture of dependency is defined as a type of culture that relies upon, and comes to expect, state benefits and other support to maintain it. Overall the usage is best related to the neoconservative supply-side view of welfare in the 1990s. The argument of a culture of dependency assumes the position that entitlements lead to poverty by reducing the work ethic and regenerating dependency on state benefits. Following the lead of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, political attacks on a culture of dependency in Europe's social democratic states began with Tony Blair in Great Britain and Gerhard Schröder in Germany in the 1990s.

In the United States, policies reducing welfare payouts by the Ronald Reagan administration and, later, Bill Clinton's welfare reform bill of 1996, titled Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), were predicated on the concept of changing a culture of dependency. Along with TANF, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act was passed to reduce welfare dependency and encourage work. The policies required individuals to become "job ready" and work to be eligible for welfare benefits. Between 1996 and 2002 there were 4.7 million fewer welfare-dependent Americans as defined by having 50 percent or more of a family's income coming from TANF, food stamps, or Supplemental Social Insurance. The U.S. welfare reform laws also limit cash awards to 5 years.

The attack on welfare and a culture of dependency occurred as Western countries moved toward neoliberalism, fiscal conservatism, and free-market strategies. Along with attempts at reducing the size of government in Western nations came an emphasis on decentralization and deregulation. The 1994 conservative U.S. Congress played a key role in the philosophy of welfare reform and the attack on the idea of a culture of dependency. The policies of workfare were a result of this critique of dependency culture.

Welfare Reform and the Third Way

The culture of dependency argument holds that chronic low income among entitlement recipients results from welfare benefits and not personal inadequacies. The generosity of the welfare state reduces self-reliance and responsibility. The main ideas of this perspective originated with the concept of a culture of poverty argument in the 1960s, along with debates on the existence of an underclass in the 1980s. Both held that poverty in third world countries and poor communities in developed countries rested on a set of behaviors learned inside those poor communities. The culture of dependency argument draws on historical attacks on welfare, with a central focus on the undeserving poor and abuse of entitlements. According to advocates of the culture of dependency argument, welfare reduces the will of individuals to work. Other aspects of the argument are that welfare causes a decline in family values linked to child illegitimacy and a rise in the number of single-parent families. The assumption is that, when faced with opportunity, individuals with entitlements will not work if it requires too much effort to secure a small rise in income.

Social theorists identify a culture of dependency with other social problems, including family breakdown, addiction, and educational failure. Those critical of socialist welfare states and entitlements make the argument that the welfare state leads to passive actors and inhibits enterprise among dependents. The welfare reforms of the 1990s thus evolved with ideas of creating a new contract making recipients accountable, while using market solutions to end poverty. Supporters of the doctrine of the Third Way argue for a smaller role for the state, while emphasizing accountability and personal responsibility. They argue for a stakeholder approach to entitlements where the state does not guarantee long-term support. In Australia and New Zealand, social reforms also led to critical responses to the welfare state and the culture of dependency.

Critics of the Culture of Dependency Argument

Critics of this stance argue that welfare has not created dependency as much as it has produced an isolated population with few options. They point to

welfare as a form of social control for capitalism and the idea of dependency as a myth used to dismantle the system under neoliberalism. Liberals and leftists argue that many single parents are trapped not by dependency on benefits but by the absence of affordable child care and a lack of decent jobs.

The idea of a culture of dependency has also been applied in international development perspectives on social problems faced by developing nations. Perspectives on poverty reduction strategies use the idea to describe the culture of dependency of poor people, including indigenous populations faced with colonialism, uneven development, and exploitation due to global capitalism. Development theorists point to dependency on limited benefits as a by-product of land concentration, debt, and other social problems. World system and dependency perspectives criticize neoliberalism as a main cause of a culture of dependency in developing nations. Unlike the Third Way, they draw on dependency theory emphasizing the role of power and conflict in creating a culture of dependency. These approaches concentrate on development initiatives which include capacity building and institutional accountability.

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See also Poverty; Welfare; Welfare States

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Culture of Poverty

The culture of poverty, originally termed the *subculture of poverty*, is a concept that first appeared in 1959 in the work of North American anthropologist Oscar Lewis. As the name implies, this theory focuses attention on the cultural aspects of poverty. The theory holds that adaptation to the economic and structural conditions of poverty promotes the development of deviant social and psychological traits which, in turn, act as barriers to overcoming poverty. Once a culture of poverty emerges, it is reproduced through the transmission of traits to future generations. This perspective leads to the conclusion that economic solutions are limited in their ability to end poverty. Lewis suggested that social work and psychological interventions accompany economic responses to poverty. Culture of poverty theory has had a powerful influence on U.S. poverty policies and programs. A great deal of criticism surfaced as this theory gained prominence as an explanation for poverty in the United States.

Conditions That Promote a Culture of Poverty

Culture of poverty theory is a class-based theory. That is, the structure of the economy is posited as the initial condition that gives rise to a culture of poverty. It is most likely to emerge during transitional periods such as the shift from an agrarian to an industrial society or when rapid economic and technological shifts occur within a given society. Although racial discrimination can be a factor, it is not a necessary condition for a culture of poverty to emerge. (Lewis claimed that cultures of poverty formed among ethnically homogeneous populations in Latin America and among poor rural whites and poor African Americans in the United States.) Low-wage, unskilled workers who experience high rates of unemployment or underemployment in capitalist societies that stress social mobility are thought to be at greatest risk for developing a culture of poverty.

Culture of Poverty Traits

By the time he had fully formulated his theory, Lewis had compiled a list of 70 characteristics thought to be common to groups who live in cultures of poverty. He characterized members of these cultures as people who do not form their own local organizations and are isolated from participation in mainstream social institutions. For instance, the theory posits that people who live in cultures of poverty have high rates of unemployment, do not use banks or hospitals, and rely on dubious businesses like pawn shops. Such social isolation initially results from structural conditions of

poverty (e.g., unemployment). However, when opportunities do arise, cultural values that develop in response to isolation work against future integration into mainstream society.

Family illustrates another way that the values of the poor are said to deviate from mainstream society. The theory holds that cultures of poverty are characterized by community and family disorganization. Male unemployment is thought to discourage formal marriage and encourage female-headed households. In addition to recognizing economic disincentives to marry, women may view poor men as too punitive and immature for marriage. The theory also contends that no prolonged period of childhood occurs, and consequently, children experience early initiation into adult activities such as sexual relations. High rates of adult illiteracy and low levels of education contribute to the inferior academic performance of children raised in a culture of poverty. Impulsivity, a present-time orientation, and an inability to set goals further impede educational attainment.

Not all impoverished groups form a culture of poverty. A connection to local organizations or national movements hinders such development by providing the poor with a greater purpose. For example, Lewis claimed that a culture of poverty is less likely to form in socialist countries like Cuba, where neighborhood committees helped to integrate the poor into the national agenda.

Criticism of Culture of Poverty Theory

Criticism surfaced as a culture of poverty framework gained dominance among U.S. academics and policymakers. Critics focused their attention on methodological concerns and on poverty policies and programs influenced, in their development, by culture of poverty theory.

Critics suggest that the popularity of culture as an explanation for poverty is inappropriate, because Lewis based his theory on findings from a small number of interviews with Latin American families. Moreover, critics suggest that scholars who employ this theory filter their observations through a white, middle-class understanding of "appropriate" cultural values, a form of classism and ethnocentrism. In fact, findings from subsequent research studies that employed in-depth fieldwork called into question the claims put forth by Lewis and his contemporary adherents. Family and community disorganization is an example of one theme targeted by critics. Critics claim empirical evidence shows that poor groups who have been depicted as disorganized actually live in highly organized neighborhoods and rely on extended kin and friendship networks. Moreover, research finds that poor women value marriage as much as their middle-class counterparts do. Although critics agree that in recent years, inner-city family and neighborhood networks have eroded, they trace this pattern to structural causes such as the loss of living-wage jobs and cuts to the social safety net.

Critics are concerned that the focus on behavior gave rise to ineffective poverty policies and programs. For instance, recent growth in job programs that center on developing a work ethic and teaching the poor how to dress and behave in a work environment exemplifies the type of behavioral approaches that critics view as ineffective. These approaches contrast sharply with the decline in structural solutions like the creation of living-wage jobs and the expansion of the social safety net (e.g., unemployment benefits, subsidized health care).

The extent to which behavioral solutions are reflected in poverty policies and programs shifts over time. The influence of culture of poverty theory on U.S. poverty policy is rooted in 1960s War on Poverty programs. Culture of poverty theory shaped Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1965 report, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (more commonly known as the Moynihan Report), and Michael Harrington's 1962 book, *The Other America: Poverty in the U.S.* Both of these scholars influenced President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty campaign and the consequent passage of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, which established federal funding for, and oversight of, anti-poverty programs.

Critics contend that the Moynihan Report racialized culture of poverty theory. After the publication of the report, poverty became equated with race, and an image of the black matriarch as the cause of black poverty became firmly rooted in the popular imagination. Despite the uncritical acceptance of characterizations of the poor, critics point out that the 1960s anti-poverty programs still addressed the structural causes of poverty. For instance, both Head Start and the Job Corps were War on Poverty programs. Irrespective of his portrayal of black family "pathology," Senator Moynihan argued for the extension of welfare benefits to black single mothers. Addressing

the economic causes of poverty was viewed as necessary to achieve the desired behavioral changes.

Behavioral solutions to poverty gained prominence in the conservative climate of the 1980s. The antipoverty programs of the 1960s came under attack as conservative politicians advanced the view that these programs encouraged economic dependence. Critics argue that it is no accident that the focus on behavior as the cause, not the consequence, of poverty coincides with the call to end the era of "big government" by cutting spending on poverty programs. Welfare reform, enacted with the 1996 passage of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, illustrates this trend. Research shows that congressional debates on welfare reform excluded discussions of economic trends. Racialized images of poor single mothers who eschew work and marriage dominated both political and public discussions. Critics charge that the focus on behavior resulted in the passage of a law that failed to make sufficient provisions for the impact of low-wage jobs on women who now face restricted access to welfare benefits.

Scholars and policymakers continue to debate the relationship between poverty and culture. Social scientists face the difficult task of studying culture without losing sight of the complex relationship between culture and structure. In addition, they face the task of attending to the impact of poverty without reinforcing harmful socially constructed views of the poor.

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See also Cultural Capital; Life Chances; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; Poverty; Relative Deprivation; Social Capital; Working Poor

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Culture Shock

The term *culture shock* was first introduced in the 1950s by anthropologist Kalvero Oberg, who defined it as an illness or disease. Later studies focused on cognitive, behavioral, phenomenological, and psychosociological explanations. In general, culture shock is a consequence of immersion in a culture that is distinctly different from one's own background or previous experiences. Typically, these encounters involve new patterns of cultural behaviors, symbols, and expressions that hold little or no meaning without an understanding of the new social setting. The most common usage of the term today is in discussing the effects of students' studying abroad or immigration. Although in the short term culture shock may have adverse effects, in the long run it can enhance one's appreciation of other cultures, foster self-development, and help a person gain greater understanding of diversity.

Several important factors intensify the effects of culture shock. Greater ignorance of foreign contexts and stronger integration in one's own native culture contribute to the difficulty of acculturating in a new cultural context. Other variables include intrapersonal traits, interpersonal group ties, the ability to form new social groups, the degree of difference between cultures, and the host cultural group's perceptions of the new member.

First, intrapersonal factors include skills (e.g., communication skills), previous experiences (e.g., in cross-cultural settings), personal traits (e.g., independence and tolerance), and access to resources. Physiological characteristics, such as health, strength, appearance, and age, as well as working and socialization skills, are important. Second, embracing a new culture includes keeping ties with one's past social groups, as well as forming new bonds. Those who can maintain support groups fare better in unfamiliar contexts. Third, variance in culture groups affects the transition from one culture to another. Acculturation is more challenging when cultures hold greater

disparities in social, behavioral, traditional, religious, educational, and family norms. Finally, even when an individual's physical characteristics, psychological traits, and ability to socialize are favorable, culture shock can still occur through sociopolitical manifestations. The attitudes of the citizens in a foreign culture may exhibit social prejudices, acceptance of stereotypes, or intimidation. Furthermore, social presumptions may couple with legal constructions of social, economic, and political policies that enhance hardships for those interacting in new settings.

Culture shock develops through four generally accepted phases: the "honeymoon" (or "incubation") phase, problematic encounters, recovery and adjustment, and finally, reentry shock. In the honeymoon stage, the new environment initially captivates the individual. For example, fast-paced lifestyle, food variety, or tall skyscrapers of a large city may initially awe a newcomer coming from a small town. In the second stage, the area becomes increasingly uncomfortable. Within a few days to a few months, the difference in culture becomes acute and often difficult. Misinterpretation of social norms and behavior leads to frustration or confusion. Reactions could include feelings of anger, sadness, discomfort, impatience, or incompetence. In this phase, the newcomers feel disconnected from the new setting. However, by the third phase, individuals experience their new context with better understanding. They become more familiar with where to go and how to adapt to daily life, for example, knowing where to buy stamps and send a letter. Finally, for those returning to their home locale, they commonly experience "reshock." In this phase, they must readjust to their previous lifestyle. Things may have changed in their absence, and they must resocialize into their previous cultural setting.

To combat the more distressful aspects of culture shock, the individual must be open-minded to new cultural experiences, must develop flexibility and adaptability skills, and must be capable of building tolerance. Furthermore, he or she must hold positive but realistic expectations. Communication development, whether it be through understanding social norms or decreasing language barriers, is critical to acculturation in a new environment.

Although travelers and study-abroad students often experience culture shock, the extent of cross-cultural interactions goes beyond such narrow conceptualizations. Culture shock also affects many others, such as military personnel, immigrants, minorities entering college, parolees from prison, and married couples who divorce. Additional factors include an individual's social and class mobility, occupational change, or migration between urban and rural environments.

In particular, immigrants can experience culture shock in a variety of ways. First and foremost is the manifestation of cultural differences in traditions, holiday observations, rituals, and other practices that involve distinct religious differences or educational beliefs. Second, accepted behaviors in both public and private settings may be fundamental to one's native culture but socially unacceptable in the new environment. An additional hardship may include distance from friends and family and other social support networks. Third, what is particularly difficult for some immigrants is the language barrier. Despite finding comfort and adaptability in the physical environment, they may not be able to communicate successfully. Macro structures of new cultural ideologies, reproduced through micro interactions, can affect the personal psyche of the individual. Further exacerbating the situation may be an underlying racist or stereotypic assumption, which further reinforces insecurity. In addition, a new immigrant may have feelings of anxiety in unfamiliar contexts as a result of a lack of knowledge of cultural behavior cues.

The study of culture shock becomes increasingly important as the globalization process continues. Greater exposure to other cultures requires a better understanding of cultural differences. Furthermore, understanding culture shock can help lessen social problems that are not cross-national. For underprivileged groups, such as minorities, those in poverty, and English language learners, growing accustomed to new environments can be extremely difficult. In addition to problems in day-to-day lifestyles, these groups also may experience culture shock along a continuum ranging from treatment as "the other" to racism, sexism, rejection, or violence.

Educational programs that address cultural differences can minimize culture shock to make the transition phase less overwhelming. Gaining greater understanding of other cultures not only facilitates the acculturation process but also helps build bridges between diverse groups.

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See also Acculturation; Assimilation; Cultural Values; Immigration

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Culture Wars

The phrase *culture wars* refers to the conflicts between individuals or groups who see themselves as either preserving or, in some measure, changing fundamental cultural understandings and practices. These conflicts play out in the political arena and in the battle for public opinion. The earliest use of the term *culture war*, or *cultural struggle*, was in the context of Otto von Bismarck's unification of modern Germany in the late 19th century. At that time, *Kulturkampf* was deployed approvingly by liberal, largely Protestant forces to describe a variety of legal efforts aimed at separating church and state and limiting Roman Catholic clerical power. The phrase is now most often associated with U.S. cultural controversies, gaining popular currency in the United States in the 1990s. It is, however, occasionally applied to such controversies in other developed countries. In the United States and elsewhere, the culture wars are a main locus of social and political tension.

The issues implicated in the U.S. culture wars are many, including abortion, artistic and personal expression, crime and punishment, education, ethnicity, family relations, gun ownership, immigration, language, media bias or objectivity, medical ethics, national identity, popular culture, race, religion, and sexuality. Both sides in the culture wars tend to identify the mid- to late 20th century as the time of important changes in popular attitudes, legislative constraints, and political consensus on each of these issues. The preservationists generally see this as change for the worse. In this sense, they seek to retrieve and preserve what they claim to be an earlier U.S. cultural consensus, which they often see as rooted in unchanging moral, theological, and political truths. Meanwhile, advocates of change tend to argue for continuous evolutionary progress toward new understandings that they claim are more consonant with contemporary mores.

Contemporary Usage

The currency of the phrase *culture wars* in the United States is largely traceable to sociologist James Davison Hunter and media personality and political candidate Patrick J. Buchanan. Hunter argued, in 1991, that significant fault lines in U.S. society no longer correspond with old cleavages such as class, or religious or partisan affiliation, but with new divisions over cultural questions that transcend the old cleavages. He contended that the United States is polarizing into two hostile camps, defined by their orthodoxy or progressivism on these questions. To members of these camps, the old divisions are less salient than the new. Moral and political allegiances and alliances are therefore subject to reconfiguration, and new social solidarities and political movements emerge. Groups united by these new identities and common purposes define themselves according to their answers to cultural questions and their tactical responses to cultural controversies.

At the Republican National Convention in 1992, Buchanan gave a widely noted speech in which he claimed the culture wars are, at root, religious in character and that only by stopping or reversing a host of cultural shifts that had occurred since the mid-20th century could the United States follow God's will. For many on the left, such rhetoric amounted to hate speech; for many on the right, it was a symbolic call to arms for a nation in crisis. Indeed, the terms *left* and *right*, or *liberal* and *conservative*, are increasingly used in the United States to define opposing factions in the culture wars, in contrast to their earlier application to different philosophical and policy orientations on economic or foreign affairs questions.

Cultural Divisions

The new fault lines manifest themselves in various ways. In religious terms, preservationists understand themselves to be orthodox or traditional rather than modernist. If Christian, they tend to be evangelical rather than mainstream. Advocates of cultural change

are more likely to identify themselves as non-orthodox or secularist. The culture wars also have distinct political implications in the United States. Preservationists are more likely to support the Republican Party, whereas advocates of cultural change gravitate toward the Democratic Party. Preservationists are more likely to defend and ally with popular or common opinion, whereas advocates of change find more common ground with elite opinion. Institutionally, preservationists tend to be suspicious of the judicial branch of government, which they see as pushing the culture too far too fast in the direction of unconstitutional and indeed immoral change. By contrast, advocates of cultural change are more likely to be sympathetic to judicial alterations of the cultural landscape. Indeed, particular judicial decisions are rallying points for those engaged in the culture wars. For many preservationists, cases identified as fundamentally altering a cultural status quo, such as the abortion decision *Roe v. Wade,* are abominations; for many advocates of cultural change, they mark out sacred ground not to be ceded.

The Culture Wars Internationally

In Australia and Canada, some issues associated with the U.S. culture wars, and occasionally the phrase itself, enjoy currency. In Canada, a variety of scholarly and populist organizations have emerged since the 1980s to combat what they see as cultural drift and decadence, including the perceived liberal activism of the Supreme Court of Canada. In European nations too, cultural issues have gained increasing traction, particularly in relation to Muslim immigration into Europe. With this immigration has come the threat, from the point of view of preservationists, to European national identities that is posed by the injection of Islam into largely secularized polities. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Denmark, among other countries, have all seen explosive cultural controversies in recent years, sometimes spurred by actual violence or the threat of violence by Islamist forces fundamentally hostile to the dominant culture. These forces themselves cannot be considered to be engaging in the culture wars, however, because of their willingness to move from the arena of ideological and political struggle to the arena of actual warfare.

Assessment

Whether one is preserving or changing culture depends on how one defines it. Complex questions of political and social theory as well as historical interpretation are bound to arise. The nature of the struggle, as well as the relative strengths of the parties, are therefore controversial. In the United States, those who understand themselves to be preserving the culture often claim they are on the defensive against the hegemony of elite forces hostile to older but worthy understandings and practices, which forces they claim dominate many or most media and educational institutions. By contrast, those who understand themselves as changing U.S. culture often claim they are persecuted minorities who are simply reflecting newer but more legitimate interpretations of understandings and practices, or bringing out what has always been latent in the society.

The culture wars arguably have the potential to be more divisive than previous social conflicts in U.S. history. Partisans in the culture wars tend to concentrate on particular issues and the reorientation of public opinion and policy on those issues, rather than seeking broad-based accommodations and compromises. The relative lack of attention to compromise stems from the fact that these issues are linked to the very origins and sense of identity of the partisans. To them, they are issues of the highest possible salience because they speak to the question of ultimate moral standards and authority.

On the other hand, some political scientists argue that members of the U.S. political classes, including party activists, may be polarized, but average Americans are not. These experts contend that most Americans do not embrace the extremes of either cultural conservatism or liberalism, and their opinions continue to be relatively stable on a variety of issues, including abortion and homosexuality. Furthermore, at the mass as opposed to the elite level, these opinions tend to converge in the center. Thus consensus rather than conflict may best describe contemporary U.S. attitudes on cultural questions.

What can be said for certain is that forces of preservation and change have routinely vied with each other for the ability to define authoritatively the mores of virtually all societies throughout history. It is highly likely that the contemporary culture wars will, for many years to come, result in seesaw battles waged in and for legislative chambers, courtrooms, and public opinion.

Bradley C. S. Watson

See also Abortion; Affirmative Action; English-Only Movement; Euthanasia; Feminism; Gun Control; Homosexuality; Immigration, United States; Multiculturalism; Politics and Christianity; Pornography; Religion and Politics; Same-Sex Marriage; School Prayer; Values

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Current Account Deficit

The current account deficit is broader than the generally well-known trade deficit because it includes the deficit (or surplus) on investments and both personal (think foreigners sending money home) and government (think foreign aid or military assistance) transfer payments. A *current account* is the difference between exports and imports plus the difference between interest and dividends received from foreigners or paid to foreigners plus the difference in transfer payments paid or received. It is a current account deficit when the total amount of money leaving a country across these three categories exceeds the amount coming in; most commonly this occurs when imports exceed exports. The current account deficit and the federal budget deficit are often erroneously linked in discussions of the "twin deficits."

As Figure 1 shows, the United States has experienced a current account deficit for all but one quarter (the first quarter of 1991) over the past 25 years. Virtually all forecasters expect this deficit to continue for years to come.

The one positive number came about when several countries (most notably Germany, Japan, and Saudi Arabia) offered to contribute billions to the United States to pay for the cost of the Persian Gulf War on the condition that the contributions be used solely for the defense budget and not in any way to reduce the overall federal budget deficit. Then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney discovered that the Feed and Foraging Act of 1864 was still the law governing such contributions and that it allowed donations of money or goods and services to be used only for defense (or war) purposes. So much money came in that it gave the United States a one-quarter surplus on the current account. It also meant the United States made a profit on that war.

The basic economic principle to keep in mind is that the balance of payments for every country in the



Figure 1 The Current Account Deficit

Source: Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.

world is identical, namely, zero. This is an iron law of international accounting and has nothing to do with any theory.

This simply means that every country that has a current account deficit has a capital account surplus (an inflow of foreign money) of exactly the same amount. Any country with a current account surplus (such as China, Germany, or Japan) has a capital account deficit (an outflow of money to other countries) that exactly offsets the current account surplus.

The data do not provide any way to separate which side is driving the situation. Some commentators argue that because the return on investment that foreigners expect to earn by investing in the United States is so attractive, they continue to pour money into the United States at a rapid rate. So much of this has gone into direct investment that the Bureau of Labor Statistics now estimates as many as one out of every six employed people in the United States works for a foreign company such as BMW, British Petroleum, Four Seasons, Nissan, Shell, or Toyota.

If these people are correct, then the U.S. current account deficit will remain huge. Of course, trends that become unsustainable must stop and turn around, so sooner or later this will change.

Figure 2 shows the current account deficit as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), the total value of all the goods and services produced for final demand within the borders of the United States. The current account deficit appears to have stabilized in 2006 at approximately 6.6 percent of GDP.

Other analysts believe that it is the appetite of U.S. consumers for foreign goods that drives the current account deficit. Figures 3 and 4 show the huge and growing discrepancy between imports and exports of goods. The largest part of this trade deficit is due to motor vehicles (think of all the Jaguar, Lexus, and high-end BMW and Mercedes-Benz vehicles in the United States), and the largest deficit with a single country, which is unrelated to motor vehicle sales, is the one with China, which was $201.5 billion in 2005.

Figures 5 and 6 show that in the realm of services (education, entertainment, health care, travel, and so on), the United States has a large surplus. This surplus was $66.0 billion in 2005.

Much research has shown that approximately 70 percent of U.S. imports of goods are from affiliates of the same company. These imports are part of complicated corporate supply chain strategies and are not likely to change much due to normal ups and downs in the value of the dollar.

The best example of this is U.S. vehicle producers. The United States and Canada have had a free trade agreement since 1988, and this has led to a complete interchange of vehicles and parts between the two countries. After the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which began on January 1, 1995, went into full effect, the same became true of vehicle and parts production in Mexico.

The United States and Canada are the world's two largest trading partners. Total trade between the two countries was a little over $500 billion in 2005 as



Figure 2 The Current Account Deficit: Percentage of GDP

Source: Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.



Figure 3 Exports and Imports: Goods

Source: Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.



Figure 4 The Trade Deficit: Goods

Source: Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.

compared with $290 billion with Mexico, $285 billion with China, and a little over $193 billion with Japan.

The group that thinks it is imports of goods driving the current account deficit always argues for a decline in the dollar to reverse or at least ameliorate the situation. However, this remedy is unlikely to work because the magnitude of decline for the dollar needed is too large and because so many corporate supply chain relationships would have to change dramatically.

Of course, if it is the attractiveness of the United States as a place to invest that is driving the current account deficit, then a decline in the dollar would only exacerbate the situation. This is frustrating to some people.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce publishes updated information on the current account every 3 months. It also publishes monthly estimates of the trade deficit.



Figure 5 Exports and Imports: Services

Source: Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.



Figure 6 The Trade Surplus: Services

Source: Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.

It seems likely the United States will have a current account deficit for many years to come. It will probably shrink as a share of GDP, but it is unlikely to disappear for a long time, if ever.

James F. Smith

See also Capital Flight; Global Economy

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Cyberspace

Cyberspace is an invisible realm occupied by electronically mediated communication. Coined by science fiction writer William Gibson as a tool to describe a global computer network, the term *cyberspace* closely identifies with the age of the information revolution. Derived from the Greek verb *Kubernao* (to steer), the term commonly refers to the perceived freedom afforded users by the Internet and can involve any form of communication that involves computers or networking, ranging from text to multimedia and machine-generated data exchanges.

Computer-mediated communication can be thoughtful, edifying, and unifying, bringing far-flung families together and bridging continental divides. But cyberspace does not always carry positive connotations. Web sites supporting racial, gender, and religious stereotypes engender hatred and encourage social instability. E-mail has replaced traditional mail in many sectors, and legitimate e-mail is overwhelmed by unwanted "spam," which clogs in-boxes and has the potential of carrying destructive viruses. In addition to spreading computer viruses, malicious coders have used computer networks to generate denial-of-service attacks that can cripple Web sites and businesses.

Governments have used cyberspace to violate the civil rights of citizens and also have been victimized themselves. Some countries have censored what digital content is available to their citizens, and others have been accused of spying on citizens in the name of national security. Cyber sleuths suspect both China and Russia of backing a series of attacks on U.S. government and corporate sites in espionage cases known as "Moonlight Maze" and "Titan Rain." The potential for social, political, and economic conflict resulting from cyber espionage is daunting.

Cyberspace can involve both the positive and the negative. U.S. workers protest that cyberspace allows jobs, which once provided domestic employment, to be outsourced to Asia, where the process dramatically improves the lives of workers, their families, and the economies of those nations. Whereas this instance of communication in cyberspace has caused dislocation in one sector, it has brought prosperity to another, highlighting the ambiguous nature of the tool.

Robert Harris

See also Computer Crime; Digital Divide

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D

Debt Service

In this entry, *debt service* is defined as the repayment of principal and interest on loans to sovereign entities such as cities and nation-states. This restriction of the definition facilitates a focus on social issues precipitated or aggravated by the repayment of such obligations.

Most commonly, governments fund their activities by borrowing the funds needed, usually via sale of obligations, such as treasury bills with terms under 1 year for financing current year operations, or treasury bonds with longer terms. Purchasing governmental obligations allows the buyer to "lock in" a return on the investment made for a long period of time or, if needs change, to resell what should be a widely held, well-regulated investment.

Governments borrowing funds must then repay them according to the terms and conditions of the obligation. Repayment usually requires transferring amounts greater than those borrowed—in other words, repaying both the amount borrowed (principal) and the interest thereon, or "servicing the debt." When servicing debt starts negatively to impact the provision of social services, the social dimension of debt service begins.

Debt Service in Developing Countries

Debt service in developing countries that causes extended, seemingly intractable social issues is usually the result of one of three scenarios: (1) Funds were lent to countries with a poor governmental structure, meaning with leadership not beholden to the population for its decisions; (2) debt was transferred that arose during colonialism, meaning historical costs incurred by the colonizing country were transferred to the newly independent colony at its independence; or (3) loaned funds were not properly managed, usually meaning that the lenders (in the wealthier countries), instead of ceasing to lend, actually lent more funds as economic or political situations deteriorated.

According to data presented in a 2005 news article by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), total debts amassed by the world's poorest countries increased more than 20 times in the 3 decades from the early 1970s to the beginning of this decade, rising from—in U.S. dollars—$25 billion in 1970 to over $520 billion in 2002. Specifically to Africa, its share of the total in 1970 was less than $11 billion, not even half the total owed by poor nations. But, by 2002, total African debt stood at $295 billion, over half the total owed by all poor countries. Perhaps the bleakest fact is that, although the world's poorest countries have repaid $550 billion in principal and interest over the past 3 decades, on $540 billion of loans, these same countries are currently spending $13 on their debt repayments for every $1 they receive in grants.

Obviously, a country whose government cannot use its revenues, including (and especially) any grants received as humanitarian aid, for any current activity other than debt service, will have social issues. Because all three scenarios (described earlier in this section) seem to be caused by the actions of foreigners, social unrest is also often stoked.

Debt Service as a Political Issue

Debt service as the root cause of social problems has its origin in the creation of the system of exchange rates brought into effect with agreements reached at the conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. The representatives of the sovereign states in attendance created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an independent organization monitoring monetary flows among sovereign states, agreeing to certain principles for measurement of those flows—and either to assist or to threaten to sanction any state's monetary policy as it affected world prosperity. Because the member states are generally represented at the IMF by their most senior treasury or finance official—usually an unelected cabinet member or other appointee—virtually every intervention has both monetary and political dimensions.

Thus populations in countries in which debt service markedly diminishes the amounts spent on social costs (health care, housing, public transport, education, etc.) tend to blame their government or the governments of the lending countries—usually members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—or the IMF itself. Strikes and riots, resulting from increased intolerance of such situations and impatience in awaiting their resolution, tend to exacerbate the overall problem by reducing the creditworthiness of the nation-state. In turn, this increases interest rates assessed on outstanding debt, further reducing the government's ability to service its debt.

Issues in Debt Relief

One way to remove issues created by debt service is for lenders to forgive outstanding debt. In theory, funds exported for debt service may then be used immediately to address social issues in-country. But there are at least two problems in relieving debt. First, the real lender—meaning the financial entity—usually requires settlement. This means the government of the lender must use public-sector funds to pay what is generally considered a private-sector debt. This is not very popular among taxpayers, as it seems their government is using their money to rescue big banks from imprudent lending, lending often made to unpopular or dictatorial regimes. Second, debt relief seems to rescue countries that have mismanaged funds or, worse, have misappropriated funds or, worst, continue to commit significant human rights abuses. For example, between 1998 and 2000, Uganda received $374 million in debt relief—while troops were widely reported to be killing white minority farmers.

This situation has caused the World Bank and the IMF to require the government requesting debt relief to create a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) that the two organizations must approve before recommending debt relief. The PRSP contains requirements, among many others, for a democratically elected government. This can generate additional resistance at both the leadership and popular levels of such governments: Requiring an approvable PRSP is usually seen as further foreign interference in sovereign affairs.

Still, progress is occurring. The Paris Club is a voluntary gathering of creditor countries that coordinates handling of the debt owed them by developing countries. Since 1983 alone, it has canceled or rescheduled debts worth $509 billion. In January 2007, the Paris Club announced agreements to cancel 100 percent of Sierra Leone's $240 million in debt. Unfortunately, the Paris Club still has over $500 billion of developing nation debt to go.

Jeffrey Whitney

See also Colonialism; Human Rights; Social Revolutions

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Decriminalization

Decriminalization broadly refers to the removal or reduction of criminal penalties from particular substances or activities. Although the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, *decriminalization* and *legalization* are not the same thing. Legalization implies complete removal of governmental control, whereas acts or substances that are decriminalized are still subject to state control even if the acts are no longer considered criminal. Commentators often vary on their interpretation of the term, based on the extent to which the state is involved in regulation. Terms such as *partial decriminalization* and *full decriminalization* specify the extent of state enforcement.

Decriminalization often takes place in response to social change. A society may change its political or moral views regarding an act, thereby no longer viewing the act as harmful, deviant, or worthy of intervention by the criminal justice system. Acts that are subject to decriminalization are typically victimless or public order crimes. A victimless crime refers to an act that is regarded as illegal and potentially harmful to society despite the lack of a victim. Prostitution, homosexuality, abortion, pornography, and illicit drug use are examples of acts that are, or were considered, victimless crimes and have been, or are, subject to decriminalization.

Although the concept of decriminalization can be applied to a wide variety of acts and substances, most of the discussion regarding the topic involves the debate over the decriminalization of illicit drugs. Those in favor of drug decriminalization often refer to the lack of success enjoyed by the current prohibition policy in the United States. Current policies, they argue, tend to overcrowd prisons, cost a great deal of money to enforce, and cause an increase in drug-related violence. Others argue that decriminalizing drugs would allow the state to place some regulations on the quality and purity of substances, as is the case with alcohol and tobacco, thus reducing the dangers that drug users face in consuming unregulated substances. Opponents of decriminalization suggest that such measures would drastically increase drug use or that decriminalization may not actually decrease drug-related violence.

Also relevant to the discussion of drug decriminalization is the issue of civil liberties. Those in favor of decriminalization note that prohibition not only results in restricting one's right to use psychoactive substances but also encourages unconstitutional practices by law enforcement, given the discrete nature of drug distribution and use. The varying levels of government control, coupled with the uncertainties over whether drug use is an individual right or a societal problem, make for varying perspectives on decriminalization at both ends of the political spectrum.

Jamie Longazel

See also Drug Abuse, Crime; Prohibition; Victimless Crimes

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Deforestation

Deforestation is the clearing and destruction of forests. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that deforestation accounts for the loss of 13 million hectares of forests annually. At this rate, nearly all of the world's tropical rain forests will be depleted by the year 2050. Forests are important for a number of reasons, including the production of wood products, soil and water conservation, conservation of biodiversity, and social services such as recreation, tourism, and education. Forests, and the natural resources held within them, are essential for the survival of the human race.

Forests contain a number of advantages for the planet Earth. More than 20 percent of the world's oxygen, essential for survival of the human race, originates in the Amazonian rain forests. Forests are also a significant source of food for the human species, including fruits, vegetables, nuts, grains, and even fish. The number of species of fish in the Amazon, for example, is higher than the number found in the entire Atlantic Ocean. In terms of medicine, the benefits of forests are immense. Rain forests provide 25 percent of drugs currently used by Western pharmaceutical

companies. Over 70 percent of the plants identified as active in fighting cancer originated in the rain forests, including periwinkle, which has significantly reduced childhood leukemia. Yet scientists have assessed only 1 percent of the trees in the rain forests for potential medicinal purposes, meaning that deforestation may lead to the permanent loss of lifesaving drugs.

Much of the deforestation is due to an increase in population, slash-and-burn techniques to clear land for agriculture and cattle grazing, and logging for paper, wood, and fuel products. More than 11 million acres of forest are cleared annually for commercial and property purposes. In Brazil alone, 70 percent of the tropical rain forests cleared have fallen to medium and large-scale ranches. Large corporations from the United States and other industrialized nations have also cleared land in rain forests for land production. In the United States, 90 percent of the virgin forests have been converted into firewood, shingles, furniture, railroad ties, and paper. Other causes of deforestation are acid rain, pollution, cash crops that require large tracts of land and deplete soil nutrients quickly, and industrialization.

Deforestation threatens the planet Earth in many ways. Tropical forests cover only 2 percent of the world's surface but account for 90 percent of the world's biodiversity. The current rate of deforestation has led to the loss of 50 to 100 animal and plant species daily. Of additional concern is the immediate impact of deforestation on our natural resources, including soil erosion, water treatment, fisheries protection, and pollination. The world's poorest people rely on these natural resources for their survival, and deforestation affects their quality of life and survival. The long-term consequences of deforestation include the decrease in biodiversity and significant increases in climate changes, both of which threaten the human race.

Deforestation has a significant impact on soil erosion. Forests act as a sponge, soaking up rainfall and providing a humid environment for plants and animals. As forests are cleared, water runoff and drought increase. The effects of Hurricane Mitch on Nicaragua and Honduras in 1998 provide a good example of the dangers. The extent of deforestation in Central America led to landslides, flooding, and the destruction of entire villages in areas in which land had been cleared. In many cases this destruction was at the expense of the poorest individuals in the countries with the least number of resources for survival.

Climate change also is a consequence of deforestation. Trees are a natural "sink" for carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas that contributes to the rise in temperatures on the planet Earth. As forests are depleted, greater concentrations of carbon dioxide are present in the atmosphere and the threat of drought increases. The loss of freshwater can have a serious impact on human consumption, industry, and national security. As countries compete for less freshwater, the risk of global conflicts increases. Deforestation alone accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the world's global warming.

The habitats and livelihood of people in this world are being lost to deforestation. Indigenous populations in many parts of the world rely on tropical rain forests for cultural, medicinal, and spiritual purposes. Five hundred years ago there were 10 million indigenous people living in Amazonian rain forests. Today, because of deforestation, fewer than 200,000 individuals live there. Often it is the poorest countries that suffer the worst consequences of deforestation.

A correlation exists between a reduction in deforestation and a reduction in poverty. The preservation of forests provides individuals with more capital in terms of natural resources, more opportunities to earn their livelihood through better agroforestry techniques, improved wildlife management, and an increase in levels of fire management. As individuals acquire more wealth, they are less likely to depend on forests for survival.

Conversely, better forest management reduces poverty by increasing income, improving people's health, and giving them tools to increase protection of their natural resources. In assessing the positive impact of forests on people in poverty, three areas are important: land tenure rights, effective governance of these rights, and the community's capacity to manage their natural resources.

The rate of deforestation is declining, although the process is still continuing. The FAO reports that from 2000 to 2005 the net loss of forests was 7.3 million hectares per year, down from 8.9 million hectares annually from 1990 to 2000. Contributing to this decrease are greater conservation efforts, reforestation efforts, and the natural growth of forests. Industries such as recreation and ecotourism also contribute to an increase in efforts to preserve forests and biodiversity. The longevity of the human species is dependent on such efforts to halt the rate of deforestation.

Wendy Sellers Campbell

See also Environmental Movement; Erosion; Global Warming; Population Growth; Sustainable Development

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Deindustrialization

Deindustrialization is a term that describes the decline in manufacturing (or goods producing) employment occurring in the United States and other industrialized countries since the 1970s. Indeed, between the late 1970s and 2000s, the share of workers employed in goods-producing industries declined from approximately one third to one fifth of the workforce. Some scholars also define deindustrialization in terms of increased trade deficits, associated with increased foreign investment and production. Deindustrialization—closely associated with globalization and postindustrialization—has generated increases in earnings inequality, higher unemployment, and higher poverty rates in the United States. Furthermore, deindustrialization has undermined the strength of unions and has financially devastated some local cities and communities.

Whereas some economists argue that deindustrialization is a normal component of economic development, many scholars attribute deindustrialization to globalization. These scholars argue that economies are deindustrializing because firms face increasing competition in the world market. In the late 20th century, U.S. firms lost their competitive advantage in the global economy, and they responded by reducing costs. Innovations in information technology, production, and transportation permitted firms to move capital and jobs overseas where they could hire cheap labor and enjoy tax breaks, as well as relaxed labor and environmental laws.

The second associated process, postindustrialization, is the shift toward service employment. The deindustrialized, postindustrial economy is unique with its polarization of the new service industries into high-wage, knowledge-intensive service industries—such as finance, insurance, and real estate—and low-wage service industries, including personal services. During the latter part of the 20th century, the share of employment in service-producing industries increased dramatically. The largest share of these service jobs is characterized by lower pay than manufacturing jobs, and they are more likely to be part-time with few benefits.

As a result of deindustrialization and the simultaneous shift toward a postindustrial economy, wage and income inequality increased. The manufacturing sector had offered a more egalitarian wage structure than the service sectors. To illustrate, in 2005, the average hourly compensation for goods-producing employment was $29, ranging from $27 per hour in nondurable manufacturing (which includes textiles and food production) to $31 in durable manufacturing (which includes machinery, computer, and furniture production) and $37 in mining. Average wages in service industries were $24 per hour, ranging from $15 in retail to $33 in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries, to $36 in information industries (which includes publishing, printing, and motion picture production).

According to numerous scholars, deindustrialization has disproportionately harmed lower-skilled workers in inner cities. The substantial job loss in inner cities, particularly in blue-collar occupations found primarily in manufacturing industries, has not been offset by the growth in jobs in service industries, because many of these jobs require extensive education. Thus they do not provide sufficient opportunities for displaced workers. This, along with the suburbanization of manufacturing jobs and residential segregation, has led to an education mismatch between the supply of labor and the available jobs, particularly among young, inner-city youth.

The vast majority of jobs that moved overseas required little education and offered low wages. The loss of these jobs has reduced the demand for low-income and less-educated workers in the United States. This has resulted in stagnating wages for these workers. Indeed, among men who completed only high school, the entry-level wage declined between 1973 and 2005, dropping from $13 per hour in 1973 to $11 per hour in 2005. In contrast, the average entry wage for male college graduates rose between 1973 and 2005, increasing from $18 per hour in 1973 to $20

per hour in 2005. These patterns are similar for women. In addition to stagnating wages, deindustrialization has increased long-term unemployment among low-income workers. As a result, long-term dependence on governmental assistance has increased. However, the government attempted to reduce this dependence through the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program.

In addition to its deleterious effects on workers, particularly low-income workers, deindustrialization has negatively affected unions because the manufacturing sector is one of the most heavily unionized sectors. The loss of jobs in this sector has undermined union strength, particularly because firms have relocated, in part, in an effort to escape the wage demands of unions. As unionized firms have closed and the volume of unemployed workers has increased, the negotiating power of existing unions has declined.

The negative impact of deindustrialization on unions is a key reason that deindustrialization has harmed lower-income workers. Historically, wages were relatively high among unionized workers and industries, particularly when comparing the incomes of unionized and nonunionized workers at the bottom of the income distribution. However, unionization rates declined most dramatically among low-income workers, due in part to the loss of low-wage manufacturing jobs. This in turn served to reduce the wage premium of unionization among low-wage workers.

Finally, deindustrialization can have devastating effects on cities and communities, particularly when entire towns or sections of towns are dependent on a manufacturing firm or industry for economic vitality. A number of ethnographic studies illustrate the impact of deindustrialization on families and communities, showing that when cities lose manufacturing employment, their economies suffer because lost jobs result in reduced consumerism, a depleted tax base, and an increased need for public support. Lost jobs inhibit the ability of displaced workers to contribute to the local economy. Thus many other businesses that rely on manufacturing workers as consumers, such as restaurants and retail shops, feel the ripple effects of deindustrialization through reduced profits. In addition, deindustrialization depletes the city's tax base because cities lose revenues from business taxes and individual income taxes. This further undermines the vitality of the city. In sum, while deindustrialization allows U.S. firms to remain competitive in the global economy, it also has broad detrimental effects on individuals, organizations, businesses, and in some instances, entire communities.

Stephanie Moller

See also Current Account Deficit; Global Economy; Globalization; Income Disparity; Inequality; Postindustrialism; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Urban Underclass; Wage Gap; Welfare; Working Poor

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DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

Deinstitutionalization—the movement of mentally disabled people from mental institutions into a community- or family-based environment—is a concept that transformed in a generation from a solution to a problem. Introduced in the early 1960s as a way to reduce societal reliance on state institutions, the policy itself became a problem by the early 1980s. Increases in homelessness, poor community services for the mentally ill, the placement of the chronically mentally ill in nursing homes, the increase in the

mentally ill in jails and prisons, and a general increase of incivility in large cities were all seen as consequences of deinstitutionalization. For many, the reform caused more problems than it solved.

The United States, by the mid-20th century, had become a country reliant on "total institutions" to control and treat deviance and dependency. State mental hospitals counted more than a half million patients and had long waiting lists in most states. Institutions for children dominated care for dependent and neglected minors. Prisons were the answer to criminality. Although the poorhouses of the 19th century had disappeared, their replacement—public housing projects and federal welfare programs—segregated the poor in minority communities. Started during the second quarter of the 19th century, these public institutions lost their legitimacy as a reasonable way to care for the needy and troubled. They were expensive, overcrowded, and generally seen as failures. They neither rehabilitated nor protected. That consensus led to new ideas about care and containment. Moral entrepreneurs from both the left and the right stepped in with proposals to close institutions. Scholarship emphasis on institutions shifted from seeing them as agencies of reform to seeing them as producing the very problems earlier reformers thought they would fix. If institutions were causing the problems they were supposed to ameliorate, then closing those institutions, or at least reducing the reliance on them, would improve the situation greatly. *Deinstitutionalization* was the name given to those efforts.

By the 1980s deinstitutionalization had become a bad word. Officials emptied the mental hospitals and closed down children's institutions. The median length of stay in state mental hospitals dropped by almost 44 percent during the 1970s. Between 1974 and 1984 the number of beds in state mental hospitals dropped by more than 58 percent. But community mental health services intended to replace mental hospitals and foster care in place of children's institutions failed to improve conditions for mentally ill or dependent children. Journalistic reports revealed that many of the mentally ill were living on the streets, and children in foster care were trapped in a permanent limbo. Homelessness increased 300 percent in the 1980s, and fear of the mentally ill intensified as involuntary commitment receded. Prison populations skyrocketed, and the mentally ill filled the jails. Nursing homes became repositories for the chronically mentally ill in many states. By the 1990s few spoke of deinstitutionalization as a remedy, and most spoke of it as a problem. Little could be done to reverse the trends, though. Case law made reinstitutionalization a legal impossibility. The Supreme Court limited the use of institutions, and state courts were reticent to reverse this trend away from exclusion and confinement. By the 21st century, society had transitioned into a world of care and containment that included the deviant in society (with prisons as the notable exception).

Nevertheless, deinstitutionalization left society with a new set of serious and persistent problems. Whereas some scholars could look back and see progress, many citizens could only see communities that did not have the tools to care for and contain the chronically mentally ill. For them, deinstitutionalization failed to protect society from the troubled and troubling. With involuntary commitment greatly restricted and most state mental health systems committed to community care, even the most difficult mentally ill persons were assigned community care or no care at all. After a quarter century of experience, few would call it a success. Yet, the society seemed incapable of moving beyond the rhetoric of inclusion and the reality of weak social control capacity.

From the variety of explanations for this turn of events, some argue that deinstitutionalization was flawed in its conceptualization. Built on symbolic interactionist theory of the self and its production, the very idea misspecified the source of the deviance and the process that brought it into being. Many important works on deinstitutionalization assumed that mental illness was less a disease and more a learned social role. Given that fundamental theoretical mistake, they argued, the policies that followed could not help but be flawed. Acting mentally ill did not disappear when the socializing institutions that taught the role disappeared. Others felt that the theory was correct but that the implementation was woefully inadequate. Most mental health care is provided by state systems. Although the 1970s saw a rapid decline in patient censuses at state hospitals, the saved dollars were slow in being transferred to community services. The community services that developed were poorly integrated, as most states relied on private organizations to deliver community care. The idea of deinstitutionalization was solid; the implementation was deplorable. States failed to put the resources into the new community services, and the results were unsurprisingly devastating.

Deinstitutionalization is part of a major transformation of social control strategies that occurred in the

last quarter of the 20th century. Desegregation of schools and deconcentration of public housing combined with deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals to absorb deviant and dependent populations back into civil society. The exclusion that was the hallmark of institutionalization was replaced by the push for inclusion. Stimulated by the civil rights movement and a desire to correct the abuses of the institutional system of care, the push to mainstream those on the fringes of society has won the day. Today the deviant are hidden away downtown as opposed to out of town in institutions. But the mentally ill and other deviant groups did not disappear. Nothing in the move to inclusion reduced the number of people who experience mental illness or the ravages of poverty and racism. Today, they are hidden among us waiting for a new generation of social problem researchers to tear away the camouflage and expose the reality of a deinstitutionalized system of care.

Dan A. Lewis

See also Mental Health; Total Institution

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Dementia

Originating from the Latin word *demens,* meaning "without a mind," the term *dementia* historically designated social and intellectual deterioration associated with old age. However, beginning in the late 19th century, the medical characterization of *dementia* increased in specificity with the rise of biological sciences and the advent of new technologies to study the brain. As a diagnostic category, the term now encompasses about 70 different conditions associated with abnormal cognitive decline. Seminal in this evolution was the 1906 description by German neuropathologist Alois Alzheimer of a presenile form of dementia in a younger woman in her early 50s. In 1910, famous psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin reviewed Alzheimer's findings and claimed them to be suggestive of a new condition he called "Alzheimer's disease" to distinguish it from senile dementia, a disease experts then believed to occur only at a later stage in life. Later research revealed that Alzheimer's disease and senile dementia shared similar clinical and histological features, and by the 1970s, the medical community reached a consensus to use the term *Alzheimer's disease* to designate both conditions, irrespective of age of onset.

The 1980s marked the development of standardized diagnostic criteria under the impetus of the Alzheimer Disease and Related Disorders Association and the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Diseases. This development allowed more precise clinical identifications of distinct forms of dementia, including Alzheimer's disease, vascular dementia, and Pick's disease, among others. It also permitted more accurate estimates of the number of dementia cases within the general population.

Current findings put the prevalence of dementia in Western countries at between 2 and 9 percent of people over the age of 65, with rates for those age 85 years and over as high as 50 percent. Alzheimer's disease is by far the most common form of dementia and accounts for approximately three quarters of all cases. In the United States alone, the Alzheimer Society reports that Alzheimer's disease currently affects an estimated 4.5 million Americans, and projections for 2050 put this number at between 11.3 and 16 million. Worldwide, dementia affects an estimated 28 million individuals, a figure projected to increase to 80 million by 2040. These estimates make dementia one of the most common causes of morbidity in elderly people.

The Geneticization of Alzheimer's Disease

A significant recent development in dementia research has been the discovery of several genes associated with familial and sporadic types of Alzheimer's disease. Familial Alzheimer's disease implicates the action of a number of mutated genes that follow an autosomal dominant pattern of inheritance whereby each child has a 50 percent chance of inheriting the disease if one of the parents is a carrier. Individuals with familial Alzheimer's disease account for about 10 percent of all cases and typically develop the disease

before the age of 60. By contrast, sporadic Alzheimer's disease involves a combination of genetic factors not necessarily mutational that likely interact with a host of poorly understood environmental factors. Sporadic Alzheimer's disease accounts for the majority of cases of the disease, and onset typically occurs after the age of 60. So far, only a variant of the apolipoprotein E gene, called apoE4, has been determined to increase susceptibility for sporadic Alzheimer's disease.

A number of caveats have prevented the widespread use of genetic testing for Alzheimer's disease in clinical settings. First, testing to identify asymptomatic individuals who will develop the disease later in life is only useful for a small subset of familial cases. Predictive testing in sporadic cases remains problematic because apoE4 is an unreliable marker for Alzheimer's disease. Also found in individuals who do not develop the disease later in life, this variant likely needs to interact with other factors to cause the disease. A key concern with genetic discoveries is their potential for redefining Alzheimer's disease as an inherited condition that clinicians can accurately detect early in life. This mischaracterization of the predictive power of genetic testing raises concerns about the misguided use of test results by employers and health care insurers for eliminating high-risk cases from their rosters.

Dementia as Loss of Self

The neuropathological consequences of dementia have been well documented in the medical literature as a gradual decline in intellectual function that affects memory, thinking, and behavior. Through the artifacts of computer tomography scans, autopsied brain matter, and psychometric scores, biomedicine has legitimized dementia as a disease that unfolds independently from social circumstances, gradually erasing the identity of those afflicted by its pathology. In the popular imagination, dementia exists as rhetoric of irrevocable decline that robs afflicted individuals of self and dignity. Yet, this inevitability is increasingly being challenged by research that seeks to understand the influences of culture, social location, organizational practices, and health policies on how dementia is interpreted, and responded to, by both diagnosed persons and their social partners. Adhering to the tenets of social constructionism, this perspective critically interrogates the different discourses that construct dementia in relation to social, historical, and political contexts. The suggestion is that a nihilistic understanding of dementia sets expectations and responses that undermine the moral status of those afflicted and creates the conditions under which expressions of the self are subsumed to pathology. This alternate conceptualization acknowledges the impact of pathology but also recognizes people with dementia as having the ability to maintain a sense of valued self when supported by person-centered care practices.

The Treatment of Dementia

One of the most significant developments in dementia care has been the introduction of pharmacological interventions to slow mild to moderate cognitive decline in Alzheimer's disease. The majority of these drugs are designed to interfere with the process by which the Alzheimer pathology breaks down acetylcholine, a neurotransmitter essential for optimal brain functioning. The introduction of drug treatment coincided with an interest in studying dementia in its earliest manifestations, when cognitive loss deviates from normal functioning but at levels insufficient to meet criteria for a diagnosis of dementia. This phenomenon, described almost half a century ago as "benign senescent forgetfulness," has in the past decade received a surge of interest, with nearly 20 new diagnostic categories characterizing more or less the same type of impairment.

The attraction in detecting dementia at an early stage lies in the possibility of introducing pharmacological intervention to retard decline into full-blown disease. With an increasingly aging population, early detection represents a potentially lucrative market for pharmaceutical companies that have invested in the development of dementia treatments. However, a key challenge has been to develop neuropsychological tests that are sufficiently accurate to distinguish the types of impairment that convert to dementia from those associated with normal aging. Inaccurate diagnosis could lead to the unwarranted use of potentially harmful drugs and cause psychological distress to those mistakenly identified as being at risk for dementia and their families. The stigma of being labeled as "dementing" early in life also has repercussions in terms of employment and access to adequate health insurance coverage. Rising public awareness of these new diagnostic categories could also potentially cause healthy older individuals to needlessly worry about their memory function.

The Future of Dementia

The definition of *dementia* remains contested as biomedicine continues in its quest to categorize cognitive decline into increasingly specific disorders. Social scientists have drawn attention to the social and moral dimensions associated with the diagnosis, genetic testing, and treatment of dementia disorders, with particular emphasis on Alzheimer's disease. Epidemiological findings about the prevalence of dementia disorders in an increasingly older population raise concerns about the allocation of health care resources worldwide.

André P. Smith

See also Chronic Diseases; Discrimination; Discrimination, Institutional; Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Insurance

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Demilitarization

Demilitarization refers to the dismantling or deconstruction of militarism. Militarism is the influence of the military as an institution and of the preparations to use military force on the overall social organization of society. Demilitarization can be seen as taking place along several dimensions, which may or may not be aligned with each other. The implication is that a society might be in the process of becoming demilitarized in some areas but not in others.

One key element of militarism is the direct participation of the armed forces in the governing structures of society. In this case, demilitarization signifies the reduction of this practice by the introduction of new legislation, stronger democratic electoral procedures, and the strengthening of other norms encouraging civilian participation, or by the actions of citizens who become less inclined to vote or otherwise support military leaders. Since the end of the cold war, Latin America and some parts of Africa have seen a dramatic reduction of this form of militarism.

Militarism also finds expression as an aggressive foreign policy that relies on the actual and threatened use of armed force. In this respect, demilitarization is proceeding, at least in parts of the world where international organizations such as the United Nations and International Criminal Court, new treaties between nations, and commercial transactions, tourism, and professional and educational exchange are gradually replacing geopolitical competition. At the same time, it should be noted that some powerful nations continue to rely on the projection of military force. Furthermore, many parts of the globe remain violent. The demilitarization of some countries and some features of international relations is not incompatible with continued economic, political, and cultural inequality.

Demilitarization also includes the replacement of values and norms that glorify military conduct and the reduced impact of preparations to use military force on key institutions. During World War II, defense spending accounted for 40 percent of the gross national product of the United States; now it is about 5 percent (although the absolute size of military spending remains very significant). The process of demilitarization is also likely to limit conscription and the search for external and internal enemies. Fully demilitarized societies are also more likely to embrace formal and informal forms of conflict resolution, nonviolence, and a more elaborate peace culture. These developments may be the result of institutional changes or more deliberate efforts to create political will through concerted peace movements and other forms of activism.

Paul Joseph

See also Militarism; Military-Industrial Complex

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Democracy

Democracy is an ancient Greek word meaning the rule (*kratos*) of the people (*demos*). It refers primarily to a form of government in which political decisions are made by a majority of the citizens (direct democracy) or their elected representatives (representative democracy). Democracy also signifies a country, society, or culture that possesses or tends toward a democratic form of government. Thus one might say that the future states of America knew democracy before officially gaining independence from the British Empire.

Varieties of democracy and of democratic theory abound, but a remarkable consensus exists as to the value of democracy: To call a country democratic today is virtually synonymous with saying its government is legitimate. Since World War II, almost all countries, however authoritarian, have called themselves democratic and have held elections—even if fraudulent—to maintain this reputation.

Direct democracy requires a small and close-knit society and is generally associated with historical polities, such as ancient Athens or the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, though it also survives today in town meetings and plebiscites, such as referenda, initiatives, and recalls. Most democracies now use representation, which is organized according to one or a mixture of two models. In presidential systems such as the one used in the United States, government is divided into branches—legislative, executive, and sometimes judicial—separately elected or appointed, with distinct but overlapping responsibilities and powers. This produces a system of "checks and balances" in which different representations of the popular will struggle to prevail or achieve compromise in public policy. Parliamentary systems such as Great Britain's instead give the bulk of effective powers to a single branch—the "lower" or popular branch of the legislature—with executive and judicial authority subordinated to its membership and laws, respectively. This tends to facilitate the formation of centralized, energetic administrations that founder only when public opinion demonstrably turns against them or when intraparliamentary alliances and loyalties fail.

From the first accounts of democracy in ancient Greece, the concept has been associated with the claim to equal freedom on the part of each member of the *demos,* or qualified citizenry. The meaning and social impact of democracy thus changes with the definition of citizenship. Factors such as race, gender, age, education, and economic condition have historically been applied to limit political participation and its concomitants, now referred to as civil liberties. Today the prevailing tendency is to enfranchise all adults, with some exceptions; for instance, in the United States resident aliens and felons may not vote, there are minimum ages for political office, and only natural-born citizens may run for president.

The concepts of equal freedom and majority rule are not perfectly congruent, as citizens who tend to be in the minority need not be treated fairly by democratic majorities. Examples include those whose race, ethnicity, religion, or way of life gives them interests truly or seemingly contrary to those of their fellows, a problem long noted. Aristotle and the American founders both warned, for example, that unrestrained majorities might seek to use government to divest the wealthy of their property and redistribute it to the people, undermining the economic system upon which politics relies. Political philosophers have insisted on the distinction between the good of the majority and the good of all; when the former supplants the latter, it is often called the "tyranny of the majority."

Solutions to majority tyranny are numerous but entail two broad strategies. Classical political philosophy sought to curb the excesses of the democratic faction by recommending a mixed regime—one in which government is divided among offices representing members of the various social classes. The modern approach eschews any institutional recognition of class, relying instead on various procedural mechanisms to guard against majority tyranny. These include (a) requiring a supermajority or qualified

majority vote on certain important measures, (b) the aforementioned checks and balances among branches or levels of government, (c) the concept of enumerated powers outside of which government may not act, (d) proportional representation of various groups within society, and (e) the provision of individual rights, which the government may be barred from infringing. Governments that employ such strategies to protect minority interests are often referred to as liberal democracies.

Most democracies today are liberal democracies, and it could be argued that the spirit that animates them is as much liberal (focused on individual rights) as democratic (focused on majority rule). When U.S. leaders speak of promoting democracy in the Middle East, for example, they are thinking of government with constitutional protections for women and ethnic and religious minorities, not of regimes such as that of Iran, an Islamic Republic in which key offices are elected, but Shi'a Islam is the official religion, and councils of clerics apply Islamic law to legislative, executive, and judicial decisions. Liberal democracy, by contrast, is generally thought to be incompatible with an establishment of religion or legal restrictions on the religious beliefs of individuals.

One consequence of the focus on liberal democracy has been the gradual enhancement of the power of courts in deciding political issues. The United States pioneered this trend when its Supreme Court claimed the power of judicial review: the ability to negate laws or governmental acts that, in the Court's judgment, conflict with the Constitution. Originally, this power was defended by noting that laws passed by popular representatives are subordinate to the Constitution, embraced as a "higher law" by a supermajority of eligible citizens at the time of its ratification (the same applying to subsequent amendments). Today, the Court argues more broadly that modern democracy implies the "rule of law," including vital but indeterminate constitutional rights, and that as the final interpreter of these rights, the Supreme Court serves an indispensable function within democracy. In the United States and elsewhere, this trend has empowered courts vis-à-vis elected officials.

L. Joseph Hebert

See also Citizenship; Civil Rights; Inequality; Political Fragmentation; Religion and Politics; Voter Apathy

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Demographic Transition Theory

Prior to the 20th century, many social scientists believed that at some point the carrying capacity of the earth would be outstripped by the needs of the rapidly growing human population. However, during the 20th century, data became available that led social scientists to abandon the idea that the human population would continue to grow in an unsustainable manner. This change came about with the realization that, from the late 18th through the 19th century, numerous European countries experienced dramatic demographic transitions that were eventually mimicked by countries in other parts of the world. These demographic transitions might ultimately stabilize the world population.

Demographic transition theory posits that populations ultimately stabilize by way of a three-phase process (see Table 1). Characterizing the first of these phases are high rates of mortality offset by high rates of fertility to create a balanced mortality–fertility regime with slow population growth. Characterizing the second phase is rapid population growth brought about by continued high levels of fertility and declining levels of mortality. Historically, dramatic population growth has most often resulted from lower death rates, not higher birth rates. Characterizing the third and final stage of demographic transition are low levels of fertility and low levels of mortality.

While general agreement exists that preceding declines in fertility are declines in mortality, no consensus exists as to the cause of fertility decline. Some argue that high levels of fertility reflected strategies of familial and self-preservation in the face of high mortality levels at all stages in the life course. Others focus on structural changes in societies, namely industrialization and urbanization, as the main causes of fertility decline. In agricultural

Table 1 The Three Phases of Demographic Transition Theory

Phase	*Mortality*	*Fertility*	*Population Growth*
I	High	High	Slow/Stable
II	Low	High	Rapid/Unstable
III	Low	Low	Slow/Stable

societies children were, among other things, economic assets—crucial to family and household economics. Young children could provide substantial manual labor, infant and child care, and elder care. To the extent that this is true of preindustrial societies, it is not surprising to find high fertility levels among them. In the urban-industrial context, however, children become economic liabilities because economically productive activities are generally removed from the household where children can easily contribute. Modern child labor laws and compulsory schooling have further undermined the ability of children to contribute to household economics. Still others attribute fertility decline to cultural changes in societies, namely, modernization and secularization, which are not necessarily tied to the structural changes described earlier.

Irrespective of the causes, much of the world is moving into the third stage of the demographic transition. In the space of two generations, Mexico and other less-developed countries cut their fertility rates in half—from more than five children per woman to less than three. All of this has led population experts to less frequently ask, "What must be done about the population explosion?" and more often to ask, "How do societies work when people stop replacing themselves?"

Amon Emeka

See also Birth Rate; Mortality Rate; Population Growth

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Dependency Ratio

The dependency ratio is the number of elderly people and children as a fraction of the number of working-age adults. For example, a dependency ratio of 30 percent would indicate that there are 30 children and elderly people for every 100 working-age adults. The definitions of the age groups may vary. For example, some calculations treat people between the ages of 20 and 64 as working-age adults, whereas others define this group as people ages 15 to 64. The ratio is intended to capture the size of the population that is too old or young to work, relative to the population that is capable of producing economic output; that is, it reflects the number of children and elderly who must be "supported" by each working-age adult. The aged (or old-age) dependency ratio is similar but includes only the number of elderly people as a fraction of the number of working-age adults.

An increase in the dependency ratio typically places additional stress on the public sector, as the working-age population must bear an increased tax burden to support programs for children and the elderly. The aged dependency ratio has particular significance for policy debates in the United States and other industrialized countries, where aging populations are putting a strain on public retirement programs and other programs targeted toward the elderly.

Trends and Forecasts

The aged dependency ratio in the United States (using the 20–64 working age definition) rose from 13.8 percent in 1950 to 20.3 percent in 2005. According to the latest projections of the Social Security Board of Trustees, this dependency ratio will rise rapidly between 2010 and 2030, reaching 34.9 percent in 2030. After that, it should increase more slowly, to 38.0 percent in 2050 and to 42.1 percent in 2080. However, significant uncertainty surrounding such forecasts exists. The Social Security trustees estimate that the dependency ratio in 2080 could be as high as 58.1 percent (the "high-cost" scenario) or as low as 31.6 percent (the "low-cost" scenario). A similar trend is occurring around the world, particularly in industrialized countries. According to official UN estimates, the aged dependency ratio (using working age as 15–64) for developed countries could rise from 22.6 percent in 2005 to 44.4 percent in 2050.

Changes in a country's dependency ratio can result from a number of demographic factors, including fertility, mortality, and immigration. Affecting the projected rapid increase in the U.S. dependency ratio prior to 2030 is the aging of the baby boom generation. Driving the more gradual, long-term upward trend is increasing life expectancy due to medical advances, combined with a low fertility rate. The period life expectancy for a 20-year-old in the mid-20th century was 71.2 years; by 2003 this increased to 78.4 years. Whereas the total fertility rate varied greatly over the past century, it has remained at around 2.0 children per woman recently (below the rate of 2.1 required to maintain zero population growth in the absence of immigration and changes in life expectancy).

Relevance for Fiscal Policy

The upward trend in the dependency ratio has significant implications for public sector programs, particularly Social Security and Medicare. In a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) retirement program, the following mathematical relationship holds at every point in time:

$$twN_y = bN_o$$

Here, t is the payroll tax rate, N_y is the number of workers covered by the program, w is average covered earnings per worker, b is the average benefit per retiree, and N_o is the number of retirees. The equation implies that all payroll taxes collected in the current period are paid out as benefits to current retirees; this is the defining characteristic of a PAYGO system. This equation can be rearranged as follows:

$$t = (b/w)(N_o/N_y)$$

Here, the side to the left of the equal sign is the payroll tax rate, and the side to the right of the equal sign is the product of the replacement rate (fraction of the average worker's earnings that the retirement benefit replaces, or b/w) and the aged dependency ratio (retirees per worker, or N_o/N_y). This equation shows that the payroll tax required to support the system is directly proportional to the dependency ratio.

Currently, the payroll tax rate for Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program is 10.6 percent, while the replacement rate is approximately 42 percent for a worker with average earnings. Taken together with the dependency ratio of 20.3 percent, one can see that the left-hand side of the equation is larger than the right-hand side, indicating that OASI is running a surplus. As the dependency ratio rises to 42.1 percent (its expected value in 2080), the right-hand side grows larger than the left. This indicates that OASI will run deficits (drawing down the trust fund) unless either the payroll tax is raised or benefits are cut. The Social Security trustees estimate that the OASI program will begin to run deficits in 2018 and that the trust fund will be exhausted in 2042. The Medicare Hospital Insurance program, which operates in a similar manner, also is greatly affected by increases in the dependency ratio. Medicare trustees predict that the hospital insurance program will begin to run deficits in 2010 and that the trust fund will be exhausted in 2018. The sizes of the long-run imbalances are significant, with Social Security's unfunded obligations amounting to $13.4 trillion and the Medicare Hospital Insurance program's amounting to $28.1 trillion.

Sita Nataraj Slavov

See also Baby Boomers; Birth Rate; Fertility; Life Expectancy; Medicare; Mortality Rate; Pensions and Social Security

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Deportation

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security deports more than 1 million nonresident aliens annually,

including about 150,000 to 200,000 "formal removals." A formal removal occurs when an alien is decreed deportable in an administrative proceeding within the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Deportability may be due to undocumented entry, visa overstay, or criminal conviction. More than two thirds (69.5 percent) of formal removals in 2005 were Mexican nationals, with nationals of Honduras (7.0 percent) and Guatemala (6.0 percent) a distant second and third. More than one third of formal removals (36.2 percent) resulted from attempts to enter without proper documents (see Table 1). A similar offense, "present without authorization," resulted in an additional 34.6 percent of removals. Only about one fifth (19.2 percent) of formal removals were due to criminal violations. Thus undocumented migrants account for the majority of formal removals. Nonetheless, nearly 90 percent of deportations are termed *voluntary departures.* This occurs when foreign nationals are permitted to depart the United States without formal proceedings. By far the greatest number of these deportations occurs when the U.S. Border Patrol returns undocumented Mexican nationals directly to Mexico.

Table 1 Aliens Formally Removed by Administrative Reason for Removal: 2005

Administrative Reason for Removal	*N*	*%*
Attempted entry without proper documents or through fraud or misrepresentation	75,532	36.2
Present without authorization	72,229	34.6
Criminal violations	40,018	19.2
Previously removed, ineligible for reentry	18,203	8.7
Failed to maintain status	1,042	0.5
Public charge	824	0.4
Smuggling or aiding illegal entry	540	0.3
Other	120	0.1
National security and related grounds	10	0.0
Unknown	3	0.0
Total	208,521	100.0

Source: "Table 40: Aliens Formally Removed by Administrative Reason for Removal: Fiscal Years 1996 to 2005." Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Retrieved January 13, 2007 (http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/table40.xls).

History of Deportation

The history of deportations interrelates with conditions that cause xenophobia: periods of financial insecurity, war, and mass immigration. The first legal grounds for deportation came through passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. In preparation for a possible war with France, the United States passed An Act Concerning Aliens, granting authority to the president to order the deportation of any alien deemed "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States." The president was also granted the power to remove aliens who had been imprisoned. Another related law passed in the same year was An Act Respecting Alien Enemies. This act gave the president the power to detain or deport aliens if their country of citizenship was at war with the United States. Whereas three of the acts passed in this series were repealed or allowed to expire, the Alien Enemies Act is still enforced in a modified form today.

Early Immigration Laws

Faced with the growing diversity of immigrants from non-European countries, the United States instituted a series of laws, including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Acts of 1891, 1903, 1907, and 1917. These laws restricted immigration and barred Chinese and many Asian migrants. These laws expanded the reasons for the apprehension and deportation of undocumented immigrants, enemies of the state, and criminal aliens. There were relatively few formal removals in the early period of the laws (between 2,000 and 5,000 annually), and voluntary departures were not tracked. Following the Immigration Act of 1903, in which the Bureau of Immigration was moved to the Department of Commerce and Labor, the number of formal removals doubled to nearly 10,000 deportations. By 1910 there were 27,000 removals, climbing to a peak of 37,000 in 1914. Deportations dropped dramatically during World War I to fewer than 10,000 annually by the end of the war. Yet, during this period, demands in the

United States required the importation of undocumented laborers from Mexico as many U.S. workers had gone to Europe to fight in the war. By 1924, labor demands had decreased and deportations nearly reached pre-war levels.

The Great Depression and Operation Wetback

The Great Depression saw a surge in deportations as labor surpluses led to extreme competition for jobs. Although official immigration statistics show about 351,000 deportations of all nationalities between 1929 and 1939, estimates place the number of Mexican laborers deported or repatriated at between 1 and 2 million persons. Deportations again declined following the Depression, as the United States entered into World War II. Farm labor shortages during the war led to implementation of the Bracero Program, the legal importing of as many as 400,000 temporary Mexican guest workers annually. Even more undocumented workers entered the country during the same time period seeking employment. Yet, growing xenophobia in the early 1950s and the post–Korean War recession caused President Eisenhower to launch a campaign of mass deportations of Mexican workers. Under General Joseph Swing, the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted a series of raids recording more than a million deportations in 1954 of persons of Mexican origin, even including some legal residents and U.S.-born children of immigrants (see Figure 1).

Recent Immigration Legislation

The Hart-Celler Immigration Bill of 1965 (aka the Immigration Act of 1965) radically restructured the U.S. immigration system to one that favored family reunification and immigrants with needed skills. The law also removed preferences for European countries, permitting a greater influx of immigrants from Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. As the flow of legal immigrants increased after 1965, so too did the number of deportations for illegal entry (officially "entry without inspection"), visa overstay, and other reasons. The number of deportations quadrupled from 82,209 in 1964 to 320,817 in 1970.



Figure 1 Aliens Expelled: Fiscal Year 1940 to 2005

Source: "Table 38: Aliens Expelled: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2005." Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Retrieved January 13, 2007 (http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/table38.xls).

In the 1980s negative public opinions of undocumented migrants and the fear of the rapid growth of the foreign-born population compelled Congress to consider changes to immigration laws. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 sought to control the flow of immigration by penalizing companies that hired undocumented workers while regularizing the status of those already in the United States without permission. It also contained a provision for increasing the Border Patrol to curb further entry without inspection. In that year nearly 1.7 million deportations occurred, partly as a result of the addition of more than 1,000 new Border Patrol agents. The reforms proposed by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 had the unintended consequences of increasing migration flows through family reunification. Likewise, employers were able to avoid penalties and fines as they did not "knowingly" hire undocumented workers. In 1996 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act was passed, adding 5,000 new Border Patrol agents by 2001, appropriating more funding for border control, and introducing a process of expedited removal in which officers of the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Department of Homeland Security) could remove undocumented aliens without judicial oversight.

Stephen J. Sills

See also Asylum; Bracero Program; Chicano Movement; Human Trafficking; Immigration; Immigration, United States; Labor, Migrant; Nativism; Repatriation; Sanctuary Movement; Terrorism; Undocumented Immigrants; War; Xenophobia

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Depression

See Mental Depression

Deregulation

Deregulation is the easing or elimination of governmental restrictions on economic activity. In the past century, in advanced capitalist economies such as that of the United States, governments instituted many rules restricting business behavior. As these rules always seemed onerous to businesses, businesses have always been in opposition to them. This opposition became effective in the past 30 years, leading to deregulation policies to remove the fetters on market activity and let markets determine economic outcomes. From this point of view, regulation stifles the economy, creating inefficiencies and lowered output.

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), created in 1887, was the first federal regulatory agency in the United States. At that time the railroad industry was fixing rates, controlling markets, and favoring large customers, that is, acting in noncompetitive ways. The federal government tried to reintroduce competition into this industry by setting rules and regulations concerning fares and routes. However, these rules had little effect, essentially creating a protected, noncompetitive market for the railroads under the aegis of government regulation.

Since then, many different federal regulatory agencies have emerged to regulate most economic activity. For example, the oil, steel, agriculture, banking, air travel, pharmaceutical, construction, and chemical industries have all been subject to regulatory scrutiny, with varying results. Some agencies, like the ICC, have been failures; others, like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have been quite successful in achieving their stated goals.

Regulation is a response to the functioning of the market. Certain undesirable outcomes may be the result of free-market activity. These kinds of outcomes can be considered as market failures, which the market itself is inherently incapable of correcting. A classic example of this is air pollution. In the refining of oil into gasoline, toxic chemicals are discharged into the air. Because the oil companies do not own the air and need not pay anyone for its use—it is commonly held by society—little incentive exists for them to limit their discharges. Whatever they spew into the air costs them nothing and therefore is not taken into account by them or consequently by the market. There may very well be costs associated with this air pollution, in the form of increased payments for health care, but they are not reflected in any market calculations. If left to the market, this problem is insoluble. Thus it becomes necessary for the government—an agent outside of the market—to step in to solve the problem.

Not wanting to eliminate markets (e.g., by replacing them with government planning), the U.S. government tries to alter these negative outcomes by limiting what businesses can do. Market failure is one main reason why a government may regulate. In addition to pollution (regulated by EPA), other examples of market failure are unwanted income distribution (not regulated in any way); lack of product information, such as the efficacy and safety of drugs (regulated by the Food and Drug Administration); and monopoly power (regulated by various antitrust laws promoting competition). A second reason for regulation would be to prevent discrimination—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, established in 1961, oversees this. A third reason is to promote the health and safety of workers on the job—the Occupational Safety and Health Administration sets myriad rules that employers must follow regarding worker safety. With the establishment of these more recent agencies, the federal government now regulates virtually all business in the United States in one way or another.

Not surprisingly, a backlash against this extensive regulation soon followed. Businesses chafed at having to follow all of these rules imposed by agents outside the market. The only impact that they could see was the increased costs associated with compliance with these rules. Widespread regulation seemed to be an unfair governmental intrusion into private business. The move toward deregulation was born.

While the primary objection to regulation on the part of business is the increased cost and resultant lower profits, an economic–philosophical argument also exists against this sort of government interference. Economists who believe in the free market argue that market outcomes are the most efficient and desirable of all outcomes; government involvement can only make things worse. They have faith that by following the rules of the market, letting supply and demand freely determine prices and output, the economy will be the best that it can be. This became the intellectual underpinning of the deregulation movement beginning in the late 1970s.

The first major deregulation legislation was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 that removed many rules governing air travel, presumably opening up this industry to more competitive forces. Within the 1980s satellite transmissions, trucking, natural gas, crude oil prices and refined petroleum products, radio, and the financial industry were all deregulated. Generally speaking though, rules concerning safety (both worker and product) and discrimination remained.

In addition to changing laws, deregulation can also occur through government neglect. If the government does not enforce the regulatory laws—by not monitoring industry for safety violations, for example—this is, effectively, deregulation. The George W. Bush administration, which strongly supported deregulation, used this as a primary tactic in its fight against what it saw as governmental interference in the free market.

The results of deregulation have been mixed. Commercial airfares have gone down, but bankruptcies and labor problems plague the airline industry. The main goal of deregulation—lower prices—occurred in some cases, while the opposite occurred in others. A striking failure of deregulation was the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s. After 1982, when Congress took oversight controls off of savings and loan institutions, those institutions responded with an orgy of speculative investments resulting in massive bankruptcies, with taxpayers ultimately paying $160 billion for this experiment in market freedom.

Paul A. Swanson

See also Conservative Approaches; Megamergers; Multinational Corporations; Oligopoly

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DESERTIFICATION

Of all the global environmental problems, desertification is, perhaps, the most threatening for poor rural people. The most accepted definition of *desertification* states that it is land degradation in arid, semiarid, and dry subhumid areas (hereafter called "drylands") resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human activities. Drylands cover almost 40 percent of the total land surface of the world and are inhabited by approximately 1 billion humans dispersed over more than 100 countries. These people include many of the world's most vulnerable, marginalized, and politically weak citizens. In spite of the progress in the understanding of the ecological dimension of this phenomenon, few communities' well-being has improved by the myriad action plans and activities carried out by local, regional, or national organizations, particularly in Africa. A growing body of evidence suggests that a closer look at the social system and the role of its components is critical to understanding this frequent outcome.

Drylands are characterized by water scarcity stemming from the conjunction of low water offer (i.e., precipitation) and high water demand (i.e., water lost to the atmosphere as water vapor from soil via evaporation and from plants through transpiration). Drylands' precipitation is highly variable through the year and occurs in infrequent, discrete, and largely unpredictable events. In turn, the high evaporative demand of the atmosphere, resulting from high air temperatures, low humidity, and abundant solar radiation, determines that water availability is the dominant controlling factor for biological processes such as plant growth and herbivore productivity. Thus drylands, though not barren, are ecosystems of low and highly variable productivity capable of limited human settlement and vulnerable to anthropogenic disturbance.

The proximate causes of desertification are complex and vary from region to region. The European Mediterranean region has a long history of human misuse. War, urbanization, farming, and tourism have, over the years, altered vegetation to such an extent that, at present, virtually no natural vegetation exists there and soil erosion is ubiquitous. In contrast, Australian drylands have experienced extensive degradation only recently. The introduction of domestic livestock by Europeans in the late 1880s, together with the fences used to concentrate these animals and the suppression of fire, drastically reduced the abundance of perennial grasses, leaving more soil exposed to erosion by water or wind, and triggered shrub encroachment. In the Sahelian region of Africa, where the concept of desertification was first coined at the beginning of the 20th century, the replacement of the original vegetation by crops, the increase of grazing pressure over the remaining lands, and the collection of wood for fuel resulted in a reduction of the biological or economic productivity of the land. In particular, inappropriate use of heavy machinery, deficient irrigation schemes, and grazing management practices led to soil erosion, salinization, and overgrazing.

Any attempt to assess the impact of desertification on human societies should first acknowledge the difference between the ways water-limited ecosystems shape the functioning of social systems and the effects of desertification itself. Desertification imposes an additional constraint on human well-being by further reducing the limited ecosystem goods (e.g., food, timber, water) and services (e.g., soil maintenance, erosion control, carbon sequestration) that drylands provide. Failure to address this difference would lead to an overestimation of the desertification effects. Additionally, the manifestations of desertification vary widely, depending on the capacity of each country to mitigate its impacts. For example, in Africa it resulted in declining productivity and intensifying food insecurity and widespread famines, whereas in the Mediterranean region desertification seriously threatens water supply, while many regions of northern Europe are experiencing an increase in dust deposition due to north African soil erosion. In poor countries with a large proportion of their territory in arid and semiarid regions, desertification may trigger a downward spiral where a significant amount of a nation's human and financial resources are devoted to combating past desertification effects, leaving less available to invest in health, education, industry, and governmental institutions. The ultimate precarious social conditions thus developed generally lead to migrations, exacerbating urban sprawl, and may bring

about internal and cross-boundary social, ethnic, and political strife.

Approaches to the desertification problem broadly fall into two competing perspectives: the predominant global environmental management (GEM) discourse and the populist discourse. Whereas the former discourse rests on neoliberal values and Malthusian thinking, the latter has its philosophical roots in the self-reliant advocacy derived from the dependency schools of the 1970s and 1980s. The GEM discourse depicts overpopulation in drylands as the main problem leading to the degradation of the ecosystems on which they depend. As seen in the GEM discourse, the global problem of desertification requires a global solution. Therefore, GEM supporters promote top-down, interventionist and technocentrist solutions implemented through international institutions and conventions, such as the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. On the contrary, the populist discourse—populist in the sense that it positively portrays the acts of local people—emphasizes that the marginalization of smallholders and pastoralists started during the colonial period and was subsequently deepened by global capitalism, transnational corporations, and northern consumers as the principal causes of land overexploitation and degradation. International assistance in the form of debt per nature exchanges or technological transferences is regarded as part of the problem itself. Rather, the populist discourse focuses on local or traditional knowledge and community-based action as major sources to overcome environmental problems. However, despite its diametrically opposed explanations of the desertification problem, neither discourse denies an impending crisis caused by desertification.

Why, almost a century after its first detection, does desertification continue to be among the most important environmental problems faced by humankind? Though no single answer exists, there are some arguments to sketch an answer. Undoubtedly the inherent complexity of the desertification phenomenon hampers almost every phase of the sequence leading to the mitigation or control of an environmental problem (i.e., first detection, general recognition, agreement on regulation). For instance, a long period elapsed between when French foresters first perceived what they called "the desert advance" and the widespread diffusion of the desertification tragedy that took place in the Sahelian region of Africa after a series of drought years at the beginning of the 1970s; today improvements in our understanding of rangelands functioning and climatic variability allow for faster detection and prevention. These advances show that vegetation dynamics in drylands may remain seemingly unaffected by an increase in land use pressure until there is a sudden shift to a lower-productivity stable state, with stochastic climate events, such as severe droughts, acting as triggers. Additionally, incomplete or inadequate scientific knowledge, together with the urgent need of integrative solutions for the Sahelian drama, may have driven actors to resort to the first workable options, leading to erroneous regulations at that time. However, regulations of this kind are not dependent on scientific knowledge alone but also on political pressure mechanisms. Thus an explanation of the failure to achieve sound regulation needs to consider political issues as well.

The predominance of the GEM discourse, despite the poor performance of top-down solutions to "unsustainable" resource management, can be explained by its convenience for the interests of three main groups involved in the desertification issue: national governments, international aid donors, and scientists. National governments benefit not only from foreign financial aid but also from the use of desertification as the basis for severely repressive social control. International donors and institutions find the problem of desertification a reason unto itself for their involvement, whereas scientists may highlight the global nature and severity of the desertification problem as a means to obtain research funds. On the contrary, the bottom-up approaches promoted by the populist discourse do not fit the terms and conditions of bilateral and multilateral funding and instead stress the principles of participation and decentralization.

It is apparent that the progress achieved in our comprehension of desertification has not been matched by an improvement in the regulations aimed at mitigating its consequences. While the accumulation of knowledge generated during the past decades provides evidence against both discourses' main tenets, they nonetheless remain influential in the political and scientific arenas. Future contributions to the solution of the desertification problem require the synthesis of recent social and ecological advances into a new synthetic framework that overcomes the constraints upon the solutions imposed by the GEM and populist discourses. Social scientists hope that a new desertification paradigm—that is, the dryland development paradigm, which represents a convergence of insights from both discourses—is emerging.

Santiago R. Verón

See also Deforestation; Ecosystem; Environmental Degradation

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Deterrence Programs

Deterrence programs rest on the belief that society can reduce crime by taking action that makes it more difficult for a criminal to commit a crime or by developing punishment that is so severe that an individual will not commit the crime so as to avoid the stated punishment. Philosophers during the latter part of the 18th century originated this belief. Jeremy Bentham stated in his "Utilitarianism" that people, after reviewing the benefits and possible detriments of committing a crime, will always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Cesare Beccaria echoed Bentham's words in his "On Crime and Punishment" essay, in which he stated that people want to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. Therefore, to deter crime, the pain administered as punishment for the crime must be in a proportionate amount to offset the pleasure obtained from the crime. Beccaria also taught that the certainty and swiftness of the punishment is even more important than the level of severity of the punishment in deterring crime, thus making the stated purpose of punishment to be the prevention of crime.

General deterrence is the belief that effective public action reduces crime within the general population. If people fear being caught and punished for committing a crime, they will not commit the crime. The fear of apprehension is tied to the certainty of being caught and the swiftness of the trial and punishment, as much as it is to the severity of the punishment. When people believe that they are not going to be caught for committing a crime, they have little incentive to obey the law. Therefore, if a society can increase the certainty of apprehension and punishment, it can logically expect a reduction in the amount of crime.

Specific deterrence is the belief that, for certain crimes, if the chance of being caught and convicted is great enough or the punishment is severe enough, the rate for that specific crime will be reduced. This design includes harsher punishment for specific crimes that the public finds to be especially offensive and for repeat offenders. Whereas many believe that the severity of punishment will decrease crime, studies show that the correlation between the severity of punishment and crime reduction is not proportional in relation to crime rates.

Incapacitation is an action that eliminates the possibly of a crime being committed. A criminal cannot commit the crime if the methods, the opportunity, or the tools needed to commit the crime are eliminated. Such deterrence programs may take a number of different forms: incarceration, capital punishment, or police activity.

Selective incapacitation is a deterrence program based on the premise that a small number of offenders commit a large amount of crime. If society can eliminate the opportunity to commit crime for this selective group of offenders, then the crime rate will decrease. One example of this type of program is the Supervision for Life Program, now existing in many states for sex offenders. Parole authorities supervise convicted sex offenders even after they complete their periods of incarceration. The program rests on the belief that such extended supervision will reduce the opportunity of the sex offender to re-offend.

Incarceration is the primary method of incapacitation used in the United States. Because U.S. culture places great value on freedom of movement, the greatest deprivation that society can inflict as punishment is to imprison someone. Public officials express the belief that, as the number of imprisoned criminals increases, a corresponding drop in the crime rate follows. Today, more than 2.2 million people are in federal, state, and local correctional institutions. Although a causal relationship is still unproven, since the use of imprisonment for felons has increased, the crime rate has, on average, dropped each year since 1990. In addition, the belief that strong punishment reduces crime led to enactment of mandatory sentencing laws in every state. The "three strikes and you're out" law for repeat offenders operates on the assumption

that offenders will make a stronger effort to stay within the law and avoid a third conviction if that conviction means an automatic life sentence.

The most commonly recognized deterrence program is capital punishment, the ultimate form of punishment. During the U.S. colonial period, the death penalty was the punishment for more than 245 different types of crime. Over the years the public's attitude toward capital punishment and findings from additional criminal justice research led to reduced application of the death penalty to crimes of murder at the state level and treason at the federal level. Public support for the death penalty appears to be based more on the issue of revenge than a general belief that capital punishment really is a deterrent.

Another form of deterrence program is police activity. Many people believe that the simple presence of additional police will reduce crime because criminals will be less likely to commit a crime if they are aware of a police presence. However, studies show that mere presence is not as effective as directive assignment or a change in police tactics. However, the redeployment of police resources to specific troubled areas reduces crime in those areas if the police officers enforce the laws aggressively. Another approach, *community policing*, encourages police officers to patrol on foot or on bikes to reduce the isolation between officers in cars and the community. Improved communication between officers and community members has reduced crime rates in select neighborhoods because it enlists the help of the community in preventing and solving crimes, which in turn increases the chances of apprehension of the criminal. Also, the increased use of guns and the growing amount of violence in life has made gun control into a major deterrence program. Officials believe that by reducing the number of firearms in the community, the number of murders, particularly of young people, will decrease. Many states have enacted legislation to reduce the number of firearms and to restrict those who can possess firearms.

Raymond R. Rainville

See also Community Corrections; Community Crime Control; Crime

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Deviance

Generally speaking, deviance is behavior that a group or society considers inappropriate. Approaches to deviance are primarily biological, psychological, or sociological. Typically, biological and psychological approaches view deviance as a result of a defect or character flaw within the individual. Sociological explanations accept that individuals have free choice but emphasize that often societal forces shape one's choices, including the choice to engage in deviant behavior.

Every group or society attempts to regulate its members' behavior and actions through norms of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Such general norms, often classified as folkways or mores, with the latter deemed more important and carrying strict penalties for violators, find enforcement through both positive and negative sanctions. Positive sanctions are rewards for acceptable behavior, while negative sanctions are punishments for undesirable behavior.

Because of the highly relative nature of societal norms from society to society and through time, deviance is a highly relative concept. For example, U.S. society today does not view premarital intercourse by a female as a violation of significant norms and thus cares little for any punishment. More traditional cultures, such as in the Middle East, consider this as highly deviant behavior punishable by death, even if government criminal laws may prohibit such punishment. Various studies show that the public considers a wide range of behaviors as deviant, depending on the respondents' culture and socioeconomic status.

White-Collar and Corporate Crime

Deviance exists at all socioeconomic levels. Typically, property crimes correlate more often with the lower

class, and white-collar and corporate crime is more characteristic of the middle and upper classes. White-collar crime refers to the violation of law by individuals of high social position as part of their day-to-day professional activities. Typical types of white-collar crime include insider trading and financial fraud and also can include an attorney who deliberately overbills clients or doctors ordering unnecessary tests for fees. The most popular examples in the media focus on the illegal activities of corporate executives who defraud their own companies, the public, and often the government. Enron's top executives provided an extreme example in which fraudulent activities led to the ultimate collapse of one of the largest U.S. corporations.

Corporate crime differs from white-collar crime in that the corporation as an institution engages in deliberate violations of law. Victims of such crime include consumers, government, and employees. Common examples of corporate crime include environmental pollution through inappropriate disposal of waste, the sale of products known to be unsafe, and various forms of financial fraud. In extreme cases corporations have even violated international laws governing national sovereignty to protect their financial interests when threatened. For example, International Telephone & Telegraph in the 1970s collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile. It then installed Augusto Pinochet, one of Latin America's most brutal dictators.

Both white-collar and corporate crime is committed primarily for financial gain. What distinguishes these types of deviance from others is that the perpetrators often do not see themselves as committing crimes. Rather, they see themselves as industry innovators persecuted for their business success. Ex-Enron chief executive officer Jeffrey Skilling, convicted of fraud and insider trading, consistently characterized his activities as innovative rather than illegal.

Drugs and Deviance

Another major area concerning deviance relates to drug abuse and efforts by law enforcement to curb distribution. Drug abuse is not limited to illegal substances such as heroin and cocaine. It also includes abuse of over-the-counter and prescription drugs, most commonly pain medications. Reasons for drug abuse are varied, ranging from escapism to recreational use. Drug abuse occurs throughout all socioeconomic levels, but social class is a factor in the type of drug used. For example, professional and middle- to upper-class abusers typically use cocaine, whereas lower-class abusers more commonly use crack, a cocaine derivative.

A major issue related to drug abuse is how society determines which drugs are legal. This question is often not answered based on the actual effects of the drug but rather the perceived harm. For example, tobacco and alcohol are legally available in the United States, but marijuana is not. Compared with other illegal substances, marijuana use is not addictive, and its negative health impacts are more comparable to legalized tobacco than to other illegal drugs. Moreover, marijuana has been found to have various positive effects especially for medicinal use, such as treating loss of appetite associated with cancer therapies, and as an effective painkiller without the severe side effects of prescription drugs. Although tobacco and alcohol kill many times more people than all illegal drugs combined, they are nonetheless legally sold. The reason often given for this contradiction is that society's reaction to a drug is based on perception and moral beliefs rather than scientific evidence.

Functions of Deviance

Not all deviance is necessarily negative. For example, one can be a deviant but for a noble cause, such as those who engaged in civil disobedience to promote racial equality in the 1960s. Émile Durkheim was one of the first social scientists to recognize that deviance could also have functional benefits for society at large. First, identifying deviance sets the moral boundaries between right and wrong. Second, by defining deviance we also define acceptable norms and values. Third, the concept creates a sense of group cohesion in terms of "us versus them." Finally, deviant behavior often functions as a mechanism for change by challenging existing ways of thinking. For example, art is often shocking in that it challenges our way of thinking about various issues.

Major Perspectives

Historically, people viewed deviance as a result of demonic possession, biological defects, and psychological problems. Seventeenth-century Salem, Massachusetts, residents saw lesbians and assertive

women as deviants, attributing their behavior to witchcraft or demonic position, and so burned them to death. In late 19th-century Italy, Cesare Lombroso, a physician, hypothesized that deviance had biological origins. As such, he believed that deviants could be identified by common physical characteristics, such as low foreheads. Lombroso reached these conclusions by examining the body types of prison populations without realizing that such traits were common in the general population. By the mid-20th century, William Sheldon believed criminality could be predicted by body structure. In contrast, psychologists identify internal psychological problems as the cause of deviance, but in the second half of the 20th century, sociological explanations of deviant behavior became more widely accepted.

Positivist Perspectives

The positivist perspective, generally associated with the natural sciences and law enforcement, defines deviance as intrinsically real and makes three assumptions about it. The first is absolutism, the belief that something intrinsically real regarding the deviants' behavior sets them apart from conventional society. Second is objectivism, the reality that deviance can be objectively studied and quantified, such as with statistical police reports. Third is determinism, the belief that variables outside of the deviant's control will cause the deviant act. Examples of positivist theories would include Robert Merton's strain theory, Edwin Sutherland's social learning theory, and control theory, exemplified by Hirschi's social bond and self-control theory.

Strain Theory

This positivist theory exemplifies the sociological perspective called structural-functionalism. Merton had argued that every society encourages its citizens to pursue certain legitimate goals, such as wealth, with corresponding legitimate means, such as obtaining an education and a career. However, some people may experience a disconnect between the legitimate means and goals and thus experience strain, prompting five modes of adaptation (responses). First is conformity, when the goals and means are accepted (e.g., a college graduate pursuing wealth through a career). Second is innovation, where a person "innovates" new illegitimate means toward the goal (e.g., becoming a drug dealer or prostitute). Third is ritualism, by which a person accepts the means but cares little about the goal (e.g., doing enough to keep a job without extra effort or interest in obtaining promotions and bonuses). Fourth is retreatism, where the individual rejects all legitimate means and goals, (e.g., by becoming a hermit or severe drug user). Fifth is rebellion, when a person rejects both means and goals and replaces them with his or her own alternative set (e.g., the hippies of the 1960s who rejected American materialism in favor of a natural way of life).

Social Learning Theory

Differential association is an interactionist sociological perspective which treats deviance as a socially learned behavior through interaction with deviants. Edwin Sutherland argued that individuals associating more with people who have deviant ideas than with conformists are more likely to become deviant themselves. This is more likely to occur within small primary groups. Associating with deviants is only a first step, however. A person must also identify with the deviants and act accordingly before becoming one of them.

Control Theory

Control theory argues that conformity results from social controls placed on the individual by society. Travis Hirschi argued that everyone has an innate tendency to deviate from social norms. However, if our bond to society is strong, we will choose to conform. Accordingly, people bond to society in four ways, namely (1) attachment to conventional people; (2) commitment to conformity by investing in conventional activities such as an education; (3) involvement in conventional activities, which reduces the time available for other activities; and (4) a belief in the validity of the existing social rules.

Constructionist Perspectives

This more recent perspective, which emerged in the 1960s, sees deviant behavior as a social construct, determined by how society reacts to certain behaviors, which in and of themselves are not intrinsically bad or good, such as getting a tattoo. Constructionists also make three assumptions regarding the nature of deviance. First is relativism, the belief that deviance is not intrinsically real but rather a socially imposed label upon that behavior. Second is subjectivism, the

idea that there is nothing objective regarding deviant behavior, thereby requiring its study from the subjective perspective of the deviants themselves. Third is voluntarism, a view of deviant behavior as a result of free will without external causes. Examples of constructionist theories include labeling, relativist, phenomenological, and power theory.

Labeling Theory

Labeling theory fits within the sociological perspective of symbolic interactionism. This theory argues that what is important is neither the cause nor the deviant act in itself but the meaning that people attach to it, who applies the label, and the resultant consequences on the labeled and labelers. According to this theory, those with power define and impose the label of deviant or conformist on others who may or may not actually deserve it. The labeled, in turn, may eventually come to accept the deviant label in a self-fulfilling prophecy. A person who commits an initial deviant act (primary deviation) will face societal sanctions even though the person may not see himself or herself as a deviant at the time. If the person repeats the behavior (secondary deviation), society will impose harsher penalties and eventually stigmatize the violator as a deviant. The violator may eventually come to accept the label and continue the expected deviant behavior.

Conflict, Marxist, and Power Theory

Conflict theorists argue that deviance results from differences in either social class or culture. Marxists believe that capitalism, as an economic system and in its coercive control over the working class, induces deviant behavior caused by alienation from production, society, and oneself. Conflict theorists maintain that the wealthy and powerful elite of a society define as deviant any behavior that poses a threat to their wealth or privileged social position. For example, laws protecting private property benefit the rich and their extensive wealth more than they do the working class, who may not have any property. Power theorists argue that the extent of one's power determines the type of deviant action. For example, the powerful—encountering weaker social controls—have a greater deviant opportunity because of their skills and position in society. Combined with higher expectations of success, this may cause feelings of relative deprivation and a stronger deviant motivation. Thus the powerful are more likely to engage in more profitable white-collar and corporate crime. The powerless, who face greater social controls and who have fewer skills and lower positions, are more likely to engage in less profitable blue-collar crime like robbery.

Deviance is difficult to define because of the relative nature of societal norms governing behavior. In general, a high social consensus exists regarding some forms of deviance, such as murder and rape. In these cases, the focus tends to be placed on prevention, deterrence, and containment of the deviant. In other instances, a lower degree of social consensus exists as to what *is* deviant. These cases generally involve behaviors regulated by informal codes of everyday behavior, such as cell phone use in public places.

John Asimakopoulos

See also Alienation; Anomie; Corporate Crime; Crime; Differential Association; Drug Abuse; Illegitimate Opportunity Structures; Labeling Theory; Pornography; Social Bond Theory; Social Constructionist Theory; Social Control; Stigma; Strain Theory; Terrorism; Victimless Crimes; White-Collar Crime

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Differential Association

Edwin Sutherland's theory of differential association, the first learning theory of crime, continues to stimulate research today. In 1947, Sutherland stated the theory as a set of nine propositions, which introduced three concepts—normative conflict, differential association, and differential group organization—that explain crime at the levels of the society, individual, and group.

Societal Level: Normative Conflict

For Sutherland, primitive, undifferentiated societies are characterized by harmony, solidarity, and consensus over basic values and beliefs. Such societies have little conflict over appropriate behaviors. They also have little crime. With the industrial revolution, societies developed with advanced divisions of labor, market economies, and inevitably conflict. These societies are characterized by specialization rather than similarity, coercion rather than harmony, conflict rather than consensus. They have high rates of crime. Sutherland hypothesized that high crime rates are due to normative conflict, in which groups conflict over the appropriateness of the law. Some groups define the law as rules to be followed under all circumstances; others define the law as rules to be violated under certain circumstances. When normative conflict is absent in a society, crime rates are low; when it is pervasive, crime rates are high. Thus crime is ultimately rooted in normative conflict.

Individual Level: Differential Association

The differential association process provides a social psychological explanation of how normative conflict translates into individual criminal acts. Criminal behavior is learned through communication in an intimate group, and the content of learning includes two important elements. First are the requisite skills and techniques for committing crime, which can range from complicated, specialized skills of insider trading to the simple, readily available skills of purse snatching. Such techniques are a necessary but insufficient condition of crime.

Second are definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime. These are motives, verbalizations, or rationalizations that make crime justified or unjustified. For example, definitions favorable to income tax fraud include "Everyone cheats on their taxes" and "The government has no right to tax its citizens." Definitions favorable to drunk driving include "I can drive fine after a few beers" and "I only have a couple of miles to drive home." Definitions favorable to violence include "If your manhood is threatened, you have to retaliate" and "Sometimes in the heat of the moment, you can't help yourself." These definitions favorable to crime help organize and justify a criminal line of action in a particular situation. They are offset by definitions unfavorable to crime, such as "Income tax fraud deprives citizens of important programs that benefit society," "Turn the other cheek," "Friends don't let friends drink and drive," and "Any violation of the law is wrong." Some definitions pertain to specific offenses only (e.g., drunk driving), others refer to a class of offenses (e.g., fraud), and still others refer to virtually all law violation. Definitions are not merely ex post facto rationalizations of crime but rather operate to justify committing or refraining from crime.

Sutherland identified four modalities on which definitions vary in importance (weight): (1) frequency (the number of times a definition is presented), (2) duration (the length of time of exposure to a definition), (3) priority (the earlier a definition is presented in one's life), and (4) intensity (the more intense one's relationship with or the more prestigious is the person presenting the definition). Therefore, the individual-level hypothesis of differential association states that individuals will engage in criminal behavior if the following three conditions are met: (1) They have learned the requisite skills and techniques for committing crime. (2) They have learned an excess of weighted definitions favorable to crime over unfavorable to crime. (3) They have the objective opportunity to commit the crime. If all three conditions are present and crime does not occur, or a crime occurs in the absence of all three conditions, the theory would be wrong and in need of revision. Thus, in principle, the theory can be falsified.

Group Level: Differential Social Organization

Differential social organization—the extent to which a group or society is organized against crime versus organized in favor of crime—explains how normative conflict translates into group rates of crime. Here, Sutherland reconceptualizes Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay's concepts of social disorganization (weak organization against crime) and cultural transmission (strong organization favoring crime). Shaw and McKay observe that disorganization arises in inner cities when rapid urban growth undermines informal social controls by increasing mobility, poverty, family disruption, immigration, and physical deterioration. Residents tend to be transient, fail to develop a sense of community, and consequently, are unable to build strong and linked families, schools, and neighborhood associations. Such social disorganization, in which a community is unable to control local youth, is equivalent to "weak organization against crime."

But disorganization is only half of the equation. The other half is "organization in favor of crime," which consists of structures that foster criminal behavior—such as cultural transmission, in which older street gangs in disorganized areas transmit a delinquent tradition to younger groups, resulting in high rates of delinquency across generations of youth. Differential social organization refers to both forms of organization and can be applied to any group to determine its crime rate. Thus, compared with suburban neighborhoods, inner-city neighborhoods are weakly organized against street crimes and strongly organized in favor of such crimes. Compared with the United States, Japan is strongly organized against violence and weakly organized in favor of violence. Moreover, differential social organization is not static, and its dynamics can be explained by theories of collective action.

Differential social organization explains group crime rates by determining the availability of definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime within a group. Groups strongly organized in favor of crime and weakly organized against crime will present an abundance of definitions favorable to crime and few definitions unfavorable to crime (and vice versa). Members of such groups have a high probability of learning an excess of definitions of crime (and vice versa), which can determine their criminality. Thus the group- and individual-level explanations are inextricably linked.

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See also Crime; Crime Rates; Cultural Criminology; Illegitimate Opportunity Structures; Juvenile Delinquency; Social Disorganization; Subcultures; Theory; Violent Crime

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Digital Divide

Digital divide is a metaphor for the cleft between people with access to technology and those without. Although the term originated in the mid-1990s to describe differences in technological infrastructure of U.S. schools, it has grown to describe various forms of alienation predicated on class, race, and national identity. Some analysts see a problem rooted in access, or the lack thereof, to computers and Internet services, whereas others suggest a more persistent gulf between developed and developing nations. Still others deny the existence of a divide at all, arguing that market forces have created an abundance of services and products that serve to render the issue moot. Finally, some authors maintain a "change over time" approach, pointing out that although the term may have had some cogency when it was coined, various government and social initiatives are working to narrow the divide.

A 2005 study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project found that two thirds of U.S. adults go online, and white, educated, affluent people without a child living at home are more likely to have regular access to the Internet from home. Older citizens, African

Americans, and the less educated are not as likely to go online, although only one in five reported never having been online at all. The report suggested that the current digital divide resides with access speed; connection speed is a more important factor in Internet use than experience. The report also suggested three degrees of Internet access: cold, tepid, and hot. The first group has no access and does not go online, the second has a tenuous or modest connection to the Internet, and the third is considered highly wired.

Some critics contend that figures such as those reported by the Pew Center are important but miss the deeper issues of understanding and social inclusion. Despite well-meaning attempts to improve people's lives through the introduction of information and communication technology, meaningful access entails much more than just the provision of computers and Internet connections. Rather, a complex interaction among variables, including physical, digital, human, and social resources and relationships, must be considered as critical components to the problem of, and the solution to, the disparity between technological haves and have-nots.

An international study released in 2005 by the UN Conference on Trade and Development combines many of these arguments. The report finds that wealthy, predominantly Caucasian (and some Asian), relatively educated countries do better than poorer countries, especially those in Africa. While the technological rift today may be due to the presence or absence of, and access to, dependable, high-bandwidth connections, information and communication technology is slowly becoming more available and accessible to all. Case studies of China, Chile, Botswana, Singapore, India, and the United States have explored how various social, institutional, and governmental strategies interacted to create diverse solutions and equally varied results to technological disparities. Although market-based solutions have been important tools in bridging the digital divide, the report suggests that private enterprise solutions may have reached the point of diminishing returns, and new solutions need to be explored to continue the advances already under way.

Optimists offer a market-based panacea to take on the assumption of the growing alienation between the well-connected and those who are not, typically citing the prevalence of free or almost free hardware to Internet connections as proof that the divide is a myth and attempts to reconcile it are wasted. Most studies, however, suggest this argument reflects more wishful thinking than rigorous analysis. When one third of Americans lack access to the educational and journalistic information provided by information and communication technology and when developed and developing countries support radically different technology infrastructures, alienation within and between nations is likely.

Robert Harris

See also Cyberspace; Social Change

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Dillingham Flaw

The Dillingham Flaw is a relatively new concept to describe a centuries-old phenomenon of faulty logic when nativists misinterpret and react to the presence of immigrants in their midst. It ignores diversity and assumes homogeneity, thereby setting a framework for negativity about newcomers.

The term draws its name from a special commission created in 1907 by President Theodore Roosevelt to look into the "immigration problem." Chaired by Senator William P. Dillingham of Vermont, the commission, over a 4-year period, listened to testimony from civic leaders, educators, social scientists, and social workers and made onsite visits to Ellis Island and New York's Lower East Side. In 1911, the commission issued a 41-volume report of its findings. Unfortunately, the report was flawed in its application and interpretation of the data that the commission had

so tirelessly collected. Social scientists agree that the commission erred in its use of simplistic categories for diverse immigrant groups. Their second error was in an unfair comparison of "old" and "new" immigrants despite the changed structural conditions and longer time interval that previous immigrants had to assimilate and achieve some measure of economic security.

Quite simply then, the term *Dillingham Flaw* refers to inaccurate comparisons based on simplistic categorizations and anachronistic observations. This erroneous thinking can occur in assessments of the past, present, or future.

The Past

Applying modern classifications or sensibilities to a time when they did not exist, or, if they did, had a different form or meaning is one version of the Dillingham Flaw. In this instance, we utilize our modern perceptions to explain a past that its contemporaries viewed quite differently. For example, today's term *British* refers collectively to the people of Great Britain (the English, Welsh, Scots, and Scots-Irish). However, in the 18th century, *British* had the much narrower meaning of only the English, and for good reason. The English, Scots, and Scots-Irish may have been English-speaking, but significant cultural and religious differences existed among them and they did not view each other as "similar." For us to presume that the colonial British, even just the colonial English, were a single cohesive entity and thus the 13 English colonies were homogeneous would be to fall victim to the Dillingham Flaw.

Similarly, we fall into this trap if we speak about either African slaves or Native Americans as single, monolithic entities. Such ethnocentric generalizations fail to acknowledge that these groups actually consisted of diverse peoples with distinctive languages, cultures, and behavior patterns. Similarly, European immigrants were not alike, despite their collective groupings by mainstream society. Instead, all of these groups—African American, Native American, and immigrant—were diverse peoples with many distinctions that set them apart from one another.

The Present

Similar misconceptions can, and often do, occur in one's own time. Here, the faulty logic about the past just described is used to evaluate the present. Working from a false premise about past rapid assimilation and cultural homogeneity, individuals employ what they believe is an objective comparison with the present scene, which they find troubling in its heterogeneity and supposedly nonassimilating groups. Like the 1907 presidential commission (mentioned earlier in this entry), they are susceptible to mistaken impressions about a "threat" posed by recent immigrants whose presence and behavior they view as different from earlier immigrants.

The most common examples are expressed views that today's steadily increasing ranks of Africans, Asians, Hispanics, and Muslims in the United States present an unprecedented challenge to an integrative society. Reacting to the increasing presence—even in many nonurban settings—of nonwhite newcomers speaking a foreign tongue, including many from a non-Judeo-Christian background, nativists view with alarm these demographic changes. Such fears are echoes of those raised about earlier groups, such as the racist responses to the physical appearance of southern Europeans or the anti-Semitic reactions to eastern European Jews. In reality, studies consistently reveal rapid English language acquisition among all immigrants groups and higher naturalization rates among non-Westerners.

The Future

Using oversimplified categorizations and imposing present-day sensibilities—the essence of the Dillingham Flaw—also can occur when individuals engage in demographic projections. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau projects that Hispanics will compose about one fourth of the total U.S. population in 2050. Given past patterns and current trends, however, we cannot be certain that today's group categories, such as Hispanic, will still be valid by then.

Currently, most white Americans bear witness to mixed European ancestry, but two generations ago, Americans of southern, central, and eastern European backgrounds were far more likely to be of a single national lineage and religion. Their single-group identities evolved into multiple-group identities, as large-scale intermarriages generated such a blending of peoples that "whites" and "European Americans" became synonymous. Further, their mixed heritage is now more likely to be passively acknowledged, except for occasional symbolic celebrations. It is no

longer an element of everyday ethnicity, subcultural participation, or minority status.

Each succeeding year shows greater numbers of exogamous marriages among ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Therefore, it is not unreasonable, for example, to suggest—given the annual increase in Hispanics marrying non-Hispanics—that in two generations many of the descendants of today's Hispanic Americans will claim a mixed heritage, partly Hispanic and partly non-Hispanic. Projections that the mid-21st century will find the United States with a one-fourth Hispanic population suggests a demographic categorization by today's realities that may well not fit the reality then.

A similar argument could be made for other groups, as racial intermarriages continue to create a growing multiracial population. Using today's categories for Americans living in 2050 can easily be another unwitting application of the Dillingham Flaw. Projecting our perceptions and the existing social distance between groups onto a distant future carries a presumption that they will remain the same. Our present-day categories may be inadequate or irrelevant to our descendants.

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See also Acculturation; Americanization; Assimilation; Nativism; Xenophobia

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Disability and Disabled

Approximately 54 million people, one in five Americans, have a disability, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The size of this population group would rank people with disabilities among the largest minority groups in the United States. Disability knows no limitation by race, ethnicity, religion, or gender. It is an experience that touches upon every corner of society. Indeed, as average life spans trend upward, disability prevalence is also increasing as a natural phenomenon of aging. However, people with disabilities remain in the shadows of the general public, largely ignored as people with an undesirable characteristic and condemned to inequality of opportunity. This entry offers insight into the disability identity and its future direction.

Medical Model of Disability

Conventionally, disability refers to an individual's physical or mental limitations. For example, the World Health Organization defines disability as any restriction or lack of ability (resulting from an impairment) to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being. With the deficiency construed as inherent, biological, and abnormal, the focal point was to repair or mitigate the functional limitation to the extent medically possible. Disability became primarily a challenge for the medical profession, to "cure" people of their physical and mental shortcomings.

Whereas many types of disability cause physical hardship and affect the quality of personal health, most disabilities are relatively benign and manageable with the proper supports. Although the provision of health care is a humane effort that is a foundation of civilization, the well-being of people consists of more than the functionality of their body parts. The narrow and heavy emphasis on the medical aspects of disability created a social understanding and attitude about people's well-being as diminished if they have a disability.

In cases where medical intervention into disabling conditions was limited by research, technology, capacity, or resources, frequently charitable or governmental institutions would attempt to bridge the gap by providing funds. For charitable organizations, a particularly effective means for collecting contributions was appealing to the public's sense of empathy and pity by portraying people with disabilities as victims of natural tragedy. Petitions for support from governmental institutions typically described people with disabilities as unfortunate wards of the state requiring care by society. Collectively, those approaches created a social mind-set that a physical or mental limitation condemns one to a lower standard and quality of life, and their recourse is dependence on society's largesse if they are not medically restored. Educational institutions and employers thus doubt their ability to successfully educate and employ people perceived as below the mainstream of society.

In response, people with disabilities often develop low self-esteem and low expectations for how they may assert themselves in life. Compounding this situation is the fact that members of their families or communities are likely not to share the same condition, removing them from any opportunity for a shared cultural identity with respect to a distinguishing characteristic. Unless people lay claim to a different model of experiencing their disability, they are more likely to become isolated, impoverished, undereducated, and out of place with society.

Social Model of Disability

In 1962, the University of California at Berkeley admitted Ed Roberts and arranged for him to live in the campus medical facility out of concern for his polio-related condition. He had almost no functional movement and was dependent on a respirator. A year before, Ed had been rejected by the California state vocational rehabilitation department as too severely disabled and considered "unemployable."

Ed organized other students with disabilities in a group called "The Rolling Quads." Together, they started a self-determination movement which would radicalize perceptions of people with disabilities and how they perceived themselves. Stating that he was tired of well-meaning noncripples with their stereotypes of what he could or could not do in deciding his life choices, Ed explained his desire for "cripple power," where the disabled would direct their own programs and be able to train other disabled persons to direct new programs. He insisted that achieving independence was not a functional limitation or medical issue but rather a sociological, political, and civil rights one.

In 1972, Ed and others established a community-based self-help program called the Berkeley Center for Independent Living (CIL). The fundamental philosophy of the Berkeley CIL—dignity, consumer direction, peer support, and civil rights advocacy—sparked an independent living movement that has since resulted in nearly 500 CILs throughout the country. The term *center for independent living* is now commonly understood to mean a consumer-controlled, community-based, cross-disability, nonresidential private nonprofit agency that is designed and operated within a local community by individuals with disabilities and provides an array of independent living services.

The independent living movement pushed for the "demedicalization" of disability by shifting from a controlling medical model to an approach of individual empowerment and responsibility for identifying and fulfilling one's own needs. There was growing awareness that environmental and attitudinal issues produced the greatest challenges and barriers to the independence and full participation of people with disabilities, more so than their physical and mental conditions. Solution efforts focused not on people with disabilities but on altering and remedying societal and environmental barriers.

People with disabilities began to view themselves as capable, self-directed, and with opportunity, as opposed to being afflicted, less than normal, victims of external barriers, objects of charity, and passive beneficiaries of governmental support. Evolving society began to view disability as a natural and common human experience, not a tragedy.

As an ironical footnote, in 1975 California Governor Jerry Brown appointed Ed Roberts as the state director of the Vocational Rehabilitation Agency, which originally had refused to serve him as being too severely disabled ever to work.

Civil Rights Movement

In the United States, the disability rights movement emerged in the 1970s as a substantial tool in eradicating the societal and attitudinal barriers afflicting people with disabilities. Modeling the African American and women's civil rights movements, groups of people with disabilities became fierce advocates in gaining the right to be free from discrimination and to pursue equal opportunity. A series of national disability rights laws were enacted:

- Architectural Barriers Act: prohibits architectural barriers in all federally owned or leased buildings.
- Rehabilitation Act: particularly Title V, Sections 501, 503, and 504, prohibits discrimination in federal programs and services and all other programs or services receiving federal funding. Also provides for independent living centers and the Client Assistance Program, an advocacy program for consumers of rehabilitation and independent living services.
- Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act: among other things, establishes protection and advocacy.
- Education of All Handicapped Children Act (Pub. L. No. 94-142): requires free, appropriate public

education in the least restrictive environment possible for children with disabilities. This law is now called the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

- Mental Illness Bill of Rights Act: requires protection and advocacy services for people with mental illness.
- The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act: authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to investigate conditions of confinement at state and local government institutions, such as prisons, jails, pretrial detention centers, juvenile correctional facilities, publicly operated nursing homes, and institutions for people with psychiatric or developmental disabilities.
- Air Carrier Access Act: prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in air travel and provides for equal access to air transportation services.
- Telecommunications Act: requires manufacturers of telecommunications equipment and providers of telecommunications services to ensure that such equipment and services are accessible to, and usable by, persons with disabilities, if readily achievable.
- Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act: generally requires polling places across the United States to be physically accessible to people with disabilities for federal elections.
- Fair Housing Amendments Act: prohibits discrimination in housing against people with disabilities and families with children. Also provides for architectural accessibility of certain new housing units, renovation of existing units, and accessibility modifications at the renter's expense.
- Americans with Disabilities Act: provides comprehensive civil rights protection for people with disabilities; closely modeled after the Civil Rights Act and Section 504 of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations.

Political Force

People with disabilities have made great strides in recent years, which saw the emergence of nationally recognized disability rights laws that propelled awareness of the desire for people with disabilities for full inclusion in the mainstream of society. Disability advocacy groups, such as the American Association of People with Disabilities, used its several thousand membership base to become a force in promoting political and legislative responsiveness to the issues of people with disabilities.

The disability rights movement is now global, as recently highlighted in March 2007, when the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of People with Disabilities. The convention reflects the evolving concept of disability and fully represents the human right of people with disabilities to determine and direct their destinies.

Jeff Rosen

See also Medicalization; Prejudice; Self-Fulfilling Prophecy; Social Constructionist Theory

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Disability Social History Project. (http://www.disabilityhistory.org/).
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Smithsonian Museum of American History, the Disability Rights Movement. (http://americanhistory.si.edu/disabilityrights/welcome.html).
UN Enable. (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/).

Disasters

A disaster is an event generating exceptional social and structural disruption characterized by four main elements. First, humans play a significant role in effects of disaster impact. Whether technological (e.g., a nuclear reactor leak) or natural (e.g., a hurricane), humans modify their environment in a manner that may facilitate or hinder the impact of a disaster. Second, disasters have a "before," "during," and "after," as opposed to existing as a singular event or moment in time. Although many commonly think of a disaster as lasting for a specified time, there is a lead time before impact, the impact, and the aftermath. Third, disasters are exceptional in their altering of previous routines of action, interaction, and ritual. By focusing on disasters as exceptions, researchers can assess social change before, during, and after disaster. Finally, disasters are socially and structurally disruptive; they significantly disrupt routine patterns of action as well as the social structures and built environment. In fact, some previous patterns of action and physical structures either change significantly or may no longer return or exist. For this reason, some scholars, such as

Robert Merton and Gary Kreps, have argued that disasters may be social catalysts for change that offer researchers a unique opportunity to understand social action and social structures under extreme pressure over a relatively short duration.

Distinctions of Disaster

A disaster is different from a hazard in that a hazard such as a flood, hurricane, tornado, fire, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or tsunami may occur but have little impact on the social or structural environment. In contrast, a disaster necessitates exceptional social and structural disruption. Thus, if a tornado strikes a pristine forest without social disruption, it is a hazard, but if the same tornado were to later strike a community and generate exceptional social and structural disruption, it is a disaster.

Disaster is uniquely located in the context of social and structural disruption. For example, a complex emergency such as a large traffic accident or a plane crash may result in exceptions to routines, but not to the extent that it constitutes a significant disruption to communities and social structures. Thus authorities and emergency professionals can respond to complex emergencies without adversely impacting most members of a community and social institutions.

On the other hand, a disaster is not sufficiently as large as a catastrophe. In contrast to a disaster, a catastrophe impacts most or all of the community. Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work roles; help from nearby communities cannot be provided due to the scale of impact; most, if not all, of the community's routines are disrupted; the community undergoes a period of prolonged inoperability, and the role of the political institution emerges as increasingly significant in dealing with the catastrophe. Thus disaster may be understood not merely as an exceptional social and structural disruption but as fitting along a continuum ranging in severity from emergencies, to complex emergencies, to disaster, to catastrophe.

History of Disaster

Disaster evolved from two Latin words (*dis* and *astro*), which together roughly mean "formed on a star." In the 16th century, *disaster* made reference to unfavorable negative effects, usually of a personal nature, resulting from a star or planet. However, following the 1775 Lisbon earthquake, the outlook that disaster was an uncontrollable force that humans were powerless against began to change, as the disaster evoked a coordinated state response and a comprehensive plan for reconstruction. Thus some professionals and elites of Western Europe began to view disasters as something humans and societies could attempt to prevent or mitigate through a secular and protoscientific framework.

Despite the acknowledgment of a secular and protoscientific approach, the first known social scientific research on disasters did not occur until 1909 when Eduard Stierlin studied the psychological consequences to survivors of a mining disaster and the 1908 Messina earthquake. Although some disaster research continued through the first half of the 20th century, not until after World War II did a more systematic study of disaster take place. This research began with military-sponsored strategic bombing studies of civilian communities and their responses and continued with the establishment of the first social science disaster institution, the Disaster Research Center, in 1963.

As a research interest within the social sciences, the study of disaster has, until recently, always been at the periphery. This was largely due to the conceptualization of disaster as exceptional and divergent from normative behavior, and thus an area not of considerable interest to most social scientists. However, even in research traditions such as social problems where normative deviance is of considerable interest, disaster had trouble gaining widespread acceptance. For example, Robert Merton and Robert Nisbet's highly influential *Contemporary Social Problems* of 1961 originally featured a well-written and substantive chapter dedicated to the social problem of disasters. In preparation for the second edition, a survey of its readers found the chapter to be the most difficult to teach to students and the least familiar to those in the subfield of social problems. Consequently, disaster was dropped from subsequent editions and, until recently, rarely studied as a social problem. Recent occasions such as the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and Hurricane Katrina have again provided the opportunity to a larger audience for disaster research within the social sciences. The renewed interest in disaster is indicative of both the changing interests of social scientists and the changing nature of disaster. Because current research emphasizes exceptional social and structural disruption, the potential for additional study

of occasions such as terrorist attacks, biological accidents, economic destabilization, or pandemic disease offers an expansion of disaster as well as greater opportunity for social science collaboration.

John Barnshaw

See also Pandemics; Stressors; Terrorism

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Discrimination

Discrimination is one of the most studied social phenomena within the social sciences because of its serious social, political, economic, psychological, and physical consequences and implications. It is the action of distinguishing and categorizing individuals in a society based on perceived cultural, social, or physical characteristics and subsequently preventing certain categories or groups of people equitable access to social, economic, and political resources.

As with all social constructions, the role of perception is central to the understanding of discrimination, as discriminatory practices differ according to the circumstances in which they occur. For example, in the 19th- and early 20th-century United States, Italian and Irish Americans and immigrants were actively discriminated against. Justification for these discriminatory practices rested in commonly accepted stereotypical perceptions that Irish and Italians were lazy, drunk, dirty members of a budding criminal class and unable and perhaps unwilling to assimilate into U.S. culture.

Yet, in the 21st-century United States, discrimination against these two groups based on such stereotypical perceptions of their ethnicity is almost nonexistent. While the status of Irish and Italian Americans has improved, perhaps because of their assimilation into mainstream U.S. society, others have taken their place. For example, in the post–9/11 climate, most Americans justify the racial profiling of Arab Americans as serving homeland security purposes. Many Americans agree with the existence of "no-fly" lists that actively discriminate against those suspected as terrorists, and they regard the fact that the vast majority are of Arab descent and not affiliated in any way with terrorist organizations as a necessary inconvenience, even if such a list is clearly discriminatory. In fact, after the attacks of 9/11, reported incidences of discrimination and hate crimes against Muslims in the United States increased to such a degree that the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice placed a priority on the prosecution of bias crimes and acts of discrimination against perceived Muslims, including Sikhs and persons of Arab and South Asian descent. And although the status of Irish Americans has significantly improved, prejudicial attitudes toward people of Irish descent in the United Kingdom are still widespread, suggesting once more that discrimination should be understood in specific historical, cultural, economic, and political contexts.

In the United States and other racially and ethnically diverse societies, race and ethnicity are often at the root of discrimination. A partial explanation is the visibility of racial phenotype, but in the United States, another factor is the fact that the nation's social structures and institutions are still experiencing the lingering effects of such racially discriminatory practices as slavery and segregation. Thus, in historically racialized societies like the United States or South Africa, discrimination is an inherent part of their social existence. Discrimination, however, is not only rooted in racial prejudice but in a wide range of social prejudices such as homophobia, sexism, ageism, disability discrimination, and religious intolerance.

The key to understanding the social function of discrimination is marginalization. Although anyone can become a victim of discriminatory practices, ultimately the essence of discrimination lies in power and privilege. Socially marginalized groups in society

tend to be the most likely targets of discriminatory practices. This characteristic, with its roots in the perpetuation of power and privilege, makes discrimination of particular relevance to the study of social problems. For instance, historical examination of anti-discrimination laws can provide an analytical framework to examine why and how certain groups in society are disadvantaged and what groups set out to benefit from this marginalization.

The Problem of Power and Privilege

Whereas discrimination is often grounded in political ideology (e.g., religious or sexual discrimination) or opportunity (e.g., scarcity of jobs), in all instances its underlying principle is power, especially the perpetuation of power. Examinations of the roles of power and privilege are essential to the understanding of the social function of discrimination. Only those with social or economic power, the socially dominant groups, have the ability to actively discriminate in ways that prevent individuals or groups of people access to social, economic, or political resources.

Discrimination occurs on two levels: institutional and individual. On the institutional level, discriminatory practices are embedded in the social structures of a society, whereas on the individual level, discrimination takes place during direct interactions among individuals or groups. Unlike individual discrimination, which tends to be overt, intentional, and direct, institutional discrimination is often covert and unintentional, and this invisibility makes it much harder to detect. Standardized testing in schools, for example, may exclude certain historically marginalized groups from succeeding in academic settings. Although the government may not have intentionally established testing standards that are culturally or class biased, in practice these standards tend to have a disproportionate negative effect on ethnic minority students. Furthermore, institutional discrimination often has a generational or cyclical impact on certain ethnic minority groups and therefore its consequences are as severe, if not more so, than for those suffering individual discrimination.

Social scientists often employ the power/privilege framework to provide theoretical explanations of the role of discrimination in society. Three sociological perspectives—structural-functionalism, conflict theory, and symbolic interaction—examine this social phenomenon. Conflict sociology, grounded in Marxist thought, suggests that society is in a constant class struggle for scarce resources. Those controlling economic, political, and cultural resources safeguard their economic and social privilege through discriminatory practices that establish and perpetuate inequality. Elites thus reproduce their own advantages and privileges by limiting the distribution of resources and supporting the dominant value system.

Social classes conflict with each other as they vie for power and economic, social, and political resources. Elites shape societal beliefs to make their unequal privilege appear legitimate and fair, thereby constructing a false consciousness to perpetuate their hegemony. This unquestioned acceptance serves to perpetuate racial or gender privileges in a society. Similarly, the false consciousness inhibits many in the lower classes from questioning the fairness of the economic system and their social status in society. Conflict theorists would argue that inequality is an inevitable consequence of class conflict, due to the economic exploitation built into the social system.

Unlike conflict theorists, sociologists who adhere to the structural-functionalist theoretical approach do not see inequality or discrimination as an unnatural state of society. Functionalists view society as an organism in which all of its elements (social institutions) serve to maintain its stability and thus work toward survival of the society. Although discrimination may be deplorable and has certain dysfunctions, these theorists suggest that it does serve an important social function. For instance, supporters of assimilation theories may believe that marginalization occurs because of certain groups' failure to conform to the normative (cultural) standards and values in a society, a failure that contributes to a lack of social cohesion and, in its most extreme form, to anomie—a state of normlessness. Discrimination, in this case, forces these marginalized groups to conform to the socially accepted standards, morals, and values and thus fosters social (cultural) cohesion. Functionalists may also argue that in a capitalist society, discrimination maintains economic stability by creating and maintaining a cheap manual labor force. Unlike conflict theorists, who argue that, because inequality is built into the social system, only a complete restructuring of society can rid it of social and economic inequality, functionalists are more optimistic. They would point to ethnic groups, such as the Irish, Italians, Japanese, or Korean Americans, who overcame their historical social marginalization through hard work and cultural

assimilation. They generally maintain, for example, that if society determines that racial discrimination is no longer socially functional, then the norms regarding its existence will be reevaluated.

Functionalist and conflict theories are structural concepts used to explain the purpose of discrimination by examining its roots in social institutions and structures. However, a micro-level analysis can also serve as a theoretical perspective. Symbolic interaction theorists, for example, focus on the role interpersonal communication plays in the construction of stereotypes and social prejudices. They see society as constantly created and re-created through interactions and subsequent negotiation of meaning. They may, for instance, argue that sexual identities are not biologically constructed but rather learned behaviors or "performances." Thus, from a related perspective, labeling theory, discrimination does not occur because of attributes inherent to marginalized groups but because of dominant groups' reactions to these perceived attributes. Power inequality, therefore, rests in a dominant group's ability to label certain perceived behaviors as deviant and to enforce and perpetuate such labeling through social control and legal enforcement (e.g., implementation of anti-sodomy statutes or anti-miscegenation laws). Symbolic interactionists would thus maintain that discrimination, in this instance, is a socially constructed practice rooted in interaction and perception rather than biological determinism.

Types of Discrimination

In U.S. history, many racial and ethnic groups have been victims of racial discrimination, particularly those "visibly" or racially identifiable. As discussed earlier, discriminatory practices can either express themselves individually (e.g., through hate crimes or the lynching of African Americans during the 19th and 20th centuries) or in an institutionalized way (e.g., by subsequently failing to prosecute those responsible for these lynchings). Other examples of institutionalized discrimination include the enactment of laws barring Native Americans from owning land (1898 Curtis Act), the disenfranchisement of African Americans from voting (until the enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act), the barring of Chinese from entering the country (1882 Chinese Exclusion Act), or the classification of Japanese Americans as enemy aliens allowing for their subsequent internment during World War II (under Executive Order 9066). Of course, the United States does not stand alone in its history of legal and social discriminatory practices against ethnically marginalized groups. Other examples include Germany's treatment of Jewish Europeans, culminating in the Holocaust; South Africa's system of apartheid; the treatment of Muslim citizens during the war in the former Republic of Yugoslavia; the Turkish genocide of Armenians between 1915 and 1917; and the current genocide in the Darfur region in Sudan.

Furthermore, in most countries discrimination based on sexual orientation is still socially acceptable and in some cases legalized. Whereas the Netherlands, Canada, Belgium, and Spain recognize same-sex marriage, same-sex intercourse carries the death penalty in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Mauritania, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Also, in the United States, until 2003 when the Supreme Court ruled that *Bowers v. Hardwick* of 1986 unfairly criminalized "same-sex sodomy," 13 states had prohibited lesbians and gay men from engaging in sexual activities. Same-sex couples, however, still are unable to marry legally in most places, and private schools may deny admission to lesbian or gay students if their same-sex lifestyle conflicts with the school's religious convictions. While many nations have some form of institutionalized discrimination, many countries have recognized and negated discrimination by adopting legislation banning discrimination in employment, housing, and education, as well as legislation on hate crimes.

In the United States, several federal laws prohibit discrimination in employment. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in companies consisting of 15 or more employees. Also, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 protects men and women who perform equal work in the same work establishment from sex-based wage discrimination. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 protects individuals who are 40 years of age or older from workplace discrimination, and Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibit discrimination in employment against qualified disabled individuals in the private sector and in state and local governments. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) oversees and coordinates federal equal employment opportunity regulations, practices, and policies and enforces these laws.

Despite some fluctuations, the number of sex-based discrimination charges between 1992 and 2005 remained relatively stable. In 1992, the EEOC received

21,796 sex-based discrimination complaints as compared with more than 25,000 in 1994, 2001, and 2002, and 23,094 in 2005. Last, whereas federal laws still fail to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employees from workplace discrimination, many states offer anti-discrimination protections that are often more expansive than those offered under federal law. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia, for example, have laws protecting gay and lesbian employees from discrimination in privately owned companies.

In the United States and many European countries, significant strides have been made to protect historically marginalized groups against discriminatory practices. However, despite these advances, much work remains, as reflected by the still prevalent gender gap in wage earnings, the increase of hate crimes against Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11, continuing debates surrounding the legality of same-sex marriage in the United States, and the religiously, racially, and ethnically charged armed and political conflicts that continue around the world. Discrimination, especially struggles over power and privilege, remains a relevant field of study in the (global) social sciences.

Marc JW de Jong

See also Affirmative Action; American Dream; Apartheid; Ethnic Cleansing; False Consciousness; Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Genocide; Hate Crimes; Hate Groups; Hate Speech; Homophobia; Inequality; Jim Crow; Minority Group; Multiculturalism; Native Americans, Cultural Degradation; Nativism; White Supremacy

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Discrimination, Institutional

The term *institutional discrimination* broadly refers to the systematic and unequal treatment of people within the ongoing operations of society's institutions. Entrenched in customs, laws, and practices, these discriminatory patterns can exist in virtually any private or public entity, including schools, corporations, hospitals, financial institutions, and the government. Institutional discrimination is often "invisible" and difficult to document as it is deeply rooted in the norms and values of society. As such, institutional discrimination often appears logical to the members of society. Because it stems from widely held, but incorrect, assumptions about groups of people, institutional discrimination is unlike other forms of discrimination, in that prejudice may not be intentional on the part of the individual and may not be fueled by bigotry.

For example, many women today find themselves discriminated against in the workforce. A number of large, high-profile class action suits were consequently filed against large corporations claiming that women receive less pay for the same jobs that men hold and pointing to the widespread absence of women in managerial positions. Sometimes referred to as the "glass ceiling," this situation is gradually improving, with more females becoming chief executive officers of Fortune 500 companies. Another manifestation of institutional discrimination against women in the corporate world lies in pay disparities. However, a May 2007 Supreme Court ruling in *Ledbetter v. Goodyear* made it harder for workers to sue their employers for discrimination in pay. In this case, the only woman among 16 men at the same management level was paid less over a 20-year period than any of her colleagues, including those with less seniority. The Court ruled that employees must make their complaint within 180 days of when their pay is set. Ms. Ledbetter thus learned too late in her career that she was making 40 percent less than the lowest-paid man.

Of course, institutional discrimination is not limited to gender. Court and historical documents offer numerous cases of institutional discrimination against

other minority groups. Institutional racism in Black Codes and Jim Crow laws denied African Americans access to the same institutional resources that others have enjoyed. Bias against ethnic minorities has often been built into society, from the blatant job discrimination in "No Irish need apply" signs of past years to ongoing real estate discrimination steering minority clients away from mostly white housing areas. Homosexuals have experienced denial of equal rights in marital, religious, legal, and employment institutions. Senior citizens have often encountered systematic discrimination in the workplace because of the perception by employers and many in society that they are "obsolete."

Because institutional discrimination hinges on the norms and values of society, the more these norms are evidential in society, the more they are reinforced and the harder it becomes to recognize the manifestation of institutional discrimination. In fact, it often becomes so widespread that even those engaged in such practices may be completely unaware of their existence.

Faye Allard

See also Ageism; Discrimination; Glass Ceiling; Racism; Sexism

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Disengagement Theory

Disengagement theory defines the aging process as a period of mutual separation between the old and the young. The theory predicts that the social order requires a transformation among those advancing into old age, from a state of active involvement in society to one of steady withdrawal. It suggests that the elderly desire both psychological and social separation from the young, and this comes at a time in their lives when societies tend to devalue the importance of their contributions. As a result, those advancing into old age tend to seek isolation at the same time in which society is discouraging their continued participation. The most compelling evidence in support of disengagement theory may be its apparent usefulness for explaining why elders seem to prefer early retirement, leisure, and isolation. According to the theory, these choices represent successful and adaptive responses for older people who normally find their lifestyles and philosophies inconsistent with those maintained by popular culture or mainstream society.

This theory envisions the disengagement of those advancing into old age as natural because it occurs in all societies, regardless of the high status that the elderly possess in some cultures. It is also inevitable since growing old leads to unavoidable death, the ultimate separation from society. Perhaps most significantly, disengagement is a necessary function of the aging process because it facilitates the replacement of old ideas with newer and more advanced knowledge. By withdrawing from society, disengagement theory suggests that the elderly assist in the modernization of science and technology and also in the creation of new job opportunities for the young.

Intense criticism, beginning as early as the theory's inception in the 1960s, led to the near universal abandonment of disengagement theory by the field of gerontology. Functionalist theorists argued that disengagement theory overlooks the presence of dysfunctions inherent in its assumptions. For example, disengagement theory neglects the negative outcomes for the elderly that are associated with isolation. Critics also contend that societies do not advance any more effectively by casting the elderly aside. To the contrary, gerontologists believe that societies bring harm to themselves by discouraging participation among older members of society. Such exclusionary practices are a common result, however, of negative stereotypes based on age (or ageism). Many believe that this results in the false notion that disengagement is a typical and socially acceptable course of action for those who are growing old. In fact, empirical research reveals great diversity in the routes that people follow into old age and that little or no basis exists for the notion that disengagement leads one to age successfully.

Christopher Donoghue

See also Activity Theory; Ageism; Life Course

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DIVORCE

Divorce is the legal dissolution of a marriage, as initiated by one or both partners. The social acceptability of divorce has varied widely across historical periods, religious faiths, and cultures. Whereas the United States has allowed divorce, under certain conditions, since the establishment of the nation, Chile legalized divorce in 2004, and a handful of other countries still prohibit the practice. Because sociological theory traditionally views the family as a basic building block of society, social scientists are interested in many aspects of divorce. Some scholars view the right to divorce as an indicator of women's rights, whereas others attempt to explain the social and cultural causes and consequences of rising divorce rates in the United States and elsewhere. Still other researchers examine families' internal dynamics preceding or following divorce. Accompanying the rise in divorce rates since the mid-20th century have been other changes in family forms, including the rise of single-parent households, an increase in age at first marriage, lower fertility rates and fewer children in families, the rise of cohabitation, and the formation of gay and lesbian families.

Accurately estimating the incidence of divorce is difficult because of the varying lengths of marriages, the related challenge of tracking individual marriages over time, and confusion over how to define a couple who divorces and then remarries. Recent U.S. statistics from the National Center for Health Statistics show that there were 7.5 new marriages per 1,000 people and 3.6 divorces per 1,000 people in 2005, giving rise to the conventional wisdom that "half of all marriages end in divorce." These rates have remained relatively constant since the 1960s.

Divorce reform was a major concern of the U.S. women's movement of the mid-20th century, commonly referred to as the "second wave" of feminism. Prior to major reforms undertaken by individual states since the 1970s, U.S. laws followed the British legal tradition of finding one partner at fault for the breakup of a marriage. The advent of no-fault divorce laws made divorce a simpler process by allowing reasons such as "irreconcilable differences" as grounds for divorce.

Advocates of women's rights pursued expanding the availability of divorce, based on an understanding of marriage as an institution based on gender inequality, in which the woman is the weaker partner and at risk of exploitation, domination, or violence by her husband. Many feminists view marriage as an inherently unequal social institution in which the man has more power than the female because of greater social status, higher income, or greater physical strength. Women have traditionally been responsible for care of the home and children, increasingly in addition to paid work outside the home. Because of these disadvantages, women are more likely than in past generations to seek a divorce or separation. Thus the legal right to break marital bonds emerged as key to women's autonomy and independence.

Consequently, divorce has become more socially acceptable in the United States since the women's movement in the 1960s. Before that time, a social stigma was attached to divorced families, especially to divorced women and their children, rather than to the men. Divorced families constituted "broken homes," a phrase still in use today. Illustrating the normalization of divorce are not only higher divorce rates but also the often positive or sympathetic portrayal in popular culture of divorced men and women.

Regardless of the causes of divorce, its social and economic consequences are a source of concern for both conservative and liberal politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals. Whereas some studies show strong negative effects on children, other studies argue that differences between children of divorced parents and children of continually married parents are overestimated. Most experts agree that children of divorce tend to have more negative outcomes in terms of educational achievement, delinquency and crime, psychological well-being, teenage pregnancy, and behavior when compared with children of "intact families." In addition, children who experienced parental divorce have higher divorce rates than those whose parents remained married. Experts debate about whether there are gender differences in these long-term effects. Moderating the risks for children from divorced families can be attentive and supportive parenting and low levels of conflict between divorced parents. Despite these protective factors, the period immediately following divorce is stressful for

children and can lead to anxiety and depression that typically fade within 2 years. The long-term outcomes of children from divorced families are partially caused by the decrease in standard of living and socioeconomic status after divorce. Households composed of never-married or divorced women and their children are much more likely than two-parent households to live in poverty, a trend sociologists refer to as the "feminization of poverty."

The debate over whether the negative outcomes of children of divorce stem from family structure (i.e., living in a home with one rather than two parents) or poverty is far from settled. Some scholars argue that poverty leads to divorce as well as increasing the likelihood of negative outcomes for children. Others claim that it is the absence of a father in the home that leads to both poverty and children's problems. Still other scholars of family life state that it is increasingly difficult for men, especially working-class and minority men, to fulfill the socially expected role of breadwinner. Lack of economic opportunities may thus cause men to leave marriages to which they feel they are not contributing financially. In terms of the effects of divorce, both popular and academic discussions tend to emphasize either culture or economics.

Aside from the question of the economic effects of divorce, the termination of a legal marriage generally involves some process of negotiation over the married couple's finances. Interactions between husbands and wives can become conflictual about dividing up the couple's assets and determining whether spousal support (referred to as alimony in the past) or child support will be required. Due to assumptions about gender roles and the actual gendered division of labor among married couples, the husband has typically been the partner required to pay alimony and child support to compensate for the family's expected drop in income after divorce. With many women employed and possibly the higher-earning partner, the granting of spousal support (alimony) does not always occur and is not always in the direction of husband to wife, although this is still a common occurrence. Child support enforcement varies from state to state. Failure of divorced fathers to pay child support is one of the reasons for high poverty rates in families composed of divorced women and their children.

Custody of children is often another point of conflict during the process of divorce. As with alimony and child support, assumptions about gender roles have been inherent in judges' decisions over which partner legally becomes the primary parent after a divorce. Because most cultures recognize the woman as the primary parent who takes on most of the parenting responsibilities (caring for children's emotional and physical needs), the courts typically favor mothers as custodial parents. The famous Oscar-winning film *Kramer vs. Kramer* of 1979 dramatized this tendency: In the film, the mother was awarded full custody although the father had shown himself to be an exemplary and caring father. Although mothers are more likely to obtain custody, U.S. courts also favor fathers' involvement in children's lives and will generally allow fathers the right to visit and interact with their child or children on a regular basis. Despite the rights of fathers to visit their children, only about one quarter of fathers have regular contact with their children after divorce.

One result of the increase in divorce rates is the increase in the rates of formation of stepfamilies. A stepfamily is made up of a married couple with one or both partners having children from a previous marriage or relationship. Although stepfamilies can form after the death of one partner's spouse, most stepfamilies are the result of a previous divorce. Also, the mother with custody of her children generally remarries, meaning that most step-parents living with stepchildren are men (stepfathers). Step-parents not residing with children tend to be stepmothers. Stepfamilies are more likely to end in divorce than are first marriages, which means that the children in these families may experience multiple divorces in their lives, an experience that some scholars argue can affect their educational and social outcomes. In most states, step-parents who do not legally adopt their stepchildren do not have special rights, privileges, or responsibilities toward the children. Adoption of stepchildren is only possible if the nonresident parent has died or given up his or her parental rights. Despite this fact, stepchildren are often eligible for Social Security or military benefits through their step-parents.

Erynn Masi de Casanova

See also Family; Family, Blended; Family, Nuclear; Fathers' Rights Movement; Feminization of Poverty; Single Mothers

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Domestic Partnerships

Domestic partnership ordinances are a form of licensed cohabitation in the United States, typically available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Currently, couples may register their unions in approximately 60 cities, 9 counties, and 6 states. Hawaii in 1997, California in 1999, Vermont in 2000, Maine and New Jersey in 2004, and Connecticut in 2005 were the first to confer some form of official recognition on same-sex couples, as well as on unmarried opposite-sex couples, who may also be licensed domestic partners. At the national level, proposed domestic partnership legislation in 2001, the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act, was referred to the House Subcommittee on the Civil Service and Agency Organization but never reached the floor; so far no one has introduced a similar bill.

The first domestic partnership ordinance—implemented in Berkeley, California, in 1984—provided official acknowledgment of the unions of same-sex couples, at a time when legal marriage did not exist elsewhere. Since 2004, Massachusetts has permitted same-sex couples to legally marry and, to date, remains the only state to do so, although no other state yet legally recognizes these Massachusetts marriages. Berkeley extended the option of becoming licensed partners to opposite-sex couples as well, as legislators asserted that heterosexual cohabiting couples also need legal acknowledgment of their unions, particularly when couples dissolve their unions and disagree over property division and "spousal" maintenance (commonly referred to as "palimony"). Most locales actually do permit both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register. Currently, domestic partnership legislation in five cities and three counties (in addition to the states of Hawaii, Vermont, and Connecticut) specifies that only same-sex couples are eligible.

In most locales, becoming licensed partners requires the completion of an affidavit; couples attest that they are financially interdependent adults who share a single residence, are not biologically related, are not related through legal marriage or adoption (and are not legally married to anyone else), share an intimate relationship, and agree to be mutually responsible for each other's well-being. Some locales have additional requirements. For example, currently in the states of California and New Jersey, the partners in same-sex unions must be at least 18 years of age to register their unions. At least one partner in opposite-sex unions, however, must be at least 62 years of age (as a function of the eligibility requirements under the Social Security Act). Other locales are less restrictive. For example, some do not require that the partners be residents of the locale, as long as they meet the other requirements to become licensed. Regardless of additional requirements, to register the union in most locales, couples must submit the completed affidavit, along with a small registration fee, to the appropriate government records office (e.g., the city clerk's office), though in some locales, couples may have their affidavits notarized to register their partnerships.

Despite the legal acknowledgment of licensed partnerships, most locales grant few tangible benefits to the partners. Indeed, although all states with domestic partner registries offer some benefits, only a handful of cities do so. Benefits typically include the option of including a partner under one's health insurance plan, visitation rights in hospitals and correctional facilities, and bereavement leave. Additionally, some state and local governments provide health insurance benefits to their employees and their partners even without enactment of a domestic partnership ordinance.

The proportion of licensed couples that are same-sex or opposite-sex is unknown, as most locales do not request this information on the affidavit. Thus, estimates rest on determining the sex of each partner on the basis of first names, but even then such methodology is not conclusive. Furthermore, because of confidentiality issues, about half of all locales refuse to release information about how many couples register their partnerships. From the available data of domestic partnership records from the locales that release such information, approximately 8 percent of all registered couples are in heterosexual unions.

Individuals can legally leave licensed domestic partnerships more easily than they can leave marital situations. The only requirement to terminate the license is that one of the partners inform the government

records office where the partnership was registered. Termination of the license does not require the consent (or knowledge) of both partners, and the legislation does not include guidelines with regard to property division or palimony. In most locales, a new licensed partnership may be registered 6 months after the termination of the previous one. Furthermore, couples must terminate their license with the government records office even if the couple has subsequently married, though it appears that many couples fail to do so.

Legal challenges concerning domestic partnership ordinances focus on the debate surrounding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, with little attention paid to opposite-sex unions. Court decisions have come down on both sides of this issue. In *Baker v. State of Vermont* in 1999, the state supreme court ruled in favor, leading to the implementation of civil unions in that state. In *Goodridge v. Massachusetts* in 2003, the state court extended eligibility for legal marriage to same-sex couples. However, in *Knight v. Schwarzenegger* in 2005, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of licensed domestic partnerships. In this case, the petitioners argued that the state's Domestic Partners Act, in effect, amended Proposition 22, the defense of marriage initiative approved by a majority of California voters that defined legal marriage as existing only between one man and one woman. The petitioners argued that allowing same-sex couples to register as licensed partners redefines marriage without voter approval. The California Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that marriages and licensed partnerships were two legally distinct institutions. Other cases include *Snetsinger v. Montana* in 2004 and *Tyma v. Montgomery County Council* in 2001. Both cases were unsuccessful attempts to deny benefits such as insurance coverage to the domestic partners of homosexual employees.

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See also Cohabitation; Family; Homosexuality; Norms; Same-Sex Marriage

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Domestic Violence

Domestic violence—usually defined as intentional physical, sexual, or emotional harm by an intimate partner or family member—likely has always been part of human history. The construction and reconstruction of this social problem in the United States occurred in several ways, beginning as the problem of wife abuse.

Claims makers concerned with wife abuse emerged during the 1970s out of several other moral entrepreneurial campaigns, particularly those of the second wave feminist consciousness-raising groups, the anti-rape social movement, and the child protection movement. The first two focused their attention on challenging the secondary status of women in society. Consciousness-raising groups gave women time and space away from their busy lives to share stories of harassment, victimization, and often, abuse. These groups let many women see that what they had experienced was not unusual but rather was typical of many women's experiences. These groups gave women a discourse with which to analyze their individual and collective pain: how patriarchal institutions such as the family, the criminal justice system, and religion controlled women's lives and how women and girls were vulnerable to male power from birth until death, among other issues. The anti-rape movement's claims deepened the political analysis, showing how law enforcement often revictimized women when they reported sexual assaults and how police and prosecutors often did not follow through with investigations of incest and what came to be called "date rape." Some other women shared the humiliation and frustration of rape by their husbands; even if they called on law enforcement for protection and justice, they were often turned away for lack of an offense that could be prosecuted. Thus many women

did not report intimate wife abuse or rape; they feared not being believed and they were loath to suffer the humiliation of police investigative techniques.

Emboldened by the sheer numbers of stories of terror at the hands of men told in consciousness-raising groups, feminist activists initiated social change by creating sexual assault centers and training law enforcement officers to understand trauma and victimology; in time, they began to advocate for shelters where victims of wife abuse could go to be safe and to gain a time away to rethink their lives and their futures. With much hard work, the shelter movement grew across the United States. With its successes came awareness that the term *wife abuse* did not adequately capture the essence of what women were enduring. Not all victims were married to their abuser; as sexual mores changed, more women were living with a male partner without benefit of marriage, and thus the term *wife abuse* was a misnomer. The shelter movement—now a freestanding social movement—began to refer to the problem as "family violence." Family was understood, in a holistic way, as anyone with whom a person creates an intimate bond; this normally meant a sexual relationship between two consenting heterosexual adults. But family violence was different in another way; there was a growing recognition that children were also victims, even if they were only witnesses to the adults in their lives hitting each other. Learning lessons from the child protection movement, family violence activists emphasized that such children were more likely to grow up to be violent with an intimate partner (if a boy) or to allow a partner to hurt them (if a girl). Thus the intergenerational cycle of violence theory was born, and it resonated with many in the general public.

Activists strove to find ways to keep their claims about this kind of violent act fresh and in the public's consciousness. So by the 1990s, they reconstructed the social problem yet again, this time calling it "domestic violence." This new term incorporated the earlier elements of the claim: Males were the perpetrators, while females and children remained as victims, but the new term allowed for expansion of the possible kinds of victimization and, therefore, created more possible victims and more accused perpetrators. *Domestic violence* became the umbrella term for other acts of interpersonal violence: Emotional abuse, fiscal abuse, even spiritual abuse were new ways that males could hurt their female partners. The success of these claims allowed for construction of new types of domestic violence: Sibling abuse, elder abuse, even roommate abuse also became instances of domestic violence. Nevertheless, for most people, domestic violence meant aggressive behavior between those who were—or had been—in romantic relationships.

When asked to identify the causes of domestic violence, experts focused on two. First, there was a societal explanation: U.S. society was thoroughly patriarchal. Major institutions such as the criminal justice system, the labor market, and education were infused with "male is superior" values and minimized women's contributions, complaints, and suffering. Those institutions, undergirded by chauvinistic mass media, further socialized each sex into what patriarchy felt was its natural status. Not surprisingly, public policy also endorsed male superiority; this could be best illustrated by the few domestic violence shelters that existed and the difficulty they had in finding stable funding. Such limited societal resources to help victims of domestic violence often meant that women had to return to their abusers. Feminist experts—especially when they appeared in the media—explained repeatedly how this high rate of victim return did not mean that "women were asking for it" or that "they were masochists who enjoyed being hurt." Individual causation, experts opined, was the second reason that domestic violence occurred: A man decided to hurt the woman he loved. Even though he had been socialized into patriarchy, every male faced a choice: He could channel his anger, jealousy, frustration, or other emotions into behaviors that fostered healthy communication and a healthy relationship, or he could choose to do harm to his intimate partner, whom he viewed as his inferior. Even if the man felt powerless in his other statuses in the public sphere, it was not acceptable, these experts claimed, to turn those feelings of powerlessness on innocent victims within his family. These experts also rejected male explanations for losing control, such as alcohol or drug usage, arguing that they were simply rationalizations to cover the men's deliberate decision to hurt their partner.

By the mid-1990s, domestic violence claims makers had made significant gains in shaping public policy. Shelters were present in many more communities; passage of state and federal laws offered more protection for victims in areas as wide-ranging as mandatory insurance coverage, temporary protective orders, child custody, and so on. The public, thanks to several well-known cases covered by the media, such as the Nicole Brown–O. J. Simpson case, became much more sensitized to the harm that domestic violence could cause.

Such high-profile cases also added two new elements to the social problem of domestic violence. The first new element was stalking; perpetrators did not allow their victims to leave the relationship voluntarily. Instead, they followed their former partners, tracing their every movement in person, via the mail, or via the Internet, and threatened to commit, or committed, violence against their exes. Stalking behaviors were simply one more example of the male's need to control his female partner, even after the relationship had ended. That led directly to the second new element, that without intervention, domestic violence would continue to escalate, culminating in the murder of one partner or ex-partner, most often the woman.

More recently some sociologists have critiqued the feminist construction of domestic violence as men exhibiting power over women, by studying interpersonal violence within same-sex relationships and violence perpetrated by females against their male partners. Their analyses show that although patriarchal values are woven through many relationships, not all violence between partners can be attributed to patriarchy.

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See also Abuse, Child; Abuse, Elderly; Abuse, Intimate Partner; Abuse, Sibling; Family, Dysfunctional; Violence

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Downsizing

Downsizing refers to the reduction of employees in a business enterprise for economic or business reasons. In contrast to being fired, to be downsized is usually not strictly related to personal performance but rather to economic cycles or a company's need to restructure itself. Eliminating a downsized employee's job and not refilling it occurs because the company wishes to reduce its size or operations, not because the employee failed to perform. Downsizing is a permanent or large-scale workforce reduction and is distinguished from a layoff, which typically is a more individualized or temporary job loss. A "mass layoff" implies laying off a large number of workers and is similar to downsizing. A plant closing or relocation, in contrast to downsizing with the elimination of some positions and the retention of others, occurs when the entire workforce, at least at a particular location, is eliminated.

Industrial "restructuring," that is, job churning rather than net job reductions, or change in composition rather than change in size, is what occurs in many circumstances broadly termed *downsizing*. In fact, while the manufacturing industry has experienced significant downsizing, nonmanufacturing industries, even in the midst of large-scale downsizing, have experienced significant "upsizing" in terms of actual net company size. Nevertheless, both downsizing and restructuring entail individual job termination. Downsizing is one cause of worker *displacement*, a comprehensive term that refers to all forms of involuntary job loss that result from economic and business conditions largely beyond the control of the individual worker, including downsizing and restructuring, layoffs, and closing or relocating plants.

Rightsizing is downsizing accompanied by the firm belief that a given enterprise should operate with fewer people. Some contention exists that downsizing has become too closely associated with the process of organizational decline and that downsizing can be a purposive strategy, undertaken and designed to improve organizational efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. Downsizing thus defined falls into the category of management tools for achieving desired change, like rightsizing or "reengineering."

Further Definitional Issues

The narrowest definitions of worker displacement include the points that (a) the workers have been displaced as the result of a structural cause, including but not limited to international trade, technology, and government regulations, rather than due to cyclical downtown or economically motivated firm-specific idiosyncrasies and (b) the workers are firmly attached

to the sector in which they were employed and have a limited ability to return to a comparable job in a reasonable time span. Empirical research, however, rarely uses these narrow criteria.

The distinction between voluntary quits and involuntary displacement is not always clear-cut. Firms may wish to reduce costs without downsizing workers and may reduce or fail to increase wages. This may prompt some workers, presumably those with less job loss risk-aversion, to quit, whereas other workers, presumably those workers with more job loss risk-aversion, may choose to work for lower wages.

Data Sources

The Mass Layoff Statistics program of the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics collects reports on mass layoff actions that result in worker–job separations. Monthly mass layoff numbers come from establishments that have at least 50 initial claims for unemployment insurance filed against them during a 5-week period.

Since 1984, the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor has sponsored the Displaced Worker Surveys (DWSs) that collect information on workers who were displaced from their jobs. The DWSs are conducted biennially as supplements to the Current Population Survey, a monthly survey of households that is the primary source of information on the nation's labor force. The DWS defines displacement as an involuntary job separation based on operating decisions of the employer, such as a plant closing, an employer going out of business, or a downsizing or layoff from which the worker was not recalled. DWS data have the benefit of a large sample of displaced workers. But DWS data suffer from several limitations; most important, the data are cross-sectional, making it difficult to study causal relationships.

The most widely used longitudinal data in empirical studies of downsized workers come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal Surveys. The primary advantage of longitudinal data is that they allow the construction of comparison groups; the primary disadvantage is the small sample sizes relative to the DWS. Other data sources on downsized workers include regional data, data from administrative sources on workers and their firms, and case studies of plant closings. These data are rich in detail and narrative but tend not to generate a representative portrait of the broader experience of downsizing.

Effects on Workers

Roughly 2 million workers a year were displaced in the early 1990s from jobs that they held for at least 3 years. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, during the January 2001 through December 2003 period, another 5.3 million workers were displaced from jobs they held for at least 3 years. With the tenure restrictions relaxed, the number is significantly larger. Other data show an increase over the past 3 decades in downsizings, plant closings, and layoffs that is independent of the business cycle.

Downsizing correlates with serious career losses for workers. The most reliable estimates indicate that the average displaced worker experiences a substantial period of nonemployment, a period that lasts longer during recessions than expansions. The length of nonemployment has a high degree of variance; some workers experience rapid reemployment at comparable (or improved) pay, whereas others experience prolonged periods of unemployment or reemployment at reduced wages. Researchers also found an increased probability of part-time employment following displacement. Substantial earnings losses are also incurred, and these generally are more persistent than nonemployment effects. The degree to which displaced workers suffer earnings losses is cyclical. Moreover, labor market conditions in a downsized worker's industry and local area conditions are important factors in the extent to which downsized workers suffer earnings losses. Some studies also found that downsized workers experience declines in other properties of jobs that signal quality, such as occupational status, job authority and autonomy, and employer-offered benefits.

The risk of being downsized varies along a number of dimensions that in turn condition the extent to which the event damages a worker's career. First, men are more likely to be downsized than women, although debate persists over the question of whether men or women experience greater losses following displacement. Second, studies find that less educated workers are more likely to lose a job due to downsizing than are more educated workers, spend more time unemployed, and suffer the greatest wage losses. Third, the risk of job loss and transition difficulties corresponds to occupation: Semiskilled, blue-collar workers disproportionately endure long-term unemployment and the largest earnings reductions. However, as the incidence of downsizing events for more educated and white-collar workers increases, the transition difficulties for such workers increase as well.

Some theories of why workers are downsized and unable to replace lost jobs with comparable reemployment include (a) technological innovation and the structural transformation of manufacturing; (b) foreign competition, including international trade and the pressure that low-wage labor abroad puts on U.S. labor markets; (c) a shift in consumer spending from goods to services; (d) a weakening of labor unions; and (e) a change in the social contract between labor and capital such that workers are seen as costs that need to be minimized in an effort to increase profits.

Policy Response

The unemployment insurance system, although not directly targeted at downsized workers, is the most consequential policy effort. One policy targeted at displaced workers is the Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, which requires employers to provide 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, originally enacted by Congress in 1962, provides income replacement support above levels provided by unemployment insurance, targeting workers downsized from jobs as a result of the relaxation of trade restrictions. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program also is a response to concerns about job loss following trade liberalization; it provides income replacement and reemployment services. The Job Training and Partnership Act, amended in 1988 as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, provides job search assistance and retraining. Research on existing training programs shows no clear evidence that such programs provide many benefits to downsized workers. Also, programs have generally failed to address the most critical component of worker's costs: earnings losses after reemployment.

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See also Deindustrialization; Economic Restructuring; Globalization; Outsourcing; Social Mobility; Underemployment; Unemployment

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Drug Abuse

What is a drug? For social science purposes, a drug must be defined in context. In the medical context, a drug is a chemical substance used to heal the body and mind, one that is physician approved in medical therapy. In this sense, Lipitor, a cholesterol-fighting agent, Zoloft, an anti-depressant, and Celebrex, an anti-arthritis agent, are drugs. Within a legal context, a drug is an illicit or controlled substance, one whose possession and sale are subject to legal penalties; this makes marijuana, LSD, and heroin drugs. In a psychopharmacological sense, a drug is a chemical substance that is psychoactive, that significantly influences the workings of the brain and hence the mind; it has an impact on mood, emotion, and cognitive processes. By this definition, alcohol, methamphetamine, and cocaine are drugs. Even tobacco induces a psychic state, while not an intoxication or "high" per se, that causes pleasurable sensations in the user that entices him or her to continue consumption.

To the analyst of social problems, the third of these definitions is most relevant. The psychoactive property of drugs induces a substantial number of people to use them for recreational purposes, that is, to achieve a particular state of intoxication, which often produces harmful medical and psychological effects and dangerous behavior that generate concern in the public, negative attention from the media, and calls by

legislators for controlling such use. In addition, the medical administration of drugs generates social problems when their overuse or misuse causes harm, leading to still other calls for corrective remedies.

Social problems can be measured objectively and subjectively. Objectively measured, concrete indicators such as death, disease, monetary cost, and an incapacity to work or attend an educational institution define a social problem. Subjectively measured, defining a social problem is its social construction, that is, how the members of a society—including the general population, the media, lawmakers and law enforcement, social movement activists, and the medical and psychiatric professions—define and react to a given condition or supposed condition. Also referred to as the "social construction" of a social problem, this subjective definition often finds expression through emotions such as fear and dread, which may or may not be related to a condition's objective harm.

Measuring the Drug Problem Objectively

The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) collects data from emergency departments on untoward nonlethal drug effects that cause users to seek medical care. This program also collects data from medical examiners on drug-related lethal overdoses. DAWN's data only cover sudden, direct, or acute untoward drug episodes, or "overdoses," such as unconciousness, convulsions, and psychotic episodes. DAWN does not tally chronic or long-term harmful effects, such as cirrhosis of the liver, AIDS, and hepatitis. In addition, DAWN's program, especially its data collection effort on lethal overdoses, does not cover the entire population, and so its statistics are incomplete. Still, untoward effects remain one of several objective measures of drug use as a social problem.

In 2005, DAWN tallied 816,696 nonlethal drug abuse–related emergency department episodes in U.S. metropolitan areas. A total of 31 percent involved illicit drugs only; 27 percent involved pharmaceutical drugs only; 14 percent involved alcohol plus one or more illicit drugs; 10 percent involved alcohol with pharmaceuticals; 8 percent involved illicit drugs with pharmaceuticals; 4 percent involved a three-way combination of alcohol, pharmaceuticals, and illicit drugs; and 7 percent were in a separate category: alcohol-only patients under the age of 21.

DAWN also collects drug-related mortality data from medical examiners in 35 metropolitan areas; as of this writing, 2003 statistics are the latest available. Of the roughly 7,000 deaths by overdose on which DAWN collected information, 70 percent involved one or more opiate or narcotic drugs, including heroin; 43 percent involved cocaine; 30 percent involved alcohol; 17 percent involved benzodiazepines, a category of tranquilizers; and 17 percent involved anti-depressants. (These percentages do not add up to 100 percent because these deaths involved more than one drug.) Clearly, with respect to death by overdose, these drugs or drug types represent a social problem.

More than 100 epidemiologists and biostatisticians from the World Health Organization surveyed the available data and isolated roughly 20 leading risk factors for premature death in countries around the world. The risk factors were somewhat different for developing countries as compared with developed countries. In such developing countries as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Bolivia, factors such as malnutrition and poor sanitation were the leading causes of premature death. But in the developed or industrialized countries such as France, the United States, and Japan, tobacco consumption accounted for 12.2 percent of the years of life lost to all the risk factors, and excessive alcohol consumption accounted for 9.2 percent. Tobacco and alcohol were the number one and number three factors in this respect. In contrast, illicit drugs only accounted for 1.8 percent of years of life lost. In other words, in the industrialized world, the legal drugs, taken together, contribute more than 5 times as much to premature death as do the illegal drugs.

Because DAWN's data are incomplete, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation estimates the total number of direct deaths (mainly overdoses) in the United States per year as a result of taking illicit drugs at 15,000 to 20,000. The foundation estimates the number of deaths caused by illegal drug-taking from all sources (AIDS, hepatitis, tuberculosis, homicide, injury, suicide) at 25,000 to 30,000. The number of direct deaths from alcohol consumption are estimated at 20,000 per year, and the foundation's tally of alcohol's total contribution from all sources is 100,000. The federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate the number of deaths caused by long-term cigarette smoking at just under 440,000. (Smoking causes virtually no sudden or acute deaths.) Of the 2.4 million deaths that occur in the United

States each year, approximately one in four is caused by alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drug use. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation calls substance abuse the nation's number one health problem.

The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has calculated the risk or chance of being killed in a single-vehicle crash, given a specific level of blood alcohol concentration (BAC). At the 0.08 to 0.09 BAC level, DWI (driving while intoxicated) or DUI (driving under the influence [of alcohol]) in all states, for 16- to 20-year-old males, that chance increases 52 times; for females at the same age, the chance increases 15 times. At the 0.15 BAC level or higher, for males 16 to 20 years old, this risk increases by over 15,000 times; for females, this figure is 738 times. For the older age categories, the risk is less elevated. After 1982, the number of alcohol-related fatalities in the United States declined by some 10,000 per year, but between 1999 and the early 2000s, it increased slightly each year. In contrast, teenage alcohol-related fatalities consistently declined after 1982, for under-16-year-olds, from 1,269 to 573 in 2002, and for persons 16 to 20, from 5,244 to 2,329. Nonetheless, drinking and driving remains a major social problem.

Death, effects that trigger emergency department admissions, and automobile accidents are but three of many objective measures of drugs as a social problem. Estimates place the U.S. economic cost of substance abuse at a half trillion dollars in the value of lowered on-the-job productivity due to illness and injury, health care expenditures, motor vehicle crashes, fire, and violence; 40 percent of that total is from alcohol abuse, a third from smoking, and a quarter (27 percent) from illicit drug use.

High school students who use illicit drugs and engage in binge drinking are more likely to experience impaired personal relationships and difficulties in their mental and physical health. The relationship between drug use and criminal behavior, while causally complex, is nonetheless an epidemiological fact: People who commit crime are *hugely* more likely to use drugs than the population at large, and it is possible that drug use may be causally implicated in the commission of criminal behavior.

Clearly, the contribution of substance abuse to death, disease, monetary cost, educational and occupational impairment, accidents, and violence is considerable. Drug use is a social problem of major proportions.

The Social Construction of the Drug Problem

A measure of independence exists between the subjective and the objective as it does for all other conditions that cause harm and damage to the society. For instance, given the nearly 600,000 deaths caused by the use of alcohol and tobacco compared with the 20,000 or 30,000 deaths caused by illicit drug use, why does the latter generate so much more concern than the former? Considering solely the objective harm caused by a given condition—using death as one measure of harm—why should the *less* serious problem generate *more* public concern and dread?

The answer to this question does not stem solely from irrational factors. Some of them seem entirely reasonable. For one thing, on a dose-for-dose basis, several of the illicit drugs (most notably, heroin, and to a lesser extent, PCP, cocaine, and methamphetamine) are more damaging and dangerous than alcohol and cigarettes. A single episode of heroin use is vastly more likely to kill the user than a single episode of alcohol consumption and, even more emphatically, a single episode of cigarette consumption. Second, heroin and cocaine tend to kill earlier in the user's life for each death than is true of alcohol and, especially, cigarettes. Hence, with respect to number of years of life lost, to equal one crack cocaine death, it would take 10 cigarette deaths and perhaps three to five alcohol deaths. It seems entirely reasonable that the former would generate more public concern than the latter. Third, most cigarette deaths result from chronic conditions, such as lung cancer, whereas most cocaine and heroin deaths result from sudden, acute conditions, and sudden, dramatic deaths attract more attention than long-term, chronic deaths. Last, illicit drugs are implicated in maladies other than, and in addition to, direct drug-induced medical death: maladies such as drive-by and bystander shootings, robbery, burglary, holding a neighborhood hostage to drug dealers, addicted babies, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Of course, some of these harms can be traceable to the illicit status of illegal drugs. Nonetheless, illegal drugs, especially cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, are implicated in other objective social problems more than the legal drugs are. And many of these conditions are what people worry most about.

One indicator of the subjective or constructionist perspective defining a social problem is the public's

designation of drug abuse as the number one problem facing the country today. Between January 1986 and September 1989, the Gallup poll and the *New York Times*/CBS polls reported that the proportion of Americans naming drug abuse as the country's most important problem catapulted from 2 to 64 percent. Clearly in the late 1980s, the crack cocaine epidemic had caught the public's attention. In just 2 months, however, this figure had slipped to 38 percent; by July 1990, it had decreased to 18 percent and in August 1990, to only 10 percent. Throughout the 1990s and into the first 2 years of the new century, up until September 2001, the percentage of the U.S. population indicating drug abuse as the most important problem facing the country today remained in the 5 to 10 percent range. After the attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the public's priorities shifted. A Gallup poll taken in November 2001 revealed that more than a third of the respondents (37 percent) named terrorism as the nation's top problem, and from then until today, somewhere between 1 and 3 percent of Americans, depending on the specific date of the survey, list drug abuse as the country's top social problem.

What the roller-coaster ride of drug abuse as a major social problem indicates is that conditions compete with one another for public attention and concern. In other words, a "carrying capacity," or saturation point, of public attention means only so many issues can rank near the top and, obviously, only one can be number one. The war in Iraq and the War on Terrorism crowded out drug use as a major social problem, causing its decline on the list of the public's major concerns.

Another way drug abuse is socially constructed as a social problem is through the criminal justice system. In 1970 the number of prisoners in state and federal penitentiaries totaled 200,000. As of 2006 the nation's prisons housed 1.5 million inmates; its jails held nearly 800,000 detainees. This enormous increase did not come about as a result of an increase in the crime rate; in fact, the country's crime rate declined sharply. In 1994, the violent crime victimization rate was 51.2 per 1,000; in 2005 it was 21.2. In 1977, the country's property crime victimization rate was 544.1; in 2005, it was 154.0. Likewise, the country's drug use has not increased since the 1970s; in fact, it has decreased. In 1979, 14.1 percent of respondents said they had used at least one illicit drug in the past month; in 2005, the figure was 8.1 percent. The figure for cocaine in 1979 was 2.6 percent, but in 2005 was 1.0 percent. What has happened is that arrests and incarcerations for drug possession have skyrocketed. In 1970, the country's drug arrests totaled 322,000; in 2004 they were more than 1.7 million. In 1970, 16 percent of all inmates housed in federal penitentiaries were sentenced for drug offenses; today, the figure is 55 percent. In the state prison system (whose population makes up 90 percent of all prisoners), there are more inmates incarcerated for a drug offense than a violent offense. The federal justice system spends $20 billion a year fighting the drug war; states spend roughly the same amount. Clearly, the country is waging a drug war, and that war is a measure of drug use as a social problem, an indicator of public concern about drug use.

The subjective recognition of substance abuse as a social problem does not mean that its designation is arbitrary or fanciful. Saying that drug use is a constructed problem is not to say that it is "just" a construction; not all social constructions are equal. Still, we must be alert to disjunctions between claims and evidence, and drug use represents one condition for which such discrepancies are especially striking. In general, such discrepancies are normal because claims issue from interested parties, interest groups, political activists, and ideological and moral entrepreneurs, as well as a variety of other sources, whereas objective measures of material harm issue from social, medical, and natural scientists. By any criteria, drug abuse is a major social problem, but the claims made about the degree of harm it causes do not always match up with material reality. Indeed, this is one of the more intriguing features of drug use as a social problem.

Erich Goode

See also Alcoholism; Binge Drinking; Club Drugs; Cocaine and Crack; Drug Abuse, Crime; Drug Abuse, Prescription Narcotics; Drug Abuse, Sports; Drunk Driving; Heroin; Marijuana; Smoking

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Drug Abuse, Crime

Drugs and crime are undeniably linked. Not only are manufacturing, distributing, and purchasing drugs illegal, but the misuse of drugs often increases the need and likelihood of committing additional criminal acts. Overwhelming evidence indicates a connection between drug misuse, criminal activity, and arrest. However, the nature of the relationship is complex, and no one explanation or pathway accounts for everyone's experiences with drug misuse and crime.

The criminalization of drug use has long been the official policy of the U.S. government. The prevailing viewpoint of the addiction that drives drug use and the associated criminal activity is largely through a criminal, rather than medical, paradigm; the people addicted to drugs who commit crimes are not sick or ill but offenders in need of punishment, not treatment.

Characterizing the U.S. War on Drugs are increased penalties for crimes associated with so-called hard drugs and narcotics. With the crack epidemic of the 1980s largely subsided, today law enforcement pursues not only drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and marijuana but also methamphetamine and designer drugs such as Ecstasy. The focus of criminal justice policy is on crimes committed in association with drug use, whether driven by the pharmacological effect of the drug, an economic need to obtain more of the drug, or violence committed while participating in the illegal drug market. Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the War on Drugs is its well-documented differential impact on society's poor and nonwhite.

History of Drug Use as Crime

The criminalization of U.S. drug use parallels the sociopolitical events in the country's history. Drug use as a federal crime began with the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 that taxed the manufacture, importation, and distribution of opiates and coca. Motivated by the government's desire to control opium users after seizing the Philippines at the end of the Spanish-American War, Congress expanded the act in 1924 to include the importation of heroin. At that time the United States was experiencing an influx of immigrants who brought their culture, including their patterns of drug use, with them. Asian immigrants introduced opium to the United States, and Mexican immigrants brought marijuana. With the societal belief that blacks favored cocaine, the false image of a crazed black man, high on cocaine and raping white women, helped fuel the public's moral panic.

The government's leading spokesperson for the criminalization of drug use was Harry J. Anslinger, who served as the first head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, later the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), from 1930 to 1962, and fervently promoted the criminal model of addiction. Through a series of improper research studies, false testimony given to Congress, and successful use as a legal defense, marijuana became known for inducing insanity and homicidal tendencies in users. The 1937 Marijuana Tax Act made it illegal to distribute marijuana without a stamp or license from the federal government. Because the government would not issue stamps, this essentially made marijuana illegal, punishable by a significant fine and prison term. The Boggs Act of 1951, passed during the cold war and while the country was fighting the Korean War and motivated by fear that the enemy was using drugs to sabotage the country's youth, increased penalties for drug crimes fourfold. The Daniel Act of 1956 followed the first televised Senate hearings on the topic of organized crime in the United States and increased penalties eightfold. In Virginia, for example, conviction of rape mandated a 10-year sentence, whereas drug possession mandated a 20-year sentence.

Despite the increasingly severe punishment of drug crimes, use of illegal drugs skyrocketed in the 1960s as the country faced cultural upheaval and challenges

to the status quo. President Lyndon Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, referred to as the President's Crime Commission, and comprising criminal justice experts, members of law enforcement, and authors from across the country, culled scientific research regarding crime and the criminal justice system response. According to the commission's 1967 report, crime resulted from poverty and social disorganization, thus requiring increased integration and services to provide support to offenders and those at risk of offending. During the 1960s and early 1970s these policy recommendations began to take hold within the criminal justice system. The seemingly enlightened tone of the report and the political era may have influenced passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, more commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, the first piece of legislation to reduce penalties associated with drugs. It also classified drugs, except tobacco and alcohol, according to their medical use and potential for misuse.

Shortly after passage of the Controlled Substances Act, 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater inserted the fear of street crime into national politics. Although Goldwater lost to Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon returned to the message in 1968 and laid the foundation for a get-tough era in the White House that culminated with Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Reagan declared a national war on drugs in 1982 and called for its renewal in 1986. The Reagan and first Bush administrations increased funding for law enforcement budgets, pouring resources into international drug interdiction and domestic programs that ranged from increased drug testing in the workplace to assigning more law enforcement officers to pursue drug crimes. President Reagan initiated the expansion of criminalization to private or casual drug use, arguing that society should not have to bear the burden of anyone's addiction. However, with prisons funded by tax dollars, the public did not escape responsibility for drug addicts. Between 1985 and 1995 the number of state prisoners convicted of a drug crime increased 478 percent and accounted for 35 percent of the total increase in the overall prison population during that time. At the federal level, drug offenses increased 446 percent and accounted for 74 percent of the increase during the same period.

The federal government maintained pace with the changing drug scene. A powerful tool in that effort is the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 that enables drug enforcement officials to bypass traditional administrative requirements and immediately classify a substance as illegal. The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 empowers the DEA to regulate the distribution of the chemicals and equipment often used to manufacture illegal drugs. Similarly, the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, in addition to increasing the penalties associated with manufacturing and distributing the drug, regulates the chemicals and equipment most commonly used in its production. More recently, GHB, often referred to as the "date rape drug," and the weight-loss drug ephedrine, were classified as controlled substances.

The control of drugs and crime expanded beyond any one political orientation. The 1994 Violent Crime Control Act, sponsored and signed into law by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, increased penalties for drug crimes and provided states with funding if their inmates convicted of violent crimes served at least 85 percent of their sentence. Despite society's concern with violent crime, contemporary drug laws are such that people convicted of nonviolent drug offenses can serve sentences longer than those who commit violent street crimes.

Ample evidence shows that the increased penalties for drug crimes have had disproportionately negative effects based on race and class. Differential punishment of drug users, based on the type of drug, as incorporated into the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, established harsh mandatory sentences for possessing less than $100 worth of crack, a relatively cheap drug viewed as favored by poor urban dwellers. Until 2007, federal law set the sentence for possession of 1 gram of crack at the equivalent of that for 100 grams of cocaine, an expensive drug favored by wealthier, white drug users. Research shows that differential treatment continues in the courtroom, where, among those convicted of drug felonies in state court, whites are less likely than nonwhites to be sent to prison and generally more likely to receive shorter sentences when they are punished. Nearly half of all state prison inmates serving time for drug offenses are black; whites and Hispanics each make up about one quarter of state prison inmates. Nonwhite drug users would appear to be over-represented in the criminal justice system as, according to self-report studies, nearly three quarters of drug users are white; blacks represent approximately 15 percent and Hispanics about 10 percent of U.S. drug users.

Drug-Related Crime

Violation of drug laws is not the only intersection between drug misuse and crime. Whether drug users are viewed as criminal or as suffering from addiction, crime perpetrated by them is not as uniform as once thought. Not until the 1970s and 1980s did research become sophisticated enough to reveal the range of differences among drug users. As the types of drugs people use vary, so do the types of crimes committed. Most research on drug-related crime has concentrated on heroin, as it was found that hallucinogens and marijuana do not consistently increase criminal activity; the research is mixed regarding tranquilizers and stimulants.

Another focus of research regarding drug misuse and crime has been on violent offenses. The most widely accepted model outlines a three-pronged relationship between drug use and violent crime. The psychopharmacological or biochemical effects of drug use can lead to violence, as can the economic need or compulsion created by addiction; violence can also result from the illegal activities related to drug markets. According to the National Institute of Justice, in 2002 approximately 25 percent of convicted property and drug offenders reported that they committed their crimes to get money for drugs, while 5 percent of both violent and public order offenders reported an economic motivation. Authorities generally agree that most drug-related violent crime is the result of the prohibition against drugs, rather than the drugs themselves. Support for this comes from the violence and criminal enterprise surrounding alcohol that flourished during the years of Prohibition and quickly dissipated after its repeal.

From 1986 until 2004, under the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program, the Justice Department collected information about the illegal drug use of arrestees. In nearly 40 cities across the country, urine testing for illegal drug use during the 72 hours preceding arrest revealed that approximately two thirds had at least one illegal drug in their bodies at the time of arrest; females had slightly higher rates of use. In 2000, for example, men were generally more likely than women to test positive for marijuana, whereas women were more likely to test positive for cocaine. During the same year, methamphetamine use was more common in the West and used more frequently by women than men.

Alcohol and Crime

Although not a target in the War on Drugs, alcohol use strongly relates to criminal activity and is the only drug regularly shown to increase aggression. Instead of violations of drug laws or offenses associated with its distribution, alcohol-driven crime is most frequently interpersonal and violent. Approximately 40 percent of violent crimes and fatal car accidents involve alcohol. Two thirds of violent crime victims attacked by an intimate reported alcohol was a factor in the offense. Among domestic violence victims, approximately 75 percent of offenders used alcohol. Violence results not only because of intoxication but also through learned expectations about how drinking and violence are paired.

Unlike prohibitive drug laws, those regulating alcohol deal primarily with the legal age of consumption. After Prohibition, most states adopted a minimum legal drinking age of 21. When 29 states lowered the age between 1970 and 1975, researchers found car crashes significantly increased among teens in those states. In response to mounting public pressure, most but not all states returned the age to 21. The federal government enacted the Uniform Drinking Age Act in 1984, stipulating receipt of federal transportation funds as dependent on a minimum state legal drinking age of 21. Despite such laws, underage drinkers consistently report it is relatively easy to obtain alcohol.

Drug Treatment

Mandatory or involuntary treatment ordered by the criminal justice system is a much debated issue. Research shows coerced treatment is generally effective but that issues of motivation are important for determining individual success. An often-cited RAND Corporation study found that treatment is 10 times more cost-effective than efforts at interdiction in reducing the societal costs of cocaine addiction, including crime and loss of productivity. Recently, several states adopted alternatives to incarceration, including mandatory treatment, for nonviolent offenders who misuse drugs.

Because of the heterogeneity among drug-using offenders and the range of challenges in employment, education, and health care that drug users face, a variety of interventions exist. Drug treatment for offenders may take place in residential or inpatient programs, in

community-based outpatient programs, or in programs administered in prison. These intervention programs vary greatly in terms of the types of services provided and the quality of those services. Programs differ in the extent of staff training, the levels of rewards and punishment incorporated, whether psychological and medical care is provided, and whether medication, such as methadone, is administered. No single, specific approach consistently results in success for all drug users; rather, programs offering a variety of integrated services, those of longer duration, and those administered in the community, not prison, are generally more effective. Overall, treatment for incarcerated addicts appears to have decreased in recent years.

Since 1989, drug courts have addressed the multiplicity of issues faced by drug-using offenders by combining supervision, drug testing, and treatment governed by a system of rewards and punishment. Patterned after a social work caseload model, the courts are effectively coordinating multiple services and decreasing rates of relapse and recidivism. However, little support from the public presently exists for drug legalization and treatment or for clean needle exchanges. An alternative to the prohibition policies of the United States is the harm reduction approach favored in Western Europe, Australia, and Canada.

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See also Addiction; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; Club Drugs; Cocaine and Crack; Crime; Drug Subculture; Gangs; Heroin; Juvenile Delinquency; Marijuana; Uniform Crime Report

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Drug Abuse, Prescription Narcotics

Prescription narcotics include a number of opiates, including morphine, codeine, hydrocodone (Vicodin), and oxycodone (OxyContin). OxyContin and Vicodin—Schedule II and III painkillers, respectively—represent the most widely abused prescription narcotics in the United States. Both have significant abuse potential. Recreational users take them orally in pill form, crushed and snorted, or dissolved in water and injected. Effects of Vicodin include feelings of well-being by reducing tension, anxiety, and aggression ("high"). Effects of OxyContin are stronger than those of Vicodin and similar to the effects of heroin.

Hydrocodone and oxycodone were first manufactured and marketed in the United States in the 1920s, as an answer to the number of Americans who were addicted to opium-derivative cough medicines such as heroin and morphine. The addictive potential of hydrocodone and oxycodone has been a major concern since the early 1960s. However, the introduction of the Vicodin and OxyContin preparations in the mid-1990s radically boosted illicit use and abuse due to a major marketing push by numerous pharmaceutical companies. The problem of Vicodin and OxyContin abuse became widely recognized by the media in 2003 when conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh admitted abusing these drugs.

Hydrocodone products are the most frequently prescribed pharmaceutical opiates in the United States.

Despite their medical utility, they are also the most popular pharmaceuticals associated with trafficking, abuse, and addiction. In every geographical area in the country, the U.S. government lists Vicodin among the most commonly diverted. OxyContin has been popular among the narcotic-abusing population since its introduction in 1995. Medical misuse of both Vicodin and OxyContin is most common among the elderly, whereas illicit use is most common among youth. However, recent concern has grown among federal, state, and local officials about the increase in illicit availability and abuse of both Vicodin and OxyContin, particularly in the eastern United States.

Millions of dosage units of Vicodin and other hydrocodone products get diverted by theft, doctor shopping, fraudulent prescriptions, and Internet fraud. Chronic long-term use of Vicodin can cause severe liver damage, and hydrocodone-related deaths are widespread and increasing. Emergency room admissions for hydrocodone-related problems have increased by 170 percent since 1994. Consequently, the U.S. government has recently moved to enact regulations reclassifying Vicodin and other hydrocodone products as Schedule II controlled substances.

OxyContin abuse has also led to increased instances of pharmacy robberies, thefts, shoplifting incidents, and health care fraud incidents. Most OxyContin-related deaths result from ingestion of high quantities of the drug in combination with depressants such as alcohol. In the eastern United States, OxyContin is the drug of greatest concern to law enforcement, although reliable data on actual abuse incidence are difficult to establish. More recently, a number of states have enacted or proposed more stringent regulatory guidelines and increased penalties for its illegal sale.

Philip R. Kavanaugh

See also Deviance; Drug Abuse

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Drug Abuse, Sports

Drug use and abuse, including alcohol abuse, are considerable public health problems. One societal domain where this problem has received particular attention is in the realm of sports. This attention is due, in part, to numerous alcohol- and drug-related incidents involving well-known sports figures, and the problem encompasses both performance-enhancing and recreational drug use. Scholars have conducted numerous studies on the prevalence rates and reasons for drug abuse among athletes at various competitive levels, although many important questions remain unanswered.

Performance-Enhancing Drugs

Performance-enhancing drugs are substances that give an athlete some type of competitive advantage and are deemed illegal by a sport's governing body or state or federal law. Examples of commonly used performance-enhancing drugs include steroids, human growth hormone, amphetamines, and painkillers. These drugs are generally used to increase strength and speed, provide extra energy for practice and competitions, allow an athlete to train harder and recover more quickly from training, and enable an athlete to compete when hurt or injured.

The use of drugs for enhancing athletic performance is not a new phenomenon, as historians have uncovered evidence of stimulant use among ancient Greek athletes for competitive advantages. Steroid use to increase strength was documented among Olympic, professional, and intercollegiate athletes in the 1960s and 1970s, and the first Olympic drug-related suspensions occurred during the 1968 Summer Olympics. The first most notable performance-enhancing drug suspension involved Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson being stripped of his 100-meter gold medal at the 1988 Summer Olympics, although throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century a number of Olympic and professional athletes continued to be suspended for performance-enhancing drug abuse. In 2007, Marion Jones—the first woman to win five medals at one Olympics (in Sydney, Australia, in 2000)—admitted to using steroids and was stripped of her medals. No comprehensive studies, however, have been conducted among professional or other elite athletes to gauge the overall prevalence rate of performance-enhancing drug use among this population, although the 2007 Mitchell Report revealed that

some professional baseball athletes had used illegal performance-enhancing substances. Recent studies among college and high school athletes have found that 1 to 4 percent of athletes in these groups reported steroid use or amphetamine use for performance-enhancing purposes.

The most obvious reasons for performance-enhancing drug use among athletes are self-evident: to become a better athlete and have enhanced sport-related outcomes. Athletes also report that they use such substances to recover from and prevent injuries, to improve their appearance, and in some cases in response to pressures from coaches. Stimulants may be used for energy purposes or as a weight loss aid, the latter reason being particularly relevant for sports where appearance can be judged (e.g., gymnastics) or where weight requirements exist (e.g., wrestling). Athletes may abuse painkillers in an effort to conform to a cultural norm that suggests being injured is explicitly or implicitly met with disapproval and playing through pain or injury is rewarded.

Abuse of performance-enhancing drugs can have multiple negative impacts on an athlete's health. Some substances, such as painkillers and amphetamines, can result in physiological and psychological dependence. Steroid use has been linked with a number of physical and psychological problems, including cardiovascular disease, genital shrinkage (among men), development of masculine physical characteristics (among women), and increased mania and rage. It should be noted, however, that most of the research on the long-term effects of steroid use comes from case reports and not well-designed, comprehensive studies.

Aside from the potential negative health impacts, performance-enhancing drug use compromises fundamental assumptions associated with athletic contests. One of the most important assumptions of competitive sport is that all participants are adhering to a standard set of rules and laws. Individuals who intentionally violate these rules in an effort to gain a competitive advantage compromise the integrity and fabric of the activity in which they participate. If those who participate in and are fans of a sport cannot be certain that the competitions are "clean," the resulting decline in credibility could have a considerable negative impact on the sport's popularity and acceptability within the larger culture.

Recreational Drugs

Unlike substances such as steroids, there are generally no physiological performance-related advantages to using recreational substances like alcohol, marijuana, or cocaine. Nonetheless, recreational drug use, especially alcohol use, has long been linked with athletics. In Europe a formal relationship between the alcohol industry and athletics goes back several hundred years, and today alcohol companies are among the most important commercial sponsors of organized sports. Additionally, there have been several high-profile athlete deaths involving recreational drug use, including cocaine overdoses and auto accidents when driving while intoxicated.

A number of research studies have found those who participate in athletics consume more alcohol and engage in more high-risk drinking than those who do not. Several national research studies on college students in the United States have found that intercollegiate athletes are considerably more likely than other students to engage in heavy drinking. Not surprisingly, these studies have also found that college athletes are more likely than non-athletes to experience negative health, social, and legal consequences as a result of their drinking. Studies among youth, high school, professional, and recreational athletes are not as comprehensive, but most indicate that those who participate in athletics consume more alcohol than those who do not. Others studies have shown that sports fans drink more heavily than do non-fans. In contrast, research seems to indicate that participating in sports serves as somewhat of a protective factor against other recreational drug use, as studies have shown that youth and college-aged individuals participating in sport are less likely than others to use substances such as marijuana and cocaine.

There are several theoretical explanations as to why athletes tend to drink more than non-athletes. These include athletes being under more pressure than non-athletes (e.g., balancing academics and athletics), athletes having high levels of personality traits associated with alcohol use (e.g., impulsivity), the larger cultural link between alcohol and sport, athletes having more social opportunities than other individuals, and a perceived norm regarding the social behaviors expected of athletes. Few research studies have explored these possibilities, however, so the exact reasons athletes tend to drink more than non-athletes remain unknown.

The reasons that athletes seem to use drugs (other than alcohol) less often than non-athletes do are also largely unknown. Many professional and collegiate sporting organizations engage in random drug testing that could serve as a deterrent, although comprehensive

research studies on the effects of drug testing programs in sports are lacking. Some research indicates that one of the common reasons college athletes report not using recreational drugs is concern for their health, so it is possible that the negative health effects of substances like cocaine and marijuana are salient for those participating in athletics. Finally, it is possible that the overall culture of athletics, while somewhat permissive regarding alcohol use, implicitly and explicitly discourages the use of other recreational drugs.

Preventing Substance Use Among Athletes

Over the past 10 years research studies have shown that brief, individualized interventions are effective in the general population at reducing alcohol and other drug use, especially those that utilize the motivational interviewing framework or alcohol and drug skills training. Motivational interviewing is a nondirective approach, often incorporating personalized feedback regarding one's behaviors, which is designed to enhance one's desire to change his or her behaviors. Alcohol and drug skills training programs are designed to help the individual develop specific strategies for reducing his or her substance use. Research studies have shown that many athletes are exposed to education-based substance abuse prevention programs, but these education-only programs generally have been shown to be ineffective at reducing substance use. However, a handful of recent studies have provided promising support for using motivational interviewing or skills training programs to reduce substance use, specifically among athletes. Adaptations of these types of programs that address considerations unique to athletes, such as the impact of substance use on an athlete's sport performance, may prove to be particularly effective.

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See also Binge Drinking; Drug Abuse; Drug Subculture

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Drug Subculture

Culture refers to the commonly held beliefs, shared language, history, and systems of meanings that link large groups of people together. The concept of a subculture refers to a definable, recognizable group within a larger culture that can be distinguished by its own beliefs, customs, and values. Members of a subculture recognize that they are within the larger culture and often define or describe the values or customs of their subculture in opposition to the larger social world. Insider knowledge of the subcultural argot provides members with a kind of cultural capital that helps them to recognize one another, reinforces group solidarity, and confers degrees of status as a member of the group.

Do drug users, or users of some drugs, constitute a unique drug subculture? There is evidence to suggest both yes and no.

Drug use is often a social activity in which groups of users are known to one another but not publicly identified. At each stage of the process, from finding dealers, to purchasing drugs and equipment, to finding a safe space to use, to the consumption itself, drug use is characterized by elaborate and mostly secret symbols and slang. Furthermore, both police and researchers have observed unique etiquette, some say

rituals, surrounding the distribution of drugs and the sharing of equipment ("works") among groups of users. Finally, groups of drug users accord each other status for drug-related achievements—such as eluding the police, serving time, or surviving harrowing drug use experiences—that would not be bragged about by nonusers. All of these features imply that unique subcultures exist around the use of particular drugs.

Despite the superficial similarities, there are many reasons to reject the subculture label as applied to drug use. First, drug use is illegal and aggressively prosecuted. Shared signals and slang exist to avoid detection and arrest, regardless of any presumed histories or shared meanings. Slang, in particular, allows dealers to arrange sales over phone lines or in public spaces without actually providing evidence of a crime when the conversations are recorded. The behaviors are hidden out of necessity. Hiding them does not clearly indicate a desire to separate oneself or to form a unique group.

The hypothesis that drug use is ritualistic, particularly that injecting drug users share syringes as a statement of community, with status conveyed through the order of use, was explored closely in the wake of HIV/AIDS. If users preferred to share equipment, researchers worried, then it would be much more difficult to reduce the spread of HIV among them. Research has indicated, however, that the opposite is true. Users are aware of the medical risks that come with reusing syringes. That is why those who invest the most money or take the greatest risk in procuring the drugs will often insist on shooting up first. A cost–benefit analysis explains more than the "etiquette" argument. As most U.S. states have decriminalized syringe possession or allowed the introduction of syringe exchange programs, users have taken advantage of the opportunities to use clean needles whenever possible.

Do drug users actively reject the value systems of their social worlds? Probably not, because most users are employed and lead stable lives. Others, occasionally referred to as junkies or "chaotic" users, appear to have fallen out of the mainstream social world due to their chaotic dependencies rather than having chosen to leave it. Drug use is often an aspect of the lives of many people who otherwise have little in common.

Patterns of drug use have social and cultural aspects to them. Although it is not uncommon for drug users to have experience with multiple drugs, medical and ethnographic research has found that most users have a "drug of choice." Club drug users prefer particular types of drugs in particular social settings. Crack cocaine use follows very different patterns, as does youth pot smoking and other drug use settings from high school bleachers to shooting galleries. These social worlds do not routinely come into contact. Drug dealing, of course, is a separate social sphere altogether from drug use. Much of the drug subculture research has had a hard time separating drug use from other social, economic, or cultural contexts. The "hang loose" ethic that researchers of the 1960s associated with pot smoking among college students turned out to be very difficult to distinguish from the "youth culture" of the time or the self-described youth "counterculture." Sociologists of the period also attempted to distinguish the cultural worlds of the self-described "heads" (pot and LSD) versus "freaks" (speed), which demonstrated differences between them but did not show complex cultures defined around the drugs.

Critics point out that it is often unclear who is in a subculture and who is not, that by defining deviant behavior as a choice people are obscuring the social, political, and economic factors that constrain those choices, and that, by extension, one of the main accomplishments of the subculture explanation is that it absolves mainstream society of responsibility. That is, this is not a society with drug users, thieves, gangs, and tax cheaters; this is a society of good people who have subcultures of drug users, tax cheats, and so forth, living among them. Thus, the subculture label stigmatizes groups rather than explaining them.

Anti-drug campaigns and literature still use the concept of a drug subculture. This literature represents drug use as the "lifestyle choice" of a subculture whose members seek to recruit other users. The drug subculture is here defined to include research organizations and drug policy reform groups that criticize the zero-tolerance policies that the United States has adopted since the mid-1980s, presumably as part of a secret campaign for complete drug legalization. There are little data to support this approach.

Howard Lune and Pedro Mateu-Gelabert

See also Club Drugs; Cocaine and Crack; Cultural Capital; Drug Abuse; Gateway Drugs; Subcultures

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Drunk Driving

Traffic crashes are the cause of more fatal and debilitating traumatic injuries than any other modern activity in the United States, and today few are blind to the fact that alcohol-impaired drivers pose a significant risk to themselves and others. The deaths and injuries that drunk driving causes are frequently inflicted upon innocent victims; as there is no justification for drunk driving, these are particularly pointless and tragic occurrences. But broad recognition of the problems drunk drivers cause has not led to an easy crafting of effective strategies to combat them; indeed, the path remains contentious. Even fundamental issues, such as defining the term *drunk driving*, spark sometimes-heated battles among researchers, activists, industry, and the government. Nonetheless, great strides have occurred in preventing deaths from drunk driving. Of concern, though, is the apparent recent stall in the decline in drunk driving and the identification of tools for further prevention success.

Drunk driving is the act of driving after being impaired by alcohol, placing the driver at a higher risk of crashing than normal, given the same driving conditions. This is a more general term than a legal definition, which requires impairment to be identifiable by an enforcement officer, or a per se definition of driving under the influence (DUI) based on a specific blood alcohol concentration (BAC). States vary in their definitions of DUI and driving while impaired (DWI). Further, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) uses the term *alcohol related* to mean a crash that occurs where at least one driver, pedestrian, or pedalcyclist has a BAC greater than or equal to .01 (g/dL). To avoid confusion, statistics in this entry include the terms and definitions of the statistic's source.

The NHTSA compiles alcohol-related traffic fatalities within a database, the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), formerly known as the Fatal Accident Reporting System. FARS is a valuable resource for understanding the prevalence of drunk driving within the United States. Each state reports to this system its fatal road crashes, along with important details about the drivers, other vehicle occupants, the vehicles, and the crash itself. Included within the driver data set are the results of any alcohol level testing. The NHTSA uses an imputing scheme to replace missing data from states' reports.

According to the NHTSA analysis, in 2005, 16,885 fatalities stemmed from alcohol-related crashes. Most of these crashes (85.3 percent) involved drivers whose BAC was .08 (g/dL) or greater. In fact, more than half of the crashes (57.6 percent) involved a driver with a BAC of .15 (g/dL) or greater. Relative to their risk of being in any fatal crash, males and those between ages 20 and 39 are at a disproportionate risk of being in an alcohol-related fatal crash. Motorcyclists are also disproportionately involved in alcohol-related crashes.

Physiology

Alcohol is usually absorbed quickly through the stomach and intestines and thus enters the bloodstream within 20 minutes of consumption. Food in the stomach acts to slow this absorption. The concentration of alcohol within the blood is usually measured in the proportion of grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood (g/dL). This fraction is often referred to as blood alcohol concentration (BAC). A number of formulas can estimate the resulting BAC from the consumption of varying amounts of alcohol. The actual attained BAC that results from consumption is a function of the drinker's physiology (including weight and sex), the quantity of alcohol consumed, and the time over which the consumption occurred. Time plays two roles: latency of absorption and time that it takes for removal of the alcohol by the liver.

In 2000, the U.S. Congress mandated that states adopt a legal limit of BAC 0.08 g/dL. Since then, all states have adopted this standard, many lowering it from their previous limit of BAC 0.10 g/dL. Also, mandatory "zero tolerance" laws now make it illegal

for drivers under age 21 to have virtually any BAC at all.

The amount of impairment alcohol causes is directly related to the BAC, though people differ with respect to the concentration needed to observe particular impairments. The effects of low BAC levels (below .04 g/dL) are difficult to observe without baseline performance assessments. Generally, these impairments involve attentive and cognitive functions. Such impairments, while mild, may account for some of the increased risk of crashes such BAC levels appear to produce, as driving is a behavior that requires the ability to divide one's attention among a number of important tasks.

At moderate BACs (.05 to .08 g/dL), cognitive impairments become more pronounced, affecting not only attention but judgment. Some drinkers experience gross motor impairment at this level too. Above a BAC of .08 g/dL, gross motor coordination problems are usually observable. Perceptual impairments may also be present as attentiveness impairments become severe. Judgment becomes impaired as cognitive effort becomes too great to consider multiple alternative choices within the decision process.

An innovative research protocol, known as the Grand Rapids Study, estimated the increased risk associated with various BAC levels. Breath alcohol tests were conducted on drivers who matched accident-involved drivers on environmental exposure to road conditions. Thus the researchers were able to control for a variety of external factors related to the crashes and estimate the role of alcohol. Their data showed that as measured BACs rose above .04 g/dL, a clear increase in accident involvement risk emerged and rose exponentially. Looking at accident causation, by BAC .10 g/dL the relative probability of causing an accident was estimated at more than 5 times greater than having a BAC 0.0 g/dL. By BAC .16 g/dL, the probability increases by a multiple of 35. The stark results of this seminal study have been credited for spurring the adoption of laws regarding BAC levels in the United States.

Recognition of the Problem

Concerns about drunk driving date back to the introduction of the automobile. Early 20th-century temperance movement literature mentions drunk driving as a justification for avoiding alcohol. One 1917 temperance publication lauded the American Automobile Association's contest board policy of prohibiting the use of alcohol among "drivers, mechanicians [sic] and officials of races." It laments, however, that alcohol was still sold to spectators, indicating that the American Automobile Association's policy reflected a driving-related safety concern and not a general affinity for the temperance cause. At the end of Prohibition, temperance movements again raised the issue of drunk driving concurrently with other social ills associated with alcohol. The Kansas United Dry Forces produced poster stamps with messages like "Death rides the highway" and "Alcohol belongs in the radiator" in 1939. An early anti–drunk driving poster commissioned by the WPA Federal Arts Project in 1937 depicted a skull, whiskey bottle, and gas pump with the caption reading "DON'T MIX 'EM."

Although early research pointed out the inherent hazards of drunk driving and government-funded anti–drunk driving programs had been around for decades, there was little advocacy for a collective approach to the problem. That changed with the founding of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) in 1980. Candy Lightner, whose daughter Cari was killed by a drunk driver, launched the organization after encountering mostly indifference from state officials about the issue. That indifference launched a quickly growing sense of outrage spurred by MADD, as it rapidly became a national organization. Lightner's effective use of television news events is credited for bringing the staggering statistics of the true impact of drunk driving into the social consciousness and changing the perception of the nature of drunk driving.

The Drunk Driver

Drunk driving cuts across all racial, ethnic, age, and socioeconomic categories. It is a crime that a substantial proportion of the U.S. population commits at least occasionally. However, certain risk patterns remain fairly consistent. According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), female drivers 21 and over are less likely than their male counterparts to report having driven under the influence within the past year (11.4 percent vs. 22.0 percent respectively; SAMHSA). The prevalence generally declines with age, though reporting of ages within most studies tends to group ages into broad categories, making it difficult to be certain that the decline is linear. Both the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) and the FARS data show declines

with age, though the NSDUH data on self-reported DUI (SAMHSA) appear to show a steeper slope than the FARS crash data (NHTSA). Native American drivers and non-Hispanic white drivers report the highest rates of driving under the influence (SAMHSA).

Though most incidents of drunk driving do not end in either a crash or an arrest, when they do, it is often a wake-up call for the driver to modify his or her behavior. However, a substantial proportion of DUI arrests are for drivers who have already been arrested at least once before. This recurrence of arrests indicates that drunk driving behavior has a persistence that some drivers find difficult to break. In fact, over half of one sample of interviewed DUI offenders admitted to driving under the influence again during the penalty phase of their DUI convictions.

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See also Alcoholism; Prohibition; Temperance Movement

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Dual-Income Families

Dramatic changes in the workforce participation of women and men and, to a lesser extent, in the division of labor in the home have occurred in recent decades. The traditional family of the male breadwinner and female homemaker, the norm among middle-class married couples in the 1950s and 1960s, evolved into families where both the husband and wife often work for pay—the dual-earner family or dual-income family. Dual-earner families include two-career couples and couples who do not see their jobs as careers. Careers differ from jobs in requiring a deeper commitment of time, energy, and education; the payoffs are higher salaries. Thus, despite the difficulties dual-earner families experience because of career demands, the added income can buy many services.

Working wives and mothers are not new. Since the 1850s working-class, minority, and immigrant women have found employment as factory laborers or domestic servants, or have taken in boarders or laundry or performed other home-based jobs. What is new are the numbers of middle-class women and mothers of preschool children who are employed outside the home. Among adults today, dual earners comprise over 60 percent of all families compared with 30 percent with one earner. In 1963, the reverse was true, with 60 percent of families having one earner.

Currently, over 70 percent of married mothers of preschoolers work for pay at least part-time, and one third of these mothers are full-time employees. Their paychecks lift some families out of poverty and permit others to enjoy a middle-class standard of living. Typically, the family income for dual-earner households is twice that of single earners at similar skill levels.

The experiences of dual-earner couples are both positive and problematic. When their jobs are challenging and provide status and autonomy, mothers and fathers feel involved and they experience positive self-esteem at work and at home. These women work not because they are unhappy at home but because they gain personal satisfaction from the job.

However, dual-income parents tend to work long hours and are forced to sacrifice time with their families to satisfy the demands of the workplace. U.S. dual-earner couples work an average of 81 hours per week, and 12 percent of couples work 100 or more hours per week. Forty-one percent of the couples report going to work early or working late, nearly 60 percent take work home, and 54 percent report that they feel pressured to keep up.

Employed parents complain that there are not enough hours in the day—they feel "harried" and "hurried." Such working parents remain connected via their cell phone, Blackberry, or laptop; many often go to work early, stay late, and carry work home. The long hours and spillover of work into the home drains parents emotionally and leaves them feeling stressed and resentful of their work intruding into family life.

Gender Differences

Although both men and women struggle to balance work and family and men currently do more housework than previous male cohorts, women still do almost twice as much housework as men. Among couples with children, especially young children, the women spend more time on child care. Typically the woman makes the greater adjustment, reducing her work hours or even leaving the workforce. As children grow older, many women increase their work hours, but usually their work hours will never again match those of their spouses.

Tradition also continues when couples are faced with making choices between his and her career. In one sample of professional couples, the career of the husband was most often given priority over the wife's career. Husbands are more likely than wives to travel for work and relocate their families for a new job; mothers are more concerned about disrupting family life than are fathers. Moreover, relocation moves can lead to underemployment for the wife, and having young children at home also decreases the probability that the mother will travel for work.

However, there is an upside to being in a dual-earner couple. Studies show that, in addition to enjoying enhanced self-esteem and a buffer from home stress, women who are employed full-time experience less anxiety and depression and report better physical health than full-time homemakers.

How do husbands respond to their wives' employment? Some men are relieved to share economic responsibilities and to have added income. Others feel emasculated and may lower their share of housework. Not surprisingly, divorce rates are higher for dual-earner than for single-earner couples. This higher divorce rate may reflect the difficulties in negotiating the division of labor, as well as reflecting the wife's ability to support herself and, therefore, to leave an unhappy marriage. Sharing household work is especially important for the emotional health and marital satisfaction of working wives, benefits that also accrue to husbands.

Who Cares for the Children?

Child care arrangements are another major consideration in the dual-earner family. Studies indicate that almost half of all children are cared for by the husband or wife when the couple works split shifts; a grandparent may take over if both are working at the same time.

Another 20 percent of children are cared for in a private residence, called family day care. Only 30 percent of children are in a formal day care center at the mother's place of work, operated by a nonprofit community organization, or run by a commercial chain.

Regardless of the type or quality of the child care center, all suffer from extremely high staff turnover, primarily due to low pay. By contrast, in most Western European countries, preschool is universal and publicly funded, and the teachers earn the same pay and prestige as kindergarten teachers. Year-round child care workers in the United States are paid about half of what public school teachers earn. U.S. parents fend for themselves, a situation that strongly favors wealthier families who can afford quality child care.

When the shortcomings of the U.S. day care system are explored, the media and some political leaders tend to blame working parents, especially working mothers. Critics tend to focus on the behavioral problems of some children rather than the research, which indicates that the great majority of youngsters (83 percent) show no significant behavioral problems. Children's language skills and other cognitive abilities also improved when the children were in day care for 20 hours or more per week. Child advocates contend that investing more money in universal, early childhood education would benefit children from low-income families and could narrow the education and income gaps that grow wider as the children age.

Managing Work–Family Conflict

Another solution to help dual earners balance competing demands, which today may also include the needs of aging parents, lies in supportive workplace policies. Many mothers prefer a schedule that reflects the local school day. The relatively few U.S. corporations that have instituted "family friendly" policies such as flexible time schedules, part-time work with benefits, compressed workweeks, and job sharing, have benefited from lower absenteeism, lower turnover, higher employee morale, and increases in psychological and physical health.

Studies show that the most egalitarian relationships in dual-earner families occur when both husbands and wives find work that requires a "moderate amount of time," allowing them to balance work and family demands. Working long hours is not

necessarily desirable, and at least one study found that 64 percent of mothers are actually interested in working part-time.

However, many employers and employees believe that only full-time workers are seriously committed to the company and their careers and are therefore resistant to such changes. Most experts agree that there is a dramatic need to change the culture of the workplace, which now requires employees to work unconditionally and place work demands above family concerns. What many sociologists have shown is that work–family conflicts are structural problems, stemming from existing institutional arrangements, not from individual shortcomings. If middle-class families with considerable resources experience problems in balancing their work and home lives, parents with more limited resources struggle even more.

Dual-earner families need a more equitable balance between the demands of work and family life. The major challenge for U.S. newlyweds today is to find that mutually compatible balance between breadwinning and home and child care tasks.

Peter J. Stein

See also Family; Family Leave Act; Labor Force Participation Rate

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E

Eating Disorders

Eating disorders include anorexia nervosa (self-starvation) and bulimia nervosa (binge-purge syndrome). Although anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa represent different types of disordered eating, both entail a distorted body image and fear of fatness.

Specifically, anorexia nervosa involves self-starvation alone or in combination with excessive exercising, occasional binge eating, vomiting, or laxative abuse. An individual with anorexia nervosa refuses to maintain minimum weight for age and height and is at least 15 percent below expected weight. Bulimia nervosa is a pattern of bingeing and self-induced purging. This eating disorder consists of binge eating, followed by vomiting, laxative abuse, enemas, or ipecac use. One's weight is usually normal or close to normal.

The reported occurrence of eating disorders increased markedly over the past 30 years. Eating disorders do not exist equally across populations; they have very specific patterns of distribution and are most prevalent in certain cultural contexts and sociodemographic categories.

Sociodemographic and Cultural Context

In general, eating disorders most commonly occur among young, white, affluent females in modern, industrialized countries. Concerning the gender distribution of eating disorders, 90 percent of individuals with eating disorders are female. Cultural norms of the body are critical to understanding why females are more vulnerable to eating disorders than are males. Specifically, the pervasive thinness norm for women is a major contributor to gender differentiation. The ideal body norm for males, in contrast, is to be muscular and not skinny or weak. Rather than desiring weight loss and thinness, males want to gain weight and size from muscle.

Females perceive themselves as overweight even when they are not. For example, over half of college females believe they are overweight when a much lower percentage actually is. In addition, nearly three out of four college females of normal weight report their wanting to be thinner. This striving for thinness develops early. For example, girls as young as 6 years old choose as ideal image silhouettes of girls who are thinner than they are and already falsely think of themselves as overweight.

The ideal body type of thinness is also crucial to understanding the international distribution of eating disorders. Within developing countries, many people do not get enough to eat; only the affluent can afford to be fat or corpulent. So, fatness becomes a symbol of wealth and an ideal body shape. Therefore, eating disorders, with their fear of fatness, are unlikely. Further, the eating disorder of bulimia nervosa is less likely, due to the expense of buying large quantities of food for bingeing. Also, it seems improbable in a developing country that one would have anorexia nervosa, or deliberate self-starvation, when forced starvation is evident.

In contrast, in modern, industrialized nations, fatness no longer symbolizes affluence because people generally obtain enough to eat. In fact, it is possible to eat too much. Thus, being slim becomes a symbol of

discretionary eating, and appearance ideals shift from plumpness to thinness. Affluent groups in particular have the resources to eat as much, as or little, as they want.

In the United States, whites compose most of the affluent classes, which helps to explain why eating disorders are more prevalent among whites. Also, larger-size body norms for women may be more prevalent among certain ethnicities, such as African Americans and Hispanics. Eating disorders are more common among individuals of color as they become more upwardly mobile, and among recent immigrants to the United States who experience acculturation.

Another major sociodemographic pattern in the occurrence of eating disorders concerns age. The teens and early 20s are the most reported ages of onset and prevalence. This time is one in which individuals form their identity and are quite vulnerable to peer group influences and appearance expectations. Problems with self-esteem also occur more often during this age period. Thus, manipulating one's weight and being extra compliant with thin body norms are more likely occurrences in young age groups.

The Social Construction of Eating Disorders

The great majority of writings on eating disorders focuses on the medical and psychological dimensions of the conditions. This attention facilitates the belief that eating disorders require medical intervention and control, thus viewing anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa as illnesses or diseases that need to be treated by the medical profession. Such a construction of eating disorders promotes the medicalization of these conditions. Medical professionals become the experts in treating the conditions, and individuals who have eating disorders become patients. Examining cultural and societal context becomes secondary to medical testing and treatment, and eating disorders become another societal condition that the medical profession can claim as its own. Notably, both eating disorders are included in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* with specific diagnostic features.

In the medicalization of eating disorders, attention is paid to the immediate, medical treatment of the problem and to medical and psychiatric etiology. Many hospitals now have special floors or wings for patients who have eating disorders and often remove these patients from family and friends while they receive psychiatric counseling and medical treatment. Once released and away from this controlled environment, patients often relapse and find themselves back in the hospital. Other popular medical treatments are drug therapies to deal with the diagnosis of depression that often accompanies eating disorders, as well as with the reported obsessive and compulsive nature of the diseases.

Cultural Messages

In contrast to being viewed as grounded in biological processes, eating disorders can be seen as a mirror of culture. Several aspects of the sociocultural context perpetuate attempts to conform to the slim standard and facilitate the occurrence of eating disorders. The factors contributing to eating disorders are heavily engrained in the normative structure of society. Prominent among societal influences are the multimillion-dollar diet industry, the mass media, and role models.

Many women believe it is a role obligation to be visually attractive. On a given day in the United States, more than half of all women report that they are dieting; however, the main reason for dieting is cosmetic concerns, not health or fitness. Dieting has become a cultural preoccupation among females of all ages. Even among 10- and 11-year-old girls, nearly four out of five diet. Not surprisingly, a proliferation of weight-reducing centers and spas, as well as diet drugs, guides, aids, and plans, have emerged. As a weight loss measure, cigarette smoking has increased among teenage girls. Eating disorders represent extreme concern about body shape and weight and are thus extensions of slim body ideals. In fact, a history of dieting is common among anorexics and bulimics.

Concerning the mass media, magazine models are uniformly slim, and dieting and weight-control books and magazines are ubiquitous. Even women's magazines not devoted to dieting offer a pervasive amount of food ads and articles on dieting and body shape. Such inclusion encourages weight control preoccupation, through the dual emphasis on eating and staying thin. Compared with men's magazines, women's magazines include a much larger number of food articles and ads, as well as ads and articles on dieting and body shape. Further, in television programs, most females are thinner than the average woman, and in contrast to males, few female characters are overweight.

Regarding the influence of role models, standards for women generally became less curvaceous in the latter part of the 20th century. Contestants in the

Miss America pageant as well as *Playboy* centerfolds have less of an hourglass shape, which reflects an overall decrease in their bust and hip measurements. In addition, many winners of Miss America are thinner than the average contestant. Further, two thirds of *Playboy* centerfolds weigh 15 percent or more below expected weight for height, one of the criteria for anorexia nervosa.

Rather than focus on eating disorders as a medical problem, a critical examination would direct attention to the social conditions and cultural context that promote the genesis and maintenance of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa. Eating disorders are most prevalent in societies that both visually objectify females and endorse pervasive, powerful industries and media that support a cult of thinness.

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See also Body Image; Cultural Values; Gender Identity and Socialization; Mass Media; Medical-Industrial Complex

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Economic Development

Encompassing the nexus between political, economic, cultural, and social trends, the study of economic development has been one of the most contentious in sociology. The intellectual course of this field resembles Karl Mannheim's institutionalization of ideas. Academics and public intellectuals from both industrial and less-developed societies have quarreled for more than half a century over topics related to nation building. The tumultuous intellectual debates that ensued resulted in one of the first instances of international public sociology.

Early Developments

The field of economic development exploded in earnest after World War II. A particular historical conjunction gave rise to the preoccupation with promoting some measure of prosperity among developing nations. The first obvious political event was the process of decolonization, which resulted in the birth and rebirth of new nations, such as Korea regaining independence in 1945 after 40 years of Japanese rule and the emergence of African nation-states in the 1950s and 1960s. The plight of newly independent developing societies and the disparities of the world economy became the focus of much public and academic debate. One result of the resonance of this intellectual trend was the remarkable growth of institutions dedicated to the study of the challenges associated with economic development. Two such emerging organizations, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Exploratory Committee on World Areas Research, and its successor, the Committee on Comparative Politics, would later, irrespective of each other, compete in their economic development theorizing.

In addition, several contextual international developments also facilitated the explosion of development thinking. After the outbreak of the cold war and the Chinese revolution, economic development policies were inserted into the overall peripheral containment strategy. Since then, the juxtaposition of political economic interests and humanitarian intentions has resonated in the minds of pundits and academics.

Meanwhile, the foundations of development studies were grounded in Western philosophy. Liberals argued that the wealth of nations depended, in large part, on their ability to capitalize on free trade policies. Mercantilists became ardent supporters of state-sponsored development. Malthusians correlated living standards with population size. Years earlier, Max Weber, in his *Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism,* had laid out the foundations for a cultural approach to national development, while Marxists argued that developing nations are often enmeshed in

financial and diplomatic networks that sustain their own dependency.

Competing Paradigms

Several competing paradigms offered their own prescripts of the causes as well as the policies to overcome the adverse effects of underdevelopment. The first was the modernization perspective. Modernization theory grew out of behaviorist standpoints and the structural-functionalist persuasion that dominated U.S. social sciences for much of the 1940s and early 1950s. Modernization scholars were devout anticommunists, and as such, they conformed to the view that liberalism was absolutely necessary to deflate any stipulations other than a Western approach to development. Modernity, they argued, was essentially the engine to transform backward traditions into Western-style progress. Modernization scholars envisioned this transformation incrementally and linearly. They espoused the conviction that Western development models, particularly the American model, were replicable anywhere in the world. For this reason, modernization scholars fervently supported development aid policies and embedded liberalist programs like the Alliance for Progress.

Some proponents encouraged the emergence of an entrepreneurial elite capable of transforming traditional values into concrete economic growth and development. For them, entrepreneurs were the innovators who restructure the production process. Others went to considerable efforts to foster basic tenets of achievement and modernity to jettison "backwardness."

Needless to say, the ethnocentrism embedded in this line of thinking quickly came under attack for sanitizing the complex and overwhelming reality that developing nations confronted. As a result, a structural version of modernization later gained some currency in the social sciences. Scholars affiliated with the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics promoted a framework that explored structural obstacles and other conditions affecting economic development without seriously questioning the effects of the world economy. In a widely cited and controversial study, Seymour M. Lipset found a positive correlation between levels of industrialization and democracy. Another provocative study examined how the effectiveness of states facilitates economic development. Another group of scholars scrutinized the modernizing capacity and latent functionality of development.

Modernization was quickly criticized for misunderstanding the distortions of the Western experiment in other parts of the world. Take, for example, Lipset's argument. Supposedly, industrialization promotes the expansion of the middle class, so pivotal for the functioning of democratic politics. Yet, others quickly pointed out that pressure to lower production costs and the desire of transnational capital to remain competitive depressed middle-class wages, resulting in a more sophisticated brand of authoritarianism. In one of the most pointed critiques of modernization, Guillermo O'Donnell, an Argentine sociologist, illustrates how the new authoritarianism unfolds when—to satisfy demands from multinationals—the military, civilian technocrats, and the entrepreneurial elite forge coalitions and transnational pacts with foreign capital that adversely impact the national interest.

Another equally mesmerizing perspective was dependency. As its name implies, the dependency perspective represented the antithesis of liberal modernization. Early on, many *dependentistas* rejected the assumptions of modernization and shared the premise that the predicaments of development must be examined within the broader context of regional and global relations that often inflict developing nations. These relations, essentially sustained by hierarchical structures of power, trap less-developed countries in the periphery of the world economy. Conversely, revolutionary change, not incremental evolution, serves as the most viable way out of underdevelopment conditions.

The dependency movement was a radical outgrowth of the basic "terms of trade" argument proposed by Raul Prebisch and his Economic Commission for Latin America associates. The condition of underdevelopment was largely determined, they argued, by the unequal exchange between exporters of raw materials and manufactured goods. The strategy of development they advocated was industrialization through import substitution. Politically, this policy resulted in the rise of mercantilist states, command economies, and populist social mobilizations. However, scholars within the dependency tradition went further to anticipate such conditions as associated-dependent development, development of underdevelopment, marginality, and internal colonialism.

The dependency movement soon fell under criticism from the right for its lax methodology and its historicism and from the radical left for not going far enough in exploring the inner workings of the international

division of labor. An outgrowth of this perspective, therefore, pushed for further understandings of the historical legacy of global capitalism.

Immanuel Wallerstein's world system, even though it did not quarrel with some of the basic premises of dependency, underlines how the economic development *problematique* lies within the organization, nature, and scope of the global economy, not with the nation-states. Conversely, this position argues that while the location of nations in relation to the world system may change over time from the periphery to the semiperiphery—or in a few cases, as with the United States, to the core—the capitalist raison d'être and its patterns of exploitation remain. A foregone conclusion, then, was that the only way to promote more equitable forms of development was by changing the capitalist structure, not the bilateral relations among individual units as the dependency movement earlier proposed. This ominous conclusion eventually cast doubts on the capacity of national development theories to promote viable solutions to the question of underdevelopment.

Recent Directions

More recently, the sociology of national development literature no longer attempts to understand micro and macro structures alone or to chart radical policies. With the advent of globalization, the Asian export–led development model, and the modernization under way in China, the possibility of relative national development growth is again in the minds of scholars and policymakers. Globalization has also gravitated to the study of more technical middle-range development issues, such as the volatility of fiscal reforms, production networks, and the magnitude of trade liberalization. Especially welcomed are the recent examinations of neoliberal policy formations. Finally, another popular line of research discerns the impact of transnational population movements and communities.

This new twist in national development theory also contradicts some of the most impious premises advocated by liberal and neo-Marxist scholars. One noteworthy example is the recent work of Peruvian social scientist Hernando de Soto, who dismisses the myths of prevailing lack of entrepreneurial values among marginal classes in developing societies by demonstrating how transaction costs adversely impact economic development. De Soto concludes instead that development bottlenecks lie within the thick bureaucratic layers devised by rent-seeking states to protect their interests and those of their benefactors.

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See also Global Economy; Globalization; World-Systems Analysis

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Economic Restructuring

Economic restructuring refers to any major reconfiguring of the primary way in which goods, services, capital, and jobs get produced, distributed, or consumed. Over the past 70 years, the U.S. economy changed from one dominated by manufacturing and farming to one dominated by industries that provide services rather than producing goods. As early as 1955 the percentage of employees in the service sector passed the 50 percent mark, and that trend has continued ever since. In 2004, service industries accounted for 70 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and for 75 percent of all employed persons. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that by 2014, that employment figure will increase to 78.5 percent.

What are the service industries? As tracked by the U.S. Census Bureau, they are retail and wholesale

trade; transportation and warehousing; information, finance, and insurance; real estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientific, and technical services; administration and support, waste management and remediation services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation; and other services.

The Current U.S. Occupational Structure

Not all service occupations are alike. The diversity in compensation and skills ranges widely and includes occupations such as nurses, child care workers, software engineers, postsecondary teachers, cashiers, and truck drivers. Certain service occupations require highly skilled, highly educated workers, but a majority of the occupations (measured as the number of people in those occupations) do not require a postsecondary degree, although many do require some technical training beyond a high school degree. The top 10 occupations listed in Table 1 employ nearly 20 percent of the total workforce.

As of May 2005, 130 million people were in the workforce. More than 70 percent were in occupations with an average hourly wage under $18.39 or $38,500 a year; 50 percent were in occupations with an average hourly wage below $15.77 or $32,500 annually; and 24 percent of all workers earned wages at or below the poverty level.

The trend by which low-skill jobs dominate the U.S. labor market will continue, with projections that two thirds of U.S. job growth will come from occupations requiring only on-the-job training. Those with the most projected growth are some of the lowest-paying occupations (see Table 2).

Historical Causes of Economic Restructuring

Why has manufacturing become less of an important economic engine for the United States? In the 1980s many countries, including the United States, changed the international financial rules, making it easier for corporations to move capital and goods from one nation to another. The legal opening of markets also increased competition for U.S.-based companies, as "open" markets are not necessarily equal. U.S. corporations—with the salaries and benefits of their employees and the legal limits on labor, safety, and environmental practices—were at a competitive disadvantage with companies in the developing world. As a result, many U.S. producers utilized

Table 1 Top 10 Largest Occupations in the United States

BLS Occupation	*Number Employed (in Millions)*	*Median Hourly Wage*
Retail sales	4.3	9.50
Cashiers	3.5	8.08
General office clerks	3.0	11.40
Registered nurses	2.4	27.54
Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand	2.4	10.20
Food preparation and service workers (including fast food)	11.0	7.90
Waiters and waitresses	2.3	7.14
Janitors and cleaners	2.1	9.58
Customer service representatives	2.1	13.62
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks	1.9	14.69
Total	35 million	

Source: Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics Report "Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2005."

Table 2 Top 10 Occupations Projected to Grow

BLS Occupation	*Number of Projected New Jobs by 2014*	*Training Required*	*Current Median Hourly Wage*
Retail salespersons	750,000	On the job	9.20
Registered nurses	700,000	Associates degree	26.28
Postsecondary teachers	510,000	Ph.D.	
Customer service representatives	450,000	On the job	13.22
Janitors and cleaners	425,000	On the job	9.32
Waiters and waitresses	400,000	On the job	6.83
Food preparation service workers	390,000	On the job	7.11
Home health aides	380,000	On the job	9.04
Nursing aides, orderlies, attendants	370,000	Vocational degree	10.31
General and operations managers	300,000	Bachelor's degree and work experience	45.90

Source: Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics *Occupational Outlook Handbook 2006–2007*.

cost-cutting practices called offshoring and outsourcing. *Outsourcing* means buying services from another company—often in another country. *Offshoring* is when companies opt to move their production facilities to foreign countries—often to what are called economic processing zones. Compared with their U.S. counterparts, workers in economic processing zones receive significantly less pay, have fewer health and safety protections, and have fewer rights to act collectively.

At the same time that manufacturing jobs declined, service industries expanded their workforce and also created new areas of work that included jobs for computer programmers, web designers, and Internet technology specialists. Thus manufacturing experienced a twofold shrinkage in terms of its contribution to GDP and percentage of workers it employs.

Service industries are also less susceptible to offshoring and outsourcing pressures. The services they provide, the customers they serve, and the goods they move usually exist at the local level. However, although less susceptible to pressures to outsource or offshore, services are not immune to the competitive pressures to cut labor costs by outsourcing. For example, U.S. tax servicing companies, like H&R Block, hire accountants in India to process U.S. income tax returns; customer service call centers can and do relocate anywhere in the world a company can find English speakers. As technology increases the ability to relocate services to secure cheaper sources of labor, corporations will probably outsource whatever they can.

Effects on Income Inequality

Since the 1970s income inequality in the United States has steadily increased and is now at an all-time high. The Census Bureau reported that 50.5 percent of all income in 2006 went to the top 20 percent of U.S. households; the bottom fifth had a share of just 3.4 percent of all income. Debate continues as to whether or not economic restructuring caused this inequality to grow. Most likely, economic restructuring, combined with the dominant, neoliberal economic assumptions in the 1980s, brought a rise in income inequality. Neoliberalism is the belief that creating open or free markets—which is the absence of, or limit to, regulations on commodity and capital markets—would raise everyone's living standard.

Like the United States, many Western European countries—including France, Germany, and Sweden—have economies where over 70 percent of the GDP comes from service industries. Unlike the United States, however, they do not have the attendant rise in inequality. Some scholars suggest that each government faced a trade-off among economic equality, full employment, and budgetary restraint. U.S. leaders, as opposed to their Western European counterparts, opted for full employment and some comparative budgetary constraints at the expense of economic equality.

Effects on Workers

Opening national borders to trade in goods from other countries made goods cheaper, and hence many economists argue Americans are better off overall, despite growing inequality. But there have been major tradeoffs, particularly for low-skilled U.S. workers, their families, and in particular, women-headed households. Historically, manufacturing jobs offered workers some protection through their unions that were able to negotiate job security, living wages, and benefit packages including health care and pensions. All these conditions are less likely in today's job market. Many of today's workers face more job insecurity as employers move to a flexible workforce backed by a philosophy of retaining employees only when they are really needed. By using temporary employees through outside agencies, fewer employers offer benefits. In 2006, for example, only 59.7 percent of workers had health insurance coverage through their employers.

These forces affect subgroups in the U.S. population in different ways depending on race, gender, and education level. The most recent census data show that men who did not graduate from high school earned 22 percent less in 2006 than in 1979, while those with a high school degree or with some college saw their wages remain stagnant. Families with a two-parent household have coped by sending an additional worker out into the workforce. In 2006, 63 percent of women with children under the age of 6 were working, compared with 39 percent in 1975. Female-headed households have fared the worst as women across all levels of education earn, on average, less than men. In 2005, 22.4 percent of working families headed by women were earning wages below the poverty line. This compares with 11.7 percent for households headed by single men and 8.3 percent for married-couple families.

A high correlation exists between race and class and inequality. Blacks and Latinos/as, historically shut out of the good paying jobs, have had a harder time in the shift to a service economy. They are overrepresented in the poorest paid and least secure occupations. Even when controlling for education, Latinos/as and blacks make approximately 82 percent of whites' weekly median earnings.

Lorna Mason

See also Deindustrialization; Deregulation; Feminization of Poverty; Global Economy; Inequality; Labor Market; Outsourcing; Postindustrialism; Segregation, Occupational; Service Economy; Split Labor Market; Trickle-Down Economics

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Ecosystem

The science of ecology is the study of organisms, their relationship with the physical environment, and the interactions among organisms. Ecosystem is a concept in ecology. An ecosystem consists of both nonliving and living components. The abiotic parts include the atmospheric gases, all forms of water, and sediment. The 28 chemical elements required by living organisms are contained in these three interconnected physical spheres. The biotic segments of an ecosystem are the living organisms in five biological kingdoms: Monera (bacteria and blue-green

cyanobacteria), Protista (algae and protozoa), Fungi (mushrooms, molds), Plantae (green plants), and Animalia (animals).

The living organisms in an ecosystem may be divided into two functional groups: producers, which are the photosynthetic plants and algae, and consumers, which are the heterotrophs. Heterotrophs are macro consumers and micro consumers. Macro consumers are herbivores and carnivores. Micro consumers are bacteria and fungi; together they are the decomposers of the ecosystem. The role of the decomposers is to break down dead organic matter into molecules and inorganic compounds. This mineralization results in chemical components that are reused by living organisms. Thus the required chemical nutrients are continually recycled through ecosystems.

Energy flow and nutrient cycling are the dynamic processes that maintain an ecosystem. Solar energy is the source of energy for ecosystems on Earth, and this energy enters the ecosystem through the process of photosynthesis of algae and plants. Pigments in the cells of algae and plants capture solar energy and change it to chemical energy during photosynthesis:

$$6CO_2 + 6H_2O \xrightarrow[\text{pigment}]{\text{sunlight}} C_6H_{12}O_6 + 6O_2$$

$$\text{carbon} + \text{water} \xrightarrow[\text{pigment}]{\text{sunlight}} \text{sugar (glucose)} + \text{oxygen gas}$$

Carbon dioxide gas from the atmosphere is taken in by the plant and algal cells and, in a complex set of biochemical reactions, combines with water to form carbohydrates and to release oxygen gas back to the atmosphere. This primary productivity provides the energy base of the food web in ecosystems. The greater the rate of primary productivity there is, the more energy there will be available to herbivores and carnivores. Light energy must be continually provided to ecosystems for them to survive, because the energy flow is one-way: It enters the ecosystem and is released via cellular respiration at each trophic level and is not recycled.

Aerobic cellular respiration is a metabolic process that occurs in the cells of all living organisms:

$$C_6H_{12}O_6 + 6O_2 \longrightarrow \text{energy released} + 6CO_2 + 6H_2O$$

$$\text{Glucose} + \text{oxygen gas} \longrightarrow \text{energy released} + \text{carbon dioxide} + \text{water}$$

In this process, oxygen is used to break down carbohydrates in the cells to produce energy that the organisms use for normal maintenance, reproduction, and growth. Carbon dioxide gas is released as a by-product of cellular respiration. All organisms undergo cellular respiration. It occurs in heterotrophs all the time and occurs in plants and algae mainly in the dark. The greatest amount of energy in an ecosystem resides in the first trophic level, consisting of plants and algae. The more productive the bottom level is, the more productive the entire ecosystem will be.

Ecosystems are ranked by ecologists in order of their primary productivity, which is the rate at which carbon, from carbon dioxide gas, is incorporated into the chemical structure of the cells of algae and plants. Examples of natural ecosystems are the temperate deciduous forest, coniferous forest, tropical rain forest, grassland prairie, arctic tundra, desert, wetland, lake, stream, estuary, and ocean. An ecosystem can be as small as a quart-size aquarium and as large as an ocean, as long as there exists a food web of interacting autotrophs, heterotrophs, and decomposers, and a light energy source. In natural ecosystems, populations of organisms interact in a complex food web in which energy flows through, nutrients recycle, and decomposers break down organic compounds. Thousands of species may live and interact in one ecosystem. The interactions among populations and the interactions between organisms and the physical environment are incredibly complex, and no system has ever been completely studied.

Ecosystems vary in complexity. For example, a tropical rain forest is very complex and has high biodiversity (many species of organisms). Ecologists have determined that tropical rain forests have more species of organisms than any other ecosystem. On the other end of the scale, the Arctic tundra has relatively low biodiversity. In between are deciduous forests and lakes.

Ecosystems also vary in the number of trophic, or feeding, levels. The least complex system might have only two trophic levels: producers and herbivores

that feed on them. Decomposers are always present, but they are not considered a separate level, because they are part of all trophic levels as these bacteria and fungi break down the dead organic matter. Available energy limits the number of trophic levels in an ecosystem. When primary productivity is high in the producer level and energy is transferred efficiently between trophic levels, the total number of trophic levels may reach seven or even eight in an ecosystem such as the ocean. However, three to five trophic levels are most common. The first level is always the producers (algae and plants), the second level consists of all the herbivores lumped together, and the third and higher levels are carnivores (see Figure 1).

Energy flow in ecosystems follows the two laws of thermodynamics. The first law states that energy can neither be created nor destroyed, only changed in form. The second law entails that when energy is transferred from one form to another, some is lost as heat, so the transfer is not 100 percent efficient. Ecosystems obey the laws of physics, and as energy is transferred from one lower level to the next higher level, energy is lost as heat of cellular respiration from the living organisms. Therefore, the upper level always has less available energy than the lower level. This is why light energy must continually enter at the producer level via photosynthesis of algae and plants. Energy is a one-way flow; it does not cycle and must always be replenished. As a rule of thumb, approximately 90 percent of the energy is lost through heat of cellular respiration at each trophic level. Thus only 10 percent of the energy in a lower level is available to the next higher trophic level. Energy quickly diminishes through the web and, as a result, limits the number of trophic levels in ecosystems.



Figure 1 Energy Pyramid Showing Four Trophic Levels and the Decrease in Available Energy From Lower to Higher Levels

All systems are connected either directly or indirectly. An example of close connection is a forest that contains a lake and streams to and from the lake. In this example, three ecosystems are directly interconnected. Some organisms and nutrients travel throughout the three systems and between them and the atmosphere above. Ecosystems have no natural boundaries. The biosphere of Earth is a continuum of ecosystems that are determined by the climate and soil type. For example, in eastern North America, the arctic tundra gradually becomes the boreal coniferous forest of Canada and New England to the south, which further south becomes the eastern deciduous forest of the Mid-Atlantic states. All natural ecosystems have been affected by humans, and the impact continues as human activities result in more pressure to modify them. With such influence on Earth, the human species needs to maintain and protect these ecosystems.

Social Obligations Solutions

Human activities threaten the Earth's natural ecosystems. Scientific evidence shows conclusively that increasing concentrations of gases such as carbon dioxide cause climate change that will increase the average temperature of the atmosphere and oceans. The varying consequences include undesirable weather patterns, desertification in some areas and increased precipitation in others, sea level rise with flooding of developed coastal areas and inhabited islands, destruction of wetlands, decreased agricultural production, and species extinction. Deforestation, particularly in the Amazon rain forest, will affect global climate. Deforestation everywhere on the planet affects soil erosion, stream destruction, flooding, and decreased groundwater recharge. Large-scale mining eliminates ecosystems outright and pollutes the remaining ones. Overfishing has decimated most of the ocean's fisheries, which may never recover. In many areas, urban sprawl and habitat destruction are the greatest threats to natural ecosystems, including filling or flooding valuable wetlands.

Humans are the ecosystem destroyers, and we must learn to become the caretakers instead. Most protectors of the environment today are people who played, camped, fished, or hunted in the outdoors and

thereby developed a love of the environment when they were young. However, there are too few, and they are getting older. Thus the key to the future protection and restoration of natural ecosystems is to have today's children spend much time outdoors playing, camping, hiking, fishing, and hunting. Such environmental education of young people will help develop and maintain a critical mass of voters and lawmakers to ensure environmental protections and the maintenance of our natural ecosystems.

Michael J. Sebetich

See also Acid Rain; Deforestation; Desertification; Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Pollution; Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Hazards; Extinction; Global Warming; Nonrenewable Resources; Water Organization; Water Quality; Water Resources

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Edge Cities

Coined by Joel Garreau in 1991, the term *edge cities* describes the suburbanization of office work, retail trade, and industrial production that followed residential relocation out of urban areas after World War II. More than 200 edge cities exist in the United States and several in Canada, typically located on highway corridors outside central cities. Some commercial clusters were intensifications of land use in formerly rural settlements; others were planned developments on agricultural land. Highway intersections centered some, but most were strip formations along arterial corridors without sharp boundaries or restriction to a single municipality.

Developers used edge cities to capture the increase in value that public highways brought to land on the urban fringe, while satellites and fiber optic networks kept these new entities linked to the national and global economy. Highways made these complexes accessible to suburban workers and consumers, but their automobile dependence added to regional sprawl and highway congestion. Shifting the locale of much office work, they depleted the job and tax base of core cities.

In their early phase, core cities allowed suburban residents to avoid commuting to central cities and permitted developers to erect signature buildings in campus-like environments without the limitation of existing street grids. But as each project stimulated subsequent development on the metropolitan frontier, the costs became apparent. Their low density made them more costly to service than older city locations, they displaced agriculture from prime soils near urban markets, and their dependence on cars led to clogged highways and air pollution. As commercial islands beyond efficient mass transit, they required aprons of grade-level parking that disconnected them from the street and pedestrian fabric of community life. This isolation, initially a cost advantage for speculators, entailed inefficiencies for suppliers and customers and even for employees seeking a restaurant lunch. As a locus of capital investment, they drained economic activity from city locations where schools, housing, and mass transit were already in place. The brownfield locations in older cities, created by concurrent deindustrialization, offered more rational locations for many edge city projects.

Edge cities were not safe from their own obsolescence. Office complexes continued to be built further out on arterial highways, even as firms outsourced staff functions to domestic and foreign suppliers. As business shifted from a national to an international focus, the most competitive business locations proved to be those that provided face-to-face interaction between management and financial and marketing support firms as well as a rich cultural environment. This dynamic stimulated a commercial and residential revival of globally oriented central cities.

In response, some edge cities altered their design. Orange County's John Wayne Airport area, with more than 25 million square feet of office space and a large retail mall, added a performing arts center and plans light rail mass transit to compete with Spectrum, a nearby high-tech industrial park. Upping the ante, Spectrum added office buildings, a cinema complex, and an Amtrak station. Addison, Texas, an office park

on the highway north of Dallas, added rapid transit, a conventional street grid, stacked parking, apartments, and retail stores to make it a 24-hour city. Under competitive pressure, edge cities are trying to resemble traditional urban areas in their mix of uses and texture of street life.

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See also Urban Decline; Urban Infrastructure; Urbanization; Urban Sprawl

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Education, Academic Performance

The past 2 decades witnessed a marked increase in public attention to academic performance. Historically, concern about quality of the U.S. educational system has fluctuated, but rarely has there been a period of such intense interest in measuring and comparing performance of students, teachers, and schools. Whereas in earlier eras the measurement of performance focused on summary indicators, such as graduation from high school, recent efforts utilize more refined measures. Examining the current state of academic performance—defined broadly as how well students in schools achieve the goals established by and for them—requires examination of changes in performance measurement and the changes in the consequences of performance.

Measurement Changes

Two broad reforms in U.S. education over the past decade drive the current focus on academic performance: the development and implementation of standards-based education and the implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 (NCLB). Both reforms sharpened policy focus on measuring educational performance.

Standards

Stemming from anxiety about the conditions of U.S. schools following the publication of *A Nation at Risk* in 1983, the standards-based movement emerged. The report warned that the educational foundations of the nation were being "eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity" and that a primary factor contributing to this condition was the lack of rigorous standards in U.S. schools.

Developing and implementing a set of educational standards was held to be the key to addressing the mediocrity identified in *A Nation at Risk.* The core idea of educational standards is that there are sets of basic knowledge and skills that students of a particular grade level should master, such mastery to be evaluated using a series of tests. Reform rests on the notion that educational improvement will occur when rigorous academic (content) standards are set, student performance against these standards is assessed, and then students and teachers are held accountable for meeting these standards. The 1990s thus witnessed a substantial investment of energy by educational policymakers in the development and implementation of content and performance standards. Nearly all states have implemented academic standards and all but two states now have academic standards in the core subjects of mathematics, language arts, science, and social studies.

No Child Left Behind

Following the initiatives of standards-based reforms, particularly the framework of establishment of performance standards, NCLB brought about a number of significant changes in the U.S. education system, particularly in substantially expanding the role of the federal government.

The first of NCLB's four key program elements is stronger accountability for results. The act established a system of requirements for states to fulfill, including the creation of standards for what children in Grades 3 through 8 should know in the subjects of mathematics and reading, as well as a set of assessments to measure how many children have met the state standards. This translated to a substantial expansion of the testing required in school, with students (excluding some exceptions) tested each year in Grades 3 through 8 and at least once during Grades 10 through 12.

The passage of NCLB also served to increase interest in the performance of educational institutions.

Schools must submit annual state-, district-, and school-level "report cards" of how many children achieved acceptable scores on the assessment. Under federal law, local districts must make available achievement data for each school through these report cards. As discussed in the next section, the data carry consequences, with rewards and penalties based on performance. Under NCLB, schools are also required to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward improvement in student performance. Although the formulae used to calculate and assess AYP are too complex and opaque to explore here, the central idea of the requirement is that districts must make annual gains in reducing the percentage of students who do not achieve at a proficient level.

The NCLB law is designed so that the primary consumers of data from the report cards are teachers, administrators, and parents; however, data on educational performance have found a much broader audience, with aggregated measures of test scores, graduation rates, and similar data now available in newspaper articles, and even as part of real estate ads.

Consequences of Performance

The increase in policy focus on performance has been accompanied by changes in the use of academic performance measures, with policies basing rewards and sanctions on test performance at the level of individual student, classroom, school, and district. At the student level, the past decade witnessed the widespread adoption of policies whereby grade retention is tied to performance on standardized assessment. Students in the majority of states are now subject to educational statutes that tie promotion to performance on a standardized assessment—and those who are unable to attain a minimum score on such an assessment are required to repeat the school grade. Similarly, a number of states and districts are working to create systems to tie teachers' pay and other career goods to measures of school or classroom performance. These efforts, however, face significant difficulty in their creation and implementation, as teacher rewards historically rest exclusively on tenure and level of education.

Moreover, under NCLB individual districts are now held accountable for the performance of the schools, as measured by standardized assessments in a method analogous to school-level accountability. The law specifies that 95 percent of the students in the district must be tested, as well as 95 percent of subgroups. With the performance system as constructed, there are specific sanctions for schools and districts that do not meet AYP goals. Schools that do not make AYP goals by this measure are subject to an increasing set of sanctions, such as replacement of school staff, implementation of a new curriculum, and complete "restructuring" of the school, a step involving dissolution of the school.

Unintended Consequences

Although the intent of the policy changes is to increase the measurement and consequences of academic performance to influence instructional practice and effort, these efforts to tie rewards and sanctions also have yielded a number of unintended consequences. Newspaper accounts report a number of episodes of students, teachers, and even administrators cheating on high-stakes exams. Similarly, other reports have revealed students being classified as special needs (a category with special testing provisions under NCLB) to avoid their inclusion in the school's performance measures.

Another unintended consequence of the high-stakes testing regime is that teachers and schools may focus resources disproportionately on those students at the margin of passing the test. For example, one study of students in a Texas public school told of teachers focusing the bulk of their effort on students identified as "bubble kids," those who were just below passing but could conceivably pass with additional help. All of these triage and cheating actions are understandable in light of the heightened stakes of performance, as tangible rewards and penalties are tied to test results.

Persistence of Performance Differences

Proponents argue that both standards-based reforms and NCLB can serve as the basis for improving both excellence and equity in education. The NCLB Web site explicitly makes this point: The law is "designed to help close the achievement gap between disadvantaged and minority students and their peers." Yet, despite the attention to the measures of student performance and revisions in the measurement and consequences of performance, significant gaps in performance persist—and they persist in the face of a federal program designed to address the historical gaps in educational performance. One innovative

aspect of NCLB is that it requires performance results to be disaggregated by gender, race/ethnicity, English language proficiency, migrant status, disability status, and socioeconomic status. However, gaps in assessed performance persist. Moreover, there is evidence that poor and nonwhite students are increasingly classified as special education or having educational needs that exclude them from the pool of students tested, a strategy designed to meet performance targets without addressing students' educational needs.

Future of Academic Performance

While academic performance will almost certainly remain a topic of importance in the future, it is not clear whether or how the current system of performance measurement, rewards, and sanctions will persist. NCLB is up for reauthorization in 2008 and, at present, its prospects for renewal are uncertain. A growing chorus of critics of testing programs have repeatedly made the argument that these programs limit student learning to only those topics tested and that what is tested is a narrow slice of what students should know, ignoring skills such as problem solving and critical thinking. Whether and to what extent these criticisms bring about changes in the measurement and consequences of educational performance remains an open question.

Christopher Weiss

See also Academic Standards; Charter Schools; Education, Inner-City Schools; Education, Policy and Politics; Education, School Privatization; Education, Special Needs Children; Educational Equity; Magnet Schools; No Child Left Behind Act; School Dropouts; School Funding; School Segregation; School Vouchers

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Education, Inner-City Schools

Because the vast majority of U.S. students reside in urban areas, their education and indeed the preservation of the values of democracy are intrinsic to the success or failure of U.S. inner-city schools. Such schools are historically overpopulated and underfunded, leading to problems relating to the quality of education and learning activities offered in comparison with suburban schools. Of concern are large classes affecting discipline, motivation, teaching effectiveness, and morale, as well as having sufficient school supplies and attractive learning facilities. Maintaining a safe environment and recruiting and retaining good teachers are other primary concerns.

Like their suburban counterparts, inner-city schools address the usual pressures of preparing students for productive lives upon graduation. In many instances, contemporary inner-city student bodies are multiracial, multiethnic, and socially and ethnically diverse. Complicating "normal" teaching and administrative challenges—for example, the practical enactment of classroom authority—is the need to nurture positive academic and racial/ethnic identity and the ongoing negotiations between teachers and students. These teacher–student relations are socially constructed and linked to social problems in the wider society.

Public schools located in densely populated urban areas contend with challenges that are indistinguishable from the broader social environments in which the schools and their students exist. Crime and gang activity, particularly activities related to the selling and using of illegal drugs, coupled with low societal expectations of inner-city students, make up an almost insurmountable barrier to school—and student—success. Recent empirical and ethnographic studies of drug-related social problems, linked to the rising incidence of violent crime, point to potentially dire consequences for poor students of color in inner-city neighborhoods situated in urban centers. However temporary they may be, the complex social and economic benefits of participation in the local drug and gang cultures in inner cities can be an irresistible lure to young people with few family or financial resources. Although a thriving drug and gang culture

creates myriad problems, including poverty, drug addiction, homelessness, and the like, such a culture also can offer a sense of belonging and even a sense of social structure to the community.

Findings from recent research on low-income African American and Latino/a students identify key factors that influence racial/ethnic identity formation in inner-city schools. Such findings link racial/ethnic identity formation with student achievement and, ultimately, school success and describe student responses as falling into one of three general categories: (1) cultural mainstreamers, (2) cultural straddlers, and (3) noncompliant believers.

Cultural mainstreamers express themselves culturally in race-neutral terms and, as might be expected, tend to achieve at higher levels in comparison with the other two groups. The cultural mainstreamers appear to acknowledge an essential racist environment while simultaneously accepting the structural limitations of assimilation. The implication is that cultural assimilation—accommodation to the norms, values, and cultural behaviors of middle-class white society—place such students at odds with their racial/ethnic peers.

Those in the second group, the *cultural straddlers*, inhabit two worlds. They honor the school's cultural code while at the same time constructing an alternative meaning for their everyday academic experience as students. Furthermore, the enrolled children of immigrants often have limited English proficiency, and the language barrier often constrains their parents' interaction with the school and reinforcement of these children's learning.

The *noncompliant believers*, predictably the group least likely to experience school success, paradoxically strongly believe in education, especially its potential for upward mobility. As might be expected, students who resist the premium placed by schools on academic work tend to do poorly academically. However, contemporary qualitative studies have uncovered a more nuanced appreciation for the processes whereby cultural complexities are implicated in a racial/ethnic dynamic that implicitly rejects the academic values of white society. In particular, noncompliant students tend to acutely struggle with the norms of the school—its dress code, the policing of student behavior, or an irrelevant school curriculum.

Issues of student and cultural diversity complicate the consolidation of professional authority in the classroom. This leads, potentially, to the academic underachievement of straddlers and noncompliant students, or worse, ultimately pushing many young black and Latino males into criminal activity and probable eventual incarceration. The broad social challenge is to achieve educational and social equity in an increasingly multiracial and multicultural society. Given the educational and political challenges of narrowing the achievement gap, the central goal of the No Child Left Behind Act, both a conceptually more sophisticated understanding of teachers' authority and the application of this legitimate authority in relation to student identity are crucial.

Luis Mirón

See also Education, Academic Performance; Educational Equity; Ethnicity; No Child Left Behind Act; Race; School Dropouts; School Funding; School Segregation; School Violence; School Vouchers; Social Constructionist Theory

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Education, Policy and Politics

The professional standing of educators in U.S. society is particularly conflicted, and this situation weakens their voice in shaping educational policy at the national, state, and even local levels. As a result, decisions made often reflect political considerations rather that professional, academic insights.

Public school teachers, who are the most visible and largest segment of the profession, offer a prime

example of how the defining characteristics of professional status are insufficiently established and, as a consequence, how the status of educator as a professional is absent or compromised. Historians and social commentators since de Tocqueville have noted a number of reasons why teaching has not fully attained the standing of fields such as medicine, law, nursing, pharmacy, and others. These include the sheer number of persons in public school instruction, the local genesis and control of the schools, the popular conceit that no specialized knowledge is necessary for the teaching role, and the convention of allowing untrained persons to teach under "emergency" conditions. Also blurred are the lines between certified teachers practicing in their specialization and those who are either uncertified or teaching out of their field. Many thus casually use the term *teacher* to refer to anyone who offers instruction of any kind, as opposed to protected titles such as physician, attorney, and nurse. Teachers have strength in numbers, but they suffer from an unclear societal identity, which gives them a tenuous grip on professional status.

To a large extent, these conditions spill over onto professors of education, particularly onto those in teacher education. The education professoriate is numerous, like teachers, which lends some influence. Their *knowledge base*—to employ the field's own term—undergoes much internal debate, however, and receives outside challenges over its very existence. Even the question of the need for the field of teacher education is continually at issue. One need not be a scholar in the field to verify the phenomena that challenge the field. For example, no universal, mandatory accreditation for teacher preparation exists. Competing accrediting bodies take radically different approaches to their mission. Furthermore, numerous states accept alternative pathways to certification. Such alternatives may require, for example, no more than acquisition of a bachelor's degree and passing a standardized test of general knowledge. Part-time instructors without terminal degrees or scholarly credentials often conduct teacher education in transported "storefront" programs. A new movement matriculates elementary teachers at community colleges, reverting to a pre–World War II standard of preparation. These challenges to teacher education are unique: No other major field faces such threats of de-professionalization and de-skilling.

Phenomena such as these have a profound influence on education policy and politics and contribute to a destructive cycle affecting the profession. Assigned low status and struggling with an uncertain identity, educators are often bypassed by elected officials in the formation of policy that affects their practice. Such action prevents educators from overcoming challenges of identity and autonomy, allowing further incursions to take place. Perceived as low status and quasi-professional, educators seem to need only minimal preparation, so the cycle replicates itself at the levels of teacher education and policy development.

Some recent events in reading provide an important example. On the federal level, the National Institutes of Health, specifically under the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, assembled a research strand in reading. By determining that literacy was a "health concern," this study of research in reading thus distanced itself from the teachers and professors of reading and literacy. The researchers, named the National Reading Panel, drawing on paradigms identified with educational psychology but distant from the practice of teaching reading, presented a lengthy, prescriptive report on reading instruction. Complementing the report was a summary and an executive summary, each of which deviated from the content of the report and neither of which the panel vetted. The report quickly affected policy and funding in reading across the United States. Even as the scholarly community of reading specialists called the report (and especially the summaries) into question, the U.S. Department of Education moved quickly to encourage applications for discretionary funding based on the recommendations of the summaries, thereby narrowly restricting educational policy and practice at the state and district levels. The net result was a redirection of federal money to prescriptive, textbook-oriented programs published by corporations active in the world of Washington lobbyists. Sloganeering, with such phrases as "Reading Wars" and "Phonics vs. Whole Language," reduced the discussion of improving literacy to a publicity battle rather than a public discussion of the substance and subtlety of what was at issue.

What was wrong with this process? It co-opted scholarly processes in the selection process of the panel as well as its means of deliberating. Later, the process compromised the report's validity when popularized, and slanted versions of the report were put forward to influence policy formation. Politics and public relations were disguised as scholarship for the purpose of "feeding the voter base" of phonics advocates and steering government funding to campaign

donors. The experience, expertise, and perspectives of teachers were excluded except for the marginalized voice of dissent, in this case, from one panel member who had been a teacher of reading. The voices and views of reading scholars express grave concerns in the literature, but these remain primarily within the academic research community and have little influence on policy implementation.

In another example, on a statewide level, legislators ordered the California Commission for Teacher Certification to create a set of objectives in reading for preservice teachers as well as a standardized test that would serve as a gatekeeper for entry to the profession. The commission, to its credit, salvaged the process by introducing a list of expectations and an assessment, the Reading Instruction Competency Assessment, which surpasses conventional standardized tests in determining competence in professional practice. Professors of education in reading methods courses, however, were confronted overnight with a prescribed curriculum for much of their preservice coursework in reading. This is another example of a process that provides a stunning message to universities about the degree of control of the curriculum that the legislature is able to assume when so motivated. Rarely does much resistance or response emerge from faculties of education or higher education at large in such cases, yet the vulnerability of faculties of education to imposition from the political world should attract the attention of all faculty.

Characterizing education policy and politics in the United States is the marginalization of professional educators from the process of consultation and decision making. Even though teachers' unions are among the top donors to the Democratic Party, the voices of teachers and teacher educators and their organizations are notably absent from both the writing of policy and the debates that lead to legislation. Today, in a period marked by the heightened infusion of public relations techniques into politics, policy such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB) is distinguished not only by its neglect of professional education expertise but also by its undermining of the public education establishment.

Education policy has departed so far from informed, collaborative decision making among educators and politicians that it has become the vehicle for creating wedge issues in political life and a means for manipulating the public treasury for the benefit of publishing houses and other campaign donors with no professional responsibility to students and society. The statistically questionable thresholds of annual yearly progress have made NCLB a fool's game for public education in which there are countless ways to be deemed a "failed school" and the paths to success are few and improbable. This high-stakes scenario extended the federal tradition of unfunded mandates by setting high standards without providing the additional funding known to be necessary for meaningful reforms to take place. NCLB also has not addressed what are recognized as the chronic and "savage inequalities" of the U.S. school funding system that distributes per student support in a highly inequitable fashion that is particularly disadvantageous to urban, minority schoolchildren.

Without an acknowledged and significant place in policy formation for professional educators and an honest, in-depth presentation and discussion of issues before legislators and the public, education policy and politics will continue to be subject to exploitation for purposes other than the welfare of children and youth. As the inadequacies of the current political era continue to draw criticism and public discussion nationally and internationally, educators may have an opportunity to take their rightful place as informed and experienced professionals in the arena of policy formation and political process. Progress of this type cannot occur, however, unless teachers and professors of education and their organizations are persistent and assertive in their pursuit of professional respect and autonomy.

Paul Shaker

See also Education, Academic Performance; Education, Inner-City Schools; Education, School Privatization; Education, Silencing; Educational Equity; No Child Left Behind Act; School Dropouts; School Funding; School Vouchers

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Education, School Privatization

A controversial and often politically tinged idea, school privatization in the United States describes a range of proposals to transfer K–12 education from the public to the private sector. These proposals stem mostly from conservative critiques of public education that in turn sparked reforms such as school vouchers, charter schools, and school choice. Such measures attempt to bring public schools into the sway of market forces—supply and demand—in a bid to reward good educational practices and penalize bad ones.

Implicitly, such measures usually reflect the belief that the public sector is less efficient and less effective than private institutions, whether the latter are nonprofit or for profit. They may also draw on the libertarian notion that education and social programs are not a proper concern of government, which should be limited to only the most basic necessities of public order and defense. Privatization plans also appeal to advocates of religious education as a means to fund and legitimize their cause, and such plans offer an opportunity to circumvent certain teachings in public schools that they oppose on religious grounds, like human evolution and sex education.

Chartered and Privately Managed Schools

Charter schools represent the most widespread effort at privatization in the United States. As of 2007, an estimated 4,000 elementary and secondary charter schools were in operation. Charters first appeared in the 1990s as a solution to various problems perceived in the public schools. Some are effectively private, whereas others are more directly supervised by a local school district. A related practice is privately managed public schools, where a so-called education management organization (EMO), often a for-profit company like Edison Schools, Inc., runs one or more schools in a district. In either case, these schools may depart from certain rules and practices of ordinary public schools to carry out innovations as their organizers see fit. For example, charters usually have different rules for admission, different staffing and management policies, and not infrequently, they are run entirely by EMOs. Often they adopt a mix of several "alternative" practices, either in pedagogy or management, although some adopt few or no such measures at all. In theory, though, all are held accountable for student progress and risk losing their charter if students fail to meet state-mandated levels of achievement.

In fact, the sheer breadth of different organizations, structures, curricula, and pedagogies of these schools poses a major hurdle for evaluating their effectiveness. Although they all have special legal status with respect to public schools, they are far from having a single, coherent policy or educational strategy to assess. To treat them all as one method of schooling is to ignore the vast differences among them.

Research Evaluations

Social scientists have not, for the most part, painted a flattering portrait of either the motives or the outcomes of privatization efforts. Public schools, however imperfect, have long been perceived as a leveling mechanism to reduce inequality in society; some social philosophers argue that education is a basic right and a requirement of democracy, no matter how inefficient public schooling may be. In the ideal case, public schools allow people of limited means to develop skills and talents which, in turn, allow them to compete effectively for placement in higher education and desirable jobs. Public schools' success at attaining this ideal, though, has been roundly criticized; according to many observers, they have not leveled the playing field enough. Hence one rationale for privatization: If public schools have not lived up to their promise, so the theory goes, more rigorous and dynamic private schools could fill the gap. However, this is not the conclusion of most scholars when considering the question from the standpoint of equal opportunity for socially and economically disadvantaged groups. To the contrary, privatization appears to them a retreat from the goal of universal education. Drawing on theories of class and inequality, they argue that privatization only widens

the opportunity gap. Moreover, some scholars dispute the free-market logic on which most privatization plans are based. They cite imperfect information about which school is "best" and wealthier parents' ability to intervene more effectively to have their students placed in the preferred schools, thereby reproducing inequality along class lines. Meanwhile, on the supply side, scholars question whether a truly competitive industry could ever emerge to set off a "race to the top" in terms of quality, as opposed to a "race to the bottom" aimed at consolidating profits and market share.

Depending on the locale, privatized schools can "drain" the public schools of better prepared students, who, for example, may seek out a charter school for higher academic quality. This appeared to happen in Arizona, where white, non-Hispanic students disproportionately chose charter schools over regular public schools, and these same students were more likely to have higher test scores. But privatized schools might also have higher concentrations of students who are struggling, as in cases where a charter school has replaced a local public school that was considered below par. In either scenario, the population of the privatized school is unlike that of surrounding schools, the result of a selection bias that can affect both privatized and public schools. Studies also show that the rise of charter schools may have a negative effect on student–teacher ratios at nearby conventional schools. Thus the problem becomes one of finding an adequate comparison to measure any private school advantages over conventional schools.

One solution is to compare student achievement within categories of ethnicity, sex, language background, and past academic performance—for example, comparing high-achieving black students at a charter school with high-achieving blacks at a conventional public school. Other approaches include comparing learning growth rates to national averages and following individual students through school to measure their particular gains. In the case of vouchers, random assignment—the optimal solution—has led to more compelling data in cities like New York. In short, any meaningful comparison must take both policy differences and potential selection bias into account. Unfortunately, some published evaluations have failed to do so, leading at times to prematurely negative or positive assessments of the benefits they might offer.

Overall, research in this area has been contradictory despite the level of funding and attention directed toward charter schools, vouchers, and similar efforts. Most careful studies on these issues find that privatization has, at best, a small advantage, usually as measured in performance on standardized tests. Still, a few well-researched econometric studies attribute higher student gains to privatization measures, although not always across all groups of students. Most often, comparisons turn up essentially no difference between privatized ventures and conventional public schools, and in a few cases, the private efforts appear worse. Strikingly similar results appear in studies of voucher programs (e.g., Wisconsin), charter schools (Arizona), and privately managed schools (multiple sites managed by Edison Schools, Inc.). Further dampening the prospects of privatization reforms is evidence that private efforts, and specifically charter schools, can actually harm public schools by taking away resources and increasing ethnic segregation. In short, the upside for privatization appears to be small, and it may be outweighed by the potential downside.

Scott Heil

See also Charter Schools; Income Disparity; Inequality; School Funding; School Segregation; School Vouchers

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EDUCATION, SILENCING

Silencing in education (as verb) refers to the state of being forgotten; to put to rest; to be quiet, as with selected voices of students, public school teachers, and professors. *Silence* (as noun) suggests concealment or secrecy; the absence of sound or noise; omission of mention or expressed concern.

In its theoretical variations, silence has been categorized as either cultural or ontological. Within the cultural—for example, socioeconomic, feminist, and postcolonial theory—silence is used to expose hegemonic workings, linguistic dispossession, and sites of repression. In contrast, Western ontological theory imbues silence with a transcendental signifying capacity, disassociated from language's contingency, or, following post-structuralism, grants it a constitutive role at the heart of language. Silence, like meaningfulness, has both an absence and a presence. It requires one to rethink, to welcome in, to host difference, for it is neither literal silence, as in the absence of speaking, nor epistemological silence, as when faced with the unspeakable, but ontological silence, the silence of Being or Life itself. This entry addresses the theoretical variations and the implications of silence in education.

In cultural terms, silence is a form of resistance. For example, some researchers describe a continuum of women's perspectives on knowledge, where silence is a position of unconsciousness. Silence as such reflects a position in which women experience themselves as mindless and voiceless and subject to the whims of external power. Silence is thus contingent upon the individual's relationship to a community of speakers, institutional structures, and the individual's relationship to power and language. Silences also express power struggles because certain voices or accounts count while others are discounted. For instance, preservice teachers express their practice in what they name and what remains unnamed. Since enactment of the *No Child Left Behind* legislation, there have been widespread efforts to silence those whose views challenge current political polities and initiatives, to restrict forms of research by funding and supporting only those aligned with current policy, and to curtail what public school teachers can say and do in the classroom.

Michel Foucault's description of silence captures some of the implicit power dynamics of discourse. Power lies not only with the things one declines to say or is forbidden to name, but also with the authorized type of discourse or form of discretion required by those who can and cannot speak of such things. He emphasizes there is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.

Foucault considers silence essential to speech. Silence is meaning without language and can be a substance with meaning, just as language can be without meaning. Silence is not mere background to speech; it is a state of being shaped and colored by meanings. When institutionally sanctioned, discourse becomes powerful because it positions the subject in relation to what and how something is said and in relation to a community that favors and makes available particular practices. When the powerless use silence to avoid conflict, it is not a deficit of language but a counter-language of critique.

Janet Miller explains that the silence of both her students and herself belies the claim that educators have overcome historical, social, cultural, economic, racial, gender, and class constraints that deny them the power to decide about curriculum and what counts as knowledge. Professors, preservice teachers, and those in public schools continue to be constricted by hierarchical structures of schooling and the legacy of a behaviorist-oriented curriculum field that requires the separation of classroom experiences from everyday lives. Such unnatural silence may envelop educators and researchers in a comforting sense of supposed completeness or a muffling of questions.

Curriculum, critical, queer, and feminist theorists are moving not only into areas that may break that unnatural silence but also into the silencing aspects of communication features in studies across the social sciences, especially in clinical, psychotherapeutic, and experimental psychology. In organization studies, scholars frequently note that organizations with a deeply embedded patriarchal discourse are generally intolerant of dissent, so employees are often reluctant to speak about problems. The silence sustained within such discourse, argues Adrienne Rich, severs women from their history and constitutes one of the ways in which women's work and thinking are made to seem sporadic, errant, and orphaned of any tradition of their own. This belief is true not only of women but also of various groups, including racial and ethnic minorities. The result is not just to render them voiceless but to blame them for not having a voice, thereby weakening their relationship to a community and their relationship to power and language. This silence in organizations

can make people unable to articulate certain types of experience, such as the aesthetic, or the emotional, when silence seems governed by norms or rules that dissuade people from speaking out. This structure has led to a focus on organizational conspiracies, cultures, and climates of silence. Silence is a feature of all organizations, including schools and universities, which may be theorized as an effect of both power and management.

Alexandra Fidyk

See also Conflict Perspective; Culture Wars; Education, Policy and Politics; Feminist Theory; Hegemony; Hidden Curriculum; No Child Left Behind Act; Queer Theory; Standpoint Theory

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Education, Special Needs Children

Throughout history, there has been an enormous disparity in attitudes toward and treatment of individuals with disabilities in the workplace and the community. The advent of universal public education during the 19th century added another area in which this disparity would play out.

Similar to many other universal rights, publicly supported education was denied to many individuals with disabilities in the United States up through the first half of the 20th century. In the 1950s, organizations of parents and professionals coalesced to press for the right of children with disabilities to receive a public education, and political leaders gradually began to acknowledge that right through legislation and court decisions. Educators responded by establishing special education programs and the bureaucracy by which students in need of special education could be identified and provided with services. The first significant federal legislation was Public Law No. 94-142, The Education of All Children. Passed in 1975, this law established three bedrock principles of special education. These principles have since expanded through several critical court decisions and the reenactments of the law. The current version is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, commonly known as IDEA 2004.

The first principle is that all children, regardless of ability, are entitled to a free, appropriate public education. Districts must provide programming with a suitable curriculum and instruction for each individual child with special needs. A continuum of services now exists, ranging from assistance within the regular education classroom to placement in a hospital or institution.

The second principle is a criterion for placement known as the least restrictive environment. This means that, of the range of settings where appropriate services can be provided for an individual child, the first choice must be the setting that is as close as possible to the setting the child would be educated in if the child had no disability.

The third principle is that children's right to be educated with their peers must not be infringed upon without their consent, or more typically, that of their parents. Federal law clearly defines the procedural safeguards in the provisions for obtaining informed parental consent before any decision is made regarding evaluation, classification, or placement.

Embedded in these principles is the intent to provide services that are nondiscriminatory in nature and designed to enable individuals to lead productive and independent lives as adults. However, progress in the education of students with special needs has not resolved many of the issues that confront individuals with disabilities. In addition, the classification and

placement procedures of children have produced uncertainty and conflict among parents and educators. At best, the process can be categorized as a work in progress.

Changes in terminology reflect efforts to avoid unfairly categorizing children receiving special education services. Replacing the term *handicapped* is the term *disabled*, making a finer distinction between the two terms. A disability refers to a condition where an individual is unable to perform certain life skills because of a loss of function in one of the bodily systems. Handicap is situation specific; children with an attention deficit disorder may have a handicap where they are required to sit and listen for long periods of time, whereas on the playground no handicap is evident. In addition, leaders in the field of special education maintain that the language used in speaking about children in special education is important. Naming children by their diagnosis, as in "a learning disabled child" or "the autistic," suggests that the disability is the major aspect of the child's life. Advocates instead promote the use of nomenclature that emphasizes the person rather than the disability, as in "individuals with disabilities" or "a child with autism."

A more intense debate focuses on the practice of labeling children by their diagnosis in the process of identifying those in need of special education services. Supporters of this practice maintain that the use of a diagnosis to categorize a child helps to suggest means of remediation and programming. Opponents criticize the stigmatizing nature of the process of labeling; labels gradually slip into public use and often acquire a pejorative connotation. In addition, within disability categories, wide variations exist in ability, motivation, and attitude that are masked by a label. Labels also influence expectations. These can limit consideration of all the strengths and weaknesses of a child in formulating individualized goals and services.

Another issue related to labeling is the disproportionately higher classification of students from minority groups. African Americans constitute 16.6 percent of the school-age population but a larger proportion (20.5 percent) of the students classified for special education, a fact that engenders widespread concern and criticism. African American students are 2.99 times more likely to be classified as having mental retardation and 2.21 times more likely to be classified as having an emotional disturbance than all other racial groups combined. Some experts link this disproportion in classification to income; 25 percent of students with disabilities live in poverty compared with 20 percent of the general population. Social welfare programs, preschool programs such as Head Start, and increased preparation in helping teachers teach children from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds attempt to reverse the trend.

Debate over the setting for delivery of special education services reflects concerns over both the discriminatory nature of isolating children from their peers and the effectiveness of instruction in a special education setting. *Inclusion* is the term to denote the trend to keep a classified child in the general education classroom with the delivery of appropriate services. The debate largely focuses on the second aspect of this issue: the effectiveness of instruction in inclusive settings. Advocates of inclusion point to the stimulation of interaction of peers who model learning and behavior and the benefits for children without disabilities to learn to interact with a wider range of abilities. Opponents argue that the goals and pace of the curriculum in the general education classroom are too far removed from what children with moderate to severe disabilities need to learn and that their presence in the classroom is disruptive to the learning of their nondisabled peers. Research has not provided definitive answers because it is not entirely acceptable to place children in control groups, and challenges remain to providing remedial services within the general education classroom. However, as a result of this push, the number of classified students spending 79 percent or more of their day in the regular class increased from 33 percent to 46 percent between 1990 and 2000.

Concern over the effectiveness of special education has been an issue since initial efficacy studies in the 1950s. Part of this concern is related to budget issues. On average, it costs approximately $6,000 in additional funds to educate a child with a disability. It is evident too, that despite extensive interventions, most students in special education continue to lag behind their nondisabled peers on measures of achievement. For example, on the National Assessment of Educational Progress administered in 2002, 36 percent of classified eighth graders scored at the proficiency level, compared with 79 percent of their nondisabled peers.

This concern with efficacy manifests itself in two ways. The first is an increase in the degree of accountability in special education. Children with disabilities

are required to work toward the same curriculum standards as their nondisabled peers. As a corollary, progress toward those standards must be measured and documented. P.L No. 107-110, the No Child Left Behind Act (2001), mandates assessment of children with disabilities and establishes requirements for corrective action if targets are not reached. Opponents of No Child Left Behind have criticized the assumption that, with effective instruction, nearly all students with disabilities can meet grade-level curriculum standards.

Special educators and laypeople are also troubled by signs that transition to a productive adulthood for individuals with disabilities is often an unrealized dream. Nationally, only 48 percent of classified students leave high school with a diploma. They also endure rates of unemployment at significantly higher rates than the general population, ranging from 55 to 79 percent of those students with moderate to severe disabilities. Studies tend to show that classified students are often unprepared for the world of work. As a result, new legislation requires an increased emphasis on transition planning from age 14 on up. Components of the planning include consideration of a student's abilities and preferences, the provision of school experiences that would help students achieve occupational goals, and collaboration between school, family, and public agencies to identify postsecondary resources for education, employment, and recreational activities.

Peter Griswold

See also Education, Academic Performance; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; No Child Left Behind Act

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Educational Equity

Educational equity refers to equal access, opportunities, and expectations in education for all persons, irrespective of their backgrounds or status. As a democratic nation, the United States offers a system of "universal" and free public education as a primary mechanism for providing equal educational access and opportunities to all persons, for preparing its people for civic participation in society, and for the socialization of immigrants.

The basic premise of public schooling in the United States is that students at all grade levels are entitled to equal learning opportunities irrespective of advantages, disadvantages, or liabilities linked to skin color, ethnicity, disability, or socioeconomic status. An open system of public education serves as a key compensatory strategy to minimize individual differences and to equalize potential achievements and life outcomes for all. To achieve this end, attendance in public schools became compulsory in most states by the start of the 20th century.

Rooted in the principle of human equality in a democracy, educational equity identifies with the basic liberties and constitutional rights of all citizens, allowing them to participate on an equal footing in a competitive, capitalist economy, with the freedom to move, as desired, in a stratified social system in pursuit of their goals in life. Colloquially referred to as the American Dream, this principle finds expression in the Declaration of Independence as every person's entitlement to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Specifically, the words *equality* and *equity* have different meanings. Equity speaks to public actions and policies in the cause of fairness and social justice. It requires a sufficient distribution of social resources to rectify initially unequal conditions for different groups of people.

Equal access to educational opportunity has been a central issue of legal, educational, and social debates since the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1954. Affirmative action policies like busing, a strategy for balancing racial distributions in public schools, are examples of public actions aimed at improvement of educational equity through desegregation.

Fiscal equity and educational adequacy lawsuits represent other examples of legislative action in the

pursuit of educational equity. These cases challenge inequitable allocation of dollars by U.S. states for public schools located in rich versus poor localities or in inner-city versus suburban areas. Because school financing is largely dependent on local property taxes, plaintiffs successfully argued that children in school districts with low assessable property values receive a lower-quality education than that available to children in wealthier districts. Observers document that larger classes, fewer certified or qualified teachers, run-down physical plants, low teacher pay, and limited or out-of-date teaching materials are found more often in schools located in poorer areas.

The 1980s standards movement in the United States focused educators, policymakers, and the courts on equality of educational outcomes and on "achievement gaps" among different socioeconomic, ethnic, gender, and disability groups, as measured on standardized achievement and ability tests. The bipartisan No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 followed 2 decades of standards-based reforms in U.S. education. NCLB was passed on the premise that higher standards alone had not resulted in higher levels of achievement, and achievement gaps still persisted in various ethnic and socioeconomic subgroups. Comprehensive visions of educational equity in the United States now advocate broadening resource allocations to achieve student outcomes beyond raising test scores. Recent proposals aim to equalize access of families to an array of health, educational, and supplemental services, both in and out of school, to improve students' cognitive and noncognitive outcomes more comprehensively.

Globally, the notion of educational equity found voice in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of the United Nations, signed by all member nations in 2002. The MDG calls for universal primary education and equal educational access for girls and boys in developing nations worldwide.

As a social problem, the analysis of educational equity can be approached from multiple perspectives. Issues for investigation may be situated in ethical, legal, political, sociological, economic, or institutional policy frameworks. The appraisal standards for educational equity vary in different contexts, such as in public schools, higher education, and professional or private institutions, both in the United States and overseas.

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See also Academic Standards; *Brown v. Board of Education*; No Child Left Behind Act; School Funding; School Vouchers

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Elderly Socioeconomic Status

Most observers agree that the elderly suffered a loss in status during the periods of modernization and industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries. According to modernization theory, older members of society failed to maintain their economic standing in the nations that were developing economically during this time, as new skills and technology replaced more primitive forms of production. These nations mainly include those on the European continent and the United States, which were transforming their economies during that time from agriculture to industrial manufacturing. These changes led to an emphasis on factory labor, which required long hours, fixed working schedules, manual dexterity, and often great physical endurance. Elders were not well equipped to compete for these jobs or to remain in good health under that stress. Modernization theorists believe that these trends led to widespread poverty among the elderly during this time, thereby giving rise to age-based prejudice as younger people sought to replace older people in the labor market.

Another suggestion is that in the United States, elders lost their traditionally venerated status prior to industrialization, when the young sought to reverse social standing based on age in the interests

of equality and free enterprise. Historians have identified several trends indicating that old age was becoming a less-desirable condition (such as the enactment of mandatory retirement ages for judges and the rising popularity of clothing styles that accentuated youth); many of these trends predate the U.S. industrial era. Critics of this perspective charge, however, that because it is not known exactly when these trends began, modernization as the cause cannot be dismissed.

The financial situation only worsened for elders in the decades following industrialization. In the absence of centralized public pension systems, most of the older people worked as long as their health allowed. When they became out of work and poor, they relied on family and local welfare services. In the midst of the Great Depression, Congress passed the Social Security Act of 1934, which offered some hope for the future well-being of the aged in the form of public pensions granted to workers who retired at the age of 65. Although some European nations had already initiated such programs, U.S. leaders had been reluctant to enact social welfare programs because of their perceived potential to undermine the capitalist incentive to work for a living. In a political compromise, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt supported a plan that rewarded only those elderly retirees who had contributed to the system through compulsory salary deductions for a period of at least 10 years.

Eligibility for U.S. public pension benefits expanded in the 1940s and 1950s to cover not only the old but also the disabled and the children and living spouses of deceased workers. Private pensions also grew immensely during this time. Public health insurance became available to the elderly and the disabled in the 1960s with the passing of Medicare and Medicaid; Supplemental Security Income offered welfare checks to elders and people with disabilities who did not have an adequate work history for regular Social Security benefits but were poor. Cost of living increases to Social Security pensions improved in the 1970s, and the regulations concerning mandatory retirement for the collection of benefits were relaxed by the end of the 20th century. By this time, the Medicaid program had also begun paying for about half of the costs incurred by the rising nursing home population.

These increases in government spending on senior benefits and services drastically reduced the proportion of elders living in poverty. Historical data from the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that the percentage of people over 65 below the poverty line was approximately 35 percent in the 1960s. By 2000, that proportion dropped to about 10 percent. Still, many elders continue to suffer from financial constraints that persist because of the rising costs of housing, health services, and pharmaceuticals. Women tend to experience these problems more than men do, because their higher life expectancy makes them more likely to become widowed and to live on their own in old age.

Population Aging

During the 20th century, it became clear that lower death rates and lower birth rates would soon mean that most nations of the world would experience exponential growth in the age of their populations. Many demographers and economists believe that aging populations will be prone to economic crises as they experience a shortage in the availability of working-age people and an abundance of older people who are dependent upon their labor. In response, many nations have begun to formulate plans to restructure their old age pension, insurance, and health benefit plans or to seek greater efficiency in these programs through privatization.

Critical aging theorists believe that the recent interest in privatizing or restructuring these senior health benefits actually represents a political movement to curb further increases in spending on programs that benefit the elderly. By implying that economic crisis is an inevitable result of population aging, the proponents of these spending cuts are believed to be seeking a political foothold to foster more conservative spending reforms. Although they face fierce opposition from their politically active elder constituents and advocacy groups for the aged, their efforts have so far led to the introduction of incremental reforms, such as the increase in the retirement age for full Social Security benefits. The prospect for more severe cuts in social welfare programs for the aged may depend upon both the nature of the public's image of the elderly and the ongoing extent of age-based prejudice.

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See also Discrimination; Life Course; Minority Group; Population, Graying of; Prejudice; Stereotyping; Stratification, Age

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Eminent Domain

Eminent domain refers to the government taking private property without the owner's permission for specified, legitimate purposes and just compensation. This entry explores various conceptualizations of eminent domain and its background and then discusses controversies surrounding its key components.

Related concepts to eminent domain exist in other countries with common law systems. In the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Republic of Ireland, a similar procedure is called compulsory purchase, and in Australia it is called resumption. In Canada and Louisiana, a concept similar to eminent domain is expropriation.

In the United States, eminent domain receives legal support from the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reads, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Eminent domain is often considered an inherent governmental power, even without legislation saying so. Governments, however, must use due process to appropriate the property, often taking private property through a condemnation proceeding. Government can take property only for public uses, and it must compensate the property owner. The courts usually defer to the legislative branch in deciding what a public use is.

In the United States, it is without controversy that governments possess an inherent power to exercise eminent domain but that due process must be followed beforehand. Experts conceptualize four kinds of property takings: complete, partial, temporary, and easements. A complete taking is a total and permanent taking of property, whereas a partial taking is a permanent taking of a portion of the owner's property, such as land on one edge of the property. A temporary taking means the owner is compensated for temporary loss of the property, but the property eventually returns to the owner. An easement gives another entity access to the property, but the owner can continue to use the property if it does not interfere with the other entity's use. An example of an easement is that a utility company can install power lines over a property; the property owner can continue to use the property under the power lines as long as he or she does not interfere with the utility's service.

Contemporary controversies surrounding eminent domain revolve around what are legitimate public uses and what is fair compensation. The notion of a legitimate public use has changed dramatically over time, from a notion of universal availability, to a definite, direct public benefit, and more recently, to a potential, indirect public benefit. State governments have exercised eminent domain since the nation's founding, but one of the first U.S. Supreme Court cases, *Kohl et al. v. United States*, 91 U.S. 367, was concerned with what is a legitimate public use. Decided in 1876, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal government could appropriate private property in Cincinnati, Ohio, to develop a building that would house a federal post office, courthouse, pension office, customhouse, and other federal government facilities. In this instance, the Court was concerned with the potential access of all Americans to these public properties.

Eventually, the focus of legitimate public use was less on universal access and more on the interest of the public. It became no longer necessary that everyone have access to the property but rather that everyone would benefit from the property. This change was sometimes characterized as arising from government's police power, that government can legitimately secure the safety, health, and welfare of its citizens by maintaining public order. In *Berman v. Parker,* 348 U.S. 26, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency could use its powers of eminent domain to

take blighted property in Washington, D.C. The specific area subject to eminent domain proceedings was characterized as one in which "64.3 percent of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4 percent needed major repairs, only 17.3 percent were satisfactory," and the Supreme Court noted that most had outdoor toilets, over 60 percent did not have baths, and over 80 percent did not have laundry facilities or central heating. In ruling that eminent domain proceedings were appropriate, the Supreme Court noted in this 1954 case, "Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. . . . They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden."

Attempts to construe public use to an indefinite, indirect public one have recently dominated the legal and policy arenas. Notably, in the 2005 case *Susette Kelo, et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al.*, 545 U.S. 469, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a city could appropriate private property for a public purpose, even if that private property is turned over to private developers whose ultimate aims may or may not result in fulfilling a public purpose.

Rather than condemning the property to build a public facility as in the *Kohl* case, or condemning a building because of public health concerns as in the *Berman* case, the New London city government wanted to appropriate the private property and then sell it to real estate companies, who would then develop the property. Two public purposes were to result from this transaction: economic development and increases in tax revenue. The U.S. Supreme Court previously did hold that economic development is a public purpose for which condemnation proceedings are legitimate. An important difference in the *Kelo* case is that government was conveying the private property to a private developer, whose objectives only indirectly put the property to a public use. The public purpose that would be served would be economic development and an increase in tax revenue. Logically, the *Kelo* case stands for the proposition that government can legitimately force a family to convey their home to a private entity that promises but cannot guarantee economic development and consequent tax revenue.

Another reason the *Kelo* case is controversial is that the city government of New London used condemnation proceedings against homes that were not dilapidated but were in a working-class neighborhood that, by all accounts, was not blighted. Some members of the New London neighborhood had assented to purchase of their property by the City of New London, but other neighborhood residents had not. The city government condemned the holdouts' properties, despite the lack of evidence that the neighborhood or homes were falling apart.

Not surprisingly, hostile responses to the *Kelo* case were swift and strong. The Property Rights Protection Act, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2005, has since languished in the Senate. If it ever becomes law, it would prevent local governments from receiving economic development funds to use for eminent domain proceedings for private development. Across the United States, several state legislatures passed legislation to prevent governments from using the strategy of designating a home or neighborhood as "blighted" to condemn private property when the primary purpose is economic development.

The other important debate arises from just compensation. Typically a government must pay fair market value to the owner of the private property; eminent domain proceedings force market prices onto the property owner. Given that the owner of the private property is not willing to sell the property, often he or she will value the property higher than what he or she can receive on the market. Thus the property owner will believe an eminent domain proceeding does not provide full compensation. Taxpayers, the group that funds the local government's purchase, will overpay for the property if they pay more than the market value. As a result, typically neither the private property owner nor the taxpayers receive fair treatment through eminent domain proceedings.

Eminent domain fundamentally raises questions about boundaries separating public and private actors. A key ingredient of a capitalist-oriented economy is private property. In the United States, the original intent of eminent domain was for situations when property would have the greater purpose of serving an entire community, and the U.S. Supreme Court was reluctant to permit government officials to take private property unless the use would benefit everyone. In contrast, today local governments can take private property from a private owner and convey the property to another private owner because the government anticipates the end result will be greater tax revenue, arguably a greater good. Ironically, in these situations the advantage gained by the new owner seems to have fallen out of the equation.

Brian Gran

See also Equal Protection; Gentrification; Urban Renewal

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English as a Second Language

English as a second language (ESL) is a multifaceted term associated with several aspects in the area of English language teaching and learning. Broadly speaking, it refers to the use or study of English by speakers of other languages who are permanently or temporarily residing in English-dominant countries, such as Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and the United States. In a narrow sense, it refers to the field of study in applied linguistics that brings together aspects from theoretical linguistics, language acquisition, and teacher education; it is a discipline with its own theories, methodologies, and approaches for teaching and learning.

ESL is one of the possible ways to refer to the learning and teaching of English to native speakers of other languages. Due to the range of meanings subsumed under ESL, many other terms and acronyms have been coined over time, including *English as a second or other language (ESOL), teaching of English to speakers of other languages (TESOL), teaching of English as a second language (TESL),* and *English language teaching (ELT).* In the past few years, however, the tendency has been toward an acknowledgment of the increasing presence of multilingual speakers for whom English becomes their third, fourth, or fifth language. As a result, *English as an additional language (EAL)* has been replacing *ESL* as an umbrella term in the latest professional literature.

ESL learners can be found at all levels. From prekindergarten to graduate studies, programs aim at meeting the needs of their particular population of language learners. ESL programs typically fall into three main categories: ESL in elementary and secondary schools, ESL in higher and professional education, and adult ESL. Regardless of the type of model, successful ESL programs always take into account the elements that influence the process of English language teaching and learning. Crucial factors to consider are that learners have different needs, learning abilities, levels of education, and literacy, and they vary depending on age, socioeconomic background, and sociolinguistic variables.

Elementary and Secondary Schools

In K–12 public schools, educators identify students whose native or home language is not English as English language learners (ELLs) or limited English proficient (LEP) students. These students include both foreign-born and U.S.-born students reared speaking a language other than English. ELLs can receive either traditional ESL instruction, which has English as the subject matter, or content-based ESL instruction, which focuses on teaching English through grade-level content. Neither of these program models should be confused with bilingual education programs, which involve the use of the students' first language to provide academic instruction.

Traditional ESL programs treat the learning of English as an isolated topic, that is, devoid of content area subject. In high school, ELLs have separate ESL class periods. In elementary school, however, ESL programs generally include *pull-out* classes. Students leave their regular classroom daily to receive 40 to 50 minutes of English language instruction in self-contained classrooms with limited or no first language support, while their classmates continue with their regular schedule. Although pull-out programs are the most implemented type of ESL instruction, research shows that they are the least effective. This approach provides students with English language instruction, but students miss some of their regular class time to receive such instruction. To avoid this loss of instructional time, some school districts have implemented inclusionary or *push-in* programs. These programs bring the ESL teacher into the regular classroom to provide English language instruction as the classroom teacher covers the grade-level content. Evaluation of

this new approach is limited, but initial observations indicate it may be even less effective than pull-out programs. Coordinating the activities of two teachers with two distinct foci teaching together in the same classroom seems to be a highly complex enterprise.

In content-based ESL programs, ELLs receive content area instruction based on the students' level of English language proficiency. English language development (ELD) programs are geared to ELLs with low levels of English language proficiency. ELD programs use content as a means to acquire English, focusing on developing language skills. ELLs with intermediate levels of English language proficiency have a wider range of options. These include programs such as structured English immersion (SEI), specially designed academic instruction in English (SDAIE), the cognitive academic language learning approach (CALLA), and sheltered instruction observation protocol (SIOP). These programs allow the development of language skills as students learn content area knowledge in a more understandable way. In high school, ELLs are in classes taught by teachers with dual certifications—subject area and ESL. In primary school, content-based instruction is self-contained and leads to mainstreaming, that is, a gradual shift of students to all-English classes, as they become fully proficient in English.

Higher and Professional Education

Most higher education institutions have ESL programs for their international, resident, and U.S.-born ELLs. These programs concentrate on general language skills needed for general academic work across disciplines as well as learning and study skills. Courses range from academic reading and writing to oral presentation skills. The majority of the undergraduate students are U.S.-born and long-term U.S.-resident ELLs who, despite graduating from U.S. high schools, are still in the process of learning English. These students are known as *generation 1.5* students because their cultural world and everyday experiences place them in the world of both the first and second generation of immigrants. Depending on the institution, these undergraduates take ESL classes as a prerequisite to the general English requirement or as an optional course in lieu of general English courses.

Graduate students, on the other hand, are mostly international students who need to develop further their written or oral communication skills in English to meet the language demands of their academic discipline. These students have an array of ESL classes specifically designed for the language requirements of their disciplinary community. These courses, which range from oral communication skills for teaching assistants to dissertation writing, are housed in English for academic purposes (EAP) programs—one of the divisions of English for specific purposes (ESP). The primary focus of ESP programs is ESL courses tailored to the specific learning and language use needs of students, most of whom are educated adult learners. In addition to EAP, ESP programs include English for occupational purposes (EOP) programs, which concentrate on the teaching and learning of either English for workers in nonprofessional contexts (vocational English) or English for professionals, such as English for business and economics, English for science and technology, English for medical purposes, and English for legal purposes.

Adult Education

Adult immigrants and refugees interested in learning ESL find themselves taking courses in adult education programs. Located in community centers, schools, and churches, these programs respond quickly to the changing needs of fluctuating immigrant populations and diverse adult learners. Most of these students are working adults who need to acquire basic skills in English. Others are preparing for citizenship or trying to complete a general education diploma. Classes are typically multilevel, meet in the evening or on weekends, and have open enrollment to allow students to register and drop the class at any point in the term. Although ESL is crucial in facilitating the adjustment to the new environment and integration to U.S. society, great challenges still remain to be overcome in terms of program design, teacher preparation, instructional strategies, and learner assessment.

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See also Bilingual Education

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English-Only Movement

The goal of the English-only movement is to make English the official language of the United States and to restrict the use of non-English languages in schools and for government services, such as interpreters and voting materials. The movement is based on the belief that encroachment on English by minority languages has reached such a level that English is in danger of losing its primacy as the nation's dominant language. A widespread campaign to make English the official language and to restrict the use of minority languages began in 1983, with the founding of US English by John Tanton and the late U.S. Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R-CA).

Two years prior, Senator Hayakawa had proposed an English Language Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Hayakawa gave three primary reasons for why English needed to be an official rather than a de facto national language: (1) English is a common language that can unify people, and separate languages can fracture and fragment a society. (2) All immigrants who come to live in the United States should learn English. (3) Immigrants can fully participate in democracy only if they learn English.

Although Hayakawa's amendment proposal failed, the assertions he made about the unifying power of a common language resonated with many Americans who saw the provision of bilingual schooling for immigrant children and bilingual voting ballots for naturalized citizens as contradictory to the requirements for citizenship: ability to read, write, and speak English. Hayakawa's message also resonated with English speakers who were concerned with the burgeoning language and ethnic diversity in the United States. Dr. John Tanton, a Michigan ophthalmologist, founder and head of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), teamed up with Senator Hayakawa to form US English, mainly as a way to expand his efforts to restrict immigration, particularly among Latinos/as, whom he believed were not only unwilling to learn English but also reproducing with such speed and numbers that they threatened the ability of white people to maintain their dominance.

In his work with FAIR, Tanton financed negative propaganda about immigrants, especially Mexican immigrants, whom he described as having low educability and little interest in civic affairs. He also advocated policies of eugenic sterilization for immigrant groups. Tanton and his connection to FAIR became a liability for US English, and he was forced to step down after the executive director of US English, Linda Chavez, when learning of his anti-Hispanic and anti-Catholic views, resigned in protest. At that time, US English claimbed to have approximately 400,000 dues-paying members, but its membership climbed to 1.8 million by 2007. The organization added the US English Foundation to disseminate information on English teaching methods, develop English instructional materials, and promote opportunities for people living in the United States to learn English. Today, US English lists Senator Hayakawa as the sole founder of US English, omitting any mention of Tanton or connections to FAIR. Parenthetically, Tanton later founded a competing English-only organization, initially called English Language Advocates, and now known as ProEnglish. US English is careful not to use language that could be construed as racist toward any particular minority group. However, the organization continues to use quotes from conservative and neoconservative supporters that capture the group's belief that English is a unifying language and that U.S. nationhood depends on having a common language.

Arguments for English as the Official Language

Motivating the campaign to make English the official language of the United States are two types of fear: (1) Some suggest that English is under siege and in jeopardy of losing its place of dominance, and (2) others suggest that bilingualism, biliteracy, bilingual communities, and any educational approach promoting the acquisition and use of languages other than English promote ethnic hostility and divisiveness. To overcome these fears, proponents of English-only argue that English must become the official, common language of the nation so that Americans of diverse backgrounds can communicate with one another and, in this manner, assimilate into U.S. society (an appeal to those who fear that the English language will be replaced by Spanish). A second argument is that, because new immigrants, as opposed to early 20th-century immigrants, refuse to learn English, there must be a concerted effort to eliminate government-sponsored bilingual education, which encourages immigrants not to learn English (an appeal to white Europeans whose immigrant ancestors supposedly assimilated quickly). Third, all immigrants should be taught English only through intense immersion in the language, where they are forced to use it for communication (an appeal to conservatives who fear the spread of bilingualism and bilingual communities). Fourth, ethnic politicians promote bilingualism and biliteracy for selfish ends: to provide jobs for constituents and to keep immigrants dependent by encouraging them to keep their native language and not learn (an appeal to those who fear the growing populations of Latinos/as across the United States). Finally, proponents insist that language diversity always leads to group conflicts and competition over goods and services, to ethnic hostility, and to political separatism (an appeal to both sets of fears).

US English presents these arguments with no reference to evidence or research, which is understandable since studies consistently disprove their claims. It is clear, for example, that the overwhelming majority of immigrants, both new and old, shift to English-only within three generations, and many lose their native language abilities by the second generation. Research shows that the idea that "new" immigrants, especially Latinos/as, refuse to learn English is simply not the case. What is true, however, is that many of those who are supportive of English-only proposals are also anti-immigration, and particularly, anti-Mexican. Accordingly, the main objectives of US English and the English-only movement are to adopt a constitutional law establishing English as the official language of the United States; repeal laws mandating multilingual ballots and voting materials; restrict federal funding of bilingual education, and wherever possible, encourage English-only immersion education; and strengthen the enforcement of English language oral and written requirements for naturalization.

Support for the English-Only Movement

Across the nation, 60 to 90 percent of Americans answer "Yes" to the simple question, "Should English be the official language?" Latinos/as are the only group of Americans to consistently answer "No." However, when Americans are asked whether the government should restrict the use of languages other than English or terminate bilingual services for people who need them, support declines significantly for all demographic categories—age, ethnicity, sex, income, education level, and political affiliation. This is an important pattern because it shows that while non-Latino/a Americans tend to favor some kind of official language policy, when it comes to enforcing English-only policies through restrictions on minority language use, few seem willing to support an enforcement measure. Accordingly, the English-only movement has yet to garner enough votes in Congress to support a constitutional law, mainly because most Americans do not support enforcement efforts, which are in conflict with First Amendment rights concerning freedom of speech.

As of 2007, 30 states had passed a law declaring English the official language. However, voters in only three states had passed anti–bilingual education laws to restrict the use of non-English languages for academic instruction and to enforce a strict English-only mandate for public schools.

Because the English-only movement is tied to the national concern over immigration, especially what to do about the burgeoning numbers of undocumented workers and families from Mexico and Central America, and because US English portrays these same groups of immigrants as reticent English learners who choose not to assimilate, it is likely that more states will make English official. It remains to be seen, however, whether Americans nationwide will favor restrictions on non-English language use. The United

States is not, and has never been, a country with one language. While English is undeniably the dominant language of the United States, it is not in any danger of being overtaken by other languages. Moreover, many Americans are critical of past restrictions on the use of Native American languages and other non-English languages in school and in the workplace and may be reluctant to place limitations now on the use of languages other than English for legal, political, and educational purposes.

Christian Faltis

See also Acculturation; Americanization; Assimilation; Bilingual Education; English as a Second Language

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Entrapment

Entrapment in law occurs when an enforcement officer or other government agent suggests, encourages, or aids in the production of a crime that otherwise would not have been committed. The defense is recognized in federal law and also in most states. Alaska statute §11.81.450, for instance, allows an affirmative defense if, to obtain evidence of the commission of an offense, a public law enforcement official, or a person working in cooperation with the official, induces the defendant to commit the offense by persuasion or inducement that would be effective to persuade an average person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense.

The U.S. Supreme Court in 1932 upheld the entrapment defense in *Sorrells v. the United States*, 287 U.S. 485. A federal agent had approached the defendant in his rural North Carolina home and claimed that he was a furniture dealer from Charlotte and had served in the same army unit as David Sorrells. The agent persistently sought to have the defendant sell him liquor, a violation of the National Prohibition statute. Sorrells maintained at first that he did not drink whiskey, but after several visits and persistent requests, he provided the agent with half a gallon of whiskey and was arrested and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The Supreme Court decision stressed that the aim of the government should not be to create crime in order to punish it but rather to prevent crime, and it called for a retrial in which the jury could evaluate Sorrells's claim to having been entrapped.

To overcome an entrapment defense, the state must convince the judge or jury that the individual had a predisposition to commit the criminal act and that the inducement offered was not sufficient in itself to produce that result. This criterion is known as the "subjective test" of entrapment. Some commentators regard this standard as unfair because it places persons with a previous criminal record at a disadvantage because their earlier illegal behavior can be used to demonstrate a predisposition to offend. There also is some philosophical uneasiness about the courts' acknowledgment of the entrapment defense as criminal law rests on free will doctrines that maintain that, except for gross inadequacies such as mental deficiency, all persons, whatever the circumstance, are to be held responsible if they choose to violate the law. If entrapment is a legitimate excuse, it can be argued that growing up in poverty in a crime-ridden neighborhood also ought to be seen as an excusatory circumstance on the ground that it propelled a person into criminal behavior that would not have occurred had that person lived an affluent existence in a crime-free suburb.

The "objective test," advocated by several judges in the *Sorrells* case, focuses on the decency and

persuasive power of the tactics used by law enforcement personnel to determine whether an entrapment defense will prevail. Its aim is not to excuse defendants but to monitor police behavior so that it adheres to acceptable standards of morality.

Procedures such as radar equipment to detect speeding motorists and two-way mirrors in supermarkets to discover shoplifters are not regarded as entrapment. Police, at times, will use decoys in sites with high crime rates or where a pattern of specific offenses has emerged. The decoys may assume roles such as derelicts, shoppers, or drunks. For example, in a case in which patients complained that a dentist had sexually molested them while they were under an anesthetic, an undercover policewoman posed as a patient, was anesthetized, and was kept under surveillance by a hidden camera, which captured evidence of the dentist's criminal act.

Tactics that arguably represent illegal entrapment typically are employed against persons engaged in activities defined as "crimes without victims," particularly narcotics violations where there are no complaining witnesses and the police have to resort to proactive enforcement efforts. Similarly, female detectives, posing as prostitutes, engage in dragnets to apprehend johns who patronize prostitutes. Those accused can prevail with an entrapment defense only if they can convince a judge or jury that the law enforcement officer acted so aggressively and seductively that, but for this, the arrested person would not have solicited her services.

For social scientists, entrapment raises complex issues of causation and responsibility. If the temptation seems virtually irresistible, such as a wallet deliberately left by police detectives in a telephone booth in a ghetto neighborhood, should the youth who keeps the contents of the wallet be allowed to claim entrapment?

Entrapment figured in two prominent cases in recent decades. The Abscam sting operation targeted primarily lawmakers believed to be susceptible to bribery. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents posed as representatives of a make-believe wealthy Arab sheikh, offering considerable sums to members of Congress for the sheikh's alleged desire to obtain asylum in the United States, to invest in U.S. enterprises, and to launder money. The ruse resulted in the conviction of a U.S. senator, six members of the House of Representatives, and three other officeholders. Only Florida Congressman Richard Kelly succeeded with an entrapment defense, and this was only temporarily, because an appellate court reversed the original decision and Kelly went to prison.

John DeLorean was accused in 1982 of putting up $1.8 million to buy 100 kilos of cocaine that, if resold, would have netted him $24 million, enough to bail out his failing automobile manufacturing company. DeLorean was caught in an FBI sting operation that had a former drug smuggler-turned-informant offer him the opportunity to finance the drug import transaction. The judge dismissed the case on the ground of entrapment, with DeLorean not needing to call a single witness on his behalf.

Gilbert Geis

See also Affirmative Action; Corruption; Power Elite; Victimless Crimes; White-Collar Crime

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Environment, Eco-Warriors

In recent years a set of related movements, sometimes referred to as "radical environmentalism," has appeared on the global stage. Despite precursors in history, what is new about these movements is the confrontational nature of the tactics they often employ, including blockades, tree spiking, forest occupations, and property destruction. Sometimes referred to as "eco-warriors," or more pejoratively by authorities as "ecoterrorists," the individuals in these movements directly confront the social problem of environmental degradation, yet also at times generate new social problems through their choice of tactics and strategies.

Some observers suggest the radical environmental movement found its initial inspiration in Edward Abbey's writings, which popularized the term *monkeywrenching*. Despite the linguistic logic to this, more philosophical discourses such as "deep ecology"

have had an equally profound impact on modern eco-warriors. Indeed, the radical environmental movement appears to be a product of equal parts wide-ranging ecological thought and explicit calls to action. Combining theory and practice, eco-warriors call attention to serious issues such as pollution, species extinction, nuclear waste, and deforestation through the use of dramatic actions aimed at simultaneously educating the public and preventing further environmental harm.

Rik Scarce characterizes an eco-warrior as someone who generally believes in "direct action" instead of incremental or legislative change, strongly embraces the values of biological diversity, disdains bureaucratic hierarchy in favor of self-organization, works tirelessly to save the environment despite long odds and great personal risk, and maintains an ecological consciousness that often includes a spiritual component. Eco-warriors also generally adhere to a philosophy of nonviolence toward all living entities; nonetheless, highly confrontational tactics are part of the movement's identity. Eco-warriors have, for instance, vandalized animal testing laboratories, chained themselves together to block logging roads, damaged bulldozers and other machinery, picketed outside the homes of animal researchers, and disrupted power lines to mining operations. Still, experts generally agree that these environmentalists have not caused serious physical harm to any humans during their campaigns, except perhaps to themselves on rare occasions.

Dave Foreman, one of the founders of the radical environmental entity Earth First!, asserts that monkeywrenching—the direct resistance to the destruction of the earth and its life forms—is nonviolent, in that it never aims to harm any living being, with care taken to minimize any possible physical threat to people. He further argues that monkeywrenching itself is diverse, as anyone can do it and a wide range of movements on both the left and the right actively use it. Movement activists themselves also accept direct action strategies such as monkeywrenching as part of a "diversity of tactics" to employ, depending upon the situation, and that sometimes radical actions can help more mainstream activists accomplish their stated aims and goals. However, this remains a controversial point in environmental circles and in movement literature.

In addition to Earth First!, eco-warriors also include groups such as Greenpeace, the Sea Shepherds, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the Redwood Alliance, Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, and Friends of the Earth. While at times employing strategies like boycotts and blockades, these entities also utilize less-controversial tactics, such as media campaigns, legislative lobbying, and mobilizing around environmental issues ranging from animal exploitation to ocean health to nuclear power. Whereas some view these groups as radical extremists, others see them as an institutionalization of environmental concerns and a more viable alternative to movement radicalism.

In the 1990s, more directly confrontational animal rights and environmental movement groups appeared, sometimes under the rubrics of the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. These entities claimed credit for numerous acts of strategic property destruction, including the sabotage of development projects that threatened endangered species, the destruction of laboratories experimenting with genetically modified organisms, and arsons at dealerships that sold sport-utility vehicles. These activists appear to take more literally the notion that protecting the environment is a matter of war and that nature needs dedicated defenders if it is to survive. These sentiments, sometimes accepted as doctrinal in the radical environmental movement, justify the construction of eco-warriors as a specific class of activists and partly explain the increasing frequency of acts of ecological sabotage (also known as "ecotage").

These more confrontational tactics have brought an increased interest on the part of law enforcement. Numerous legislative acts and federal interdiction efforts focus on eradicating "ecoterrorists," resulting in the dramatic increase in criminal penalties for acts of ecotage against commercial enterprises. Also, anti-terrorist laws passed after 9/11 have, at times, been used against radical environmentalists. This led some activists to speak of a "Green Scare," drawing an analogy to the anti-Communist Red Scare of the 1950s in the United States. Despite the many arrests made, authorities acknowledge the difficulty of curtailing these activities entirely, as there are no formal group structures involved and it is difficult to intervene in actions of autonomous individuals. This view is consistent with the characterization of an eco-warrior as someone who disdains organizational hierarchy in favor of self-defined actions, yet it can also leave practitioners open to allegations of terrorism in its apparent randomness. Nonetheless, eco-warriors

generally hold to their stated principle of avoiding physical harm to human life, which for some has made the invocation of the terrorist label problematic.

Eco-warriors are thus a diverse and complicated part of the modern environmental movement. Whereas many admire their motivations and goals, others criticize their tactics as dangerous and divisive. As befits such contradictions, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of eco-warriors in promoting the values of ecology and sustainability. And as with many social problems, this one evidences a great deal of ambiguity and consternation, bringing to mind the aphorism that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter.

Randall Amster

See also Deforestation; Environment, Pollution; Environmental Crime; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Justice; Environmental Movement; Global Warming; PATRIOT Act; Social Change; Social Movements; Terrorism; Terrorism, Domestic Spying; Toxic Waste

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Environment, Hazardous Waste

Hazardous wastes are among the by-products of industrial production in societies in which there is intensive use of chemicals (e.g., acids, bases, chlorinated hydrocarbons) and materials (heavy metals [e.g., mercury] or paint pigments) that are toxic and can cause poisoning and death. Official definitions of hazardous waste promulgated by state and federal environmental protection agencies usually require that the material have at least one of four characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity.

Hazardous wastes can become severe social problems for entire societies and smaller populations within them. Unregulated industrial dumping of such wastes can poison large land areas and residential neighborhoods, or foul drinking water or swimming beaches, with potential or real damage to human and other populations. Even when placed in special dump sites, some wastes can dissolve into groundwater and soils, a process known as leaching. Once transported by streams or tides, dissolved wastes can endanger populations far from the original dump site.

Industry is not the only major source of hazardous waste. Household waste often contains corrosive, toxic, ignitable, or reactive ingredients like paints, cleaners, oils, batteries, and pesticides, all of which contain potentially hazardous ingredients. These require special care in disposal, and consumers must be continually educated about safety in the use of these products, as well as the proper procedures to follow in disposing of them. Improper disposal of household hazardous wastes often results from pouring them in drains, on the ground, or into storm sewers or mingling them with other trash. Such improper disposal of these wastes can pollute the environment and pose a health threat, which is why communities in the United States and other industrial nations now offer a variety of options for their safe disposal.

Most hazardous wastes have histories of earlier public, and even scientific, ignorance about their potential dangers. For most of the industrial age, people paid little attention to the consequences of indiscriminate dumping of the by-products of mining and manufacturing. As late as the 1960s, containers of pesticides, household insulation materials containing asbestos, old car batteries, and used paint cans—all containing extremely hazardous materials—were handled and disposed of quite casually. Quantities of poisonous materials were transported in unsafe containers and disposed of in public dump sites or even in vacant lots. Industrial corporations frequently dumped hazardous wastes into rivers and streams, resulting in long-term damage to plants and animal species and eventually to humans. In the developing world these

unsafe practices often continue and present a growing danger to the world's oceans and animal species.

Public awareness about hazardous materials and wastes in the United States was almost nonexistent until publication of Rachel Carson's book *Silent Spring* in 1962. Drawing extensively on new scientific studies of the dangers of pesticides and other toxic chemicals to human and other animal species, Carson exposed the dangers of the insecticide DDT to the earth's food chains. The tragic case of widespread mercury poisoning in the Japanese fishing village of Minamata in the 1950s and 1960s brought world attention to problems of hazardous waste disposal and indiscriminate dumping of hazardous wastes by private companies. Not until the 1978 crisis of environmental poisoning and the high incidence of children with birth defects in the community of Love Canal in New York State, near Buffalo, did the federal government pass effective legislation to identify and begin cleaning up areas of land polluted and empoisoned by hazardous wastes. In response to the Love Canal disaster, Congress in 1980 passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, known most commonly as the Superfund Act.

The federal Superfund pays for toxic waste cleanups at sites where no other responsible parties can pay for a cleanup. Its funds come from a special tax on the petroleum, chemical, and other industries that routinely use or produce toxic materials and wastes. The Superfund Act also provides broad federal authority to clean up ongoing releases or potential releases of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment. The majority (65–70 percent) of uncontrolled U.S. waste sites are waste storage and treatment facilities (including landfills) or former industrial properties. Typically these properties have been abandoned, and most have more than one major chemical contaminant. Another category of hazardous waste sites is found in federal government facilities in such as military bases, armament testing grounds, and nuclear energy complexes.

The substances most commonly released into the environment from uncontrolled hazardous waste sites are heavy metals and organic solvents: lead (59 percent of sites), trichloroethylene (53 percent), chromium (47 percent), benzene (46 percent), and arsenic (45 percent). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified more than 15,000 sites that qualify for Superfund remediation. About 1,400 of these sites are currently proposed for listing or are listed already on the National Priorities List. Assessment and remediation of these sites is proceeding under the direction of EPA, with support of the national Superfund Trust. As of this writing, Congress has failed to renew some of the fees collected from the oil and related industries, and the Bush administration is the first in the history of the program to oppose making polluting industries fund the Superfund toxic waste cleanup program.

The burdens of living with hazardous wastes are not shared equally in the United States or in most other industrial nations. Contaminated Superfund sites in the United States are most commonly found adjacent to poor communities, often populated by ethnic and racial minorities with relatively large numbers of children. Research commissioned by EPA estimates that approximately 11 million Americans live within 1 mile of a high-priority contaminated Superfund site, and between 3 and 4 million of these persons are children under 18 years of age. This puts them at risk of exposure to chemical toxicants released from these sites into the air, groundwater, surface water, and surrounding communities. Because they are growing rapidly and their bodies are building new tissue more rapidly than are adults, children are uniquely susceptible to health injury resulting from exposures to chemical toxicants in the environment.

EPA has identified more than 1,000 hazardous waste sites on military bases and proving grounds and in 1997 ordered Camp Edwards in Massachusetts to cease firing live ammunition because munitions chemicals were leaching into the drinking water for all of Cape Cod, where more than 500,000 people spend the summer. In response, the Pentagon has repeatedly, but so far unsuccessfully, requested legislation that would exempt more than 20 million acres of military land from key facets of the Clean Air Act and the two federal laws governing hazardous-waste disposal and cleanup. State environmental officials widely oppose this legislation, fearing that it will interfere with the ability of states to enforce environmental laws that protect drinking water and otherwise protect public health.

Nuclear waste is particularly hazardous and presents some of the most difficult problems of disposal. Exposure to radioactivity can cause cancer and birth defects and also has potential uses by terrorists. Nuclear waste results from the use of radioactive metals in nuclear power plants and military nuclear weapons facilities. Throughout the world are nuclear

power plants nearing the end of their operating lives, particularly in the United States, where most of these plants are approaching the end of the operational time period allowed in their licenses. The close of the cold war in the 1990s left a legacy of radioactive waste from decommissioned nuclear missiles, but hospitals and nuclear research facilities also generate a great deal of nuclear waste.

Nuclear waste is classified as either "low-level" or "high-level" radioactive waste. Low-level nuclear waste includes material used to handle the highly radioactive parts of nuclear reactors (i.e., cooling water pipes and radiation suits) and waste from medical procedures involving radioactive treatments or X-rays. The level of radioactivity in low-level waste is relatively small, and the materials are relatively easy to dispose of. Storing the waste for a period of 10 to 50 years will allow most of the radioactive isotopes in low-level waste to decay, at which point the waste can be disposed of as normal refuse. High-level radioactive waste comes from the core of the nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon. This waste includes uranium, plutonium, and other highly radioactive elements made during fission. Most of the radioactive isotopes in high-level waste emit large amounts of radiation and have extremely long half-lives (some longer than 100,000 years), creating extensive periods before the waste will settle to safe levels of radioactivity. In consequence, waste disposal facilities for high-level nuclear wastes must be extremely secure and well protected. Few cities or regions welcome the location of hazardous waste treatment facilities, particularly nuclear waste facilities, in their vicinity. This makes the problem of transport and disposal of these materials a particularly difficult political problem.

William Kornblum

See also Environment, Pollution; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Racism; Water Quality

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Environment, Pollution

The environment is an important part of life that must be safeguarded and preserved in the best way possible, because without it there would be no life. People have always used the environment to advance their own goals, but this can lead to environmental pollution, which in turn affects the world's population. In other words, human beings must be consciously concerned with the environment—whether air, water, or soil—because it affects them as much as they affect it. To assess the health of the environment and the effects of environmental pollution, we must look at the environment's different facets individually and how they interact. Discussing environmental pollution is only one part of the whole. The other component is assessing the extent of its negative effects on people.

Pollution Trends

Today, pollution is occurring on a vast and unprecedented scale worldwide, impacting virtually everyone and everything. We can best understand the dramatic changes or increase in pollution in the 20th and 21st centuries in terms of four long-term trends.

First, the world's population increased more than threefold in the 20th century, along with a twentyfold increase in the gross world product. These increases caused a demand on the use of fossil fuels, thereby increasing the release of both sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide into the atmosphere. These emissions are the principal components of smog and give rise to acid rain.

The second long-term pollution trend recognized in the 20th century is the shift from gross environmental results to micro toxicity. Before World War II, the major public health issues centered on smoke and sewer-related issues. One incident, the killer fog over Donora, Pennsylvania, in 1948, sickened thousands and killed 20 people. An even more ominous micro-level threat has existed since the advent of nuclear technology. The ushering in of the nuclear age, chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare, and the peacetime

applications of these technologies—such as agribusiness fertilization and power generation—has led to the development and widespread use of chemical, biological, and radioactive material, thus creating waste storage issues for generations to come.

The third environmental pollution trend is its global spread. Once thought to be a problem of the rich or more developed nations, pollution is now a serious problem for less-developed countries as well. For example, with the explosion of industrialization in both China and India, these countries are experiencing environmental pollution problems on a national scale that threaten the quality of life for both rural and urban residents. Moreover, data from the UN Global Environmental Monitoring System indicate that, by and large, cities in eastern Europe are more polluted with sulfur dioxide and other particles than most cities in Western developed countries. In essence, developing world citizens rank high in their exposure to pollutants, particularly toxic chemicals. Many of these impacted people reside in Mexico, India, and China.

The fourth trend in global environmental pollution is how localized environmental contamination becomes a larger, more global environmental assault, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the burning of oil wells during the Gulf Wars, and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. Such incidents, despite their having occurred in confined geographical regions, have had wider global environmental impacts.

Attention to global environmental issues approached critical mass with the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992. The major crises of focus were the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, climate change, rapid shrinkage of tropical rain forests, the loss of biodiversity, the spread of deserts, and the decline of global fisheries. During the early 1990s scientists adopted the wider concept of global change to signify the level of impact humans have on global environmental conditions and their potential to alter permanently the functioning of the ecosystem on earth. To combat the aforementioned issues, the 116 heads of state attending the 1992 summit adopted a revised set of principles and action statements called “Agenda 21” and a host of environmental treaties on climate change and biodiversity as well as a statement on forest principles. To strengthen Agenda 21, the UN General Assembly created the Commission on Sustainable Development. Although its progress is questionable, the Commission on Sustainable Development works to improve environmental quality worldwide, as do other organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, government think tanks, scientific and professional societies, and the European Union (as a collective).

Air Pollution

Air pollution is almost impossible to contain because of its ability to spread rapidly over a large area. There are many different pollutants in the air, and their effects range from environmental damage to health issues. The effect of pollution on the ozone layer is one example of environmental damage. The ozone layer is a part of the atmosphere that helps absorb radiation from the sun and a portion of ultraviolet light that is responsible for causing, among other things, various types of skin cancer and cataracts. Because substances such as carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, and sulfur dioxide (the chief cause of air pollution) are being released into the air, the ozone layer is being reduced and could possibly be destroyed. These pollutants are by-products of industrialization, such as the combustion of fossil fuels and exhaust from automobiles and factories.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken steps to prevent and reduce several sources of air pollution, such as supporting the passage of legislation to ban the use of lead in gasoline in the United States. Furthermore, the Clean Air Amendment of 1990 mandated a 50 percent reduction in pollutants such as sulfur dioxide by the year 2000 in an attempt to reduce future occurrences of acid rain. Despite action taken, a common problem that the EPA encounters is that many strategies used to reduce one type of pollution can lead to the introduction of a different pollutant into the environment.

The danger of air pollution is not only how rapidly it spreads but also how it affects other parts of the planet, such as the ozone layer. The atmosphere is such a critical part of the environment that experts now view it as a resource in the same way as land, forests, and water.

Water Pollution

Like air pollution, water pollution spreads quickly over a large area. Surface water and groundwater both serve as sources of drinking water, and both are uniquely affected by pollution. As a general rule of thumb, surface waters are more polluted than groundwaters due

to disinfection by-products and the heavy industrialization of river and lake basins. However, the contamination of groundwater generally involves higher concentrations of chemicals because of the low amount of underground dispersion, mixing, and dilution.

Because surface water is readily available to companies, lakes and rivers tend to be more polluted; however, because water constantly moves, the foreign materials are dispersed over a larger area, making the concentration of pollution smaller. Groundwater moves more slowly than surface water, so contamination tends to be more concentrated and recorded in higher levels than in surface water. Groundwater is not moved by wind and it does not normally encounter air, making the underground water reservoirs (aquifers) stagnant. Therefore, when toxic chemicals or foreign materials enter that water supply, they are not diluted or dispersed over larger areas as they are in surface water. Although all groundwater sources eventually run into rivers and lakes, the water used for drinking is most often acquired while it is still underground and the pollution is at its most concentrated, causing the most harm to the people who drink water from such underground sources.

Because of its availability and the low cost of extraction, groundwater is a popular choice of industries to extract and turn into drinkable water. However, the downside to this is that although groundwater may have a higher availability rate, it is not a quickly renewing source such as surface water. This causes companies to tread with caution when extracting groundwater because if too much is taken, the entire source could be depleted indefinitely. Precipitation and runoffs make surface water a renewable source of drinking water. However, before it is usable as potable water, surface water usually requires extensive treatment (purification) to remove all pollutants. Although pollution is increasing the cost of extracting surface water and purifying it, surface water's ability to renew itself through precipitation makes it a preferred source of drinking water.

The main source of water pollution is poor disposal of industrial waste, which often leads to the contamination of both groundwater and surface water sources. Industrial waste accounts for more than 18 billion gallons of wastewater daily and 800 million pounds of pollutants yearly. The inadequate construction of disposal sites, such as landfills and injection wells, also contributes to water pollution. Injection wells are pipes lined with concrete that are dug deep into the ground, past the layer of earth where groundwater reservoirs reside that many industries use to dump waste. Contamination occurs when these pipes are constructed or operated incorrectly, thus leaking waste into the groundwater system. Without better care, the available drinking water resources also become contaminated from pathogens that enter the water from sources such as untreated sewage, storm drains, and boats that dump sewage into the water.

Ground Pollution

Ground pollution is closely tied with water pollution because of its close proximity to sources of water. Many sources of water contamination come from pollution originally introduced into the ground. The chief source of ground pollution comes from the inadequate operation and construction of waste disposal facilities, such as landfills and injection wells. This inadequate disposal of wastes leads to ground pollution, which leads to the contamination of rivers, lakes, and groundwater reservoirs. Improper discharge of pollutants in the air (which can become acid rain) can also lead to contamination of water supplies. Incineration, a waste disposal method meant as an alternative to land-based disposal facilities, further contributes to air pollution, as it creates airborne particle contaminants and leaves heavy metal residues for waste disposal, which can result in the contamination of the surrounding environment. However, poor waste management is only a part of the overall pollution affecting the environment.

Some of the pollution contaminating the soil and damaging vegetation is caused by humanmade pesticides and herbicides. Although used primarily for agricultural purposes, these pesticides and herbicides are dangerous if people are exposed to a high enough concentration of the product. During the Vietnam War, the United States developed a strong herbicide, code named Agent Orange, to destroy the jungle canopies and vegetation the Vietcong used as cover. Agent Orange was successful in its destruction of the vegetation, but the region had difficulty recovering from its effects. So toxic was the chemical that few new plants grew for several years after the spraying, and restoring the forests will apparently take several decades. The use of Agent Orange not only had long-term effects on the environment but also affected the people exposed to it; these people subsequently developed higher rates of liver problems, cancer, and immune system disorders than those not exposed.

The lessons to be learned are the realities of an interrelationship among different forms of environmental pollution and of the interdependence of humans and their environment. The combustion of fossil fuels and factory emissions contribute to air pollution. Herbicides damage vegetation in ways from which it could take years to recover. Water pollution is influenced by ground pollution, which in turn is created by poor waste disposal. People cause all this pollution that harms not only the environment but also themselves. Few, if any, can escape the far-reaching effects of pollution. People in all countries are dependent on the Earth's ecosystem and its resources. Although all people are harmed by damage to these resources and ecological systems, the harm is much greater for individuals who are poor, those who live in developing countries, women and children, and racial/ethnic minorities.

Society needs to develop a proactive attitude in dealing with environmental pollution, instead of merely reacting to an environmental crisis. This will be difficult when the wealthiest countries (the United States, Canada, Western European countries, Japan, and Australia), who contain only about 22 percent of the world's population, disproportionately consume the largest portion of the world's resources (nearly 88 percent of the natural resources each year, including 73 percent of the world's energy resources). The best way to treat pollution is to eliminate its source. If people act first and eliminate the sources of pollution, rather than reacting to crises and scrambling to contain the already widespread pollution, the environment will have a better chance of survival.

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See also Acid Rain; Deforestation; Desertification; Ecosystem; Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Crime; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Racism; Water Organization; Water Quality; Water Resources

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Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication

Eutrophication, or cultural eutrophication, is the enhancement of the natural process by which streams, lakes, reservoirs, and estuaries become enriched with nutrients (phosphorous and nitrogen), enabling the ecosystem to support higher rates of production as measured by biomass or energy per unit area over time. This natural process of enrichment can take thousands of years and result in the succession of a glacial lake into a bog and, eventually, a prairie. However, this process can be greatly accelerated by human activities; while natural eutrophication occurs on geologic timescales, a reservoir undergoing cultural eutrophication can evolve into a bog in less than a hundred years.

This accelerated enrichment can have many detrimental ecological, aesthetic, and human health effects. Excess phosphorous and nitrogen can disrupt the natural balance of the aquatic ecosystem by spurring population explosions of nuisance algae and aquatic plants. As these algal populations sink and die, they create an oxygen demand in the underlying water

where bacteria deplete oxygen supplies to decompose the dead algae. The oxygen-depleted bottom waters become poor fish habitat. In freshwater ecosystems, sudden, short-term episodes of low oxygen levels can cause fish kills, and extended periods of low bottom-water oxygen concentrations can cause a shift in fish populations from desirable sport fish to low-oxygen-tolerant species such as carp. In marine ecosystems, this phenomenon is seen in the Gulf of Mexico's "dead zone," where nitrogen from the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers stimulates high rates of algal growth in the upper water layers, which cause oxygen depletion in the underlying waters.

Nutrient enrichment has also been cited as the cause of coral reef destruction, degrading both the ecological and recreational value of these marine resources. In freshwater ecosystems, nuisance algal blooms can diminish the aesthetic and recreational value of the water body by forming surface scums and producing earthy and musty tastes and odors, which can persist in finished drinking water. In addition to ecological and aesthetic degradation, some algal blooms can pose risks to human health. These harmful algal blooms (HABs) can produce potent toxins, and scientists have implicated them in wildlife, livestock, and pet deaths after the animals had drunk contaminated water. Long-term low dose exposures of a hepatotoxin, microcystins-LR produced by HABs of *Microcystis*, is suspected to contribute to high rates of liver cancer in certain parts of China. A short-term acute poisoning of the neurotoxin anatoxin-a, produced by an HAB of *Anabaena*, was the likely cause of death for a Wisconsin teenager in July 2002. In marine ecosystems, HABs have resulted in human exposures to the neurotoxins brevetoxin and saxitoxin, which are produced by the algae *Karenia brevis* and *Alexandrium fundyense*, a known cause of paralytic fish poisoning.

The causes of nutrient enrichment can be categorized into two main sources: point source pollution (i.e., from a pipe) and non-point source (i.e., diffuse) pollution. As all streams, lakes, reservoirs, and estuaries receive water from their respective watersheds (area of land that drains into a water body), any upstream or up-watershed sources of pollution can become pollution sources to the receiving water body. In the United States, the point source release of plant (and algae) nutrients, phosphorus and nitrogen, into the environment is controlled by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), a provision of the Clean Water Act.

Although the NPDES program has achieved much improvement in nutrient pollution control, recent assessments of the nation's water quality have shown continued water quality degradation caused by these nutrients (e.g., a 1999 U.S. Geological Survey study showed that the nation's median stream phosphorous concentration was still greater than the 0.100 mg L^{-1} threshold for reduced phytoplankton growth), demonstrating a need to manage both point and non-point sources of nutrient pollution. Non-point source pollutants are transported to the receiving waters via subsurface water, surface water (i.e., streams and rivers), or runoff (direct overland flow).

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studies have shown that in a natural forested area, 40 percent of rainwater returns to the atmosphere through evapotranspiration, 50 percent filters into subsurface flow, and 10 percent runs off the land surface into a receiving water body. However, with the removal of vegetation and its replacement with impervious surfaces (land cover that does not allow for the water to soak into the ground, e.g., rooftops, parking lots, and streets), the amount of water transported via runoff increases: Suburban land cover results in 30 percent rainwater runoff and urban land cover results in 50 percent rainwater runoff.

In 2000, EPA stated that the most common sources of pollution affecting U.S. streams and rivers were agricultural runoff, animal feeding operation runoff, hydrologic modification (e.g., channelization, dredging, and dam construction), habitat modification (e.g., removal of stream bank vegetation), urban runoff from lawns and impervious surfaces, erosion from urban development, and urban storm sewer overflows. These sources of non-point pollution can transport more than just nutrients to receiving waters: Pesticides from agricultural and suburban uses, bacteria and pathogens (e.g., *E. coli* and *Cryptosporidium*) from animal feeding operations, and oil and trash from parking lots can be transported as well.

Social Dynamics of Addressing Eutrophication and Runoff

EPA's 2000 National Water Quality Inventory showed that, of the U.S. water bodies assessed, 47 percent of rivers, 53 percent of lakes, and 52 percent of estuaries were polluted or threatened. In 1996 and 2000, nutrients and siltation (sedimentation) were among the top five causes of impairment for streams, rivers, lakes, ponds, reservoirs, and estuaries. Both nutrient enrichment and

siltation can lead to eutrophication, but in many cases, the nutrient enrichment and siltation caused by human manipulation of the environment can be prevented or minimized through the use of best management practices (BMPs). However, even though safe drinking and recreational waters are social necessities, a lack of understanding of causes and effects of pollution often inhibits stakeholder investment in BMPs.

Case studies by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources on Squaw Creek Watershed in 2002 and Cedar Lake Watershed in 2001 showed that perceptions of good water quality varied widely between water quality specialists and local landowners based on different ideas of how the water body should function. Whereas participants from Squaw Creek Watershed said that stream water quality was adequate (or not harmful) to wildlife but not okay for human consumption, water quality specialists measured good water quality on the basis of a broad set of physical, chemical, and biological characteristics. This discrepancy in determining the health of the watershed ecosystem impacted the importance stakeholders placed on water quality improvement efforts.

In the Cedar Lake study, water quality specialists identified agricultural operations as the main cause of excess nitrates in the lake water. (Studies implicate nitrates as a cause of the Gulf of Mexico's dead zone.) However, the discrepancy between farmers' and water quality managers' perceptions of water quality led to only 50 percent of the farmer participants believing that agricultural activities were the cause of elevated nitrate levels. The farmers cited the many conservation practices they already employed as proof that their activities were not the cause of the high nitrate levels. As such, project managers focused efforts on educating stakeholders on the complexity and differences of different pollutant transport.

To be fair, this discrepancy in attitudes between water quality managers and stakeholders toward water resources is not unique to farming communities. Similar attitudes toward pollution exist in suburban and urban communities. From development practices that remove or redirect headwater streams and build retention ponds to homeowners who improperly fertilize their lawns or fail to maintain septic systems, many people do not recognize the link between an individual's actions and the broader context of cumulative ecological effects. In an EPA 1997 study, urbanization was shown to have a direct impact on stream ecology. Therefore, recent efforts have focused on reducing runoff from suburban and urban areas, resulting in the implementation of urban BMPs such as EPA's Low Impact Development program. This program, like agricultural BMPs, requires landowner buy-in, where the homeowner or homeowner's association is responsible for maintaining the BMP.

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See also Ecosystem; Environment, Pollution; Environmental Degradation; Erosion; Urbanization; Urban Sprawl; Water Quality

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Environment, Sewage Disposal

The history of civilization, especially urban civilization, is the history of water—of the fundamental need to supply clean, fresh, disease-free drinking water while simultaneously disposing of vast quantities of disease-ridden, foul human and animal waste. From at least the time of the Phoenicians up to the present day, the growth of the world's major metropolitan centers—Rome, Paris, London, New York, Beijing—has been defined by how well they solved that dilemma of water supply and waste disposal.

The challenge of water supply and disposal is directly related to population density. In prehistoric time, and in many impoverished areas even today, "night fertilization" of open field and cropland is not uncommon and may not pose an unwarranted risk of

disease to the population or a heavy burden to the environment. Under rural farm conditions, both the supply of potable water and the safe disposal of waste are only minor difficulties. More often than not, nature itself, without the need of human intervention, provides the mechanisms by which water is filtered and cleansed of contaminants. Simple precautions such as keeping the outhouse far from the water well are adequate to ensure human health wherever population density is low.

Increasing population density demands increasingly complex treatment solutions. There are at least three major environmental issues that have to be addressed when disposing of human and animal waste: (1) reducing organic and inorganic solids, (2) reducing the demand for oxygen in wastewater that is a consequence of its dissolved and suspended load of organic matter, and (3) minimizing the concentration of nutrients and chemicals that always characterize waste materials.

As population density increases above rural, farm levels, some sort of engineered solution to the waste disposal problem must be found. Cesspools and septic systems have long provided such solutions in many suburban areas of the world. A cesspool is little more than an underground tank with many holes in it. Household waste enters one (settling) chamber of the tank from which overflow is allowed to escape into the soil surrounding the tank. Natural or introduced microbes and enzymes within the cesspool tank decompose the organic matter in the waste stream while the tank itself provides storage for any indigestible materials. Soil organisms and vegetation around and above the tank provide further filtering of the wastewater and take up some, if not all, of the chemical burden. Cesspools have the drawback of becoming clogged over time and require periodic cleaning and flushing to work efficiently. Septic systems are a slight improvement over cesspools—the overflow wastewater stream from a septic tank exits through a gridded system of perforated pipe that is laid out in soil at shallow depth. The slow flow of water through the septic-field grid enhances the decomposition of organic matter and the absorption of nutrients and chemicals by soil organisms and vegetation. Septic systems require less maintenance but demand large areas of lawn or open field not often available in urban centers.

Both cesspools and septic systems cannot remove 100 percent of the burden of organic matter, nutrients, and chemicals from typical household waste. The increasing use of detergents, soaps, and other chemicals in modern households has placed an additional and growing burden on the ability of house-specific waste disposal systems. At some point on the population growth curve of urban systems, cesspools and septic systems are no longer a viable alternative and some other approach has to be taken to sewage treatment. One of the most spectacular examples of this transition in modern times is provided by Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island, New York. What was once rural farmland was rapidly suburbanized following World War II. Initially the waste disposal of homes was served by cesspools and septic systems—one or the other depending primarily on lot size. Over time, however, these house-specific systems dispensed an ever-increasing load of nutrients into the groundwater system of the island—a drinking water supply on which the suburban community was totally dependent. The concentration of one particular nutrient, dissolved inorganic nitrate, was the trigger that led to a complete reengineering of the two counties' waste disposal systems—a construction project of immense size that is still under way. High levels of nitrate had led to "blue-baby syndrome," a condition under which newborns have difficulty breathing. The solution was to place the homes in every community in the two counties on sewerage systems connected to central processing plants. Nearly every street and highway had to be excavated, every household lawn dug up, and sewer lines installed. In addition, a place had to be found for the huge and not-always-welcome treatment plants.

Sewage treatment plants have been built in major cities since the 19th century. Basically sewerage systems consist of a network of collection pipes from an urban environment directed by gravity to the central facility typically located at the lowest elevation available—either on the coastline or next to a river. Initially the treatment facilities consisted of little more than settling tanks in which "floatables" and sediment were accumulated and later disposed of as sludge. This "primary" treatment did little for overall concentration of organic matter, nutrients, and chemicals in the water. The outflow of these plants was dumped directly into the ocean, stream, or river to be dealt with by natural decomposition. In some urban and suburban environments, sewer lines were merged with storm drains from streets in what is known as "combined sewer overflow" systems.

During a rainstorm the huge quantities of runoff, rapidly developed in urban environments, mixed with sewage and were discharged directly to streams and rivers without any treatment. U.S. cities are still dealing with the legacy of these combined sewer overflow systems today.

Few natural aquatic ecosystems are capable of dealing with the heavy demands for decomposition placed on them by the influx of large amounts of primary-treated sewage. As decomposition proceeds within the natural system, the demand for oxygen to fuel the microbial decomposition process exceeds the capacity for the absorption of oxygen through the water's surface or the generation of oxygen via photosynthesis by plants. An "oxygen sag" develops downstream from the wastewater treatment plant outflow. Depending on several factors—the load from the treatment plant, the discharge of the stream or river, and tidal flushing of bays and estuaries—the depletion of oxygen in water can reach critical levels, typically set at below 4 mg/L of dissolved oxygen. At those low levels, fish, and the insect life on which they depend, die. Other pollution-tolerant organisms replace those fish and "higher-order" insects. Eventually all oxygen-dependent life can be extinguished and the aquatic system can descend into anoxia, capable of supporting only anaerobic organisms. Those anaerobic organisms, more often than not, produce foul-smelling hydrogen sulfides among other noxious chemicals.

In the United States and Europe this sad state of affairs for most urban streams and rivers was reached sometime during the 1960s and 1970s and led directly to the passage of water-quality legislation such as the Clean Water Act in the United States. Existing sewage treatment plants were upgraded, and new plants were built nationwide. This upgrading consisted chiefly of the addition of "secondary" treatment at each facility. Secondary treatment is designed to reduce the dissolved and suspended organic matter in the waste stream. This is accomplished in a variety of ways. The simplest way is to aerate the wastewater in huge tanks, either by mixing or by direct aeration with bubblers. Some treatment plants employ anaerobic digestion, that is, enclosed tanks from which oxygen is excluded. Inside these tanks bacteria reduce organic matter to methane, which can fuel the treatment process itself. In addition, anaerobic digesters, as they are called, emit far less odor than open-tank oxygen-decomposition facilities. They are more expensive to maintain, however, and can require periodic injections of microbes if, for example, antibiotics enter the tanks from the sewer lines.

Secondary treatment is effective at reducing the level of organic matter in wastewater plant discharge, but it has little effect on the nutrient and chemical load of the plant discharge. In fact, secondary treatment may even increase the levels of nutrients such as nitrates and concentrate and elevate existing loads of phosphate in the plant discharge. This discharge of nutrients can promote the rapid growth of algae and macrophytes in streams and rivers. If those plants grow excessively and if conditions (such as a drought) in the aquatic environment lead to the wholesale death of those plants, the stage may be set for a calamitous decline in dissolved oxygen concentrations. Such oxygen-depletion events have caused repeated occurrences of huge die-offs of fish in modern times.

Thus, today, we are faced with the problem of going beyond secondary treatment of sewage to tertiary treatment—the removal of nutrients—an expensive process that will involve rebuilding nearly all of the thousands of treatment facilities throughout the world.

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See also Environment, Pollution; Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Water Organization; Water Quality

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Environmental Crime

Environmental crime is among the most controversial categories of illicit activity within the parameters of defining social problems. Some scholars simply classify it as a form of white-collar crime, because the

motivating factor behind committing such offenses is frequently financial gain. Federal enforcement entities consider the term more broadly, deeming actions such as killing endangered wildlife or illegally releasing toxic substances into public drinking water or agricultural production as posing serious risk to the public because of the long-term harm such actions may pose to society. Last, human rights advocates proffer that workers exposed to hazardous materials without proper health and safety equipment or training, and the deliberate placement of chemical plants and hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities in economically disadvantaged areas, are forms of *political* crime because those at the lowest stratum of the socioeconomic scale lack a voice in protecting themselves and their families when compared with constituents from wealthier communities. Collectively, this problem is referred to as the challenge of attaining environmental justice.

Financial Motivation

What induces large manufacturing corporations, small home contracting companies, and individuals to commit acts such as illegally dumping hazardous waste, improperly removing asbestos and lead-based paint, and poaching rare and exotic flora and fauna? In each case, the response is but one word: money.

The proper treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes are expensive, and many businesses are willing to chance getting caught because the risks outweigh the costs. For example, in a 2001 U.S. district court judgment against ExxonMobil, the company acknowledged that from 1991 to 1993, it had improperly stored and disposed of benzene—a known cancer-causing agent found in petroleum products—at its product storage and distribution facility in Staten Island, New York. Although ExxonMobil paid a hefty US$11.2 million in penalties (one of the largest settlements in U.S. history), it was the equivalent of just 3 months' salary enjoyed by ExxonMobil chairman and chief executive officer Lee R. Raymond.

For smaller companies such as home contractors, meeting strict environmental regulations may prove cost prohibitive when compared with their larger competitors. Consider the disposal of asbestos-containing materials (ACMs) found in household pipe insulation, boilers, and furnaces. To properly manage ACMs requires laboratory testing, removal by a state-licensed technician, and a postremediation inspection by a certified professional. A self-employed home remodeling contractor may be willing to risk his own health (or worse yet, the long-term health of the household's unsuspecting occupants for whom the work was completed) to bring the job in at a lower estimate than that of his larger competitor.

Profit is also the primary motivation for wildlife poachers and for those who illegally traffic in wildlife parts. For example, the gallbladder of a common black bear can net anywhere from $2,000 to $10,000 on the underground market because some cultures believe it has medicinal value. An individual bowl of bear paw soup can cost as much as $1,000 in Asia. Worldwide, the profit associated with threatened and endangered species is even greater, as seen, for example, in the $2,300-per-pound premium for African rhino horn (purportedly an aphrodisiac in some cultures) or the sale of more than 5,000 elephant tusks in 1999, which netted traffickers about $5 million. At present, the World Wildlife Fund estimates that the global trade in illegal wildlife parts exceeds $20 billion annually.

Enforcement

To reduce the profit motivation for large corporations and smaller businesses and individuals engaging in the improper disposal of hazardous wastes, Congress enacted a variety of environmental laws from the 1970s through the early 1990s. These statutes protect air, soil, and water from the risks of contamination posed by industrial chemical residues and heavy metals common in the manufacturing process.

Among the most important of the initial laws passed during this era were the Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA) and the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA). The CAA radically improved upon previous air quality laws passed in the 1950s and 1960s by mandating acceptable levels of airborne contaminants that could be released by manufacturers, energy producers, and industrial facilities into the environment. It also established a timetable by which facilities must meet these thresholds and imposed civil and criminal penalties for those entities unable or unwilling to do so.

Similarly, the CWA created a permit requirement system for releasing toxins into the environment, especially in areas where surface waters may be located or rainfall runoff could feed into riverways, lakes, ponds, or drinking water reservoirs. By mandating that businesses obtain effluent discharge permits via the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or its authorized state representative, the government was better able to control potential pollutant risks to humans and wildlife. The CWA also provided federal funding to build and upgrade sewage treatment plants throughout the United States, further reducing contamination posed by bacteriological and chemical hazards.

Following the successes of the CAA and CWA, Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974 and the Solid Waste Disposal Act—commonly referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—in 1976. The Safe Drinking Water Act was designed to protect the nation's drinking water supply from the risk of contamination posed by faulty public water supply piping (which often contained high levels of lead or copper). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also strove to reduce contamination to drinking water wells and groundwater from public landfills (e.g., from leaking batteries, cleaning products, solvents, thinners, pesticides). Last, the Safe Drinking Water Act established specific maximum allowable concentrations for heavy metals and chemicals in drinking water, while the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act specifically banned substances that were deemed toxic, reactive, ignitable, or corrosive from public landfills and required that these substances instead be taken to EPA-licensed treatment, storage, and disposal facilities for proper handling.

Armed with these laws and the addition of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, both of which prohibit unauthorized releases of hazardous substances and petroleum products into the environment, EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard have exercised extensive environmental enforcement authority, making arrests, shutting down facilities, and imposing civil and criminal penalties for violations of environmental regulations. High-profile cases such as the 1998 $8 million settlement against W. R. Grace for polluting drinking water wells in Woburn, Massachusetts, and ExxonMobil's payment of $900 million in punitive damages for their involvement in the 1989 tanker disaster in Valdez, Alaska, demonstrate that the environmental enforcement community takes its mission seriously.

Although less media attention is paid to the quiet victories of wildlife inspectors, special agents, park rangers, and other environmental enforcement specialists from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Department of Agriculture, their work is equally demanding and the breadth of laws available in their regulatory arsenal just as powerful. Often combined with extensive undercover operations, federal statutes such as the Lacey Act and the Endangered Species Act frequently yield large criminal penalties for those trafficking in wildlife parts both within the United States and abroad. Similarly, park rangers monitor large tracts of public land via truck, horse, and foot patrol and through aircraft and electronic surveillance to enforce the Federal Land and Management Policy Act and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. These guardians of U.S. natural, cultural, and historic resources ensure that hazardous substances are not unlawfully disposed of in critical wildlife habitat, marijuana is not being cultivated on federal property, and artifacts are not removed from battlefields and Native American burial grounds.

Environmental Justice

The financial motivations for corporations and individuals who pollute, poach, or traffic in animal parts are clear. Moreover, the corresponding enforcement strategy on the part of the U.S. government to protect human health and the environment is also readily apparent. What is far more elusive is the concept of environmental justice, that is, ensuring that those persons in the lowest socioeconomic stratum of society are afforded the same health, safety, and environmental protections under the law as are society's wealthiest members. Much of this concern dates back to the mid-1960s, when workers in a variety of industrial settings such as shipyards, chemical manufacturing plants, and the textile industry began to experience illnesses based on years of exposure to asbestos, solvents, and heavy metals. Lawsuits gave way to legislation such as the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act, which guarantees all workers a right to a workplace reasonably free from industrial hazards. Yet, more than 30 years later, employees in many of these high-risk settings still face challenges such as receiving basic respiratory protection gear and chemically resistant gloves and goggles, obtaining training on how to properly use these items, and participating in medical monitoring programs to track their long-term health.

Legislation such as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1980 and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992 granted

leaders in the most economically disenfranchised areas empirical evidence to support what they had long suspected: Many chemical manufacturing plants, hazardous waste storage areas, and energy production facilities are located in or adjacent to those locations with the highest rates of minorities and lowest socioeconomic status. Community activists responded by amending their rallying cry pertaining to the siting of such industrial facilities from "Not in my backyard" to "Not in *anyone's* backyard."

The term *environmental crime* is complex, and it evokes images ranging from the midnight dumping of 55-gallon drums in a local stream behind an elementary school to the wholesale slaughter of threatened and endangered species for sale on the black market. Whatever one's perspective is on this issue, only through the examination of the nexus between financial motivations, regulatory enforcement, and equal protection for all of society's members can this important social problem be explored with the richness it so rightly deserves.

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See also Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Pollution; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Justice; Environmental Movement; Environmental Racism; NIMBYism; Occupational Safety and Health

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Environmental Degradation

Theoretically, as many proposals exist for tackling the origin of the phenomena of environmental degradation as do different views on how to define it. First, this plethora of theoretical approaches always begins with an interest in identifying certain variables suitable for strategic policies of intercession, that is, environmental amelioration. Thus, the very question of how to define environmental degradation is contentious because it innately promotes particular policies and de-legitimizes others.

Second, besides having raw politics determine environmental degradation policy first and then popularize a theory to justify such policy afterward, the definition of environmental degradation also wrestles with difficulties in the organization of Western institutionalized divisions in academia. Particular methodological cultures compete against one another to reduce environmental degradation to their discipline instead of working together on defining environmental degradation. The topic of environmental degradation thus became divided across separate disciplines of biology, physical sciences, and social sciences (social sciences itself divided across sociology, political science, economics, and anthropological divisions of methodology). Thus the topic of environmental degradation tends to mirror reductionisms inherent in this disciplinary division, with each providing a reductionist construct on most occasions.

In short, what has passed historically for analysis of much environmental degradation has been a series of cultural filters and viewpoints that influenced approaches to its treatment. The environmental degradation construct historically determined what should be done—if anything—to ameliorate environmental degradation. What is being reacted to, in many cases, is this environmental degradation construct.

However, taking the question of the definition of environmental degradation into account as a historical issue of change in the construct, a pattern emerges of moving from arguments about philosophical primacy of a single factor of population—with monotonic, monocausal, ahistorical, and quantitative/mathematical requirements of timeless "unalterable" issues—toward explanations of environmental degradation more multivariate (multiple variables without any of them being reducible to another), historical, strategic, and highly interdisciplinary. Arguably, as multiple variables enter the definition, the robustness of the model improves toward relational and interscientific definitions of environmental degradation. With multiple variables involved in modeling environmental degradation, the areas or variables to deal with expand. Instead of only one recognizable venue of intercession, a far more problematized, political, relational, and interscientific model of environmental degradation with multiple areas for intercession

comes to the fore—demoting previous reductionist attempts to link environmental degradation to philosophical conjecture about only one factor of population and its preeminence instead of its relation with other factors.

Early Reductionist Constructs

Though many other literate cultures throughout world history left records observing environmental degradation and theoretical state approaches to alleviate it, with European imperialism and scientific culture having such a wide effect on the world in the past 500 years, it is impossible to ignore the importance of the freshly minted and highly acclaimed culture around—and even substitutionary religious status for—quantification. Quantification was popularized within Europe as a more reliable method of thought for establishing "stable, timeless, true" knowledge in the wake of mutual Protestant and Catholic disenchantment of the Wars of Religion conducted in Europe over the period of the French Wars of Religion (1550s–1598) into the generalized European Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). Nevertheless, the selected factors that came to be measured in the model were still subjective.

The Venetian lapsed-Camaldolese monk and mathematical philosopher Giammaria Ortes (1713–1790) was the first to take quantification of population and apply it to political philosophical issues and "social science." Ortes provided the first mathematical theory of what he considered the penultimate variable for environmental degradation: population. Why was it so? Because to Ortes, population was imminently quantifiable and could be fitted to methods he wanted to utilize. To be sure, Giovanno Botero (c. 1544–1617), in *On the Greatness of Cities* of 1588, foreshadowed the dynamic Ortes describes, though he was writing before European popularized mathematized arguments were framed as static, inescapable, counterbalanced, zero sum game equations imported with great status into political argument. By the 1750s, Ortes published the first instance of a mathematized argument implying exponential population growth versus arithmetic food resources leading to both starvation/poverty on one side and wealth consolidation on the other. He argued that geometric population growth "had to," by logic of his mathematical models, outstrip the assumed slower arithmetic progress of food production. In the last year of his life, 1790, Ortes published *Reflections on the Population of Nations in Relation to National Economy*, setting an unalterable construct of an upper limit for the world's human population at 3 billion—after moving through a series of mathematical arguments and tables. Ortes is the first to employ the term *carrying capacity* as well. Thus, Ortes is the father of "overpopulation" theory.

Due to high political Venetian–English political alliances and other points unmentioned for lack of space, it is certain that Rev. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834), himself a cleric with a greater interest in mathematics, plagiarized ideas of mathematic ex-monk Ortes. In Rev. Malthus's famous work, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* of 1798, he makes identical religio-moral mathemetized arguments as "proof" about population outstripping food as inevitably decreasing food per capita. Without any intrusion of other variables, Malthus, like Ortes, claims this inevitably leads to famine, environmental degradation, and social and moral degradation. Malthus even calculated his own Ortesian "carrying capacity," which was to be broached sometime in the mid-19th century. Like Ortes, Malthus proposed that late marriage and abstinence should be state policies as a check on "geometric" population growth. The larger context is that while all other major continental states in Europe, like Colbertian France, Linnaean Sweden, and Frederick the Great's Prussia, were cameralist (meaning, among other points, supporting population growth politically as the means to make a state wealthy), the maritime empires of Venice and England—without comparable political economic situations linking their larger transoceanic empires' elite wealth to the well-being of their territorial inhabitants—took to anti-cameralist arguments against their continental cameralist enemies. Hired in 1805 as the first chair of political economy in Britain soon after his essay was published, Rev. Malthus worked until his death at the Haileybury school, created by the British East India Company (BEIC) to indoctrinate its corporate management staff in the business of running a global anti-cameralist empire, with such management ideologies continuing into the British Raj. In short, Rev. Malthus's construct of environmental degradation as a populationist idea of "natural timeless famines" and as a nonpolitical check on population encouraging wealth conservation was applied as the main anti-cameralist policy justification for the global BEIC/British Empire's food, poverty, population growth, and famine response (or lack thereof) from Ireland, to India, to China, to Africa.

Though most social scientists no longer seriously consider single-variable causal model solutions of social problems, construct environmental degradation as populationism continues to have considerable political policy influence regardless of the fact that rarely any "calculations" came true over the past 200 years showing population as a direct variable of environmental degradation. The common application and thread in this population policy-based construct of environmental degradation is as a useful anti-cameralist policy for maintaining a global corporate state empire from the 1700s to the present. However, even the United Nations, long maintaining such anti-cameralist constructs concerning environmental degradation/population, by 2002 moved toward more multivariate models to make sense of the reality of negative population growth evident across many countries since the 1990s. Charitably, population as a proxy for environmental degradation has been, at most, an indirect relationship even if government workers acted upon construct populationism.

The earliest, more sociological, models of environmental degradation are elaborations of direct inexorable populationist arguments, however sociologically adapted—namely, the work of Ehrlich, O'Connor, the Club of Rome group, Schnaiberg/Gould, or Catton.

Intercession Variables

More multivariate models of environmental degradation and intercession have been aired since the 1970s. These include a plethora of other proposed direct variables of environmental degradation which are equal pressure points for environmental intercessions. This entry proposes a relational and interscientific definition of environmental degradation to encapsulate these many variables. Regardless of the theoretical-methodological approach to the construct of environmental degradation, any statement of environmental degradation must include issues of the organization of human consumption and pollution. The devil has always been in the multivariate details, however. This is despite a long history of attempts to popularize environmental degradation strictly, with populationism being politically paramount instead of being just one factor among many. The tendency of many sociological theories of the environment has been to ignore multivariate aspects and ignore case-specific issues, that is, to aim toward a grand theory. Grand theories or plans typically fall apart in the analysis of particular cases or applications to real-world issues. A multivariate appreciation of environmental degradation is more appropriate, particularly in summing all the different variables analyzed in environmental degradation as well as toward applications of environmental amelioration.

Summarizing much of the literature that talks at cross-purposes, it will be noted that the empirically multivariate issue of human consumption shows we are (1) populations that consume (2) choices of physical and biological materials through which we have (3) chosen to create particular pollution wastes, in (4) social networks via mostly (5) institutionalized and habitual frameworks (6) contentiously legitimated or delegitimated among ourselves, employing (7) choices of available knowledge and choices of technological interfaces, influenced by the (8) history of (9) politics and (10) weather/geographic pattern changes. In the political variable concerning environmental degradation, it is particularly clear how formal institutions and formal policy change to respond to, or to shore off response to, the aforementioned variables. As a result, in the past decades scholars have moved toward more (11) infrastructural views on environmental degradation, as well as, in turn, more infrastructural views of human consumption. This requires changing many basic epistemological views, particularly how we define and analyze commodities, commodity choice, socioeconomic change, the origins of technological change, and environmental degradation as politically contentious developmental issues instead of as neutral economic presuppositions and methods employed in these areas.

None of these numbered intercessions that influence environmental degradation can be reducible to another. All are, to various degrees, independent sites of intercession and are relational. They are politically negotiated, problematic, and historically iterative in their effects instead of timelessly stable or given. All have been aired—either together or separately, either as direct or indirect variables involved in environmental degradation. A simpler statement is that human population is always mediated through these organizational factors of consumption, making such organizational issues of consumption direct variables of environmental degradation and intercession, whereas population scale/reduction is, at best, an indirect variable. It is quite possible, in other words, to reduce or expand population and to have little or zero change in

the institutionalized patterns of environmental degradation, because human consumption is mediated by many sociopolitical, cultural, and technological issues. Humans are networked and mediated creatures in their consumption across multiple ecologies; however, many attempts have been made to take 18th-century populationist models or 20th-century population ecology models and "plug in" human numbers.

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See also Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Pollution; Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Movement; Environmental Racism

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Environmental Hazards

An environmental hazard is a threat posed by the natural or built environment to humans and the things that are valued in human society. An environmental hazard becomes a disaster when the threat is realized and causes significant human loss. Death, injury, and psychological harm are judged to be more serious than economic or property loss, and threats to nonhuman environments and their flora and fauna are considered to be the least severe and are frequently left out of measures of environmental hazard unless they lead to a secondary threat to humans or their property.

Environmental hazards are categorized as either natural or technological, though multiple hazards may be linked to one another. Natural hazards include geologic events, like earthquakes, landslides, and volcanic eruptions; hydrologic events, like floods and drought; meteorological events, such as tornadoes and hurricanes; and biologic events, like wildfires, infestations, and diseases. Technological hazards arise from within human systems and are usually accidental in nature. They include industrial failures that release toxic materials into the environment, structural collapse of buildings and bridges, and transportation disasters like plane crashes and train derailments.

A third category of environmental hazard has been increasingly employed to describe events with the potential for catastrophic impact on the global environment. Sometimes referred to as "context hazards," these include not only unpredictable occurrences like meteor impacts or the mutation of a virus into a deadly pathogen but also chronic, ordinary events. For example, deforestation and the release of industrial contaminants are increasingly implicated in the complex environmental threats posed by global warming.

The connection between human action and natural disaster was first explored at the University of Chicago during the 1950s by geographer Gilbert F. White, who argued that disasters cannot be understood in isolation from human society. Social scientists

using a human ecology framework began to investigate disaster prevention and the mitigation of its consequences. Geographers took up a "hazards-based" approach to disaster, analyzing perceptions of hazards and subsequent behavioral responses. Psychologists compared perceptions of risk for hazards that are involuntary (like breathing air pollution) and voluntary (like smoking cigarettes), while anthropologists noted that perceptions of hazard are substantially influenced by cultural tradition. At the same time, sociologists were preoccupied with collective behavior and the dynamics of social organizations that might influence disaster preparedness and response. Earth scientists continued to focus on the physical causes of disasters. Geologists, meteorologists, and hydrologists were developing better systems of disaster prediction, while civil engineers worked on designing more effective technological defenses.

By the 1970s social scientists challenged the "behavioral paradigm" associated with the hazards-based approach and criticized its emphasis on individual action and its minimization of the power of social and economic forces. The new theoretical paradigm (also known as the critical or political economy view) asserted that environmental hazards are not caused by natural or technological processes but by structural inequalities within and between nations that systematically increase the risk to some social groups while sheltering others from threat.

The term *risk* refers to the probability that a particular hazard will be realized, combined with the severity of its consequences. For example, the coastal landing of a hurricane presents the same hazard to rich and poor; however, the risk of suffering serious harm as a result of the hurricane is significantly greater for the poor than for the rich because they are more vulnerable to the consequences. Vulnerability is the key variable used to measure susceptibility to the harms associated with environmental hazards and to calculate risk. Less-reliable technological systems (those with frequent system failure) and less-resilient social systems (those with reduced capacity for recovery following disaster) are considered to be most vulnerable. Studies that chart the distribution of risk across demographic groups demonstrate that it is the very old and the very young within the lowest socioeconomic and culturally marginalized groups who are the most vulnerable to disasters' harmful effects. The least vulnerable are those with the greatest access to financial, technological, and informational resources.

Although most disaster researchers and policymakers share many of the same practical goals, there remains a substantial divergence in philosophy and strategy. Echoing the globalization debate between modernization and dependency theorists, the behavioral view of disaster attributes the vulnerability of less-developed nations to their failure to modernize, whereas conflict theorists point to unequal global trade relations. Arguing that wealthy industrialized nations use economic and political pressure to force economically dependent nations to exploit their own natural resources, these theorists claim that it is not underdevelopment that creates vulnerability to environmental hazard, but poverty. Behavioralists assume that vulnerability can be reduced through technological innovation, whereas conflict theorists call for social changes, including redistribution of wealth and power and greater reliance on local knowledge in preference to imported expertise. Finally, there is sharp disagreement about the extent to which environmental hazards and their realized disasters occur as a result of unusual occurrences or whether they reflect chronic circumstances. Having as a post-disaster goal a return to "normalcy" is problematic if normal conditions are implicated in creating the environmental hazard in the first place.

The United Nations has developed the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, a plan of action for the 21st century that acknowledges the complex social contexts that color perceptions and influence calculations of vulnerability and risk. The plan takes a pragmatic view, advocating the use of both behavioral and structural strategies to reduce the losses associated with environmental hazards.

Judith Pintar

See also Disasters; Environmental Justice; Modernization Theory

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Environmental Justice

Environmental justice seeks to assess the fairness of the distribution of environmental risks and benefits. Of primary concern are the negative effects of nearby activities that generate pollution or risk in some form and that have health or nuisance impacts on people who live or work in the neighborhood. Most research and public policy dealing with environmental justice seeks to determine whether low-income or minority populations are disproportionately and negatively impacted by polluting activities.

Primarily since the 1970s, a number of research projects in the United States have investigated whether or not a systematic inverse relationship exists between pollution exposure and income or racial minority populations. Many of these studies examined the population characteristics of areas in the vicinity of solid waste transfer stations and disposal sites.

Criticisms of many of these investigations concern their (a) dealing with population areas larger than the likely spatial extent of the negative spillovers, (b) employing inadequately defined control areas to assess if disadvantaged people were disproportionately impacted, (c) depending too heavily on case studies with limited external validity, and (d) not addressing whether nearby sources of pollution or risk did indeed have negative health or nuisance effects on neighboring populations.

Other studies employing sound research designs have demonstrated that in some geographic areas, low-income and minority groups in the population *do* live closer to some kinds of environmental hazards than other groups. For example, a national study in the mid-20th century used a comprehensive listing of waste storage and disposal facilities and census tract data for a 20-year period, comparing tracts with and without hazardous sites. In general, the findings were that surrounding these sites were primarily working-class neighborhoods with mostly white populations extensively employed in manufacturing. However, this was more the case in northern urban areas than in the southeastern portion of the United States, where neighboring tracts had larger black populations.

The most reliable studies account for market forces and land use controls, using census tracts in the same urban area but without waste sites as the basis for comparison. Although even these largely fail to establish the public health effects of this proximity, they do point out what needs to be considered to have a reliable empirical basis for assessing the distributional implications of local decisions and thus for public policy.

Public policy applications of findings from sound environmental justice research focus not only on remediation and mitigation of existing conditions but also on current and future decisions that can impact environmental quality. This is the primary purpose of Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority and Low-Income Populations, signed by President Clinton in 1994.

This order directs each federal agency to adopt, as part of its mission, responsibility for evaluating and mitigating "disproportionately high adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income populations in the United States." This order also requires both informing these populations about these likely health and nuisance impacts and involving them in assessing these impacts and in developing ways to minimize or mitigate them.

The National Environment Policy Act requires environmental impact assessments on anything that the federal agencies sponsor, fund, permit, or undertake, which includes many programs and projects implemented at the local level. Legal action can occur in the case of unequal treatment under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires nondiscrimination in relation to sex, age, disability, race, color, and national origin.

Although Executive Order 12898 establishes the principles concerning factors to consider in assessing environmental justice, it stops short of specifying the strategy that agencies must use or prescribing the methodology for evaluating the performance of alternative plans or project designs. Instead, agencies can initiate a range of approaches on an experimental

basis. Even so, the principles of the order suggest a sequence of at least four analytical tasks.

First is identifying and mapping the spatial extent of negative environmental impacts, such as air and water pollution, noise and vibration, displacement of homes or businesses, degraded aesthetic values, disrupted natural and man-made resources, traffic congestion, and disrupted community cohesion or economic vitality. The second task is identifying the demographic profile of those living and working in the impacted area. Next is defining a baseline or control population, usually for a larger area such as a jurisdiction. The final analytical task is calculating and comparing the percentage of low-income and minority people in the impact area and the larger area, to determine if those impacted by the action are disproportionately disadvantaged.

As noted earlier, the order requires both these analytical tasks and public outreach and involvement in identifying, reviewing, and understanding the negative environmental effects. It also requires engaging stakeholders in designing ways to reduce these effects, to mitigate those effects that remain, and perhaps to compensate for effects that are otherwise difficult to mitigate.

This executive order was a unique initiative by a central government to address and act on environmental justice. Furthermore, it provided a definition of environmental justice that grew out of studies that examined who was especially adversely impacted by the location of hazardous facilities. Finally, this definition led to an analytical and outreach procedure to assess the environmental justice implications of alternative designs for programs and projects involving the federal government.

Donald H. Miller

See also Environmental Movement; Environmental Racism

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Environmental Movement

The environmental movement is a social movement dedicated to the management, protection, and restoration of the natural environment. Also referred to as the conservation movement, or more recently, the green movement, it is one of the more successful social movements of the 20th century, for it secured widespread public support and influenced governments to establish agencies and pass legislation consistent with the goals of the movement.

Although the movement is rooted in many ideas from the conservationist movement of the early 20th century, what can be called the modern environmental movement did not begin until the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time the movement benefited from the increased political mobilization and cultural climate that accompanied the civil rights and anti-war movements. Also helping to launch the environmental movement was new scientific evidence increasingly indicating that human activity was harming the natural environment. Environmentalists pointed to river fires, gas station lines, and factory soot as examples of avoidable human behavior that was damaging to the environment.

Numerous highly publicized disasters occurred during the 1970s and 1980s that further increased public awareness. Two of these events—the near meltdown at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, in 1979 and the explosion at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986—involved mishaps with nuclear energy. Both events received considerable media and public attention, resulting in a decline in public support for nuclear energy. In 1989, an oil tanker, the *Exxon Valdez,* hit

a reef off the coast of Alaska, resulting in leakage of an estimated 11 million gallons of oil into the sea, one of the largest oil spills in U.S. history. The images of sea animals covered in oil further outraged the public and produced increasing support for the environmental movement into the 1990s.

Government agencies were established and legislation was passed near the beginning of the environmental movement, and these agencies and laws remain in effect today. In 1969 came the National Environmental Policy Act and establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency as a federal agency devoted to protecting and preserving the environment. In 1973, the Endangered Species Act sought to save species who were threatened by environmental destruction.

Various organizations promoting environmentalism have also had a profound impact. Two of the first organizations, the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society, have been promoting environmental issues for more than a century. Sporadic grassroots protests, referred to as Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) movements, reflect local concerns of the environmental movement by discouraging the establishment of waste sites and trash incinerators in local communities. Earth Day—first held on April 22, 1970—continues to serve as a day encouraging Americans to be particularly cognizant of environmental issues.

Recently, the environmental movement began focusing on such macro-level concerns as global warming, ozone depletion, and rain forest loss. In 2005, an agreement among more than 160 countries, known as the Kyoto Protocol, went into effect. Countries ratifying this protocol agreed to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases considered harmful to the environment. The United States has not ratified this protocol despite being the world's most significant producer of greenhouse gases.

Demographically, the environmental movement is primarily a middle-class movement. Many attribute the affluent nature of this movement to the greater amount of time devoted to recreation by the middle class and the tendency for the middle class to focus on aesthetics. A recent trend in the movement, however, has been an emphasis on environmental justice, which emphasizes racial and class disparities in the level of harm caused by pollution and waste. Those participating in the movement tend to be younger in age than participants in most other social movements. Despite the rural nature of the early conservationist movement, those participating in the environmental movement are more likely to reside in urban areas.

Although the environmental movement receives a great deal of public support, some groups resist the movement. Businesses with economic incentives to engage in what many consider to be environmentally harmful practices oppose the movement, typically stating that claims made by environmentalists are exaggerated or mythical. Recently, however, businesses have begun to alter their practices and images to act and appear more environmentally friendly. As a result, the culprit has become the general public, and emphasis has shifted to individual responsibility for environmental concerns.

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See also Environment, Eco-Warriors; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Justice; Environmental Racism; Global Warming; NIMBYism; Social Movements

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Environmental Racism

Environmental racism refers to the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards and toxic facilities resulting from governmental or corporate policies and regulations that deliberately target poor and minority communities. The seminal 1987 study, *Toxic Waste and Race in the United States*, conducted by the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice, found that race was the most significant variable in deciding where hazardous waste facilities were to be located. Subsequent research has largely confirmed that race, even more than economic class, is the strongest predictor of placement for waste-producing facilities. In effect, environmental racism can be seen as mirroring existing patterns of social

inequality; the most polluted communities tend to be the ones populated by minority residents of low socioeconomic status.

The disparate geographic distribution of environmental hazards means that toxic facilities emanating high levels of pollution are apt to be situated near neighborhoods with low property values and high minority populations. Individuals in these communities are more likely to be exposed to inordinately high levels of contamination and work in jobs that subject them to increased environmental risk. Furthermore, children are particularly vulnerable to health risks from higher levels of pollution; illnesses such as asthma, lead poisoning, leukemia, and encephalitis are being detected with increasing frequency among young children living in highly polluted regions. Whereas many of the most polluted areas can be found in and around urban neighborhoods—"cancer alley," for example, is the vicinity along the Mississippi River near Baton Rouge, Louisiana—nuclear waste and other toxic materials and garbage are often disposed of on Native American reservations, which are particularly vulnerable because they are not subject to state jurisdiction. Environmental regulations on Native American lands are more lax, making them prime targets for nuclear waste disposal, landfills, and other toxic facilities.

Environmental justice advocates argue that toxic facilities tend to be placed in nonwhite communities because these are more likely to be impoverished areas where residents are disenfranchised, possess little political power, and offer the least amount of resistance. Furthermore, research suggests that minority communities receive less protection from the enforcement of environmental laws. According to a 1992 report in the *National Law Journal,* penalties for hazardous waste were 500 percent higher in white communities, and penalties for pollution law violations were almost 50 percent higher in white communities than in areas with large minority populations. Environmental justice advocates argue that this disparity, which has been found to occur regardless of whether communities are middle class or poor, is a result of governmental regulations that are enforced in a discriminatory manner.

Still, critics suggest that there is nothing discriminatory about the placement of hazardous waste facilities, arguing instead that market forces ultimately determine where toxic sites are located. As a result, incinerators, landfills, and other waste facilities tend to be found in areas where land is cheaper. These areas, in turn, are also where inexpensive housing is available for lower-income households. Hence, critics argue that toxic facilities are not disparately situated in poor and minority communities, but rather that poor people and people of color tend to move to those areas because they offer the most affordable housing. However, environmental justice activists are critical of the market forces approach, arguing that people in poor and minority neighborhoods do not make a freely rational choice to live in those areas where the risks from environmental hazards are most severe.

Advocates further argue that the effects of "NIMBYism" (based on an acronym for "not in my backyard") have exacerbated the disparate effects of environmental hazards on racial minorities. While middle- and upper-class communities have exhibited the political power to stop the intrusion of hazardous waste facilities, these successes have led to the increased development of toxic sites in poor and minority neighborhoods. According to the 2001 Supreme Court decision in *Alexander v. Sandoval,* 532 U.S. 275, individuals are unable to sue to enforce federal regulations that prohibit disparate racial impacts. In other words, it is not sufficient to simply show harm or discriminatory impact as evidence of environmental racism. Instead, courts also require evidence of discriminatory intent, meaning individuals must prove that they were disproportionately affected by environmental harms resulting from acts of purposeful discrimination. Because most poor and minority communities lack the financial resources and political power needed to maintain a legal challenge against polluters, many environmental justice advocates argue that existing laws and regulations simply serve to maintain the status quo.

In hopes of effecting change, increasing support can be found within the environmental justice movement for grassroots activism that empowers traditionally passive and marginalized neighborhoods. Historically, environmental activists have fought to block the placement of hazardous sites without any communication or consultation from those residents who live in the communities that will be most affected by the presence of harmful toxins. However, grassroots environmental justice organizations are increasingly working with the people living in vicinities affected by environmental degradation. The goal is to encourage the active participation of residents in historically disenfranchised areas in the struggle

against placing toxic facilities in their neighborhoods. As the fight against environmental racism continues to evolve at the grassroots level, the hope is that poor and minority residents living in marginalized communities will continue to have more prominent voices in the fight for environmental justice.

Ray Maratea

See also Discrimination; Discrimination, Institutional; Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Pollution; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Justice; Environmental Movement; NIMBYism; Race

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Epidemics, Management of

The standard biomedical definition of *epidemic* is the sudden spread of a disease among a number of people in excess of normal expectancy. Unlike most social problems, infectious disease epidemics are grave social problems not only because of the possible deadly nature of the disease but also because of the element of surprise and the social context of contamination. For most communities affected by an infectious disease epidemic, the outbreak is unexpected. The mode of contamination tends be a simple daily life activity involving social relations and practices that are innocuous under normal circumstances but that must be halted once the link with the disease becomes evident (e.g., preparing, buying, and selling food; collecting, storing, and drinking water; sharing garments or eating utensils; or engaging in close social and physical contact). The disruption of normal social and economic activities in the affected communities is one of the major consequences of epidemics that transform what begins as one person's illness episode into a large-scale social problem or crisis.

Thus the management of epidemics as a crisis is a problem of governance. Generally, governance refers to the management of the affairs of the collective to ensure safety, fairness, and equality of opportunity for all its individual members. Seen from the perspective of crisis management, unforeseen epidemics are real-time tests of the effectiveness of a country's governance in a time of crisis, and foreseen epidemics testify to the country's level of preparedness. Either way, the political leaders' style of governance becomes a definitive factor in the country's efforts to prevent or contain the epidemic. Consequently, the political and health authorities in the country or region affected by an epidemic are major stakeholders as they are naturally expected to find a solution and implement the measures necessary to deal with the crisis.

The world's experiences with bubonic plague, cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, and countless other infectious disease epidemics of the ancient past have been amplified by encounters with recent epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), and the threat of human transmission of the H5N1 virus, commonly known as "avian influenza" or "bird flu." It is a sign of the times that, compared with past generations, although the world might still be caught unaware by an epidemic in the 21st century, economically advanced countries today are in a better position to manage epidemics. Still, the ability to manage epidemics varies widely across countries depending on the nature of the disease, economic resources, technical expertise, and the overall level of preparedness, among other things.

The accumulated knowledge and experiences with past epidemics highlight three important areas of attention in their management: the scientific and biomedical efforts to develop an effective cure and vaccine against the infectious disease; the types of people affected by the disease; and the leadership actions and decision making that affect the level of success in managing the crisis. The biomedical and scientific efforts to find cures and vaccines are beyond the scope of this entry. The objects of attention here are the other two areas: people and the decision-making process.

Concerning the types of people involved, four types of stakeholders are crucial in the management of epidemics: the group or community directly affected by the outbreak, including infected persons, their families, and immediate social networks both formal and informal; the larger population at risk of infection; the medical and other health care personnel; and the political authorities, including policymakers, health authorities, and all levels of policy implementation personnel. The active cooperation of these important stakeholders is necessary to deal successfully with the epidemic. Medical sociology and social policy studies show that the cooperation of these groups tends to fluctuate due to the influence of many factors, but more significantly with the level of trust citizens have in their national leaders.

Regarding actions and decision-making processes, the management of epidemics requires two kinds of knowledge: (1) knowledge on the nature of the virus or bacteria involved and its clinical features, and (2) knowledge on the population affected. Historical records show that lack of both types of knowledge was among the reasons for the failure of communities and nations waging war against a succession of many epidemics such as bubonic plague in the 14th century; typhus, scurvy, and dysentery in the 16th and 17th centuries; and pulmonary tuberculosis for most of the 19th century.

Today we have HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza ("bird flu"), among other major infectious diseases. Managing these epidemics means preventing and controlling the infectious disease outbreaks, and this is a race against time. The ability of viruses to evolve and move across species represents an ever-increasing danger in a time of considerable population movements through global travel, immigration, and forced exodus propelled by large-scale natural and human-caused disasters. As a result, scientists around the world are scrutinizing the microcosm of viruses and bacteria with an increasing sense of urgency and intensity. Yet, while scientific advances are crucial, they are insufficient. The battle against infectious disease epidemics must be fought simultaneously outside the laboratory on a wider, social front involving the attitudes and actions of ordinary individuals and groups. People's image of a disease influences their attitudes toward illness and may even become part of the community's folklore. Research by medical sociologists and other social scientists indicates that the successful management of epidemics involves knowledge of factors such as cultural values, beliefs, and practices; socioeconomic and demographic features of the population; the public image of the infectious disease; and the political will to intervene. Cultural norms on disease causation, diagnosis, and treatment (including social stigma, privacy issues, and ability to obtain prompt and affordable medical care) are very important. These norms and beliefs influence people's behavior and the level of success in preventing and containing an infectious disease epidemic.

A final point deserves specific mention. Given the dual nature of epidemics as both biomedical and social problems and given the two types of knowledge (biomedical and social) required for their prevention and management, it is clear that effective governance of epidemics can be attained only by close and dynamic collaboration between biomedical and social science experts on the one hand and leaders and the public on the other hand.

Stella R. Quah

See also Bioethics; Health Care, Access; HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations; Pandemics

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Equal Protection

The concept of *equal protection* originates in the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In part, it reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; *nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws*" (emphasis added).

The seemingly simple clause has generated significant public debates over its interpretation and usage. Among these is whether the framers were concerned primarily with *equality* of the laws or *protection* of the laws. Various alternative framings and interpretations have generated a vocabulary of common expressions such as *separate but equal* and its converse of separate as *inherently unequal*, *color-blind*, or *race conscious*, as well as the terms *equal opportunity, affirmative action*, or *preferential treatment* and its corollary *reverse discrimination*. These competing conceptualizations frame larger social, political, and legal debates spawned by the equal protection clause.

Historical Perspective

The 14th Amendment was ratified in 1868, just 3 years after the 13th Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, and 2 years before the 15th Amendment, which prohibited denying citizens the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." This trio of post–Civil War amendments served many purposes, but a central focus was protecting newly freed slaves, particularly in those States that had constituted the Confederacy.

So on its face, the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause seemed intended to provide recently freed slaves the same protection under the laws as white citizens. Surprisingly, the earliest litigation involving the 14th Amendment had little to do with race. Today, litigation under the equal protection clause involves questions about gender, age, disability, and sexual orientation, among other classifications. Nonetheless, examining the application of the equal protection clause to race is illustrative.

In 1877, when federal troops withdrew from the South, abruptly ending a period of Reconstruction, many Southern and Border States enacted regulations known as Jim Crow laws (which prohibited blacks from using the same public facilities as whites) and Black Codes (which impinged on blacks' civil rights and civil liberties). In 1896, one such Jim Crow law was the focus of a notorious U.S. Supreme Court case known as *Plessy v. Ferguson.* This case gave rise both to the doctrine known as "separate but equal" and to a contradictory minority view that the Constitution was "color-blind."

Using the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, Homer Plessy challenged a Louisiana law that mandated that railway coaches be segregated by race. State law required black customers to ride in separate, third-class passenger cars. Plessy, an "octoroon" (meaning he was one-eighth black), was arrested when he boarded the train with a first-class ticket usually reserved for white patrons. The Court upheld the law, finding that the equal protection clause did not extend to "equality in social arrangements" but rather protected only "equality of civil rights."

In this reading of the equal protection clause, the notion of *protection* of the laws trumped the idea of *equality* of the laws. Justice Brown, writing for the majority, identified "the underlying fallacy" of Plessy's argument as based on an assumption that "separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority." The only dissenting justice, John Harlan, wrote, "Our Constitution is *colorblind*, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" (emphasis added). Two decidedly conflicting views thus emerged. The majority permitted separate treatment by race if that treatment was equal; Harlan objected to the very notion of *separate*, where people were sorted by race.

Ostensibly, *Plessy* permitted separate treatment only when groups were treated *equally.* In reality, the *Plessy* decision legitimized racial discrimination in virtually all aspects of social life and resulted in inferior treatment of blacks. Separate accommodations extended well beyond transportation and included all types of public facilities and institutions (e.g., water fountains, swimming pools, schools, hotels, and lunch counters). These laws flourished into the 1960s.

Interpretation Change

The "separate but equal" interpretation of the "equal protection" clause was finally successfully challenged in 1954 in the landmark case of *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.* In this case, involving segregated public schools, the U.S. Supreme Court held that separate schools were "inherently unequal" and explicitly violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Note the significant shift to interpreting the equal protection clause as discriminatory merely by virtue of treating minority groups separately. The Court acknowledged that racial classifications could not be considered independently from the social context that perpetuated inferior treatment.

During the 1960s, civil rights advocates expressed concern about institutional or structural discrimination.

Advocates argued that race-neutral or color-blind policy—which might appear fair and impartial on its face—actually perpetuated institutional discrimination (on the basis of race, gender, or age) as a practical matter by replicating the status quo. These advocates argued that race-conscious policies were necessary to correct historic inequities. They sought to provide equal opportunities for historically marginalized populations through affirmative action programs and policies. Under these initiatives, special preferences could be given to under-represented groups. The point of affirmative action was to correct, compensate, or redress past discrimination for social injustices by giving preferential treatment to individuals based on membership in a group to ensure their equal opportunity to participate in social and political institutions (education, employment, etc.). The object was to increase the representation of the minority groups in areas where they had been traditionally excluded or under-represented. Unequal treatment was seen as a way to promote equal protection as it related to distribution of opportunities.

By the 1970s, concern that some groups were receiving preferential treatment led opponents to reframe the issue and introduce the idea of reverse discrimination. In general, "reverse discrimination" was conceptualized as the practice of discriminating against members of a majority or dominant group by favoring members of a minority group. Affirmative action or preferential treatment programs and policies were challenged as violating the equal protection interests of members of the majority.

For example, in *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,* another landmark Supreme Court case, Allen Bakke—a white male applicant to the University of California at Davis School of Medicine who was twice denied admission—argued that the school's affirmative action program, which set aside 16 seats for minority candidates, violated his equal protection guarantees because the policy discriminated based on *his* race. Notably, he argued it was race alone that barred him from competing for one of those 16 reserved seats. The court agreed, holding that a quota system that reserved a specific number of seats based on race was an unconstitutional violation of the 14th Amendment.

Recent Developments

More recently, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of affirmative action policies and university admissions. In 2003 the court held in *Grutter v. Bollinger* that the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy was constitutional and did not violate the equal protection clause. Barbara Grutter, a white woman who was denied admission, argued that the university's race-conscious admissions policy violated her 14th Amendment equal protection rights. The university argued that diversity—broadly defined to include more factors than race, such as socioeconomic status, gender, age, and religion—was necessary to obtain a diverse student body. In order not to run afoul of *Bakke,* the University of Michigan argued that it did not have a quota system but rather that each person was individually evaluated based on a number of factors including, but not limited to, race and that each had an equal opportunity to compete for every seat.

Although race serves as the primary example in this entry, the equal protection clause has been broadly applied—with greater and lesser success—to many other kinds of groupings, such as gender, age, sexual orientation, and disability. The Supreme Court has established a three-tiered theory of equal protection depending on what group is being considered and the importance of the interest threatened. *Strict scrutiny,* the highest standard, is reserved for cases involving race, and the unequal treatment must meet a *compelling state interest.* The lowest standard of review is known as *rational scrutiny.* Under this minimal standard, there must be some sort of reasonable relationship between the unequal treatment and a legitimate government purpose. The middle tier has been used exclusively for cases involving gender, where the unequal treatment must be *substantially related* to an important state objective. Thus, as simple as the idea of equal protection sounds, it applies differently based on group membership and the interests at stake.

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See also Affirmative Action; Black Codes; Civil Rights; Jim Crow; Race-Blind Policies; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure

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Erosion

Erosion can refer to either the effects of human and natural processes or the human–natural interactive processes, the latter serving here as the focus in discussing soil erosion and biodiversity loss, particularly as a result of surface water runoffs in both urban and rural environments. When humans disrupt soil creation processes, habitat fragmentation, habitat destruction, and general ecological unraveling begin in the soil gradient's plant and animal life specific to it. Worldwide, the majority of biologists blame anthropogenic (resulting from human influence) soil erosion and biodiversity loss for the current sixth major mass extinction event in the history of planet Earth. This is the first anthropogenic mass extinction event, and it is far more rapid than any of the "Big Five" in past geologic times.

Natural Erosion and Soil Creation

In different soil gradients, a specific slow, organic and inorganic physical process of natural soil creation occurs that involves beneficial erosion. This process jockeys increasingly with a faster, human soil erosion and sheet runoff that kill plant and animal life within a soil gradient—carrying the slowly formed soil away. Thus anthropogenic soil erosion and associated biodiversity loss start in the alteration of this balance in the creation or destruction of soil and in how humans affect water dynamics.

Understanding soil creation chemically and physically is necessary if one wishes to understand and arrest the process of soil destruction. Soil creation results from a mixture of decayed organic and inorganic matter relationships, which create an all-important macro-molecular chelate arrangement of humic acids. Humic acids are a major component required for making humic substances, created via microbial degradation of once-living matter. A large number of humic molecules are hydrophobic, meaning they innately allow, in the presence of water, clumping into "water-avoiding" supramolecular nodes.

Only the acidic component of humic substances, mainly carboxylic acid, gives soil a capacity for *chelation*, a capacity to "store" inorganic minerals as ions without them having a strong chemical bond with anything else. Chelated inorganic ions are more readily bioavailable for plants or are sequestered away from them if they are poisons. Thus one of the most important properties of humic acid is this chelation ability to solubilize many ions into hydrophobic cations (water-avoiding, chemically positive ions). For bioavailability chelation, ions like magnesium, calcium, and iron are made available for plant absorption. For *sequestering* chelation, humic acid holds apart as ions many elements that otherwise would form toxic molecular salts to poison the soil without positive biological effect (like cadmium and lead). For instance, sodium and chlorine ions naturally want to combine to form a salt. Instead, in good fertile soil they are attached as separate ions to humic acids and clay—rendered harmless by chelation. Thus many good soils contain large quantities of safely chelated "salt,'' held apart in ionic form from precipitating out in this way. Plant growth thrives in such "theoretically saline'' soils, in many cases. In short, humic acid chelation capacities have an important dual role for living systems: They make biological uptake of nutrients possible, and they sequester poisons. Chemistry of varied humic acids has a profound influence on chelation capacities as well.

On the contrary, human soil erosion processes chemically have in common destruction of the humic acid creation process. This causes (1) loss of chelation capacity and (2) loss of water permeability and loss of soil infiltration capacities as a consequence. For agriculture, the latter can lead to (3) forced excessive watering, and in turn, a raised pH. Water as slightly alkaline (chemically positive) as well as dilutive would demote the slightly acidic (chemically negative) environment that encourages humic acid creation and would thus demote chelation action further. Such watering as a consequence can lead to (4) artificially raised water tables that can bring in external salts to precipitate from below, creating a hardpan and encouraging erosion of the drier soil above it. These four interactive soil destruction factors cause increased salt precipitation in chelated soil. This encourages a chemical and physical change toward poorer soil and less water-absorbent soil in both urban and rural areas. This primes the conditions that cause soil erosion, whether by sheet water runoff or wind.

Erosion: Just Add Water or Wind

Poor land or soil uses such as those involving deforestation, overgrazing, styles of chemical and physical agriculture (tilling), unmanaged construction activity, and

urban impermeable surfaces demote humic acid formation. This leads to erosion because less humic acid means less hygroscopic soil, resulting in an innately dry soil—regardless of climate. Human-created poor soils facilitate ongoing natural water erosion and wind erosion above rates of natural soil formation. In heavily eroding water conditions, it is not water alone that erodes, but also suspended loads of abrasive particles of poor loose soil, pebbles, and boulders, which expand the power of erosion as they traverse and scrape soil surfaces. Waterborne soil erosion in these conditions is additionally a function of water speed and suspended particle dynamics.

Wind erosion occurs in areas with little or no vegetation, often in areas without sufficient rainfall. However, the common factor of a less humic-acidic hygroscopic soil facilitates wind erosion regardless of climate. One example is provided by the long-term shifting dunes in beaches or deserts, which advance to bury any plant life even when underground sources of water may be sufficient. Huge areas of western China are experiencing expanding desertification and wind-based erosion, whipped into incredible dust storms caused by mostly anthropogenic climate change. Both water and wind erosion cause further biodiversity loss from receiving water sedimentation and ecosystem damage (including fish kills).

Anthropogenic soil erosion and biodiversity loss expand from *edge effects,* the ecological juxtaposition between contrasting environments. Edge effects are boundaries between natural habitats and disturbances by poor land use choices. When an edge is created to a natural ecosystem and the area outside is a disturbed system, even the natural ecosystem fragment is affected for great distances inward from the edge. This edge effect area is called the "external habitat" and has a different microclimate than the residual "interior habitat." This partially compromised external habitat starts a feedback loop process, leading to further soil erosion and microclimate change unraveling and exposing more interior habitat to further habitat destruction. For example, Amazonian areas altered by edge effects exceed the area actually cleared, and fires are more prevalent in the external habitat area as humidity drops and temperature and wind levels rise. Increased natural fire frequency from the 1990s in the Amazon, Indonesia, and the Philippines is an edge effect.

In such contexts, an ecosystem unravels toward a simpler, *emergy* state (i.e., embedded or sequestered biomass energy). Intrusive exotic species are part of this, further causing biodiversity loss to levels of lower complexity. Exotics are hardly to blame. The blame is human soil-erosive processes that create edge effects and biodiversity loss that exotics opportunistically utilize.

Shifting Blame and Shifting Cultivation

The blame for much of the world's soil and biodiversity erosion usually focuses on the poor—the slash-and-burn cultivators, mostly of the developing world. However, the developed world engages in transnational corporate logging, mining, export-driven grazing of cattle, and plantation agriculture linked to a war economy demoting political expression of local ecological self-interest. These factors in combination are to blame for soil and biodiversity loss, as well as for keeping such degradation in place. In short, current faulty and unsustainable developed world models and associated warfare are the larger origin of soil erosion, defoliation, and biodiversity destruction. Another example of misplaced priorities of exclusive blame (though a matter of proper concern) on peasant slash-and-burn for erosion is its false magnification by politicized developed world research institutions. Despite the largest blame for soil erosion and biodiversity loss coming from developed world developmental models, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) assessed shifting cultivation of the last independent natives to be the main cause of deforestation—ignoring more invasive and destructive unsustainable developed world logging. The apparent discrimination and policy focus against independent shifting cultivators (whom the FAO recommend be forced to work on export economy rubber plantations) caused a confrontation between the FAO and environmental groups who saw the FAO supporting unsustainable commercial logging and plantation interests against local rights of indigenous people to be independent economically.

The lesson here is that the infrastructural and cultural adherence of more than 3 to 4 billion people (at least ambivalently) supportive of developed world political economic models and commodity choices is far more dangerous to soil erosion and biological diversity than the estimated mere 250 million people subsisting on slash-and-burn. Instead of nomadic slash-and-burn sustenance-minded shifting cultivation

villages, it is the expansion of permanent agricultural monocropping techniques—particularly in export frameworks of high herbicide/pesticide commodities, mining pollution, transnational corporate logging, and tree plantations—that has led to more soil erosion and biodiversity loss. Massive export-oriented sheep and cattle herding, for instance, led to soil erosion and biodiversity loss in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the Amazon. In less than 150 years in Australia, export-oriented monocrop agriculture in New South Wales led to clearing 90 percent of native vegetation. The same chosen agricultural strategy and chosen commodities removed 99 percent of tallgrass prairie in North America in the same period, leading to extreme habitat fragmentation and massive *suspended loads* (sediment) flowing down the Mississippi River. In the past 50 years, erosion has been affecting even oceans, with more than 60 massive dead zones of deoxygenated ocean water appearing off the littorals of the developed world. In short, organizing developmental paradigms of more locally attenuated human–environmental commodity relationships to maintain local natural soil gradient formation processes and to maintain soil infiltration are two generalized goals common to addressing soil erosion and biodiversity loss. There are already many land use techniques developed in urban and rural areas to allow for quick sedimentation and decreased water speed. Wider goals are to demote contexts that allow suspended loads or soil destruction in the first place—by altering agricultural and construction practices to mitigate loosened soil or heavy watering. There are frameworks of urban water handling and agricultural water and soil handling already developed to allow for more water infiltration, less (sometimes zero) soil tilling, and elimination of chemical pesticides and herbicides.

Integrating ecological relationships into urban infrastructural relations and making rural extraction sustainable by encouraging soil-creating human activities instead of soil destruction are both crucial. This seems to be the only route to demote the massive soil erosion and biodiversity loss that follow soil gradients. Comparatively, soil and biodiversity survive with human societies, or all will fall together.

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See also Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Movement; Water Organization; Water Quality

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Ethnic Cleansing

Ethnic cleansing refers to the act of purging a region or area of a particular group based on its ethnic or racial identity, through violence and intentional oppression against the targeted group. Activities associated with ethnic cleansing include forced migrations, population transfers, appropriation of property, establishment of resettlement camps, threats of violence, and acts of violence (rape, torture, murder) on an individual and mass scale. Smaller-scale but equally insidious acts include prohibitions against citizenship and work; restricted civil rights; and restrictions on the right to bear arms, own property, use public resources, and communicate with the outside world. The intent of these deliberate acts is to alienate and exclude the target group.

The purpose of ethnic cleansing, a type of extreme action on behalf of nationalism or national self-determination, is ostensibly to purify a region or place. A majority or dominant group empties a region to occupy it. The offered justification for such a goal

is often presented in either historical terms—in which the group taking the action considers itself bereft of past glory—or in racial terms—in which the dominant group claims that the victim has no right to exist within a territory. This drive to homogenize a place is not new, but the widespread and increasingly problematic use of the term is rather recent.

Vocabulary referring to the victims of ethnic cleansing includes such innocuous-sounding terms as *émigrés, deportees, refugees, war refugees, migrants, immigrants,* and *displaced persons*. Norman Naimark and others have traced the meaning of the term *ethnic cleansing* in European languages, including *chishchenie* (Russian) and *cicenja* (Serbo-Croatian), as referring to political purges. The term compares with the German word *Säuberung,* which conjures up the concepts of eugenics and race as well as political persecution. The term emerged during the Balkan Wars of the late 20th century, when it appeared in use by journalists in 1992 to describe Serbian activities against Croats and, later, Bosnian Muslims, with the clear intent to convey that a population was being expelled by means of force and terror. It became a pervasive term in the press, from the *New York Times,* to the *Financial Times* and the *Economist,* to the London *Times* and the *Guardian,* to the BBC, CNN, and wire services like the Associated Press and Agence France. By the summer of 1992, *Newsweek* and *U.S. News and World Report* used the term. This proliferation produced a debate about whether journalists had sanitized the term *ethnic cleansing,* rendering it an illegitimate synonym for genocide. A perhaps simplistic response would be that genocide may be a tactic of ethnic cleansing, but not all ethnic cleansing is genocide. The term has since been formalized by its use in war crimes cases. For example, items 138 to 140 of the World Summit Outcome, adopted by the United Nations on September 15, 2005, fell under the heading "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," thus demonstrating that the term has acquired legal status.

Since its introduction into the vocabulary of politics and the media, the term *ethnic cleansing* has been applied to cases ranging from the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda. These may be the simplest applications, whereas others—such as the population transfers during the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the exile of Germans from the Volga region in 1941 and the later deportation of the Chechen-Ingush and the Crimean Tatars in 1944, the expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland after 1945, the genocide of Armenians in 1915, and the ongoing crisis in Palestine—are more complex and contested instances of ethnic cleansing. Some point to events such as the Spanish Inquisition as evidence that "cleansing" against Jews, Muslims, and "the Other" has long been a legacy of Western civilization. Other postwar applications include attacks on Kurds in Iraq, crimes of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the Sudan crisis of Darfur. This has led to a debate about whether it is appropriate to apply the term retroactively.

The question of morality also comes into play when equating ethnic cleansing with genocide or the Holocaust. Assigning the role of victim to a population is a weighty task and one fraught with pitfalls. For example, only after the reunification of Germany did a real discussion emerge which allowed for the investigation of ethnic Germans as suffering ethnic persecution after the war. Likewise, populations of other ethnic groups, including Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, registered complaints regarding postwar population transfers intended to homogenize territories as a prophylactic against future petitions from a large ethnic minority and as a means for the Soviet Union to force East Europeans into a condition of dependency.

The justification of acts of ethnic cleansing can be interpreted as a perversion of the Wilsonian concept of national self-determination, taking various forms. In former colonial territories, it involves the invention or rediscovery of indigenous culture and power structures, which are then interpreted, or reinterpreted, along ethnic lines. In the immediate aftermath of World War II in Europe, acts identified as ethnic cleansing were a direct result of Nazi or fascist interpretations of historical destiny as inextricably linked to ethnic identity and Aryan superiority, as well as oppressive expansionist and genocidal activities in occupied territories. Thus, at both the macro and micro levels, invoking both legal justifications and illegal persecution, ethnic cleansing was practiced in Europe and elsewhere, both before and after 1945.

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See also Genocide; Holocaust; Human Rights; Mass Murder; Refugees; Resettlement

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Ethnic Group

An ethnic group is a large group of people that defines itself, or is delineated by outsiders, as separate or set apart socially and sometimes geographically. The separation of this group of people is due to differences in national or geographic origin, religion, or other cultural factors, and race. National origin refers to the country or geographic region, for example, in Europe or Asia, where a person's family came from originally or at least at one point in the past. Cultural factors that create ethnic group boundaries include language, dress, family structure, and values, as well as religion. Ethnic groups are also set apart by race. Although race is a socially manufactured concept, it has been, and continues to be, an important factor in creating and maintaining ethnic group boundaries in many societies.

Although everyone may not know the term *ethnic group,* the concept is very important to many people for everyday interaction. When someone asks, "What are you?" or "What kind of name is that?" the question indicates a desire to know one's ethnic group affiliation.

Interestingly, the term *ethnic group* is often mistakenly equated only with recent immigrants. People who are newcomers to society and who might speak a different language, have different cultural or religious practices, or have different racial features are seen as "ethnics," meaning that the newcomers are members of an ethnic group, whereas native residents are not. In fact we are all members of an ethnic group even though one person's group affiliation might not be as apparent as another's. For example, a white Protestant who has no idea when his or her ancestors first came to America, nor from where in the world they originated, might consider him- or herself as having no ethnicity compared with recently arrived Mexican Americans who seemingly have a clear ethnic group membership. But everyone has an ethnic group affiliation. To those Mexican Americans, for example, "ethnic group" could refer to white, Protestant Americans.

However, not everyone's ethnic group holds the same degree of importance. Ethnic group membership plays a significant role in the everyday lives of recently arrived immigrants. Furthermore, ethnic group affiliation is meaningful to other groups that have been severely oppressed for many years, such as African Americans. Often Native Americans remain bounded by clear and significant social and geographic boundaries.

As in the United States, many societies claim to be egalitarian, arguing that their members do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. However, to varying degrees, it is important for many people who hold stereotypical views to be able to place individuals in the proper ethnic group. Just as awareness of gender is important for many people in trying to relate to others, ethnic group affiliation is important for those holding stereotypical beliefs of the people with whom they are seriously interacting.

The passage of time often makes a difference. Whereas the German American ethnic group was sharply set apart in many U.S. communities from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, today the German American ethnic group is largely symbolic.

John P. Myers

See also Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism

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Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a descriptive concept. One's ethnicity is something like a residential address. When you reveal that you live at 1402 River Street, Philadelphia, Mississippi, in the United States, the listener knows more about you, can locate you in the geographic

world, and perhaps from this address can detect some clues about your social placement as well. However, what we might call one's "social address" is equally important to many people. Ethnicity makes up an important part of one's social address along with class, gender, and other factors, such as the community in which one lives.

When people ask, "What are you?" or "What kind of name is that?" they want to know your ethnicity. "Ethnicity" refers to the phenomena that create boundaries that separate a large group of people from other groups. The ethnic group itself, as well as outsiders, can create and maintain this separation. Some groups, such as Amish Americans, ardently maintain their ethnicity. Other groups, such as African Americans, encounter ethnic boundaries maintained by the larger groups in power through formal and informal practices and norms.

The phenomena generating ethnicity are national or geographic origin, religion or other cultural factors, and race. National origin refers to the country or geographic region, for example, in Asia, Europe, or Latin America, where a person's family came from originally or at least at one point in the past. Cultural factors that create ethnicity include language, dress, family structure, values, and religion. Race may also be a defining part of ethnicity. Although race is a socially manufactured concept, it has been and remains an important factor in creating and maintaining ethnicity in many societies.

Ethnicity is not like an illness that comes and goes. We all have an ethnic background that is always part of us. Some often think that only recent immigrants possess an ethnicity, but this is wrong. Newcomers who might speak a different language, have different cultural or religious practices, or have different racial features are certainly visible "ethnics," openly revealing themselves to be members of an ethnic group not that of native residents. However, we all possess ethnicity even if it might not be as apparent. For example, a white Protestant American with no idea when his or her ancestors first arrived, nor from where in the world they originated, might consider him- or herself as having no ethnicity compared with recently arrived immigrants. Yet that white, Protestant American group possesses cultural attributes that are recognizable by others.

Not everyone's ethnicity is a conscious daily reality, however. One's ethnicity plays a significant role in the everyday lives of recently arrived immigrants compared with the occasional ethnic self-awareness of fully assimilated individuals. Furthermore, ethnicity is usually most meaningful to members of groups that were severely oppressed for many years. Thus, being African American is very meaningful in the United States. Often Native Americans still experience clear and significant social and geographic boundaries.

John P. Myers

See also Cultural Values; Ethnic Group; Ethnocentrism; Subcultures

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ETHNOCENTRISM

The meaning of *ethnocentrism* is revealed by the smaller words that make up the larger one: *ethnicity* and *center*. Ethnocentrism means placing your ethnicity at the center. In this case *center* means "most important." Ethnocentrism is the practice of judging other cultures and ethnic groups against your own culture and ethnic group while seeing your own group and culture as the ideal.

For example, many Americans hold the viewpoint that the English language is the best language, the most natural language, and certainly the only language to be spoken in the United States. Those imbued with ethnocentrism would conclude that other languages are inferior. The same holds true with many cultural practices. Those possessed by ethnocentrism would conclude that their religion, their holidays, their economic system, and their family structure are clearly the best ones.

Ethnocentrism results in prejudice and discrimination based on culture and ethnicity. Racism and ethnocentrism are parallel concepts and processes, both having to do with attitudes and behaviors. Both imply a sense of superiority of one race or ethnic group to others. Both become justifications to oppress groups.

Sociologist Andrew Greeley sees ethnocentric people concluding, "Why can't they be like us?"

Invidious comparisons are inevitable when viewing members and practices of other ethnic groups through the lens of ethnocentrism, which sees all other cultures and groups as lacking and inferior. This often leads to frustration and hostility for those who are ethnocentric. Prejudice, discrimination, proselytizing, verbal hostility, and violence are ways ethnocentrism may be made manifest. In the United States, hate crimes are one of the outcomes of ethnocentrism. Indeed, ethnicity and race account for the great majority of hate crimes.

Being ethnocentric may facilitate regrettable decisions. For example, on a large-scale level, country "A," which is led by ethnocentric rulers, makes war on country "Z." The leaders in country A believe that the Zs are suffering under a bad government, subject to an oppressive religion, and the citizens are impoverished because the economic system in country Z is outdated and needs to be modernized. The leaders of country A expect the population of Zs to be supportive of the invasion and "liberation" of their country. They expect Zs to embrace a new and "better" form of government and support the new Z leadership installed by the As. However, the As find out that even though most Zs were not totally happy with their lives, overall the Zs were fairly satisfied and so they resist the invasion by the As. As a micro-level example, ethnocentric U.S. college student Bill takes a semester abroad in Mexico. Bill attempts to convince the members of his host family that they should shower at least once a day, work longer hours, forgo their siesta, allow the young women to date without chaperones, and increase the amount of meat in their meals. In addition, Bill was only trying to help the members of the host family when he told them about the "one true religion."

John P. Myers

See also Cultural Values; Prejudice; Racism

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ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Ethnomethodology is a sociological paradigm (perspective) that views the social world as a phenomenon that individuals must constantly construct and reconstruct in thought, process, and action. It is a micro-analytic perspective that focuses on breaking taken-for-granted rules.

History and Definition

In the United States in the 1960s, Harold Garfinkel first coined the term and developed the school of ethnomethodology. The term means the study (*ology*) of people (*ethno*). Its foundation lies in Europe, generally based on the work of phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. Schutz's writings redevelop Max Weber's *verstehen* (sympathetic introspections or understanding behavior from the perspective of those engaged in it). Phenomenology is the counterpart to scientific positivism, which views the social world as objective reality. Positivism perceives society as external to, and dominant over, the individual. In ethnomethodology, nature and culture influence human experiences in an intersubjective manner, given that interaction with others creates social worlds. Early ethnomethodological studies involved college students "bargaining" in a grocery store by insisting on paying more for jelly beans than the sale price indicated and pretending to be boarders in their own homes.

Focus and Application

Although ethnomethodology links symbolic interaction and dramaturgy, it differs in methodology and focus. It requires that the researcher shed preconceived notions of how social order is maintained and instead focus on the fluidity, the constantly changing nature of social structure. Social order occurs through member interaction and cooperation; it is not something detached from, and imposed on, members.

People tend to share the manner in which they experience the social world. Our culturally shared understanding of how social life is conducted facilitates interaction. Interaction rests not on anonymous relationships but on the subjectivity of membership categories (e.g., mother, employer, female, white, etc.) that identify those engaged in the interaction.

In human interaction, nothing in the interactive process is completely objective or subjective. Explanations individuals provide result from their cultural and personal experiences and expectations (biographies).

Ethnomethodology thus focuses on the documentary evidence (accounts) that members provide by questioning the taken-for-granted to reveal the norms that help maintain social order. Ethnomethodologists analyze mutually related factors regarding the interrelations of actors in a given situation in everyday life. These factors refer to the indexical and reflexive character of the interaction process. *Indexicality* is a term used to explain the interpretive nature of human interaction. The context in which, or vantage point from which, to view an individual or social situation impacts the "construction" of the "reality." The term *reflexivity* refers to the intuitive nature and commonsense component of interaction. Based on the appropriateness of manner and circumstance, individuals are accountable for engaging in socially acceptable behavior.

Communication in general, and the use of language in particular, play important roles in ethnomethodology, as these reveal the organization of people's ideas. Words have meaning in the context of their use; that is, individuals use words that fit their circumstances and the language patterns of those with whom they interact. Labels attached to behavior are given symbolic meaning through the subjective understanding of situations in everyday life.

Two rules help to process and categorize information: consistency and economy. Once a person or situation receives a category or label, individuals will perceive, construct, and reconstruct past and future situations so that the definition of the situation seems "objective" and "real." Using ethnomethodology, the researcher must provide a logical analysis (a reasonable account) of the individual by interpreting the information provided in the given interaction in conjunction with physical appearance, official records and reports, and standard categorizations or typifications (i.e., homeless, manic depressive, homosexual, felon, etc.).

Ethnomethodologists see past records and labels solely as products of social structure, or indicators of organizational norms, not as the reality of the social problem. To understand social order, the researcher should also identify the members of the society who have the daily responsibility for maintaining that specific component of social structure. For example, if the problem is homelessness, the researcher would seek out social workers to uncover the social norms and manner prompting the typification "homeless."

Some may question how a generally classified micro-method perspective can provide an understanding of macro-sociological issues. It is important to note that the context in which the phenomenon occurs determines the categorization (micro or macro). What is a micro phenomenon in one situation is macro in another. To determine whether or not an ethnographic study is appropriate, the researcher must clearly delineate the goals of the research; the major goal of the research should drive the methodology. Once the research goal is identified, researchers can use an ethnomethodological approach to analyze poverty, social welfare, homelessness, pregnancy, alcoholism, crime, or any social problem or form of deviant behavior.

Susanna Tardi

See also Social Constructionist Theory; Standpoint Theory

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EUGENICS

Eugenics is a broad term for policies aimed at the genetic improvement of the human race. Whereas most people are familiar with the eugenic practices of the Nazi Party, fewer realize the widespread international use of such practices, both before and after World War II. Derived from the Greek word meaning "well born," eugenics falls into two types: positive and negative. Positive eugenics is encouraging people with "good genes" to reproduce, whereas negative eugenics refers to discouraging reproduction by

people with "bad genes." Often these policies are couched in terms of the "fit" and the "unfit."

Unlike social Darwinism, which argues that social systems will, if left alone, provide checks against poor breeding, eugenics implies an active role for the state. Eugenic programs include forced sterilization for those deemed unfit, as well as the criminalization of abortion for the fit. The definition of fitness is, of course, socially constructed and reflects the biases and agendas of those in power, as well as the state of scientific knowledge at the time of implementation. Although overt eugenics programs, such as murder and compulsive sterilization, fell out of favor (at least publicly) after World War II, the ideology of eugenics is still very much alive.

Programs of selected breeding have existed since the time of the ancient Greeks. Plato wrote in *The Republic* that the "best men" should reproduce with the "best women" as often as possible and that the "inferior" should reproduce as little as possible. The Spartans also practiced passive eugenics, leaving newborn infants in the elements to determine their physical hardiness. During the 1860s, Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, systematized the ideas behind this history and titled them *eugenics.* Galton argued that behavioral and personality traits, such as criminality and intelligence, were linked to genes. As social welfare programs grew, he argued, society was effectively preventing the human species from ridding itself of the genes responsible for society's ills.

The American Eugenics Movement

American eugenicists appropriated Galton's ideas in the 1880s when radical social change brought by increased immigration and economic changes created unease in the minds of Americans. Eugenics quickly became a popular ideology, attracting many highly respectable supporters. For example, Alexander Graham Bell studied the rates of deafness at Martha's Vineyard and determined (correctly) that deafness in this community was genetic in nature. Incorrectly extending his findings to all deaf people, he argued for prohibitions on marriage and childbearing for anyone with deafness in their family.

In 1896, Connecticut passed the first law prohibiting marriage on eugenic grounds. Charles B. Davenport, a prominent U.S. biologist, received funds from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Institutes. Using that money in 1910 to found the Eugenics Record Office, he began to promote eugenics nationwide. In 1914 his partner, Harry Laughlin, published a model eugenics law. This model law called for legalized sterilization for the "socially inadequate" (those supported in part or entirely at public expense), and it was the blueprint for the German eugenics program in 1933.

Eugenics became more explicitly tied to racism and xenophobia when eugenicists served as expert witnesses for the passage of the Immigration Act of 1921. Because of their congressional testimony regarding "unfit races," immigration from southern, central, and eastern Europe decreased from an annual average of 780,000 to 155,000 annually. But eugenicists did not focus solely on outside threats. Although there were no federal eugenics statutes, many states engaged in forcible sterilization of the unfit. Evidence of unfitness included such things as disability and criminality, as well as sexual deviance and poverty. African Americans and Native Americans were sterilized in large numbers and were often the subject of laws preventing their marriages.

In the 1927 Supreme Court case *Buck v. Bell*, the court upheld the rights of states to sterilize "imbeciles" (i.e., the mentally deficient). Ruling on a 1924 Virginia law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes determined that it was in the best interest of the society to actively improve the gene pool and commented, "Three generations of imbeciles is enough." Although little hard evidence existed as to Carrie Buck's actual mental state, only one justice dissented, thereby laying the legal groundwork for new and more expansive state laws. Those considered unfit could legally be sterilized without consent and often were segregated into asylums where they were victims, sometimes fatally, of neglect and abuse.

The American eugenics movement did not exist solely within the courts, however. It was also an integral part of U.S. culture. The movement had displays at many local and state fairs and encouraged people to take part in its "Fitter Family" contests, where families competed in categories of attractiveness, vitality, and intelligence to be deemed the most "fit" and appropriate to reproduce. Films like *The Black Stork* entertained viewers and educated them about the dangers of ill-advised breeding. Mobile exhibits demonstrated the cost of poor genetics through displays with flashing lights next to statements like "Every fifteen seconds 100$ [sic] of your money goes to the care of persons with bad heredity such as the insane, feebleminded, criminals, and other defectives."

Eugenics Through the Back Door

After world awareness of the atrocities of the Nazi regime, overt eugenics fell from favor. However, the ideology did not go away completely. The Eugenics Record Office closed in 1944, and all of its records went to the Institute for the Promotion of Human Genetics at the University of Minnesota. Eugenics was, in effect, made over but not eliminated. Today many scholars speak of eugenics "coming in from the back door." Replacing the language of "fitness," associated with overt eugenics programs, is a more humanitarian language, with a focus on alleviating the suffering of individuals or society.

For example, although compulsory sterilization for poor women was no longer lauded as the salvation for the human race, it was still practiced in many U.S. cities well into the 1970s. Doctors pressured poor African American women, particularly those on welfare, to have the operation. Others still were sterilized without their consent when they went in for unrelated medical treatments. This practice, justified as a social cost-saving measure, was so common, it was given a name: the "Mississippi appendectomy."

But sterilization and immigration restrictions are not the only way to affect the gene pool. With more advanced scientific testing, doctors can diagnose certain conditions in utero and perform selective abortions. The work of the Human Genome Project suggests that at some point in the future, couples may create a "designer baby" with preselected traits, an idea sometimes referred to as "reprogenics." In the 1990s, the Repository for Germinal Choice, more commonly referred to as the "Genius Sperm Bank," opened its doors, promising carefully screened and morally upright women the chance to bear the child of a Nobel Laureate.

Eugenicist beliefs about race, while not as overt as those in the first part of the 20th century, are still active. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, in *The Bell Curve* of 1994, explored intelligence in America by examining IQ scores and concluded that minorities, particularly African Americans, were inherently less intelligent and therefore less successful than whites. Given their findings, the authors argued that the U.S. welfare system promoted the overbreeding of an unfit class of people. They argued for the elimination of welfare benefits because they subsidize "births among poor women, who are also disproportionately at the low end of the intelligence distribution." Two years later the federal programs they referenced were substantially cut.

Resistance

While eugenic modes of thinking still exist, so does resistance to them. The disability rights movement decries selective abortion on the grounds that many individuals with these "selected" conditions live full and productive lives. Racial equity and pride movements focus on the reproductive options of women of color, particularly the coerced usage of long-term birth control such as Norplant and Depo-Provera. Some bioethicists caution against blanket acceptance of genetic testing and manipulation without an appropriate examination of the social forces that cause particular genes to be considered "unfit." Social scientists argue that the majority of a person's life chances are determined by social forces irrespective of genetic makeup, citing the fact that health and welfare outcomes are most strongly influenced not by racial factors or prenatal defects but instead by the zip code area in which the person lives.

Jes Peters

See also Abortion; Bioethics; Civil Rights; Contraception; Disability and Disabled; Genetic Engineering; Holocaust; Immigration; Intermarriage; Mental Health; Nature–Nurture Debate; One-Drop Rule; Racism; Welfare

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EUTHANASIA

The Greek roots of the term *euthanasia* denote "good death." Though it is common to think of death as unequivocally bad—it is, after all, our most severe punishment—one can easily distinguish between dying processes that are mercifully tolerable and others that are agonizing beyond endurance. During the events of 9/11, scores of people trapped in the World Trade Center leaped out of windows to escape the heat and smoke, some holding hands with others as they fell. Presumably, knowing their lives had come to an end, they chose deaths better than the ones they would suffer if they remained inside. Though it was tragic that so many luckless people met death in this way, few, if any, publicly argued that it was impermissibly wrong.

Euthanasia requires a second person's involvement. In these so-called mercy killings, one person acts for the benefit of another. Many people think that, except for self-defense and a few other cases, it is a grave wrong to cause the foreseeable death of another human being. But one can imagine oneself struggling through the heat and smoke to reach a window at the World Trade Center. A coworker who uses a wheelchair is also there, but unable to get past the debris and into the air outside. She asks for your assistance. Now if it is permissible to do some one thing oneself, why would it not, by implication, be equally permissible to lend assistance to one who reasonably desires to do that same thing but is unable to do so?

Euthanasia, as an ethical problem, focuses on whether and, if so, when killing another person can be excused or justified on the grounds that it benefits the person killed. Except in some European countries, euthanasia is a crime. Those who end the lives of the intractably suffering, even when they follow urgent requests, will be charged with homicide. Should the law be changed to permit some beneficent killings?

Three issues muddy the waters. First, "euthanasia" was the euphemism the Nazis used to sanitize their early extermination of those they deemed defective. The program quickly evolved to kill millions: Jews, Romani, homosexuals, Communists, and more. Treated as vermin, the people involuntarily and secretly gassed in the concentration camps were not killed beneficently. "Involuntary euthanasia"—killing another *against* his or her will—seems a contradiction in terms. While some fear that loosening the law of homicide will send us down the slippery slope to holocaust, such prognostications require careful examination.

The second issue concerns what some still call "passive euthanasia": the discontinuation of life-prolonging measures, often the removal of a ventilator (a mechanical breathing device). When a patient or an authorized proxy withdraws consent to treatment, then doctors, no longer at liberty to continue, may lawfully withdraw life support, causing death. Some maintain these patients die from their underlying diseases rather than from the doctor's action. But if death is a foreseeable consequence, then the clinical removal of a ventilator kills a patient just as surely as the removal of a regulator kills a deeply submerged scuba diver. The law of homicide already includes this exception for doctors, and much of the literature on death and dying treats the patient's legal and ethical power to refuse treatment. Although withdrawing life support can sometimes avert suffering, this strategy is often unavailable and the deaths so obtained may not be as tolerable as those medically induced. Nonetheless, it is nearly everywhere unlawful to administer medications for that purpose. Should this be changed?

The third issue, physician-assisted dying, refers to doctors who provide the means to end life: commonly a prescription and special instructions. Such assistance is legal in Oregon. Note that the doctor does not take the final, life-ending step. Should we amend the law on homicide to permit beneficent killing?

Intractable Suffering

Suffering commonly affects patients with progressive illness—metastatic cancer, multiple sclerosis, Huntington's disease, and so on—where the diagnosis is firm and the prognosis dire. Patients often understand what lies in store. Much of the euthanasia literature fixates on pain, and the sufferings brought on by severe illness come in many flavors: dizziness, diarrhea, disfigurement, itching, insomnia, incontinence, exhaustion, strains upon relationships, shortness of breath, anxiety, cognitive impairment and dementia,

debt, depression, disabilities of all kinds, dependency, loss of control, nausea, offensive odors, and the losses of dignity that can accompany these.

Sometimes—but not always—symptoms can be managed while preserving positive elements that give value and richness to a waning life, for example, talking with loved ones, listening to music, or enjoying a sunset. But residual abilities too can succumb, even as a patient retains sensitivities that can make life intolerable. One strategy is "terminal sedation." Doctors render a patient unconscious while withholding nutrition and hydration: Death ensues in a matter of days. However, not every patient prefers such "care" to a timely passing. There is a difference between having a life and being (biologically) alive: The former—the life one has—may be of supreme value to a patient. As with those trapped on 9/11, that life can come to an end before death occurs.

When a human life deteriorates to the point where one reasonably desires to end it, the argument for the permissibility of euthanasia turns on autonomy, that is, the ethical and legal power, within civic constraints, to chart the course of one's own life, especially in areas where the stakes that others have in one's action are not as great as one's own. The root political idea is that, unless sound and proportional countervailing reasons exist, adults should be free to make their own choices. The presumption is in favor of liberty, that is, the liberty of informed, suffering, competent individuals to choose the manner and time of their death. In the face of intractable suffering and an expressed and settled preference for death, advocates argue strongly (a) that voluntary euthanasia should be permitted and (b) that it is cruel to prohibit charitable assistance to those who are relevantly similar to the luckless coworker in her wheelchair. Those acting out of compassion in these cases are surely not the criminals we have in mind when we build prisons. Accordingly, public policy should regulate, but not prohibit, voluntary euthanasia.

Forced Abandonment

The second type of case occurs in the context of medical catastrophe. During a disaster the flow of patients into a hospital can temporarily exceed its carrying capacity. Doctors then focus on the patients who will likely live if treated but die if untreated, setting aside those without life-threatening injuries and those who will likely die despite treatment. They do not abandon this last group—"expectant" patients commonly identified with black tags—but give only ongoing comfort care (pain medications) and medical reassessment, especially if they unexpectedly survive the period of scarcity.

During forced military retreats and sometimes massive civilian disasters like Hurricane Katrina, health care settings can collapse catastrophically and care professionals and their patients can be compelled to evacuate. Should it prove impossible to relocate black-tagged patients, physicians have only three choices:

1. They can, at great personal risk, stay behind with these doomed individuals even though there is little or nothing that can be medically done for them. By abandoning other treatable patients, health care professionals may be violating obligations toward them.
2. They can abandon the black-tagged patients, leaving them to die unmedicated and unattended (or, during forced military retreats, in the hands of the enemy), thereby violating legal and ethical obligations toward those patients.
3. They can beneficently kill expectant patients who cannot be evacuated. Patients able to decide could opt for abandonment, but those incapable of giving and withholding consent would receive nonvoluntary euthanasia.

This situation highlights two weighty medical norms: the prohibition against killing patients and the prohibition against abandoning them. Where it is impossible to evacuate patients and too dangerous to remain with them, one of the two norms must give way. Given this tragic moral uncertainty, it seems both compassionate and reasonable for the law to refrain from condemning those who try heroically to render honorable assistance under these rare but appalling circumstances, even though they deliberately end the lives of some.

Objections

It is useful to distinguish between "yellow-light" objections (urging caution) and "red-light" objections (admonishing one to stop): Euthanasia can be said to pose a risk of adverse consequences or it can be said to be impermissible on its face.

There are many yellow-light objections. This is a slippery slope down which we can slide to holocaust. Compassionate homicide might erode the professional commitments of physicians as well as our trust in doctors. Patients could be depressed or pressured at the time of decision, or misdiagnosed, or haste in ending patients' lives could prevent possible recoveries, or relatives and health care providers might conspire to end the lives of the ill, or protective measures might be unequal to the task of preventing carelessness and misconduct. The definitive assessment of these objections requires that we examine the effectiveness of specific protections. Here the Oregon record, as it becomes available, and the experience of the Dutch, Belgians, and Swiss become useful. Unlike the Nazis, we can require publicity in the implementation of protocols. Should adverse consequences occur following legalization, they must be measured against the adverse consequences of prohibition.

Many red-light objections emerge within particular religious traditions. These we can set aside because, in a pluralist society, the arguments that settle important public issues should be ones that can persuade any reasonable person, not just those who embrace some sectarian view. The sectarian arguments often maintain that human life is sacred and not to be discarded lightly. But if the closely related idea of human dignity can somehow be given a secular interpretation—one that is broadly persuasive and sufficiently weighty—and if the favored understanding of that idea somehow precludes euthanasia, then it may be reasonable to keep the law of homicide as it is. Again, such arguments require close examination.

The problem of euthanasia arises in extreme circumstances. In the first case, the life of a suffering person approaches a ruinous and horrific end. In the second, a collapsing health care system is unable to minister to the most grievously afflicted. It is distressing to ponder what it is like when such important matters go so dreadfully awry and to discern our responsibilities when they do. But such tragedies do befall us, challenging our capacities to craft decent and just social practices and to act rightly out of charity, compassion, and respect.

Kenneth Kipnis

See also Bioethics; Disability and Disabled; Disasters; Eugenics; Holocaust; Hospices; Murder; Suicide

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Evaluation Research

Evaluation research originally emerged in the education and human services arenas as a means for improving social programs, but it now focuses more on determining the overall effectiveness of programs. Both approaches are valuable in that they yield evidenced-based research to secure funding or develop and implement effective programs.

One type of evaluation research, *formative evaluation,* deals with influencing the beginning stages of program development. The evaluation researcher collects and interprets data about how a program operates in its early stages and then translates this information into concrete suggestions for improvement to be shared with program staff. For example, if a local school board requests a formative analysis of a new Holocaust Education program, the researcher would carefully review the program's goals, objectives, curriculum, and instructional materials as well as collect data from students, teachers, and administration about how the program functions. After analyzing and interpreting the data, the evaluator could offer program improvement suggestions in such areas as curriculum, instructional materials, and overall program management.

The second type of evaluation research, *process evaluation*, determines whether a given program was implemented as designed. Understanding the sources of variation in program delivery allows evaluators to understand better how a program works. Process evaluations are especially important when trying to understand multisite programs such as the Gang Resistance Education and Training program. The focus is not to determine if a program works, but rather to determine how it works and what variations in its delivery could potentially contribute to its overall effect.

Summative evaluation, the third type of evaluation, focuses on determining the program's outcomes. In other words, did the program work? Did it meet its professed goals and objectives? This type of evaluation research resonates strongly with funding agencies. For example, in the 1990s, the National Cancer Institute funded several health promotion programs reaching out to Hispanic women to raise awareness, increase knowledge, and improve access to cancer screening opportunities. For funding eligibility, each proposed program had to include a summative evaluation component. The proposal design comparing the intervention group with another group had special appeal to the funding agency.

Program evaluations, regardless of type, typically encompass a sequence of stages. The initial two stages involve understanding the essence of the program. More specifically, stage 1 involves the formulation of the program's goals and objectives, while stage 2 involves developing an understanding of the program's delivery, setting, and participants. Stage 3 focuses on designing the evaluation. The design can include both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. Choice of methodologies depends on several factors, including purpose of the evaluation and type of information needed. The fourth stage involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the data. The fifth and final stage of the evaluation involves utilizing the evaluation results to improve the program or to verify that it works.

Evaluation Research Designs

Evaluation researchers typically use a variety of research designs when evaluating a program. Design choices depend on several aspects of the evaluation, including the intended audience, available resources, and ethical concerns. Three main types of evaluation research designs exist: experimental designs, quasi-experimental designs, and qualitative research designs.

Experimental designs use summative evaluations to assess whether the program worked. Because this design involves the random assignment of participants to an experimental or a control group, researchers can be reasonably certain that any outcome differences between the two groups result from program participation as opposed to preexisting group differences. For example, if an elementary school principal applies for funding for a social-skills training program for fifth-grade students, she must include an evaluation design in her proposal. Recognizing that experimental design is a stringent, respected means for evaluating program effects, she proposes that her school's fifth-grade students will be randomly assigned to either an experimental group or a control group. She hypothesizes that those students assigned to the experimental group will demonstrate more positive social skills than those in the control group.

Quasi-experimental designs are more commonly utilized than the more stringent experimental design. Examples of quasi-experimental designs include nonequivalent control groups and time series. Like experimental designs, the nonequivalent control group design involves both an experimental and a control group. However, because random assignment is not possible, the researcher must find an existing "control" group that is similar to the experimental group in terms of background and demographic variables. Despite the matching process, the two groups may still differ in terms of important characteristics. Because of the nonequivalent nature of the groups, pretests will determine baseline differences on the outcome variable. Controlling for these differences allows the researcher to isolate program effects. Another type of quasi-experimental design, time-series, involves measurements made over a designated period of time, such as the study of traffic accident rates before and after lowering the speed limit. Time-series designs work in those situations in which a control group is not possible.

Qualitative research methodologies are another means for obtaining evaluation research data. These methodologies are especially useful because they can provide in-depth information about program processes, which in turn can inform program modifications. Focus groups, in-depth interviews, and content analyses of program materials are all useful tools for the program evaluator. For example, in a

process program evaluation of a school-based parent-involvement program, Spanish-speaking parents are less likely to attend sessions than English-speaking parents, despite the fact that sessions are available in Spanish. An evaluator decides to find out why this is the case by setting up focus groups with Spanish-speaking parents. Results indicate that although Spanish-speaking parents want to be involved in their children's schooling, they view their lack of English proficiency as a barrier to effective involvement. Program staff can use this information to modify recruitment strategies, ensuring communication to Spanish-speaking parents that their involvement encompasses more than schoolwork assistance.

From Research to Practice

It might appear that evaluation research would have a significant impact on whether a program continues. However, this is not always the case, particularly when a program is immensely popular and taps into the public's perception of what should work. The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program provides a good example of a program that receives continued funding despite a plethora of evaluation research indicating that it has no long-term effects for preventing and reducing adolescent drug use. The D.A.R.E. case illustrates that program evaluation research can only be effective when program stakeholders, those with a vested interest in the program's success, actually utilize the results either to modify the existing program or to design a more effective one.

Vera Lopez

See also Focus Groups; Latent Functions; Manifest Functions

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EXTINCTION

Extinction—the permanent disappearance of a species from the earth—can be thought of as the ultimate social problem. When our neighbors disappear from the planet forever, our potential social interactions are forever diminished. Extinction is not a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is the current *rate* of extinction, which is dramatically higher than any in the geologic record, and the fact that for the first time ever, a single species—our own—is the *cause* of this high rate of extinction. This is why extinction represents a serious social and environmental problem.

Extinction in Context

Just as every person will die someday, so too will every species eventually go extinct. In fact, almost all species that have ever existed on earth have already gone extinct. Paleontologist David Raup has estimated that 99.9 percent of all species in Earth's history have gone extinct (or, conversely, that today's living world represents only 0.1 percent of the variety of species that have existed at one time or another). Studies of marine fossils—the most continuous and reliable record of life on earth—indicate that the average "life expectancy" for a species is approximately 1 to 10 million years.

Simple microscopic life (formed of prokaryotic cells—those without cell nuclei, like today's bacteria) began appearing some 3.8 billion years ago. More complex unicellular life—formed of eukaryotic cells, those with cell nuclei and organelles—began to appear approximately 2 billion years ago. More recognizable, larger multicellular forms of life—fishes, plants, and the like—began proliferating about 542 million years ago (at the start of the Paleozoic era). Throughout the history of the Earth, species have arisen and faded like the blossoming and wilting of generations of flowers. Even though extinction is inevitable, species have different fates. Some morph into new, better-adapted species, becoming the ancestors of vital living lines. Others find themselves in evolutionary dead ends, the last of their kind. The

interaction of living species with the ever-changing environments on Earth, through the process of natural selection, creates ever-better-adapted organisms, usually resulting in greater diversity of life.

While extinction is almost as old as life, it has not always occurred at a uniform rate. Geologists and paleontologists have been able to decipher a "background extinction rate" throughout the geologic past—an average rate of species loss, which turns out to be approximately 2 to 3 extinctions per year globally. In general, though, new species have been generating much more rapidly than old ones have been going extinct. Creation, then, has generally been outpacing loss. (Accordingly, biological diversity on this planet is higher than ever before.) But there have been five "moments" in the geologic past when huge numbers of species became extinct at roughly the same time ("same time" in this case referring to a period of a few million years). Scientists refer to these as "mass extinctions." From most ancient to most recent, these mass extinctions occurred in the geologic ages known as Ordovician (440 mya [million years ago]), Devonian (365 mya), Permian (245 mya), Triassic (210 mya), and—best known—the end of the Cretaceous (65 mya). Two of these have drawn special attention from biologists.

The episode at the end of the Cretaceous (usually referred to as the "K-T" mass extinction, because it straddled the boundary between the Cretaceous—which geologists symbolize with a "K"—and the Tertiary periods) is familiar to the general public because this was the end of dinosaurs (many earlier forms of which had already gone extinct). The abruptness of this massive change in life forms had long been recognized, because of fossil evidence, but had long puzzled scientists. Evidence suggests that this mass extinction was precipitated when a meteorite approximately 6 miles (10 kilometers) wide struck the planet, in what is now the Gulf of Mexico, causing enormous climatic and habitat shifts. The meteorite's impact created thick dust clouds, which initiated a dramatic reduction in levels of photosynthesis. Other consequences of the meteorite impact included immense tidal waves, large-scale fires, and atmospheric changes leading to "acid rain."

The Permian extinction crisis represented the closest brush that life on earth ever had with total annihilation. The history of extinction is usually examined through study of marine animal fossils. Marine environments have been present throughout Earth's history, and many marine animals fossilize well. When looking so far in the past, biologists tend to focus on organisms at the level of the family—two steps more general than species in the hierarchy of biological taxonomy—because they can have greater confidence in their conclusions about this more general grouping. During the other four mass extinction crises, roughly 12 percent of marine animal families went extinct, but during the Permian, well over half the families disappeared. Extrapolations suggest that this represents somewhere between 77 percent and 96 percent of *species* lost. It took almost 100 million years for species diversity to regain previous levels. But of course these were new species. One of the starkest realities of extinction is that it is truly forever—once a species and its complex genetic coding is lost, it will never be seen again.

Extinction Today

What is of concern today is that humans have initiated the sixth great extinction crisis in the history of the planet. While this point is occasionally argued in popular media, there is remarkable scientific consensus that this rate of extinction is much higher than anything seen in the fossil record. Humans' impact has been much greater than that of a meteorite smashing into the earth. It is difficult to be exact, of course, when predicting the future. And predicting extinction is especially challenging because the vast majority of species have yet to be described. Approximately 1.7 million species have been described and named by scientists, but no one thinks that is even close to the true measure of biological diversity. Well-reasoned estimates range from approximately 5 to over 100 million species on earth today. Why such confusion? Because Western science emerged from Europe and North America, the temperate zones have been studied much more carefully than other parts of the world. Certain habitats have only recently begun to be explored—the canopies of tropical rain forests, for example, and deep-sea thermal vents. As it turns out, these new biological frontiers are, in many cases, immensely more diverse than anything in Europe or North America. Also, certain groups of organisms—vertebrate animals, especially—are relatively well-known, whereas many other groups are just now being discovered.

In some cases, we are losing species before we even know they exist. One poignant example: In 1978 two botanists visited a ridge in Ecuador and found

almost 90 species of plants that were known from nowhere else. Within 8 years the ridge had been cleared for agriculture, and most of those species were gone forever. If not for that one visit, we would be ignorant of this loss.

In spite of these predictive challenges, many scientists have attempted to predict the short- and long-term future of extinction. Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson provided one of the most painstakingly calculated examples, estimating our current rate of extinction to be 2,700 times higher than the average "background rate" in the geologic record. Other estimates have asserted a current extinction rate "only" hundreds of times higher than the background rate. Actually, all these estimates are remarkably similar: All declare that the current extinction trend is at least an order of magnitude higher than ever before, and all estimates are based on conservative assumptions on numbers of species and optimistic assumptions on crucial changes in human behavior patterns. Thus the reality could be worse.

Not only is the future hard to predict in relation to extinction, but the recent past can elude certainty as well. For one thing, it is difficult to know exactly when a species *has* gone extinct. For another, as stated above, we cannot know true rates of past extinctions when we are only aware of the existence of a fraction of the world's species. Nevertheless, biologists do their best to maintain records of species loss. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature Red List—an authoritative database of loss and endangerment—documents a minimum of 844 extinctions since 1500. Alarmingly, the rate of loss increased dramatically in the most recent century.

Why do species go extinct? While some species have been directly and intentionally exploited, the most common cause of extinction is destruction or fragmentation of habitat. Certain characteristics of species predispose them to be more vulnerable to extinction. Species with more general food and habitat preferences are able to adapt to environmental changes—including those induced by humans—more readily than specialists. Species with limited geographic ranges, such as islands, are at special risk. In fact, 75 percent of the animal species that have gone extinct in the past 4 centuries were island dwellers. Species that specialize in a particular habitat become vulnerable when people desire that habitat. Many species from the prairies of the North American Midwest, for example, almost all of which have been plowed under for large-scale agriculture, have either gone extinct or hang on in remaining shreds of prairie—in pioneer cemeteries and along remote roadsides. Passenger pigeons were once the most abundant bird in North America; individual flocks, numbering millions of individuals, were known to darken the sky at midday. Their extinction would have been unthinkable to early settlers. Yet the pigeons relied on extensive tracts of eastern deciduous forest; once these forests were cleared away for settlement and agriculture, they did not last long. Some species are victims of direct hunting and persecution; those that taste good or scare us are especially vulnerable. Some species, especially large predators such as bears and mountain lions, have problems because they require large areas to roam. Some species are vulnerable for several of these reasons. Wolves, for example, require large home ranges of relatively wild country, and they have been persecuted for centuries because people consider them fearsome beasts. Whatever the initial causes of endangerment, when a population becomes very small, it becomes especially susceptible to extinction. Chance occurrences can exert critical influence on a species' survival. Random sorting of gametes can unbalance a species' sex ratio, lowering its probability of ongoing successful reproduction. Small populations are more likely to inbreed (mating between closely related individuals), which can accentuate harmful genetic traits (as was seen in some European royal families). And unpredictable events, such as forest fires or hurricanes, can be catastrophic for a species with only a few individuals.

Extinction as a Social Problem

As terrible as wars, injustice, and poverty are, no form of human violence and indiscretion will have such long-lasting and irreversible consequences as the extinction of species from our planet. As Wilson has pointed out, this is the only human-caused problem that will take literally millions of years to compensate, and then only incompletely. The forms of life we lose will never come back, a folly for which Wilson believes our descendants will be least likely to forgive us. His calculations, described earlier in this entry, on extinction rates work out to a prediction of losing 10 to 25 percent of the species in the world in the next 50 to 100 years. This relatively conservative prediction is based on an assumption of stabilizing human population and reducing excessive consumption in developed

nations. Without achieving those laudable goals, the losses will be much greater, perhaps even worse than losing a quarter of the species in the world in the next two human generations.

Why does this matter? Foremost is the simple tragedy of so much loss. Forms of life that evolved over the course of millions of years, through the interactive forge of natural selection, have an intrinsic right to exist for their own sakes. More pragmatically, the loss of biodiversity creates both direct and indirect problems for humanity. Biodiversity has several types of instrumental (utilitarian) value for people. It directly provides *goods,* such as food, medicines, fuel, and fiber. It also provides ecosystem *services*—for example, climate regulation, pollination of crops, and fixation and cycling of crucial chemical elements. Without these services, life on earth as we know it would cease to exist. Moreover, wild species hold *information* of untold usefulness to humans—potential templates for genetic engineering and future medicines, for example. For this reason, environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott has likened the mindless destruction of biodiversity to book burning. Finally, the world's biodiversity holds *psychospiritual* value for people: in the sheer aesthetic beauty of the world, as the source, in some cases, for religious awe, and as a sanctuary for mental and spiritual well-being. For all these reasons, a world of human-hastened extinction of species is a tragically diminished world. But because humans are the cause of this problem, we are also the source of solutions.

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See also Deforestation; Desertification; Environment, Pollution; Environmental Degradation; Global Warming; Nonrenewable Resources; Population Growth; Water Quality

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Extramarital Sex

Extramarital sex refers to any sexual activity, but usually intercourse, that takes place outside of a legally sanctioned marriage. Even though general use of the term is with respect to heterosexual partnerships, it can also apply to homosexual relations when one of the individuals is in a heterosexual marriage. Furthermore, extramarital sex is a broad concept that encompasses sex that takes place in a cohabiting relationship; teenage sex; any other form of premarital sex; and adulterous sexual relations between two people, at least one of whom is married.

The 20th century witnessed increases in all the forms of extramarital sex, which eventually helped normalize sexual activity outside of marriage. A vocal group of commentators and scholars decried these increases as a sign that the American family was in decline. The 1960s, in particular, witnessed a marked increase in the rates of cohabitation, nonmarital births, and divorce. College students in the 1960s and 1970s were prime movers with respect to cohabitation and premarital/teen sex. By the 1990s most of the trends had stabilized, indicating that despite concerns, marriage remained a lasting American institution into the 21st century.

According to demographers, overall trends in extramarital sex since World War II are primarily the result of the long-term process of women's growing employment outside the home and their better access to birth control. Social scientists also draw on shifts in social and cultural values—such as the decline in the power of religious norms to affect individual behavior and changing opinions on the permanency of marriage—to explain the increase in extramarital sex.

One of the most common forms of extramarital sex is cohabitation, the sexual union between an unmarried man and woman. Cohabiting partners share the

same living quarters for a sustained period of time, though their arrangement does not normally invoke any legal rights and obligations; as such, it is less stable than marriage. In the late 1960s only 8 percent of first marriages began as cohabiting relationships, but by the 1990s that number had jumped to 56 percent. Cohabitation became commonplace during the 1970s and 1980s, as younger people began to postpone marriage but not sexual relations or life with a partner.

As with other forms of extramarital sex, cohabitation increased due to a variety of social, cultural, economic, and technological changes. These include the change in values about sexual relations outside of marriage (again, partly attributable to the weakening of religious influence on individuals' decision making); the increased employment opportunities for women, which gave them greater bargaining power in relationships; and the development and availability of various forms of birth control that freed couples from having to get married following an unexpected and unwanted pregnancy.

Development of effective contraception, along with the legalization of abortion in particular, made it more likely for women to engage in extramarital sex at various points in their life course, beginning in their teen years. While there has been much hand-wringing over teenage sexual activity, mainly because of concerns over poverty and high school dropout rates, the current rates of teenage pregnancy in the United States are down from previous highs. Still, the United States has the highest incidence of teen pregnancy in the developed world; in 2004 approximately 41 out of 1,000 girls ages 15 to 19 experienced pregnancy, almost always as a result of extramarital sex. Although there have been efforts, especially with teens, to sign virginity pledges promising not to have sex outside of marriage, teenage sex continues to persist. Efforts now focus on helping to prevent teenage pregnancy through the effective use of contraception—a sign of tacit acceptance that extramarital sex for teens is here to stay.

The sex lives of older adults also changed in the second half of the 20th century. Increases in extramarital sex among older men and women can be attributed to two related trends: the delay of age at first marriage and the increase in the divorce rate. As young people wait until their late 20s and into their 30s to get married for the first time, there is a subsequent rise in the incidence of extramarital sex, which in this case is defined as premarital sex.

Even though the likelihood of divorce is lower for those who marry later, divorce rates remain quite high in the United States. In many cases, divorce occurs because one or both partners engage in extramarital sex. Increases in adultery can be partially understood as a result of the same changing social and cultural values that promote the other forms of extramarital sex. A shift in views of marriage allows people to view marriage as a changeable state rather than a permanent one. This means that as soon as one person feels unhappy or attracted to another person, he or she feels able to leave the marriage or to stray sexually without concerns about social censure. Additionally, such feelings are often legitimated for people when they are protected from pregnancy and disease through contraception and prevention and when the woman can independently support herself financially. In effect, partly as a result of economic and technological changes, some see marriage less as a permanent partnership and more as the temporary union of two individuals.

Despite the seeming retreat from marriage through cohabiting relationships and sex outside of matrimony in its various forms, the institution continues to persist. One scholar has written that there is still strong sentimental strength in marriage, especially when children are involved, even though marriage may no longer be seen as an economic necessity for women or as a cultural imperative. But so long as marriage continues to be important, extramarital sexual relations will persist, for teens, single young adults, and divorcés and widowers.

Hilary Levey

See also Cohabitation; Contraception; Divorce; Premarital Sex; Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting

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F

Faith-Based Social Initiatives

Faith-based social initiatives are forms of social and community support that religious institutions such as mosques, churches, and synagogues provide to help solve social problems. For some, religious institutions are a main source of support and guidance. This support can include building and funding elementary schools, providing health care, sponsoring local neighborhood watch programs, operating soup kitchens, providing clothing for the needy, and building low-income housing and neighborhood renewal.

For quite some time, religious and community leaders and politicians alike have argued for more governmental support for their programs because of the impact they have on their communities. Indeed, when most people think of faith-based social initiatives, they think of the fairly recent federal programs that allow churches and other religious institutions to seek funding to support their charities and community works. These programs encourage faith-based institutions to apply for and receive federal funds from the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and Labor and the U.S. Agency for International Development, in addition to any funding from state and local sources.

These programs evolved after January 29, 2001, when President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13199, establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. This office, under the executive branch of the federal government, oversees the government's efforts in encouraging both religious and community-based institutions to supply social services as well as provide financial and even, in some cases, technical support for social service programs. Another function of this office is to ensure that policy developed is in accordance with administrative goals that encourage charity and community action and identify and replicate successful community service programs.

Origins of Federal Aid

Discussions about federal funding of faith institutions began with welfare reform proposals in the 1990s that sought to have individuals take more control over their well-being and also to reduce welfare fraud. In 1996, President Clinton signed legislation that reduced government funding for welfare by limiting the length of time that people can receive welfare support. Section 104 of this welfare reform law, the Charitable Choice provision, removed barriers preventing religious institutions from applying for federal welfare funds. Simultaneously, this provision also stressed the separation of church and state by allowing these religious institutions to promote their religious beliefs without government intervention yet stipulating government funds could not be used for religious activities such as religious instruction or missionary work.

Because of attention paid to the more dramatic aspects of the welfare reform overhaul, for the most part, Charitable Choice fell between the legal cracks until the 2000 presidential campaign, when both candidates, Al Gore and George W. Bush, endorsed such funding of religious institutions for social service programs. Immediately after taking office, Bush established the aforementioned Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to implement the Charitable Choice provision.

Controversy and Opposition

These initiatives quickly became highly controversial. Civil libertarians, secularists, and opponents on both ends of the political spectrum argued that federal funding of faith organizations violated the First Amendment's "separation between church and state." They feared that federal taxpayer funds could be used to support proselytizing, discrimination in hiring, and the building of houses of worship. Such concerns extended not only to the separation of church and state issue but also to the fear of some that public funding would go to support religious institutions with whom other taxpayers disagree, whether it be a clash of religious values and beliefs or atheists unwilling to support any religion. Indeed, little, if any, federal monitoring has occurred to ensure compliance with the safeguards against proselytizing.

Debates surrounding employment discrimination increased in 2001 when the Salvation Army requested an exemption in hiring gays and lesbians, maintaining that homosexuality went against their religious beliefs and morals and that receiving federal funds should not force religious institutions to change their beliefs. A New York Federal Court subsequently ruled that the organization could use religious criteria in its hiring. Critics of the decision argue that, theoretically speaking, the Salvation Army is willing to accept tax dollars from all Americans, including gays and lesbians, but is unwilling to hire all Americans, including homosexuals.

Concerns about public funding for religious buildings proved legitimate to critics when, in 2003, the Bush administration, through the Department of Housing and the National Parks Service, allowed the allocation of federal funds for the construction or rehabilitation of such edifices, as long as community service programs would be enacted.

Although some religious institutions may have beliefs that discriminate against other groups and others are controversial—for example, Hare Krishnas, Wiccans, the Nation of Islam, Scientologists, or even religious cults—all are eligible for federal funding. Because no definition exists as to what constitutes a religious institution and what types deserve funding, the current position of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives is that, as long as these religious institutions develop programs to create positive social change, they are eligible for funding.

Although federal funding of faith-based initiatives is part of federal law, the controversy still continues. Few would deny the influential role that faith-based institutions play within their communities to ease social problems; they reach people in ways that other service organizations, government agencies, and even community-based organizations cannot. However, the church–state separation issue remains, and challenges to the constitutionality of such public funding continue as of this writing. Only time will tell if a change in national leadership or future Supreme Court rulings will alter or reaffirm this approach to improving society.

Angelique Harris

See also Politics and Christianity; Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics

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False Consciousness

False consciousness is a complex cognitive-epistemological and socioeconomic political concept. First explored by the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, notably Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, its most common association is with the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Although *false consciousness* is one of the most central Marxian terms, Marx and Engels use it only once each in their published works to refer to distorted knowledge or inadequate expression of reality. Marx used the term in his 1854 essay, "*Der Ritter vom edelmütigen Bewußsein*" (The Knight of Noble-Minded Consciousness). However, he uses it not in a conceptual way to categorize a certain phenomenon

but to refute a slanderous article by August Willich, claiming the latter attempted to detect "a false consciousness behind a correct fact." The connotation of Engels's usage of the term is something more substantial. In a letter to Franz Mehring dated July 14, 1893, he discusses the genesis of ideology (superstructure) and how it affects structure. He admits that he and Marx emphasized how structure determines superstructure but neglected to work out how superstructure affects structure. In this context he asserts that ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker. Consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seemingly motivating forces.

Thanks to the first generation of Marxist philosophers, particularly Georg Lukács, the concept of false consciousness assumed its current preeminence. In his classical essay "Class Consciousness," Lukács suggests that Marx's concept of false consciousness arises as a reply to bourgeois philosophy and sociology of history, which reduce progress to the role of individualities or supernatural forces like God. Now, Marx resolves this dilemma of bourgeois theory of history, Lukács suggests, by developing his concept of historical materialism and by presenting human relations in capitalist society as reification. Then, by referring to Engels's letter to Mehring, Lukács introduces the concept of false consciousness. He poses the question whether historical materialism takes into account the role of consciousness in history. In this connection he speaks of a double dialectical determination of false consciousness. On the one hand, considered in the light of human relations as a whole, subjective consciousness appears justified because it is something that can be understood. That is, it gives an adequate expression of human relations, but as an objective category, it is a false consciousness as it fails to express the nature of the development of society adequately. On the other hand, this consciousness in the same context fails to achieve subjectively determined goals because they appear to be unknown, unwanted objective aims determined by some mystical, supernatural alien forces.

The work of Marx and Engels explores how human relations can be brought into an agreement with human consciousness. The mature work of Marx on this question is *Das Kapital,* most particularly the first chapter on commodities. In his analysis of commodity, Marx differentiates between value in use and value in exchange. The use value of commodities is obtained by transforming natural objects into useful objects, say, by transforming wood into tables through useful or productive labor to satisfy various human needs. The exchange value is the relative value of commodities, or the socially necessary labor time to produce them, and is realized in the consumption of commodities. The exchange value is realized in the exchange process; that is, by relating commodities to one another and exchanging them for one another. Now, in his analysis of the relationship of use value and exchange value, Marx sees a mutual negative relationship. He thinks that this negative relationship results from reversal of the exchange process, going from the aim of production (satisfaction of needs) into the obtaining of exchange values. The aim of production, then, is no longer satisfaction of human needs but rather production and realization of exchange values. This gives rise to the fact that products as commodities dominate humans rather than humans their products. This is, in turn, the reason why everybody strives to realize exchange values and becomes commodity fetishists. As a result, human relations take the form of social relations between products.

The commodification of products, however, also requires the commodification of human labor. The commodification of human labor, in turn, requires the separation of laborers from their means of production and monopolization in the hands of the few (original accumulation) so that the laborers have nothing to sell but their labor forces, that is, the physiological and intellectual functions of their bodies. This is also the source of the rise of social classes in capitalist society with their class consciousnesses or ideologies. In capitalist society, then, there are two contradictory sets of ideologies: on the one hand, the institutionalized ideology of the ruling class claiming to represent the whole of society and, on the other hand, the subaltern ideology of subordinated classes. In short, ideology as a form of consciousness arises from social class relations.

Marx's concept of ideology is often equated with false consciousness. But as Theodor W. Adorno showed in the early 1930s and as Hans Heinz Holz and István Mészáros reinforced in the 1970s, equating ideology with false consciousness is undertaken in the tradition of Weberian sociology—in particular in the sociology of knowledge of Karl Mannheim. Ideology in Marxian thought has many meanings, and false

consciousness is just one of them. To introduce a historical perspective into the debate on false consciousness, Lukács suggests considering Marx's concept of ideology in the light of class position vis-à-vis the means of production. Only in this manner, Lukács thinks, can one obtain objectivity to overcome consciousness as ideology and false consciousness. He thinks that, because of its position vis-à-vis the means of production, the only class that is objectively interested in overcoming consciousness ideology and false consciousness is the working class, an idea Marx and Engels formulated as early as 1848 in *The Communist Manifesto*.

Doğan Göçmen

See also Conflict Perspective; Socialism; Social Movements; Social Revolutions

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Family

One of the most contentious issues facing us today is the impact of changing norms and values on the bedrock of society: the family. The structure of the family has changed significantly over the past 50 years, so much so that it is often difficult for both individuals and social institutions to keep up and adapt. Replacing the traditional breadwinner–homemaker model that at one time epitomized the family are a multitude of family forms—single-parent households, stepfamilies, cohabitating couples, extended and multigenerational families, same-sex partnerships, and grandparents raising grandchildren. In response to these changes, some bemoan the demise and decline of the nuclear family and push for the promotion of marriage as salvation, whereas others see an opportunity for wider acceptance of diversity in family households and advocate for public policy to accommodate families in all shapes and sizes. So, how did we get to this crossroads, in feeling that we have lost touch with the form and function of this cornerstone institution?

What Is the "Family"?

The term *family* carries with it plentiful social and cultural meanings, and it also has profound and personal significance for most people. Most discussions about the family, however, define it in practical terms as two or more people living together who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption. The most common assumption about households (defined as one or more people who occupy a house, apartment, or other residential unit, except dormitories) is they should consist of two-parent families. However, various social and economic transformations in society have also led to a transformation of the family in recent decades, which has resulted in a decline in the traditional family share of households.

In 1960, 85 percent of households were family households; by 2000, just 69 percent were family households. Most of this decline reflects the decrease in the share of married-couple households with children. Explanations for this shrinking proportion include declines and delays in fertility within marriage, postponement of first marriage, an increase in cohabiting and single households, and a consistent divorce rate. Two-parent family households with children dropped from 44 percent to 24 percent of all households between 1960 and 2000.

The changes in household composition began gradually in the 1960s, which coincided with radical social changes in U.S. society, including the civil rights movement and the women's liberation movement, and particularly with the baby boom generation heading into adulthood. The biggest decline in the share of family households was during the 1970s when the baby boomers entered their 20s. By the 1980s, change was still occurring but at a less rapid pace; by the 1990s, household composition reached a still-continuing equilibrium. So with these structural changes and the eventual quieting that occurred, why are we still concerned about the state of the family and where does this alarm stem from?

Nostalgia for Families Past

In many public policy discussions surrounding marriage and the family, the common underlying theme is a desire for simpler times. This time warp in mind-set harks back to the 1950s, when a prosperous post-war economy existed and families fared well overall in comparison with an earlier generation that faced the hardships and challenges of the Great Depression. In this era between the 1950s and the late 1960s, changes



Figure 1 Trends in U.S. Households, 1940 to 2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. "Households by Type, 1940 to Present." Retrieved December 26, 2007 (http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/hh1.pdf).

occurred in family structure from times past, where marriage rates increased and the baby boom occurred. The revision of the breadwinner–homemaker model came about; no longer were women told they did not need to work outside the home in order for the family to make ends meet. What we need to remember about this time, however, is what it represents: a blip in our nation's history. A precursor to the women's liberation movement from this time was "the problem that has no name," which was Betty Friedan's call to a generation of women about complacency and adherence to conformity. Still, what is often recalled from the 1950s is a romanticized version of the family, not how things really were.

Much discussion continues about the save-the-marriage movement promoted by the Bush administration, in offering financial incentives for marital counseling, the push for covenant marriages and stricter divorce laws in several states, and the continued impetus for the decline in welfare benefits for single-parent households but no change in assistance to working-poor families, as well as the endorsement of the "defense of marriage" laws defining marriage as being between a man and a woman. However, the real problem does not necessarily lie with the structural appearance of the family but with how well families are faring underneath the surface impressions. What are we doing, as a society, to support the infrastructure of the family?

Table 1 Trends in Single-Parent and Two-Parent Families With Children Under Age 18, 1950 to 2000

	Percentage Distribution of Families		
Year	*Single Mother*	*Single Father*	*Two Parents*
1950	6	1	93
1960	8	1	91
1970	10	1	89
1980	18	2	80
1990	20	4	76
2000	22	5	73

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. "Families, by Presence of Own Children under 18: 1950 to Present." Retrieved December 26, 2007 (http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html).

Note: Includes only families who maintain their own households.

Reality of Present-Day Families

The institution of the family continues to persist and evolve, as families continue to be an important anchor for both individual and collective well-being in our society. Modern norms refuse to dissipate in discussions about the desirability of marriage, the optimal timing of children, and the involvement of fathers in childrearing and of mothers in breadwinning. Families of today are taking on changing and varied forms of adaptation; what we are seeing is how the institution of marriage and family has become more flexible and fluid in reaction to the reality of the choices and opportunities that

are available to individuals. Research continues to show an overall transformation in attitudes toward family behaviors; people have become more accepting of divorce, cohabitation, and sex outside of marriage; more tolerant of blurred gender roles; and more open-minded about a variety of living arrangements, family configurations, and lifestyles.

The biggest challenge that families face in society today is economic well-being, as economic fortunes and the health of family relationships remain ever intertwined. Other issues of great importance include how families will balance paid work and childrearing and whether the workplace will become more accommodating to family needs, what income inequality will do to the potential fortunes and life chances of the next generation, and also how relationships between the generations will be altered by the increase in life expectancy, with the impact resting on the sandwich generation to meet the needs of their aging parents as well as their children. Over the generations, the family has changed in response to economic conditions, social change, and such changing demographics as the graying of the population. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect families to continue to be adaptive and resilient in the future as well.

Pamela McMullin-Messier

See also Adoption; Child Care Safety; Divorce; Domestic Partnerships; Dual-Income Families; Family, Blended; Family, Dysfunctional; Family, Extended; Family, Nuclear; Family Leave Act; Family Reunification; Same-Sex Marriage; Single Mothers; Transnational Families

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Family, Blended

Blended families are the result of two adults establishing a union, with at least one having had a child or children previously. Because the concept of family itself is evolving to include gay partnerships, "commuter" relationships with separate households, and cohabiting couples, the definition of the blended family is also fluid. Blended families reflect all the nuances of the modern nuclear family, while bearing the additional impact of members' prior family relationships.

Sociologists characterize family by long-term commitment, strong group identity, and an economic structure that provides for any children within the union. Kinship, common ancestry, or marriage are traditionally, though not always, present. The exceptions to these guideposts are apparent in the blended family. In most, a previous commitment has already ended; identifying with the new family unit is a lengthy process and not guaranteed; possibly, there is economic involvement, with all its implications, from outside the new family, in terms of child support. The strength of blood and legal bonds is especially ambiguous in the blended family.

Considering the overall 50 percent divorce rate in the United States and the fact that 50 percent of marriages are remarriages, blended family dynamics are an influential social phenomenon. One in three Americans is now part of a stepfamily, and demographers predict that the aging baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) will have to rely more on stepchildren than biological children for elder care. Thus, resolving complicated blended family relationships is culturally significant.

Three types of blended families and several variations thereof exist and are reflected in popular culture: (1) the biological mother–stepfather arrangement (most common, as divorced mothers usually gain custody of their children); (2) the biological father–stepmother; and (3) the couple who each brings biological children to the new union, as in the popular TV series from the 1960s and 1970s, *The Brady Bunch.* In the book-based movie *Yours, Mine and Ours,* a widowed couple also each had their own children and went on to have mutual

biological children. A recent remake of that film depicted the wife's adopted children of various races and ethnicities, calling to mind the real-life celebrity union of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie, whose biological child followed and preceded single and joint multiracial adoptions, respectively. An even more intricate—and controversial—family configuration was the nonmarital, noncohabiting relationship of Woody Allen and Mia Farrow and her multiple adopted children, some of whom were also his legally adopted children, and the ensuing marriage of Mr. Allen and one of his own children's adopted siblings, the legal daughter of his former romantic partner. Social reaction, both positive and negative, to such multilayered connections is indicative of the blended family experience.

Without diminishing their delicate, interpersonal dynamics, the notoriety of the blended families described in the previous paragraph helped dispel stepfamily myths. Historically wrought with negative connotations underscored by fairy tales like Cinderella, the archetype of the stepmother, in particular, has given way to more benevolent images. However, the possible pitfalls of step-parenting are an aspect of the blended family that cannot be overlooked. Preexisting parent–child allegiances and the influence of family members outside the home or held in memory weaken loyalties to, and the authority of, step-parents. Moving to a different community may be part of the new arrangement, and transitional strains may result. Indeed, the term *blended family* itself may be a misnomer, as families do not so much blend as they expand, potentially encompassing residential and nonresidential stepsiblings and half siblings, additional sets of grandparents, and other extended stepfamily members, and, in the case of "serial" couplings and breakups, ex-stepfamily members. *Binuclear family* is another term used to describe two families joining to form a new one.

New family members are often of unfamiliar backgrounds, and the lack of homogeny in second and third marriages increases their rate of failure to 60 percent, while shortening the expected duration from 8 years for a first union, to 7. A couple's compatibility strongly depends on familiarity with one another's culture, but because people are older at the time of successive marriages or cohabitation (mid- to late 30s vs. early to mid-20s for first unions), the pool of available partners has diminished, and they may marry outside their generation, social class, ethnicity, or religion. Adding children to the mix, especially adolescents, without sufficient time for couple adjustment, increases stress.

Ironically, most blended families involve cohabitation, rather than marriage, yet the remarriage model, and related research, is the only reference available to institutions like school and church. One case study illustrates confusion over family ties: A single mother's live-in boyfriend coached her daughter's sports team. The community questioned his relationship with the child, as the parents were not legally married, and ruled that he could not coach because he was not part of any team member's family. Yet, this man had served as stepfather to the child all her life.

Theorists acknowledge that lack of biology between some blended family members can be problematic. The family—that basic unit of civilization—is an intimate, stressful, and potentially dangerous experience. Some social scientists who subscribe to the biosocial perspective, which posits that genetics and evolution govern roles and relationships, assert that society should not encourage the formation of stepfamilies, as danger increases when no biological ties rule behavior. Indeed, 30 percent of adult–child sexual assault cases involve a stepfather, and higher incidence of child abuse statistically links to a mother's cohabiting boyfriend. The issue of incest becomes a concern also, especially whenever revelations of sexual activity, even marriage, between stepsiblings becomes known.

Nonetheless, blended families help those divorced or widowed reorganize their lives and maintain familial structure. Women living in poverty may raise their socioeconomic status through subsequent family formation. People are more mature when they remarry, and such relationships are more egalitarian. Children benefit from the commitment, communication, cohesion, and effort required of successful blended families.

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See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Divorce; Family

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Family, Dysfunctional

Dysfunctional family refers to a family pattern generally associated with lower levels of health, well-being, happiness, and positive outcomes, compared with other families. Conceptualizing a dysfunctional family should be not as a dichotomy but as a continuum, viewing it in terms of degrees of dysfunction. Some families may be more or less dysfunctional than other families, with the extent and severity of dysfunction varying.

Many disciplines—such as sociology, psychology, social work, medicine, and criminology—study dysfunctional families. Because several disciplines study dysfunctional families, many different definitions, viewpoints, and solutions to dysfunctional families exist.

Many different types of dysfunctional families exist, as do various forms of family violence commonly classified as dysfunctional. For example, all forms of chronic or severe child abuse—sexual, emotional, and physical—are considered dysfunctional, as is child neglect, perhaps the most common form of child abuse. Spousal violence is also dysfunctional because of the physical and emotional harm inflicted on the victim and the negative and threatening environment in which the children live.

Chronic and abusive use of drugs or alcohol within the family is dysfunctional because of the action affiliated with such activity. Such chronic and abusive use correlates with higher levels of emotional and physical violence as well as diminished parent– child interaction. The net results for offspring are lower levels of academic success, self-esteem, and other indicators of overall well-being. Moreover, a higher likelihood of drug or alcohol abuse among children and adult children of drug- or alcohol-addicted parents is another negative outcome.

Dysfunctional families often result from chronic poverty, particularly in areas that offer few economic opportunities, inadequate educational programming, and an overall lack of hope for the future. Such families experience low levels of academic achievement, few plans for the future, high levels of criminal activity, drug and alcohol addiction, unemployment, and homelessness. With fewer means to achieve success, families in chronic poverty are more likely to be considered dysfunctional.

Some research findings suggest that families experiencing emotional or physical disabilities have higher rates of stress, marital breakup, and second generations of emotional disorders (among families with emotional/psychological disorders, such as depression). However, many families in similar situations do not become dysfunctional. No particular event or social circumstance appears to cause or create a dysfunctional family, despite such assumptions. More likely, the way a family or family member views the event or social circumstance is the determining factor as to whether or not the family remains more functional. Thus, one family may experience a family member becoming disabled and yet remain highly functional, whereas another family may experience the same event and become dysfunctional because of inadequate support, self-definition of the event as a crisis, and lack of previous positive experiences.

Where on a dysfunctional family continuum families fall relates to the number of dysfunctional characteristics present within the family. That is, families with several elements associated with being dysfunctional would fall in the “more dysfunctional” category. For example, a family in chronic poverty, headed by a drug- or alcohol-addicted parent where child and spousal abuse are also present, is more dysfunctional than a family where one event of non-life-threatening couple violence occurred. The more dysfunctional the family, the more challenging it is for the offspring to have successful outcomes in life.

Dysfunctional families are a social problem for two main reasons. First, the immediate members of a dysfunctional family may experience harm or hardship because of the nature of the family. Second, the pattern of dysfunctional families may be transmitted to the second generation, in what is known as “intergenerational transmission.” However, intergenerational transmission is not an absolute; whereas some family members will repeat the dysfunctional family pattern, many will not.

Perhaps most important in determining whether or not intergenerational transmission occurs are individual characteristics of children. Substantial research documents the resilience of some people to harsh or unhealthy environments. These individuals generally have several protective factors that aid in minimizing the long-term impact of dysfunctional families. These protective factors include high intelligence, external social supports, an internal sense of locus of control, the ability to recognize opportunities for change, and an awareness of the ability to have better outcomes. Recognition of the dysfunctional nature of family actions is essential but does not necessarily prevent intergenerational transmission of family dysfunction.

Recent research indicates that disidentification with dysfunctional family members may aid in preventing repetition of the dysfunctional behaviors. Disidentification comes about by the offspring recognizing the problem behavior and taking steps and making a commitment to break the cycle. Sometimes disidentification involves limiting contact with the dysfunctional family members. The presence of role models who may or may not be family members also seems to be important in preventing intergenerational transmission of dysfunctional family patterns. Less frequently, removal of children from the dysfunctional family is necessary to prevent permanent physical or mental harm to the children, resulting in their placement with alternative family members or foster care families.

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See also Abuse, Child; Domestic Violence; Foster Care; Poverty

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Family, Extended

The extended family consists of two or more generations of the same family residing in the same household. Members of the extended family can consist of, but are not limited to, husband and wife, their children, maternal and paternal grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The extended family is also referred to as the "consanguine family" because most of its members include those of the same bloodline.

Sociologists once believed that the extended family was the norm in preindustrial societies, an economic unit that produced and distributed goods. In addition, extended families relied on one another for economic survival, support, and services, such as care for the sick and the elderly, services that society did not yet provide.

With industrialization, family members leave home to seek work that pays wages, leading to the end of the family as an economic unit and the breakdown of the extended family. This gives rise to the nuclear family, consisting of husband and wife and their children residing in a home of their own. The nuclear family is also known as the "conjugal family" because it centers on marriage.

The assumption that the extended family thrived prior to industrialization may be a myth. Records of households in Europe and America during the 17th century show that the nuclear family was actually the most common family form of the time. The idea of the extended family as dominant may have derived from the most common living arrangements of the time, in which the nuclear family may have had servants, slaves, boarders, lodgers, or apprentices living within the same household and contributing economically to the household.

The industrial revolution may have actually promoted the extended family, as members of nuclear families left home to seek work in urban areas and sought out relatives to live with, out of economic need. In addition, some working-class families in urban areas shared living spaces in order to share living expenses.

Today variations of the traditional extended family can be seen among different racial, ethnic, and social groups throughout U.S. society. Many extended families live within the same geographical location and rely on each other to provide financial and social support, child care, and protection. In poor urban and rural areas, extended families develop in response to economic needs and to provide support for one another. Among the elite, extended families provide a sense of community and maintain the family's wealth.

As many extended families no longer live within the same household, the U.S. Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service do not recognize these families as extended but rather as separate family households. As a result, there are no public programs or policies in place to support the extended family.

Although not always the dominant form of family within society, the extended family has always existed in response to economic factors. With the increase in single-parent households, the high divorce rate, stagnating wages, and the high costs of housing and child care, extended family households have been on the rise.

Cheray T. W. Teeple

See also Divorce; Family, Nuclear; Role Conflict; Single Mothers

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Family, Nuclear

The nuclear family consists of a married couple and their children, either natural or adopted, who reside within the same household. Because the nuclear family is based on marriage, it is also called the "conjugal family." Nuclear families form around marriage, a legal relationship that includes economic cooperation, sexual activity, and childbearing and childrearing, which people expect to last. Although many different types of family exist in North America, the nuclear family has long been considered the norm.

The origin of the nuclear family is connected to the economic and social changes of the industrial revolution. The nuclear family's smaller size, in relation to the larger extended family, was considered better suited for moving closer to the occupational opportunities the industrial revolution created.

The traditional view of the nuclear family consisting of a husband and wife and their dependent children living within the same household is based on the ideal of the husband/father breadwinner and the wife/mother as the family caretaker. However, the male breadwinner/female caretaker nuclear family was only possible when men could earn enough to support their families. Throughout history, many nuclear families have had to rely on wages earned by women in order to remain economically stable.

With specific gender roles, the nuclear family becomes a distinctive group, whose function in society is to socialize the children and to provide emotional support, love, and affection for the family members. As the family members turn to each other for emotional gratification, the home is seen as a safe haven and private retreat from the larger community.

The prevailing view of the nuclear family coming about with the industrial revolution may be a myth. The examination of birth, death, and marriage records from 17th-century English and American households shows that the dominant family form was nuclear. Sociologists now believe that the concept of childhood, a period of time to train and prepare children to become adults, emerged during the 17th century. The increased importance given to the welfare of children necessitated the formation of close bonds among family members and the stability of the family unit.

The nuclear family is also seen as an isolated, independent unit that is self-reliant within society. This view assumes that the nuclear family's association with relatives is distant and that the extended family does not play an important role in the nuclear family. However, many nuclear families do remain within the same geographic location as their relatives. Extended family members often provide services, such as child care and financial assistance. For families that are scattered across the United States, modern transportation and communication help families maintain their bonds.

Today, many feel that the stability of the nuclear family is being threatened by divorce, cohabitation, single parenthood, and gay and lesbian couples. It is feared that the breakdown of the nuclear family will lead to the breakdown of society. Despite these "threats" to the nuclear family, most people still want to be a part of this family structure. The nuclear family will likely remain a foundation of U.S. society for some time to come.

Cheray T. W. Teeple

See also Family, Blended; Family, Extended

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Family Leave Act

The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 was the first piece of legislation signed into law by President Bill Clinton. Prior to its enactment, the legislation went through numerous iterations, with nearly a decade of congressional debate, and was vetoed twice by President George H. W. Bush. The FMLA allows a qualified worker up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave during a 12-month period to attend to various health-related conditions: the birth or adoption of a child, serious personal health conditions, or the care of a sick child, spouse, or seriously ill parent. The bill guarantees relative job security and requires employers to maintain the same level of employee health benefits paid prior to the leave. Companies with fewer than 50 employees are exempt from providing the benefit; employees working for companies that fall under the mandate of the FMLA must be employed for 1 year, must give 30 days notification in advance of the leave, and may be required to reimburse the company for all benefits if they do not return to work.

The final contours of the FMLA reflect the compromises worked out among various stakeholders involved during its evolution during the 1980s and early 1990s, including the business community, labor groups, feminist organizations, advocates for the elderly, and partisan politicians. Its ultimate passage was proclaimed to affirm the needs of an increasingly feminized workplace; yet an analysis of its provisions, in comparative perspective, reveals the extent to which the policy reflects patterns of social stratification and power distribution in the United States. Although the FMLA recognizes the intersection of work and family obscured for nearly a century by the ideology of separate spheres, the patterns of usage reveal the extent to which care work within families is still defined as women's responsibility—the gender neutrality of the law notwithstanding.

Unlike medical leave policies in other industrialized nations, the U.S. policy has a family focus rather than a specification toward pregnancy and early child care. The first iterations of the legislation (e.g., the Parental and Medical Leave Act) were formulated in response to the increasing labor force participation of women of childbearing age. The rapid aging of the baby boom demographic and the political strength of elder care advocates are linked to the inclusion of caring for elderly parents in the revised law by 1990. Indeed, this reformulation acknowledged women on the so-called corporate granny track: primarily white, middle-class professionals who bear responsibility for the care of aging parents. The narrow definition of family, however, excludes both extended family members and fictive kin potentially in need of care and excludes gay and lesbian partners.

The other characteristics of the FMLA that differentiate it from leave policies in other countries are that the benefit is tied to size of company and, most significant, it is unpaid. Studies show that fewer women than men in the labor force are eligible, although men are less likely to take family leave. Workers who report the most need, including single mothers, seasonal and temporary workers, and other low-income laborers, are less likely than middle-class professional workers to meet eligibility requirements. African American workers report the most need, yet they are the least likely among all racial groups to qualify. In fact, research shows that although a majority of workers who need leave take it, only single-digit percentages of workers actually do so through the FMLA. Research also suggests that the costs of the policy have not appreciably affected the costs of doing business; ostensibly this is related to both low eligibility rates and low usage.

Research also suggests that the FMLA, when compared with the provisions of welfare reform under the Personal Work and Responsibility Reconciliation Act, reinforces patterns of stratification by class, gender, and race. Within the dual labor market, the FMLA covers employees with top-tier jobs, who are more likely to have the financial resources and familial support to take leave without income replacement. On the other hand, welfare reform legislation requires low-income mothers to work full-time for limited pay in low-mobility and generally peripheral jobs. One group of privileged mothers is given the security to suspend work for

child and family care, whereas another group is compelled to work or face dire financial straits. Thus, existing patterns of stratification that privilege primarily white, middle-class families over lower-class and largely minority families are reproduced within the two-tiered welfare system.

Critics suggest the FMLA is a prime example both of "policy minimalization" and of a typical U.S. response to social problems. Similar policies in European countries that provide paid leave and extended allocations of time may reflect the higher likelihood of their workers to be unionized and the normativity of state and employer redistribution of economic resources to workers. Widespread support for family-friendly policies exists in the United States, but the FMLA is so exclusive that the primary constituents in need of its benefits are the least likely to receive them—low-income, contingent, racial minority, and women workers. As such, it primarily represents the interests of the organized business community and economically privileged families and is a less than effective policy in relation to the problem that it was initially formulated to address.

Laura L. O'Toole

See also Dual-Income Families; Mommy Track; Sandwich Generation; Welfare

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Family Reunification

U.S. immigration laws are based on the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act and subsequent amendments. These laws grant priority for permanent residence status to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents for family reunification. Priority is also given to applicants with critical job skills, refugees and asylum seekers, and applicants from countries with low levels of immigration to the United States (diversity immigrants). The Immigration Act of 1990 specifies an annual limit of between 416,000 and 675,000 for family-sponsored preferences, employment preferences, and diversity immigrants. The annual limit for family-sponsored preferences is from 226,000 to 480,000 immigrants, accounting for more than half of all immigration priorities. There are also per country and dependent area limits of 7 percent and 2 percent respectively, for the total number of family-sponsored and employment preferences.

Family reunification consists of two categories: immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and family-sponsored preferences. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens include spouses of U.S. citizens, unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens, and parents of U.S. citizens. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens account for 40 percent or more of the annual legal permanent residence status. This category has no numerical limit. Family-sponsored preferences consist of four numerically limited categories: (1) unmarried, adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their children; (2) spouses, minor children, and unmarried, adult sons and daughters of legal U.S. permanent residents; (3) married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and children; and (4) brothers and sisters, including their spouses and children, of adult U.S. citizens.

A Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), submitted by a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident, must be approved by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to receive legal permanent residence as an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen or as a family preference immigrant. Filing the petition establishes a priority date for the immigrant. The U.S. State Department monitors the availability of visas within the categories and country limits, and issues a permanent immigrant visa (green card) to the immigrant if there is no administrative backlog. Before issuing the visa, the State Department completes

criminal history background checks and ensures that the immigrant is not a security threat and is admissible to the United States.

Current immigration laws and practices regarding family reunification may warrant further review, as families typically experience lengthy periods of separation while waiting for reunification. In 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now known as USCIS, had 1,190,768 pending I-130 applications, as compared with 747,369 applications in 1994. This administrative backlog, caused by insufficient human resources and the increasing numbers of various application types filed, contributes to a minimum processing time of 24 months for permanent resident visas. Further, as the demand for visas exceeds the number of visas available for family-sponsorship preferences, a second backlog results from the discrepancy between the demand for visas and the actual availability of visas. Except for the immediate relative category, with no country or category limits, all other categories of family-sponsorship immigration have processing delays.

In 2000, partially addressing the consequences of backlog, Congress approved the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE Act), granting temporary nonimmigrant status (V status) to spouses and minor children of lawful permanent residents waiting for longer than 3 years for an immigrant visa. Persons granted V status would receive employment authorization and would be allowed to remain in the United States until they received permanent residence status. However, these visas had limited availability. Solutions to lessening the number of administrative backlogs also include giving immigration agencies more resources to handle their workload. Backlogs caused by the quota system could be alleviated by raising the limit on the first and second preference categories so that the number of visas available better meets demand. Proposed measures of reform also include broadening the definition of *immediate relative* so that more visas could be available to the remaining categories of family-sponsored immigrants, and not counting immediate relatives in the family-sponsored preferences limit.

Immigration law requires that the sponsor must file a Form I-864, *Affidavit of Support,* and prove an income level minimally at 125 percent of the federal poverty level before filing for a relative. If the sponsor's income does not meet the requirement, other financial assets can be considered. The income of certain other household members can also be considered if they sign a Form I-864A, *Affidavit of Support Contract Between Sponsor and Household Member.* Although this financial requirement is intended to ensure that immigrants will be provided for by family members and will not depend on public assistance, it may be an additional constraint to family reunification.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 instituted a 5-year bar to admission for aliens unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days but less than 1 year and a 10-year bar for aliens unlawfully present in the United States for 1 year or more. The act stipulates a waiver for immigrants who are spouses or children of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents if they can satisfactorily establish to federal authorities that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the immigrant. Although given sole discretion to waive the clause, the attorney general may not adjust the status of more than 4,000 aliens annually. Reports of recent increases in the number of denials of these waivers may constitute a further barrier to family reunification.

Danielle Taana Smith

See also Citizenship; Immigration; Immigration, United States

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Famine

Famines are complex processes, usually arising from a combination of several causes over an extended period. Their effects on different households and social groups vary greatly according to levels of anticipation and preparedness, capacity to cope with sustained adversity, and ability to return to previous livelihood patterns once the crisis period has passed. The difficulty of pinpointing critical causes and effects, other than on a case-by-case basis, makes it hard to define what famine is or when it starts and stops. As a result, there are no agreed-on mechanisms to trigger appropriate interventions to prevent or mitigate famines, and the question of responsibility for relief is normative and politicized.

Definition Problems

The simplest way to define famine is as a significant increase in mortality from starvation or starvation-related disease over an extensive geographical area. This is hard to measure, however, because famines often occur in regions where mortality rates are variable and poorly recorded. Disputes arise over deaths resulting from behaviors in response to hunger—for example, from eating venomous wild foods. Diseases such as cholera are common when people migrate en masse toward dwindling water sources—and epidemics can last for years after food crises have passed—but it is a matter for debate which disease deaths should count as famine mortality. It is tricky to distinguish between deaths from starvation and from gastric diseases.

More important, if famine is defined by mass mortality, famine relief will always be too late. Interventions early enough to prevent starvation can be described as famine prevention, but without a specific phenomenon to which to respond, both governments and international agencies often fail to achieve them. It would also be useful to differentiate between successful but last-ditch humanitarian efforts and long-term programs designed to make people food secure. However, an instrumental definition of famine vulnerability would require ongoing assessment of several aspects of people's livelihoods, which would be difficult in practice.

Because famines do not start suddenly and are difficult to define objectively, it usually falls to national governments to declare their existence. The World Food Program, like all United Nations agencies, can only intervene in sovereign states by invitation. Yet governments have an in-built incentive not to acknowledge that they have allowed famines to occur under their watch, at least until they have to, when it is again usually too late for some. National and regional vulnerability assessment committees are attempting to redress this problem, as are donor-funded schemes, such as the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET). Both, however, depend primarily on measurement of rainfall and crop yields rather than on social indicators. Vulnerable people themselves are more likely to label famines by their sociopolitical causes, such as land theft, or by strategies used to survive them.

Causes of Famines

In this context, it is no longer helpful to distinguish between natural and man-made famines. Even when drought is a proximate trigger, a famine will occur only if both markets and political systems fail to respond to food shortages. The likelihood of drought or other disasters has itself been increased by human forces, including both local and global climate change. Since the groundbreaking work of Amartya K. Sen in the early 1980s, most analysts have focused on the ability of individuals and households to command food rather than on aggregate food availability. This usefully switches the focus away from technological solutions to a technical problem and onto socioeconomic and political understandings of famine causation. For example, development of commercial farming for export can increase the vulnerability of nearby smallholders left on the poorest land.

Overpopulation in poor areas can leave too little food to go round, but the effect of HIV/AIDS has shown that reduced populations are sometimes more

vulnerable, when it is the most productive members of households who are stricken. Temporary or permanent migration by young men to urban areas in search of paid employment can also contribute to chronic food shortages, though it may improve individual households' entitlement to food. Thus famines can be engendered by ordinary, unspectacular economic or social processes. From the 1970s until the early 21st century, almost all famines were associated with conflict or political repression. More recent crises, however, reflect the declining capacity of governments to respond to disease, worsening terms of trade, and infrastructural gaps.

Effects of Famines

Famines affect different social groups in varying ways, depending on the range and reliability of their entitlements to food. Particular professional classes whose work is dispensable in times of hardship, such as barbers, may suffer more than poorer laborers who are better able to adjust the nature or location of their work. People's own coping strategies are critical to their chances of survival but can involve taking risks. Migration and crime are both common responses that involve increased mortality rates, as suggested by the fact that more men than women die in most famines. Vital indigenous knowledge of which wild foods are safe to consume is likely to be limited in areas where famine is unprecedented, and this knowledge is diminishing, even in chronically vulnerable areas, because of the impact of HIV/AIDS.

Mortality patterns are further confused because deaths from starvation-related disease are far more common than from starvation itself. While the likelihood of dying from disease is greatly increased by hunger, the chance of becoming infected in the first place is less strongly correlated with food intake. As a result, starving people perceive their chances of survival to be arbitrary and beyond their control. They are therefore liable to protect their long-term livelihoods in preference to maximizing their consumption in response to prolonged hunger. For example, it is rare for key productive assets such as land or cattle to be sold until famine crises are acute. Savings, jewelry, and unessential tools are usually disposed of first, though this is made more difficult by declining prices for household assets, particularly relative to the cost of food.

Recently, humanitarian agencies have attempted to match their relief efforts to people's coping strategies, for example, by providing food for work programs close to homes. However, these are hard to target and organize and attract far more women than men, who prefer to work for cash. Care also needs to be taken not to encourage extreme behaviors. Coping strategies can be divisive or violent—for example, household breakups and murder rise sharply during famines. They are also finite. Households surviving one famine by selling assets may not be able to cope with a second, even many years later. Relief therefore needs to start before people have made decisions that will permanently affect their livelihoods. This suggests a need for better cooperation between humanitarian and development agencies. Long-term sustainable development would reduce the risk of famines. Again, however, it is important to consider poor people's priorities. Poverty reduction strategies may be rejected if they are perceived to increase risk, even if they are designed to improve household food production or profits. Examples include genetically modified seeds and projects encouraging diversification into high-value nonfood crops.

Responses to Famines

For relief to be timely and effective, it is essential to establish who bears primary responsibility for it. Ideally it should be the government, provided it has sufficient capacity and will. However, we cannot assume that all nation-states will take the (often difficult and expensive) measures necessary to prevent starvation in every case, especially if the threat of famine is in a remote or politically unimportant area. Indeed, where a local population is from a minority ethnic group or tends to support political parties opposed to the government, leaders may even see benefits in allowing famine to develop. Many authors now argue that the politics of relief has a greater bearing on the likelihood and extent of famine mortality than any other factor.

Famine prevention therefore becomes a question of how to provide incentives for states to uphold their populations' right to sufficient food, as established in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (Article 26.1). One way could be to establish such rights legally. Supreme Court cases in India and South Africa have held specific governments accountable for failures to

prevent starvation. However, only 22 nations guarantee this right in their constitutions, and scarcely any have specific legislation to ensure that it is enforced. The International Criminal Court could investigate cases where governments have been directly culpable for famines, but the court is unlikely to see them as straightforward or as taking priority.

An alternative would be to rely on democracy and free media to punish governments that fail to prevent famines. Although the fear of losing power would be a powerful incentive, this may not help where famines only affect minority groups. Though shocking, recent famines will not be the only issue in most elections and may not be the main one in voters' minds. Moreover, underfunded local media organizations—and notoriously fickle and uninformed international ones—rarely provide early enough warnings of imminent famines to prompt preventive action. Taking responsibility for famine response away from governments, however, would be problematic. International agencies or nongovernmental organizations may exacerbate political problems associated with food insecurity, as recently happened, for example, when President Mugabe disputed FEWSNET's warnings of severe shortages in Zimbabwe.

David Hall-Matthews

See also Desertification; Food Insecurity and Hunger; HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations; Human Rights

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Fathers' Rights Movement

The fathers' rights movement is an international movement, though concentrated in Western countries, that seeks to protect the legal rights of biological fathers. This primarily involves advocating for custodial rights for divorced fathers on the part of local, state, and national organizations, such as the American Coalition for Fathers and Children.

During the 1990s there was an increase in the number of single-father families; by 2002 they accounted for one in five single-parent families in the United States. However, the movement predates the recent increase in the number of father-led families. Born in the 1970s in the United Kingdom and in the United States, it was mainly a reaction to the rise in divorce rates, coupled with the increased economic independence of women through employment in the labor market and the women's rights movement. In the United States, many states moved to no-fault divorces in the 1960s, which also led to a rise in the number of divorces and hence the number of single fathers.

Historically, fathers were responsible for both the physical and financial fitness of their children, but this changed in the 20th century due to a social and cultural shift that saw mothers as better caregivers. As a result, in recent decades, physical custody of children has almost always been awarded to women. Those in the fathers' rights movement consider the legal system now unfairly biased in the direction of mothers, and they advocate for joint physical custody of children, arguing that it is in the best interest of the child to have a healthy relationship with both biological parents.

Frustration exists among many organizers and those active in the movement that the trend toward joint legal custody has been slow to take hold, even though certain types of fathers are more likely to receive either sole custody or shared physical custody of their children. This group includes high-income families, families in which the parents owned a home together, and families with older children who are boys.

As father-only families remain a small proportion of all families, the fathers' rights movement has also begun to move in a new direction, that is, emphasizing that the father is important in all families and that married fathers also need support and representation in their attempts to balance work and a meaningful home life. This involves promoting awareness about the importance of family time and pushing for paternity leave policies. In general, the increase in mothers who

work outside of the home and a cultural shift that resulted in the decline in patriarchal attitudes about and within families combined to allow the fathers' rights movement to gain a foothold to advocate for all kinds of fathers in the legal arena and beyond.

Hilary Levey

See also Divorce; Single Mothers

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Felony

A felony, in contrast to a misdemeanor, is a more serious and harmful offense to society. Rooted in common-law tradition, felonies in most states are offenses punishable by imprisonment for one or more years or death. Misdemeanor offenders receive sentences for less than a year and serve their time in local jails. However, the same offense can be either a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the degree of harm, potential danger to society posed by the offender, number of times an offender commits the same offense, or amount of property stolen.

Felony convictions first appeared in England in the 12th century and, following common-law practice, led to forfeiture of assets or death. The United States remains the only major common-law nation making a distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor. Other English-speaking countries distinguish between a petty crime (not requiring an indictment or jury) and an indictable offense (requiring a jury).

Most U.S. jurisdictions impose felony penalties based on the gravity of the offense, as stipulated in federal criminal law statutes or state penal codes, vehicle codes, and health and safety codes. The list of felonies is extensive, ranging from theft to drug possession to computer crimes to murder. The underlying rationale of classification schemes is that felonies are intentional, purposeful acts with multiple elements of harm, danger, and severity. Yet little research examines the role of felony classifications in punishment philosophy and practice.

Unlike other crimes, felonies receive differential treatment, both substantively and procedurally. Offenses like burglary require intent to commit a felony as a critical element in their definitions. Crime classifications can change if accompanied with a felony. The most controversial and widely debated example is the felony-murder rule whereby a death, even if accidentally occurring during the commission of a felony, is treated as murder. Many argue this rule disregards intent and contradicts *mens rea* (literally "guilty mind"), which is at the heart of criminal law. Multiple convictions for nonfelony offenses can also become felony offenses under state "three strikes" laws popularized in the 1990s.

Guided by court rulings and interpretations, law enforcement agents can use deadly force in arresting felons and may even arrest felons without a warrant if there is probable cause. Due process considerations are critical in felony cases and guide policy and practice, often requiring a preliminary hearing and sometimes a grand jury indictment.

The implications and consequences of definitional, substantive, procedural, and conviction decisions are numerous, including loss of voting rights, disqualification from holding public office, and prohibition against serving on juries or in the military, practicing law and some other professions, and owning firearms. Civil rights activists challenge this disenfranchisement of convicted felons, citing its anti-democratic character. The stigma and resulting deprivations and life-altering consequences associated with a felony conviction are difficult to overcome, prompting debate in research and policy circles about recidivism (relapse into criminal behavior) and societal reintegration. The charging and transferring of violent juvenile offenders to adult felony courts is another current controversial issue.

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See also Juvenile Justice System; Misdemeanor; Recidivism; Three Strikes Laws

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Female Genital Cutting

Female genital cutting (FGC; also known as "female circumcision" or "female genital mutilation") has sparked enormous debate because the issue lies at the crux of many other critical issues: globalization, sovereignty, women's and children's rights, democracy, and modernity. The precise origins of the practice, which dates back to antiquity, are unclear. FGC is deeply embedded in the culture of a number of eastern and central African nations and can be found in other parts of the world as well. The practice continues primarily because it is a tradition. At the turn of the millennium, FGC was practiced widely in 25 countries. The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that more than 130 million women and girls have undergone some form of genital cutting worldwide. Since the 1970s, eradication efforts have been particularly intense.

FGC is typically delineated into categories that vary by type of procedure. "Sunna" is most comparable to male circumcision. It involves the removal of the prepuce, or hood, of the clitoris. "Genital excision" or "clitoridectomy" is the removal of the entire clitoris and the labia minora, leaving the labia majora intact. "Infibulation," the most extreme form of FGC, is the excision of the clitoris, labia minora and labia majora, followed by the sewing together of the raw edges of the vulva so that only a small hole remains through which urine and menstrual fluid may pass. Mothers have typically taken responsibility for having their daughters circumcised. A traditional midwife often performs the circumcisions, but in some places, health professionals are circumcisers.

FGC creates a number of short- and long-term health consequences. Severe bleeding is the most common immediate complication. Many other complications, such as urine retention or keloids, can lead to discomfort and disfigurement but are typically not life-threatening. Nearly all forms of FGC interfere with women's sexual response. However, they do not necessarily eliminate the possibility of sexual pleasure or climax. Infibulated women are especially vulnerable to more serious health consequences. Much of the literature on FGC exaggerates such harmful or negative health consequences because it often assumes that all circumcised women are infibulated. In fact, estimates suggest that this extreme form of FGC occurs among only 15 to 20 percent of circumcised women. Further, the incidence of infibulation has decreased in recent years. In some parts of the world, increased medicalization has reduced the incidence of negative health complications.

Three different cultural frameworks for FGC exist. Frequently, the practice is promoted to ensure the virginity of women upon marriage. The idea is that a clitoridectomy will help women keep their sexual desires in check; in some societies, infibulation is an added precaution because it makes intercourse uncomfortable and difficult. In communities where virginity is of paramount importance, girls are often circumcised in a private ceremony. The second cultural framework treats FGC as a rite of passage into adulthood. In this case, entire cohorts of girls are circumcised at the same time at a certain age. A cohort of boys is also often circumcised at the same time. When FGC is a rite of passage, a period of seclusion often follows, in which elders educate girls about community requirements. Under either of these cultural frameworks, FGC is usually a requisite for finding a marriage partner. A much less common cultural framework for FGC is the fad. Young women in a number of countries (including the United States and Chad) are undergoing the procedure to be fashionably different. This type of FGC is the least prevalent and tends not to have a lasting impact on the communities in which it occurs.

Mobilization Against Female Genital Cutting

Western feminists and women's international organizations were critically important in the 1970s in raising international interest in FGC. African opponents of the practice had been present for some time but had been unsuccessful in getting the attention of international organizations. The Western women who initially took up the issue argued that FGC was a tool of patriarchy and a symbol of women's subordination. Although some African women were part of this early mobilization, many African women objected to this framing of FGC. For example, at the international women's conference in Copenhagen in 1980, African women boycotted a session featuring Western feminist Fran Hosken, calling her perspective ethnocentric and insensitive to African women. As a consequence, international organizations eschewed the feminist rhetoric in their eradication efforts. Instead, they couched their interventions in a purportedly more neutral medical discourse.

Eventually, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, activists returned to the women's rights discourse. A relationship between gender equality and human rights had been developing, and gender equality was becoming an appropriate basis for international action. Feminist arguments that the state was responsible for protecting women and children from abuses suffered in the private sphere had been rejected or downplayed earlier, but now these arguments became the overriding ideology of international organizations. By the mid-1990s, a women's rights frame was dominating the anti-FGC discourse.

In a dramatic policy reversal, a joint statement of WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA (UN Population Fund), and UNDP (UN Development Programme) in 1995 even labeled the medical basis for anti-FGC policies a "mistake." The reasoning of the joint statement suggested that much of the medical discourse—at least as it was applied locally—was exaggerated and consequently counterproductive. The second problem with the medical reasoning was more surprising. Essentially, medicalization had been *too* effective. By making FGC safer, the international community had undermined the urgency that originally motivated the eradication of the practice. The organizations attempted to recapture some of that urgency in their repackaged message: FGC had negative health consequences, but—more important—it was a violation of women's rights.

The popular media in the West were particularly amenable to this message and to dramatizing FGC. In 1994 Cable News Network (CNN) broadcast live the circumcision of a 12-year-old girl in Cairo. The footage prompted promises of action from the Egyptian government. It also launched a global media frenzy. In the United States, FGC was suddenly featured on many popular television talk shows, such the *Oprah Winfrey Show,* and in popular magazines, such as *Cosmopolitan.* These popular media stories were grossly ethnocentric, often involving stories of U.S. women "saving" the women of Africa from FGC.

In 1996 the United States made FGC illegal. In addition to forbidding FGC in the United States, the law also made loans and aid to other countries contingent on the development of eradication policies. Soon all of the countries where FGC occurred (except those which had no government) had policies opposing the practice. These policies were often very controversial and frequently had to be implemented without formal parliamentary approval. For example, in Egypt, where mid-1990s estimates suggested that 97 percent of women had been circumcised, the Egyptian parliament was unwilling to pass a law criminalizing FGC. Ultimately, the anti-FGC policy in Egypt took the form of a "Health Ministry Decree." Although some women were able to use the laws as leverage to forgo circumcision, a lack of popular support undercut their effectiveness in many countries.

In fact, the media hype, combined with the coercive measures of countries like the United States, created a backlash against intervention in some parts of the world. Leading African proponents of eradication began to call for more local solutions. A number of scholars began to argue that FGC was not an issue that should concern individuals outside the societies where it occurs. These scholars have been at the forefront of exploring FGC within a cultural context and of calling for more culturally sensitive anti-FGC interventions.

Changing Behavior

One widespread impact of international intervention has been to increase the medicalization of FGC. In other words, chances have increased that parents will go to a health professional to have their daughters circumcised, and even traditional midwives now frequently use antiseptics and other medical aids.

In terms of raw rates of circumcision, the overall effect of eradication efforts has been uneven. For example, a recent study conducted in Egypt indicated that the percentage of circumcised Coptic Christian girls had decreased, but the percentage of circumcised Muslim girls had remained relatively stable. The same study also found that education only led to a decrease in daughters' circumcisions among Christians. This suggests that for some groups FGC has become an important cultural marker to distinguish "us" from "them." In other countries, such as Uganda, eradication efforts appear to be very effective. The most recent demographic health surveys coming from countries where FGC is practiced tend to show no change or slight decreases in the prevalence of the practice (from 2 to 6 percent) at the aggregate national level. Overall, interventions that are narrowly tailored and culturally sensitive to empower women appear to be the most effective at eradicating FGC.

Elizabeth Heger Boyle

See also Feminism; Women's Rights Movement

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Feminism

Feminism is both a theoretical perspective and a social movement. As a theoretical perspective, feminism provides an explanation of social behavior and social phenomena, particularly those having to do with gender. As a social movement, feminism seeks to bring about social change, specifically gender equity.

Feminism as a social theory is not a single, unified perspective. Rather, there are multiple feminisms (e.g., liberal feminism, socialist feminism, standpoint feminism). However, there are several principles common to all feminist perspectives. One principle is that gender is socially created rather than innately determined. This is not to deny the fact that humans are biological beings and that our biological makeup influences who we are as women and men. However, from a feminist perspective, there is a complex interaction between biology and culture, and biological traits may be modified by environmental or social conditions. Feminism defines gender as a set of social expectations that is reproduced and transmitted through a process of social learning.

A second feminist principle is that gender is a central organizing factor in the social world. Gender is embedded in all social interactions and processes of everyday life as well as all social institutions. At the institutional level, gender is shaped by a society's economic and political structure. In every society, a specific set of gender norms is dominant, even though these norms may vary from society to society—further evidence that gender is socially constructed. According to the feminist perspective, no gender is inherently better or superior to any other. However, the culture of a society may imbue one gender with a higher value than another gender. In the United States and most Western societies, for example, masculinity (i.e., behaviors and traits associated with being male) is valued more highly than femininity (i.e., behaviors and traits associated with being female). Men, therefore, are accorded greater access to resources and rewards in these societies, simply because they are (masculine) men. Thus differential valuing produces gender inequality.

A common misconception about feminism is that it focuses only on women or "women's issues." It is the case that feminism's primary goal, as a theoretical perspective, has been to study and explain the position of women in society, largely because women and the behaviors and traits associated with them have historically been devalued or ignored. Nevertheless, feminism recognizes that men have gender, too, and that although virtually all men benefit in some way from gender privilege, some groups of men are disadvantaged by other social factors. A third principle of feminism, therefore, is that gender inequality does not have the same consequences for all women and men. The feminist perspective examines how gender inequality intersects with other types of inequality—racism, social class inequality, heterosexism, ageism, and inequalities based on physical and intellectual abilities—to affect different groups of women and men differently. For instance, a man who behaves effeminately is viewed as deviant and is punished for this deviation in various ways, which include social ostracism; discrimination in employment, housing, and other areas; and sometimes even violence. Similarly, poor men of color have less access to societal resources and rewards than white middle-class women do, because the negative effects of racism and social class inequality in their lives outweigh the advantages of gender privilege.

Because feminism understands gender to be socially constructed, this perspective holds that any aspects of current constructions of gender or gender norms that are harmful or destructive can be changed. And because gender norms are institutionalized, this change must occur not only at the individual level but

also at the institutional level. Feminists are advocates for social change that brings about gender equity, and they have mobilized to bring about such change through collective action. In this way, feminism is more than a theoretical perspective; it is also a social movement.

Although feminist theory and resistance to gender inequality have been found in early Christian writings, as well as in writings from the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation, historians date the emergence of feminism as a social movement toward the end of the 18th century. It was during the late 1700s that some women began publicly demanding equal rights with men, especially in the area of education. During the first half of the 19th century, women working in anti-slavery organizations in the United States, Great Britain, and Europe became angry when their male peers prohibited them from speaking in public and segregated them at meetings and conventions. Armed with the organizational and administrative skills they had acquired through anti-slavery activism and using abolitionism as an ideological framework for understanding their own inequality relative to men, these women began to hold conferences and stage protests demanding equal rights for women. The most famous women's rights conference was held at Seneca Falls, New York, on July 19 and 20, 1848. There about 300 women and some sympathetic men adopted the Declaration of Sentiments, modeled on the Declaration of Independence, along with 12 resolutions that supported equality between the sexes and opposed laws and customs that discriminated against women. But as this "first wave" of the feminist movement developed, its focus narrowed on winning women the right to vote. This effort took nearly three quarters of a century to achieve its goal. Ratification of the 19th Amendment occurred on August 26, 1920.

Following ratification of the 19th Amendment, feminism as a social movement became dormant. Although small groups of feminists, such as the National Women's Party, continued to lobby for women's rights, including the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, it was not until the 1960s that a second mass mobilization occurred. A number of factors contributed to the resurgence of feminism as a social movement at this time, including the appointment by President John F. Kennedy of a Presidential Commission on the Status of Women that documented widespread and severe labor force discrimination based on sex, as well as the publication in 1963 of the bestseller *The Feminine Mystique,* by Betty Friedan. Feminism also appealed to women involved in the civil rights movement and the anti–Vietnam War movement, who were motivated by their personal experiences of gender discrimination in these social movements as well as in the larger society.

This second wave of feminism was not homogeneous. It included, for example, lesbians as well as heterosexual women, and pro-feminist men were involved. However, one serious criticism of contemporary feminism—a criticism that was also leveled against the first wave of feminism—was racism. Critics maintain that feminism as a social movement was composed of mostly white, economically privileged, well-educated women, who disregarded or deliberately excluded the concerns of women of color as well as poor and working-class women of all races and ethnicities. At the same time, by focusing largely on winning formal legal rights for women—and often succeeding—second wave feminism also overlooked the concerns of younger generations of women, who came after them.

Although it has been argued that most young women today reject feminism, research documents the development of a third wave of feminist activism that is rebellious against conventional gender norms and that also embraces inclusiveness. Studies of third wave feminism emphasize its celebration of sexuality, women's agency and autonomy, and multiculturalism. Third wave feminists have adopted a multiracial emphasis and address problems resulting from racism, social class inequality, homophobia, and other inequalities in addition to gender inequality. In fact, the inclusiveness of third wave feminism is likely to be key to the continued viability of feminism as a social movement in the 21st century.

Claire M. Renzetti

See also Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Sexism; Women's Rights Movement

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Feminist Theory

Feminist theories are varied and diverse. All analyze women's experiences of gender subordination, the roots of women's oppression, the perpetuation of gender inequality, and remedies for gender inequality.

Liberal feminism argues that women's unequal access to legal, social, political, and economic institutions causes women's oppression. Liberal feminists advocate women's equal legal rights and participation in the public spheres of education, politics, and employment.

Radical feminism claims women's oppression originates in men's power over women (patriarchal power). They argue that men control women's bodies through violence, objectification, and men's status in social institutions, such as medicine and religion. Radical feminists see sexism as the oldest and most pervasive form of oppression; they argue that the eradication of patriarchy and compulsory heterosexuality are key to ending gender oppression. This would be accomplished by increasing women's control over their bodies, including transforming sexuality, childbirth, and motherhood, and by eliminating patriarchal social relations.

Marxist and socialist feminists root gender inequality in capitalism. They argue that capitalists and individual men exploit women's unpaid reproductive labor—both within the family and in the workplace. Women are exploited as a low-wage and expendable reserve army of labor. Marxist feminists claim capitalism produces patriarchy that will end with capitalism's demise. Socialist feminists argue that patriarchy and capitalism are separate systems of oppression but that they do intersect. They call for economic and social change, specifically of relations within the family, as well as changing access to education, health care, economic opportunities, and political power.

Psychoanalytic feminism applies Freudian theories to gender inequality. It seeks to correct the male bias in psychoanalytic theory, producing theories that explore women's experiences with their emotions, bodies, and sexuality. Theorists argue that early childhood experiences shape women's psyches and create differences between men and women, especially because of the different roles of men and women within the family. They argue that the phallus, a symbol of male power, dominates Western culture. Solutions call for an androgynous society, possibly created through dual parenting.

Women of color criticize feminist theories for ignoring coexisting forms of oppression. This perspective includes black, Chicana, multicultural, and third world feminisms. They integrate analyses of gender oppression with systems of inequality based on race, class, gender, and sexuality. They show how privilege and disadvantage are built into a matrix of domination and intersect to produce unique forms of oppression. They advocate for remedies that focus on the survival of entire peoples rather than solely on women. Postcolonial feminism elaborates on intersectionality by emphasizing Western colonization. Here, sexism results from modernization and economic restructuring; it includes women's exploitation as workers and sexual beings. Postcolonial feminists focus on the roles of women as mothers within communities who can use their position to advocate for education of girls, adequate health care, and environmental protection.

Postmodern feminists avoid overarching causes or solutions of gender inequality and focus on plurality and difference. They challenge inevitable and fixed characteristics of gender, including heteronormativity (assumption that heterosexuality is "natural"), and the undifferentiated category of "woman." They argue that performativity—the repetition of gendered identity and display—perpetuates gender inequality. They advocate *queering,* a blending of gendered characteristics, and questioning "normal" forms of gender and sexuality as remedies for gender inequality.

Katherine Castiello Jones and Michelle J. Budig

See also Feminism; Standpoint Theory; Theory

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Feminization of Poverty

The term *feminization of poverty* was first coined by Diana Pierce in 1976 in an attempt to describe the changing demography of the poor in the United States since 1960. Whereas the poverty rate for all families in the United States had declined quite rapidly (from 18.1 percent in 1960 to 9.4 percent in 1976), the

number of female-headed households in poverty had dramatically increased (from 1.9 million households to 2.6 million households), and one third of all female-headed households were in poverty. The question became why a disproportionate number of the poor or near-poor (those between 100 percent and 125 percent of the poverty line) were women and their children, and how the demography of the poor had changed so swiftly.

One key explanation for the feminization of poverty in the early 1970s was a change in family structure, particularly in the number of female-headed households created by divorce. The divorce rate steadily climbed from the 1960s until 1979, and in divorces where children were involved, women were more likely to receive custody. Although many of the women were in the labor force, women earned on average about 62 percent of what men earned in the 1970s. This gender gap in income, coupled with the loss of male income, accounts for much of the rapid increase in the number of female-headed households falling into poverty. Although the divorce rate has declined since 1981, data from the 2000 census suggest that there were about 3.2 million female-headed households living in poverty; the poverty rate for female-headed households continued to be disproportionately high, around 25 percent.

At the same time that divorce created more female-headed households, births to unmarried women became more pervasive in the United States. In 1960 about 6 percent of all births were to unmarried couples, but by 1996, over a third of births were to unmarried couples, with the largest increase among black families. While black women are more likely to be unmarried mothers than are white women, the trend of more births to unmarried women is similar across racial and ethnic lines. Black female-headed households are more likely to be in poverty than are white female-headed households. This disparity is related to historical differences in access to good jobs and residential segregation, both resulting in part from racism and discrimination.

The feminization of poverty is not solely the experience of single women and their children. The elderly compose a nontrivial proportion of the poor or near-poor, with elderly women disproportionately represented. Although the poverty rate among the elderly has been declining as a result of federal programs such as Social Security and Medicare, elderly women do not accrue the same benefits as do elderly men, especially if those women are divorced and did not remarry. On average, women born before 1930 have limited work histories, thus having contributed little to Social Security and having less access to pension benefits. Widowed women could expect access to their husbands' benefits; divorced women could not. Longer life expectancy among women, as well as an increased desire to live independently, place elderly women at a greater risk of living at or near the poverty line.

The U.S. government implemented many policies with the goal of reducing poverty, some of which were targeted toward women and children. Early means-tested welfare policies, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), provided cash transfers to low-income mothers caring for their children that could be used for housing, food, or other expenses. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families replaced AFDC in 1997, but the goal of the program is generally the same: to provide temporary aid to families caring for children as the caretakers search for employment, acquire additional skills, and more generally, work to move out of poverty. Medicaid is a means-tested program that provides access to medical care for the poor. Comprehensive child support enforcement legislation has been implemented by the federal government as well as in many states. This legislation works to ensure that children who deserve financial support from a nonresidential parent have access to that support, with the goal of reducing the need for support from the federal (and state) government. As noted earlier, Social Security benefits and Medicare are governmental programs that have helped elderly women move out of poverty.

As women and children continue to be disproportionately represented among the poor, social scientists have suggested other policies and policy reforms that target the proximate causes of poverty. Policies that encourage a strong and growing economy that includes well-paying jobs with benefits will help reduce poverty overall, not just among women and children. Low-cost, high-quality child care would allow women to work while providing safe caregiving environments for children. Policies encouraging the building of affordable housing, offering affordable health care, and providing access to education and skills training will also work to stem the tide of families moving into poverty.

Shannon N. Davis

See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Divorce; Gender Gap; Poverty; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Wage Gap; Widowhood; Working Poor

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FERTILITY

Fertility is the process of producing live births. Because of their roles in shaping population dynamics and change, fertility, migration, and mortality are central concepts in the field of demography. Demographic transition theory attempts to trace populations as they move from high or low birth and high or low death rates; however, researchers now recognize that the process is more complicated than the theory suggests.

While counting births can be straightforward, exposure to the risk of becoming pregnant is not universal, complicating the denominator in measures of fertility. Although both men (or at least sperm) and women are necessary to create a live birth, measurement is simplified by relating fertility to one sex, usually women. The crude birth rate, a basic measure, counts the number of live births per 1,000 women of childbearing age (usually 15–49 years old) in the population of interest. The age-standardized fertility rate and total fertility rate (TFR) are two measures that directly account for age variation in fertility. The proximate determinants framework attempts to quantify a woman's exposure to the risk of becoming pregnant as it varies by four factors: marital/union status (exposure to sexual intercourse), postpartum infecundability (the inability to become pregnant directly after giving birth, as breast-feeding further slows the return of menstruation), contraception use, and abortion (spontaneous and induced).

Fertility levels can be characterized in a number of ways. Populations with high birth rates are often referred to as those with natural fertility, suggesting that there is no conscious effort to control family size. Theoretically, women could begin childbearing in their mid-teens, having a child each year until their late 40s, resulting in 35 births. Yet, even in natural fertility populations like the Hutterites (United States/Canada) and the !Kung (Kalahari Desert), TFR was far below this biological maximum, at 10 to 12 and 4.5 births, respectively. Replacement fertility occurs when TFR is 2.1 (a woman has two children over her lifetime, thus replacing the children's parents; the one tenth accounts for child mortality under age 15). Today a number of countries, including many in Europe and East Asia, have total fertility rates below replacement: On average women have fewer than two children over their lifetime.

Fertility research often focuses on (a) ways populations control family size, (b) access to and unmet need for modern contraception, and (c) understanding changing fertility levels. An interest in fertility control through natural and modern contraception and the processes behind fertility decision making drives a number of quantitative and qualitative studies in diverse populations. For example, the World Fertility Surveys (60+ countries, 1974–86) and the Demographic and Health Surveys (mid-1980s–present, 70+ countries, many with multiple surveys) provide data to explore some of these issues. Understanding the influence of gender dynamics and social contexts on fertility and the impact of emerging reproductive technologies are central to future understandings of fertility and infertility.

Enid Schatz

See also Abortion; Birth Rate; Contraception; Demographic Transition Theory; Population Growth; Total Fertility Rate

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Fetal Alcohol Syndrome

Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is a cluster of birth defects related to prenatal alcohol exposure. There are four diagnostic criteria for FAS: prenatal and/or postnatal growth deficiency, central nervous system abnormalities (most typically mental retardation), a set of characteristic craniofacial features, and confirmed maternal alcohol use during pregnancy. Estimates of the prevalence of FAS vary widely, in part because there is no gold standard for recognizing a child affected by FAS. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that FAS affects 0.2 to 1.5 births per 1,000. FAS tends to be concentrated among minority and disadvantaged populations. For example, in the United States the reported prevalence of FAS is highest among African Americans and American Indians. Reports of FAS are particularly prevalent in South Africa, in Russia, and among Native Peoples of Canada. However, numerous studies have documented both overdiagnosis and underdiagnosis of FAS in certain population groups. Moreover, FAS is subject to ascertainment bias, meaning that physicians may be more inclined to see it in some groups than in others.

Not all women who drink heavily during pregnancy have babies with FAS; the syndrome is correlated with poverty, race/ethnicity, advanced maternal age, and high number of children. Researchers have hypothesized that factors such as nutritional status, exposure to environmental toxins, smoking, and stress may exacerbate the adverse effects of alcohol. Despite widespread public belief that any alcohol exposure during pregnancy is dangerous, there is considerable uncertainty about the exact etiology of FAS. Binge drinking (the consumption of five or more drinks in a single episode) is highly correlated with FAS.

In 1973, physicians at the University of Washington discovered FAS, based on similar defects observed among eight children of alcoholic mothers. Over the past several decades the diagnosis has expanded to include categories such as "fetal alcohol effect," "alcohol-related birth defects," and "alcohol-related neurodevelopmental disorder." There are no clear diagnostic criteria for these labels.

Governments around the world have responded in disparate ways to the policy issues raised by FAS. In the United States the surgeon general first issued a warning advising pregnant women not to drink in 1981 (updated in 2004), and congressionally mandated warning labels have appeared on all alcoholic beverages since 1989. Rates of FAS have not decreased since implementation of these measures. European countries tend to have more permissive attitudes about prenatal alcohol use, whereas drinking during pregnancy is today a highly stigmatized behavior in the United States. South Dakota and Wisconsin permit civil detention of women who drink during pregnancy; several states have brought criminal charges against women whose babies have allegedly been born with FAS or a related diagnosis. None of these prosecutions has been successful.

Elizabeth Mitchell Armstrong

See also Alcoholism; Binge Drinking; Social Control

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Fetal Narcotic Syndrome

Fetal narcotic syndrome refers to the effects on the fetus and newborn of exposure to illicit substances—particularly cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin—during pregnancy. Narcotic use during pregnancy poses risks to both the woman and the fetus, including miscarriage, poor fetal growth, placental problems, premature delivery, low birth weight, and stillbirth. In addition, infants born after exposure to drugs may develop symptoms of withdrawal, including excessive crying, irritability, trembling, and breathing or gastrointestinal problems. These symptoms, known as "neonatal abstinence syndrome," are short-lived. National surveys find that about 4 percent of pregnant women in the United States report using illicit drugs. In contrast, about 18 percent of pregnant women report smoking cigarettes. Women ages 15 to 25 are substantially more likely than women ages 26 to 44 to use illicit drugs during pregnancy.

The mass media, health care workers, and legislators became particularly concerned about the consequences of prenatal drug use during the crack cocaine epidemic in the 1980s. Initial reports suggested that infants born after prenatal exposure to crack cocaine, labeled "crack babies" by the media, suffered permanent brain damage and lifelong behavioral problems, raising fears of a generation of unteachable children in the inner cities. However, more thorough epidemiological research later established that children exposed to cocaine and other drugs in utero do not suffer lasting cognitive deficits. Moreover, many pregnant women who use illicit substances also use alcohol and tobacco and may experience extremely poor nutrition, sexual abuse, domestic violence, and homelessness. These factors make it difficult to discern the effect of narcotics alone on fetal development and birth outcomes.

The policy response to prenatal drug use has been mainly punitive. In the past 2 decades, more than 200 women in 34 states have been prosecuted in criminal courts for substance use during pregnancy. Many others have been jailed, faced charges of child endangerment or neglect in civil proceedings, or had their children removed from their care because they tested positive for drugs at the time of the birth. Some women have been prosecuted for murder after their babies were stillborn. The majority of women targeted by these policies are poor and nonwhite. Many child advocacy, public health, and medical organizations—including the March of Dimes, the American Public Health Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists—oppose this criminal justice approach, arguing that it scares women away from prenatal care and other needed services.

Elizabeth Mitchell Armstrong

See also Addiction; Cocaine and Crack; Drug Abuse; Heroin; Social Control

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Flextime

Flextime refers to an arrangement permitting full-time employees to negotiate hours of employment, allowing for an arrangement of the start and end times of the workday and workweek in such a way that they vary from the standard work schedule. Flextime arrangements benefit both the employee and the employer, as such programs resolve conflicts between work and family responsibilities with the intention of promoting productivity. Women are the main benefactors of flextime, as these programs offset family demands traditionally assigned to women.

As originally conceived, flextime policies aim at reducing the pressures on women to leave the labor market to bear and rear children. Through such policies, women would not be subject to derailed career paths, loss of wages, and lack of employment consideration as a result of family demands. Flextime policies thus create greater equity between men and women in the workplace.

Working women are not the only ones who benefit from flextime policies. Employers benefit from such programs in numerous ways. By controlling their own work schedules, employees can reduce the stress and distraction that comes from competing home and work responsibilities, thereby lowering tardiness and absentee rates. Accommodating schedules also result in lower turnover rates. Moreover, offering the option of flextime allows employers to be competitive in their hiring practices, making their company more attractive to potential employees and putting themselves in a better position to hire and retain valuable employees.

Flextime arrangements may be of a formal or informal nature, although formal flextime arrangements are more common in large organizations, with policies outlining flextime options and arrangements. Usually, employers make flextime available only to employees

holding certain types of positions least affected by such an arrangement. Within smaller organizations, flextime arrangements are often worked out informally among a work group.

Studies of the impact of flextime arrangements on negative spillover, job satisfaction, and salary rates and parity between men and women are inconclusive. To the extent that women remain the primary responsible parties for home responsibilities and the ones more likely to take advantage of flextime, the policy seems to perpetuate much of the inequity it was designed to alleviate. Until flextime is seen as a viable option for men and women and the stigma associated with its use eliminated, the goal of reducing inequity in the workplace remains unattained.

Barbara Feldman

See also Income Disparity; Mommy Track; Second Shift

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Focus Groups

A focus group includes either strangers or acquaintances and typically 8 to 12 participants.

Focus group interviewing is a valuable method for studying how particular categories of people think about social issues and social problems. The goal in such research is often to examine how claims making in the public arena influences the consciousness of particular categories of people.

As a research technique, the focus group has advantages and disadvantages relative to alternative approaches to the study of public opinion. In contrast to random sample surveys, focus groups (like other qualitative methods) enable the researcher to observe not just *what* people think and say but also *how* they think and say it. Thus, transcripts of focus group discussions can be analyzed for the constituent elements of everyday social problems talk, including media imagery, popular wisdom, and everyday personal experience. The technique thus permits analysis of how claims making in the public arena interacts with other factors in shaping how people think and feel relative to particular problems. However, focus groups do not constitute a random sample and therefore cannot be reliably generalized to total populations.

The focus group also has advantages and disadvantages relative to its qualitative cousins, the intensive interview and the ethnography. Ethnographies provide more naturalistic observations but are more time-consuming to conduct and provide fewer instances of relevant social problems talk. Intensive interviews enable greater attention to the views and experiences of particular individuals but serve as weaker indicators of how people talk in their everyday social groups. Located at a conceptual midpoint between the intensive interview and the ethnography, the focus group enables researchers to exercise control over the topic of conversation, while preserving certain elements of the naturally occurring social environment, including the gallery of peers.

In studies that do not compare subgroups, focus groups involve individuals with a particular trait or characteristic, for example, elementary school teachers, parents of young children, or baseball coaches. In studies that compare subgroups, the focus groups are generally homogeneous with respect to the variable under examination (e.g., race, marital status) and heterogeneous in relation to other variables. In general, groups should be added within each subcategory until the point of theoretical saturation (i.e., the point at which adding groups yields little additional information). To preserve the "insider" character of the discussion group, the moderator is typically attached to the group in relation to the critical research variable. The interview format tends to include relatively few open-ended questions (e.g., 4–6 questions for an hour-long discussion) rather than many short-answer questions. The interview format design also encourages free-flowing conversation among the discussion participants rather than between the moderator and the individuals in the group. Discussion prompts from the public discourse (i.e., campaign advertisements, political cartoons or posters) can help sharpen and focus the discussion. Discussions are typically recorded or videotaped and transcribed for subsequent analysis.

Theodore Sasson

See also Claims Making; Collective Consciousness; Ethnomethodology; Mass Media; Media; Public Opinion

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Food Insecurity and Hunger

Food security is access by all people in a population at all times to a reliable supply of food from socially acceptable sources sufficient for an active and healthy life. In contrast, *food insecurity* is the involuntary shortage of food due to economic constraints. When this food shortage progresses to the point that physical symptoms are felt, *hunger* occurs. Since the 1990s, these terms have largely come to replace a focus on *malnutrition*, a physiological condition that can arise from both shortages of food and disease processes. Worldwide, population levels of food insecurity tend to be associated with gross domestic product; within the United States, ethnic minorities and families with children have higher levels of food insecurity.

Hunger and food insecurity were rediscovered in the United States during the 1960s as physicians supported by the Field Foundation visited poor populations and reported widespread nutritional problems previously assumed to exist only in developing countries. These problems became the targets of Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty. Federal resources were directed to programs to assist low-income families with job training, nutrition, and health care needs. These programs highlighted social inequality, particularly that linked to racial discrimination. Due to the activities of such programs as the Food Stamp Program, Head Start, and the Women, Infants, and Children feeding program, the prevalence of frank malnutrition was reduced, but it was replaced with food insufficiency that is chronic or cyclic in many poor households.

In the 1980s in developing countries, the discussion of food insufficiency was redefined. Experts noted that "famine" and "malnutrition" were not the same as food insufficiency, but rather, a complex range of factors kept households from having access to sufficient food. The change in focus to factors regulating access has been instrumental in producing national and international efforts to increase access.

In 1996, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations convened the World Food Summit. This summit affirmed poverty as the major source of food insecurity and its eradication as a critical step in reducing food insecurity. Participants set a goal of reducing food insecurity by one half by 2015 and acknowledged three core concepts—food availability, food access, and food utilization—each a necessary but not sufficient condition for the next. Cross-cutting these concepts is a set of risks (e.g., conflict, climatic fluctuations, job loss, and epidemic disease) that can disrupt any of the three cores. A second summit in 2002, called to assess the reasons for poor progress toward the 2015 goal, cited a lack of will by the signing countries. However, critics cited the need for "food sovereignty," the rights of poor countries to grow food for their own countries' consumption, rather than for export through multinational corporations. These proceedings highlight the web of factors that regulate availability, access, and utilization of foods: land ownership and control, access to credit for agricultural inputs, and national policies regarding food exports.

At the same time as efforts focused on economic development as a means of ensuring food access, private efforts in the United States focused on food banking, soup kitchens, and other means of providing emergency food to the poor. The number of such programs has increased dramatically since demand spiked with the recession of the 1980s. Food banks were established to receive surplus food supplies, gleaned produce, and food donated through local and national food drives. The food banks supply a wide network of public and private food pantries and soup kitchens, staffed by volunteer organizations that distribute food directly to those in need. Analysts point out that such programs have allowed contributors to believe they are helping to solve the problem of hunger, while not directly addressing the complex circumstances (e.g., low-wage employment, mental illness and drug addiction, social stratification, declining government support for social programs) that lead to household food insufficiency.

Measurement of Food Insecurity

Food insecurity has several core experiential domains common across cultures. They include uncertainty and worry, inadequate quality, insufficient quantity, and social unacceptability. The cross-cultural comparability

of these domains makes it possible to construct questionnaires to measure food insecurity that make sense cross-culturally. Reflecting these domains, the U.S. Household Food Security Survey Module (HFSSM) contains 18 questions that measure levels of food insecurity in the United States. Since 1995, the annual Current Population Survey and other government-sponsored surveys have included it.

The HFSSM module is based on ethnographic research that indicates that food insecurity is a process managed by households. "Belt-tightening" measures such as changing to low-cost foods and reducing food variety occur before more extreme measures occur, such as decreasing meal size or skipping meals. The steps in this management process serve as the basis for the behaviors and experiences assessed by items in the HFSSM module. These include worrying that food will run out, cutting the size of meals, and feeding children before feeding adults. Research shows that these behaviors and experiences occur in a predictable order as households manage their declining food availability.

Changes in the interpretation and labeling of the HFSSM results were introduced in 2006. They included eliminating the terms *food insecurity* and *hunger*. Instead, households are labeled as being *food secure*, having *low food security*, and having *very low food security*. The intent of these changes is to reduce the confusion of food security as an economic concept with hunger, a physiological phenomenon.

Consequences of Food Insecurity

The experience of chronic food insecurity and hunger appears to have long-term consequences for physical health. Data from a variety of studies suggest that children and women in food-insecure households are more likely to be obese than those in food-secure households. Because most data on food insecurity and obesity are collected at the same time, it is difficult to establish causation. However, several suggested potential mechanisms may explain this association of food insecurity and obesity. Eating patterns of food-insecure families appear to be more binge-like, with food deprivation leading to greater overeating when food supplies are adequate. Analyses of food costs suggest that energy-dense foods of refined grains, fats, and added sugars cost less than less-dense foods such as fruits and vegetables. Thus, consumption of energy-dense food in poor households as a cost-saving measure may lead to overconsumption of calories and obesity.

Other effects of food insecurity on physical health are more difficult to measure. Elderly persons in the United States report making choices between purchasing food and medications. Seasonal variation in food insecurity, particularly for the elderly, has also been linked to costs of heating and, to a lesser extent, cooling, suggesting that households must pay for heating and cooling utilities rather than food.

Mental and social health has also been linked to food insecurity. Children from food-insecure households have problems in school, including greater anxiety and irritability, more absences, difficulty in learning, and lower grades and test scores. They are also more likely to be hospitalized.

Sara A. Quandt

See also Famine; Human Rights; Inequality; Living Wage; Poverty

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Foster Care

The protection and nurturance of children is a universal goal shared by all human cultures. Children thrive best when they live in safe, stable, and nurturing families. However, many children in the United States lack this type of home environment. For these children whose families are not safe havens, a caring society needs to find alternative foster care placements.

Foster care refers to the system that provides protection for minor children who are unable to live with their biological parents. Currently there are over 500,000 children in foster care in the United States. The goal of the foster care system is to provide abused and neglected children with an environment of safety, permanency, and nurturance.

The Purpose of Foster Care

In many states the foster care system makes provisions for both voluntary and involuntary foster care. Voluntary foster care involves circumstances stemming from parental problems that render parents unable to care for their children (e.g., illness, substance abuse, AIDS, incarceration, or death) or from situations when a child's behavioral or physical problems require specialized treatment and parents are unwilling to care for their children.

Involuntary foster care requires the removal of children from their parents to ensure the children's safety. The children are usually victims of abuse or neglect whom the court removes from their homes and places in the state's custody. Young children tend to be placed in homes with foster families, while teens tend to be placed into residential facilities or group homes.

Children in Foster Care

Removal from their homes and placement into a foster care setting is both difficult and stressful for children. Although they come into foster care because of their exposure to serious abuse and maltreatment, family problems, and any number of risk factors, many children struggle with feelings of guilt and blame for being removed from their homes.

Many children also experience a sense of confusion, anxiety, stress, and loss. In addition, they may feel unwanted and helpless about their placement in a foster care setting; they may have difficulty attaching themselves to the many different foster parents they encounter as they move from one placement to another; and they may be insecure about their future. Prolonged and multiple foster care placements can contribute to negative outcomes for some of these children. For example, children—especially adolescents—who have been in foster care for an extended time have difficulty developing self-sufficiency and independence in adulthood.

Children need consistency, connectedness, and a sense of belonging to have a successful, healthy development. Providing a safe, stable, nurturing environment can bolster resilience and the short- and long-term adjustment of children.

Permanency Planning

The foster care system provides only a temporary living arrangement for vulnerable children to ensure their safety and well-being. Children remain in foster care placements until the problems that caused their removal are solved. Decisions made about the future for foster care children are called "permanency planning."

A successful resolution enables children to return home. However, if no successful resolution to the problem occurs, the court may terminate parental rights and free the children for adoption, or else provide long-term care with foster parents or relatives. Fortunately, more than half of children in the foster care system get reunited with their birth parents or primary caregivers. In addition, more than 2 million children live with grandparents or other relatives because they were not able to return to live with their parents.

Approximately half of the children in foster care spend at least 2 years in the system and one in five children remains in the system for 5 years or more. Some children in foster care move between families as many as seven times during their stay.

The Foster Care System

The number of children in the foster care system continues to increase. While the foster care system is essential in helping abused, abandoned, and neglected children, many children remain in foster care for long periods of time when family reunification or adoption is planned. Court delays can often extend the time between when children enter the foster care system and when they are placed into permanent homes.

Significant differences exist in the quality of care and outcomes for children depending on their race and ethnicity. The percentage of children of color in the foster care system is larger than the percentage of children of color among the general U.S. population. However, the occurrence of child abuse and neglect is at about the same rate in all racial/ethnic groups.

The foster care system tends not to be a cohesive system; it is a combination of many different intertwining agencies whose responsibilities include the provision of services, financial support, and other services to children and families. Many foster care agencies find themselves unable to provide adequate, accessible, and appropriate services for these children and families. In addition, many of these agencies have high caseloads and high staff turnover.

Over the past 40 years, an evolution occurred in the development of the U.S. policy that influences the protection, placement, and care of children in foster care. However, serious gaps still exist in areas such as the provision of adequate, accessible, and appropriate community-based services for families; the development and implementation of individualized service plans for birth parents; the provision of supportive training programs for foster parents; and the high caseloads of caseworkers. As society continues to struggle with problems such as poverty, violent crimes, substance abuse, HIV/AIDS, homelessness, and racism, the need for foster care services also continues to grow. Although the foster care system is not the most desirable parental option for a child, the system is an alternative that usually provides a safe, stable, and nurturing home for children who otherwise would be exposed to detrimental and traumatic circumstances.

Myra Robinson

See also Adoption; Adoption, Gay and Lesbian; Adoption, Transracial; Family

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Foster Children, Aging Out

Foster care is one remedy for the social problem of child abuse, neglect, and dependency. Designed as a short-term solution to ensure the safety of children, critics have assailed foster care as creating additional social problems for children and families, including for young adults who transition out of foster care, referred to as “aging out.” Children who age out of foster care reach the maximum age of service by the foster care system, 18 years of age in most states, or 21 for persons with developmental disabilities, or somewhere between 18 and 21 after completing high school.

Aging out becomes a social problem in the failure of the foster care system to secure permanent adoptive families for these children earlier, leaving them to become adults who have no permanent legal families. Children not successfully reunified with families of origin or alternative family members—such as an aunt, uncle, or grandparent—leave foster care, transition directly into adulthood, and lack placement with permanent families.

About 20,000 individuals age out of foster care each year. Their living conditions and outcomes, compared with those of individuals who have never experienced foster care placement, are typically worse. Because the foster care system seldom adequately prepares aging-out youth for independence, they often experience other social problems in adulthood and suffer lower levels of overall well-being compared with the general population.

The foster care system fails in several ways to prepare youth for independence. First, many people who

age out of foster care complain that the initial reasons they were placed in foster care—child abuse, neglect, and dependency—were never adequately processed by the foster care system. Many complain that they were left to manage all of the psychological impact of experiencing child abuse and neglect by themselves. While the long-term effects of child abuse and neglect vary, the effects do tend to be negative. Those individuals who were provided counseling services for the effects of child abuse, neglect, and dependency frequently claim that the therapeutic approaches used by counselors were ineffective and that they struggled and still struggle with the long-term effects of child abuse, neglect, and dependency.

The foster care experience itself seems to be related to negative life outcomes for aged-out adults. It may be that reentry and drift impair independent living skills acquisition by interrupting both formal education and other important learning experiences, such as independent living skills training that would have more adequately prepared aging-out youth for independence. As a result, child welfare professionals have developed independent living skills training to better prepare older foster children for more successful transitions to adulthood. Although there are many foster care agencies providing excellent independent living skills training, many adults who have aged out of foster care indicate the training was inadequate because it relied on generic workbooks, was not community specific, did not require long-term learning by foster children, and was not ongoing long-term training.

Aged-out adults may contribute to other social problems in adulthood. Individuals who aged out of foster care are likely to move from foster care to public assistance. Indeed, aged-out adults are more likely to need public assistance over the life course compared with the general population. Thus, it appears that society pays high costs because many aged-out adults are not able to make it independently. This may be due to some other negative outcomes aged-out adults experience, such as lower levels of education, high unemployment, poverty, low-wage jobs, homelessness, and a disproportionate involvement in criminal activity. That is, they are more likely to be victims or perpetrators of violence and to serve jail time. Aged-out adults are also more likely, when compared with the general population, to experience young parenthood, divorce, and relationship instability.

Overall well-being is lower among people who have aged out of foster care than among the general population. For example, aged-out adults are more likely to experience depression and other mental health problems, lower self-esteem, lower aspirations for the future, lower levels of social support, less knowledge and understanding of family histories, and lower overall life satisfaction than the general population.

Aging out of foster care is therefore a social problem for many reasons. The inadequacy of the foster care system, the long-term impact of child abuse, neglect, and dependency, the overarching negative life outcomes experienced by aged-out adults, and their contributions to other social problems over the life course provide some evidence of the problematic nature of aging out of foster care. Aging out of foster care often generates difficulties that challenge aged-out adults throughout their lives.

It is important to note, however, that even though many individuals who have aged out of foster care experience fewer pro-social adult outcomes in general, many others can and do become successful adults. Furthermore, it is not clear that aged-out youths actually have worse adult outcomes than individuals who were reunified with family.

Donna Dea Holland

See also Abuse, Child; Foster Care; Poverty

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FUNDAMENTALISM

Fundamentalism is the strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion. The term

fundamentalism, though, was originally an Anglo-Saxon Protestant term applied to those who maintained that the Bible must be accepted and interpreted literally.

In popular usage, the term *fundamentalism* connotes both religious conservatism and traditionalism, and by extension, various strands of thought in politics, economics, government, and also scientific and academic perspectives that advocate strict adherence and maintenance of traditional perspectives in reaction against secularism and modernism. Although the term came into popular usage in the early 20th century, the concept and ideology trace back to early Christian and European history.

Origins and Purpose

As a movement, fundamentalism began in the United States as a Protestant movement to repel liberalism and developments perceived as threats to the purity, integrity, and authority of God's word as found in the Bible. In 1878, the Niagara Bible conference drew up 14 fundamentals of the faith, later reduced to five central doctrines: the inspiration and inerrancy of the Bible, the virgin birth, the physical resurrection of Jesus, the death of Christ as atonement, and the physical return of Christ to preside on Judgment Day. The resulting controversy ranged across all denominations, but it was most intense among Baptists and Presbyterians.

In the so-called monkey trial of 1925, a Tennessee teacher, J. T. Scopes, was found guilty of teaching evolution in public schools; other attempts to banish modernism and evolution from schools and society were unsuccessful. Unfavorable press reports quickly turned public opinion against fundamentalists, rendering their victory a short-lived one. Many dissociated themselves from the movement, not wanting to be labeled anti-intellectuals and fanatics. Gradually, the movement lost its cohesiveness and degenerated into splinter (independent) groups. From the late 1940s through the 1960s, fundamentalists redefined themselves in a movement known as neo-evangelicalism and sought broader participation within the U.S. political system. Billy Graham epitomized this new trend in evangelicalism.

Since the 1970s fundamentalists have reaffirmed their beliefs and initiated political actions to shape the nation accordingly. They used the ballot box, the airwaves, the mega-churches, and the power of the purse to restore what they saw as the unquestionable role of religion in society. Their position is that most social institutions of today's secular society and most contemporary social issues—such as abortion, same-sex marriage, family and divorce, the spread of pornography, the ban on school prayer, homosexual lifestyle, feminism, gender equality, priesthood for women, and ordination of gay and lesbian ministers—are incompatible with religion. Consistently, they seek to include the teaching of creationism or "intelligent design" theory in public schools alongside evolution and to defeat politicians they view as liberals contributing to moral decadence in the nation. In their effort to reconstruct society, fundamentalists developed strategies that transcended borders. For example, Jerry Falwell, a fundamentalist Baptist minister, founded the Moral Majority in 1979, which enabled fundamentalist organizations to become a formidable force in U.S. politics. Together with other New Christian Right groups and political conservatives, fundamentalists supported the candidacy of Ronald Reagan and helped elect him president in 1980. Ever since then, they have influenced the U.S. political process.

Fundamentalism has its parallels in Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism in attracting followers reacting against secularization and modernism. Fundamentalism in Islam has a strong political component as Muslims view Islam as a comprehensive way of life, making their religion an integral part of politics, state, law, and society. The most influential fundamentalist movement was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as a reaction against the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of European imperialism. Sayyid Qutb was its most prominent thinker. A similar ideology underlines today's fundamentalist movement Al-Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden. Originally established in 1988 in Afghanistan as a resistance movement against Russian occupation, it had the support of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States. In recent years Al-Qaeda has expanded globally and seeks to rid Muslim nations of all foreign elements and to reestablish the primacy of Islam.

Global Fundamentalism Today

Although fundamentalism has been a recurrent phenomenon in religious history, its recent characteristics are strident militancy, confrontation, and all too often, violence. Increasingly radicalized, fundamentalist extremists thus pose a serious threat, especially to developing nations and those experimenting with democracy.

The past 2 decades have witnessed continuous but steady growth in religious fundamentalism and revivalist movements. The growing Arab and Islamic presence in Europe, especially in Germany and France, once a bedrock of Christianity, has prompted concern among European Union nations. While seeking understanding of the emergence of fundamentalism, militancy, and extremism among many European Muslim groups, some Western nations also are asking if the time has come to take a defensive position.

Fundamentalism in the 21st century is a complex phenomenon characterized by several factors that combine socioeconomic and religiopolitical dimensions. Many traditionalist and conservative believers, including some of the better educated, deeply believe that they are in danger of losing their identity and culture because of the erosive forces of secularism and modernism. Thus, sparking today's resurgence in fundamentalism is a reaction against the social upheaval caused by globalization and technology. Fundamentalists view their world and belief system as falling deeper into moral and social decadence and believe that a return to the true religion in its orthodoxy would solve all social problems.

Because fundamentalism offers a simple solution to the complexities of many contemporary moral and social issues, it appeals to certain individuals and has the potential of mobilizing groups for action. As a movement attracting devout adherents, fundamentalism must be recognized as a major social force. Many fundamentalist groups view contemporary problems from a perspective quite different from other observers in their society.

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See also Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Religious Extremism

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G

Gambling

> *This is a vice which is productive of every possible evil, equally injurious to the morals and health of its votaries. It is the child of avarice, the brother of inequity, and father of mischief. It has been the ruin of many worthy families; the loss of many a man's honor; and the cause of suicide. . . . The successful gamester pushes his good fortune till it is overtaken by a reverse; the losing gamester, in hopes of retrieving past misfortunes, goes on from bad to worse; till grown desperate, he pushes at everything; and loses his all. In a word, few gain by this abominable practice (the profit, if any, being diffused) while thousands are injured.*
>
> —George Washington in a letter to his nephew, January 15, 1783

The father of his country would be dismayed 225 years later to look upon his child. Legal lotteries in 41 states, horse racing in 43—these would have been familiar even to Washington. But the past quarter-century has seen an explosion in the availability of other forms of gambling, with full casinos legal in 10 states and on Indian lands in 16 others, card rooms in 5 states, and gambling machines (video poker, etc.) by the thousands in convenience stores and other locations in 6 states. And these are only the legal forms of gambling. Sports betting, at least 90 percent of it handled by illegal bookmakers, may run as high as $380 billion annually (the low-end estimate is closer to $80 billion). Most recently, the Internet has made all these forms of gambling available to anyone anywhere.

In assessing the impact of gambling, it is useful to distinguish between places—the neighborhoods, cities, or states where legalized gambling has taken hold—and people. After all, proponents of legalization have never argued that gambling benefits individuals, though subsequent advertising usually appeals precisely to that idea. Instead, they promote gambling as an economic enhancement to the general community. Lotteries and machines ("electronic gaming devices") would provide money for education and other worthwhile government projects; casinos would be the core of a tourist-like industry, reducing local unemployment, bringing money to other local businesses, and generally improving the local economy. Opponents argue that casinos would also have negative effects on the area, attracting crime and perhaps other illegal commerce, like prostitution and drugs.

The results of various forms of legalization are mixed. Revenues from lotteries, even when dedicated to education, often merely allow states to cut back on other sources of revenue, thus shifting the tax burden to lottery players, who come disproportionately from the ranks of the poor, the black, and the uneducated. Lotteries function in effect as a regressive tax. Casinos, however, do reduce unemployment (though this may not hold for tribal casinos), and casino jobs are generally good jobs, better than what these employees could get otherwise. Casinos raise the value of commercial property, especially property close to the casinos, but not residential property. Particularly

for economically depressed areas, introduction of casinos can spark community renewal, but the net effect on business is not always like that of general tourism, with local restaurants and shops flourishing. Often the revitalization affects a narrow slice of the region, as the history of Atlantic City shows. Twenty years after the glitzy casinos opened, the number of bars and restaurants had fallen by 80 percent, and many of the businesses that survive more than a few steps from the casinos are pawn shops and other downscale establishments—the gold coast and the slum, with little in between.

As for the attendant problems of crime, and so on, evidence, especially evidence of direct causation, is lacking. Some gambling centers—for example, Atlantic City and Las Vegas—have high rates of property crime because, as in nongambling tourist areas, the hotel rooms, cars, and sometimes tourists themselves make attractive targets. The crimes committed by losing gamblers desperate for money are likely to be nonviolent—embezzlement mostly and check fraud—and do not have great impact on the localities. Nor is there evidence that gambling adds to other forms of social blight.

If gambling has not brought problems to the areas where it has been legalized and in some ways has brought benefits, the same cannot be said of its effects on gamblers themselves. Most people who gamble lose money—an outcome assured by the odds; over the long run, the house wins, and the gamblers, collectively, lose. Moreover, the games played most frequently, state lotteries, take out the largest house percentage. Still, most people who gamble say they do so for the enjoyment rather than to win money (71 percent vs. 21 percent) and see their losses as a cost similar to that of other forms of entertainment.

For some people, however, gambling becomes a problem. In a typical cycle, even if the gambler starts off winning, he or she eventually loses and then gambles more in hopes of getting even; further losses lead to attempts to recoup, with the gambler tapping into other sources of money—savings, money that should have gone for household expenses (mortgage, rent, food), then credit card debt, loans, and even crime, in a logical if insidious downward spiral. Attendant problems can include loss of job, bankruptcy, divorce, arrest, substance abuse, and suicide, all of which affect not just the gambler but also his or her family and others.

Estimating the incidence of this kind of gambling is difficult. Researchers must rely on self-reports of embarrassing, shameful, or even criminal behavior, and they must be somewhat arbitrary in defining the condition and selecting a time frame. Most analyses distinguish "problem" gambling from "pathological" gambling according to the number of criteria among the 10 listed in the authoritative *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (e.g., preoccupation, chasing, lying). Researchers also estimate both "lifetime" incidence (whether the person has *ever* been a problem or pathological gambler) and "past year" incidence. The population estimates for lifetime incidence range from 0.8 to 1.5 percent for pathological gambling; for problem gambling, estimates cluster around 3.5 percent. Past-year estimates are of course lower: 0.6 to 1.2 percent for pathological gambling and 1.9 to 3.7 percent for problem gambling. The difference between lifetime and past-year rates—anywhere from 50 percent to 300 percent—suggests that many or most problem gamblers overcome the problem, whether by self-reform programs or by just aging out. These incidence rates translate to anywhere from 3 to 8 million Americans with a gambling problem, numbers which are dwarfed by other addictions like alcohol and drugs but which still constitute a social problem.

Undoubtedly, some causes of problem and pathological gambling lie within the individuals, their psychology, and perhaps their brain chemistry. But gambling is affected by external, social factors, notably the availability of gambling, the structure of the game itself, and the social situation of the gambler.

As gambling has become more available, the number of problem gamblers has increased. Areas within 50 miles of casinos have double the prevalence of problem and pathological gamblers. Games where payouts come faster are more likely to "hook" gamblers. In the old days, a horse-race gambler had to wait a half hour between bets. Now, at a track, an off-track parlor, or even from home, one can bet legally on races at several different tracks, and at many tracks, one can play slot machines as well. Casino games (blackjack, craps, roulette) offer one payout per minute. At slot machines, video poker, and other electronic gaming devices, a player can make 10 to 12 plays per minute. More important, with these machines available in ordinary stores, gamblers do not have to make a special trip, as they would to a casino. One Las Vegas psychologist has called the machines the crack cocaine of gambling.

The Internet makes all forms of gambling even more available than video poker machines in 7-Eleven

convenience stores. Several factors about Internet gambling suggest that it will increase problem gambling. Because of its newness, however, evidence of its impact is thin. The Internet offers gamblers every form of gambling except state lotteries. Internet gamblers can play at a variety of sites simultaneously at any hour and from any location—home, school, or work. The anonymity and privacy of the Internet allow the gambler to keep the problem secret. By contrast, brick-and-mortar casinos train staff to identify problem gamblers among customers and employees, and even illegal bookmakers may try to help the problem gambler, interventions that are impossible from Internet sites. Finally, the Internet is more accessible to young people, who are more at risk of becoming problem gamblers.

The crucial link for Internet gambling may well be the credit card companies. The most important factor allowing losing gamblers to become problem and pathological gamblers is access to credit. If credit card companies and Internet money transfer companies like PayPal limit or ban payments to gambling sites, players will find it much harder to chase after lost money. Such a ban was at the heart of the 2006 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), which targeted the link between offshore gambling sites and U.S. financial institutions. As of this writing, the impact of the UIGEA on gambling, both pathological and conventional, and on land-based casinos remains unknown.

Jay Livingston

See also Bankruptcy, Personal; Deviance; Values

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Gangs

Gangs composed of young persons, as distinct from organized criminal syndicates, arose in America by the mid-19th century and were a concern for city leaders from the time they first appeared. The first serious piece of research on the subject did not come until Frederic Thrasher's book *The Gang* was published in 1927. Since then, research on the subject has become quite prevalent.

Though not easily summarized, there appears to be consensus on two points. First, gangs are far more likely to be found in "disorganized communities." These would be places that have few, if any, homegrown institutions and groups to guide and constrain their residents, especially their young people, so they will behave in more "conventional" ways. A corollary of the disorganization hypothesis is that the people living in "disorganized communities" are likely to be members of a minority population, be overwhelmingly poor (or certainly not well-off), and have unclear or questionable values. Second, the only way to control gangs is to cut off the supply of members or break up the groups. Efforts to suppress gang activity often combine a variety of carrots (e.g., programs that attract youngsters to conventional groups and styles of behavior) and sticks (e.g., police harassment and incarceration). Sometimes the whole neighborhood or community at risk is the target of these initiatives. On other occasions, it is the gang or its members that are targeted.

Although local people sometimes help implement plans to discourage gang activities, it usually is outside agencies and experts that assume most of the responsibility for fashioning intervention strategies and carrying them out. That is because much of the money to support these programs comes from one or another federal, state, or local government agency, and the noncriminal residents inside the targeted "gang areas" are often thought to be almost as problematic as the gangs and their members. Be that as it may, most gang intervention programs have not been effective. In some cases, the use of repressive tactics

actually emboldens gang members or makes gangs more attractive to young persons. In other instances, gang activity flares back up once programs intended to discourage gang activity or help children stay out of gangs are curtailed or, in the case of legal efforts to incarcerate gang members for a period of years, members are released from jail.

In the 1990s there was a renewed sense of urgency to do something about youth gangs. That is because many new minority populations arrived in urban areas, and their children formed gangs that both mimicked and diverged from gangs formed by earlier ethnic groups. Although not as much is heard today, as compared with the end of the 20th century, about gangs like the "Crips" and "Bloods," those organizations are still out there, and new gangs and confederations of local gangs have emerged in the 21st century. Armed with even bigger weapons and seemingly less concerned than ever about the havoc they create in the neighborhoods where they are located, contemporary gangs are considered every bit as dangerous as, and perhaps even more indiscriminately violent than, their late 20th-century counterparts.

Historically, some gangs have had a "gang tradition" in a particular neighborhood where several generations of gang members are tied to members of their own families and closest neighbors (e.g., in some Hispanic and Chinese gangs). Others have been more independent and not as well tied in to the ongoing routines of their community or its conventional adult-run groups (e.g., gangs composed of African American youth and more recent Asian immigrants). Some, like many white working-class gangs rooted in older ethnic enclaves, have a tradition of defending their neighborhood against "outsiders." Others, like the drug-dealing gangs affiliated with the Crips or Bloods, are viewed more as predators than defenders of their community. There are ample variations around each of these patterns, to be sure, with gangs sometimes being more protective of the people living around them and on other occasions holding people as virtual hostages in their own neighborhood.

Other changes in gangs occurred in the late 20th century. Girls are now creating their own gangs instead of serving as the female auxiliary to boy gangs. Gangs have also appeared in suburbs and even small towns located some distance from any large city. Some gangs are now more deeply involved than ever in serious illegal activities; use deadly force to solidify their control over an area more readily than they did earlier in the 20th century; and are more mobile, too. In short, the number and variety of gangs has grown, and there appears to be little that can be done to curtail them much less remove them from most of the communities where they take root. One well-known expert at the end of the 20th century had grown so despondent over the prospect of finding any intervention strategy that would work that he recommended abandoning the pretense of trying to curtail gang activity in major urban centers and focusing instead on smaller cities where gangs were just beginning to emerge.

To the degree that gang experts are right (and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that their assessment of the spread of gangs is not wildly exaggerated), something important is going on in American culture. To begin, it would seem that the social disorganization hypothesis is either wrong or now can be extended to cover virtually every kind of American community. On its face, the latter explanation seems implausible. True, American intellectuals at the tail end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st were prone to see American culture as worn out, if not altogether corrupted, and its civic routines as being suspect. At the same time, however, most Americans were not moving to small, out-of-the-way places or out of the country, and those who did were not making those moves to escape youth gangs.

There is an alternative explanation for what has been going on in American civic life and with American youth. Basically, civic routines and values may not be as worn down as social critics imagine, and young men and women, boys and girls may not be as problematic as many observers think. By extension, youth gangs would not be so alien a creation as people have been led to believe.

The foundation of this alternative way of looking at youth gangs is laid in the work of American scholars who have studied the rise of different kinds of unscripted and disruptive forms of civil unrest (e.g., mobs, protest marches, boycotts, and gangs) in European history. It turns out that virtually all these seemingly unscheduled and upsetting displays of public discord and the groups that use them are not as irrational, unorganized, and threatening as many persons have theorized and feared. Indeed, these activities have many features in common with those undertaken by more conventional groups, meet similar needs for their members, and do not discourage members from becoming "normal" adults. The boundary line between conventional and unconventional groups, individuals, and behavior is a lot fuzzier and easier to cross than had been imagined.

That is why so many youngsters "mature out" of gangs as they age. Most young people who live in communities with gangs do not belong to such groups, even though they may be on very good terms with youngsters who are. And most young people who join gangs do not become career criminals; rather, they grow up and out of gangs and move into more conventional adult roles like "employee" or "parent."

Gangs fit in this cultural landscape in a very important and telling way. Over the past 200 years, they have managed to change or keep up with the ways other unconventional groups have changed and managed to "fit in" with the larger, more conventional culture. They do this by combining elements of so-called primitive forms of corporate action (e.g., feuds and brawls) with "reactionary" kinds of civic disturbances (e.g., hostility toward "outsiders," particularly powerful outsiders, who might threaten customary ways of doing things) and, more recently, more "modern" types of corporate action (e.g., labor and union unrest) that are designed to garner new resources and rights for those groups initiating the actions. Gangs cannot be compared to labor unions or political parties. However, many contemporary youth gangs mimic modern corporations by forming far-reaching confederations and making lots of money, even as they defend their market or "turf" with a great deal of seemingly "primitive" brawls and feuds. It is the act of combining different kinds of unconventional and even violent behavior in the same groups that distinguishes Americans' use of disruptive community acts from those thought to be used by Europeans, which and has rendered them more conservative and less upsetting of the status quo than their European counterparts.

Contemporary youth gangs carry on the European tradition of forming age-segregated youth cliques. They do this by providing their members with opportunities to make their presence felt and their arrival as full-fledged "adults" known to a much larger and potentially indifferent public. Gang members, like teenagers generally, have presented themselves increasingly in adult-like ways, like assuming the right to take a life, despite being unprepared to accept the responsibilities that come with the assumption of such prerogatives. Thus, in their stylized dress, ritualistic declarations of brotherhood, indecipherable graffiti, harshly violent ways, and crude capitalization of home-grown entrepreneurs, contemporary youth gangs are, in a broadly cultural sense, a cruel parody of 18th- and 19-century male fraternities.

The point is not to dismiss the dangerous activities and harm that a gang does or to embrace gang members' views of the world; it is rather to appreciate the ways in which gangs and gang members fit into a long and surprisingly conservative tradition in the uses of group violence and displays of public bravado. It also is to recognize this singularly important way in which young people from very different backgrounds and in all kinds of communities have come to assume the rights and prerogatives of adults without being prepared by adults to accept the obligations and consequences that come with such privileges.

From what is known about the conduct of gangs and gang members in different settings, several conclusions can be drawn about the relation between gangs and the communities in which they are rooted. First, communities with relatively stable working-class or lower-middle-class populations have fewer gangs, and the gangs they have act in more restrained ways. Second, communities with a lower *or* higher economic profile and less stability in their population (i.e., people move in and out with great frequency) have more gangs, or the gangs they have act out in less-restrained ways.

What stands out most clearly about the relation between gangs and the communities where they are found is that the wealth and status of the persons living there are not the most critical factors in determining how gangs will act. What matters most is the ability and willingness of adults working through informal groups, voluntary organizations, and local businesses to engage their young people in more constructive ways. This is the most effective gang intervention strategy. It will not "save" every youngster, but it will make the transition between childhood and adulthood smoother and kinder than it has been for many young people.

The frightening thing about this assessment is that social scientists had very strong hints that this was the case as early as Frederic Thrasher's pioneering study of youth and adult gangs in 1920s Chicago. Millions of dollars have been spent since then in efforts to create more and better ways to suppress gang activity and lead gang members down a more conventional path to adulthood. The irony is that even as more and more expensive remedies (which ultimately do not work) are suggested and tried, the answer—having adults engage youth in more constructive ways—continues to be ignored.

Daniel Joseph Monti

See also Violence

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Gangsta Rap

Gangsta rap is a subgenre of hip-hop music which emerged in South Central Los Angeles and Compton during the 1980s. N.W.A., Ice-T, DJ Quik, and others rapped about urban poverty, police brutality, unemployment, gang violence, drugs, prostitution, and other social problems in the inner city. Today, gangsta rap has grown into a multibillion-dollar industry and has become a part of popular culture. At the same time, opponents of gangsta rap also grew in numbers and influence. Several critics have argued that gangsta rap celebrates violence and misogyny, initiating a debate over its merits and consequences that still continues.

It is important to understand the broader social conditions from which gangsta rap emerged. During the 1980s, inner-city communities were devastated by deindustrialization and the rise of a service sector economy. Many working-class blacks lost their jobs and could not find employment when manufacturing plants closed. These trends were particularly visible in inner-city Los Angeles, which experienced record highs in unemployment and crime during the 1980s and 1990s.

Gangsta rap reflects many of these themes. Los Angeles– and Compton-based groups like N.W.A. and South Central Cartel and solo artists like MC Eiht rap about street violence in their neighborhoods. Others, such as Ice-T, DJ Quik, and Eazy-E, rapped about pimping and the emergence of an underground economy in "the hood." Many of the same themes continue in today's generation of rappers. For example, Snoop Dogg and The Game carry on the legacies of previous gangsta rappers.

Negative Responses to Gangsta Rap

The growth of gangsta rap also fueled different social responses. Several journalists decried gangsta rap, arguing that it has a negative effect on today's youth. Similarly, in the 1990s former civil rights advocate and (then) president of the National Congress of Black Women, C. Delores Tucker, led a crusade against gangsta rap, arguing that it encouraged violence and misogyny among youth. This resulted in a series of court cases against record labels for distributing controversial rap albums.

Law enforcement also responded negatively to the commercial rise of gangsta rap. Many saw gangsta rap as a threat to mainstream U.S. values. In 1989, N.W.A. released their second album, "Straight Outta Compton," which contained several critiques of the police. In particular, "Fuck the Police" described the inner-city black community's sense of alienation and frustration with local police and other institutions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), however, did not see this song and others as valid social commentary. In the same year, the FBI sent critical letters to Ruthless and Priority Records about N.W.A.'s lyrics.

Some academics also criticize gangsta rap. Public health researchers argue that exposure to gangsta rap increases the likelihood one will engage in "risky behaviors" such as premarital sex, drug abuse, and other anti-social behaviors. Black feminists such as bell hooks argue that gangsta rap essentializes blackness by perpetuating the image of violent, oversexed, and misogynistic black men. Others criticize gangsta rap for encouraging youth to reject mainstream values, some linking black underachievement in schools to the negative values promoted in gangsta rap music. The underlying assumption is that gangsta rap socializes youth away from the mainstream and encourages them to adopt anti-social or oppositional behaviors.

The Social Merits of Gangsta Rap

While the lyrics in gangsta rap are controversial, some argue that they shed light on social problems—poverty, violence, drugs, and gangs—that occur in the

inner city. In addition, hip-hop sympathizers argue that critics misunderstand gangsta rap's message. Detractors often take lyrics about violence and misogyny literally and rarely acknowledge the playful and ironic nature of gangsta rap. Although often characterized as such, gangsta rap is not an aberration in urban black culture. Indeed, rap music draws from black nationalist ideology and black oral traditions such as playing "the dozens," signifyin', and other informal communicative practices.

Gangsta rap also provides an alternative space for individuals to express their political, economic, and social frustrations. Despite its portrayal by critics as a uniformly negative musical culture, gangsta rap also discourages individuals from the street life. Some, like Ice Cube, encourage young blacks to think critically about racialized struggles over space and political power in the United States. Others claim that their music informs the general public about issues that communities of color face.

Whichever side one takes, gangsta rap has left an indelible mark on popular culture. Record sales continue to grow each year, gangsta rappers continue to branch out into other kinds of media, and scholars continue debating the consequences and merits of gangsta rap. As it grows in visibility and importance, it becomes important to move beyond simple caricatures of gangsta rap.

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See also Black Nationalism; Deindustrialization; Gangs; Police

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Gateway Drugs

The term *gateway drugs* suggests that low-classified drugs are precursors to use of addictive and dangerous "hard" drugs. This theory originated in 1975 as a response to concerns that cannabis use leads to the use of harder drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. Leading gateway theorists statistically substantiated the relationship between marijuana and the use of other illegal drugs as well as the relationship between the use of licit drugs (alcohol and cigarettes) and illicit ones (marijuana and cocaine). The researchers found that licit drug use of either alcohol or cigarettes precedes the use of marijuana, and marijuana use precedes the use of other illegal drugs. The identification of this pattern led to the designation of alcohol, cigarettes, and marijuana as "gateway" drugs.

Determining the order in which respondents used the drugs (the sequencing of drug use) was an important aspect of these studies, as it positioned the use of drugs that appear early in the sequence as causal factors to further drug use. However, many other analysts challenge that causal presumption. An association does not mean cause. To illustrate, most bank robbers drink coffee and smoke cigarettes, but this does not mean that caffeine and nicotine cause robbery.

In two follow-up studies of this cohort in 1984 and 1992, the researchers found that the proportion of men and women (in the sample) who had used illicit drugs increased by 30 to 50 percent respectively, substantiating their general findings that drug use is progressive and that initiation into the use of gateway drugs might lead to a lifetime of drug use. The authors found that the *age* of initiation to gateway drugs was related to further progression of drug use. Men and women who first consumed alcohol or cigarettes at the age of 14 or under remained at that stage in the progression as compared with those who were initiated at age 16 or over, substantiating the progression thesis of the scientists. The *extent* of drug use in the early part of the progression was also correlated to the rate of drug use later in the respondents' lives. Furthermore, the

researchers found that males were more likely to use alcohol before cigarettes and marijuana, and women were more likely to use *either* alcohol or cigarettes before marijuana. Alcohol played a greater role for men in the progression. The use of medically prescribed drugs followed the delineated sequence. Over 60 percent of respondents who used medically prescribed drugs used legal and illegal drugs at least 10 times in their lifetime.

In contrast, a 12-year University of Pittsburgh study released in 2006 challenged the findings of gateway theorists by revealing that the sequential progression of the gateway hypothesis was inconsistent in a population of 214 boys, ages 10 to 12. The researchers found that a significant number of the young boys used harder, more dangerous drugs before they smoked marijuana or smoked cigarettes or drank alcohol. Because each stage of drug-use progression in the gateway theory hypothesis is a component of both a temporal and a hierarchical sequence, the University of Pittsburgh study challenged the causal relationships between licit and illicit drugs as well as the hysteria surrounding the smoking of marijuana. As part of their study, the researchers compared a set of boys who had followed the gateway sequence (used tobacco or cigarettes first and then used marijuana) with a set of boys who followed a reverse sequence (used marijuana first and then smoked cigarettes or drank alcohol) and found no relationship between either of these patterns and the development of a substance abuse disorder. In other words, neither of these patterns can predict the probability of continued drug use. Instead the researchers hypothesized and statistically proved that environmental factors, such as drug availability in the neighborhood, and individual factors, such as a predisposition for delinquency, play critical roles in the progression toward substance abuse. The boys were compared on 35 variables measuring psychological, family, peer, school, and neighborhood characteristics. Given the fact that gateway theory has strongly influenced anti-drug policies and informed clinical approaches to drug prevention in the United States, the findings of the University of Pittsburgh study shift away the focus from marijuana as a gateway drug and toward a behavioral and structural approach focusing on early socialization, individual and familial predisposition, and neighborhoods as precursors of a lifetime of drug abuse.

Proponents of the decriminalization of marijuana movement heavily criticize gateway theory. Legalization advocates argue that there is an unwarranted hysteria surrounding marijuana use and that marijuana does not predict the progression to harder drugs. They further argue that mediating the statistical relationships that legitimate gateway theory are factors such as the illegality of marijuana, which sensitizes marijuana users to a world of illegal drugs. In other words, it is the act of criminalizing pot smokers rather than the pharmacological properties of the drug itself or its assumed insidious nature that is the gateway to harder drugs. Nevertheless, institutions such as the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Drug Watch, the Food and Drug Administration, and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy have embraced gateway theory as a conceptual foundation for their research and public advocacy.

Vaso Thomas

See also Club Drugs; Drug Abuse; Drug Subculture; Marijuana; Smoking

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Gender Bias

Gender bias refers to the socially constructed preference for one sex/gender over the other. The practice of gender bias can be unconscious or conscious. For example, in a grade school classroom, a teacher

(female or male) can be gender biased by calling on young boys more than young girls to answer questions or to encourage boys' participation in class discussion. The teacher's gender bias may stem from the belief that male students might have more to contribute to the classroom environment than females. As a social problem, gender bias can appear in various social contexts: the educational system, the work environment and economy, families, the criminal justice system, politics, religion, and medicine. Even how spoken and written language is structured reflects gender bias, such as use of the pronoun *he* as the generic word to represent both men *and* women. Although instances occur where gender bias favors females over males (e.g., mothers awarded child custody instead of fathers in divorce proceedings), research shows that gender bias disproportionately affects women, mainly because of the patriarchal system embedded within the social structure of a given society.

Gender-Based Stereotypes

Notably, gender bias does not occur in isolation. Often driving gender bias in society is the influence of gender-based stereotypes. These are socially constructed overgeneralizations of particular behaviors attributed to a group, and they play a significant role in the formation of gender bias. These "traditional" gender stereotypes reflect expected feminine and masculine attitudes and behaviors attributed to women and men. Female stereotypes generalize women as emotionally supportive, irrational, physically inferior, and economically and socially dependent upon males. Conversely, male stereotypes generalize men as rational, intelligent, physically superior, and independent. These gendered stereotypes become part of a larger cultural belief system within a given society and serve as templates for how women and men should and should not behave in society. Simply, gender bias represents the culturally formed predispositions that individuals, groups, organizations, and societal institutions place upon women and men.

Consequences of Gender Bias

Economically, workplace gender bias contributes to the gender wage gap that exists between women's and men's earnings. For instance, in 2006, women earned 77 cents for every dollar a man earned. Women receive less pay than men, even when both have the same educational and occupational achievement. Another manifestation of gender bias is overlooking individuals for promotion or tenure. At universities, for example, when compared with male faculty members, female faculty members experience fewer opportunities for promotion and tenure. Female faculty members are also less likely than men to hold high-level administrative positions. These differences are especially significant when female faculty work within "male-oriented" fields of study, such as math and science. In addition, women collide with the "glass ceiling," an invisible boundary that prevents them from moving up the occupational ladder. This happens in the workplace because of the patriarchal assumption that women provide child care; in turn, many women are overlooked for promotions and pay raises because employers do not want to "invest" in a worker who is going to leave the workforce temporarily or permanently.

Gender bias also has noneconomic consequences. First, there is a lack of prestige attached to certain social roles in society, depending upon who fills the role. For example, men in female-dominant professions or roles—such as nursing, cosmetology, elementary school teaching, child care, or stay-at-home parenting—are considered less masculine and are therefore viewed as less valuable in society. Second, gender bias affects self-esteem. For instance, educational studies have shown that young girls and young adult women who experience gender bias in the classroom have lower self-esteem. As a result, females construct negative self-perceptions, believing that they are not as intelligent as males.

How Gender Bias Can Be Reduced or Eliminated

Since the 1960s, the U.S. government has implemented anti-discriminatory policies to ensure the equal treatment of women and men. One such policy is the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which states that employers should pay women and men the same salary for doing the same type of job with similar skill sets. Another example of federal policy is Title IX, implemented in 1972, which disallows sex discrimination in educational environments that receive funding from the federal government. Federal affirmative action policy (Executive Order 11246) prohibits sex, race, religion, national origin, and color discrimination in the workplace. Moreover, under affirmative

action policy, employers must actively seek out women (and other minorities) to reinforce equity in the work and educational environments.

Despite the implementation of the aforementioned policies, these measures have not been sufficiently enforced to completely eliminate gender bias as a social problem in U.S. society. Although reducing gender bias in specific social contexts is vital, the overarching solution would be to radically transform the existing gender-based stereotypes defined in contemporary society.

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See also Gender Gap; Gender Identity and Socialization; Patriarchy; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational; Sexism; Title IX; Wage Gap

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Gender Gap

When social scientists write of a "gender gap," they mean a systematic difference or disparity between women and men. Frequently discussed gender gaps are those in the labor market and paid employment as well as in family work and relationships. The gender gaps in these areas are not constant but instead vary across time and place; moreover, within a given place or time, the gaps often differ by group membership (e.g., one's race or social class). Because of such variation, explanations of gender gaps tend to focus on social factors rather than biological or other natural causes.

The Labor Market and Families

Men are still more likely to be employed for pay than are women. The gender gap in U.S. labor force participation dropped over the past century, with increasing numbers of women but fewer men reporting they work outside of the home (although the proportion of women entering the labor force peaked in the year 2000). Today, approximately 60 percent of women and 75 percent of men are in the civilian labor force. The numbers and proportions have increased most dramatically for married, white women with children.

The hours women spend on paid work have also steadily risen, but the gender gap in hours worked for pay remains. In the United States, employed men spend an average of 43 hours a week on the job. Employed women work an average of 36 hours per week for pay.

Often receiving even more attention is the gender gap in income and earnings. Over that same time period as the gap in employment declined, the gender gap in income narrowed. Women today, however, still make approximately 77 cents for every dollar that men earn. Moreover, in about three quarters of dual-earner couples, the husband still earns more than his wife; although the numbers are growing, in only about one third of couples in which both spouses work full-time does the wife earn more than the husband. This gender gap varies by race. For example, black wives provide almost $4 out of every $10 of household income, compared with about $3 out of $10 for both white and Latina working wives.

While the gender gap "favors" men in paid work, housework remains women's work more than men's: Wives still cook, clean, shop, and manage domestic routines more than their husbands. Although even single women do more housework than single men, the gap grows when they marry—men start doing even less, and women begin to do even more.

The gender gap in caring for children also remains strong. Over the past few decades, residential fathers (i.e., fathers who live with their children) have begun to spend more time caring for their kids. Nonetheless, just as women in two-parent households continue to do most of the housework, such mothers continue to do most of the parenting. The gap intensifies when single parents are taken into account: Across race, mothers head the vast majority of single-parent families. Even though the number of single fathers is increasing at an even faster rate than is the number of single mothers, there are still five times as many single mothers as single fathers.

A gender gap also exists in caregiving to relatives. Far more than men, women call, write, invite, and take care of kin—whether elderly mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, aunts or uncles. Matching a gender gap in the amount of time spent giving care is a difference in the kinds of care given. Although women do many and varied caregiving tasks for a significantly larger number of relatives than do men, there is not a single such task that men do more than women for a significantly larger number of people.

Gender Gaps: Explanations

What accounts for these gender gaps? A variety of explanations—emanating from different academic disciplines—address them. The so-called essentialist theories argue that gender gaps in paid work, as well as in family life, are bound up with the biological makeup of women and men and are, by consequence, if not exactly invariant, at least deep and tenacious. Often rooting gender differences in early childhood socialization, psychological theories allow far more room for variation among women and among men than do essentialist biological arguments. Much psychological research, however, explains uniformity among women and among men on grounds of invariance in gender-specific childrearing practices within a given society. Sociologists widely criticize such arguments and theories for ignoring the variation among women and among men.

Attending to such variation, sociological theories of gender gaps tend to emphasize two sets of explanations: structural forces and cultural influences operating in adult life. Most common are the arguments focusing on structural forces: that array of material and objective constraints and opportunities external to individuals. For example, according to this argument, growing educational opportunities available to women help account for the reduction in the gender gap in both employment and wages. Whereas in 1960, male college graduates outnumbered female graduates by five to three, by the year 2005, over half of those attending college were women. Because the gender gap in years of schooling declined, the wage gap between women and men diminished over those same years. Structural explanations also suggest both that the growing similarities between women's and men's paid work explain some of the reallocation of unpaid work and that remaining differences in unpaid work result in the remaining dissimilarities in paid work. Because women and men still spend different amounts of time on their jobs and have different types of jobs, men's jobs more likely pull or push them away from family responsibilities than do women's jobs. The amount and proportion of household income that women earn, the time they spend on the job, and their job prestige are negatively associated with the time they spend on housework.

Some suggest the gender gap in caring for kin also can be traced to employment. For example, compared with employed women, the "traditional woman" who does not work for pay is especially likely to provide care for her relatives. Further, the types of tasks for kin that a housewife does are different from those an employed woman does: Employed women give relatives more money and gifts, whereas housewives do more time-consuming, hands-on chores, like taking care of relatives' children. In this sense, employed women are beginning to look a little like employed men, as the structural model would predict. At the same time, a large portion of this gender gap relates to differences in men's and women's job conditions, especially their wages. When men make the same amount of money as women, for example, men's caregiving to kin begins to resemble women's. This also reaffirms a structural explanation for the gender gap.

Others, however, emphasize that even when women work for pay, the gender gap remains. The "traditional" man—who holds a paying job—continues to do significantly less housework, child care, and kin work than his employed female counterpart. The second set of explanations trace these remaining gender gaps in paid employment and unpaid family labor to the cultural factors that operate in adult life—especially three sets of cultural beliefs: (1) gender ideologies (especially those attitudes concerning what men's and women's roles and power should be in paid and unpaid labor and nurturance), (2) beliefs concerning the importance of employment, and (3) beliefs concerning the importance of family obligations. These types of explanations suggest that women still do significantly more housework, child care, and kin work than men, even if their employment conditions are similar, because women and men have different views about gender, employment, and family obligations.

Any discussion of culture and structure, however, must emphasize that womanhood and manhood are not monolithic. For example, the difference in housework between black men and black women is smaller than the gap between white women and white men. Depending on their race/ethnicity, men and women are held accountable to different standards concerning

gender, family, and employment just as they encounter different privileges and opportunities.

Overall, the gender gap in family and paid work has narrowed but still exists. A gender gap also remains in other realms of personal and social life—in physical and mental health (women get depressed more often than men while men develop what are called antisocial personalities and express anger more often than women), in crime (men are still much more likely to commit a variety of crimes, but women are catching up), and in politics (women are more likely than men to vote Democratic). Social forces can explain these, too. A gender gap does not necessarily mean attachment of a lower value to either women or men. Some of these gaps are simply markers of differences. Others are, however, indicators and enactments of inequality associated with different rewards and costs.

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See also Gender Bias; Gender Identity and Socialization; Pink-Collar Occupations; Second Shift; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational

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Gender Identity and Socialization

The term *gender identity* generally refers to an individual's feelings of being a man or a woman; it is a self-identification of gender. *Socialization* is the process through which infants develop into mature adults by learning the norms and values of the society. *Gender socialization* represents the idea that gender is socially constructed and that individuals learn gender roles and develop gender identity through human interaction. Through gender socialization, social expectations about what are appropriate masculine and feminine behaviors are communicated to members of society. Socialization processes transmit definitions of proper gender roles to individuals and shape their relationships to others in society as well as understandings of their place in it.

Some scholars argue that gender socialization can act as a mechanism of social control which defines and sanctions behaviors and attitudes about gender. Gender norms guide and restrict people's understanding and actions about what it means to be a male or a female as defined by culture. Researchers have found that extreme pressure to conform to traditional gender norms results in negative consequences for both men and women in U.S. society. For instance, boys who display femininity are often subject to severe social sanctions to reinforce norms of heterosexual masculinity. Some scholars explain that this is due to the coercive system of homophobia, defined as the fear and hatred of homosexuality. For girls, traditional gender expectations are embodied in beauty myths and the normative ideal of a thin body. These rigid and forceful gender role expectations can lead to social problems. Researchers associate high mortality rates among men in U.S. society, and high depression and proliferation of dieting and eating disorders among women, with gender ideologies.

Gender Socialization Literature

The pairing of the terms *gender identity* and *socialization* reflects a particular perspective on gender in the history of gender studies. The idea that gender is not biologically determined but socially created and learned through socialization processes was the central theoretical tenet of gender role theories and developmental literature on gender. According to gender socialization literature, gender refers to behaviors and attitudes associated with being a man or a woman, as distinguished from biological sex. Here, gender is considered a role, or a set of expectations associated with a particular status or position in society.

Young members of society learn gender norms and expectations and grow to identify with the gender category that corresponds to their biological sex. Based on this understanding, gender socialization theories

pay analytic attention to the developmental processes by which children form a sense of themselves as individuals with a particular gender. Psychoanalytic theories, social learning theories, and cognitive theories may be included in this school of thought because of their focus on human interaction and the socialization process and their linear perspective on human development. Although akin in that regard, the theories diverge somewhat in their focal interests and explanations on how gender identity formation occurs.

Psychoanalytic Theories

The principal perspective of psychoanalytic theories is that gender identity develops first from genital awareness and then through the psychological imperative to identify with a same-sex parent. In Sigmund Freud's theory, gender identity development is set in motion by recognizing one's particular set of genitals. Subsequent identification with a same-sex parent follows through complex psychosexual processes guided by a fear of the father's intervention prompted by the child's desire for the mother. By way of different psychological fantasies about their relationships to parents, boys eventually gender-identify with their fathers while girls gender-identify with their mothers so as to establish their own gender identity.

Other theories in the psychoanalytic tradition commonly emphasize parent–child relationships as the key process of gender identity formation. These theories focus on explaining why boys and girls develop different gender identities and roles, but they rarely question the link between biological sex and gender identity. In addition, the mechanism of socialization into gender roles is largely unspecified in psychoanalytic theories.

Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory focuses on analyzing the specific mechanism of socialization by which gender identity is developed. Applying principles of learning theory in behavioral science to gender socialization, social learning theory posits that gender-typed behaviors are learned through patterns of reward and punishment in social environments. According to this framework, children learn the gendered behaviors of their parents by mimicking. As children imitate parents' gender-related behaviors, they are either encouraged or discouraged depending on whether they are girls or boys. Girls may be praised for mimicking mothers' feminine behaviors, whereas boys would be reprimanded for displaying those behaviors.

After learning gender-appropriate behaviors through repeated patterns of reinforcement, children learn the label "girl" or "boy" as associated with the encouraged behaviors, and they internalize the appropriate label as their own gender identity. In essence, social learning theory postulates that children develop their appropriate gender identities through differential treatment given by parents and others in society. Socialization is perceived to be the key to mastering the knowledge about how one should behave appropriately, knowledge that then helps individuals identify with the particular gender that corresponds to the behavioral expectations.

Cognitive Developmental Theory

Whereas social learning theory focuses on adults' influence, cognitive developmental theory emphasizes children's own understanding of, and self-socialization into, gender identity. Cognitive developmental theory is based on Jean Piaget's theory of children's cognitive development. According to this theory, children develop a gender identity, around age 5 or 6, when they begin to understand the notion of gender invariance despite different behavioral displays. For example, a boy who likes to play with robots also may enjoy playing with kitchen sets, but the gender identity of this boy does not change with changing behaviors. When this understanding forms, children begin to know to which gender they belong, and they begin to associate people and behaviors with one sex or the other. Children then start to use gender categories as a lens, or an organizing scheme, to understand reality. As a result, they start to model their own behaviors after those who fall in the same gender category as their own.

Critiques of Gender Socialization

Although gender socialization literature demonstrates its strength in its analytic probing of how individuals are incorporated into the existing social order through gradual adoption of cultural norms, there are several shortcomings. For instance, gender socialization perspectives maintain the linear view on human development that children's ideas of gender are imperfect and must be molded to resemble those of adults before their socialization becomes complete. Furthermore, socialization literature's fundamental failure to see

gender as one of several interlocking systems of inequality opens itself to vehement criticisms by later gender theories. Several contemporary theories of gender challenge socialization theories' supposition that gender identity is an attribute to be obtained and become fixed for life at some point. Strong critiques are also made on the socialization literature's assumption of two (and only two) static categories of sex as well as gender, its reliance on universal definitions of manhood and womanhood, its disregard of changing definitions of values and norms, and most important, its failure to see gender as a system of power that is shaped by other structures of inequality.

Contemporary Approaches to Gender Identity

Gender scholars continue to analyze gender identity, albeit from a different perspective than socialization theorists. Gender identity is a social problems theme in today's social science scholarship not only in the sense that it represents individual struggles with cultural norms but also in the sense that gender identity construction is a site of challenge and struggle over existing inequality and power dynamics among diverse social groups. This perspective on gender identity is based on the contemporary view that gender is fundamentally a matter of inequality and domination. Many recent studies conceptualize gender as everyday practices that construct unequal relations of power and therefore emphasize the analysis of power, social structures, and the interplay of gender with class, race, and other systems of inequality.

In analyzing micro dynamics of gender, studies make conceptual distinctions between gender identity (self-attribution of gender), gender assignment (gender attribution at birth, based on genital characteristics), gender attribution (perceived gender by others in everyday interactions), gender role (appropriate behavioral expectations associated with gender categories), and gender practice ("doing gender" in everyday interaction). These conceptual distinctions challenge many taken-for-granted assumptions about gender, including the link between gender assignment and gender identity, the link between sexuality and gender identity, and the interaction between everyday gender practices and larger structures of inequality. On the macro level, analyses of gendered institutions; the mobilization of multiple gender and sexual identities, including ambiguous gender and sex identities; and the interactions between gender and other social hierarchies have come to replace interests in individuals' acquisition of gender identity through socialization.

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See also Bisexuality; Identity Politics; Sexual Orientation; Social Constructionist Theory; Transgender and Transsexuality

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Genetically Altered Foods

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are produced by transferring genetic material from one species to another. Genetically altered or modified (GM) foods contain materials derived from such processes. Whereas traditional plant and animal breeding involves the crossing of individuals with desirable traits within a single species, genetic engineering allows more rapid and radical transformations. Examples include the transfer of genes from Arctic halibut into tomatoes to confer frost resistance, and the incorporation of *Bacillus thuringiensis* bacteria into corn or potatoes as a "natural" pesticide. Genetic engineering has also made possible the cheap and rapid synthesis of common food ingredients, such as yeasts, and of products like recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH), which vastly increases an animal's milk production.

The criteria for classifying genetically altered foods vary among countries, depending on the strictness of

their regulatory systems. Broadly speaking, these foods include genetically modified crops that people consume directly (ranging from strawberries to radicchio to rice); processed foods containing ingredients made from GM crops or products (corn syrup, soy flour, cheese made with GM rennet); and meat or produce from genetically modified or treated animals (GM salmon or rBGH milk). Some people would also include meat or produce from animals fed GM cereals.

The world's first GM crop, the Flavr-Savr tomato, was patented by the U.S. biotech company Calgene and approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1994. By 2005, 90 million hectares of GM crops, predominantly soy, corn, canola, and cotton, were grown globally; the United States was world leader, with 50 million hectares. The Grocery Manufacturers of America estimate that roughly 75 percent of U.S. processed foods contain GM ingredients; however, less than half the population is aware that GM foods are sold in supermarkets. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, supermarkets label foods containing GMOs, and pubs and restaurants proclaim their dishes "GM-free." In Brazil, farmers smuggled in GM soybean seed from Argentina to overcome an official ban, whereas French cheese makers and South Indian rice farmers demolished buildings in campaigns against GM crops. Biotech corporations insist that GM crops are essential to prevent world hunger, yet when famine loomed in 2002, the government of Zambia, after a public debate, chose to refuse GM corn sent by the United States as food aid. Why are there such radically different responses to GM foods?

GM crops and foods are new life-forms that promise great benefits, including higher yields, longer growing seasons, greater disease resistance, lower pesticide use, or extra vitamins. Any new technology also carries a spectrum of risks, however, and most battles over GM foods concern how risk should be defined and evaluated, and by whom. Proponents of GM foods try to restrict the debate to immediate health and environmental effects. Opponents insist that long-term effects and social and political impacts must also be considered.

No serious health risks related to GM foods have been demonstrated to date, and for developed world consumers, the advantages of GM foods would seem to outweigh the risks. From a farmer's perspective, however, the cost–benefit analysis is more complicated. One contentious issue is intellectual property rights. There are some public research programs working on GM subsistence crops for unrestricted use by poor farmers—for example, virus-free potatoes in Peru. But the design and testing of GM crops is expensive.

Highly capitalized biotech corporations thus produce most of the new varieties. For highest returns they concentrate on important commercial crops; design new varieties to respond only to their own agrichemical products; patent the gene sequences; and sell seed to farmers as the equivalent of software, bringing damages for any infringement of copyright, like replanting or exchanging seed. The promise of lower overall costs and better output led to rapid adoption by commercial farmers in the United States, but peasant farmers around the world passionately oppose GM seeds as a tool of corporate dominance and control, deliberately designed to deprive them of ownership of their seeds and control of their production methods.

In all organized protests against GM food, including the refusal of U.S. corn as food aid by the Zambians, there is an element of resistance to what is portrayed as American corporate imperialism: Although French and Swiss companies number among the biggest biotech corporations, the industry figurehead is the U.S. company Monsanto.

Another political formulation of risk is prominent in Europe, where issues of trust and governance come to the fore. The U.S. public generally has faith in the virtues of technology and business enterprise and trusts its regulatory bodies, but few Europeans trust government institutions or corporations to assess or manage technologies in the public interest. Citizen groups opposed government licensing of GMOs without public consultation as an example of "democratic deficit." The national debates that ensued broadened the issues from primarily health concerns to encompass environmental risks, citizen rights, the critique of industrial farming, definitions of a healthy society, and concerns for global justice. Consumer boycotts of GM products and of retailers who stocked them drove the message home, and sustained public pressure rapidly brought much stricter regulation of GMOs. Public action in other nations, such as Thailand, Japan, and New Zealand, followed similar patterns, linking consumer, producer, and citizen rights and building transnational coalitions. The global knock-on effects have impacted markets, dented the confidence of GM food producers, and forced biotech corporations to reconfigure their strategies.

Biotech corporations and U.S. trade officials like to argue that foreign opposition to GM foods stems from

irrational emotionalism and scientific ignorance. Yet research shows that the more technical information individuals acquire about GM crops and foods, the more likely they are to oppose them. A better understanding of how GMOs are designed, produced, and controlled inevitably extends perception of risks beyond the narrow framework of space, time, and stakeholders that the GM industry and its supporters have sought to impose. The case of GM foods thus illustrates intrinsic tensions between technocracy and scientific literacy within contemporary democracies.

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See also Genetic Engineering; Multinational Corporations; Transnational Activism; Transnational Social Movement

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Genetic Engineering

Genetic engineering is the concept of taking genes and segments of DNA from one individual or species (e.g., a spider) and inserting them into another individual or species (e.g., a goat). The biotechnology of genetic engineering has created a broad spectrum of ethical issues, ranging from genetically modified organisms, as in crops, to animal and human cloning, genetic screening for diseases, prenatal and preimplantation diagnosis of human embryos, xenotransplantation, and gene replacement therapy.

Genetic engineering presents an exciting range of possibilities. For example, genetic engineering can give plants and crops desirable traits, such as drought resistance and additional nutrients. Such promises are not without their potential perils; some environmental groups raise concerns that the creation and use of these genetically engineered plants amounts to "genetic pollution" and that they should not be released into the environment until there is a full scientific understanding of their long-term impact on the environment and human health.

The stakes rise even higher when applying genetic engineering to animals or humans or animal–human combinations. For example, by inserting a spider's gene into a goat embryo, a biotech firm created Biosteel, a unique high-performance spider fiber, prized for its toughness, strength, lightness, and biodegradability. Possible applications include the medical, military, and industrial performance fiber markets. However, bioethicists raise concerns about crossing species boundaries and question whether or not we are creating long-term effects on the environment, inflicting harm on these creatures that we create, and whether or not we should place some ethical, social, and legal controls or reviews on such research.

The engineering or combination of animal and human genes (also referred to as "transgenics") represents a booming aspect of biotechnology. For example, genetically engineered pigs provide potential organs for transplantation (known as "xenotransplantation"). Researchers are also exploring the use of cell transplantation therapy for patients with spinal cord injury or Parkinson's disease. However, several drawbacks to xenotransplantation exist, for example, the small but significant risk of the transmission of usually fatal zoonotic diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (also known as "mad cow disease"). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has banned xenotransplantation trials using nonhuman primates until adequate demonstrations that the procedure is safe and sufficient public discussion of the ethical issues take place.

Some groups advocate the use of genetic engineering for the enhancement of the human species, but this raises the specter of eugenics, once used as an excuse for genocide and the creation of the "perfect race." Others call for a ban on species-altering technology

enforced by an international tribunal. Part of the rationale for a ban is the concern that such technology could create a slave race, that is, a race of exploited subhumans. In April 1998, activist scientists opposed to genetic engineering applied for a patent for a "humanzee," part human and part chimpanzee, to fuel debate on this issue and to draw attention to potential abuses. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denied the patent on the grounds that it violated the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits slavery. These activists appealed the decision, but the appeal has not yet reached a court, and it may never do so, because the appeal may be dismissed on other technical grounds.

A question for the future is how the ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic engineering will challenge traditional notions of personhood.

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See also Eugenics; Genetically Altered Foods; Genetic Theories

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Genetic Theories

Genetic theorists assert that we can explain human characteristics, health, and/or behavior, to a significant degree, by the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequence present in the genes of a person or of a group of people presumed to have meaningful genetic similarity.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, when they rediscovered the earlier published work of Czechoslovakian monk Gregor Mendel, Western scientists have agreed that recessive and dominant factors of heredity govern numerous human traits (such as eye color). Two contributing alleles determine these traits, one from each parent, with dominant factors always physically expressed, as they have the power to mask recessive ones. Scientists call these factors *genes*—although this term was (and some argue still is) quite imprecise—and they conceptualize genes as clustered together on chromosomes. By the 1950s, biologists had demonstrated that the DNA *within* genes influences heredity, and in 1953, scientists James Watson and Francis Crick published their famous double helix model, which is still used today, to conceptualize how discrete strands of DNA interlock with matching base pairs of adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine.

Today, common agreement exists that a gene is a stretch of DNA that produces a code specifying the amino acid sequence of one of the many proteins essential to the structure and function of the human body. DNA sequences in genes (the genotype) have some relationship to the physical expression of the human organism (the phenotype). However, disagreement persists about the degree of influence biological heredity has in determining who people are and how they behave. Some geneticists, biologists, and other scientists assert the dominance of a genetic paradigm in explaining human phenomena at both the individual and the societal level. Critics often argue that such assertions are greatly exaggerated and that factors such as family, natural, and social environments and economic and political structures have much more explanatory value. "Nature versus nurture" and "genes versus the environment" are frequently invoked shorthand terms for describing the tension between these points of view.

In the early 21st century, the pendulum between nature and nurture inclines quite steeply toward the former. Genetic explanations figure prominently in dominant understandings about what differentiates humans from one another as well as what determines health and behavior. Nonetheless, what is asserted by some as genetic *knowledge* is contested by others as genetic *theory.* This struggle over definitions and explanatory power is an ongoing social problem with both practical and theoretical implications.

Debates About the Fundamental Assumptions and Politics of Genetics

Behind debates over particular genetic issues lie several fundamental assumptions that are themselves contested. One is the premise that we best generate meaningful knowledge by examining the smallest parts of organisms—the DNA on genes. Proponents of genetic theories assert that the information gathered in this process can reveal the very essence of human life in an objective manner buffered from social or political influence. An opposing point of view is that reducing people to tiny parts ("reductionism") does not allow for a more holistic and useful understanding of humans as complete and relational beings. Reductionism has been central to most traditional forms of scientific endeavor, but many view genetics as its ultimate expression. Critics also extend to genetics a long-standing critique of scientific objectivity, arguing that all knowledge is in fact constructed through such processes as deciding how to define issues, what questions to ask, and how to examine and interpret data.

A second contested point is the relationship between knowledge and concrete interventions to improve human health. Much genetic research receives broad public and political support on the assumption that knowledge about micro processes in the body will benefit all through targeted tests and medical interventions. Critics counter that the ability to test for and diagnose real or predicted problems has always been far greater than the capacity to treat them and that there is a problematic tendency to produce tests and use them as the capacity to do so emerges, without adequate consideration of the ethical, legal, and social consequences of such actions.

A third issue is the exercise of human agency. Do genetic theories lead to a sense of fatalism because genetic endowment cannot be (and should not be) controlled by individuals? Or conversely, do they lead to a sense of hope because they may ultimately lead to greater control over intractable diseases, over the kinds of babies people have, and over what can be predicted about people's behavior and talents?

Also at stake in debates about genetics are questions about the allocation of social resources. Genetic research of all kinds, like many forms of scientific research, successfully attracts enormous financial investment. Are these dollars well spent, or might they yield greater benefit if they were used to address other problems?

Genetics and Genomics

In 2003 scientists completed the multibillion-dollar Human Genome Project, which resulted in a description or "map" of all the genes on all the chromosomes in a prototypical human body. With this massive enterprise came a shift in scientific discourse from a focus on *genetics*, characterized as single gene disorders or characteristics, to a focus on *genomics*, which takes into account both the interaction among genes and the complex interaction between genes and the environment. This shift opened the door for genetic theories to move from explanations featuring direct, linear causality (i.e., gene X causes manifestation Y) to more complex hypotheses. Recognition that the way many genes will express themselves is integrally connected to environmental factors is a particularly notable aspect of the movement from genetics toward genomics.

However, some argue that the shift to genomics greatly expanded the reach of genetic explanations and bolstered assumptions that genomic research can best illuminate and address ever-larger arenas of our social world. For example, genetics traditionally focused on relatively rare disorders, such as Huntington's disease, which are associated with mutations of just one gene. Genomics, in contrast, focuses on the genetic component of nearly all common illnesses, including diabetes, heart disease, schizophrenia, and cancer. The concern is that emphasis on the genetic component of these conditions detracts attention and resources from factors that exert greater influence over health outcomes, such as poverty and environmental toxins.

Genetic Issues in the Early 21st Century

Genetics and genomics are central to a growing number of emerging practices across arenas as diverse as medicine, criminology, special education, employment, and informatics. Two of the most salient of these issues will illustrate how genetic theories apply to concrete social problems.

Predictive Screening and Testing

Predictive screening and testing is perhaps the most tangible form genetics takes in the lives of individuals. These tests identify genetic mutations or information that is presumed to meaningfully predict a person's "risk" for disease. For example, pregnant

women now routinely test their fetuses for various mutations and make deliberate decisions about which babies to have and not have. Women identified with the "breast cancer gene" (BRCA1 or 2) may increase the frequency of visits to doctors for screening, or they may have prophylactic mastectomies. Parents whose babies get positive newborn genetic screens may act to prevent, mediate, or even anticipate disease. Proponents argue that these tests illustrate the promise of the genetic revolution. Critics argue that both the accuracy of the tests and the availability of effective treatments or prevention strategies are highly questionable, as increased testing results primarily in greater numbers of people who think of themselves or their children as sick or deviant despite no manifest symptoms of disease. Further, critics contend, mass testing programs function not just as medical procedures but also as mechanisms for categorizing individuals (e.g., as "normal" or as "deviant").

Genetics and Race

Genetic theories also play a prominent role in contemporary debates about race. On the one hand, the Human Genome Project's discovery that little genetic variation exists among people (about .1 percent) received extensive publicity. On the other hand, research on what genetic differences *do* exist among people continues at a rapid rate. Examples include studies to determine genetic components of health disparities; studies to develop "race-based" therapeutics such as BiDil, the first drug to be developed and marketed specifically for blacks; and the Human Genome Diversity Project, which is looking at DNA from groups around the world to understand evolutionary history. Despite care taken to differentiate contemporary genetic theories about race from historical precedents such as Nazi eugenics, such theories do continue to assert that we can meaningfully understand the differences among people through analysis of DNA. Critics contend that social inequality is a much more useful frame for analyzing difference and promoting equality and that genetic theories about race are both scientifically questionable and socially misguided.

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See also Eugenics; Family; Genetic Engineering; Power; Race; Social Constructionist Theory

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Genocide

Raphaël Lemkin (1900–59), a Jewish lawyer from Poland who wrote extensively about international law and crimes against humanity, coined the term *genocide* in his most famous work, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, published in 1944 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In his extensive analysis of German rule during the Holocaust, Lemkin derived the term *genocide* from the Greek root for tribe or nation (*genos*) and the Latin root for killing (*-cide*). Predating his creation of the term was Lemkin's work on earlier forms of genocide, such as the Armenian genocide during World War I and the mass murder of Assyrians in Iraq in the 1930s.

Lemkin not only contributed a conceptual understanding of genocide but also campaigned for its criminalization at the international level. His definition of genocide provided a legal basis for the Nuremburg trials. Furthermore, his work helped inspire the United Nations to establish, on December 9, 1948, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which became effective on January 12, 1951, with passage of Resolution 260. Article 2 defines genocide as certain "acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." The convention delineates these acts of genocide as killing members of a group or causing them serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life

on the group that are calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This legal definition thus classified the crime of genocide in three distinct parts: actions, intent, and victimization. The first of these include murder, causing serious harm, creating conditions for the destruction of a particular group, preventing the biological reproduction of a particular group, or removing children from the group, the latter two aimed at destroying the group's continued existence. The second part of the UN definition, intent, is controversial, as legal scholars point out that intent is typically difficult to prove and therefore hard to prosecute. Most often, proof of a perpetrator's intent lies in the terms of a political program aimed at systematic brutality against the group in question. The third element in the definition, racial, ethnic, or religious group victimization, makes genocide distinct from other kinds of murder and brutality.

Initial debates over the UN convention's definition of genocide were intensely political, and the definition itself remains widely criticized, especially for its failure to include political and social groups. The first draft of the convention included political groups, but the USSR contested its inclusion and ultimately prevailed. Moreover, whereas Lemkin's definition of genocide included the intentional destruction of cultures and political groups, the UN definition did not.

The destruction of a group's cultural identity is commonly called *cultural genocide* or *ethnocide*. During the genocide in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the term *ethnic cleansing* entered into popular parlance, but it remains undefined in legal terms. For example, while often used to describe genocide, it may also involve mass deportation without mass murder. Native Americans endured both ethnic cleansing and ethnocide during the 19th and 20th centuries. Ethnic cleansing policies forced native populations onto reservations, while white Americans seized millions of acres of their land. By the late 19th century, the federal government instituted a now-discontinued policy of forced assimilation, with the ultimate goal of eradicating native cultures and societies.

Some scholars classify genocides in terms of their history and the reasons for such action. *Instrumental genocide* refers to mass murder aimed at achieving specific goals, a motivation often associated with premodern genocides. *Ideological genocide,* on the other hand, refers to situations in which mass murder operates as an end in itself. It is often associated with more modern instances of genocide, including those based on religious or ethnic fundamentalism. The most infamous example of genocide involved the mass killing of Jews, so-called Gypsies, Communists, and other groups based on the Nazis' extreme nationalism and claims to racial superiority. As many scholars have noted, although the Nazis were not the first to engage in genocidal activity, the Holocaust was unprecedented in terms of its modern, distinctly nationalist and industrial character.

Other modern examples include the Cambodian genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, which took place between 1975 and 1979 as part of Pol Pot's pro-Communist purge. Much of the population was forced into labor camps or killed. This genocide, among the most deadly of the 20th century, resulted in the deaths of nearly one fourth of the nation's population (1.7 out of approximately 7 million). The Rwandan genocide, occurring over a mere 100 days (April to July 1994), provides a more recent example of ideological genocide. In Rwanda, extremist members of the country's Hutu majority attempted to wipe out the Tutsi minority and succeeded in killing an estimated three fourths (850,000) of the country's Tutsi population. The Rwandan genocide presents an extreme instance of a remarkably large number of people killed in such a short period of time.

In terms of prosecution, the UN convention—presently accepted by 135 nations—obligates its signatories to take actions to prevent genocide and punish those involved in it. The UN convention states that violators can be tried in courts in the country where the acts in question occurred or by international tribunal. In the 1990s, the UN Security Council created ad hoc tribunals to try international crimes, specifically the genocides in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 2002, the International Criminal Court was established to try such cases, thereby making genocide subject to universal legal standards. The convention's historical significance lies in its role as a foundation for an international system of human rights legislation and enforcement. Despite the UN's success in trying war criminals involved in genocidal activity, the international community remains concerned about the continued development of policies and strategies to prevent genocide and adequately provide for its victims.

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See also Ethnic Cleansing; Holocaust; Human Rights; Scapegoating

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Gentrification

Gentrification refers to the process in which members of a highly educated, professional class move into formerly working- or lower-class city districts, populated largely by members of minority groups. The term *gentrification* derives from the European concept of "gentry" and the "gentry class" and suggests, historically, a class whose manners, tastes, and sense of leisure, refinement, and gentility mirrored and emulated the values and habits of the aristocracy.

Contemporary discussions of gentrification take on added importance because of the American ambivalence toward cities as centers of cultural, political, and economic life. If, as Georg Simmel suggests, cities are the greatest representation of societal culture and civilization, they also represent heightened diversity, crowds, noises, anonymity, and a loss of privacy. For these reasons, members of the middle and upper classes have historically sought refuge beyond city boundaries for more space and to engage in activities with members of their own class. However, in the 1950s and 1960s, a series of political, educational, and economic changes occurred that significantly affected the health and prosperity of many U.S. cities. These changes would play a dramatic role in urban gentrification.

First were the government programs in the post–World War II era to address the housing shortage created by returning veterans and the resultant baby boom. These set in motion a suburban building boom that enabled builders to construct housing developments on vacant land outside the cities and hundreds of thousands of families to buy an affordable home of their own. In the years to follow, shopping centers, office parks, and industrial parks would move outward also, all of which would have a negative impact on most cities.

Next came the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, initially directed toward the South, but which, under the efforts of Martin Luther King, Jr. and others, applied likewise to northern schools. This increased the outflow of white middle-class residents who sought refuge outside city limits where integration was not mandated. In the 1960s a series of urban riots further accelerated a white exodus and led to the growth of series of satellite suburbs encircling cities and towns. As "white flight" occurred, a simultaneous inflow of blacks came into many U.S. cities, as well as tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans into the New York metropolitan region. This demographic shift had an almost revolutionary impact on the political, economic, and cultural landscape of U.S. cities.

Cities faced several problems. As homes and apartment buildings built in the late 19th and early 20th centuries began to age and deteriorate, cities were losing their tax base: the white middle class. The influx of mostly rural blacks and Puerto Ricans, and the existence of the small, black middle class in most U.S. cities, could not offset the lost tax revenues caused by white flight. Furthermore, President Eisenhower's massive highway construction program made it possible, and easier, for whites to move back and forth between their residence in suburbia and their workplace in the cities from which they had exited.

Urban politicians and businessmen appealed to the federal government for assistance in reshaping their cities and for relieving the traffic jams that resulted from suburbanites (many ex-city dwellers) traveling back and forth between work and home. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, cities across the country initiated massive urban renewal programs and built intra-city expressways that destroyed historic and long-existing neighborhoods and communities, homes, churches, community centers, and schools. Some areas not in the path of renewal and expressways were also affected, as cities sought to upgrade building codes,

especially those concerned with plumbing and electrical wiring. This became an expensive venture, especially for apartment building landlords or working-class people who had inherited the family home and could not afford the expenses of bringing their properties up to contemporary code standards.

As a consequence, cheap housing—in comparison with escalating suburban home costs—became available in the inner cities. This enticing inducement attracted two groups that spurred on the gentrifying process: ex-urbanites wanting to return to the city and young, highly educated professionals. As they grew older, the ex-urbanites, now empty nesters, sought a more intense interaction with people, activities, and institutions which in the aggregate could only be found in cities. The second group, nicknamed "yuppies," worked in the cities' banks, businesses, colleges and universities, and hospitals. These childless couples and single individuals loved city life and its amenities—theaters, restaurants, parks, museums and galleries, and shops—and did not want the hassles of long commuter drives. Also, unlike the previous generation of white middle-class parents, those with young children in the late 20th century had model schools, which many cities created largely to retain their small and dwindling white middle class. Some of these model schools were excellent and enticed many parents to move into cities and have their children attend one of them.

Consequently, with loans, savings, financial gifts, or money borrowed from family members, these groups began a massive remodeling program to reshape old communities and create new ones. They moved into old, often dilapidated buildings, many just shells, and spent millions to refashion some of the old Victorian homes and brownstone buildings back to what they were 50 to 70 years ago. The results were impressive; eyesores disappeared, street activity and safety returned, and the neighborhood economy thrived.

But the gentrification process came at a human cost. From urban renewal to the building of expressways, the poor were shuttled from place to place, often with their new housing more dilapidated than the old. Poor and minority communities, who had complained for years over the lack of sufficient streetlights and the invisibility of police patrols, now saw an abundance of both in these gentrified neighborhoods and communities. In addition, men not involved with drugs, who would congregate peacefully on corners and stoops, with gentrification now found themselves harassed by the police, who demanded that they move on. And working-class and lower-middle-class renters and owners who had lived in their neighborhoods for years often faced insurmountable financial stress as their rents and real estate taxes increased. Once the gentrifiers improved their properties, higher rents and property taxes followed. Thus, for many whose income did not match the increased expenses, the only choice was to move away. In some cities, such as Charleston, South Carolina, the gentrifying process grew to such an extent that it became virtually impossible for even middle-class blacks and whites to purchase homes in the peninsular portion of the city. Instead, the middle class moved to the area west of the Ashley River, whereas the working, lower classes moved to the less expensive and not yet gentrified city of North Charleston.

Because gentrification is intricately linked to matters of class, race, and ethnicity, this process has its pluses and minuses. Had urban politicians and the state and federal officials been more attentive to matters related to housing in inner cities, the consequences of gentrification in certain cities might not have been so detrimental to inner-city residents. The question is whether it is necessary to destroy a community in order to save it. Upscale buildings and restored homes unquestionably revitalized the cities, but holistic urban planning might have prevented destruction of the sense of community among low-income people and the networks around which they built their lives.

Rutledge M. Dennis

See also *Brown v. Board of Education*; Community; Inner City; Inner-Ring Suburb; Segregation, Residential; Urban Decline; Urban Renewal; Urban Sprawl; Urban Underclass

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GERRYMANDERING

Gerrymandering is the practice of drawing political boundaries—especially the boundaries of legislative districts—in such a way as to obtain political advantage. The term derives from the claim of critics that a legislative district drawn by supporters of Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry in 1812 was shaped like a salamander, or "Gerry-mander."

Consider the hypothetical region shown in Figure 1, with supporters of party A indicated by the light squares and supporters of party B by the dark squares. In proportional voting systems, the fact that 22/36 of the voters support party A would mean that party A would get that proportion—22/36—of the representation. But in a winner-take-all voting system (as in the United States), the region must be divided into a fixed number of single-winner districts. Assume that by virtue of its population, the region is entitled to three legislators, and hence the region must be divided into three legislative districts.

If the district lines are drawn as in Figure 2, then party B will win two out of the three districts (because it has a majority of the votes in each of the two lower districts, while party A has all the votes in the upper district). On the other hand, if the district lines are drawn as in Figure 3, then party A will win two out of the three districts (the top two districts). And if they are drawn as in Figure 4, then party A will carry all three districts. Thus, whoever gets to draw the lines can maximize partisan advantage.

Different district lines yield different political outcomes because, under winner-take-all voting, a party wins a district whether it has a large majority (with many wasted votes) or a narrow majority. So by arranging for one's own party to win its districts as narrowly as possible and for one's opponents to win their districts with as many wasted votes as possible, one can maximize the number of districts won. (Of course, a party might not want to make its winning edge too narrow, lest a shift in voter sentiment lead to an electoral loss.) With modern computer technology and detailed voter databases, it is possible to manipulate political boundaries with great precision.



Figure 1 Region With Supporters of Party A (Light Squares) and Party B (Dark Squares)

Note: Each square represents 100,000 voters.

Several mathematical procedures exist for neutrally drawing district lines—for example, the shortest split-line algorithm. However, it is sometimes thought desirable to have a district made up of people sharing a community of interest (say, living in the same municipality or county, or on the same side of a mountain), factors that cannot readily be accounted for mathematically. Once discretion is allowed, the opportunity exists for manipulation to suit partisan interest.

In Canada and Britain, independent commissions draw the electoral boundaries. In most U.S. states, the state legislatures—which are partisan bodies—draw the congressional district lines. In a few states, a nonpartisan or bipartisan agency—such as Iowa's Legislative Service Bureau, the Washington State Redistricting Commission, and the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission—is responsible for



Figure 2 Party B Wins Two out of Three Districts



Figure 3 Party A Wins Two out of Three Districts

drawing the lines. Such agencies are often prohibited from considering any demographic data other than population headcount. In some cases these agencies have the last word; in others the state legislature can amend the commission's plan within specified limits.

In the United States, after a new census is conducted every 10 years, the states engage in "redistricting," that is, redrawing their district lines to ensure that each district has roughly equal population. Thus, gerrymandering was once a decennial concern. In 2006, however, the Supreme Court ruled (in *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry*)



Figure 4 Party A Wins All Three Districts

that there was nothing to prevent a state legislature, when its political control switched from one party to another, from engaging in mid-decade redistricting to change districts drawn earlier in conformity with the census.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that boundary drawing must result in "compact districts of contiguous territory" with roughly equal population. In practice, however, districts have been permitted in all sorts of bizarre shapes. Although the Court barred redrawing district lines so as to obtain excessive partisan advantage, it failed to offer a standard for determining whether a partisan gerrymander is excessive, and it has even allowed patently partisan line drawing to stand. Some Supreme Court justices urge that a standard of excessive partisanship be developed; others believe that no such standard can be constructed.

The Supreme Court has prohibited the drawing of district lines where the intent is to disenfranchise racial or ethnic minorities. Some states created legislative districts where a majority of voters are members of a racial or ethnic minority (so-called majority-minority districts) to ensure that some legislators will be minorities. Republicans often support such "racial gerrymandering," with the hope that concentrating minority voters (who tend to vote Democratic) will reduce the number of Democratic legislators statewide.

Gerrymandering need not always be done for partisan advantage; sometimes it is used for the *bipartisan* advantage of incumbents. That is, incumbents

of both parties might support a redistricting scheme that makes all incumbents more likely to win reelection. For example, if representatives from party A and party B have been elected from two adjoining districts, each district having voter sentiment divided approximately 50–50 between the two parties, the district lines could be redrawn so that each has a comfortable 70–30 edge, thus assuring reelection.

Stephen R. Shalom

See also Redistricting, Congressional Districts

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Gini Coefficient

The Gini coefficient is a popular statistical measure of income inequality. It was developed by an Italian statistician, Corrado Gini, in 1912 as a measure of concentration applicable to the distribution of wealth, income, or any other continuous variable. Gini coefficients can range from a minimum of 0 (perfect equality) to a maximum of 1 (perfect inequality). Higher values of the Gini indicate greater income inequality, or income concentration, whereas lower values indicate more equality. In a hypothetical society with perfect equality, the Gini = 0 and all families or persons receive an income equal to the average, whereas in a society with perfect *inequality,* Gini = 1 and a single family or person receives all income.

Gini coefficients have an intuitive interpretation because the measure can be represented graphically on a Lorenz curve (see Figure 1). A Lorenz curve has several components: a 45-degree line representing the line of perfect equality, the cumulative proportion of the population plotted on the horizontal axis, and the cumulative proportion of income plotted on the vertical axis. The Lorenz curve plots the degree of deviation from the 45-degree line of perfect equality. The Gini coefficient is sometimes called a ratio because it reflects the ratio between the 45-degree line of equality and the Lorenz curve relative to the total area. Thus, if the area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve is A, and B represents the area below the Lorenz curve, then the Gini ratio is equal to A/(A+B).

The Gini coefficient is satisfactory on a number of grounds. It follows the principle of transfers because when income is redistributed from a richer person or family to a poorer one, the Gini index decreases, and when income is redistributed from a poorer to a richer individual or family, it increases. Gini coefficients are also scale-invariant in that when all incomes are increased by some constant, the Gini coefficient yields the same result. In practical terms, this means that Gini coefficients are not affected by inflation.

The Gini coefficient of U.S. family income has been reported by the Census Bureau since 1947. In 1968 the Gini coefficient reached a low of 0.348, whereas in 2005 the Gini coefficient reached 0.440. The increase reflects the general trend of rising income inequality in the United States. A calculation of the Gini coefficient using 2005 data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, based on a more comprehensive income definition than the census, yields a Gini coefficient of 0.587.

Despite its strengths, the Gini coefficient is not without criticism. Social scientists have pointed out that the Gini index is more sensitive to the middle of a typical income distribution. In other words, when transfers occur between very rich or very poor individuals, the Gini coefficient will be less sensitive (i.e., will not register much change) than when changes occur among middle-income families or persons. Another problem is that the Gini coefficient does not have an intuitive method for decomposing inequality into an additive within-group and between-group component, but social scientists (mostly economists) have provided potential techniques for decomposing the index.

Thomas W. Volscho

See also Income Disparity; Inequality

Figure 1 Lorenz Curve of U.S. Adjusted Gross Income, 2005

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Glass Ceiling

The glass ceiling is a metaphorical reference to systemic obstacles created in the workplace that prevent the socioeconomic advancement of minority groups by blocking them from reaching the upper echelons of leadership and management. This concept suggests that individuals who are otherwise qualified for higher-level positions are unfairly limited in their advancement through the organizational ranks. Traditionally, the glass ceiling metaphor pertained exclusively to women, but contemporary definitions now extend it to include minority groups as well. As the term *glass ceiling* implies, the barriers that limit these individuals are not immediately apparent but are tantamount to bumping one's head against a glass ceiling. The opposite term, *glass escalator,* refers to men's more rapid upward movement in organizations, suggesting a gender bias.

Historical Perspective

Coined in 1986 by the *Wall Street Journal,* the glass ceiling characterized organizational constraints that limit the movement of women to assuming leadership and managerial positions. The term quickly worked itself into the public vernacular as women earned promotions to middle management positions in increasing numbers while few advanced further. The glass ceiling metaphor has since been repeatedly stretched and molded to also apply to career mobility for those of minority group status based on race, ethnicity, disability, or sexual orientation. While there have been numerous interpretations of this phenomenon, the fundamental and underlying concept has remained the same: the scarcity of women's movement into top management positions in the workplace.

In its definition of the glass ceiling, the U.S. government views the glass ceiling as any artificial barriers that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization into management-level positions because of an attitudinal or organizational bias. With this definition, the glass ceiling now applies to all minorities, and not exclusively to women. The importance of this concept is that it implies that minority group members experience greater resistance to their advancement as they climb their organizational ladders. Although the experience of career impediments is common for all minorities, the patterns differ depending on minority group membership. For example,

minority men are not as likely to experience sexual harassment, a barrier to mobility, as their female counterparts do.

The glass ceiling is a reality when certain preconditions exist in the workplace. First, workplace inequalities based on race, ethnicity, gender, or other minority indicators cannot be explained by the employee's job performance. Second, racial and gender disparities in representation are more evident at higher organizational levels than at lower levels. Third, advancement becomes more difficult for minorities as their careers progress.

Research

Some research analyzes the glass ceiling phenomenon by examining quantitative and experiential representations of minorities occupying top management positions. In comparison with conventional barriers to career advancement, such as educational qualifications and job performance reviews, barriers that constitute the glass ceiling are frequently rooted in cultural, societal, and psychological factors. Because of the transcendent and subjective nature of the glass ceiling phenomenon, research analysis has produced mixed and varied results. However, its existence in the corporate world is less questioned than its constituent elements, which continue to be a subject of debate among researchers.

Society as a whole presents a major hurdle to the movement of minorities through the corporate ranks. Discrimination arising from strongly held attitudes, biases, and stereotypes toward women and minorities, as well as varying perspectives of normative behaviors associated with gender and social groups, directly contribute to the glass ceiling.

Researchers have identified three interrelated and panoptic hindrances to the upward mobility of females and members of minority groups on the corporate ladder in their examination and inquiry into the glass ceiling phenomenon. One barrier involves societal and cultural aspects or socialized attitudes or social psychological factors that can impose restrictions. A second barrier deals with organizational limitations or structural factors, and the third barrier addresses the personal, individual, and psychological factors that may interfere with the promotion process.

The supply barrier is the pervasive social force that acts to directly hinder women and members of minority groups from attaining the credentials necessary to move forward in their professional development. This, in turn, leads to a deficiency in the number of skilled and qualified women and minorities. Empirical research shows that each group has differential access to resources, educational and work opportunities, and status. As a result, women and minorities are frequently relegated to the confines of a narrow range of restrictive occupations, a pattern known as "occupational segregation."

The difference barrier arises from the social and cultural preconceptions associated with certain individual differences, such as gender, color, and culture. These barriers can interfere with job performance and employer evaluations. For example, prejudices associated with gender are frequently anchored in the traditionally held views of women's roles in society. Cultural and racial biases are also rooted in the established values and norms of the majority.

Individual and psychological barriers are the result of internalizing the generally held perceptions and stereotypes about women and minorities that employers may hold. Individual and societal barriers are deeply interwoven as lack of self-confidence, motivation, and aspirations. These usually stem from the generally held perceptions and stereotypes about women and minorities which these group members then internalize. One consequence can be development of an inferiority complex.

Organizational barriers occur within the workplace and its structures, a pattern known as "institutional discrimination." Institutional discrimination is systemic and ingrained in policies, laws, and procedures within an organization and is designed to keep individuals or groups of individuals subordinated. This can be intentional or unintentional by design and can include recruitment and hiring practices in the workplace. This barrier also extends to systems which may not be intentionally discriminatory but which generate the effect of depriving women and members of minority groups. These include corporate environments that alienate and isolate those in minority groups.

Future Directions

Networking is an important process that contributes to the entrenchment of the glass ceiling. Employees typically become aware of open positions through word-of-mouth networking, and many organizations routinely hire from word-of-mouth referrals. In predominantly white male organizations, referrals will

generally produce more white males for available opportunities. Under current federal guidelines, therefore, organizations must maintain responsibility for general awareness and enforcement of equal opportunity and affirmative action mandates.

Despite growing awareness among leaders in the corporate world of the intrinsic economic value of including women and minorities in senior corporate positions, progress remains slow in penetrating glass ceiling barriers. While each individual company is clearly different and must evaluate its own particular needs, advocates insist that all companies must address each of the glass ceiling barriers, that they must embrace diversity and inclusion from the top down. They also suggest that corporate leaders work to change the climate of the work environment by including a mentoring process to assist in the success and upward mobility of women and minorities.

DeLois "Kijana" Crawford

See also Affirmative Action; Discrimination, Institutional; Feminism; Feminist Theory; Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Hostile Environment; Pink-Collar Occupations; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational; Sexism

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Global Economy

The global economy refers to the increasing economic interdependence of the countries and regions of the world. The most recent form of the global economy emerged in the 1970s as a result of advancements in information technologies combined with expanding neoliberal, political-economic philosophies and policies. The extent of the global economy is very uneven, with some regions of the world largely bypassed by the process.

A functionalist perspective of the global economy views these trends as virtuous because of the economic efficiencies gained through the global division of labor based on comparative advantage combined with the advancement of democracy worldwide. From this perspective the global economy is a natural evolution of the modernization of societies. This evolution reduces social inequality and enhances the living standards of people across the globe.

A conflict perspective views these trends as vicious, as transnational corporations adopt flexible accumulation strategies to avoid democratic protections, resulting in a "race to the bottom" as countries deregulate to attract foreign direct investment. This process results in the decreased ability of nation-states to coordinate their internal economic and political affairs and in a reduction in substantive democracy. From this perspective, the global economy has led to an increase in stratification within countries of the North, as well as between the North and South.

The global economy is grounded in a long historical process of increasing political and economic integration of the countries and regions of the world. The spice trade of the 1400s led to the first global economy. Technologies such as the sextant, ocean sailing vessel, and cannon/musket allowed the European nations to embrace their "manifest destiny" and send out their fleets in the name of church, king, and country. This process accelerated in the 1700s as a result of the industrial revolution in Europe and the accompanying colonization of much of the non-European world. The international division of labor consisted of a manufacture-based system in the core countries and a mining/agriculture-based system in the colonies. At its peak in the early 1900s, this global economy divided the globe into a system of two unequal components based on asymmetrical power relations of trade, imperialism, and racist ideologies. Capitalist

development in the core countries produced underdevelopment in the periphery.

The second global economy was linked to World War I and the Russian Revolution of 1917. As the core countries focused on the war, liberation movements grew in the old colonies. The Soviet Union served as a model and ally for colonial nations to challenge their core counterparts. These events began a reversal of the global concentration of capital, power, and manufacturing in the core. World War II accelerated this process. Italy and Japan lost their colonies and England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands realized that they could not quell the rising liberation movements. Several former colonies tried collective ownership and centralized planning. It was in this setting that China embraced the path of communism. By the 1960s close to one half of the world's population lived in communist countries. Several other former colonies did not reject markets but abandoned most of the laissez-faire doctrines of the colonial system and adopted a variety of state-managed interventionist measures to support development. A decentralization of power occurred, resulting in the second global economy centered on the bipolar communist and capitalist models of development.

After World War II numerous events set the stage for the current form of the global economy. First, in 1946 political and economic officials from the United States and Great Britain developed a management plan for the postwar global economy. The Bretton Woods Agreement led to the creation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and linked the U.S. dollar to the gold standard as the basis for international currency exchange rates. Second, the United States created the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and the McArthur Plan to rebuild Japan. Both of these plans instilled neoliberal economic policies and democratic political systems in these regions. Similar initiatives were taken in Korea in the 1950s, Vietnam in the 1960s, and other countries throughout the world. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization cemented the military alliance between the United States and the rebuilding countries in Europe to counter the growing power of the USSR. This "global development project" became the major mechanism utilized by the capitalist countries to ensure that communism did not take root in these areas. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the "cold war" was the label given to this contest for world domination. In the late 1980s the USSR broke apart due to economic bankruptcy and social unrest; the capitalists won.

The Bretton Woods system of global management, based on neoliberal economic policies, laid the groundwork for the blossoming of the current global economy. The World Bank provided loans for infrastructure development projects and the IMF provided loans to stabilize developing countries' currencies in the South. At the same time the GATT worked to decrease trade and tariff barriers and foster increased foreign direct investment. Over time these loans included requirements that developing countries liberalize their political and economic systems. This neoliberal restructuring peaked in the 1980s, as debt crises led to structural adjustment programs that included the deregulation of national protectionist policies and a privatization of national industries, two processes that facilitated increased foreign direct investment by the transnational corporations of the North.

A similar process also occurred in the North, especially in the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, the rigidities of the Fordist system of socioeconomic development fostered a fiscal crisis of the nation-state and an accumulation crisis of capital. The long run of economic prosperity that began after World War II weakened, as the Fordist system of mass production linked to mass production coordinated via an interventionist state could no longer provide for economic accumulation and societal legitimation. Profits for corporations in the North were constrained by powerful labor unions, environmental regulations, growing competition from Asia (Japan and Korea), and the rise of a third world social movement in the form of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Additionally, the high costs of the cold war (Vietnam and other venues) and the War on Poverty generated a fiscal crisis of the state in the United States, as well as a legitimation crisis, as anti-war, environmental, and civil rights movements protested government policies. In 1973, the "dollar linked to gold standard" was abandoned, and global currencies began to fluctuate wildly. The fluctuations led to currency speculations that became a central aspect of the current global economy.

In response to the more tightly regulated economies and strength of unions in the North that limited corporate profits, many major corporations expanded their global business ventures in an attempt to revive economic accumulation. Capital flight, the decentralization

of production, the informalization of labor, and global sourcing became the dominant strategies of transnational corporations. Information technologies allowed for the development and coordination of global-commodity chains. The sphere of influence of the polity no longer matched that of the economy. Through the hypermobility of capital, the economy went global, but the nation-states remained constrained within their jurisdictional boundaries.

In the 1980s the Thatcher and Reagan administrations introduced neoliberal restructuring programs centered on deregulation of government policies and privatization of government-owned enterprises, thereby weakening unions and environmental protections while lessening regulations limiting corporate expansion and concentration. These actions were attempts on the part of the highly regulated nations in the first world to open their economies to re-attract capital investment to the North.

The final pieces of the current global economy are the emerging global governance structures. In 1995, the GATT was reconfigured as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the supranational state-like coordinating mechanism for the global economy. The WTO continues the function of the GATT in lowering tariffs but also acts as a governance body regarding trade disputes. Similarly, the European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement, and Association of South East Asian Nations are examples of the emergence of regional statelike entities that emulate the historical functions of the nation-state in mediating economic accumulation and societal legitimation. Anti-globalization activists resist both the regional organizations and the WTO.

Douglas Harbin Constance

See also Economic Development; Economic Restructuring; Globalization; World-Systems Analysis

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GLOBALIZATION

Today's dominant account about economic globalization in media and policy circles, as well as in much economic analysis, emphasizes hypermobility, global communications, the neutralization of place and distance, and the growth of a new professional transnational class. But this emphasis on abstract capabilities of systems and on the demand for highly educated workers leaves out many significant aspects of globalization. Globalization—economic, cultural, political—localizes in multiple concrete settings, and it does so through a broad range of venues and actors. Viewed this way, many more components to globalization exist than those that prevail in the dominant account. It is not only the powerful who are actors in these processes of globalization.

Global and Subnational Scalings

Two distinct sets of dynamics constitute globalization. One set involves the formation of explicitly global institutions and processes, such as the World Trade Organization, global financial markets, and the War Crimes Tribunals. These vary greatly in their aims, from narrow self-interest to enhancing the common good. They operate at the scale usually associated with the term *globalization*. For many, globalization is about these types of conditions and institutions.

But there is a second set of processes that does not necessarily scale at the global level as such, but rather takes place deep inside territories and institutional domains that have largely been constructed in national terms in much, though by no means all, of the world. This largely subnational and translocal form of globalization has received less attention from mainstream scholarship and is far less likely to be

conceptualized or recognized as part of globalization; one important exception is the rapidly growing scholarship on world cities and global cities. What makes these processes part of globalization even though localized in national, indeed subnational, settings such as cities is that they involve transboundary networks and domains connecting or articulating multiple local or "national" processes and actors. These include transnational immigrant households and communities; cross-border networks of activists in specific localized struggles with an explicit or implicit global agenda, as is the case with many human rights and environmental organizations; and, generally, cross-border cultural, economic, and political circuits constitutive of the multiple globalizations seen today.

Thus, global processes get constituted at various scales, ranging from supranational and global to subnational and local, and there are many globalizations, from economic to cultural. Many of the globally scaled dynamics, such as the global capital market, actually are partly embedded in subnational scales and move between globally scaled levels (such as electronic financial networks) and locally embedded conditions (such as the actual on-the-ground financial centers). Many localized entities, such as immigrant communities, can be part of transnational circuits and thereby part of globalization; these are a kind of horizontal globalization rather than the vertical forms represented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance.

In this more complex understanding of globalization, it is then possible to see how the global can also involve subnational places and the many local conditions, processes, and actors this brings with it. Thus the global economic system is partly embedded in specific types of places and partly constituted through highly specialized cross-border networks connecting the 40 or so major business and financial centers (global cities) in the world today (from cities such as New York and London to São Paulo, Shanghai, and Johannesburg). Recapturing the geography of places involved in globalization allows us to recapture people, workers, communities, and more specifically, the many different work cultures, besides the corporate culture, involved in the work of globalization.

It is important to note that globalization is also enabling liberating activities and practices, for example, specific aspects of the human rights and environmental movements as well as particular activities of the anti-globalization network. Globalization also enables the formation of countergeographies of globalization, some exploitative and others emancipatory. The focus of this entry is on the problematic aspects of globalization, which also means a greater emphasis on the global economy.

Recovering Places and Workers in the Global Economy

Hypermobility and the neutralizing of place have indeed taken place. But they are only half of the story. The other half is the territorial centralization of top-level management, control operations, and the most advanced specialized services in a network of global cities. National and global markets, as well as globally integrated operations, require central places where the most complex tasks required by the global economy get done. Further, information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentration of facilities. Finally, even the most advanced information industries have a work process involving many different types of workplaces and workers.

The capabilities for global operation, coordination, and control contained in the new information technologies and in the power of transnational corporations need to be produced. By focusing on the production of these capabilities, a neglected dimension is added to the familiar issue of the power of large corporations and the new technologies. The emphasis shifts to the *practices* that constitute what is called economic globalization and global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance.

A focus on practices draws the categories of place and work process into the analysis of economic globalization. These are two categories easily overlooked in accounts centered on the hypermobility of capital and the power of transnationals. Developing categories such as place and work process does not negate the importance of hypermobility and power. Rather, it brings to the fore the fact that many of the resources necessary for global economic activities are not hypermobile and are, indeed, deeply embedded in place, notably places such as global cities and export processing zones. Global processes are structured by local constraints, including the composition of the workforce, work cultures, and political cultures and processes within nation-states.

Once this production process is brought into the analysis, secretaries are seen as part of it and so are

the cleaners of the buildings where the professionals do their work and the buildings where they live. An economic configuration very different from that suggested by the concept of information economy emerges. The material conditions, production sites, and place-boundedness, which are also part of globalization and the information economy, are recovered.

The Other Workers in the Advanced Corporate Economy

One of the localizations of the dynamics of globalization is the process of economic restructuring in global cities which has generated a large growth in the demand for low-wage workers and jobs that offer few advancement possibilities. This has occurred amid an explosion in the wealth and power concentrated in these cities—that is to say, in conditions where there is also a visible expansion of very high income jobs.

In the day-to-day work of the leading sectors in global cities, a large share of the jobs involved are lowly paid and manual, many held by immigrant women. Even the most advanced professionals require clerical, cleaning, and repair workers for their state-of-the-art offices, and they require truckers to bring not only the software but also the toilet paper. Although these types of workers and jobs are never represented as part of the global economy, they are in fact part of the infrastructure of jobs involved in running and implementing the global economic system, including such an advanced form of it as international finance.

High-level corporate services, from accounting to decision-making expertise, are not usually analyzed in terms of their work process. Such services are usually seen as a type of output, that is, high-level technical knowledge. Thus insufficient attention has gone to the actual array of jobs, from high-paying to low-paying, involved in the production of these services. A focus on the work process brings to the fore the labor question. Information outputs must be produced, and the buildings that hold the workers must be built and cleaned. The rapid growth of the financial industry and of highly specialized services generates not only high-level technical and administrative jobs but also low-wage unskilled jobs. In New York and other cities, between 30 and 50 percent of the workers in the leading sectors are low-wage workers.

Further, the similarly state-of-the-art lifestyles of the professionals in these sectors have created a whole new demand for a range of household workers, particularly maids and nannies. The presence of a highly dynamic sector with a polarized income distribution has its own impact on the creation of low-wage jobs through the sphere of consumption (or, more generally, social reproduction). The rapid growth of industries with strong concentrations of high- and low-income jobs has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure which, in turn, has a feedback effect on the organization of work and the types of jobs being created. The expansion of the high-income workforce, in conjunction with the emergence of new lifestyles, has led to a process of high-income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers. High-price restaurants, luxury housing, luxury hotels, gourmet shops, boutiques, French hand laundries, and special cleaning services are all more labor-intensive than their lower-price equivalents. This has reintroduced—to an extent not seen in a very long time—the whole notion of the "serving classes" in contemporary high-income households. The immigrant woman serving the white middle-class professional woman has replaced the traditional image of the black female servant serving the white master. All these trends give these cities an increasingly sharp tendency toward social polarization.

The Globalizing of Survival Circuits

Crucial to the formation of a global supply of caretakers and other kinds of low-wage workers in demand in global cities is the fact of systemic links between the growth of global survival circuits and negative economic conditions in countries of origin that have been amplified by economic globalization. Among these conditions are a growth in unemployment, the closure of a large number of typically small and medium-sized enterprises oriented to national rather than export markets, and large, often increasing, government debt. (Although these economies are frequently grouped under the label "developing," they are in some cases struggling, stagnant, or even shrinking.)

Globalized survival circuits have grown in number and diversity at a time when major dynamics linked to economic globalization have had significant impacts on developing economies, including the so-called middle-income countries of Latin America. These countries have had to implement a bundle of new policies and accommodate new conditions associated with globalization: structural adjustment programs

(SAPs), the opening up of these economies to foreign firms, the elimination of multiple state subsidies, and, it would seem almost inevitably, financial crises and the prevailing types of programmatic solutions put forth by the IMF. It is now clear that in most of the countries involved, not only in Latin America but also in countries such as South Korea or Thailand, these conditions have created enormous costs for certain sectors of the economy and of the population and have not fundamentally reduced government debt among those that implemented these programs in the 1980s nor those that did so in the 1990s. In addition, a growing number of middle-income countries are also caught in this debt trap. The actual structure of these debts, their servicing, and how they fit into debtor countries' economies suggest that it is not likely that most of these countries will, under current conditions, be able to pay this debt in full. SAPs seem to have made this even more likely by demanding economic reforms that have added to unemployment and the bankruptcy of many smaller, national market–oriented firms.

Ratios of debt service to gross national product (GNP) in many of the so-called HIPC countries (hyper-indebted poor countries) exceed sustainable limits; many are far more extreme than what were considered unmanageable levels in the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Debt-to-GNP ratios are especially high in Africa, where they stood at 123 percent, compared with 42 percent in Latin America and 28 percent in Asia. It is these features of the current situation that suggest that most of these countries will not get out of their indebtedness through such current strategies as SAPs. Indeed it would seem that the latter have in many cases had the effect of raising the debt dependence of countries. Further, together with various other dynamics, SAPs have contributed to an increase in unemployment and in poverty. For over 15 years the major global lenders resisted recognizing the impossibility of debt repayment by most of the 41 HIPCs. But in January 2006, they finally recognized that the 18 poorest of these countries needed to have their debts cancelled, and eventually probably many of the remaining 23 will also have their debts cancelled.

One way of articulating this in substantive terms is to posit that (a) the shrinking employment opportunities in many of these countries, (b) the shrinking opportunities for more traditional forms of profit making in these same countries, as they increasingly open up to foreign firms in a widening range of economic sectors and are pressured to develop export industries, and (c) the fall in revenues for the governments in many of these countries, partly linked to these conditions and to the burden of debt servicing, have all contributed to raising the importance of alternative ways of making a living, making a profit, and securing government revenue. The IMF asks HIPCs to pay 20 to 25 percent of their export earnings toward debt service. In contrast, in 1953 the Allies cancelled 80 percent of Germany's war debt and only insisted on 3 to 5 percent of export earnings debt service. These more general terms have also been evident in recent history when Central Europe emerged from under communism.

All of these conditions have emerged as factors in the lives of a growing number of men and women in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. A key aspect here is that through their work and remittances, migrants enhance the government revenue of deeply indebted countries; in 2006 total remittances sent back home through the banking system (thus this figure does not cover other ways of getting money back home) were US$230 billion, according to the World Bank. The work of migrating is itself a source of profit for those who trade in people—it offers new profit-making possibilities to "entrepreneurs" (though increasingly it is murderous criminal syndicates who control the trade) who have seen other opportunities vanish as a consequence of global firms and markets entering their countries, or a chance to longtime criminals who can now operate their illegal trade globally. In 2006 criminal syndicates are estimated to have earned US$20 billion from trafficking in people.

These survival circuits are often complex, involving multiple locations and sets of actors constituting increasingly global chains of traders and "workers." There is an emergent and distinct gendering at work in the globalizing of these survival circuits. Both in the global city and in these survival circuits, women emerge as crucial actors for new and expanding types of economies. It is through these supposedly rather valueless economic actors that key components of these new economies have been built.

Globalization plays a specific role here in a double sense, contributing to the formation of links between sending and receiving countries and enabling local and regional practices to become global in scale. On the one hand, the particular dynamics that come together in the global city produce a strong demand for these types of workers, while the dynamics that

mobilize women into these survival circuits produce an expanding supply of workers who can be pushed, or are sold, into those types of jobs. On the other hand, the technical infrastructure and transnationalism that underlie some of the key globalized industries are also making it possible for other types of actors to deploy their activities at global scales, whether money laundering or people trafficking.

In brief, the major processes covered in this entry involve both the richest and the poorest countries, and the most powerful actors (whether institutions such as the IMF or criminal syndicates) and the most vulnerable (such as immigrant women trafficked from poor countries to rich global cities). This is just one window into the negatives. There is much more, including dynamics that enable the weak and the poor.

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See also Global Economy; Multinational Corporations; Transnational Families; World-Systems Analysis

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Global Warming

One reason the earth is teeming with life is the existence of a natural greenhouse effect. The earth is heated by the sun. After the sun's rays strike the earth, many of them bounce back into space, and the planet would be much colder if there were not gases in the atmosphere to trap part of the heat from these reflected rays. Since the start of the industrial revolution, changing economic activities have been increasing the concentrations of heat-absorbing greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. Computer-generated climate models suggest that the buildup of these additional GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide (CO_2) from burning fossil fuels, will warm the earth's surface. The hypothesis that there will be rising global temperatures from increased human emissions of GHGs and that temperature increases will in turn melt global ice caps, raise sea levels, and increase extreme weather events like hurricanes and floods is what has come to be termed *global warming*.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—a worldwide network of scientists set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Program to report on all aspects of global warming—global average surface temperatures have increased about 1.0° F since the late 19th century. The 10 warmest years of the 20th century all occurred in the last 15 years of that century, with 1998 being the warmest year on record. Globally, sea levels have risen 4 to 8 inches over the past century. These observations appear to be consistent with what climate models predict: increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will act like a heat-trapping blanket and raise global temperatures, the heat will cause the oceans to warm and expand, hurricanes will increase in intensity, and so on.

As a result of this apparent congruence between theoretical expectations and observations, many scientists, policymakers, and environmentalists believe that action to reduce future emissions of temperature-raising GHGs is imperative. Since 1997, more than 150 nations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which aims to reduce emissions of CO_2. The Kyoto Protocol is a first step toward mitigating global warming, but given that it falls far short of the large and costly reductions of GHGs recommended by the IPCC, some warming is seen as inevitable. This will necessitate adaptation strategies to prevent or reduce undesired consequences. Possible adaptations include defenses against rising sea levels and hurricanes, as well as assuring food security. Overall, then, the framing of global warming as a social problem can be deemed a partial success. Its main limitations include the absence of the United States from the Kyoto process, the probable withdrawal of Canada from it, the likelihood that many countries in the European Union will not meet their reduction targets, and the challenge of incorporating China and India into the Kyoto process.

Marketing Social Problems

Conditions like ozone depletion and global warming can exist without much awareness of them. In both cases, it took scientific theorizing and observations to transform the putative condition into a threat seemingly worthy of attention. Scientific warnings that

GHG emissions could warm the planet began in the late 1950s and continued sporadically until 1988. For the most part, these warnings were ignored. To transform such warnings into a viable social problem—one that commands considerable political, policy, and public attention with concrete links to action—requires a host of conducive conditions and phenomena. These include a much larger cast of claims makers than just scientists, collaboration by the media, dramatic real-world events to piggyback on, bridging metaphors to the popular culture, and an institutional context and an issue culture that support the social problem. Under ideal circumstances, these factors generate a cultural whirlwind—a rapidly evolving and progressive sequence of dynamic and often surprising events that create a vortex, hurling through a variety of arenas, creating a strong conversational and practical presence around the social problem. Clearly, issue cultures, bridging metaphors, and cultural whirlwinds cannot be concocted at will. Global warming has some real liabilities as a marketable social problem.

Issue Cultures and Real-World Events

Issue cultures are sets of related social problems that become commanding concerns in society. Perhaps the clearest example is *anything* to do with security in the United States after the 9/11 terror attacks. Another issue culture has developed around the fear of emerging diseases, ranging from Ebola and mad-cow disease to the West Nile virus, SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), and avian flu. Scientific findings or real-world events related to these problems are immediately selected for coverage by the media and attention from spokespersons in different public arenas. Social problems that can be linked to an extant issue culture are thus far more likely to attract sustained attention than problems that do not fit or resonate with any current issue culture. Clearly, proponents of a social problem would prefer to hook up with an existing issue culture and thereby garner attention. Such linkages, of course, are not automatic or assured.

Through the 1980s, an issue culture built up around the atmosphere, as a number of social problems from this domain rose in rapid succession. The popular theory that climatic change caused the extinction of the dinosaurs was followed by a furor over the threat of nuclear winter. But the cold war began to wind down after 1985, just in time for the discovery of the ozone hole. Here the timing was remarkable. With the successful negotiation of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, the ozone problem was largely resolved, just in time for climate change to emerge as a celebrity problem. Before the "greenhouse summer" of 1988, claims making about global warming received little attention. But that summer's severe heat and drought in North America, accompanied by the burning of Yellowstone National Park, put the issue on the map. There were numerous calls for action, and surveys revealed that the public was aware of the threat.

In subsequent years, despite a host of extreme weather events, such as the 1993 Mississippi floods, climate change became a secondary issue in the United States. This is in direct contrast with the European Union, which assumed a leadership role and promoted the Kyoto Protocol. Real-world events were central in Europe, as England had the Great Storm of 1987 and Germany experienced floods and storms that each caused more than a billion U.S. dollars' worth of damage. German scientists drew an extreme picture of an "impending climatic catastrophe"—a *Klima-Katastrophe*—and the term gained incredible momentum in political and media discourse. The emerging EU consensus, an effort in part to create a strong and unified international presence for the bloc, was forged in a very different institutional context than found in the United States. The U.S. political system is much more open to outside lobbying interests (such as oil companies), and a few powerful senators heading key environmental committees can block legislation. In addition, a relatively small number of "climate skeptics" who challenged the global warming consensus attracted considerable attention in the United States but were largely absent in the European Union. The electoral success of Green Parties in Europe also led the major political parties to try to preempt green issues. Finally, the precautionary principle has made considerable headway in Europe and serves to promote action under conditions of uncertainty. The United States, in contrast, has stressed the need for further study and opted for voluntary actions.

Bridging Metaphors and Scientific Uncertainty

While the factors outlined in the previous section congealed to create an early consensus and a degree of closure about global warming in the European Union, there was a backlash against the issue in the

United States following the greenhouse summer of 1988. Whereas public pressure made a significant difference in responding to the ozone hole, the U.S. public has a poor understanding of global warming and, indeed, often confuses it with the ozone hole. The latter had a clear advantage as it is linked to a very familiar "penetration" metaphor found in video games and Star Wars. Stated succinctly, the hole leads to the increased bombardment of the earth by lethal rays. It is apparent to anyone that a "hole" is an aberration, something that a protective shield should not have. The greenhouse effect, in contrast, seems like a benign and essential natural phenomenon. Global warming is an extension of this phenomenon, creating the problem of finding the human "fingerprint" amid highly variable and complex natural processes.

Overall then, there are apparently no ready-made metaphors in the popular culture—as with genetically modified "Frankenfoods"—that provide a simple schematic for understanding the science of climate change. Global warming remains a very complex scientific issue, and it is not surprising that research reveals that the public has little knowledge of either the factors that cause it or the possible means of combating it. This is most visible in the surging sales of sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) just as scientists warned of the need to reduce CO_2 emissions.

While much of the discussion in North America and England is about global warming, scientists prefer the concept of "climate change," since computer models predict that some parts of the globe could get cooler as others get warmer. Indeed, it is theorized that melting ice caps could slow the Atlantic conveyor belt—a massive stream of water in the ocean that moderates climate in North America and Europe—and create global cooling. This was the idea behind the Hollywood movie *The Day After Tomorrow,* though it greatly exaggerated the speed and magnitude of the transformation. Differential predictions about whether the planet might cool or boil in a runaway greenhouse effect—accompanied by huge variations in estimates of phenomena like sea level rise—serve to create confusion, undermine the authority of the science, and provide ammunition for critics challenging the ostensible consensus.

While it is clear that the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere is increasing and that the earth's temperature has increased about 1.0° F in the past century, both the amount of warming that is likely to occur and the extent to which it can be attributed to human influences remain uncertain. The IPCC, over a number of reports, has asserted with more confidence that the human impact is discernible and significant. But climate models, which ultimately try to link the atmosphere, the oceans, and the earth's surface, are at once extraordinarily complex and yet primitive. For example, there is great uncertainty about how clouds will affect future temperatures. There is also considerable controversy over how much of the temperature increase can be attributed to changing solar radiation.

In recent years these controversies have become increasingly apparent in public arenas. The IPCC has been challenged both internally and externally, in part for its attempts to create a consensus around issues where debate still prevails. It has also been criticized for too readily creating an icon out of the "hockey stick" graph, which appears to show a sudden and dramatic warming in the past 100 years. Claims making by climate skeptics has also escalated, though the approach of many of those who question the IPCC position can be problematic. Specifically, these critics find and hammer away at a specific fault or puzzle—such as the hockey stick model or research on temperatures in the Medieval period—and foster the impression that the reality of global warming rides or falls with this single concern. Once the issue is "resolved," they shift to a new "fault" and repeat the process.

The Current Standing of Global Warming

Despite such controversies, global warming has been revitalized as a celebrity issue in the early 21st century. Again, it has piggybacked on real-world events, encompassing heat waves, forest fires, floods, and hurricanes, particularly Katrina. Whereas there is a raging scientific debate over whether hurricanes have become more frequent or more intense, in the public realm Hurricane Katrina is largely accepted as a sign of the dangers of a warming planet. Amid record-breaking costs from extreme weather impacts, insurance companies have been the first to jump on the global warming bandwagon. With a *Time* magazine cover of April 3, 2006, warning, "Be Worried—Be Very Worried," and the relative success of Al Gore's film, *An Inconvenient Truth,* global warming is now widely seen as the most significant threat facing humankind.

This revived interest does nothing to resolve disputes about how to respond to the threat. Whereas most countries have signed the Kyoto Protocol, the

United States has rejected it. In lieu of federal action, many cities and some states in the United States have formulated their own strategies to cut back on GHG emissions. Defenders of Kyoto argue that it is a first step, although the European experience suggests that it may be quite costly to meet emission reductions. In all of this, almost no attention is being devoted to adaptation strategies. Future Katrinas are likely to become expectable events.

An alternative to mandatory reduction targets comes from the promise of energy efficiency and alternative energy sources. The rapid development of new technologies—along the line of the Manhattan Project perhaps—combined with the rapid application of the best available technologies, appears to be the response of choice at this point. This encompasses everything from using the best available technology for coal-burning plants to the production of fuel-efficient vehicles down to the selection of lightbulbs. Thus Hollywood stars recently have made it trendy to own fuel-efficient hybrid vehicles like the Toyota Prius. Solutions along these lines could help the United States reduce its dependence on foreign oil, which is proving to have a variety of political, military, and economic costs. The extraordinary economic growth found in China and, to a lesser extent, India threatens any possible benefits of Kyoto. Given the conspicuous effects of pollution in both of these countries, it is imperative that they adopt a clean energy path as soon as possible. At the global conference on climate change in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007, the assembled nations agreed on reducing GHG emissions but set no specific targets to do so.

Proposed solutions to global warming must of course be sold, and claims makers may not have an easy time here. Although there were net savings in costs as a result of energy efficiencies introduced following the large increases in oil prices in the 1970s, this knowledge is largely absent from public discourse. Indeed, there has been an unfortunate tendency to link energy efficiency with a return to the simple life. As fossil fuels lose some of their allure, efforts are being made to revive nuclear energy as the only realistic solution, and this will engender further conflict. Clearly, providing clean, affordable, and secure energy supplies will be an abiding challenge with no simple answers.

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See also Ozone

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Grade Inflation

The term *grade inflation* refers to an increase in grade point averages over time without a corresponding rise in achievement. Grade inflation illustrates a concern about declining academic standards in high schools, colleges, and universities over the past 15 years, particularly at elite institutions. For example, fewer than 10 percent of all grades given at Stanford University since 1992 have been below B; similarly, 91 percent of the grades earned at Harvard University are B– or above, and over 90 percent of Harvard graduates received honors in 2001. Applying the term *grade inflation* to these trends suggests that the grades are artificially high with a consequential decrease in the relative value of high grades.

Some researchers identify the source of this grade inflation within the dynamics of student–teacher relationships. For example, most U.S. universities use student evaluations of teacher performance in their tenure considerations; thus, teachers are reluctant to give poor grades for fear of negative feedback. Additionally, some professors fear that giving low grades puts students at a disadvantage when applying for jobs or graduate school. Finally, researchers note that many professors dislike facing students who are upset with their low grades and will grade higher simply to avoid these confrontations. These practices are problematic because artificially high grades can mask a student's true ability. Students may have trouble

handling an upper-level course if graded leniently in the lower-level prerequisite. More broadly, students may appear on paper as better educated or better qualified for a job than they actually are, which can cause problems when they are confronted with a task they may be unable to perform.

As with many social problems, however, conflicting evidence abounds. Some researchers assert that the grade inflation problem is not clear-cut, as the development of certain university programs may be causing grades to rise legitimately. For example, the expansion of financial aid programs may motivate students to achieve in order to maintain their aid packages. Faculty development programs that help professors to plan effective syllabi, state explicit expectations, and foster student learning may also contribute to rising grades. Further, a rise in the median age of the U.S. college student may indicate that today's students are more mature and better able to handle college material. Finally, studies of inflation at elite colleges may overestimate the extent to which inflation occurs at a national level. Studies that include community colleges paint a different picture of inflation. For example, during the 1999–2000 school year, only about 14.5 percent of students across all types of colleges received mostly A's, while more than one third received C– or below. Though grades may be on the rise, it is not clear whether this is due to artificial inflation, lack of reliable research, or simply greater teaching and learning over the period in question.

Bridget Rose Nolan

See also Academic Standards; Education, Academic Performance

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Greenhouse Effect

See Global Warming

Groupthink

Groupthink refers to the psychological group dynamic that can lead to disastrous decision making. Developed by Irving Janis, the concept of groupthink explains how well-intended political leaders have made notoriously bad foreign policy decisions, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Others have since invoked groupthink as an explanation for U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and the post–9/11 invasion of Iraq. Groupthink also offers a more general explanation for disastrous decision making such as launching the doomed space shuttles Challenger and Columbia in the face of contradictory evidence, the Nixon Watergate cover-up, and lack of disaster preparedness despite warnings of impending danger, such as the federal government response before and after Hurricane Katrina struck Mississippi and Louisiana, particularly New Orleans, in 2005.

People who succumb to groupthink typically emphasize the importance of a uniting cause, a uniquely gifted leader, and a strong but vague sense of moral or intellectual superiority. Group members reinforce one another's optimism, believe they cannot fail, and confidently make risky decisions. The symptoms of groupthink include discounting warnings of negative outcomes, self-censoring of doubts, marginalizing critics, ignoring alternatives, disregarding risks, reinterpreting information, and refusing to make contingency plans in case of failure. Individuals adopt particular roles within the group, most notably a "mind guard," a person who detects and punishes others who threaten the group's cohesiveness. Proposed countermeasures to help groups resist succumbing to groupthink are appointing someone to play the role of devil's advocate, staying open to criticism, maintaining an open leadership style, valuing ideological diversity, and actively seeking opinions from sources outside the group.

Criticisms of groupthink fall into three general categories: the use of case studies for theory development, the dangers of hindsight bias, and the

validity of the conditions necessary for groupthink. Experimental tests have produced mixed support, yet the idea of groupthink is so well known that some researchers, ironically, suggest that many people believe in the idea far more enthusiastically than empirical tests of the evidence warrant. The criticisms produced refinements of Janis's original idea, particularly in an effort to clarify the conditions associated with the development of groupthink. They include the need for a strong social identity, cognitive dissonance, an abusive organizational structure, and personality characteristics such as hubris and a high level of confidence in the group's ability to make proper decisions. Despite the criticisms, use of the concept of groupthink continues as an explanation for defective group decision making that produces disastrous results.

Tom Heinzen and Susan Nolan

See also Cults; Mass Murder; Power Elite

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Gun Control

Gun control is one of the most commonly proposed methods for reducing violent crime. Defined narrowly, it is the enactment and enforcement of laws regulating firearms. More broadly, it is any organized effort to regulate firearms, which could also encompass civil suits aimed at the firearms industry and voluntary gun turn-ins and buybacks.

Effects of Guns on Violence

The purpose of gun control is to reduce the frequency or seriousness of violence by preventing dangerous persons from obtaining guns. The main rationale for believing that this will reduce violence is the idea that firearms are more lethal than other possible weapons, so denying guns to violent persons will reduce the likelihood that any injuries they inflict will be fatal. Gun use or possession may also facilitate attacks that otherwise would not have occurred by weaker or fewer aggressors against more powerful or numerous victims. On the other hand, an aggressor's possession of a gun can make it unnecessary for the possessor to attack the victim to gain control—a mere threat suffices, reducing the likelihood of an attack. Gun use can also facilitate robbers tackling better defended but more lucrative targets, allowing them to gain a given amount of money with fewer robberies.

Further, guns in the hands of crime victims and prospective victims can deter attempts at crime or reduce the harmful consequences of those attempted. Victims who use guns to defend themselves are less likely to be injured or lose property than are nonresisting victims. Widespread ownership and carrying of guns may also deter some criminals from attempting crimes, by making the crimes seem riskier. These violence-reducing effects complicate efforts to control firearms because they imply that gun possession among largely noncriminal victims has violence-reducing effects, just as possession among criminals has violence-increasing effects. Consequently, the effects of gun controls are likely to differ depending on whether they restrict guns only among criminals and other high-risk groups, or limit gun possession among noncriminals as well. Efforts aimed at exclusively high-risk groups such as convicted criminals are more likely to have purely violence-reducing effects, whereas prohibitionist efforts that would disarm both victims and offenders would have mixed effects on violence.

Varieties of Gun Control

Americans support a wide array of moderate regulatory controls aimed at keeping guns away from criminals, juveniles, and other high-risk groups but oppose prohibitionist controls that would preclude them from legally acquiring or owning guns. As a result, the United States has many gun control laws but virtually none that ban guns or seriously limit access to guns among noncriminal adults. Although three large cities—Washington, D.C., Chicago, and New York City—effectively ban the private possession of

handguns, no federal or state laws ban ownership of all guns or even just handguns.

Federal gun laws are less numerous and less restrictive than those prevailing in most states. Under federal law, all persons in the regular business of selling guns must have a federal firearms dealer's license. Anyone purchasing a gun of any kind from a licensed dealer must pass a background check for a criminal conviction and other disqualifying attributes. A convicted felon cannot legally purchase a gun, and a dealer cannot sell a gun to a felon. It is illegal for a convicted felon to possess a gun of any kind, regardless of how it was obtained. It is also unlawful, everywhere in the United States, for a juvenile to possess a handgun and for a dealer to sell a gun to a juvenile. Deliberately, no national policy exists for a national registry of guns, as gun owners fear its potential use to facilitate the mass confiscation of guns. Perhaps the most significant limitation of federal gun law is that gun transfers between private persons (i.e., no licensed dealer is involved) are not subject to any background check.

Each of the 50 states has a different array of gun laws. While some states have controls stricter than the average level prevailing among democracies outside the United States, others have only limited controls. No state bans the private possession of guns, or of handguns. A few states ban the purchase or possession of certain models of semi-automatic firearms (loosely labeled "assault weapons") that fire just one shot at a time but that look like, or were adapted from, military guns that could fire like machine guns. Almost all states forbid possession or purchase of handguns by convicted felons and juveniles, and most also do so with respect to various other higher-risk categories of persons, such as mentally ill persons and illicit drug users.

Some states require a permit to purchase a handgun, and a few of these also require a permit to buy a long gun (rifle or shotgun). Although many states require the reporting of gun sales to state or local authorities, only a few have state-mandated handgun registration systems, and even fewer also register long guns. Some states require a minimum waiting period of anywhere from 1 to 14 days before buyers may take delivery of handguns; a few of these states also mandate waiting periods for long guns.

There are also diverse laws governing the concealed carrying of firearms in public places. In more than two thirds of the states, adult residents without a criminal record may get a permit allowing a concealed gun. In a few states, concealed carrying by civilians is completely forbidden, whereas in the remaining states, permits are technically available at the discretion of authorities but rarely granted in practice, making these states effectively identical to those banning the carrying of guns.

Gun Control Laws and the Supply of Guns to Criminals

Much of U.S. gun law regulates the transfer of guns to keep them away from criminals. Most of these controls apply only to transactions involving licensed gun dealers. This is problematic because many guns are acquired through private channels. Even among members of the general, mostly noncriminal, population, about one third of guns are acquired from private parties. Although nominally regulated in some jurisdictions, these transactions are largely invisible to legal authorities under existing law and, among criminals, are a common means of acquiring guns. One study found that, among felon handgun owners, 44 percent acquired their most recently acquired handgun through a purchase, usually from a source other than a dealer; 32 percent stole the gun; 9 percent rented or borrowed it; and 8 percent each obtained it in trade or as a gift. Only 16 percent of the total obtained their handgun by a purchase from a conventional retail dealer.

Although many criminals get their guns from unlicensed sources, few get them from illicit dealers regularly engaged in the business of selling guns—only 2.9 percent of the felons got their gun from a "black market source" and only 4.7 percent from a "fence" (dealer in stolen goods). The federal agency charged with enforcing the federal gun laws, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, devotes a significant share of its resources to suppressing illicit gun trafficking activity, yet its own data indicate an annual capture of fewer than 15 traffickers who dealt in more than 250 guns and that the average number of guns trafficked per trafficking case was just 15 in fiscal year 2000. The "illicit gun dealers" that come to law enforcement attention are numerous, but each one handles so few guns that arresting them is unlikely to have much effect on the availability of guns to criminals. Criminals do occasionally sell guns for profit, but this is mostly a low-volume activity done as a by-product of other criminal activities, such as burglary, drug dealing, or trafficking in stolen property.

Because Americans own enormous numbers of guns, hundreds of thousands are stolen in a typical year; at any one time, millions of stolen guns circulate among criminals. The volume of gun theft is so large that, even if all voluntary transfers of guns to criminals were eliminated (including either lawful or unlawful transfers and involving either licensed dealers or private citizens) and if police could confiscate all firearms from all criminals each year, a single year's worth of gun theft alone would be sufficient to rearm all gun criminals with enough weapons to commit the current number of gun crimes (about 430,000 in 2000). As a result, large-scale gun trafficking (as distinct from burglars occasionally selling guns they have stolen) is largely superfluous to supplying criminals with guns in most areas.

The Impact of Gun Control Laws on Violence

The enormous variation in strictness of controls across different states and cities makes the United States a natural laboratory for evaluating the impact of gun control laws. Most studies of the impact of gun control laws have found little impact on violence rates. For example, in one comprehensive evaluation, researchers assessed the effects of 19 major types of gun control on rates of homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, rape, suicide, and fatal gun accidents, separately examining gun and nongun violence (e.g., gun homicide vs. nongun homicide), as well as the impact of gun laws on gun ownership levels. They found that none of the 19 common types of gun laws showed consistent evidence of reducing gun ownership. Of course, many gun regulations, such as carry controls or add-on penalties, are not intended to reduce gun ownership. Other gun controls restrict ownership only among high-risk groups, such as criminals or alcoholics.

Gun control laws did not show consistent evidence of reducing violent crime, gun accidents, or suicide. Although some laws appear capable of inducing people to substitute nongun weapons for firearms in violent acts, they do not reduce the total number of violent acts. For example, some laws may reduce the number of gun suicides but not the total number of suicides, because suicide attempters substitute other methods. In particular, two of the most popular gun control measures, waiting periods and gun registration, do not reduce violence rates to any measurable degree. On the other hand, the gun control strategy favored most by gun owner groups—mandatory add-on penalties for committing crimes with a gun—also is ineffective.

The many varieties of gun control laws appear to have no impact on violence for several reasons. First, gun laws intended to reduce gun ownership levels, either in the general population or, more usually, within various high-risk subsets, may fail because they do not achieve their proximate goal of reducing gun availability enough to matter. With more than 260 million guns in private hands, almost anyone who strongly desires a gun can get one.

Second, given that the best research indicates that general gun ownership levels have no net positive effect on crime and violence, even if gun laws did reduce general gun ownership, this reduction would not decrease total violence rates. On the other hand, laws that reduced gun availability among criminals, without disarming noncriminal victims, might reduce violence. Unfortunately no research has effectively distinguished gun availability among criminals from that among noncriminals.

Third, many U.S. gun laws regulate only handguns or regulate handguns more stringently than the more numerous long guns. This permits the substitution of the less-regulated long guns for the more heavily regulated handguns. The harmful effects of some criminals substituting these more lethal firearms could outweigh the beneficial effects of denying handguns to other criminals and produce a net increase in homicide.

Finally, local or state controls over gun acquisition may fail because guns from jurisdictions with weaker controls "leak" into those with stricter controls. Gun control advocates argue that federal measures are therefore necessary. Research on the relatively weak Gun Control Act of 1968, however, generally found it to be ineffective, and an early evaluation of the 1994 federal Brady Act pointed to the same conclusion.

Selected Recent Developments

At the state level, one of the most highly publicized developments in recent years was the widespread passage of "right to carry" or "shall issue" laws, which made it easier for noncriminals to get permits to carry concealed weapons in public. Critics feared that the increase in authorized gun carrying would result in increased acts of violence involving permit holders, but these fears were not realized; only a handful of

permit holders committed unlawful acts of violence with their guns in public places. On the other hand, these laws also probably did not reduce crime rates.

The enactment of "state preemption" laws in most of the states, however, was arguably of greater significance, though it received little publicity. These state laws forbid local governments from passing their own gun controls. Their significance is that, while most political struggles over gun control involve just a single control measure in one jurisdiction, these laws forbade the future enactment of almost any kind of gun control, eliminated many existing local controls, and did so for hundreds of local jurisdictions within each state.

In response to defeats in legislatures, the best-known gun control advocacy organization, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, recently shifted much of its efforts to the courts, helping to bring lawsuits against the gun industry. If widely successful, the lawsuits could either bankrupt gun makers and thereby produce a de facto ban on the further manufacture of firearms, or make guns prohibitively expensive and thereby bring about a de facto ban on gun buying, without benefit of new legislation. The suits rest on novel legal theories that manufacturers or distributors were negligent in (a) producing and selling guns lacking certain safety devices (e.g., "personalized gun" technologies intended to prevent anyone but the authorized user from firing the gun), (b) marketing guns to prohibited buyers such as criminals or juveniles, (c) marketing guns based on supposedly false claims that guns can be useful for self-defense, or (d) manufacturing too many guns, in excess of the demand among noncriminals. Municipal governments also brought suits based on a public nuisance theory that manufacturers should be held liable for the costs to city governments of gun violence—the costs of police and courts, medical care of the wounded, and so forth. Although lawsuits against gun manufacturers are occasionally won on more orthodox legal grounds, such as defects (as conventionally understood) in design or manufacture, U.S. courts have not yet accepted any of these new theories.

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See also Crime; Crime, Fear of; Crime Rates; Violence; Violent Crime

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H

Harm Reduction Drug Policy

Harm reduction is a broad term applied to a variety of programs and policies, so there is no clear consensus on its meaning, although its aim is to reduce the adverse consequences of drug use and even of drug control policies. The term originated in the Netherlands in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and is the cornerstone of not only Dutch drug policy but drug policy throughout most of the industrialized world (other than the United States).

Harm reduction is a pragmatic policy aimed at minimizing the damage that drug users do to themselves, other persons, the community, and society at large. Harm reduction approaches reject a drug-free society as unachievable, recognizing that drug use has always been present in human societies. Although the official U.S. view tends to place harm reduction in the same camp as legalization, most advocates of harm reduction do not support legalization, expressing concern that it would increase drug use. Yet, they recognize that drug prohibition not only is insufficient to stop drug use but actually creates crime and marginalizes drug users.

Harm reduction interventions thus focus on integrating or reintegrating drug users into the community, taking care not to further isolate, demonize, or ostracize them. Priority is placed on maximizing the number of drug users in contact with drug treatment, outreach, and other public health services. Practitioners evaluate drug policies in terms of their potential effects on minimizing the harms of drugs to the user and to society.

Harm reduction tactics include programs such as methadone maintenance and needle exchange programs. Harm reduction can also include street outreach programs to "hidden" populations of drug users, treatment instead of incarceration, safe injection rooms staffed by medical professionals, and heroin maintenance programs. Most EU nations make treatment widely available and have a policy of street outreach to drug users to prevent further marginalization of drug users and to improve their health and encourage participation in treatment. Most industrial countries do not incarcerate individuals for simple possession of drugs, and the incarceration of drug users and sellers, while increasing, has not contributed to an epidemic of incarceration, as is evident in the United States.

Obligatory treatment, practiced primarily in the U.S. criminal justice system, is rarely considered harm reduction and is a topic of considerable debate in other industrialized countries. Several industrialized countries utilize controlled heroin maintenance, practiced in a manner similar to methadone maintenance, for those who have had multiple failures (drop out) from methadone maintenance. Research in these countries suggests these types of programs are not appropriate as a first response but rather are helpful to a small number of addicts and to their communities, as they help reduce crime.

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See also Drug Abuse; Drug Abuse, Crime; Drug Subculture; Heroin

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Hate Crimes

The term *hate crime* first appeared in the late 1980s in response to a racial incident in the white, working-class Howard Beach section of New York City, in which an African American man was killed while attempting to evade a violent mob of teenagers shouting racial epithets. Originally employed by journalists and politicians, the term was used soon thereafter by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a number of other law enforcement agencies across the United States to characterize any criminal offense motivated either entirely or in part by the fact or perception that a victim is different in socially significant ways from the perpetrator.

The term *hate crime* can be misleading, because it implies incorrectly that hatred is invariably a distinguishing characteristic of this type of offense. Although it is true that many hate-motivated crimes involve intense animosity toward the victim, many others do not. Conversely, many offenses involving hatred between the offender and the victim are not hate crimes in the sense intended here. For example, an assault that arises out of a dispute between two coworkers who compete for a promotion might involve intense hatred, even though it is not based on any racial or religious differences between them.

Hate Crime Laws

Limited federal legislation exists in the United States, thus leaving it primarily to the states to formulate hate crime legislation. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia presently have some form of hate crime statute; among them, a wide variation in the specifics of the laws exists. For example, in the area of protected groups (i.e., designated groups protected in the statute), most states list crimes targeted toward individuals because of their race, religion, or ethnicity as prohibited. However, a number of states also include sexual orientation, disability, gender, and age. The implication of this lack of uniformity is that members of a particular group may be protected by a hate crime statute in one community but not protected in a neighboring community in an adjacent state.

Another legal distinction among state laws involves the penalty structure of the statutes. In some states, a separate statute exists that prohibits hate crime behavior. In other states the hate crime law is a "penalty enhancement." Thus, for the commission of a crime motivated by bias, the penalty may increase. Penalty enhancements may also apply to crimes committed with a gun or by individuals with long criminal histories, or crimes committed against vulnerable victims such as children.

Types of Hate Crimes

Some degree of variation exists among the offenses known as hate crimes. Some target particular victims, others all members of a group. Some have an expressive function, in order to provide excitement in the lives of the perpetrators; others are designed rationally to satisfy a specific objective. A precipitating event inspires some; others require no external catalyst to provoke their occurrence. Based on the offenders' motivations, hate crimes can be categorized as defensive, retaliatory, thrill-seeking, and mission.

Defensive

In defensive hate crimes, the hatemongers seize on what they consider to be a threatening incident, which serves as a catalyst or precipitant for the expression of their anger. They rationalize that by attacking an outsider they are in fact taking a protective posture, a defensive stance against intruders. Indeed, they often cast the outsiders in the role of those actively menacing them, while they regard themselves as pillars of the community. Such crimes frequently involve attacks on individuals and families who move into, or travel through, a neighborhood where they "do not

belong." From the point of view of the perpetrators, it is their community, means of livelihood, or way of life that is threatened by the mere presence of members of some other group. The hatemongers therefore feel justified, even obligated, to go on the "defensive."

Retaliatory

In a number of communities, the police have recorded specific hate crimes perpetrated against victims because of a perceived previous hate crime against their group. The thinking is "You got one of us; we will get one of you." In such cases specific victims are seldom targeted; offenders look to attack any member of the targeted group. Another kind of retaliatory hate crime often follows an international incident such as an act of terrorism. For example, many communities witnessed an increase in anti-Arab, retaliatory hate crimes in the months following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Thrill-Seeking

Youthful hatemongers sometimes look merely to have some fun and stir up a little excitement, but at someone else's expense. In a thrill-seeking hate crime, no precipitating incident need occur. The victim does not necessarily "invade" the territory of the assailant by walking through his neighborhood, moving onto his block, or attending his school. On the contrary, it is the assailant (or group of assailants) looking to harass those who are different, who searches out locations where the members of a particular group regularly congregate. In recent years, a common location for thrill-motivated hate crimes has been gay bars, a venue to which hatemongers can travel to locate vulnerable victims. The payoff for the youthful perpetrators is psychological as well as social: In addition to gaining a sense of importance and control, they also receive a stamp of approval from their friends.

Mission

On occasion, hate crimes go beyond what their perpetrators consider thrill-seeking, defensive, or retaliatory, at least in the narrow sense. Rather than direct their attack at those individuals involved in a particular event or episode—moving into the neighborhood, taking a job at the next desk, attending the same party—the perpetrators are ready to wage "war" against any and all members of a particular group of people. No precipitating episode occurs; none is necessary. The perpetrator is on a moral mission: His assignment is to make the world a better place to live.

The offenders therefore are concerned about much more than simply eliminating a few blacks or Latinos/as from their workplaces, neighborhoods, or schools. Instead, they believe that they have a higher purpose in carrying out their crimes. They have been instructed by God or, in a more secular version, by the Imperial Wizard or the Grand Dragon to rid the world of evil by eliminating all blacks, Latinos/as, Asians, or Jews, and they must act before it is too late. Mission hate crime offenders are likely to be associated with an organized group such as the National Socialist Movement, the Ku Klux Klan, or the National Alliance.

Organized Hate Groups

Only 5 percent of all hate crimes are perpetrated by the members of organized hate groups. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Project, there are slightly more than 800 active hate groups in the United States. Yet most of these hate groups are small; the average has fewer than 20 members. In total, there are probably no more than 20,000 members of hate organizations in the United States. Given a national population exceeding 300 million people, the 20,000 figure represents a minuscule proportion of Americans.

Numbers do not, however, tell the entire story of organized hate. Thanks to the Internet, a small group of hatemongers can now have disproportionate influence in reaching the young people of America. Hate groups have established more than 500 Web sites. In addition, they create and distribute white power CDs that sanction violence against Jews and people of color. Organized hate groups take advantage of local access cable television and shortwave radio. They often provide the propaganda for youthful hatemongers not only in the United States but around the world.

The findings of recent behavioral science research aimed at understanding the causes and characteristics of hate crimes may, in part, reflect a worsening of intergroup relations during the 1980s and early 1990s, as traditionally disadvantaged groups began to make claims for equal treatment. However, such efforts to explain hate crimes probably also reflect a heightened sensitivity to violence perpetrated against vulnerable members of society—especially women, gays, and

people of color. Because of the recent convergence of new social movements involving civil rights, women, gays and lesbians, and victims in general, increased efforts are being made to confront the destructive consequences of hate crimes, especially those committed against the most vulnerable.

The research to date suggests that the best approach to combating hate crimes involves a coordinated and comprehensive approach, incorporating federal and state statutory protection for potential victims and an aggressive reaction from law enforcement. Most important, a truly effective strategy includes a grassroots community effort in which residents support targeted groups both before and after incidents of hate violence have occurred.

Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt

See also Hate Groups; Hate Speech; Homophobia; Prejudice; Racism; Violent Crime

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Hate Groups

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, more than 800 hate groups are active in the United States. The Intelligence Project estimates that the number of hate groups has grown by about one third since 2000, although most are small, with the majority having fewer than 20 members.

The growing presence of hate groups is hardly confined to the United States. In Germany, for example, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported in 1991 the presence of 4,400 neo-Nazis in Germany, most of whom were skinheads. By adding in all other right-wing extremist and Nazi groups in the country, this figure swelled to approximately 40,000. A 2005 German government report indicates that this number of right-wing extremists has remained stable for the past 2 decades.

Apparently, as indicated by voting patterns, hundreds of thousands of individuals in many different countries agree to many, if not all, of the principles of white supremacy, even if they would never join a hate group. However, white supremacist groups represent a fringe element among those who commit hate crimes. Research shows that only a small number of reported hate offenses are committed by members of organized hate groups. Statistically, the membership of all organized hate groups combined constitutes a tiny fraction of the population, most of whom would not consider burning a cross or wearing a swastika. Even so, the influence of white supremacist groups such as Posse Comitatus, the National Socialist Movement, Aryan Nations, and the Ku Klux Klan may be considerably greater than their numbers might suggest. It takes only a small band of dedicated extremists to make trouble for a large number of apathetic middle-of-the-roaders. Today these groups increasingly use the Internet to communicate their philosophy of hate and influence youngsters. The Southern Poverty Law Center estimates that more than 2,000 such Internet sites are currently active.

The newer organized hate groups do not always come so easily to mind for their bizarre uniforms or rituals. Followers of such white supremacist groups as John and Tom Metzger's White Aryan Resistance have shed their sheets and burning crosses in favor of more conventional attire. They often disavow the Klan and the Nazi movement in favor of a brand of "American patriotism" that plays better among the working people of America. In France, one of the original organizing slogans of Jean-Marie Le Pen's right-wing party was an utterly respectable idea: "Two million foreigners, two million Frenchmen out of work."

Moreover, white supremacist organizations now often cloak their hatred in the aura and dogma of Christianity. Followers of the religious arm of the hate movement, the Identity Church, are only "doing the work of God." At Sunday services, they preach that

white Anglo-Saxons are the true Israelites depicted in the Old Testament, God's chosen people, while Jews are actually the children of Satan. They maintain that Jesus was not a Jew but an ancestor of the white, northern European peoples. In their view, blacks are "pre-Adamic," a species lower than whites. In fact, they claim that blacks and other nonwhite groups are at the same spiritual level as animals and therefore have no souls.

In recent years white supremacist groups such as the National Alliance and the Creativity Movement have suffered a crisis of leadership. Matthew Hale, who heads the Creativity Movement (formerly known as World Church of the Creator) is serving a lengthy prison sentence for his part in a conspiracy to murder a federal judge. The longtime leader of the National Alliance, William Pierce, died, leaving a vacuum of leadership in the organization yet to be filled effectively. Defections of members in both hate groups contributed to the rising popularity of a neo-Nazi organization known as the National Socialist Movement and a resurgence of membership in racist skinhead groups across the United States.

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See also Hate Crimes; Hate Speech; White Supremacy

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Hate Speech

Although no widely recognized definition of the term *hate speech* yet exists, its traditional interpretation included any form of expression that any racial, religious, ethnic, or national group found offensive. This definition broadened in the 1980s to include groups based or age, gender, sexual preference, marital status, and physical ability.

Most commonly, hate speech involves racial and ethnic slurs when referring to the members of a group. Other examples may include jokes that demean or ridicule a particular group or speeches by members of organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Christian Identity Church, that demonize groups such as blacks, Jews, or Hispanics by depicting them as animals or subhumans.

Most nations have laws that restrict offensive speech, including words targeted at vulnerable groups. Germany and France, for example, prohibit many expressions of hate. The German statutes, introduced after World War II, prohibit many Nazi symbols as well as statements of Holocaust denial. More recently, expansions of legal restrictions on speech include a much broader ban on various forms and targets of hate speech.

By contrast, the United States has a tradition of safeguarding individual rights as codified in a constitutional amendment protecting freedom of expression. U.S. courts have consistently found that hate speech, while extremely offensive, does not violate the First Amendment. In 1992, in a widely cited decision, *R.A.V. v. the City of St. Paul,* the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a local community ordinance prohibiting cross burning was unconstitutional, because it interfered with expressions of free speech. Moreover, unlike most other countries, the United States has powerful advocacy groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, whose mandate requires that it assist in preserving the First Amendment. As a result, American popular culture is free to be as hate-filled and offensive as its producers wish. Hate speech continues to be heard in both Europe and America, so one approach is no more effective than the other.

Late in the 1980s hate speech became a concern on U.S. college campuses, resulting in codes of student conduct at many universities. By prohibiting expressions of hate on increasingly diverse college campuses, these codes sought to encourage an environment conducive to learning. Challenges by civil rights organizations and local groups of faculty and students led to the repeal or nonimplementation of most codes. However, they did increase awareness of the potential injury expressions of hate can inflict on an entire community.

The American Civil Liberties Union and many other concerned groups reached consensus about ways to react to hate speech. These organizations believe

that hate speech is wrong; but they also believe that prohibiting hate speech is just as wrong. As an alternative, they recommend that people of goodwill confront hate speech not with silence but with speech articulating tolerance and respect for differences. If a racist group holds a rally in a town, the members of that community should sponsor a larger and louder rally in another venue denouncing racism. When dealing with individual expressions of hate or bias, proponents of tolerance cite the necessity of letting bigots know that their hate speech is offensive. On a one-to-one basis, this may be difficult to do, but it may be the most effective way to foster change in individuals who are unaware that their words are hurtful.

Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt

See also Hate Crimes; Hate Groups

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Health Care, Access

Several indicators measure the level of access to health care. Among these, typically using a 12-month period of focus, are an individual's health care coverage and whether or not an individual saw or spoke to a doctor or visited an emergency room. In addition, determining who uses certain preventative health care, like dental services, prescription drugs, mammograms, cancer screenings, and pap smears, also gauges health care access.

Among adults ages 18 to 64, about 17 percent have no usual source of health care. In a given year, about 16 percent of adults do not see a doctor, visit an emergency room, or have home health care. About 20 percent of Americans ages 18 to 64 visit the emergency room once, and 7 percent visit it 2 or more times. Two thirds of adults see a dentist annually, 70 percent of women over the age of 40 have a mammogram once every 2 years, and 79 percent of women over the age of 18 have a pap smear once every 3 years.

Disparities in Health Care Access

Health care is stratified by certain social characteristics, especially race and social class. Nonwhites are less likely to have a regular source of health care. Hispanics—in particular, Mexicans—have the highest percentage of noncoverage: Almost one third do not have a regular health care provider. Blacks and Native Americans are more likely than whites to have used the emergency room in the past 12 months. Members of all racial minority groups are less likely than whites to have seen a dentist in the past 12 months. Minorities, especially blacks, are less likely to have invasive cardiac procedures, even when their insurance and illness characteristics are the same as those of whites.

Substantial percentages of the poor (23 percent) and near poor (22 percent) have no usual source of medical care. By contrast, 14 percent of the nonpoor have no usual source of medical care. One in five poor adults report they did not see a doctor, visit an emergency room, or receive home health care in the past year. The poor and near poor are more likely to use the emergency room than a doctor's office as their main source of medical care, especially when they qualify for Medicaid. Thirteen percent of the poor and 10 percent of the near poor have visited an emergency room in the past year compared with only 5 percent of the nonpoor. Among those with Medicaid, almost 40 percent have been to an emergency room at least once, and 22 percent have been at least twice in a given year. Poor adults are also less likely to have access to preventative care, like dental services, prescription drugs, mammograms, cancer screenings, and pap smears.

Determinants of Health Care Access

Health insurance coverage and lack thereof largely determine access. In 2007, 44.8 million Americans were uninsured, most of them with little or no access to health care. Forty-seven percent of uninsured adults had no regular source of health care within the past year, and 38 percent had no health care visits in a 12-month period. This percentage is 3 times that of the insured population. Adults without insurance are also less likely to get preventative services, like regular mammograms or pap smears.

Costs also affect access to health care. About 6 percent of the population is unable to obtain necessary medical care because of high costs, and this percentage has been increasing over the past several years. Additionally, 8 percent of Americans delay medical care because of financial difficulties. Among the uninsured, the percentages with health care access difficulties because of costs are even higher. In one study, 47 percent of the uninsured postponed seeking care in a 12-month period because of costs, and 37 percent of them did not fill a prescription because of cost.

Implications

The barriers to health care experienced by the uninsured directly impact their health. Having health insurance reduces mortality rates by 10 to 15 percent. The uninsured have less access to preventative care and therefore are diagnosed later and die earlier from cancer. The uninsured are also less likely to receive lifesaving surgical interventions for cardiac illnesses. Because 20 percent of the uninsured use the emergency room as their usual source of care, they are also more likely to spend time in a hospital for avoidable health conditions.

Many of those who experience barriers in access because of costs delay or go without necessary health care, which can exacerbate existing health conditions. More than 4 in 10 adults report having a chronic condition, like cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. These individuals are more likely to report that they or a member of their household delayed or skipped treatment because of costs: 38 percent compared with only 22 percent of their healthier counterparts. In another study, of the 13 percent with an unmet health need, 7 percent reported it was because of cost.

Christine Caffrey

See also Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change; Health Care, Insurance

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Health Care, Costs

Officials measure health care costs in two major ways: total expenditures and per person (or per capita) spending. They report total expenditures either in dollars or as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), or else as a growth rate percentage compared with the growth rate percentage of the GDP. Reports on per capita spending are often in dollars, in terms of total medical costs or total out-of-pocket costs, or as a percentage of individual income. A final means of measurement is the share of individual spending paid out-of-pocket. Total expenditures and per capita health costs can also be projected.

Estimating Health Care Costs

Total expenditures are growing at an alarming rate. In 2003, they were $1.7 trillion, with government projections to grow to $2.16 trillion in 2006 and over $4 trillion by 2015. Total health spending as a percentage of the GDP grew from 7.2 percent in 1965 to 16.2 percent in 2005, with projections to be 20 percent by 2015. Health expenditures are growing at a faster rate than is the overall economy. Projections are that health spending between 2006 and 2015 will grow annually by 7.2 percentage points while the GDP will grow annually only by 4.9 percentage points.

Per capita health care costs have also been increasing at a fast rate. In 2005, per person health spending was $7,110, up from $6,280 in 2004. Individual spending may increase to $12,320 by 2015. Out-of-pocket costs rose from $647 in 1999 to $788 in 2004, with projections to increase to $1,287 by 2015. Thirty-five percent of per capita spending is paid out-of-pocket.

Explaining Higher Health Care Costs

One of the major explanations for the increase in health care costs is the rise in the costs of providing services. Hospital care accounts for over 30 percent of national health expenditures. In 2003, hospital costs were $551 billion, and they are projected to increase to $1.01 trillion by 2014. Attempts to decrease or control hospital costs include improvements in the efficiency of administration and a reduction in the care done on an inpatient basis. As a result, other health care providers, such as those engaged in home health care, have seen a rise in their share of health care costs. Between 1990 and 2000, home health care, as a percentage of total health costs, rose from 1.8 percent to 2.5 percent. Nursing home expenses will also rise. Physician and clinical services make up 22 percent of total health expenditures, and these costs may more than double, from $370 billion in 2003 to $783 billion in 2014, because of increased demand for physicians, heightened specialization within the field, and the cost of malpractice insurance.

The emphasis on medical technology in the U.S. health care system also leads to an increase in costs. Expensive tests and highly advanced medical procedures are commonplace and sometimes done when not necessary. Examples of these procedures include invasive cardiology, organ transplantation, and imaging.

Prescription drug costs are another important contributor to rising health care costs. In 2004, they totaled $188.5 billion, but by 2015, expectations are that they will increase to $446.2 billion. The annual growth in prescription drug costs, at around 8 percent, is thus higher than the annual growth in hospital and physician costs. Advances in, and increased demand for, pharmaceutical research and technologies lead to greater medical costs, a trend expected to intensify in the future.

Demographic factors explain some of the rise in health care costs. The aging of the population will greatly impact the financial structure of the health care system. The 65+ population will increase from 13 percent in 2006 to 20 percent in 2030. This growth is caused by increases in life expectancy and the aging of the baby boom population, a cohort of 76 million born between 1946 and 1964. The 85+ population, the population in most need of health care, will more than double in numbers, from 4.2 million in 2000 to 8.9 million in 2030.

Finally, cultural factors play a role in rising medical costs. Lifestyle factors, like heavy tobacco and alcohol use, sedentary work and leisure behaviors, and unhealthy diets are linked to higher health care costs. Smoking and obesity are the two leading lifestyle factors associated with high health care costs. Unequal access to health care also explains growing health care costs. Individuals with insufficient or no health insurance coverage are less likely to seek medical care, especially preventative services. Thus, they are more likely to be treated for illnesses that could have been avoided.

Implications of Higher Health Care Costs

Health care costs are challenging the major payers, that is, the private and public health insurance systems. Private health insurance costs may well double, from $706 billion in 2005 to $1.39 trillion in 2015. Private health coverage companies responded to these increasing costs by implementing several new strategies. Most of these shifted more of the responsibility to their patients and providers. They changed their management of high-cost patients; introduced wellness, disease management, and medical technology information programs; reduced payments to providers; and implemented higher cost sharing.

Public health insurance costs will also rise, from $914.6 billion in 2005 to $1.93 trillion in 2015. Several attempts at curbing these costs slowed but did not stop the spending growth. Reform of Medicare (a federal program for those over the age of 65, certain disabled people under age 65, and those with permanent kidney failure treated with dialysis or a transplant) slowed some of the growth by cutting back payments to providers and shifting enrollees to managed care, both of which restricted benefits. However, the addition of a drug benefit in 2006 increased Medicare costs. Medicaid, a state-funded health program for the poor, greatly burdens the states, and states may respond by further restricting eligibility.

With this current climate of curbing costs, individuals must accept more and more of the financial burdens of the health care system. Two thirds of insured adults reported that their insurance premiums increased in the past 5 years. Copayments and deductibles are also rising for the majority of insured people, and for many individuals, high medical costs can have a huge impact on their lives.

Not only are rising medical costs a major stressor; they can also create significant barriers to health care. In the past year, almost one quarter of Americans had problems paying health care bills. Most of the unpaid bills were for physician services, lab fees, and prescription drugs. In a given year, almost 30 percent of adults report that they or a member of their household skipped medical treatment or either did not complete or cut the dosage of a drug prescription because of high costs. Individuals in disadvantaged social positions experience even greater access problems because of rising costs. Poor people, women, and individuals with chronic illnesses all report delaying or not getting necessary health care because of costs.

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See also Health Care, Access; Stressors

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Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change

Researchers consistently document U.S. disparities in health care access according to race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, sexual orientation, and disability. Inadequate health care access contributes to poor health outcomes over the life course, leading to higher incidence of disease and chronic conditions and, consequently, to lower life expectancy among some population segments. Although a leader in technological innovation and development and among the highest in per capita health care expenditures, the United States consistently ranks among the worst in national health and health care outcomes compared with other developed countries. In 2006, U.S. Census Bureau estimates placed the number of non-elderly uninsured at approximately 46.1 million, a figure that does not include individuals experiencing discontinuous coverage. Further, costs continue to rise due to increases in chronic health conditions, an influx of expensive new technologies, and expanding definitions of what is medically treatable.

Policymakers, health professionals, consumers, and others recognize the need to reform the U.S. health care system. Strategies to improve health care quality generally take the form of incremental changes to the structure of health care financing or introduction and improvement of health care quality data collection and feedback mechanisms. Still, health care quality improvements from these reforms have been modest. Critics argue that these reform efforts neglect existing sets of beliefs at institutional and interpersonal levels that both impede meaningful health care reform and maintain the current system of inequitable care delivery. The failure of reform efforts points to the need to identify and understand ideological barriers to health care change.

Health Care Reform

Many argue that the only way the United States can achieve substantial improvements in health care quality is through the development of national health insurance (NHI). Successful adoption of NHI would establish the right to health care. Despite high levels of support for some sort of NHI among the public, previous efforts to institute NHI failed. Historically,

labor unions and physician opposition, concretized in the lobbying efforts of the American Medical Association, helped undermine early reform efforts. Conservative political opposition, frequently aligned with the Republican Party, also rejects the notion that health care is a right, preferring to treat health care like other goods and services optimally provided through competitive markets. In support of this perspective, the American Medical Association, conservatives, and other opponents have been successful in mobilizing "myths" about the quality of the U.S. health care system as rhetorical devices to persuade policymakers that NHI is simply not a politically feasible option. These myths play upon commonsense beliefs about the U.S. health care system, including generalized beliefs that U.S. health care is "the best in the world," any existing problems are "not that bad," and the best solutions to any problems lie in privatization and the market. The dominance of such ideologies has led to the failure of significant reform attempts, ensuring that the current system of health care rationing, according to ability to pay rather than clinical need, continues.

Health Care Access and Quality

A growing body of evidence suggests that even with the adoption of reforms such as NHI, inequities in the delivery of health care will persist. Some argue that a major problem overlooked by most reform efforts is the chronic undersupply of minority and female physicians. Regardless of good intentions, a health care delivery system reliant upon physicians who are, by and large, white, upper-class, able-bodied, and heterosexual males will inevitably yield poorer health care outcomes for patients who fall outside these categories. Others argue that even if a ready supply of physicians outside these privileged groups existed, inequities sustained by the existing system of medical beliefs remain unaddressed. These barriers stem from the nature of medical training and the ways in which medical knowledge is applied within health care delivery. Medical professionals are trained to complete the process of diagnosis and treatment by taking symptoms presented by a patient and using them as clues to construct a diagnosis for which they can then prescribe treatment. Thus, patients who receive the best care are those who can most skillfully cooperate in the construction of these standardized medical narratives. Patients who are unfamiliar with the appropriate medical terms and phrases, whose cases are complicated, or who attempt to present alternative narratives to the standard medical ones are less likely to receive good care.

Ideological barriers to improvements in the U.S. health care system do not exist solely in the opposition to large-scale policy reform but also in health care delivery. Traditionally, research limited its focus to structural barriers such as health care financing and discrimination in patient–provider interactions. At the level of patient–provider interactions, the focus has been on difficulties arising from factors such as differences in communication styles due to class, race, or gender, or from conscious or subconscious discrimination, which can lead to insufficient information or misinformation, improper or inadequate provision of care and referrals for treatment, and erroneous assumptions about either the patient or the provider. Thus, most reforms have addressed financial barriers or training and reporting policies aimed at the prevention of discriminatory practices. Ideological barriers impeding health care reform and enabling gaps in care are the most pervasive yet the most challenging for reformers to address.

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See also Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Insurance

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Health Care, Insurance

Health care insurance is a contractual arrangement through which individuals spread the financial risk of unexpected and costly medical events. By enabling the voluntary pooling of health-related financial risks, health insurance enhances social welfare. However, incentives inherent in a health insurance contract can result in the inefficient use of health services, leading to reductions in social welfare. Additionally, disparities in information about health status between persons seeking insurance and entities providing coverage can affect the efficient and equitable pricing and provision of health insurance and result in welfare losses. Consequently, the conflict between the welfare gains from risk pooling and the welfare losses from the inefficient use of medical care (known as moral hazard) and asymmetric information (the problem of adverse risk selection) remains an ongoing tension in the design of health plans and in efforts to expand coverage.

Standard Theory of Health Insurance

According to standard theory, risk-averse individuals prefer a monetary loss with certainty to a gamble with the same expected value. To protect against health-related financial losses, such individuals are willing to transfer income (pay a health insurance premium) to a risk-bearing entity (an insurance company) to protect themselves against monetary losses associated with illness. When these income transfers capture the expected value of an individual's medical care expenses over a contractual period, they represent an actuarially fair health insurance premium. Because such monetary transfers are voluntary, the pooling of resources by individuals with similar risk profiles is welfare enhancing.

Standard theory also suggests that risk-averse individuals will pay a "risk premium" above the actuarially fair premium to obtain health insurance. This additional payment enables insurers to make coverage available, because it compensates them for their administrative and marketing costs and allows a margin for profit. This insurance "load" represents the true economic price of insurance as it is the minimal monetary transfer above an actuarially fair premium necessary to induce insurers to provide coverage. An individual's demand for coverage will depend on its price (in theory, the insurance load, but in practice, the out-of-pocket premium), the individual's risk aversion, and the probability and size of a health-related financial loss.

Setting Health Insurance Premiums

Despite the theoretical construct of an actuarially fair health insurance premium, controversy remains as to how premiums should be established. Some view health insurance as a form of mutual aid and social solidarity among citizens and believe that premiums should be community rated, reflecting the health care experience of an entire insured group. Under this principle, all individuals pay the same premium regardless of their own health care experience. In contrast, others suggest that premiums should more appropriately reflect the actuarial value of individual health care experience (or the experience of a group of very similar individuals) and should be experience rated. These analysts assert that community rating is unfair because it imposes an implicit tax on low risks that is used to subsidize high risks. Such pricing also results in the inefficient provision of coverage as the low risks purchase too little insurance and high risks overinsure.

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Because health insurance reduces out-of-pocket costs, individuals and their providers have an incentive to overuse health care. In doing so, individuals obtain additional health services whose value to them is less than the resource costs incurred in its production. This moral hazard welfare loss represents a major source of inefficiency in the provision of health care.

Efforts to address moral hazard include the use of deductibles and coinsurance. The growth of managed care added a number of innovations to control utilization, including constraints on provider choice, capitated or fixed-dollar payments for the care of each enrollee, utilization review, and case management and quality assurance activities.

Most recently, efforts to instill greater cost consciousness on the part of consumers have led to the development of consumer-driven health plans, typified by health savings accounts combined with high-deductible health plans. Individuals and their employers

make tax-free contributions to a health savings account up to a proscribed dollar limit. By assuming responsibility for substantial first-dollar expenditures, the expectation is that consumers will use services prudently. However, some individuals with these plans have delayed or postponed care and have expressed dissatisfaction with such plans. Concern also exists that tax-free health accounts will attract high-income persons in good health, leaving low-income persons with health problems in traditional insurance plans.

Moral hazard remains a concern, and its interpretation and policy implications may be more complex than generally appreciated. A distinction exists between inefficient moral hazard (resulting from the insurance-induced reduction in out-of-pocket price) and efficient moral hazard (resulting from the income transfer the ill receive from members of the insurance pool). Efficient moral hazard is welfare enhancing, as it enables individuals to overcome barriers to affordability.

In certain cases, such as the treatment of chronic illnesses, cost-sharing provisions to address moral hazard may need to be relaxed. The out-of-pocket costs of such provisions may deter compliance with treatment and lead to future health care costs.

Informational asymmetries between potential enrollees and insurers regarding enrollee health status can contribute to adverse risk selection. Because potential enrollees are often better informed than insurers, they may be able to enter health plans and pay premiums that do not reflect their expected health care use. Instead, they may pay the lower premiums faced by good risks. Such behavior can yield inefficiencies over time, as enrollment by poor risks causes health plan costs to rise and low-risk enrollees respond by seeking lower-priced but more restrictive coverage. In the extreme, adverse selection may lead to unsustainable health plans as low-risk enrollees defect and plans become dominated by high-risk enrollees.

To avoid adverse selection, health insurers compete by selecting favorable health risks. Such behavior is inefficient because it diverts resources from efforts to reduce plan costs and enhance quality and may leave certain individuals uninsured. State and federal reforms have sought to counter such insurer behavior by requiring open enrollment and guaranteed renewal of coverage and by limiting exclusions and waiting periods for preexisting health conditions. Efforts to counter adverse selection have included reinsuring the expenses of high-cost enrollees, establishing high-risk insurance pools, and risk-adjusting payments to health plans.

Health Care Insurance in the United States

Whereas most industrialized countries have established national health insurance systems, the United States stands out as providing a patchwork of private and public sources of coverage that leave a sizable proportion of its citizenry uninsured (15.3 percent, or 44.8 million persons in 2005). Of the insured U.S. population in 2005, coverage from employers represents the largest source (60.2 percent, or 176.3 million persons), followed by Medicare (13.7 percent, or 40.1 million persons), Medicaid (13 percent, or 38.1 million persons), and private health insurance purchased directly from an insurer (9.2 percent, or 26.9 million persons).

The lack of a uniform health insurance system in the United States has resulted in significant gaps in coverage. Persons most likely to lack insurance are young adults (ages 19 to 34), racial and ethnic minorities (especially Hispanics), persons with low educational attainment, persons with low incomes, those in fair or poor health, low-wage earners, workers in small firms, and the self-employed. Compared with insured persons, the uninsured are less likely to have a usual source of health care, more likely to report difficulties obtaining timely care, and less likely to use medical care.

The provision of health insurance in the United States has also raised a number of equity and efficiency issues, especially with regard to employment-based coverage. For example, employer contributions to an employee's health insurance premium are tax deductible, representing a revenue loss of $209 billion in 2004. This "tax subsidy" exacerbates moral hazard by creating incentives for individuals to purchase more generous coverage. Because the value of the tax deduction depends on an individual's marginal tax rate, it represents a regressive subsidy favoring higher- rather than lower-income workers.

Providing coverage through the workplace also yields labor market inefficiencies. Workers may be discouraged from changing jobs or retiring early, and they may alter their labor force activity to qualify for coverage. Means-tested public insurance, such as

Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), can also create perverse incentives whereby individuals adjust hours of work and earnings so that family members qualify for coverage. Expanded Medicaid eligibility and SCHIP implementation have also resulted in private insurance "crowd out." In this case, privately insured low-income workers with dependents eligible for public coverage substitute public for private coverage.

Although the United States has failed to address these problems through comprehensive health insurance reform, public policy has not been entirely passive. Medicaid expansions and SCHIP implementation during the 1990s contributed to a reduction in the number of uninsured children. In 2007, however, President Bush vetoed legislation that had bipartisan support to expand the number of children covered by SCHIP. Moreover, recent policy initiatives stressing voluntary enrollment in private coverage through the use of tax credits, small-group and individual insurance market reforms, and premium subsidies for employers have not reduced the number of uninsured. In response, several states have mandated that individuals obtain private coverage. In addition, outreach efforts have sought to provide information to those eligible but not enrolled in public coverage. It remains to be seen whether public policy can effectively expand coverage and address the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.

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See also Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change

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Hegemony

The term *hegemony* has a long and rich history. Etymologically, *hegemony* derives from the Greek *hegemon*, meaning "leader." The most extensive and influential elaboration of hegemony is that of the Italian theorist and political activist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937); indeed one can argue that hegemony has become synonymous with Gramsci's theory of hegemony.

Gramsci was one of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI, founded in 1921). His steadfast refusal to align the PCI with Mussolini and his outspoken criticism of fascism landed him in prison. Gramsci occupied his time in prison reflecting upon, and writing about, a series of political concerns; foremost among these was why the working class in the most industrialized nations had failed to develop a revolutionary consciousness. It is in the course of these writings, which have come to be known as the *Quaderni del Carcere* or *Prison Notebooks*, that Gramsci developed his theory of hegemony.

Gramsci used *hegemony* in his *Prison Notebooks* in two different but related senses. First, he referred to a form of rule characterized by a consensual basis within civil society, the social terrain intermediary between the economy and the state, and contrasted it to a monopoly of the means of violence or control of the state. Second, hegemony referred to the development of class consciousness and, in particular, to the movement of a class from an "in-itself" to a "for-itself" status. Each of the two senses of hegemony relates to a set of key terms. As a form of rule, hegemony relates to *consent*, *civil society*, *historical bloc*, and *war of position*. As the development of class consciousness, it relates to *organic intellectual*, *intellectual/moral bloc*, *common sense/good sense*, and the party as *collective intellectual*. Gramsci argued that the modern Western bourgeoisie rules not only, or even predominantly, through brute strength (domination) but also through intellectual and moral direction (hegemony). Consequently, a frontal attack on the state—for example, Lenin's military strategy during the Russian revolution—would be inadequate in the nations of the industrialized West because it would leave the bourgeoisie's hegemony intact. In such a situation, a war of position focused on civil society and the formation of an alternative hegemony is the only viable military strategy.

With Gramsci, the concept of hegemony moves beyond a description of a form of rule to a prescription for liberation. And it is precisely Gramsci's emphasis on liberation that accounts for the widespread influence of his theory of hegemony. According to Gramsci, the movement of a class from subordination to hegemony is a long and arduous process whose starting point is the consciousness of the aspiring hegemonic group. Gramsci, like W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, described the consciousness of subaltern or subordinate groups as divided or contradictory. For example, wage workers have one consciousness implicit in their practical activity, and another superficially explicit or verbal, that they have inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. Gramsci referred to the consciousness inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed as "common sense." Gramsci's treatment of common sense or subordinate cultures was distinctive because it avoided the romanticization/othering dichotomy that characterizes most scholarship on this subject and because it viewed these cultures as dynamic rather than static and as incoherent rather than as patterned wholes possessing a distinctive logic.

Common sense is a confused agglomerate of fragments from religion as well as from the history of philosophy and science. Gramsci argued that common sense is good enough to allow the subalterns to function successfully in their immediate surroundings, but it cannot provide them with any critical insight into their subordinate status and, consequently, poses no threat to the dominant group. However, within all commonsense conceptions of the world or subaltern cultures, there is a kernel of good sense that is the intuition of a future philosophy, and it is in this good sense that one finds the rough beginning of a possible counterhegemony.

For a class to launch a successful counterhegemony—that is, acquire self-consciousness and develop the intellectual and moral order consonant with its practical activity—it must produce its own set of indigenous or organic intellectuals. By *intellectual,* Gramsci means not simply a thinking being—indeed Gramsci argued that all human beings are intellectuals in this sense—but an individual who has the social function of producing or instilling knowledge in others. Any subaltern group that aspires to hegemony must create intellectuals from its ranks who can liberate it from common sense and elaborate its good sense into a coherent worldview.

Organic intellectuals, once formed, need to enter into intellectual-mass dialectics; that is, they must stay in constant interaction with the group they represent, educating, organizing, and developing more organic intellectuals. Intellectuals and education are considered so essential to social transformation that Gramsci envisioned the Communist Party as a collective intellectual. The final step on the road to the creation of a counterhegemony is the creation of a historical bloc; that is, the winning over of other subaltern groups to the newly constructed worldview of the aspiring hegemonic group. Gramsci emphasized that a historical bloc is not a loose association of disparate subaltern groups, each of which maintains its identity, but a fusion of subaltern groups with the aspiring hegemonic group through the appeal of the latter's intellectual and moral worldview.

Gramsci's theory of hegemony has had widespread influence. Within leftist—communist, socialist, and labor—political circles, it persuaded political leaders to acknowledge culture and consciousness as vital for any revolutionary transformation of society. The importance it places on education persuaded many leftist political parties throughout the South, and especially in Argentina and Brazil, to launch massive education campaigns and to make literacy among workers and peasants into a political priority. Within the academy it strongly influenced British cultural studies and, in particular, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, one of the first and most prolific centers for cultural studies. Although Gramsci wrote within a Marxian paradigm and used class as his basic unit of analysis—because the theory of hegemony places the issue of power firmly at the center of any discussion of culture—his theory has also been utilized in the study of racism, sexism, and postcolonialism.

Wilma Borrelli

See also Class Consciousness; Cultural Imperialism; Social Control

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Heroin

Heroin is a semisynthetic substance derived from the resin of opium poppies, which are grown widely in South America, the Middle East, and Asia. Heroin can be injected, smoked, or sniffed. Reported effects include vomiting and nausea for first-time users, followed by intense euphoria ("rush") accompanied by flushed skin, dry mouth, and impaired mental functioning.

Heroin was first manufactured in 1898 by the Bayer pharmaceutical company and marketed heavily as a treatment for respiratory ailments. Heroin was originally believed to cure morphine addiction, but doctors soon realized it was more potent and addictive than morphine. Its addictive potential was an important factor in U.S. restriction under the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914 and in its full criminalization in 1919. Presently, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency classifies heroin as a Schedule I narcotic, with high abuse potential and no accepted medical utility.

Most U.S. heroin comes from Mexico and Colombia, with New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles being the primary market areas for domestic heroin distribution. Abuse rates are highest in East Coast metropolitan areas, where higher-purity powder is available. For many years, injection was the dominant method of use, due in part to low purity levels. In the early 1990s higher-quality heroin entered the United States, making snorting and smoking more attractive routes of administration. The result has been an overall increase in heroin consumption rates in the latter years of the 20th century. New use methods also helped combat the social stigma associated with injection and helped broaden heroin's appeal to new and more affluent groups, such as suburban whites.

Despite an increase in overall rates of use, heroin remains one of the least used illegal drugs in the United States. Adolescent use has remained relatively stable over the past 25 years, with use by high school seniors fluctuating between 1 and 2 percent. However, emergency room admissions for heroin have increased 35 percent since 1995, mostly among youth. Drug treatment admissions have also increased steadily since 1992, mostly among middle-aged white males.

Heroin became associated with criminality in the 1970s based on the reasoning that users will turn to burglary, fraud, shoplifting, and prostitution to obtain money to maintain their addictions. Such reports emerged during the Nixon administration and still remain popular in anti-drug campaigns. Heroin use is also associated with violent crime. Research indicates that episodes of prostitutes assaulting and robbing clients are connected to the withdrawal experience. There is also substantial violence associated with heroin trafficking, although this is attributed to the inherent violence associated with drug markets rather than the pharmacological effects of heroin.

Health risks associated with heroin include fatal overdose, addiction, collapsed veins, and withdrawal sickness. An addict typically begins experiencing withdrawal symptoms within 8 hours after discontinuation of use. Withdrawal symptoms are similar to a severe flu, include sweating, anxiety, cold sweats, vomiting, diarrhea, and fever. Another significant problem with heroin use is the high risk of contracting blood-borne diseases, such as hepatitis and HIV/AIDS, from injection and needle sharing. Nationally, roughly 75 percent of new AIDS cases among women and children stem from the injection of illegal drugs such as heroin. Many countries have instituted programs supplying sterile needles to injectors to combat these diseases. The U.S. federal government does not currently support needle exchange programs, although some city and local governments do.

Philip R. Kavanaugh

See also Addiction; Drug Abuse, Crime

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Hidden Curriculum

Hidden curriculum is a subset of theories of socialization that investigate how society reproduces culture from generation to generation. Primary socialization encompasses the teaching of children by parents who use direct instruction and modeling to inculcate language, moral beliefs and values, social roles, and so on. At the end of the 19th century, Émile Durkheim noted that schools had become central institutions helping the child to transition from family to society, from primary to secondary socialization, where socialization is increasingly accomplished by contact with adults and peers. Durkheim also advanced the notion that more is learned in schools than is specified in the official curriculum of books, manuals, and mission statements. Researchers from both the conservative structural-functional and radical critical traditions agree that schools accomplish social reproduction, both in formal curricula, where history, literature, and other forms of cultural capital necessary to fully participate in society are taught, and in informal or hidden curricula, which inculcate equally important elements of social reproduction, particularly discipline and stratification along the lines of intelligence, race, gender, and social class.

The Structural-Functional Approach

In a germinal 1959 article, Talcott Parsons described school classes as agencies of "manpower allocation" where academic achievement and ascribed qualities like family class background contribute to the reproduction of social stratification. In U.S. schools, he argued, children had to be inculcated with particular views of "achievement" and "equality of opportunity." Parsonian structural-functionalism contended that schools must teach that inequality is the *legitimate* consequence of differences in educational attainment. Following Parsons, qualitative researchers observed public grade school classrooms in efforts to identify the actual practices that accomplished socialization and sorting. Philip Jackson described values, dispositions, and social behaviors that were rewarded by teachers, and coined the term *hidden curriculum* to describe disciplines that were essential for school progress, for example, waiting quietly, exercising restraint, trying, completing work, keeping busy, cooperating, showing allegiance, being neat, being punctual, and being courteous. Other hidden elements of curriculum are embedded in mechanisms and apparatuses, including the built environment of the school and classroom; textbooks; uniforms; gender roles enacted by students, teachers, and administrators; tracking systems; the hierarchy of knowledge and school subjects; and the competitive/cooperative lessons of sports, contests, and academic performance.

The Neo-Marxist Approach

Beginning in the 1970s, neo-Marxist educational researchers reexamined hidden curricula. Social reproduction, they contended, includes the reproduction of illegitimate inequalities including social class, race, and gender. Two economists, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, wrote an influential study showing how school norms "corresponded" with capitalist class structures of workers, managers, and owners. Students from different social classes are subject to different curricula, scholarly expectations, types of schoolwork, and treatment by teachers. Schools send silent but powerful messages to students with regard to intellectual ability, personal traits, and occupational choice. Here also, qualitative researchers examined how students in upper-class communities were inculcated with the drive to achieve, whereas those in working-class schools rehearsed disciplines appropriate for low-skill, low-autonomy work.

Resistance Theory

By the 1980s both functionalist and Marxist structuralist accounts were challenged by a group of critical theorists who criticized the concept of hidden curricula for assuming that students were passive recipients and failing to acknowledge their ability to contest socialization or to make meaning of it for themselves. Moreover, school curricula were the location of struggles and conflicts between students, teachers, administrators, and the citizenry. Hidden curriculum was thus an incomplete theory because it ignored human agency and conflict. The notion of "resistance" was proposed to challenge the oppressive nature of schooling.

Resistance theorists developed a theoretical framework in which students and teachers were conceptualized as active agents able to subvert, reject, or change socialization agendas. The hidden curriculum did not constitute a coherent structure but rather a variety of

conflicting and contradictory messages. Thus the plural *hidden curricula* was a better descriptor. Resistance theorists attended not only to how students produced meaning and culture but also to how students and teachers challenged even deeply hidden structures, creating their own hidden curricula. Resistance theory thus countered reproduction theory by emphasizing human agency, resistance, and contestation.

Some theorists have also attended to "hiddenness" itself. Noting that the socialization agendas of discipline—following abstract rules, submerging personal identity, being consigned as a member of a group, and so on—have been repeatedly exposed by educational researchers, these theorists ask, "Who are the curricula hidden from?" Interrogating the various types of hiddenness—intentional, undiscovered, hiding in plain sight, known to some but not others—they inquire about the consequences of revealing these pervasive structures of schooling.

There are still fertile fields for social research into the intended and unintended consequences of schooling. Particularly now, when the issues of privatization, vouchers, and charter schools promise to offer choices, it seems important to consider the hidden curricula of schooling in relation to socialization.

Eric Margolis

See also Ability Grouping; Education, Academic Performance; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; School Dropouts; School Segregation

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Hierarchy of Needs

Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a humanistic theory of motivation based on his observation that humans are a perpetually wanting animal. Maslow proposed five basic needs that become goals that guide human behavior. Lower-level needs are biological and experienced by everyone, whereas upper-level needs are psychological, experienced more rarely, and by fewer people. Typically portrayed as a pyramid (see Figure 1), the five basic needs are inter-related but arranged in order of their relative potency to influence behavior: physiological needs (level 1); safety needs (level 2); love needs (level 3); esteem needs (level 4); and the need to self-actualize (level 5). Thus, physiological needs are more influential than safety needs, and so on, up the hierarchy of needs. The theory posits that human



Figure 1 Hierarchy of Needs

behavior is motivated by the desire to achieve and maintain the conditions that make it possible to satisfy these needs.

Maslow proposed subhierarchies within each of the five levels. The physiological needs will be met according to the relative urgency to eat, drink, dispose of bodily waste, sleep, and breathe. If those needs are sufficiently satisfied, safety needs then begin to influence human behaviors, such as maintaining shelter, joining a labor union, and buying health insurance. Love needs are associated with belongingness and motivate individuals to create and maintain intimate relationships, have a family, and join a street gang or religious organization. The esteem needs may be satisfied by both negative and positive social behaviors, such as committing crimes to gain recognition or educating yourself to increase self-confidence. The need to self-actualize refers to maximizing one's potential and experiencing periods of peak achievement. Some psychologists refer to self-actualization as "flow," athletes describe "being in the zone," and artists describe their sensation of time becoming irrelevant while experiencing peak creativity. Maslow's hierarchy of needs unites physiological needs with psychological needs within an easy-to-understand humanistic theory of motivation.

Critics attack Maslow's hierarchy of needs both conceptually and empirically. For example, the stereotypical self-actualizing, starving artist seems to contradict the necessity of first satisfying safety needs or physiological needs. A response to that argument asserts that Maslow's hierarchy explains why there probably are not many self-actualizing, starving artists and that individuals differ in their perception of and need for safety. Researchers have had difficulty creating an empirical test of self-actualization, although creativity researchers have been addressing that issue, partly through brain imaging. Some researchers report different needs within the hierarchy, whereas others have found cross-cultural evidence in support of Maslow's theory. In spite of these criticisms, Maslow's hierarchy of needs has been widely adapted as a guide to individual therapy as well as human relations in the workplace, and as a general explanation of human motivation.

Tom Heinzen and Susan Nolan

See also Gangs; Job Satisfaction

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HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations

Twenty-five years into the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, HIV infection rates remain alarmingly high, with more than 4 million new infections every year. Despite the rapid global spread of HIV, most people in both industrialized and developing countries are at relatively low risk of HIV infection. Comprehensive prevention programs directed at all segments of the general population can help to improve awareness, change social norms, reduce stigma and discrimination, promote less risky behavior, and reduce new infections. However, careful analysis of the sources of new infections in subpopulations is essential in order to focus relevant interventions and maximize their impact. A combination of risk avoidance (abstinence, mutual fidelity) and risk reduction (reduction in the number of sexual partners, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, correct and consistent condom use, male circumcision, and needle exchange) have proven to be successful all over the globe.

Effective targeted prevention interventions can also lower the number of patients requiring costly drug treatments and boost the sustainability of expensive antiretroviral therapy (ART). At the same time, successful ART makes prevention more acceptable and helps in reducing stigma and discrimination.

To control HIV infections, the focus should be on the populations experiencing the highest rate of infections—often referred to as "high-risk populations," "most at risk populations," or "most vulnerable populations" (MVPs). Interventions tailored to specific populations reach a smaller audience than those aimed at the general population, yet they have the possibility to make a disproportionate impact on the course of the epidemic.

MVPs are a relatively smaller segment of the general population that is at higher than average risk of acquiring or transmitting HIV infections. They include discordant couples, sex workers (SWs) and their clients, injection drug users (IDUs) and other drug users, men who have sex with men (MSM), individuals in the armed forces, prisoners, and children of sex workers. A larger group of MVPs, especially in high-prevalence countries, may include HIV-positive pregnant women, sexually active and out-of-school youth, minority populations, migrant and displaced persons, and large populations of women.

There are compelling reasons to reach MVPs:

- They are often marginalized, criminalized, victimized, and discriminated against by law enforcement agencies as well as the general population. As a result they are difficult to reach and have poor access to relevant public health and other services.
- Segmentation of the various subpopulations allows for more specific, appropriate, and effective interventions.
- There are numerous proven interventions that can control the epidemic in IDUs, SWs, and MSM.

Risk and Vulnerability

An individual's risk of acquiring or transmitting HIV is affected by a variety of factors, such as sexual behavior, drug use, male circumcision, and leaving sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) untreated. High-risk individuals engage in behaviors that expose themselves to the risk of HIV infection, such as unprotected casual sex with multiple partners, sharing needles, and commercial sex.

Risk can be further compounded when the HIV-positive individual is suffering from acute HIV infection. Acute infection refers to the period of time immediately after a person is infected with HIV. Characterizing this phase is prolific viral replication and an acute drop in the CD4 count. Persons with acute HIV infection are extremely infectious, as the potential for an individual to transmit the virus increases eight- to tenfold.

In addition to individual risk behaviors, some vulnerable populations face greater susceptibility to HIV/AIDS. Societal factors, often beyond the control of the individual, may also increase the risk of infection. These include poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, gender inequities and gender-based violence, cultural practices, human rights abuses, and lack of access to information and services.

Women face increased vulnerability to infection due to biological, social, and economic factors. They often lack the power to negotiate safer sex with their partners. Because of economic inequalities, some women enter sex work or perform transactional sex for economic survival. Furthermore, women are more vulnerable to infection than men because of biology: The female genital tract has more exposed surface area than the male genital tract, semen has a greater HIV concentration than vaginal fluids, and a larger amount of semen is exchanged during intercourse than vaginal fluids.

Orphans and children of MVPs are also particularly vulnerable. Whether the parent is a SW or IDU, HIV-positive or HIV-negative, living or deceased, these children need special attention. MVPs with children may not be coherent enough to support a child emotionally or financially. They may not be physically present, may be ill due to HIV, or may have died. Many times, children of HIV-positive parents serve as caretakers.

Understanding the Local Dynamics of the Epidemic

The population of MVPs differs by the type and level of epidemic. Through investigation of the incidence, distribution, and causes of HIV in a society, epidemiologists can predict which populations are most vulnerable to, and at risk of, HIV infection.

In lower-prevalence countries, containing the epidemic in MVPs can have a wide-reaching effect on how the general population experiences HIV and AIDS. Accurate epidemiological and behavioral data can pinpoint which populations are at high risk and, therefore, which targeted interventions should be implemented to address those populations. By targeting MVPs, the progression from low HIV prevalence to higher HIV prevalence in the general population may be prevented.

In higher-prevalence countries, with an increased pool of infected individuals, a more effective strategy would be to identify those infected through targeted counseling and testing and other community-based interventions. In this environment, programs should focus on discordant couples and other at-risk



Figure 1 HIV Transmission Through Sex Work and Injection Drug Use

populations such as sexually active youth, young adults, and women and provide both risk avoidance and risk reduction programs.

In many contexts, the relationship between sex work and injection drug use is quite close (Figure 1), and prostitution and injection drug use have been the engines that have fueled the epidemic. Many SWs use injection drugs and many drug users resort to sex work to pay for their injection drug use. These IDU/SWs not only risk transmitting HIV through the sharing of injection drug paraphernalia but also can pass the infection sexually. HIV infections will then reach bridge populations and allow the virus to infect the general population.

Overall, targeted interventions may take various forms, depending on the social, cultural, economic, political, and legal specifics of the high-risk group. The discussion that follows focuses on some most at risk populations and appropriate interventions.

Sex Workers

SWs are a diverse and sizable population. They can be male, female, or transgender and work in a variety of environments, including brothels, bars, or on the streets. In some societies, such as in Amsterdam, Senegal, and Nevada, sex work is legal or decriminalized. These legal SWs have access to health and social services. In some societies, sex work is likely to be a personal choice. In many others it may be due to poverty or a lack of education and employment opportunities, or it may be fueled by trafficking of girls and women. Sex work is also often used as a survival tactic during severe societal disruption caused by civil wars or natural disasters when no services are available and necessities are scarce.

In many countries, sex work is a driving factor fueling the HIV epidemic. Sustained and meaningful interventions are complicated by a variety of factors, including a lucrative commercial sex industry, low condom use, high levels of STDs, a hard-to-reach, highly mobile population of SWs and clients, and the absence of an atmosphere that encourages access to prevention programs. Awareness and understanding of a particular community's environment is essential in tailoring a relevant, effective message.

The focus should be on harm reduction and increased knowledge among SWs as well as parallel interventions for clients and partners of SWs. Interventions should include the promotion of condom knowledge, access, and use as well as improved health care, including antiretroviral therapy, STD screening, checkups, and treatment. Other critical areas for targeting and scaling up interventions include building the capacity of community organizations; facilitating policy change to reduce discrimination and stigmatization; creating an enabling environment; harmonizing interventions with other HIV/STD, reproductive health, and drug prevention programs; and providing ongoing technical support and effective management and monitoring.

Men Who Have Sex With Men

As with interventions targeting SWs, interventions targeting MSM are essential, as well as challenging. This population is largely neglected in most countries and in urgent need of targeted, relevant HIV interventions. Because MSM often have sex with women, they possess the potential to spread HIV to the general population.

Reaching the MSM population is a difficult task for several reasons. First, this group faces a high level of stigma and discrimination by medical service providers and the general population. In many countries, homosexuality is illegal, and fear of legal repercussions drives the population further underground. Also, MSM do not often self-identify as "homosexual." Cultural

perceptions of what constitutes homosexuality can vary widely, and men adopt different definitions based on these perceptions. Lastly, the MSM population is extremely diverse in nature. MSM may include monogamous homosexuals, male bisexuals, transgender individuals, heterosexual SWs, homosexual SWs, and MSM who are IDUs.

Injection Drug Users

IDUs are another key risk population for contracting and transmitting HIV. There are approximately 13 million IDUs worldwide, and the number is rising. Many lack adequate resources or access to sterile needles and syringes, especially in developing countries. They are treated as criminals in many societies and denied access to basic services and support. IDUs face considerable legal obstacles, such as laws prohibiting the possession of drug paraphernalia and drugs, and laws against aiding and abetting. An additional complication is that drug use is often accompanied by sex work.

Though sex is the chief mode of transmission in the spread of HIV, at least 10 percent of new infections globally are those contracted through injection drug use. In some countries, especially those with a low prevalence of HIV such as China and the countries of eastern Europe, IDUs are at the center of the epidemic. Historically a problem of rich countries, HIV transmission through IDUs is now observed throughout the world.

Considering this growing trend of injection drug use, new and scaled-up interventions are imperative to prevent the spread of HIV within and from IDUs. In low-prevalence countries, interventions targeting IDUs can limit transmission to SWs and therefore prevent a generalized epidemic. In countries already battling a high-prevalence epidemic, IDU interventions are critical to prevent an increase in incidence.

Harm reduction interventions should include ART, drug substitution therapy, needle exchange and distribution, condom and bleach distribution, outreach, peer education programs, and social network interventions. Though needle distribution programs are recognized as a cost-effective way to reduce HIV transmission, they remain controversial in many countries, including the United States. Opponents of needle exchange or distribution view the practice as "enabling" and encouraging drug use. As an alternative, bleach distribution programs have been implemented in countries with laws prohibiting or restricting needle distribution.

Individuals in the Armed Services

The armed forces, police, and other uniformed services around the world face a serious risk of HIV and other STDs, with infection rates significantly higher than the general population. Members of uniformed services can serve as a core transmission group for these infections to the general population. The nature of their work often requires that they be posted or travel away from home for extended periods of time, or they must await proper housing before sending for their families. Confronting risk daily inspires other risky behaviors, and a sense of invincibility may carry over into personal behavior. These groups tend to have more frequent contact with SWs, which increases the likelihood of passing on HIV and STDs to other partners, including their wives or girlfriends. The frequent and excessive use of alcohol and other behavior-modifying drugs plays a major role in risky sexual behavior.

Other High-Risk Populations

Other vulnerable populations include prisoners, migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, truck drivers, transgender individuals, and out-of-school youth. To prevent transmission within these groups and to the general population, early targeted interventions should be implemented.

HIV/AIDS care and treatment are essential; however, prevention interventions are equally crucial. If large-scale and effective HIV prevention interventions are properly supported, the cost and need for treatment decreases.

Lower-level prevalence areas offer public health professionals an opportunity to act swiftly and avoid further expansion of the epidemic. Even in higher-prevalence countries, targeting the most at-risk individuals is important to prevent the further spread of the epidemic in the general population. National HIV prevention efforts need to be prioritized, directed, and scaled up to the populations most vulnerable and at risk of infection.

Many factors improve the ability for targeted interventions to succeed. Laws and policies directly

challenging stigma and discrimination against people who have HIV, or are perceived to be at a risk for HIV, are essential. Interventions must also address contextual issues and be sensitive to local cultural and social perceptions surrounding HIV/AIDS. New technologies such as microbicides, male circumcision, and preexposure prophylaxis may become extremely valuable tools in preventing HIV among the most vulnerable populations.

All in all, HIV interventions must focus on the populations most vulnerable to HIV, irrespective of the level of the epidemic. This basic tenet of public health continues to be a cost-effective approach to controlling HIV.

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See also Drug Abuse; Harm Reduction Drug Policy; Homosexuality; Prostitution

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HOLOCAUST

The Holocaust was the systematic, state-organized persecution and murder of nearly 6 million Jews by Nazi Germany, its allies, and collaborators. They destroyed two thirds of Europe's Jews and one third of the world's Jewish population. If Nazi intentions had fully prevailed, all Jewish life and tradition would have been annihilated globally, because Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) and his most dedicated followers took the Jews to be so threatening and unwelcome—racially, economically, and politically—that their total destruction became the plan.

The Holocaust shows where racism can lead. According to Nazi ideology, Jews were the lowest of the low in the Nazis' extensive racial classification, which put Germans at the top but also fueled twin fears: (1) that German superiority could be harmed by race mixing, which would pollute German "blood," and (2) that "inferior" races had to be controlled, if not destroyed, to ensure that German power and culture were triumphant. As a result, Nazi Germany's genocidal policies destroyed millions of other defenseless people who were also regarded as inferior and threatening. These included Roma and Sinti (gypsies) and Polish citizens as well as homosexuals, the handicapped, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other political and religious dissidents. Thus, while the Holocaust refers primarily to the Nazi destruction of the Jews, it also encompasses other groups who, for racial, cultural, or political reasons, became Nazi targets in ways that were related but not identical to the Jews' fate under Hitler.

The Holocaust has more than one name. Its perpetrators took part in what the Nazis eventually called the "Final Solution" (*die Endlösung*) of their so-called Jewish question. In the early 1940s, eastern European Jews turned to Jewish scripture and used a Yiddish word, *Churb'n*, which means "destruction," or the

Hebrew term *Shoah,* which means "catastrophe," to name the disaster confronting their people. Although *Shoah* is used widely in Israel and the official Holocaust remembrance day is called *Yom Hashoah,* the term *Holocaust,* which began to achieve prominence in the 1950s, remains the most common name. Its diverse sources include derivation from the Septuagint, an ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, which employs *holokauston* for the Hebrew word *olah.* Those biblical words refer to a completely consumed burnt offering.

Racism and Religion

Hitler and his followers were racists because they were anti-Semites looking for an anti-Jewish stigma deeper than any religious, economic, or political prejudice alone could provide. For if Jews were found wanting religiously, it was possible for them to convert. If their business practices or political views were somehow inappropriate, changed behavior could, in principle, correct their shortcomings. But anti-Semites such as Hitler and the Nazis believed that Jews were a menace no matter what they did. Racial theory "explained" why the Jews, no matter what appearances might suggest to the contrary, were a threat that Germans could not afford to tolerate.

Contrary to Nazi ideology, Jews are not a race. Any person, irrespective of "blood" or any other biological feature, can become a Jew by conversion. Nevertheless, the belief that Jews were a race caught on in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Once linked, anti-Semitism and racism energized each other. Racial anti-Semitism, however, could never have arisen had it not been for nonracial forms of anti-Jewish prejudice and hatred that were at its roots. Among those roots, none was more important than Christianity.

Not all Jews are religious, but historically Jewish identity is scarcely imaginable apart from Judaism and its traditions, which unintentionally led to Christianity, a competing religious tradition, some 2,000 years ago. The history of the Holocaust shows that while Christianity was not a sufficient condition for the Holocaust, it was necessary for the actual catastrophe that took place. That statement does not mean that Christianity caused the Holocaust. Nevertheless, apart from Christianity, the Holocaust is barely conceivable because Nazi Germany's targeting of the Jews cannot be explained apart from the anti-Jewish images ("Christ-killers," willful blasphemers, unrepentant sons and daughters of the devil, to name only a few) that have been deeply rooted in Christian teaching and practices until post-Holocaust reforms uprooted them. Existing centuries before Nazism, Christianity's negative images of Jews and Judaism—supported by the institutions and social relationships that promoted those stereotypes—played key parts in bolstering the racial and genocidal anti-Semitism of Hitler and his Third Reich.

The "Final Solution"

In late 1941, the Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich issued invitations to important German government and SS (*Schutzstaffel*) officials for a meeting to be held on December 9. Heydrich's invitations contained copies of the document he had received from Hermann Göring, his Nazi superior, on July 31, 1941. That document authorized Heydrich to plan the "Final Solution" of the "Jewish question." The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the entry of the United States into World War II forced the postponement of the December meeting. But on January 20, 1942, Heydrich convened the Wannsee Conference at Am Grossen Wannsee 56/58, a comfortable lakeside villa in an affluent Berlin suburb.

Many of the men attending the meeting held doctorates from German universities. Most knew that mass murder of Jews had become state policy. Heydrich's meeting ensured that all of the leaders in attendance, and the bureaucracies they supervised, were on the same page. The report that emerged from the Wannsee Conference sanctioned the industrialization of death. To those who had to know, its euphemistic language made clear that the Third Reich had sentenced every European Jew to die, either by attrition, extermination through work, or outright murder.

As 1942 unfolded, six major Nazi killing centers were operational in occupied Poland: Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Maidanek, and Auschwitz-Birkenau. At each of those places, gas chambers—some using carbon monoxide, others using a pesticide called Zyklon B—were destroying Jewish lives. During 1942 alone, the most lethal year in Jewish history, approximately 2.7 million Jews perished in the Holocaust.

The Nazis' racist anti-Semitism eventually entailed a destruction process that required and received cooperation from every sector of German society. On the

whole, moreover, the Nazi killers and those Germans who aided and abetted them directly—or indirectly as bystanders—were civilized people from a society that was scientifically advanced, technologically competent, culturally sophisticated, efficiently organized, and even religiously devout.

Some Germans and members of populations allied with the Nazis resisted Hitler. Many others, however, played either a silent or an active role in the Holocaust. There were, for example, pastors and priests who led their churches in welcoming Nazification and the segregation of Jews it entailed. In addition, teachers and writers helped to till the soil where Hitler's racist anti-Semitism took root. Their students and readers reaped the wasteful harvest. Lawyers drafted and judges enforced laws that isolated Jews and set them up for the kill. Government and church personnel provided birth and baptismal records that helped to document who was Jewish and who was not. Other workers entered such information into state-of-the-art data processing machines. University administrators curtailed admissions for Jewish students and dismissed Jewish faculty members. Bureaucrats in the finance ministry handled confiscated Jewish wealth and property. Art dealers bought and sold treasures looted from Jewish families. Scientists performed research and tested their racial theories on those branded subhuman or nonhuman by German science. Business executives found that Nazi concentration camps could provide cheap labor. Railroad personnel scheduled and drove the trains that transported Jews to their death. If the destruction process had not been halted by the Third Reich's crushing military defeat, the "Final Solution" would probably have continued until it was finished.

Reverberations and Aftereffects

The Holocaust's impact has been immense. It undermined confidence in religious beliefs (Where was God?), political institutions (What happened to law?), and ethics (In what sense do human rights exist?). Toward the end of the 1990s, an upsurge of concern arose about reparations for Holocaust survivors and former slave laborers and about the restitution of property stolen from Jewish families and communities during the Holocaust years. This modicum of justice is important but also far from perfect.

The Holocaust played a part in the development of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but the world has not heeded the post-Holocaust imperative, "Never Again," at least not sufficiently to prevent the ethnic cleansing and genocide that have plagued the world after Auschwitz in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Darfur. The Holocaust was also decisive in the establishment of the state of Israel. Repeatedly, however, that aftereffect of the Holocaust has led to volatility and violence as Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbors in the Middle East try to cope with each other's existence.

Once it was thought that memory of the Holocaust would check anti-Semitism, if not eliminate it. That hope has proved to be naive, especially with regard to the Arab and Muslim worlds, where it is often alleged that Jews, and Israelis in particular, use appeals to the Holocaust to legitimate policies that violate human rights. Holocaust denial—the unfounded view that the Holocaust is a myth, that it never happened, or that claims about its extent are exaggerated—used to be restricted to fringe groups, located primarily in Europe and North America, whose disrespect for sound historical research was disguised as a form of scholarly revisionism. In the early 21st century, however, Holocaust denial has become much more widespread and dangerous because it is so frequently found in radical Islamic ideologies that encourage suicide bombers and seek Israel's destruction. The Holocaust was not over when World War II ended in 1945. Its history and significance are still in the making.

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See also Anti-Semitism; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Human Rights; Religious Prejudice; State Crimes; War Crimes

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HOMELESSNESS

Small groups of people tending to makeshift structures of an encampment, disheveled men rummaging through garbage cans for food, and young women with small children lining up outside of shelters have become common sights across the world's leading cities. This widespread growth in homelessness has been linked with economic, demographic, and cultural trends that have come to be known as "globalization"—the spread of manufacturing and financial activity across borders, heightened immigration, and the global ascendance of neoliberal ideology which favors free markets over government intervention. However, it is clear that these global trends interact with local conditions, such that the number and characteristics of people who become homeless may vary greatly across locales. Taking the United States as a case, what are the specific structural and demographic manifestations and correlates of its homeless problem? What factors influence whether or not homelessness is perceived as a social problem? Also, what are the different types of public policy responses that have emerged to address this persistent problem?

Structural Precipitants and Demographic Characteristics

As homelessness significantly increased throughout America's urban landscape in the early 1980s, two opposing explanations emerged. The first laid blame on individual characteristics such as human capital deficits (e.g., limited education and job skills), substance abuse, mental illness, and criminality. The second pointed to broad structural changes in labor and housing markets and welfare provisions. However, it is now generally understood that homelessness is the result of the interaction of structural and individual factors. Structural factors help explain why the prospect of homelessness, particularly among some categories of individuals, has increased in recent years; individual factors help to identify who, among those groups most vulnerable to homelessness, is at greatest risk of becoming homeless.

Structural Precipitants

Economic Changes

As American manufacturing stagnated throughout the 1970s because of increased international competition and a series of oil shocks, firms began to close domestic plants and restructure workforces, displacing workers and driving up unemployment. Newly created jobs were more likely to be nonunion and concentrated in services, low paying, and unstable. A surge in immigration increased competition for low-skill jobs, especially disadvantaging urban residents with low educational attainment. A cheap form of cocaine called "crack" flooded the streets and significant numbers of inner-city residents used or trafficked the drug, rendering some of them vulnerable to addiction, felony conviction, and homelessness. In the early 1980s, early 1990s, and in the early post–9/11 period, cyclical economic recessions produced spikes in unemployment and forced firms to reduce labor costs to remain competitive.

Welfare Retrenchment

At the same time, the welfare state was being scaled back, beginning most notably in the early 1980s. While deinstitutionalization of large-scale state mental hospitals had begun decades earlier, sufficient funding for community-based mental health facilities, intended to replace large mental institutions, never materialized. As a result, many persons who would have been in mental hospitals in previous decades received insufficient mental health treatment and cycled through the streets, shelters, and jails. Also in the early 1980s, the federal government took measures to keep benefit levels low for households in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and restricted eligibility for benefits through the Supplemental Security Income program. Later, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a program with time limits on receipt of welfare benefits and job training. Although many participants in this program have found employment, evidence suggests that many find jobs that fail to lift them out of poverty.

Disappearing Affordable Housing

A decline in affordable housing intersected with economic polarization and stagnation and welfare retraction to increase vulnerability to homelessness. The federal government, already a minor investor in public housing compared with Europe and Asia, retreated from the rental housing market by reducing rental subsidies and all but halting the creation of public housing projects. At the same time, rising income inequality and population growth, trends more intense in major urban areas, pushed rents upward as lower-rent districts were gentrified. As a result, America's urban poor faced a major housing affordability crisis.

Estimated Size and Characteristics of the Homeless Population

Population Size

Researchers at the Urban Institute have estimated the size of America's homeless problem at two points in time, using similar definitions and methodologies. They counted persons using relief services for the extremely poor and homeless and used a moderately broad definition of homelessness that included people who were staying outside or in a car, an abandoned building or place of business, emergency or transitional shelter, a hotel or motel paid by a shelter voucher, or a place where they could not sleep for the next month without being asked to leave. A count in 1996 of the service-using adult homeless, which is estimated to include about 85 percent of the street homeless population, enumerated upward of 842,000 homeless people throughout the country at a single point in time. A comparison with a similar count conducted in 1987 shows that the national point-in-time homeless population did not decline over this 9-year period but remained approximately at the same level, despite a substantial growth in programs and the continuous economic growth of the late 1990s. Also, researchers using a national representative survey sample of U.S. adults estimated that 3.5 million people experience homelessness over a yearlong period.

Population Characteristics

The contemporary homeless population of the United States is diverse in terms of gender, family status, race and ethnicity, age, and disability status. According to the Urban Institute data, approximately 70 percent are male and 30 percent are female. About 75 percent are single individuals, 15 percent adults with children, and 10 percent adults living with one or more persons other than minor children. Many studies have found that adults with children are growing in proportion among the homeless. In terms of race and ethnicity, blacks are over-represented, making up 40 percent of the homeless population but 23 percent of the adult poor population. Whites are the largest group but are under-represented, making up 41 percent of the homeless population but 52 percent of the poor population. Latinos/as are also under-represented at 11 percent of the homeless population but 20 percent of the poor population. Native Americans are over-represented at 8 percent of the homeless population but 2 percent of the poor population. Although this study did not include data for Asians, local surveys consistently report substantial under-representation. Persons in their prime working years make up the majority of the adult homeless population, with approximately 80 percent between the ages of 25 and 54. Homelessness is rare among the elderly, likely because of social security programs, with only 2 percent of the homeless population over 65 years old. Alcohol, drug, and mental health problems are common among homeless persons, with only a third of homeless adults having no such problems and between 25 and 40 percent having struggled with one or more of these problems. The homeless of today, just as in the past, are located primarily in urban areas, particularly in central city neighborhoods.

Public Response to Homelessness

The manifestation of homelessness as a social problem has shown considerable variation across historical contexts. For example, homelessness was thought of as a minor problem, affecting only older alcoholic men in "skid row" neighborhoods in the early post–World War II period. However, by the early to mid-1980s, activists in urban communities were in an uproar about the increasing number of people fending for themselves on the streets and in emergency shelters.

What explains the shifts in prominence of homelessness as a social problem? Certainly increasing numbers and visibility of the homeless are critical. However, other factors are operative as well. First, who becomes homeless often affects the extent and nature of public reaction, as occurred when increasing numbers of women and children became homeless in

the late 1980s and 1990s. The fact that many members of this new wave of homelessness were mentally ill, engaged in some form of substance abuse, or both, also affected how the public looked at the homeless.

The level and nature of attention that homelessness receives by the public is also influenced by the extent to which the public encounters homeless people in their daily lives, as well as the nature of the space in which the two groups confront one another. Some scholars have argued that public reaction to homelessness is influenced by the instrumental use and symbolic meaning of the space in which they negotiate their daily lives. When homeless persons eke out their subsistence mainly in "marginal spaces," which have little, if any, economic, political, or symbolic value, they are not very likely to provoke a response by authorities. However, they are more likely to provoke a response when they move into "prime spaces" that are used by the domiciled for residential, recreational, or commercial purposes, or "transitional spaces" that have ambiguous use or are in the process of being transformed into prime space. When homeless persons enter prime and transitional spaces, they are likely to provoke two different responses. Political officials and their agents often try to contain the homeless population or reduce their visibility through differentially monitoring the spaces where they hang out, enforcing anti-panhandling and other ordinances, and disrupting their daily routines. Private citizens and commercial establishments also often engage in exclusionary, NIMBY (not in my backyard) activities that prevent homeless populations, or facilities serving them, from entering and settling in prime and transitional spaces.

It has also been noted that more sympathetic responses to homelessness are not constant, but wax and wane over time. Research has shown that both media attention to homelessness and participation in volunteer efforts to aid homeless persons tend to surge around the holiday season, increasing around Thanksgiving and peaking at Christmas time. It has been noted as well that as mass homelessness has persisted in urban America, public concern about it as a pressing problem has faded due to "compassion fatigue." A slightly different take on this fading concern for homelessness is that it suffers a "liability of persistence." This argument holds that it is not necessarily that the public has tired of being sympathetic to the homeless, but that the duration of the problem has caused people to believe that homelessness is a fixed aspect of contemporary urban society rather than a solvable problem. However, the emergence of recent local and national campaigns to "end homelessness" suggests that at least some citizens have not succumbed to compassion fatigue or the sense of hopelessness that often accompanies the persistence of a social problem.

Policy Efforts to Address Homelessness

Policy responses to persistent homelessness can generally be divided into at least four often coexisting categories. First, an "emergency" or "accommodation" response involves expanding shelters and food providers to lessen the hardship of homelessness but without doing much to help persons escape the streets. This approach was characteristic of the initial response to homelessness in the early 1980s. Out of this approach emerged a "restorative" response, which provides an extensive array of supportive services to remedy the individual shortcomings of persons who are homeless so they can compete, or at least function, in mainstream housed society. This is basically the approach of the Continuum of Care program, created by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Clinton administration, which encouraged localities to provide mental health and substance abuse treatment, employment counseling, case management, and household and parenting courses to guide persons through emergency and transitional shelters to permanent housing. A third type of response is "preventive" and aims to address the structural causes of homelessness by promoting the creation of affordable and subsidized housing, closing gaps in social service systems, and increasing the stock of living wage employment. This response is championed by advocacy groups and many researchers and is evident in the July 2003 Bring America Home Act (HR 2897). A final policy response consists of efforts to "criminalize" homelessness through ordinances that give police authority to cite both homeless persons for subsistence activities, such as panhandling and sleeping in public, and service providers who provide health care services and distribute meals in public parks. This NIMBY-like response is usually advocated by businesses, residents, and their political representatives in areas with sizable homeless populations.

To date, accommodative, restorative, and criminalizing responses have dominated, forming a two-pronged

but contradictory approach in which a limited number of services are available to help persons subsist amid homelessness or exit their situation, and punitive efforts seek to discourage persons from living on the street, especially in prime spaces. However, recent campaigns to end homelessness have gained momentum. These efforts basically combine the preventative approach to "close the front door" into homelessness and the restorative approach to "open the back door" out of homelessness. While these plans to end homelessness incorporate both professional expertise regarding best social service practices and broader consciousness of structural causes, estimates of the cost to prevent future incidences of homelessness and move the currently homeless off the streets are far beyond what is presently devoted to the problem. Thus, the realization of the goal to end homelessness depends on the ability of partnership members to mobilize public concern about the problem and secure sufficient resources to implement all of the components of their ambitious plans.

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See also Cocaine and Crack; Deindustrialization; Deinstitutionalization; Globalization; Homelessness, Youth; Housing; Marginality; Poverty; Race; Welfare

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HOMELESSNESS, YOUTH

Homeless youth are generally defined as persons unaccompanied by an adult caregiver for extended periods of time and generally under the age of 21. This term encompasses a variety of unaccompanied youth such as runaways and throwaways. The term *throwaway* refers to youth who are put out on the street as a result of abuse, neglect, or victimization by parents or primary caregivers. Homeless youth can also include system youth (individuals under the age of 18 who are currently in the care or custody of state agencies). Not all homeless youth are actively living on the street. For example, unaccompanied youth may be considered homeless if they currently do not have a permanent residence but are temporarily living with friends, acquaintances, or relatives. Most homeless youth have a combination of these characteristics and routinely find themselves in transitional living situations. Whereas some youth are chronically homeless, many experience episodic homelessness, meaning that their periods of actual homelessness consist of small durations of time spent on the street augmented by semipermanent living situations with family or friends or under the supervision of social service or state agencies.

The varied categories and classifications of homeless youth and the episodic and transient nature of this population make it difficult for researchers to estimate

their actual numbers. Also, many homeless youth simply may not want to be found and avoid social service agencies for fear of being placed either back in the situation from which they have run away or in a similar or worse situation. As a result of these factors, estimates of the number of homeless youth vary. Estimates can also be influenced by the counting method. As a result, counts of homeless youth in the United States range from the hundreds of thousands to millions.

When comparing homeless youth with homeless adults, homeless youth tend to cite different reasons for leaving home, such as family problems, abuse, and victimization. Homeless youth populations also experience more instances of sexual and physical victimization and abuse while living on the street. This increased vulnerability on the street may be related to their relative inability to navigate life on the street. As a result, homeless youth construct and utilize informal social networks of peers for two reasons. First, peer group and network ties provide homeless youth with a sense of safety and security. Second, social networks help homeless youth minimize the stigma associated with their marginalized position. Newly homeless youth lack the experience of living on their own and lack knowledge of where to go and what to do while on the street. Many have had real or perceived negative experiences with primary caregivers and social service agencies and so choose to avoid social services. Their choice to form strong bonds with fellow homeless youth is a logical one. Such ties not only enable young homeless individuals to identify with one another but also minimize the impact of negative consequences associated with life on the street.

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See also Abuse, Child; Abuse, Child Sexual; Family, Dysfunctional; Foster Children, Aging Out; Homelessness; Missing Children; Runaways

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HOMOPHOBIA

George Weinberg, in *Society and the Healthy Homosexual* of 1972, coined the term *homophobia* to refer to the psychological fear of homosexuals and homosexuality. That definition, however, is limited in its focus, as it neglects wider structural sources behind the taboo of same-sex sexual relationships and the negative attitudes and intolerance shown toward any gender or sexual nonconformity in society. Additionally, this concept should also include internal manifestations of self-hatred in GLBTIQ (gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersexed, or questioning) individuals because of the stigma associated with their sexuality or gendered orientation.

Newer terms, such as *heterosexual hegemony*, come across as better expressions to describe an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. At issue is sexual prejudice, the negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual (e.g., "fag" discourse among boys). Unlike homophobia, it conveys no a priori assumptions about the origins, dynamics, and underlying motivations of anti-gay attitudes. Also, using the construct of sexual prejudice does not require value judgments that anti-gay attitudes are inherently irrational or evil.

Homophobia includes bias against family forms that do not conform to heteronormativity. One cited example of such bias was the threat by U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings to stop federal funding of a PBS kids' show, *Postcards From Buster*, because of a controversial episode. The airing of the 2005 "Sugartime!" episode (also called "Sugarland") was halted because it featured a lesbian couple and their family on a maple sugar tree farm in Vermont. The show is about a cartoon character, Buster, who encounters real-life diverse families, as representative of different regions, religions, and racial/ethnic groups across the United States. The bias in U.S. society against same-sex marriage is also a form of homophobia, particularly with the "defense of marriage" policy arguments that these types of families will lead to the destruction of society.

Other structural examples of homophobia exist in the "don't ask, don't tell" policies used by the military to ban homosexuality; widespread lack of legal protection from anti-gay discrimination and hostility

toward individuals and their families in employment, adoption, custody, health care, housing, and other services; the differential treatment of homosexual and bisexual people with HIV or AIDS; and the existence of sodomy laws in more than one third of U.S. states. Extreme forms of homophobia can also be found in hate crimes and anti-gay violence, such as the murders of Matthew Shepard and Billy Ray Gaither because of their sexual orientation.

Complicating any charges or discussion of homophobia is the fact that some people believe homosexual behavior is a sin. Believing that is not necessarily homophobic, but it often gets charged as such when a minority person's reaction might be that of sensitivity toward a perceived prejudice. It is a difficult issue we face as a society, as some people are unwilling to approve of a lifestyle or orientation that they do not believe in or understand, but that does not make them homophobic. However, there is a difference between remaining true to one's moral values and attempting to impose one's values or judgments upon others.

Homosexuality was listed as a mental illness in the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (*DSM*) until 1973. However, many still uphold sexual conversion therapy (aka sexual reorientation) as a cure for what is still perceived to be an identity disorder characterized by distress over one's sexual or gender orientation or from outside pressure from society or family to change. Research shows that homosexual and bisexual men and women are at a higher risk for mental health problems because of the stigma and stress that they face. Suicide rates among gay or questioning teens remain at relatively high levels in comparison with their peers.

Advocates insist that a real need exists to change the way in which society frames sexuality and gender orientations, as there is much misunderstanding over "nature versus nurture" in sexual orientation (e.g., Do gay parents affect their child's well-being?) as well as misconceptions about sexuality (e.g., Is there a link between homosexuality and child sexual abuse?). Some suggestions for eradicating sexual stigma and prejudice include education; getting to know gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people and their families (e.g., through the organization PFLAG [Parents, Family and Friends of Lesbians and Gays]) by listening to their coming-out stories and experiences; and developing an "allies" support network among heterosexuals for GLBTIQ communities.

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See also Hate Crimes; Homosexuality; Same-Sex Marriage; Sexuality; Sexual Orientation

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HOMOSEXUALITY

Homosexuality is a sexual orientation in which one experiences sexual attraction primarily toward members of one's own sex and is also sexual behavior with partners of the same sex. The prefix *homo-* is from the Greek word for "same." The general term *gay,* and the gender-specific terms *gay man* and *lesbian,* are commonly used to describe people who identify as homosexual. Homosexuality contrasts with heterosexuality, the sexual attraction to members of the other sex, and bisexuality, where there is sexual attraction to members of both sexes.

A variation on these categories derives from the work of Alfred Kinsey and colleagues in the late 1940s. Kinsey allowed people to describe their sexual interests on a 7-point scale from exclusively heterosexual to exclusively homosexual, with bisexual as the midpoint. It is also common to distinguish aspects of homosexual experience: sexual behavior, attraction, romantic interest, and social preference. Intimate same-sex interactions also inevitably create a challenge to gender-role expectations, whether by denying or confirming them,

but with a clash between sex and gender role. Given the centrality of gender-role conflict, the acronym LGBT is often used to include lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people under a common banner.

One way in which different perspectives on homosexuality can be framed is in terms of the debate between essentialism and social constructionism. The essentialist position presents homosexuality as a relatively fixed orientation held by a proportion of the population, with continuity of experience across history and culture, and with some basis in biology or very early social development. The social constructionist view proposes that sexualities, like gender and other important social categories, are constructed as part of processes of social power that are heteronormative and that homosexuality as a sexual orientation is a modern construction. There are many variations on these two approaches, adopting more or less of the perspective from each side of the argument and reflecting the diverse ways in which members of the gay and lesbian community experience their own sexual identity, interests, and history.

This diversity of views also informs social conflicts and the operation of social forces, which create ongoing inequities and threaten the liberty, and even life, of many homosexual people. In many cultures, religion plays a central role in these conflicts. For example, many Christians see homosexuality as a direct challenge to aspects of social order based on scripture and tradition, and, indeed, some political movements arising from "queer theory" actively challenge the assumptions underlying that social order. Other members of the gay and lesbian community affirm shared beliefs about the ideal nature of relationships, seeking a point of connection with the dominant social order in order to participate in social institutions such as marriage. Within the Christian tradition itself, homosexuality has also been a source of internal conflict and schism. More broadly, the status and legitimacy of homosexuality has varied across time as well as across cultures. Homosexuality continues to be an important domain of social conflict and social change, with ongoing reverberations through many aspects of individual and social life.

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See also Adoption, Gay and Lesbian; Bisexuality; Homophobia; Queer Theory; Same-Sex Marriage

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Hospices

Hospice emerged in response to improvements in medicine and technology to address the needs of the dying more effectively than hospitals can. Caring for only the terminally ill, hospices can be independent, hospital-affiliated, nursing home based, in an extended care facility, or home health agency based.

The modern hospice movement began in Great Britain. Its origins trace back to the Middle Ages when clergy operated houses or shelters for strangers, soldiers, and pilgrims. In 1842 a group of Catholic women established a hospice in France for poor women who had terminal illnesses. This model inspired Dame Cicely Saunders to establish St. Christopher's Hospice in Sydenham, England, in 1967. In 1963 she had introduced the hospice concept to Yale medical students, leading Florence Wald, dean of the Yale University School of Nursing, to found the first U.S. hospice in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1974.

Hospice Care

Hospice gives the dying some control over their lives, pain, and medications, and it removes the isolation that often characterizes dying in hospitals. To enter hospice programs, the patient and family acknowledge the probability of the patient dying and that a cure is unlikely. Hospice can provide people dying at home with the care, comfort, and dignity that they need in their dying process.

Hospice care begins where traditional medicine ends, allowing the dying a dignified death with less pain and more ability to truly live until they die. Hospice may increase communications between patient, physician, and family to improve pain relief and symptom management. The challenge is to give the dying meaning, dignity, and life during a time of great fear and apprehension in the face of pain, distressing symptoms, dependency, extended suffering,

loss of dignity, endless meaningless days, dying alone, and financial disaster.

Dame Saunders saw pain management as the first goal of hospice. If their pain is managed, patients can take care of unfinished business and attend to aspects of their lives and important relationships. Pain increases death anxiety and depression. Those without pain are better able to think and to resolve at least some of their fears.

Fear often keeps us from thinking clearly and discovering alternatives to our situation. Hospice thus pursues aggressive pain and symptom management and creates a comforting environment without rigidity in the caregiver's approach. Unlike hospitals, which typically offer aggressive life-prolonging treatments not always in keeping with the values and preferences of patients and their families, hospice need not try to prolong life or provide painful treatments that may cause additional suffering.

Hospice tries to make patients as comfortable as possible by allowing them to stay at home or, if this is not possible, to stay in a homelike setting where patients can have treasured possessions, family, and friends. Even if hospitals allowed pets and did not have visiting regulations, they would be unable to offer the care and dying with dignity that hospice can provide. The hospice team approach encourages adaptations to different cultural groups, honors traditions, and makes families an integral part of the process. Hospice encourages families to be as involved as they wish to the extent that they are able, and it works around the families' and patients' schedules.

Hospice tries to improve the physical and spiritual quality of life of the patient as a person rather than as a disease, including physical pain, relationships, communications, and dignity. Hospice staff volunteers work as much with the family as with the patient. They may have to teach family members how to change dressings, remove a catheter, administer medicine, use bedpans, use a hospital bed, or assist the dying person in other ways. Because relationships in families are unique, there is no set pattern as to what hospice teaches, who does which task, or how exactly to administer to the needs of the dying. Unlike hospitals, follow-up care for the families continues after the patient's death to aid the families in their grief.

Hospitals and Hospices

Hospital death is typically more impersonal than death under hospice care. Medical schools teach a professional persona that leads to distancing from patients. Medical students learn to use precise medical terms that often leave patients and families confused about diagnoses, treatment, symptoms, and even what the illness might actually be. It is not that physicians cannot care effectively for the dying and their families, but rather that the system is not designed to allow them to have the time and setting to offer the level of compassionate care that hospice can provide. Living until you die is a goal of hospice. Healing and delaying death is the goal of hospitals. Yet people most often die in hospitals.

Staying at home is typically less expensive than being cared for in a hospital. Often programs exist to enhance in-home care, by providing equipment, medicine, meals, and other needs at little or no cost to the dying or their families. Although nurses may be expensive, treatment is still cheaper at home than in hospitals. For most families, economics is not the issue but rather the ability of family members and the staff who assist them to provide quality care, pain management, and a good quality of life and still maintain their own lives, jobs, and quality of life. End-of-life care is demanding and includes limiting the length and numbers of visitors for the terminally ill person, managing neighborhood noise, helping the ill person negotiate stairs, bathing, changing catheters, dealing with emotional outbursts and the person's fear of the caregiver leaving to go shopping or do other required errands, and avoiding family disagreements. Consequently, despite the costs, some family members would prefer not to have the person die at home. Also, hospitals may make families more secure in their belief that they did everything possible for the dying person.

Most families want to care for their dying, but many are not physically, financially, spiritually, or emotionally able to aid the dying. While physicians first seemed to avoid hospice and perhaps saw it as a failure on their part, now most physicians seem to have embraced the approach. Hospice has even had an impact on hospitals, where death is not as impersonal and bureaucratic as it once was. The growth of medical ethics, advanced directives, palliative care, and bereavement services in hospitals is evidence of the impact of hospice, which stretches far beyond the dying.

Gerry Cox

See also Bereavement, Effect by Race; Medicaid; Medicare

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Hostile Environment

Hostile environment is a concept describing a workplace environment that has become intolerable to an employee, due to treatment based on that employee's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or ability. The idea that some employees suffer discrimination in the form of a "hostile environment" developed in the context of struggles for workplace equality. These struggles led to legislation that protects employees from discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides protection from discrimination to ensure equal employment opportunities. The Civil Rights Act provided for the establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which aimed to protect citizens from race and sex discrimination through prevention and response to complaints.

The existence of a hostile environment, then, is considered an aspect of employment discrimination because of its association with exclusionary practices that interfere with the normal functioning of employees complaining of abuse. Hostile environment may also describe a generally abusive workplace culture. The existence of a hostile environment often correlates with occupational segregation and the efforts of more privileged workers to keep women or racial minorities from entering the "neighborhood" of their job.

Scholars of occupational segregation by race and gender pinpoint barriers to workplace integration that include harassment by some employees to exclude others. However, harassment can also be less intentional, as behavior that is offensive to some group members is not necessarily understood as offensive by its perpetrator, such as publicly displaying nude "calendar girls" in a mixed-gender work environment.

Hostile environment most often relates to charges of sexual harassment. Related behaviors may be verbal or nonverbal, physical or nonphysical, but have in common their consequence: making the complaining employee uncomfortable. However, a hostile environment for women need not include sexual harassment. As with racial minorities, a broad spectrum of verbal and nonverbal behavior can constitute harassment in the workplace. The significant aspect of the hostile environment is that it be understood as a set of practices by some employees that block members of protected groups from equal opportunities in the workplace. Thus, the creation of a "hostile environment" links to other modes of segregation and exclusion that contribute to overall patterns of stratification.

One challenge to confronting hostile work environments lies in creating new workplace cultures where employers take responsibility for providing antiharassment policies, employees familiarize themselves with forms of harassment, and victims of harassment feel comfortable using the established complaint process. When charges are levied, problems in enforcement of the law may occur. This is due both to the problem of interpreting the law and to fluctuations in the burden of proof that reflect the variability of society's commitment to race and gender justice. However, cases of harassment may also be difficult to resolve because of significant variations in judgment of how a "reasonable person" would interpret these social interactions.

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See also Discrimination; Inequality; Racism; Segregation, Occupational; Sexism; Sexual Harassment

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Housing

Housing refers to buildings or other types of shelter construction in which people live. Types of housing have varied across time and geographic location. Housing also varies by structure, layout, building material, shape, and, to some extent, function, depending on location, culture, and socioeconomic status. A house provides semipermanent residence for

one or more people, and many consider their house their home—meaning where they return every day, socialize, eat, and sleep. Housing is considered essential for physical and psychological survival in modernized societies. Modern structures generally include single-family homes (detached and sometimes on privately owned parcels of land); semidetached houses (attached to one or more houses, each including one or two housing units); multi-unit dwellings (structures with multiple separate self-contained units, sometimes referred to as tenements, apartments, flats, condominiums, or cooperatives); single-room occupancy units (a room in a multi-unit building that is rented by the week or month and does not include a bathroom or kitchen); and mobile homes (factory-built structures that are purchased and then transported to a specific location, quite often a trailer park that permits mobile homes). Housing units (regardless of type) can be owned by the resident(s) or rented (meaning someone else owns the unit and charges others a monthly fee to live there).

Housing can become the source of social problems for a number of reasons. First there are issues of affordability. If total housing costs exceed the income of those residing in the unit, then the unit is not affordable. In places where the demand for housing exceeds the supply, the cost of housing goes up. This is characteristically the case in large cities with a continual influx of people looking for employment (e.g., New York, London, and Tokyo, among others). In the United States, an accepted guideline for housing affordability is a housing cost that does not exceed 30 percent of a household's gross annual income. However, since the late 1970s, an increasing number of households have had to pay 50 percent or more of their income for housing. Rising costs can thus result in increased foreclosures and evictions, possibly causing homelessness.

People who become homeless are forced to reside in public shelters or other temporary accommodations. Because the number of beds does not meet the need and because length of stay in many public shelters is limited, homeless people are frequently forced to sleep outdoors or find alternative nonconventional lodging, including abandoned buildings, tunnels, tents, and cardboard boxes, all of which are generally unsafe. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, shantytowns known as "Hoovervilles" emerged in major cities across the United States. Families and individuals evicted from their homes would construct makeshift, temporary housing structures with whatever they could find. Hoovervilles were normally located on vacant land right outside the city limits.

For others, rising housing costs result in "shelter poverty." This is the circumstance in which households are forced to use a substantial proportion of their income to cover housing costs, leaving little to cover other essential nonshelter needs. Rising housing costs can also result in doubling up, where families or unrelated individuals share a housing unit initially built for fewer occupants. This can lead to overcrowding. Extreme overcrowding has health and safety issues associated with it.

Related to affordability is substandard housing. Although the definition of substandard housing will vary across cultures, typically such housing is without what is deemed adequate in terms of shelter or utilities, such as running water, heat, and electricity. Substandard housing can also include structures located on environmentally contaminated land. Habitat for Humanity defines substandard housing as dwellings with structural deterioration of the roof, foundation, porch, exterior walls, windows, or doors, all of which render it unsafe and unfit for occupancy. Housing becomes substandard when property owners neglect upkeep, typically either to save money or to make a bigger profit from rents collected. Over time, as the property deteriorates further, the cost of repair becomes too high to make rehabilitation of the structure economically feasible.

Substandard housing conditions were commonplace in the United States during the 1800s and the first half of the 20th century when immigrants flocked to big cities like New York and Chicago and were forced to live in squalid structures known as tenements, often associated with serious health problems and epidemics of typhoid and other highly contagious diseases. These dwellings were also prone to fires and other safety dangers. Federal and state housing legislation enacted during the mid-20th century brought about stricter building code enforcement, resulting in improved housing conditions, particularly in urban areas. However, experts argue that substandard housing remains commonplace in the United States, despite the fact that the United States also has some of the best housing in the world.

Discrimination in housing markets can indirectly result in affordability and housing quality issues. Property owners, real estate agencies, and lenders may discriminate based on characteristics of those

seeking housing, including characteristics of race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, and disability. In the United States, one of the most pervasive publicly acknowledged forms of housing discrimination is that based on race. African Americans have been vulnerable to housing discrimination in urban areas since the late 1800s. Large influxes of African Americans from the rural South to the big northern cities led to widespread discrimination in housing, forcing migrants into specific geographic areas where they had to pay inflated rents for frequently substandard housing. This process resulted in widespread residential segregation where all-black or all-white neighborhoods became visible on urban and suburban landscapes and remain so today. The term *American apartheid* describes this phenomenon. Among the harmful consequences of segregation is the consignment of racial minorities to inferior dwellings and neighborhoods where the public schools may not be adequately funded and where property values depreciate rapidly. Although housing discrimination was officially made illegal with the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and reinforced with the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, it is still pervasive and particularly focused on racial minorities.

Displacement is another housing-related problem. Displacement in the United States became an issue during the 1950s and 1960s with federally sponsored urban renewal programs. Urban renewal programs authorized slum clearance to make way for freeways and new commercial development, displacing the inhabitants, who were typically poor racial minorities. Displacement can also occur through the process of gentrification. Gentrification occurs when developers or individuals with financial means buy up housing in poor inner-city areas and renovate, eventually increasing the property values of the area and driving up the property taxes and monthly rents. This leads to the displacement of lower-income property owners and tenants who cannot afford the rising prices. This also occurs when properties, including single-room occupancy housing, are converted to condominiums.

Natural disasters cause another form of displacement. Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, landslides, or fires can result in the destruction of homes, sometimes leaving entire communities without shelter. Mobile home communities or those with deteriorating buildings are particularly vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters. Geographic locations, such as low-lying areas near large bodies of water, are particularly vulnerable. For example, Hurricane Katrina left the entire Ninth Ward of New Orleans without shelter, an area that housed many of the city's poor. Although temporary shelter is generally provided to victims of natural disasters, the pathway back to permanent housing can be a long and difficult one, particularly for people with lower incomes.

Policy solutions to housing problems have been varied. Subsidized housing, in which the government pays a portion of total housing costs, is the most common policy solution. In the United States subsidized housing has taken the form of public housing, which is run by government-funded local housing authorities, and Section 8, where private landlords are given a monthly subsidy to provide reduced rents to qualified tenants. These policies have had mixed results. Location of public housing has resulted in increased residential segregation for racial minorities. In addition, since the early 1980s, public housing has been underfunded, resulting in lack of building maintenance and ultimately substandard housing. During the late 1990s, many cities began to tear down public housing, displacing those public housing residents who were unsuccessful at obtaining Section 8 subsidies or other housing.

Although Section 8 relies on the private market for housing, there is never enough Section 8 housing vis-à-vis the needs. In Chicago, for example, the waiting list for Section 8 housing has contained more than 40,000 people. In addition, not all landlords accept Section 8 vouchers, often therefore confining participants to the poorer urban areas. Nonenforced building code violations are also commonplace with Section 8 housing, rendering some of these units substandard.

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See also Discrimination; Gentrification; Homelessness; Poverty; Segregation, Residential

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Human Rights

The concept of human rights is not a modern phenomenon. Through codes, decrees, or laws, rulers of empires in ancient India, Mesopotamia, and Persia, for example, established certain rights and privileges for their citizens. Also, some of the oldest written sources on rights and responsibilities are in the documents of many of the world's major religions.

The modern notion of human rights gained strength during the 18th-century Age of Enlightenment, as confidence in human reason increased. European philosophers, most notably John Locke, developed the concept of "natural rights" in the 17th and 18th centuries. Locke believed that people, as creatures of God, possessed certain rights by virtue of their humanity, regardless of race, culture, religion, or ethnicity. Natural rights further played a key role in the 18th- and 19th-century struggles against political absolutism and the divine right of kings, which restricted the principles of freedom and equality. The notion of natural rights, therefore, was important in the eventual development of human rights.

The term *human rights* is a relatively new one, gaining acceptance with the founding of the United Nations in 1945. This term replaced *natural rights*, partially because of the latter's frequent association with religious orthodoxy and growing disenchantment with the term by philosophical and political liberals. Natural rights entailed a select few rights—such as Locke's abstract notions of the rights to "life, liberty, and property"—which found similar expression in the U.S. Declaration of Independence. In comparison, the concept of human rights is much more diverse and specific. Adopted, in part, as a reaction to the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 established what most nations would accept as the list of modern-day human rights.

Consisting of 30 articles, the UN Declaration of Human Rights lists the rights and fundamental freedoms to which all men and women, everywhere in the world, are entitled, "without any discrimination." These specific rights fall into one of six sections: *Security Rights* protect against crimes (such as murder, torture, and rape); *Due Process Rights* protect against abuses of the legal system (imprisonment without trial, secret trials, and excessive punishments); *Liberty Rights* protect freedoms (such as belief, expression, association, assembly, and movement); *Political Rights* protect the liberty to participate in politics by communicating, assembling, protesting, voting, and serving in office; *Equality Rights* guarantee equal citizenship (i.e., equality before the law); and *Social/Welfare Rights* are nondiscriminatory rights for all (such as education for all children and protection against starvation).

Additionally, human rights fall into two main subsections: negative and positive. Negative rights are primary or "first-generation rights" and generally encompass the idea that one is entitled *not* to be abused by another person or state. Such rights are embedded in the U.S. Bill of Rights, the English Bill of Rights, and the Canadian Charter of Rights. A common example is the notion that states should refrain from denying due process of law or equality to their citizens. A positive right (or "second-generation right"), however, is one that states or individuals are obligated to follow. Such positive rights include education, health care, and a minimum standard of living. To compare the two types of rights, consider the example of the right to life: A "negative right" to life would require a state or individual to refrain from killing or critically injuring someone; a "positive right" to life would require the state or individuals to act to save the life of someone who would otherwise die.

However, one must question the practicality and legitimation of some positive rights. For example, when a positive right of citizens to be provided with an adequate diet is not fundable or feasible, is the state committing a human rights violation? Should the state therefore take any surplus from selected individuals to provide for those who are starving? And if so, would that action not itself be a human rights violation against those whose property is taken? One might argue, therefore, that positive human rights have the

tendency to be moralistic and for the collective good of societies.

At the national level, enacted laws and their enforcement, supported through judicial decisions, protect citizens' human rights. On a global level, international law, supported through treaties, creates human rights norms and protection. However, even if a country adopts certain human rights laws, that does not ensure it will always follow those laws. And if a government were to break an international human rights law, what would be the consequence? Whose duty is it to intervene and enforce the rights upon that society?

Although human rights developed, in part, as a reaction to mistreatments of citizens by their state, obvious conflicts would arise if another state or international entity were to impose its own beliefs (cultural imperialism) on the perceived "rogue state." One state cannot simply ignore state sovereignty and invade or attack another because of alleged or real human rights violations; this action would, itself, potentially be a human rights violation. Therefore, although international human rights organizations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House) document and report perceived human rights violations, no entity has the power to stop those violations. Short of warfare, the most common tactics employed by modern nation-states are economic sanctions, political pressure, and social ostracism.

A major criticism of human rights comes from its presumed moral foundation. Because cultural beliefs and morals vary among societies, the idea of human rights' universalism becomes arguable. Although certain individuals or societies as a whole may embrace certain absolute moral or ethical practices, one must question what would occur if two such individuals or societies, with different beliefs and morals, clashed. The attempt to impose one's beliefs on another has led to immeasurable violence and warfare throughout history. The most recent example is what Samuel Huntington calls a "clash of civilizations" between the West and the rest of the world, particularly Islam. Although Western religions and Islam essentially share the same roots and have a vast majority of shared beliefs and practices, the root of conflicts between these two entities appears to stem more from the cultural differences between, and practices of, traditional Western and Islamic states. Therefore, although a great consensus may exist among societies as to what constitutes a universal human right, trying to impose those beliefs on societies with different views may have negative and such potentially dire consequences as social unrest, anarchy, or warfare.

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See also Inequality; Islam and Modernity; Justice; Life Chances; Religion and Conflict; State Crimes; War Crimes

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Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is a widespread global human rights problem and refers to the recruiting, transporting, harboring, or receipt of human beings by use of force, coercion, or fraud. Trafficked persons are subjected to labor exploitation, sexual exploitation, or both. Exploitation may include forced labor, debt bondage, slavery, abuse within the commercial sex industry, private parties who demand work and sex, and removal of organs. For children, trafficking may also include trafficking for early marriage, illegal adoption, child prostitution, recruitment as child soldiers, or recruitment for religious cults.

This modern-day slavery is most prevalent in agriculture, mining, and forced prostitution, but it also exists in industries such as construction, domestic servitude, food services, and manufacturing. There are various routes to human trafficking, but the common theme is that the trafficker uses force or coercion to control the trafficked person. Some people are captured and exploited; others are forced to work without pay to erase an illegal "debt." Some voluntarily

migrate in search of better economic or political situations but subsequently find themselves in oppressive situations once they get to the destination country. Women and young girls are often tricked into migrating by traffickers who promise a better life through marriage, employment, or educational opportunities. As a means of control, traffickers sometimes keep them locked up away from the public or their families, take away passports or other necessary documents, and use violence or threats of deportation.

The International Labor Organization estimates that more than 12 million people worldwide are in forced labor, debt bondage, forced child labor, or sexual servitude. Depending on the methodology and definition used, other estimates of trafficked persons are as high as 27 million. The U.S. government estimates that the number of people trafficked annually across international borders is approximately 800,000, with millions more trafficked within their own country's borders. Women and children are particularly vulnerable and comprise the majority of trafficked persons. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that human trafficking occurs in at least 127 countries and trafficked persons are exploited in 137 countries.

Supply and Demand

Human trafficking is one of the fastest-growing and most profitable illicit industries, second only to drug trafficking. Global profits from human trafficking are estimated at $44.3 billion per year. Globalization has allowed for greater movement across borders of people, money, goods, and services. The proliferation of human trafficking is due to several interconnected factors on both the supply side and the demand side.

On the supply side, the increase in the world population, rapid social and economic change in countries around the world, and government policies or inaction have all played a role in the conditions that allow human trafficking to prosper. Struggling economies of developing countries and enormous political changes have created economic circumstances that have perpetuated extreme poverty and desperate situations, leaving many people with no choice but to accept work under oppressive conditions. In particular, postcommunist societies have experienced much economic and political instability, and the weakening of law enforcement has allowed organized crime to proliferate and engage in widespread global human trafficking. Other factors such as war, civil unrest, and natural disasters may lead to population displacement and an increase in orphans and street children who are easy prey for traffickers. Further, lack of opportunities for education and lack of a living wage increase the number of individuals competing for low-skilled jobs.

At the same time, developed countries are experiencing a decrease in birth rates. Countries such as Japan and the nations of western Europe are not able to replenish their labor force, leaving them with unskilled labor shortages. Nonetheless, restrictive immigration policies contribute to the reduction in the flow of labor to countries to fill this gap. As a result, the demand remains high in developed countries for low-skilled labor, and migrants who are desperate for jobs turn to smugglers to get them to these countries. As the risks and costs to smuggle people into developed countries increase, some smugglers become traffickers who sell the migrants or hold them in debt bondage or forced labor to recover the high costs of smuggling.

The situation for women and girls is particularly dire. They are especially vulnerable because the demand remains high for women and girls to work in the commercial sex industry, in sweatshops, and in domestic servitude. The continued subjugation of women economically, socially, and politically in many countries feeds this demand and accounts for some of the increase in human trafficking. For example, some families continue to see girls as a burden and may sell their female children or relatives to brothels or traffickers to support their sons or feed their families. Other families may sell their children believing that this will be the best opportunity for them to escape poverty. Research has shown that most trafficked women are under the age of 25, but traffickers are recruiting younger and younger girls in response to the fear of HIV/AIDS infection among customers. The majority of internationally trafficked women and girls come from Asia. Other source regions include the former Soviet Union and southeastern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. Trafficked women and girls are often sent to North America, Asia, Western Europe, and the Middle East.

International and Domestic Laws and Policies

The international community has used various mechanisms to address trafficking. In particular, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires countries to take steps to prevent the abduction, sale, or trafficking of children and to protect children from all

forms of sexual exploitation. The United States still has not ratified this convention, although it has ratified the convention's Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict. To protect women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women requires countries to curb all forms of trafficking in women, prevent exploitative prostitution, and ensure healthy and safe working conditions. Although the United States has signed this convention, it is one of the few countries that has not ratified it. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, was adopted by the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2000. The United States ratified the trafficking protocol in December 2005. Various international organizations have programs in place to combat human trafficking worldwide.

In the United States, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was passed in 2000 and reauthorized in 2003 and 2005. This legislation addresses human trafficking in the United States through prevention, prosecution, and protection. Since the enactment of this policy, however, it has actually helped very few trafficked persons in the United States. One criticism of the TVPA is that it focuses on a law enforcement approach rather than the needs of the trafficked person. Many of the provisions in the TVPA seek to protect the witness primarily so that law enforcement can successfully prosecute the case. Some trafficked persons who cannot provide evidence or refuse to cooperate out of fear are deported rather than helped. Further, this law requires that the trafficked person cooperate with law enforcement immediately and provide detailed accounts of the trafficking. Trafficked persons may be distrustful of law enforcement or traumatized, particularly when first released from trafficking. If law enforcement cannot determine that the person has been trafficked, the person is then deported. Although the TVPA sought to end deportation of trafficked persons, this practice continues to be common.

Despite estimates of up to 17,500 persons trafficked into the United States every year, since 2000 only 675 have been counted as such. This low number accounts only for the number of people who met the definition of a trafficked person within the TVPA and received a T visa, which is a temporary visa granted upon cooperation with law enforcement. Excluded from this count are those who do not report to or assist law enforcement, those who do not require immigration relief, those who are U.S. citizens, those who cannot meet the requirements for a T visa, and those denied a T visa because law enforcement refused to offer support for the application. Although prosecution of traffickers is a worthy goal, the needs of trafficked persons should also be addressed in a way that helps restore their humanity and reintegrates them into society.

A more balanced global approach is needed to address the imbalance of wealth and poverty and labor supply and demand. In particular, social scientists believe that governments in the developed world of destination countries such as the United States need to take a more proactive approach to address the confluence of unstable global economies, lack of labor laws protecting low-skilled workers' rights, lack of availability of living wages, and restrictive immigration policies.

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See also Globalization; Immigration; Labor, Child; Labor, Migrant; Migration, Global; Poverty; Poverty, Children Worldwide; Prostitution; Prostitution, Child; Refugees; Sex Trafficking; Slavery

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HYPERSEGREGATION

When a group is so segregated that its members have little chance of contact with outsiders, that group is hypersegregated. In the case of residential location, hypersegregation means that the members of different groups are extremely unlikely to live together. U.S. experts primarily pay attention to the spatial distances between whites and blacks, with increasing attention

also paid to the residential patterns of growing Asian and Latino/a populations (some studies have also examined the segregation of Native Americans). Of key concern has been the fact that many whites do not live in neighborhoods with members of other groups, a form of urban segregation documented also in other countries, including Canada, England, France, and Germany.

Identifying Hypersegregation

In an often-cited 1988 study, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton compiled 20 existing segregation measures and identified five dimensions of residential segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. *Evenness* refers to the distribution of groups across neighborhoods according to their proportion of the population. Thus, if 10 percent of the population of a given city is Asian, then 10 percent of each neighborhood should be Asian for there to be no segregation. *Exposure* refers to the probability that members of a group will have any form of interaction with other groups. *Concentration* refers to how much space a minority group occupies; if a minority group lives primarily in a few neighborhoods, they are very concentrated. *Centralization* refers to how close to the center of an urban area a group lives. In many U.S. metropolitan areas, living in the suburbs (as opposed to the central city) is associated with a higher standard of living and better access to high-quality schools and amenities. *Clustering* refers to the extent to which a group lives in contiguous or adjoining neighborhoods.

Researchers typically use census data to measure segregation, mainly because such measures require geographically detailed population counts (such as in neighborhoods) that are collected in decennial censuses. More specifically, segregation measures usually take into account the distribution of various groups in particular neighborhoods in a metropolitan area relative to their numbers in the total metropolitan population. Neighborhoods are most often defined in terms of "census tracts," which contain 1,500 to 8,000 people, though sometimes in smaller geographic units, such as blocks or block groups. The statistical indexes developed to measure each of these dimensions typically range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating complete integration on a particular dimension and 1 indicating complete apartheid or segregation on a particular dimension. Massey and Denton (1989) defined hypersegregated metropolitan areas as those where indexes exceed .60 on at least four of the five dimensions of segregation.

To date, hypersegregation appears to be a phenomenon that applies almost exclusively to blacks who reside in certain U.S. metropolitan areas. Although blacks are also segregated from whites in other countries, the levels are not as high as they are in many U.S. metropolitan areas. Table 1 provides a list of U.S. metropolitan areas where blacks are hypersegregated from whites, by year. In 2000, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Newark, and Philadelphia had segregation scores above .60 on all five dimensions of segregation. Also worth noting are the metropolitan areas where African Americans were persistently hypersegregated for several decades: Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Los Angeles, New York, and St. Louis. Two metropolitan areas in 2000 also had Hispanic-white hypersegregation (Los Angeles and New York).

Causes and Effects of Hypersegregation

The hypersegregation of African Americans in so many U.S. metropolitan areas is largely the result of racism and discrimination by whites (though other groups may also engage in similar practices). In addition to their reticence to move into neighborhoods where blacks reside, whites also move out of neighborhoods when they believe too many blacks are moving in. Other practices that have historically served to segregate and thus hypersegregate blacks include discriminatory mortgage lending practices (e.g., some banks will not provide mortgages to black customers with the same income as white customers), neighborhood redlining (mortgages cannot be obtained for certain neighborhoods—usually those deemed "black"), telling potential renters who are black that apartments in white neighborhoods have been taken, and violently attacking and threatening blacks who attempt to move into white neighborhoods. Although racial and ethnic discrimination in the housing market was outlawed with the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, research has documented the persistence, even if at somewhat diminished levels, of discrimination against minorities in the United States.

Larger metropolitan areas, those where blacks make up a large percentage of the population, as well as those in the Midwest, are more likely to be hypersegregated.

Table 1 Metropolitan Areas With Hypersegregation of African Americans, 1980–2000

1980	*1990*	*2000*
	Albany, GA	Albany, GA
Atlanta		Atlanta
Baltimore	Baltimore	Baltimore
	Baton Rouge	Baton Rouge
	Beaumont–Port Arthur	Beaumont–Port Arthur
	Benton Harbor	
	Birmingham	Birmingham
Buffalo	Buffalo	Buffalo
Chicago	Chicago	Chicago
	Cincinnati	
Cleveland	Cleveland	Cleveland
Dallas–Fort Worth		
		Dayton–Springfield, OH
Detroit	Detroit	Detroit
	Flint	Flint
Gary	Gary	Gary
Indianapolis	Indianapolis	
Kansas City	Kansas City	
Los Angeles	Los Angeles–Long Beach	Los Angeles–Long Beach*
	Miami	
Milwaukee	Milwaukee	Milwaukee
		Mobile
	Monroe, LA	Monroe, LA
	New Orleans	
New York	New York	New York*
Newark	Newark	Newark
	Oakland	
Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia
	Saginaw	Saginaw–Bay City
	Savannah	
St. Louis	St. Louis	St. Louis
	Trenton	
	Washington, DC	Washington, DC

*Also had Hispanic–white hypersegregation in 2000.

To date, the known metropolitan characteristics associated with lower levels of black hypersegregation are the proportion of new housing in a metropolitan area and the proportion of the workforce employed by the military. Why might these two metropolitan characteristics reduce hypersegregation? Some older neighborhoods

have a predominantly black population. Others are predominantly white and have a reputation of being unwelcoming or hostile to blacks. Newer neighborhoods do not have this type of preexisting reputation and hence attract a more mixed group of potential residents, which leads to lower levels of segregation. The presence of a large military population also lowers segregation because the military often selects housing for its members, and race plays little role in where people are assigned to live.

In 2000, the combined African American population of the metropolitan areas listed in Table 1 was 13.3 million. This amounts to approximately 38.5 percent of the total black population in all of the United States. Thus hypersegregation clearly affects a very large proportion of the African American population in the United States. Hypersegregation increases the isolation of African Americans from other members of society. It concentrates African Americans in neighborhoods that often have a host of issues associated with poverty, including exposure to crime, poorer access to health care, inadequate access to public transit, poor policing, dilapidated and substandard housing, and poor schools with few resources.

Rima Wilkes and John Iceland

See also Housing; Segregation, Residential

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I

Identity Politics

Identity politics refers to political activism of various social movements including, but not limited to, the civil rights movement, feminist movements, gay and lesbian movements, ethnic separatist movements for political recognition, self-determination, and elimination of discrimination. The term suggests that people who have suffered from actual or perceived social injustice can share a collective consciousness that stimulates them to take further action to advance their particular group's interests. In the social sciences, *identity politics* refers to any social mobilization related to politics, identity, and culture. Depending on the school of thought, the term sometimes means cultural activism, other times political activism, and sometimes both. In any case, however, identity politics focuses on the contrast between the assumed social, political, and occupational privileges of the dominant group as compared with perceived discrimination against the oppressed group.

Historical Synopsis

During the 1960s, unprecedented large-scale political movements—such as second wave feminism, civil rights movements, gay and lesbian liberation activism, and the American Indian movements—launched their attack on the systemic injustices and inequalities that alienated them. These social movements developed a rich literature of questions about the nature, origin, and future of the particular identities traditionally left out of studies. Identity politics as a base for collective behavior was closely connected to the idea that some social groups were historically oppressed because of their particular identities; for example, one's identity as a woman or as a Native American made him or her vulnerable to cultural imperialism (including stereotyping, stigmatizing, erasure, or labeling), violence, exploitation, marginalization, or powerlessness.

Defenders of identity politics called for new analyses of oppression and gave voice to those long silenced as they sought to reconstruct, redescribe, and transform the dominant discourse that stigmatized particular minority group(s). Intersections of race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and ethnicity were the bases of new identities that began to draw the attention of social scientists. Although the description of identity politics goes back to intellectual writings of famous critics such as Mary Wollstonecraft and Frantz Fanon, sociologist Renee R. Anspach first employed the term in 1979. For the past several decades, however, the phenomenon of identity politics attracted numerous scholars. This focus on cultural identities marked a significant shift from the economically and politically based analyses that had long dominated the social sciences. Identity-based movements became the "new social movements" in sociology literature and drew the interest of both U.S. and European scholars. Works of Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci, for example, hypothesized that the new social movements were "identity oriented" rather than "strategy oriented," and these "expressive" movements were partially a product of the information age and postindustrial era of the Western, developed societies.

Critics of Identity Politics

Identity politics as a base for organized behavior and a set of political philosophical positions draws criticism from various divergent schools of thought, including liberalism, Marxism, and post-structuralism. Criticism of identity politics dates back to the 1970s when scholars began systematically outlining and defending the philosophical underpinnings of identity politics.

Obscurity of the Term

Critics argue that use of the phrase *identity politics* as popular rhetoric belies more possible analytical explanatory power of the term. Because the term is primarily descriptive rather than explanatory, rigorous empirical analyses of identity politics are absent in the field. Using or misusing *identity politics* as a blank term invokes a range of tacit political implications, making identity claims by some early political activists seem lacking in analytical content, misleadingly totalizing, and un-nuanced. As the notion of identity has become indispensable in contemporary political discourse, even as the public rhetoric of identity politics empowered the new social movement activism, it failed to produce coherent theoretical analyses on political inclusiveness and models of the self. In this regard, identity politics increasingly became a derogatory synonym for anti-racism, feminism, and anti-heterosexism.

Critics From the Right

Critics from the political right claim that it is inappropriate for an identity-based group to expect an enumeration of unprecedented rights. Particularly for Enlightenment liberal democratic theory, if a "right" extends to only a portion of society, it is no longer a right but a "privilege." Thus, from the point of view of the political right, identity politics does not contend for "rights" as certain minority groups claim; instead, it functions as rhetoric to strengthen the discourses of some interest groups that demand special privileges.

Critics From the Left

Marxists, both orthodox and revisionist, often interpret the perceived ascendancy of identity politics as representing the end of radical materialist critique. For these critics, identity politics is factionalizing and depoliticizing, drawing attention away from the ravages of late capitalism toward superstructural cultural accommodations that hinder the reality of unchanged economic structures. A parallel criticism of identity politics comes from the radical leftists, who argue that identity politics unnecessarily divides the working class, who are the agents of the revolution against capitalism. As a result, identities are pitted against identities, creating an ideal condition for the ruling class.

"Queer" Dissent

Some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) activists criticize the identity politics approach on the basis of the argument that identity politics has marginalized LGBT people rather than emancipating them. Although LGBT activists employed an "identity politics" approach to gain mainstream culture's full recognition of sexual orientation freedom, their strategy essentially declared themselves as outside of the mainstream. These activists contend that identity politics is a counterproductive strategy, perpetuating discrimination and societal prejudices against LGBT people.

Post-Structuralist Challenge

Post-structuralist criticism of identity politics is perhaps the most philosophically developed and profound challenge to date. Post-structuralists claim that identity politics fallaciously regards actors as metaphysics of substance; that is, cohesive, self-identical subjects that can be identified and reclaimed from oppression. This essentialist position, they suggest, misrepresents both the psychology of identity and its political significance.

The alternative view offered by post-structuralists is that the subject is constantly reconstructed and redefined as a product of discourse. The post-structuralist view of agency reiterates the mutual construction of the opposites, as self versus other and identity versus difference. The danger of identity politics, then, is that it reifies "self" as a category of analysis, which is, rather, a category of practice, fluid, and always subject to interpretation.

Future Directions

Research on identity politics raises significant questions on individual experiences, cultural mobilization, and sociopolitical movements. Scholars of collective

action have recently paid more attention to the complex nature of relationships between actors' perceptions, preferences, and strategies and their identities. Analysts of identity politics, as Mary Bernstein suggests, should be careful when they assume that social movement actors' *strategic* deployment of their identities shows the revelation of the identity in essentialist ways. The depiction and reconstruction of essentialist identities might not indicate that the actors are naive to realize that these identities are socially constructed; rather, it can reveal the dynamic of relationship between identities and strategies. In this regard, post-structuralist criticism of identity politics is in need of reassessment. In any case, the debate over identity politics invites scholars of all sorts to investigate how local discourses are produced, perceived, and consequently realized in the actors' lifeworlds, which only in-depth case studies can explore.

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See also Cultural Imperialism; Ethnocentrism; Feminism; Multiculturalism; Oppositional Culture Theory; Pluralism; Social Movements; Subcultures

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Identity Theft

Although identity theft is often heralded as a new crime threat, the phenomenon itself is by no means unique to the information age. Throughout history, criminals have used false identities to commit their crimes. However, as identity theft emerges as a growing crime problem in the 21st century, it has new characteristics which are closely linked with the features of a global and technologically advanced society. The Internet, e-mail, and mobile phone technology have transformed the ways in which we live our everyday lives and, in many ways, have facilitated the criminal enterprise. With all of these changes come new risks and, with them, new challenges. Increasingly, we are required to prove our identities as we interact with others in both real and virtual environments, and the identification process is more important now than it has ever been. Consequently, different aspects of an individual's identity have themselves become attractive commodities in the criminal world. The emergence of identity theft as a recognized social problem shows how the changing value of personal data in modern society has had an impact on the nature of crime.

Definitions of Identity Theft

There is no single accepted definition of identity theft, and it is common to find broad definitions presented in the media and policy documents. Broadly defined, identity theft occurs when a criminal uses another person's personal information (such as name, address, social security number, or credit card details) without permission to commit fraud or other crimes. It is often, therefore, referred to as an "enabling offense"—the identifying information is a tool that the criminal needs to commit the "target offense." The problem with broad definitions, however, is that they ignore the important fact that the target offense can range from simple credit card fraud to the permanent adoption of a false identity and the more complex activities of organized criminal networks. As a result, by treating all offenses where an identity has been misused under one category, we fail to properly understand the motivations and methods of identity thieves. Moreover, there is a danger that we will confuse the quite different impacts on the victims of the enabling versus target offenses.

A better approach is to distinguish between two different types of identity theft. *Identity frauds* are temporary offenses in which personal data are borrowed to commit a fraudulent offense. Here, the identifying information serves merely as a tool for the criminal to use to commit another offense. The motivation for these offenses tends to be financial, either to obtain goods or services or to establish credit or a loan, and the impersonation is temporary. *Identity*

thefts are cases in which the victim's entire identity is permanently appropriated (often referred to as "Day of the Jackal" cases). The identity of another individual is "hijacked" by the fraudster with the aim of a permanent appropriation. This may be for financial reasons, for example, to escape an existing record of bankruptcy, or it may be to hide a criminal record or escape a previous life.

Extent of the Problem

Despite repeated claims that identity theft is one of the world's fastest-growing crimes, relatively little is known about the true extent of identity theft and identity fraud when compared with other crimes. The best estimates come from the United States, which recognized identity theft as a statutory offense in 1998 with passage of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act and where a number of national surveys on the subject have been conducted. The Federal Trade Commission administers a central repository for identity theft complaints and, in 2005, reported 255,565 incidences of identity theft, totaling losses of $56.6 billion. However, victim surveys (including the National Crime Victimization Survey) estimate the victimization of between 3 and 4 percent of Americans annually.

In Europe, where identity theft is not yet considered to be a widespread problem, data are scarce. The exception is the United Kingdom, which has recently prioritized identity theft as a serious and fast-growing crime problem in need of urgent addressing. Early estimates from the Home Office suggest that 137,000 people are "affected" by identity theft each year, costing £1.7 billion annually, but there is little evidence to support these claims. Other studies suggest the victimization of 1 in 10 people and as many as 1 in 4 experiencing identity theft (either directly or indirectly).

Studies on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that young people are most vulnerable. In the 2004 National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, households where the head was between age 18 and 24 were significantly more likely to be victimized, as were high-income households. Rural households were less likely to be victimized. U.K. studies concur that people under the age of 30 are most vulnerable.

Impact on the Victims

For each episode of identity theft or fraud, there are multiple victims: the individual whose information is borrowed or appropriated (the *primary* victim) and any individual, business, or institution that is subsequently defrauded or duped by the perpetrator (the *secondary* victim or victims).

The primary victim may experience a range of different forms of harm. Although the immediate loss of large sums of money is a commonly held fear, it is actually quite unlikely for the primary victim to be held liable for hefty debts incurred where an identity theft has taken place. More likely is the damage caused to the victim's credit history, which will have a negative impact on his or her future financial autonomy. Also, the primary victim of identity theft faces the challenge of restoring his or her personal identity profile, a process that can be costly in terms of time and effort. Research shows that the loss of control of personal information is potentially damaging to an individual's sense of self and quality of life. For the secondary victims, the loss suffered will, more often than not, be directly financial. Indeed, members of the retail, communications, and finance industries are the ones absorbing the costs of identity theft.

Responses

In the mid-1990s the United States became the first country to formally recognize identity theft as a crime; other countries have been slow to follow suit. Although identity theft swiftly emerged as a key issue on the crime agendas of governments across the Western world, few have followed the U.S. lead on policy. In the current climate of fear of terrorism, the urgent need for reliable processes and methods of identification is apparent. Government agencies and businesses around the world need to work together to examine the practices of document-issuing authorities and those who are involved in the processing of personal data.

It is important for the responses to the problem to be designed and applied in the appropriate context. In the United States, for example, many tailored responses address the vulnerabilities emanating from an over-reliance on the social security number, which is used as a key identifier in a wide range of public and private transactions. In contrast, the United Kingdom does not currently operate a single-identifier system, and therefore the identity theft problem is more strongly associated with extremely high rates of credit or debit card fraud.

On both sides of the Atlantic, significant efforts have been made to provide education and guidance to

citizens and consumers in the fight against identity theft and fraud. Increasingly, individuals are encouraged to develop a more responsible attitude toward their personal data. Credit card holders, for example, repeatedly hear that they should keep their card details and personal identification number (PIN) confidential and to shred or burn their statements and receipts. Businesses, too, receive admonitions to think more seriously about the threat of identity theft and the safety of their customers.

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See also Cyberspace; National Crime Victimization Survey; Property Crime

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Illegitimate Opportunity Structures

During the 1950s two predominant theories of criminal behavior were Edwin H. Sutherland's differential association theory and Robert K. Merton's anomie theory. Sutherland argued that criminal behavior is learned in the same manner as other behaviors; people who are socialized to sanction criminal behavior are likely to become criminals. Merton suggested that criminal behavior results when there is a discrepancy between the goals reinforced by society (e.g., earn a good income) and the institutionalized means for attaining these goals (e.g., complete a good education). Those whose access to legitimate opportunities is blocked in some way, perhaps due to poverty or the unavailability of good schools, may use illegal means to reach culturally valued goals. Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin agreed that both theories had merit but added that a key channel of access to culturally valued goals was through illegitimate opportunity structures, especially in impoverished inner-city communities where legitimate means may be scarce.

This notion of illegitimate opportunity structures elaborates the notion that differential access to legitimate opportunities explains why some people are more successful than others. Rather than focusing on how access to wealth or social capital leads to financial success, Cloward and Ohlin argued that some people engage in crime and deviance because they have relatively greater access to illegitimate opportunities. These opportunities imply (a) a learning environment in which particular skills and values are acquired, and (b) opportunities to engage in criminal roles. For example, youth may find legitimate opportunities blocked, but those who have learned methods of delinquency and who have opportunities to engage in such practices—perhaps because their peers are delinquent—become delinquents. In the absence of illegitimate opportunity structures, people with blocked opportunities may experience problems of adjustment (e.g., anxiety or depression), withdraw from society, or turn to risky sexual behavior or drug use in an attempt to find other avenues of self-acceptance or peer-evaluated success. Some researchers argued that illegitimate opportunity structures became more prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s as many inner-city areas experienced a concentration of poverty due to the loss of skilled jobs in urban centers. Others pointed out that crime may also result in the attenuation of legitimate opportunities, such as when conventional residents flee high-crime neighborhoods. Hence, residents may be left with few options other than illegitimate opportunities.

In their seminal works, Cloward and Ohlin focused primarily on inner-city gangs and how their members accessed illegitimate opportunity structures as they engaged in particular forms of delinquency. Their studies have been criticized because they describe deviant subcultures with norms that are opposed to the

widely accepted norms of the broader culture and focus on gangs as the main facilitator of delinquent behavior. Yet, even members of these presumed subcultures tend to sanction the legitimate norms of society, and most delinquency is not the result of gang behavior. Critics claim that delinquents who maintain that legitimate opportunities are blocked, whereas illegitimate opportunities are not, are engaging in rationalization for their failure to sufficiently inculcate the norms and practices of conventional society.

The notion of illegitimate opportunity structures may be used to account for various types of illegal or deviant activities. For example, transnational criminal organizations may search for porous borders, lax enforcement efforts, or bribery opportunities as they engage in drug trafficking, human trafficking, or money laundering. Hence, they tend to ply their trade in nations that afford ready access to illegitimate opportunities and avoid nations that block such access. Assuming that a cultural drive to financial or political success is part of certain societies, blocked legitimate opportunities may motivate even presumably successful people to draw upon illegitimate opportunity structures. This frequently occurs because people often compare themselves with proximate others, such as those who work in similar occupations, when they judge their relative success. For example, the vice president of a corporation may resort to bribing public officials if his earlier attempts to obtain government contracts were unsuccessful. A lobbyist may provide illegal gratuities to politicians to influence votes, especially if previous efforts at using legitimate means were thwarted. Academic researchers may manipulate data if their earlier research efforts failed. Students who perform poorly on standardized exams may see cheating as a viable alternative if they are eager to be admitted to a particular academic institution. These are examples of using illegitimate opportunity structures when legitimate opportunities are perceived as unavailable.

Although blocked legitimate opportunities and access to illegitimate opportunities may explain some forms of deviant behavior, it remains unclear whether the latter is a necessary or sufficient condition. For instance, access to illegitimate opportunities is often gauged by noting deviant or criminal behavior; this is clearly tautological. However, recent research suggests that providing greater access to legitimate opportunities, such as through vocational training or providing high-quality jobs, results in less criminal behavior. Moreover, moving from an impoverished neighborhood with high rates of joblessness to a better-quality neighborhood has been shown to reduce the probability of delinquency among some youth.

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See also Corporate Crime; Crime; Cultural Values; Differential Association; Inner City; Juvenile Delinquency; Oppositional Culture Theory; Strain Theory; White-Collar Crime

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Illiteracy, Adult in Developed Nations

The last decade of the 20th century witnessed an unprecedented concern for adult literacy in many developed nations. This concern was stimulated by the completion of the first International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), undertaken in the mid-1990s by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and a number of its member nations, and led to varying government responses. This entry presents the broad outlines of the IALS, its methodology, and general findings, with a focus on responses in three nations—Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The International Adult Literacy Survey

The IALS methodology was the same as that of the National Adult Literacy Survey of 1993 in the United States. Like that survey, the IALS changed the traditional practice of dividing adults into the dichotomy of "illiterate" and "literate" and instead discussed adult literacy as a continuum from very low literacy to very high literacy. Using the traditional division of adults into illiterate and literate, UNESCO reported illiteracy rates of just 1 to 2 percent for developed nations in the mid-1990s. But using the methodology of the IALS, the percentages of adults in developed nations with very low literacy skills, which earlier would have been called "functional illiteracy," were 10 times as high as the estimates of illiteracy given by UNESCO.

IALS developers defined literacy as using printed and written information to function in society, to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's knowledge and potential. Then, using door-to-door sampling methods, the IALS assessed the literacy skills of adults ages 16 through 65. The IALS developed performance scales composed of tasks for Prose Literacy (e.g., reading text materials such as newspapers, poetry); Document Literacy (e.g., scanning and completing forms or using a train schedule); and Quantitative Literacy (e.g., determining the amount of a tip for a restaurant meal or reviewing a bank statement). Scores on these three scales assign adults to one of five literacy levels (level 1 = very low; level 5 = very high literacy).

For 21 nations assessed in the IALS the percentages of native-born adults in the lowest level of literacy ranged from around 5 percent in Sweden to a high of over 50 percent in Chile, with an average for the 21 nations of about 20 percent on the Prose, Document, and Quantitative Literacy scales. Thus, on average, about one fifth of native-born adults ages 16 to 65 in these developed countries were considered to be "at risk" for social problems because of their low literacy. For foreign-born adults, the percentages were uniformly higher, averaging over 50 percent with Prose, Document, and Quantitative Literacy scores falling in the lowest level of literacy.

Using the Document performance tasks for illustrative purposes, with native- and non-native-born adults combined, 23.7 percent of United States adults ages 16 to 65 fell into the lowest level of literacy, while in Canada this percentage was 18.2, and 23.3 percent in the United Kingdom. Similar percentages, with a little variation, held for the assignment of adults to literacy level 1 on the Prose and Quantitative Literacy scales.

Self-Perceived Literacy and Numeracy Skills

Based on results of the literacy performance tests, about one fifth of adults ages 16 to 65 in the focal nations of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States were considered to be at risk for social problems such as unemployment, underemployment, low income, poverty, and poor health due to low literacy. This would come to about 3.3 million adults in Canada, 7.4 million in the United Kingdom, and 32 million in the United States.

However, the IALS did not use only literacy tests to measure adult literacy. Additionally, the IALS developed a scale for the adults' self-assessment of their literacy ability. In this case adults were asked to rate how well they thought their literacy skills matched their needs for these skills at work or in daily life. In making these judgments, adults used the rating categories of poor, moderate, good, excellent, and no response.

Using the adults' self-assessments of their reading abilities for work and daily life, less than 5 percent of adults ages 16 to 65 in either Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States rated their reading as poor. Using a 5 percent estimate for these three nations, some 8 million adults in the United States, less than 1 million in Canada, and less than 2 million in the United Kingdom considered themselves at risk for poor reading skills. Similar results held for self-assessments of writing and numeracy skills.

In the IALS, then, adults' estimates of their reading ability revealed a considerable discrepancy between the literacy skills as measured by the performance tests and the self-assessments in determining the numbers of adults at risk for poor literacy in these three nations. This discrepancy also occurred in other nations.

Efforts to Increase Access to Adult Literacy Education Programs

For the three developed nations discussed in the previous sections, there were considerable differences in the percentages of adults considered to be at risk and hence in need of literacy or basic skills instruction based on IALS test data and the actual numbers of

adults who seek out and enroll in literacy programs. In Canada, for instance, studies reported that only 5 to 10 percent of adults eligible for literacy education had ever enrolled in literacy courses. Some 43 percent of Canadians who sought information about literacy programs did not enroll because of program- or policy-related problems, such as not being called back after calling a literacy telephone hotline, long waiting lists, inconvenient course times, wrong content or teaching structure, and unhelpful program content.

In the United Kingdom, the IALS assigned around 23 percent of adults to literacy level 1 (some 8,000,000 adults) while participants in adult literacy programs around that time included less than 5 percent of that number. To increase access to provision, the United Kingdom set as a target the reduction by 750,000 of the number of adults who had difficulty with literacy and numeracy by 2004. To meet these targets the government set aside up to £1.5 billion over a 3-year period and created a number of special programs for adults.

To determine what might motivate adults with poor basic skills to seek to improve them, the Basic Skills Agency of the United Kingdom conducted a study called Getting Better Basic Skills. The research focused on adults' perceptions of their skills, why they wanted to improve their skills, their access to learning programs, the content of the programs, and what would encourage them to try and improve their skills. Significant findings showed a third of adults thought that their basic skills needed improving, 29 percent said they would definitely take up a basic skills course, and 42 percent said they would probably do so. Factors motivating adults to improve their basic skills included being able to learn on a computer, being able to improve computer skills and basic skills at the same time, getting an education qualification, and being able to attend a course near home.

In the United States, less than 3 million adults enroll annually in the adult education and literacy programs that are funded jointly by the federal government in partnership with the 50 states. Following the National Adult Literacy Survey and the IALS, no special efforts with major funding were undertaken to reach adults with literacy needs in the United States.

In 2003, the OECD conducted a new international survey of adult literacy skills, the Adult Literacy and Life Skills survey. The report of the survey was released in 2005 and indicated that for the most part, there had been little or no improvement in adult literacy skills since the initial IALS in the mid-1990s.

Thomas G. Sticht

See also Illiteracy, Adult in Developing Nations

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Illiteracy, Adult in Developing Nations

For more than 60 years the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has tracked the progress of nations around the globe in achieving higher rates of adult literacy. Though nations may define literacy somewhat differently, most consider literacy as the ability to read and write simple statements in either a national or an indigenous language. Across the latter half of the 20th century, literacy rates of adults ages 15 years and older increased from 56 percent in 1950 to 70 percent in 1980, 75 percent in 1990, and 82 percent in 2004.

UNESCO's compilation of data obtained from member nations during the years 2000 to 2004 indicate that from 1990, illiteracy among adults fell

by some 100 million, from around 870 million to 770 million, or about one fifth of the world's adult population. UNESCO data on the worldwide distribution of adult illiterates are presented next, followed by a brief discussion of some of the lessons learned in the years that UNESCO has worked to stimulate adult literacy education, primarily among developing nations.

Adult Illiteracy Worldwide

The overwhelming majority of the world's illiterate adults live in the less-developed regions of the world, including South and West Asia (41 percent of adults are illiterate), sub-Saharan Africa (40 percent), the Arab States (37 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (10 percent), and East Asia and the Pacific (9 percent). In 1990, which was celebrated around the world as International Literacy Year, UNESCO and its member nations made a major effort to promote the education of women. At that time women comprised about two thirds of the world's illiterate adults. Unfortunately, over a decade later, women still make up about two thirds of the world's illiterate adults. Women are particularly vulnerable to illiteracy in East Asia and the Pacific, where they constitute almost 72 percent of adult illiterates; the Arab States (64 percent); Southern Asia (62 percent); and sub-Saharan Africa, where women constitute about 60 percent of adult illiterates.

Globally, in terms of the extent to which literacy rates for women are at parity with those for men, 88 women are literate for each 100 men, indicating an 88 percent parity rate of women's literacy to men's literacy for the world. These parity rates are lower (.66 to .76) for the regions cited in the previous paragraph.

Some Lessons Learned

Among the important lessons distilled from the international communities' work to raise the world's literacy rate for adults, two are especially important: (1) Adult literacy programs generally produce multiplier effects, meaning that important outcomes beyond the learning of literacy are frequently forthcoming, and (2) adult literacy programs often have intergenerational consequences, meaning that improving adult literacy, especially that of women, increases the likelihood of children's education.

Multiplier Effects in Adult Literacy Education

In 1984 UNESCO awarded a literacy prize to the National Institute for Adult Education of Mexico. In 3 years the institute enrolled nearly 3 million adults, of which some 1 million became literate in that time. In teaching literacy, the institute's instructional materials integrated the teaching of literacy with the teaching of knowledge important in the day-to-day lives of the adults. This way, in addition to acquiring literacy, the participants also acquired knowledge about health, nutrition, education, and other vital concerns.

The National Institute for Adult Education of Mexico program is just one of many recognized by UNESCO for the approach to literacy education that illustrates that governments can expect multiple returns on investments in adult literacy education in at least five areas:

1. Improved productivity at work, at home, and in the community, leading to higher tax bases for communities, decreased violence at home and in the community, and greater participation in citizenship activities by a larger segment of the adult population

2. Improved self-confidence and other psychological and physiological aspects of health of adults, including activities that will help the brain grow throughout adulthood and contribute to reduced medical costs for adults as they age

3. Improved health of children as a result of adults learning in adult education programs, leading to better prenatal and postnatal care, reductions in low birth weight infants, and better home medical care, thereby contributing to lowered medical costs for children and fewer learning problems in school

4. Improved social justice from providing literacy education for marginalized populations to permit them to acquire skills and knowledge needed to take political action that allows them to achieve their civil rights and to overcome social exclusion and join in the mainstream of society

5. Improved productivity in the schools by providing adults with the knowledge they need to better prepare their children to enter school, help them achieve in school, encourage them to stay in school, and increase their opportunities to enroll in higher education

Intergenerational Effects of Adult Literacy Education

The fifth item in the previous list is especially important because it reveals the effects that educating adults can have on the educational opportunities and achievements of children. In 1983 a UNESCO literacy prize was presented to the Department of Adult Education of the Government of Kenya whose program reached more than a million adults, nearly four fifths of whom were women. The prize citation noted the excellent results achieved both directly through the program and indirectly through its impact upon the school enrollment and retention of the children of participants.

Research published by UNESCO illustrates the effects of girls' and women's education on children and their educational development at various stages from before birth to the school years:

> *Before Pregnancy.* Better-educated girls/women show higher economic productivity, better personal health care, and lower fertility rates; hence they produce smaller families. The latter, in turn, is related to the preschool cognitive development of children and their subsequent achievement in school.
>
> *During Pregnancy and at Birth.* Better-educated women provide better prenatal care, produce more full-term babies, and provide better postnatal care; this results in fewer babies with learning disabilities.
>
> *Before Going to School*. Better-educated women produce better children's health care; better cognitive, language, and preliteracy development; and better preparation for schoolwork.
>
> *During the School Years*. Better-educated women produce higher participation rates in schooling, better management of homework, and better advocacy for children's education and negotiation of school–child conflicts. In addition they produce children who achieve higher levels of education and literacy.

Because of these effects of women's education, UNESCO has for decades recommended that nations should pay special attention to the need for resources to provide literacy educational opportunities to the millions of less-literate women who will bring the next generation of children into the world. In 2003, the UN Decade of Literacy was launched with the first year of the decade devoted to issues of gender, with a focus on the literacy needs of girls and women to bring them to parity with the literacy rates of men.

Improving the Monitoring of Adult Literacy

As indicated earlier, adult literacy/illiteracy rates in developing nations are presently determined by a variety of methods. These methods are mostly based on self-reports in census surveys. But studies comparing these self-reports with direct assessments using literacy tests suggest that the traditional methods for determining literacy rates may overstate the extent of literacy. In the 2006 report on UNESCO's Education for All initiative, a report on the monitoring of adult literacy around the world, it is noted,

> In Morocco, 45 percent of respondents in a sample reported being literate, but only 33 percent demonstrated basic competence in literacy. Similar patterns are found in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and the United Republic of Tanzania. Among Ethiopian women with one year of schooling, although 59 percent were considered literate by household assessments, only 27 percent passed a simple reading test.

Because of the diversity of methods used to indicate literacy rates and the mixed results of studies such as the foregoing, UNESCO is developing new methods of measuring adult literacy to use in monitoring the achievement of adult literacy in developing nations in the coming decades.

Thomas G. Sticht

See also Illiteracy, Adult in Developed Nations

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Immigrants, Undocumented

See Undocumented Immigrants

Immigration

Immigration is the arrival of citizens from one nation-state who plan on taking or do take up long-term or permanent residence in another country. Thus it is secondary to the preceding migration. Subsequent generations of these immigrants either assimilate and become invisible or maintain features distinguishing them from other members of society as identifiable ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious (minority) groups. Given the historical continuum of global migration, immigration too has a historical continuum, probably observable at any point in history. The concept of immigration, however, is relatively new and corresponds to the emergence of modern nation-states. Nations are founded on various principles, such as blood, culture, fate and destiny, history, or other characteristics supposedly shared by members of a nation. Belonging has either a political or a natural definition, thus making it a matter of choice or of birthright. Therefore, the arrivals of other social or political groups not perceived as holding these commonly shared characteristics make them, in the minds of the natives, either aliens, foreigners, immigrants, or simply "the others."

Immigration, first studied by the Chicago School during the 1920s, raises various issues. These are usually identified with or related to reception, insertion, incorporation (or at times non-incorporation), integration, adaptation, assimilation, and related processes of belonging and identity. Each concept couples with specific beliefs, theories, or policies. While conventional and assimilationist research only examines how immigrants adapt or fail to do so, progressive research also studies the adaptation of host societies. The sociological questions arising are what happens to newcomers and what happens to receiving societies; what is the relationship between indigenous populations, previous immigrants, and newcomers; and what are the social, economic, political, and cultural consequences to all? And the political questions are what is the legal status of new arrivals; which political, civil, and social rights do they have; and how can these rights be acquired?

Integration is an interactive process involving individuals and collectives from both mobile and sedentary populations. The character of the relations, their power relations, their structural positions in society, and their communication processes are crucial. The integration of immigrants into the host society is either a one-way process (the immigrants adapt to the host society) or a two-way process (both parties change). In civic and liberal nations, belonging is a matter of choice: Integration can be negotiated and subsequent belonging acquired, as in the United States or the United Kingdom. In ethnic nations where belonging is related to descent—as, for instance, in Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Japan—this is hardly possible.

Migration and immigration are major forces of global human transformation, alongside globalization and aging. Global migration, defined as the increasing global mobility of people and immigration, significantly increases heterogeneity of ethnic composition and of cultural values and practices. The consequences are manifold: (a) It might or might not increase the size of the population of a host society, depending on net migration, that balance between emigration and immigration; (b) it changes the composition of a host society's population in terms of culture, language, religion, or ethnicity and potentially changes the fabric of a host society; and (c) immigrants increase the labor force, contribute to the economy and tax and social funds, and are consumers and service users. Issues of concern are labor market competition, overcrowding (e.g., in the housing market), drain on public services, and conflicts between indigenous and immigrant cultures. Observers pay specific attention to immigrants who simultaneously hold loyalty to their country of origin and their host country and who are engaged economically, politically, and culturally in both. These are transnational migrants and represent an increasingly relevant group. Another specific challenge relates to those who only temporarily integrate because they intend to return or move on to other destinations, which affects efforts made by both parties.

Three major models and policies of inclusion can be identified: (1) *multiculturalism* (e.g., in Canada and Australia) and its successors *interculturalism* and *transculturalism,* based on diversity, social equality, and participation and emphasizing social integration; (2) *integration* (e.g., in Germany and the Netherlands), emphasizing its structural aspects and based on social equality, participation, and adaptation to a host society; and (3) *assimilation* into a host society (e.g., France), based on (republican) ideas of homogeneity. The difference lies in the level of mutuality in the adaptation process, ranging from one-way assimilation to limited mutuality in integration and high levels of mutuality in multiculturalism.

Antonyms of integration are *social marginalization* and *social or spatial segregation.* All currently practiced models of integration are considered imperfect, at least with respect to implementation: All can lead to alienation, segregation, and (self-)exclusion, which undermine solidarity and social cohesion. While some, such as multiculturalism, pay due respect to mutuality in integration processes, implementation is insufficient because there still is a dominant community. Recent trends show that states prefer skilled immigrants with high levels of human capital and language proficiency, understood as preconditions to successful integration.

Both indigenous populations and immigrants contribute barriers to integration. In most receiving countries, immigrants experience discrimination, often on grounds of racism; hence they are legally, structurally, or socially treated unequally. Consequently, they suffer from such social inequalities as unemployment, poor education, substandard housing, political underrepresentation, overpolicing, and racial violence. Immigrants too might exclude themselves from a host society, and even confront a liberal society with illiberal beliefs, for example, with respect to gender relations. Instead, they might create or integrate into already existing immigrant and ethnic minority communities. These, however, could also be a response to prior rejection by the host society.

Although immigration represents a major challenge to society and community, no coherent theories and policies on integration exist. From the perspective of social scientists, present practices of political organization of humanity are not well equipped to accommodate mobile populations.

Franck Düvell

See also Citizenship; Discrimination; Discrimination, Institutional; Ethnic Group; Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism; Immigration, United States; Multiculturalism; Racism; Segregation

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Immigration, United States

Often described as a nation of immigrants, the United States had a foreign-born population of 12.4 percent in 2005. Before the 19th century, however, people rarely used the term *immigrant.* Instead, the foreign-born came as settlers, pioneers, slaves, or indentured servants.

The Naturalization Act of 1790 first established a centralized process for becoming a citizen, originally open to any free white individual who could demonstrate residence in the country for 2 years. In the mid-19th century, the short-lived Know-Nothing movement emerged as a reaction to a surge in immigration, particularly of Irish Catholics after the potato famine of 1845–1851. No national legislation, however, was enacted in response. Immigration was, for the most part, welcomed as a route to national development until the late 19th century. This changed with the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred Chinese from entering the country and excluded those already in the country from naturalization. From this point forward, who could and could not "become an American" was regulated at the national level. The immigrant became a distinct legal, as well as social, category.

Historically, two major peaks occurred in the foreign-born population as a percentage of the total population. According to U.S. Census Bureau statistics, 9.7 percent of the population was foreign-born in 1850, rising to 14.8 percent in 1890 and 14.7 percent in 1910. Midcentury, the proportion of foreign-born plummeted, representing just 5.4 percent of the total

population in 1960 and 4.7 percent in 1970. Since the 1970s, however, the number of foreign-born has risen rapidly. Estimated at more than 35.6 million in 2005, there are now more than twice as many immigrants than at any time before 1980. In addition to the increasing numbers of foreign-born people, there are significant trends in their ethnic and racial composition. In 1910, 87.4 percent of immigrants came from Europe. In 2005, 31 percent of foreign-born arrived from Latin America, 36 percent from Asia, and just 16 percent from Europe.

The gender and age cohorts of immigrants to the United States also varied over the past 100 years. Earlier immigrants were primarily male; in 1910 there were 131.2 males per 100 female immigrants. By 1960, this trend reversed, and in 1970 there were just 84.4 males per 100 female immigrants. The proportion of male immigrants rose again by 1990, with 95.8 males per 100 females, a pattern that continued through 2005. Similarly, the age distribution of the immigrant population shifted over time. In 1910, 5.7 percent of immigrants were under age 15 and 8.9 percent were over age 65. In 1940, less than 1 percent of immigrants were under age 15 and 18 percent were over age 65. By 1990, 7.5 percent of immigrants were under age 15 and 13.6 percent were over age 65.

Scholars analyze the determinants of migration to understand these changing demographic patterns, such as the shift from fewer female migrants in the early 1900s to many more females than males in the 1970s. Researchers also examine the experiences of immigrant groups and their offspring in relation to nonimmigrant populations. They may consider how race and ethnicity shape immigrants' experiences of adaptation and mobility, how an influx of young immigrants impacts the educational system, or how the changing profile of older immigrants affects social security and health care institutions.

Causal Factors in U.S. Immigration

Theoretical approaches to understanding the determinants of immigration include neoclassical economics, world-systems theory, the household strategies models, and social network analysis.

Neoclassical Economics

Neoclassical economic approaches to migration consider the wage differentials between foreign countries and the United States as the root cause of an individual's decision to migrate. Immigrants are often labor migrants; they may be rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of a move abroad. Immigrants may base their decisions on push and pull factors, the former referring to the causes of economic hardship which make survival in the home country difficult and the latter referring to potential economic opportunity in the United States. As such, fluctuations in immigration can relate to labor markets. For example, expansion of the railroads in the West, starting in the 1860s, provided jobs for Asian and Mexican immigrants before Chinese immigrants and other Asians were barred from entry. More recently, the increasing entrance of women into formal labor markets since the 1970s created job opportunities in child care for many female immigrants.

Immigration patterns also necessarily relate to labor markets in immigrants' countries of origin. In many African countries, for example, civil war and ethnic conflict since the 1980s left professionals with few opportunities for advancement. They often sought work in the United States where they received a greater return for their human capital. In other countries, such as the Philippines and in parts of India, the number of highly educated female nurses exceeded the demands of their national health care systems; many have found work in this expanding U.S. industry since the 1970s.

World-Systems Theories

In the real world, a pure relationship between economic hardship and opportunity is rare. Instead, economic decisions are embedded in social and political structures that may mitigate or intensify hardships and may create or dampen opportunities. A world-systems perspective analyzes the political structures underlying immigration and examines the relations between nations that contribute to creating these structures.

Immigration law and regulation is one key factor that influences migration patterns. For example, the National Origins Act of 1921, which restricted immigration from different countries according to a quota system, and its abolition in 1965 explain the drop in immigration to the United States in the mid-20th century. The abolition of the act also helps explain the greater diversity in the ethnic and racial composition of immigrants since 1965.

Inclusion or exclusion of potential immigrants is also intimately tied to international politics, particularly in the post–World War II era when the United States created refugee and political asylum provisions. For example, Cubans, whose Communist leader Fidel Castro has challenged U.S. intervention in the region since 1959, receive a warm welcome and resettlement support. However, during the 1980s, immigrants from Guatemala and El Salvador, where the United States backed the national governments amid civil war, were routinely denied political asylum. Religious leaders in the United States then illegally provided sanctuary for many Central Americans; their successful challenges to immigration law led to a 1990 provision for political asylum for El Salvadorans and Guatemalans.

U.S. military presence in a country may also spur immigration, particularly by women. The War Brides Act of 1945 allowed GIs to sponsor their foreign-born wives and children, sparking an increase in Korean and Japanese immigration midcentury. Many women from El Salvador first came to the United States in the 1980s as domestic workers for foreign diplomats stationed in their country during the conflict. Today the second largest Salvadoran community is in Washington, D.C.

Household Strategies

In contrast to external imbalances of power, the household migration strategy perspective considers the dynamics within families that shape immigration. Originally, household strategy models were relatively one-dimensional, assuming that families deployed specific members as part of a unified family migration strategy. For example, at the turn of the 20th century, Italian men often left wives and children behind when they immigrated to maintain, and at times increase, the family's holdings via remittances, reducing the risks involved in uprooting the entire family. In contrast, Irish families often sent young unmarried women between 1880 and 1920 to work in domestic service to supplement family income, because inheritance practices limited marriage pools within Ireland.

Today, scholars suggest more complicated household strategy models by tracing the ways power imbalances within families affect decisions to migrate. These scholars argue that a unified family migration strategy may not exist and that migration may not benefit all members of a household equally. For example, some suggest that because Mexican men generally have more decision-making power than do women in their families, the male breadwinner primarily makes the decision to migrate. Other scholars describe the ways that women from Latin America and the Caribbean actively convince their families to support their moves abroad in order to escape abusive situations at home.

Social Networks

Social networks also shape patterns of immigration. Because the social network is considered as an independent causal factor, social network analysis is a powerful reminder of the ways that informal structures within and between communities and families influence the face of immigration. For example, in recent years, Mexicans living in the United States constituted about 30 percent of the entire foreign-born population, by far the largest immigrant group. Mexican immigration is largely shaped by social networks now institutionalized in migrants' communities of origin.

Consequences of U.S. Immigration

Research on the social consequences of immigration usually pertains to one of three areas: immigrants' experiences of adaptation and assimilation, mobility of immigrant populations, and relationships between immigrant communities and nonimmigrant groups.

Adaptation and Assimilation

At the beginning of the 20th century, the principal stance on immigration was that the United States was a melting pot and that immigrants needed to assimilate to U.S. culture to be successful. Social campaigns during this period often strove to teach immigrant women how to make their families more "American." When immigrants lived in neighborhoods dominated by co-ethnics, enclaves were considered a source of social disorganization that undermined modern development.

By the end of the 20th century, the melting pot paradigm gave way to one of multiculturalism. Rather than a site of social disorganization, ethnic enclaves are now viewed as a source of social support for immigrants. They provide the necessary networks to locate employment and housing. Membership in religious organizations with co-ethnics is one of the

primary sites of civic participation among immigrants upon arrival. Ethnic enclaves are also important sources for entrepreneurship, the major means for mobility for some new immigrants. Self-employment rates are particularly high for well-educated Korean and Middle Eastern immigrants, although they may not depend on co-ethnics for business, instead acting as economic intermediaries in other ethnic minority neighborhoods. Yet for other members of immigrant groups, the ethnic enclave can become the principal site of exploitation by co-ethnics. This is particularly true for undocumented workers in Chinatowns across the country, who often must depend on informal, unregulated, and low-wage economic opportunities from co-ethnics.

Recent scholarship examines the increasingly important ways that transnational ties shape immigrant experiences in the United States. From this perspective, immigrants maintain social, political, and economic ties with communities of origin. Transnational studies may involve political ties (hometown associations), economic ties (remittances), technology, cultural identity, or family relationships. The transnational perspective shows that in a globalized world, immigrants' adaptation to life in the United States is intricately linked to the lives of those in their countries of origin.

Mobility

Perhaps the best way to gauge the success of immigrants' adaptations to life in the United States is to study the lives of the second generation, that is, the fate of the children of immigrants. Given the great demographic shifts between the primarily European stock of the earlier waves of immigrants and the influx of immigrants of color since the 1960s, mobility among the children of today's immigrants is particularly indicative of the ways race and ethnicity shape the social structure of the United States.

Among the many factors considered in gauging mobility in the second generation are language acquisition, educational attainment, and socioeconomic status. Despite public concern to the contrary, findings suggest that by the second and third generations, proficiency in English is uniform among children of recent immigrants, much as was the case among the earlier waves of European immigrants. Findings based on other indicators of mobility, however, are mixed. On the one hand, when second-generation immigrants are isolated in ethnic enclaves in inner cities, upward mobility is far less likely. In other cases, immigrant youth may maintain their identity as foreigners to distinguish themselves from minority nonimmigrants.

One of the most important research findings on mobility among second-generation immigrants is that experiences typically differ between and within various groups, a process known as "segmented assimilation." For example, comparative studies of second-generation youth in New York and Los Angeles show that children of different genders and racial/ethnic backgrounds may have vastly different experiences.

Relationships Between Immigrants and Nonimmigrants

A third aspect of the consequences of U.S. immigration is interethnic relationships. Scholars from the Chicago School of sociology at the turn of the century mapped the social ecology of the city as a means of depicting the relationships between immigrant and nonimmigrant groups. Until recently, immigrant settlement patterns have not varied greatly. In urban areas like Chicago, most arrived to ethnic enclaves in the city and only those immigrants who were upwardly mobile, or their children or grandchildren, moved to the suburbs following scenarios of white flight. Moreover, Latino/a and Asian populations were once concentrated in California and in the Southwest. Cubans and other Caribbean immigrants settled in Florida and in the Northeast. In some areas, immigrants worked as migrant farmworkers. For the most part, though, the study of immigrant incorporation was a study of urban communities.

In recent decades, however, immigrants have dispersed rapidly throughout the continental United States, living in rural, urban, and suburban communities. Immigrants, many of them undocumented, have become a major cause of conflict at many of these new destinations. Their presence is associated with various social problems including concentrations of day laborers, bilingual education, health care for the uninsured, and more. Minutemen militia groups have formed at the southern U.S. border with Mexico to try to keep out immigrants. Some municipal governments have passed local ordinances to prevent immigrants from settling in their towns. The

"English only" movement has gained strength. Many fear that these tensions put immigrants' human rights at risk; stories of women and children illegally trafficked into the United States illustrate the ways immigrants may be victimized in the underground economy associated with immigration.

Recently, concerns over terrorism, heightened after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, fueled rising tensions over the roles and rights of immigrants in the United States and increased pressures to regulate and monitor immigrants' activities.

Joanna Dreby

See also Americanization; Assimilation; Deportation; English-Only Movement; Ethnicity; Human Trafficking; Immigration; Intergenerational Mobility; Labor, Migrant; Melting Pot; Migration, Global; Refugees; Sanctuary Movement; Segmented Assimilation; Social Disorganization; Transnational Families; Undocumented Immigrants

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IMPERIALISM

Imperialism corresponds closely to the concept of empire and signifies all sorts of expansion policies: economic, political, military, cultural, and so on. In *The Civil War in France,* Karl Marx introduced the concept of imperialism into modern social and political thought. With his classical work *Imperialism: A Study,* John A. Hobson initiated modern theory on imperialism. Because of the close connection between the concept of imperialism and the concept of empire, many scholars assumed a description of human history in terms of imperialism. Hobson's theory of imperialism, on the contrary, is a historical theory of imperialism, describing it as a stage in the development of capitalism. His theory refers to a monopolist stage in the accumulation of capital that he places no later than the 1880s. He differentiates categorically between colonialism and imperialism.

In the colonialist age the driving economic force was the export and import of commodities. In the age of new imperialism, the driving force is exportation of capital, with the pursuit of an imperialist policy in the interest of a small population segment. That is, in the age of imperialism, an increase in the cosmopolitanism of capital occurs, and this should be not mixed up with internationalism. From a national viewpoint, imperialist policy is necessarily irrational. In colonial occupation of foreign countries, the mother country at least attempted to establish a colonial government and extend political and civil liberties to the occupied territories and to raise the state of civilization. Except for a few experiments in India, for example, the tendency of new imperialism goes the other way, seeking more drastic control of annexed territories and destruction of the achieved state of civilization. Politically, new imperialism is an expansion of autocracy. In terms of international relations, imperialism means a permanent rivalry between imperialist countries for the redistribution of natural resources, often a cause of new wars.

V. I. Lenin's contribution to Hobson's theory of imperialism is his illustration of its consistency in the tradition of Marx's critique of political economy. Lenin acknowledged, for example, Hobson's accuracy and deep economic/political analysis of imperialism. What Lenin criticized was what he called Hobson's bourgeois reformism and passivism.

Contemporarily, two closely related debates on imperialism attract interest: one on cultural imperialism and another concerning empire and new imperialism theories. In the first debate the rhetoric is between a critical liberal view of the logic of cultural imperialism and its stigmatization of other cultures, or a Marxist critique of any theory of cultural imperialism. The second debate concerns the nature of imperialism in the stage of globalization, where advocates propose to replace the classical concept of imperialism for a less definable concept of empire. Marxist scholars, in contrast, want to keep the classical concept simply by acknowledging new developments.

Doğan Göçmen

See also Colonialism; Globalization; Socialism

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Incarceration, Societal Implications

The United States incarcerates a larger share of its population than any other country. Increasingly, the criminal justice system affects not only the lives of convicted offenders individually but also the relative standing of demographic groups and outcomes in the country as a whole. This entry deals with the societal implications of the criminal justice system in the United States, specifically political participation, labor market performance, and black–white wage inequality.

The societal impact of the criminal justice system rests primarily on its size. In 2005, over 7 million individuals were under the supervision of the criminal justice system: 1.4 million in prisons, 0.7 million in local jails, 4.2 million on probation, and 0.8 million on parole. Millions more are identifiable as ex-convicts to authorities and employers. The risk of involvement with the criminal justice system is unequally distributed. Over 90 percent of the incarcerated population is male, most are younger than 45, and nearly half are black. The impact of the criminal justice system on these over-represented groups is naturally greater.

Felon Disenfranchisement

Most states in the United States disenfranchise incarcerated felons as well as nonincarcerated felons on probation or parole. A large minority of states additionally disenfranchises ex-felons after the conclusion of their sentence, and three states disenfranchise all felons for life. Only two states, Vermont and Maine, place no restrictions on the voting rights of convicted offenders, whereas some other states disenfranchise both felons and misdemeanants. Felon disenfranchisement is more common in the United States than in other democratic countries, where it is typically restricted to imprisoned felons for the duration of incarceration. Only Belgium, Chile, Finland, and Germany also disenfranchise (some) felons after release from prison. Although the number of states that disenfranchise ex-felons has sharply decreased since the 1950s, the number of affected individuals has increased because of an increase in the number of offenses classified as felonies and the increased probability of conviction in the sentencing stage of criminal trials. As a result of their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, about 12 percent of black men nationwide had lost their right to vote as of 2004.

The impact of felon disenfranchisement on political outcomes hinges on three factors: the size of the disenfranchised population, voter turnout, and political preferences. About 5.3 million current and former felons (2.5 percent of the voting age population) were ineligible to participate in the 2004 presidential election. Approximately 40 percent of these individuals were ex-felons no longer under the supervision of the criminal justice system. Research suggests that voter turnout rates would be an estimated one-third lower among disenfranchised felons than in the general population. The number of votes prevented by felon disenfranchisement, therefore, is large. (Some researchers

argue that the apparent decline in voter turnout since the 1970s may be due primarily to felon disenfranchisement: If disenfranchised citizens—mostly felons—are subtracted from the voting age population, which forms the denominator of conventional voter turnout rates, participation rates in the voting-eligible population are essentially constant over time.) One analysis concludes that as a result of the strong preference for the Democratic Party among disenfranchised felons, the 2000 presidential election would have been decided for Democrats in the absence of felon disenfranchisement. No other presidential election, however, is estimated to have hinged on felon disenfranchisement, although a small number of Senate races in the past 30 years may have.

Labor Market Participation and Black–White Wage Inequality

Official labor market statistics in the United States are calculated on the basis of the civilian noninstitutionalized population and exclude the incarcerated population. Because economically disadvantaged individuals face much greater risks of incarceration, official statistics may present an incomplete picture of labor market performance.

For example, the employment–population ratio (EPR), which measures labor force utilization, would be lower if inmates were included in the denominator of the rate and counted as nonemployed individuals. The incarceration-adjusted EPR for young black male high school dropouts would have been almost 20 percentage points lower than the official rate in the late 1990s, whereas the incarcerated-adjusted EPR for young white male high school dropouts would have been 6 percentage points lower. The impact is smaller but still sizable for working-age men (4.9 and 0.9 percentage points difference for black and white men, respectively), but not meaningfully different for the national EPR. (Note that this EPR adjustment reverses the logic of the voter turnout adjustment mentioned previously: Whereas the official EPR excludes inmates and the adjustment includes them, conventional voter turnout rates include inmates and the adjusted rates exclude them.)

Mass incarceration also affects conventional measures of black–white wage inequality. Incarceration is selective of individuals with low earnings potential, and it removes relatively more black men than white men from the labor market and hence from official statistics. To account for the economic selectivity of incarceration, researchers have estimated inactivity-adjusted wage distributions, which impute hypothetical wages to nonworking individuals, including inmates of prisons and jails. These statistics are intended to estimate the wage distribution that would prevail if everybody earned wages in the market and nobody was inactive (neglecting general equilibrium effects). One such analysis found that selective labor market inactivity (including incarceration) depressed conventional measures of black–white inequality in log mean earnings by 20 percent among working-age men in 1999 and by almost 60 percent among men ages 22 to 30. The apparent reduction of black–white wage inequality among young men since the mid-1980s, conventionally attributed to economic gains among blacks, may be entirely due to the removal of young black men with low earnings potential from the labor market through incarceration.

Felix Elwert

See also Prison; Prison, Convict Criminology

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INCEST

Incest refers to sexual relations between closely related persons. The degrees of kinship defined as incestuous vary, but virtually every known society has prohibited father and daughter, mother and son, or brother and sister from having sexual contact or marrying. Only in recent decades, though, has society recognized incest as a social problem. Earlier, the cultural prohibition, known as the "incest taboo," was of primary interest and a topic of considerable theoretical concern. Many leading social theorists, including Sigmund Freud, Émile Durkheim, and Claude

Lévi-Strauss, considered the incest taboo foundational to human social organization.

Consistent with understandings of the taboo, most people long viewed the incidence of incest as extremely rare, and until the 1980s, no prevalence studies of incest occurred. The closest thing to survey data came from general studies of sexual behavior, such as those by Alfred Kinsey, but these studies did not focus on incest and did not separately define or report it. Although incest was prohibited by law in most jurisdictions, the conviction rate of incest offenders was extremely low. As late as the mid-1960s, for example, the annual conviction rate of offenders did not exceed two cases per million persons in any U.S. state. Social scientists recognized that the actual incidence of incest must far exceed the rate of detection by law enforcement. Yet, the available evidence and the cross-cultural studies suggested that the incest taboo was uniquely powerful. Other forms of sexual offenses and sexual pathologies were of professional and occasionally public concern, but not incest.

A series of developments, beginning in the 1960s, led to a changed awareness of sexual offenses within the nuclear and extended family. The emergence of family therapy as a clinical specialty in the 1960s was important in establishing a concern with the child victim of incest. Family therapists initiated a rejection of key elements of Freudian psychoanalysis, particularly with respect to the role of incest fantasies in mental life, and their work led to the first of many treatment programs in which child victims received counseling. The child protection movement, originally organized to draw attention to the physical abuse of children, and the anti-rape movement of the early 1970s drew public and mass media attention to child sexual abuse as a social problem. They also spurred new legislation, such as the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, which made it a criminal offense for professionals working with children and public officials not to report suspected instances of child maltreatment. These movements classified incest within the more general category of sexual abuse—sometimes using terms like *intrafamilial child sexual abuse*—and argued that family members and known others, not strangers, committed most abuse. In the ensuing years, research studies, surveys, and increased reporting have confirmed that incest is far more prevalent than previously assumed.

The extent of incest behavior, however, has eluded careful measurement. Studies of such highly stigmatized behavior are notoriously difficult to conduct, and under-reporting is a serious methodological problem. So too is the lack of consensus among researchers about what behaviors and what degrees of kinship define the experience of incest. Some employ narrow definitions of sexual contact—touching or penetration—whereas others use broad definitions that span a wide range of sexual and sexualized activities from penetration to such non-touch behavior as exhibitionism and sexual propositions. There is also wide latitude in what relatives are included, with some researchers adding "father figures" and other unrelated persons. Discrepancies like these have led to great inconsistency in the estimates of the prevalence of incest.

Further, in large-scale studies of sexual offenses and sexual behavior, incest between adults is not separately reported and incest involving a child is counted as a form of sexual abuse. The latter development is also reflected in some state penal codes, where sexual offenses against children by relatives are prosecuted under sexual abuse laws rather than incest statutes. The most comprehensive sources of information on sexual abuse in the United States, for example, come from the Department of Health and Human Services. Mandated studies, including the annual *Child Maltreatment* reports, based on compilations of data from child protective service agencies in individual states, and the periodic National Incidence Studies of Child Abuse and Neglect, based on large nationally representative samples of community professionals, provide the best estimates available on the incidence of sexual abuse. Although these studies offer some breakdown of victimization incidents by the type of perpetrator (e.g., parents, other family members), they do not discuss incest.

With heightened public and professional concern in recent decades, an immense body of research has emerged on the psychological effects of incest, on the dynamics of families in which incest takes place, and on the psychology of offenders. Studies have found that incest can have a wide variety of negative consequences for the victim, in both the immediate and longer term, depending on the frequency, duration, and type of sexual contact; age of the child; relationship to the offender; and other factors. For children, these consequences can include delinquency, anxiety, poor self-esteem, sexual acting out, and other problems. For adult survivors, issues include depression, self-destructive behaviors, and post-traumatic

symptoms. Research on families in which incest occurs has centered on complex interaction dynamics and disturbances—intrapsychic, relational, and circumstantial. Men appear responsible for the majority of incest offenses, and much of the research on offenders focuses on various personality types and their conscious and unconscious motivations.

Public controversy and legal battles have erupted periodically since the 1980s over social problem claims of false reports of incest. Parent groups have organized to defend themselves against alleged false reports with respect to children, especially in divorce-custody cases, and by adult daughters or sons claiming trauma-induced amnesia for incestuous victimization as a child. In the latter case, parents criticize psychotherapists for using hypnosis and other "memory enhancement" techniques to induce a condition they call "false memory syndrome." Psychologists in the trauma field remain divided over these claims.

Joseph E. Davis

See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Rape

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Income Disparity

Income disparity refers to differences in income between two or more individuals or aggregates. Aggregates can be defined by relationship (family, household) or by some other attribute (community, nation, gender, ethnicity, age, class). Income disparities are important for several reasons: (a) Income is the primary source of economic well-being in modern societies, so income disparities indicate differences between individuals and groups in the ability to attain a desired standard of living; (b) income disparities are associated with a variety of social problems, including poverty, crime, and social conflict; and (c) large income disparities, especially between groups defined by ascribed status (e.g., gender, race), are contrary to norms of equity.

Theories of Income Disparity

Explanations of income disparities derive from more general theories of social organization, typically categorized as consensus and conflict theories. Consensus theories posit that social order arises from shared objectives, values, and the evaluation of individual and group behavior. Conflict theories posit that social order is imposed by the exercise of power. Consensus theories include functionalism in sociology and microeconomic price theory in economics. Conflict theories include Marxist and Weberian theories.

Functionalism asserts that, given a complex division of labor, societies must have some mechanisms to allocate individuals to jobs. Jobs can be ranked according to importance and requisite skills, and individuals can be ranked according to their diligence and ability. Inequality is the social mechanism that allocates the most qualified individuals to the most important jobs. Similarly, microeconomic price theory asserts that, in market societies, the price mechanism assures that markets will "clear"; that is, prices will rise or fall until completion of all desired exchanges of goods and services. At this price, supply equals demand, and the wage rate equals the value produced, thus maximizing the total value of production. Income differences represent productivity differences. Each individual, in maximizing his or her income, will obtain the skills which make the best use of his or her abilities.

Conflict theory asserts that disparities in income or, more generally, in life chances, result from conflict among individuals and groups over the distribution of resources. Marx and his theoretical descendants assert that, in all societies, those who own productive assets (land and other forms of capital) exploit those who do not. Those who do not own productive assets cannot acquire necessities, such as food, clothing, or shelter, unless they can access the assets of others. To do this, they must relinquish a share of what they produce to the asset owner (e.g., as rent). Although not explicit in most Marxist accounts, skill (productivity) differences can be incorporated into the theory as "human capital" assets. From this perspective, income disparities reflect disparities in the ownership of productive assets.

Weber and his theoretical descendants do not disagree that property ownership is important, but they assert additional important aspects of power in society: One's relative position in markets for capital and for labor ("class"), the social regard of others ("status"), and collective organization for the rational pursuit of interests ("party"). Any or all of these aspects of power may be used to deny opportunities to others and monopolize opportunities for oneself and those like oneself. Income disparities therefore reflect disparities in the distribution of economic, social, and political power.

Measurement of Income Disparity

The extent of income disparities is measured in a variety of ways, depending on the motivating interest. If interest is in income differences between two persons or social positions, one could simply subtract, but this has the disadvantage of being affected by the value of money (e.g., inflation). A measure of such disparities not affected by the value of money is the ratio of incomes. If, instead, interest is in the distribution of income across a population, numerous statistical indices are available. Quintile income shares are the percentages of income received by each fifth of the population; the standard deviation of income measures average income differences in a population. The Gini coefficient measures departures from perfect equality, where each cumulative percentage of the population receives that cumulative percentage of income. The Gini coefficient is thus a generalization of quintile shares across the entire income distribution.

Extent of Income Disparities

Current and historical data on income inequality in the United States are available on the U.S. Census Bureau Web page. These data show that in 2006, the bottom quintile of households received 3.5 percent of total household income, the third quintile received 14.5 percent, and the top quintile received 50.5 percent of total household income. In 1990, the corresponding income shares were 3.8 percent for the bottom, 15.9 percent for the third, and 46.6 percent for the top quintile; and in 1980 they were 4.2 percent, 16.8 percent, and 44.1 percent, respectively. Between 1980 and 2006, the income share of the bottom quintile of households declined, as did the income share of the third quintile, whereas income share for the top quintile increased. In relative terms, the poor and the middle lost ground, and the top gained ground. Over this period, the Gini coefficient increased from .403 in 1980 to .428 in 1990 and .470 in 2006. Other inequality indices show the same pattern. Since 1980, income disparities among households in the United States have increased.

Consequences of Income Disparities

Consensus theories of income disparities predict that income disparities will not be a cause of social disorder, even if disparities are extreme and widespread. Shared values will produce acceptance of functionally necessary (thus, equitable) disparities in life chances. Conflict theories, on the other hand, interpret disparate life chances as both the outcome of conflict among individuals and groups and the source of future conflict.

Income disparities are associated with disparities in life chances, including physical and psychological health. This is to be expected in market economies, because the goods and services that contribute to life chances must be purchased. However, the consequences of inequality extend beyond the life chances of individuals to affect entire societies. These societal consequences include poverty, social disorder, and crime. Despite debates regarding the measurement of poverty (whether poverty is relative or absolute and what the poverty threshold should be), it is clear that the presence of income disparities is necessary for the existence of poverty.

Research consistently shows an association of between-group inequality (e.g., race, class) and social disruption (riots, strikes). Examples include the labor movement of the 1930s and the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Research also consistently finds a strong association between income inequality and both property and violent crime rates. These research literatures are thus more supportive of conflict theories. Research on the relationship between income inequality and aggregate rates of economic growth has produced mixed results. One strand of this literature finds that inequality reduces economic growth rates; a more recent strand finds the opposite: that inequality increases rates of economic growth. The first is consistent with conflict theories, the second with consensus theories. These literatures differ in their measures, models, and methods, so it is not yet possible to be confident in the findings of either.

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See also Class; Gender Gap; Gini Coefficient; Life Chances; Poverty; Relative Deprivation; Stratification, Social

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Index of Dissimilarity

The term *index of dissimilarity* refers to a standard measure of residential segregation, which gauges the extent to which two groups are evenly spread throughout neighborhoods in a given geographic area, usually a city or metropolitan area. It is interpreted as the percentage of either of the two groups that would have to move in order to achieve an even distribution across neighborhoods within the larger geographic unit of interest. An even distribution indicates that all of the neighborhoods would have the same distribution of the two groups as the larger, geographic unit of interest. Values of the index of dissimilarity range from 0 to 100, with values ranging from 0 to 30 indicating low levels of segregation or high levels of evenness, from 30 to 60 indicating moderate levels of segregation, and 60 or more indicating high levels of segregation or very low levels of evenness.

Results from Census 2000 reveal high levels of segregation for blacks and more moderate levels for Hispanics and Asians and Pacific Islanders, relative to non-Hispanic whites. More specifically, 64 percent of blacks, 51 percent of Hispanics, and 43 percent of Asians and Pacific Islanders would have to move to achieve an even distribution with whites, on average, in the metropolitan United States. Trends over time in index of dissimilarity scores reveal that blacks consistently are the most segregated group. In 1980, the dissimilarity scores for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians and Pacific Islanders were 73 percent, 50 percent, and 41 percent, respectively, relative to non-Hispanic whites. Although scores for blacks have declined over time, the level of segregation still remains within the high range, even nearly 40 years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act. Scores for Hispanics and Asians have remained relatively stable, in large part as a result of the trends in immigration of these groups.

Although the index of dissimilarity is a standard measure used to gauge levels of residential segregation, it is not free of limitations. One major limitation is that it can only examine the residential segregation of two groups at a time. Other measures, such as the multigroup information theory index, can measure the evenness of more than two groups. Another is that it is sensitive to the level of geography used as its building blocks. In general, census tract–level data are used as a proxy for the neighborhoods within which evenness is examined. However, an average census tract contains 4,000 residents. Census block groups are smaller areas of geography that are composed, on average, of 1,500 people. Studies have shown that when smaller areas of geography are used to calculate the index of dissimilarity, levels of segregation are actually higher. Other limitations with the index are that it cannot gauge how concentrated or centralized the populations of interest are. Nevertheless, because of its ease of interpretation and its detection of evenness, the index of dissimilarity remains a core measure used in the residential segregation literature.

Samantha Friedman

See also Segregation, Residential

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Inequality

The study of inequality lies at the heart of the sociology of social problems. No matter what the social problem might be, different forms of inequality

influence the generation of the problem, the consequences of the problem for diverse groups, the societal reaction to the problem, and the solutions and social policies intended to address the problem. In each of these dimensions, social problems correlate with inequality. Analyzing the relationship between various forms of inequality and social problems is central to sociological theory and empirical research.

Among some of the strongest forms of inequality influencing social problems are social class, race, and gender. And, while these are some of the most significant influences on social problems, they are also problems in and of themselves. No understanding of social problems makes sense without attention to race, class, and gender. But race, class, and gender are not the only correlates of social inequality. Also influencing social problems are social factors such as age, national origin, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and family status, among others. Exactly how these different social factors of inequality relate to social problems and how they interrelate are the basis for much social problems theory and empirical research.

Inequality and the Generation of Social Problems

One way to think about how inequality relates to social problems is to ask how social problems are generated. Social stratification based on race, class, and gender forms the structural context from which social problems are created. Social inequality, structured into society, blocks opportunities for some groups, generating the conditions from which social problems emerge. The sociological literature offers countless examples of the consequences of blocked opportunity.

Research shows, for example, a strong correlation between unemployment and multiple social problems, including crime, violence, divorce, and substance abuse, to name a few. As one example, an extraordinarily large difference exists in the homicide rate of black Americans, Latinos, and whites—explained as the result of social structural conditions of both the class and race status of poor, minority men. Were non-Latino whites subjected to the same social structural conditions of inequality as are racial/ethnic minorities, white homicide rates would likely be equal to those of racial/ethnic minorities. Various measures of risk, including death by homicide, firearms, and automobile accidents, are also strongly influenced by gender. This is the result, most argue, of greater risk-taking behavior among men. The interactive mix of gender, race, and class can be a lethal combination.

Race, gender, and class also affect the likelihood of experiencing social problems other than crime and violence. For example, low-income and minority communities will more likely be sites for hazardous waste facilities and toxic dumping, not only degrading the neighborhood environment but also placing residents at greater risk for poor health. Although many such communities have organized an environmental justice movement to protest dumping in their neighborhoods, the relative lack of political power in low-income and minority communities makes environmental racism a persistent social problem.

Social problems stemming from structural inequality are also prevalent in education and work. Rates of educational attainment are higher among white Americans than among either African Americans or Latinos/as. School dropout rates, too, significantly relate to both race and income status. Hispanic students have, by far, the highest dropout rate, followed by African American students, but income matters too: Students from low-income families have twice the dropout rate of those from middle-income families and four times the dropout rate of those from high-income families. Family disadvantage also strongly relates to racial variations in math and reading comprehension for schoolchildren, and the higher the family income is, the higher are student test scores and rates of educational attainment.

At the root of educational attainment problems lie inequalities among schools themselves. Inner-city schools with large concentrations of minority and poor students suffer from inadequate facilities, poor funding, and understaffing. Furthering the problem of inequality in schooling is the resegregation of schools that is currently under way. Since 1980, segregation in U.S. schools has dramatically increased, resulting in increasing educational isolation of black and Latino/a students. School segregation partially follows from residential segregation but also results from the diminution of state-sponsored plans to challenge racial segregation in education.

Segregation is not just a matter of race, however. As inequality grows in the United States, schools are also becoming more stratified by social class. Residential and school segregation separate people not only by race but also by class. This creates disparities in school quality *across* neighborhoods and *within* schools. From ability groupings within schools

to across-school differences in curricular offerings and facilities, social class, along with race, produces inequality across *and* within schools. Added to this is the gender inequality that continues to characterize education. Although much progress has been made in reducing educational disparities between girls and boys, a gender gap persists in what students learn and the work girls and boys are prepared to do.

Structured inequality is also present in the social problems associated with work. Where, how, and whether people work is fundamentally a matter of race, class, and gender. Much research shows that gender and race are good predictors of earning differentials; they also strongly influence occupational distribution. Indeed, the greater the concentration of women and minorities in an occupation, the more degraded is the pay. Gender and race affect not only the economic status of women and people of color but also the social and psychological consequences of persistent race and gender discrimination in the workplace.

In sum, extensive evidence shows the influence of social inequality on the generation of social problems, but are there actually more social problems among disadvantaged groups? This is the subject of debate. One answer is that social inequality produces an underclass of people who turn to crime for lack of other options. Blocked opportunity, in this argument, produces social problems—more likely among the poor and minority groups. Another answer is that, because social problems occur within disadvantaged strata of society, they are more subject to surveillance and, thus, more visible than are social problems that occur within the middle and upper classes. This area of research points to the hidden nature of social problems within more privileged communities, as well as to the increased rates of policing and other forms of surveillance, such as via social service agencies, that make social problems more likely to be detected among the poor and disadvantaged. Recognizing that identifying is part of how they are generated underscores the importance of understanding not just where problems occur but also how they are created through perceptions and judgments made in society.

Inequality and Societal Reactions

Inequality also strongly influences societal responses to social problems. Research consistently shows that victims of social problems are treated differently within various social institutions. This is especially apparent in studies of the criminal justice system, although this is not the only institutional site for seeing the influence of inequality on social problems. Yet, a multitude of studies show that the race of the accused produces differential rates of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing. Studies of rape, for example, show that not only are black perpetrators more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced, but the rape itself is more likely to be reported when the perpetrator in black, regardless of the victim's race. There is also an interactive effect between the race of the victim and the race of the alleged perpetrator in how justice—or perhaps better stated, injustice—is administered. Studies of the death penalty, as just one example, find strong evidence of racial discrimination in death penalty verdicts. And race of the victim, as well as race of the defendant, is an influence, with the death penalty more likely to result when the victim is a white woman. Throughout the criminal justice system, racial minorities experience disproportionate punitive treatment. They are more likely than whites to be arrested and convicted, and they are given longer sentences than whites, even when the crime is the same.

Empirical evidence of societal reactions to social problems is also evident in the influence of social class. Corporate crime, for example, if measured in terms of dollar value, is far more severe than street crime, but corporate criminals are not punished as harshly as street criminals. Furthermore, corporate crime is also less likely to be detected, and when corporate criminals are punished, they receive more lenient punishments. Gender matters, too: Together with race, gender is predictive of whether a defendant secures pretrial release.

The societal response to social problems can also be seen in the context of how clients are treated in other social institutions. The simple fact is that authorities, generally speaking, tend to treat people differently, depending on factors like class, race, and gender. Social stereotypes, even when unintentionally expressed, guide people's judgments about one another in various realms of life. Thus, employers tend to typify black women as single mothers—regardless of the employees' actual parental or marital status; drug offenders who most closely resemble stereotypes of dangerous drug users receive substantially more punitive sentences than those who do not conform to the stereotype; teachers' perceptions of students' race and ethnic status influence their

judgments about the students' likely academic success; and racial prejudice underlies public attitudes about punishment for crime with those likely to support the most punitive policies holding the racial prejudice. In each case, social judgments not only influence how people are perceived but also produce consequences for how people are treated.

This is the essential insight of labeling theory, especially when considered in the context of structural inequality. Labeling theory is the idea that, once given a "marker" (or "label"), the so-labeled identity tends to stick and others perceive that person accordingly, regardless of the person's actual social behavior. The person so labeled may even adopt the so-designated identity, thus becoming what others perceive him or her to be. Labeling theory has been extensively applied in the study of deviant behavior, explaining how, once people are labeled as deviant, whether or not they engage in deviant behavior, they are treated as such.

Although used primarily in studies of social deviance and crime, labeling theory is also useful in thinking about other social problems. In schools, for example, who is perceived as "at risk," and what are the consequences of this perception? Race, gender, and class strongly influence such judgments, with young black men especially vulnerable to such attributions.

Where do these social judgments originate? Although surely the mass media are not the only source of such learned assumptions, clearly media depictions of various groups and various social problems strongly influence social stereotypes. How the news portrays social problems, for example, can influence public understanding of social problems. On the one hand, the media, for example, tend to depict violence as if it were random, with anyone having an equal chance of being victimized—an assumption that directly contradicts sociological evidence of the patterned character of violence. At the same time, however, the media also portray social problems via strong class, race, and gender stereotypes. News reports on the state of the economy disproportionately discuss economic events as they affect economic elites and investors, much less often reporting on problems that affect the general workforce. The media's depiction of welfare also shows an increased tendency to identify African American women with images of dependency. And, although media depictions of women have improved in some regard in recent years, women are still highly sexualized and degraded in popular culture. Exposure to sexualized imagery of women has an effect on men's and women's sexual relationships, making relationships more adversarial and making young people more accepting of interpersonal violence.

In summary, although inequality has a strong influence on the generation of the likelihood of social problems, social problems may be more evenly distributed across the population than is commonly perceived, but societal judgments influence the perception and detection of social problems. Because disadvantaged groups are more likely to be overseen by official agencies and are more likely stereotyped in the dominant culture, the appearance is created that they are more prone to social problems.

Inequality and Its Consequences

Another way to think about the influence of inequality on social problems is to examine the consequences of social problems for different groups. This can be seen at different levels—for individuals, for families and communities, and for society as a whole.

At the individual level, experiencing one social problem can lead to others. For example, studies find that having contact with the criminal justice system has a significant effect on one's lifetime earnings, thus exacerbating the initial effect of the problem of criminal labeling. Likewise, experiencing mental illness can decrease an individual's annual income by several thousand dollars. Sexual abuse not only is a problem in and of itself but is also a factor in high rates of school dropout, substance abuse, later sexual violence, prostitution, and even violent offending. However, the consequences of social problems are not always so devastating; social networks can facilitate coping with social problems. At the same time, disruption of one's support networks—influenced in turn by the strength of the network—can lead to further social and psychological distress.

The ripple effect of social problems occurs not just among individuals but also in families and communities. Among college students, for example, studies find that African American students from racially segregated neighborhoods experience higher levels of family stress than do other students—largely because of the social problems found in their home communities.

Finally, social problems have consequences for society as a whole, as is illustrated by considering the

costs of maintaining people in prison versus the cost of investing in education. The government, including federal, state, and local direct costs, is currently spending over $185 billion per year on correctional facilities—a 423 percent increase since 1982. This amounts to $209 per person per year in the United States. And, while educational funding in total is still higher than spending levels for correctional facilities, many argue that the increase in incarceration witnessed in recent years comes at the expense of support for education, especially at the state level. Every social problem a society faces has costly consequences—measured in both economic and social terms. The total cost of teen pregnancy to society is estimated at $9.6 billion per year, measured by summing the costs of public assistance, child health and welfare, incarceration, and lost tax revenues.

There are costs other than economic ones that cannot be measured in quantitative terms. Rising rates of fear in society, high rates of imprisonment, more gated communities (prisons for the lower class, gated housing for elites), and, potentially, greater violence all amount to societal level consequences. Furthermore, economic inequality threatens the very stability of societies and leads to more coercive social control. Cross-national research findings, for instance, show a tendency for expansion of state-based social control when there is internal economic inequality in a given society.

Inequality and Solutions

The strong correlation between inequality and social problems begs the question of what needs to be done to solve some of the nation's most difficult problems. Many analysts are now documenting the increasing inequality characterizing the nation in the early 21st century. Should inequality grow, it is predictable that social problems will increase.

Some policies for change may only exacerbate the problems of social inequality. In education, for example, new programs, such as vouchers, charter schools, and school choice, that are intended to improve educational quality, may only increase racial and class segregation in schooling. Welfare reform, legislated to encourage work and reduce the alleged dependency of women on welfare, has unintended consequences that reproduce inequality. Welfare rolls have been reduced, but poverty has increased; more women formerly on welfare have become employed but in low-wage jobs that have not improved their economic status. And without state support, many have also lost the related benefits—such as subsidized housing, food stamps, child care, and health care—that would otherwise serve them. Thus, while welfare "dependency" may be perceived as less of a problem, homelessness and the impoverishment of women and their children may be worse than ever.

Social changes addressing social problems can come from the "bottom up" through community organizing and grassroots mobilization. Change can also come from the "top down," through state-based action, legal and policy reform, or the application of social services. Either way, thinking about the impact of change on different social groups is a fundamental part of addressing social problem reform. Comprehensive social change engages fundamental questions of national values and the collective commitment to serving all of a nation's people. Where is the balance between values of individual freedom and collective social justice? How can a nation maintain individual freedom to pursue economic success while also supporting a social contract to support the nation's citizenry? Although such value-laden questions are not typically those asked by sociologists researching social problems, they are nonetheless an important component of thinking about the connection between social problems and inequality. It is unlikely that this connection will be severed, but reducing its impact can become more of a national priority.

Margaret L. Andersen

See also Culture of Poverty; Educational Equity; Environmental Racism; Equal Protection; Health Care, Access; Hypersegregation; Income Disparity; Justice; Poverty; Racism; Relative Deprivation; School Segregation; Segregation, Residential; Sentencing Disparities; Sexism; Stratification, Age; Stratification, Gender; Stratification, Race; Stratification, Social; Underclass Debate; Welfare

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Infant Mortality

Infant mortality is the death of an infant less than 1 year old. It is commonly described by the infant mortality rate (IMR), which is calculated by dividing the number of newborns dying at under a year of age by the number of live births during the year within a population. Analysts can use such data to compare the health and well-being of people across and within countries. The health status of infants in a society is a gauge of the overall health of the population and is an important predictor of the next generation's health. The significance of infant mortality to public health and epidemiology is that the rate can determine how successful a population is in preventive health measures for pregnant women, the access to and quality of prenatal care, and rate of immunization in a community.

Historically, infant mortality was responsible for the deaths of a significant percentage of children born around the world, and the death of an infant before his or her first birthday was a common occurrence. However, since the 20th century, improvements in basic health care, sanitation, and living conditions have led to a significant decline of IMRs in the West.

Infant Mortality in the United States

Major causes of U.S. infant mortality include congenital abnormalities, preterm/low birth weight, pregnancy-related problems, respiratory distress syndrome, and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The dramatic decrease in the U.S. IMR during the 20th century primarily reflected fewer babies dying from pneumonia and influenza, prematurity, and low birth weight as a result of better, more available technology and medicine. However, among developed countries, the United States has the second worst newborn mortality rate. The poor IMR in the United States is due to substantial disparities in race/ethnicity, education, income, and health within the population. Overall, not all U.S. racial and ethnic groups have benefited equally from the long-term downward trend in infant mortality.

In the United States, prematurity/low birth weight (less than 5.5 pounds at birth) is one of the major determinants of infant mortality and has been the leading cause of death for black infants for more than a decade. In New York City, for example, infants born to black non-Hispanic mothers have an IMR more than twice the rate of those born to white non-Hispanic mothers. This difference is especially stark in communities with a high percentage of black residents. The factors that contribute to these disparities are difficult to isolate as they interact with each other, but some areas studied include the overall health of the mother, socioeconomic status, and social stressors. The stress of marginalization associated with racism has been investigated as a cause of poorer health among minorities. It is probable that these stressors can have an effect on women before conception as well as during pregnancy, which may contribute to poor birth outcomes. There are also disparities between whites and other ethnic groups. For example, compared with non-Hispanic whites, SIDS deaths among American Indian and Alaska Natives are 2.3 times greater. U.S. efforts to decrease infant mortality across ethnic groups focus not only on the individual behaviors of women but also on the communities in which they live, their economic standing, and their social status, since many factors can affect pregnant women and the health of their babies.

Infant Mortality in Developing Countries

Each year about 2 million babies worldwide die within their first 24 hours, and over 7 million babies born in

sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East do not live to their first birthday. Their deaths most commonly result from pneumonia and dehydration caused by diarrhea. In developing nations, IMRs correlate inversely with a nation's per capita income, and in countries where people make less money the IMR is significantly higher. The relationship between poverty and infant mortality is closely related because the structural conditions of poverty such as poor sanitation, lack of primary health care, malnutrition, and lack of access to clean water can be detrimental to newborns, particularly vulnerable ones.

Social factors within developing countries also have an effect on infant mortality and the ability of newborns to survive their first year. The age at which women have children can affect birth outcomes, with adolescents and women over 40 years old more at risk for giving birth to low birth weight babies. The spacing between births is another factor that can affect birth outcomes. Babies born less than 2 years apart are at greater risk of being born with a vulnerable condition, particularly when they are born to mothers who are malnourished or in a weakened physical state. Influencing interval length between births is access to, and use of, modern contraception methods to control the timing between pregnancies. High IMRs also correlate with high fertility rates, as many families attempt to balance infant deaths by having more babies to ensure the survival of some children to eventually help support the family. Unfortunately, poor parents are often unable to devote enough resources, for such things as education, to each child within a large family, making it difficult to rise out of poverty. Both reducing the IMR within developing countries through improved health conditions and shifting social norms regarding women and childbirth can have a dramatic effect on improving the quality of life of the society.

Martine Hackett

See also Birth Rate; Contraception; Fertility; Health Care, Access; Life Expectancy; Mortality Rate; Poverty; Total Fertility Rate

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Inflation

Simply defined, inflation is a persistent increase in the average price level of goods, commodities, and services. Typically measured as an annual percentage rate of change on an index number, in the United States, the inflation rate finds common expression using the consumer price index (CPI), a time-series measure of a weighted average of prices of a specified set of goods and services. Other key indices track producer prices, wholesale prices, and commodity prices. Currently, the base period for the CPI is the average prices in the 1982–84 period. Since 1950, the average annual inflation rate in the United States, as measured by the CPI, has typically fluctuated between 1 percent and 4 percent. However, the country experienced a much higher average annual inflation rate of 7.09 percent for the 1970–79 period, with a peak in 1974 of 11.1 percent, as a result of the Vietnam War and the price increases caused by the 1973 oil embargo by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

While it is generally acknowledged that economies are likely to function more efficiently if the rate of inflation is low, little consensus exists about the causes of inflation. The two basic categories of inflation in the economic literature are demand-pull inflation and cost-push inflation. Demand-pull inflation comes from increases in aggregate demand, whereas cost-push inflation results from decreases in aggregate supply. In modern economies, however, inflation is not a simple phenomenon of rising prices but is greatly affected by the supply of money. With the advent of fiat money, governments can have a significant impact on the rate of inflation through the manipulation of the money supply and the subsequent impact on the value of money.

An inevitable by-product of inflation is income redistribution, as the burden of increasing prices is not

shared equally across all socioeconomic classes. In general, inflation tends to have a regressive impact due to the disproportionate loss of purchasing power, particularly among lower income groups and those on fixed incomes. Another aspect of income redistribution involves the "inflation tax," caused by the government financing current expenditures through the printing of money. The resulting increase in the money supply has the effect of causing a decrease in the value of cash-based assets.

The sociological literature on inflation is relatively sparse, although there have been a handful of prominent contributions. For instance, an early contribution adopted a social conflict perspective in arguing that the inflationary period of the 1970s was largely a result of an intensification of distributional conflicts between labor and employers. In contrast, a more recent contribution emphasized the growth of the use of monetary policies by governments as a way of understanding the dynamics of inflation. The recent resurgence in economic sociology holds promise for future sociological analyses of inflation and its effects.

Jonathon Mote

See also Budget Deficits, U.S.; Mixed Economy

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Inner City

Social problems related to industrialization, immigration, criminality, and poverty were initially perceived as problems of the city in its entirety and were later associated more with the inner city. With the rapid post–World War II expansion of a distinctive suburban realm, the concept of "inner city" achieved wide currency. The identification of the inner city with social problems is a primarily North American phenomenon, even if exported to other settings such as Great Britain. The inner city was perceived as the converse of the suburbs. Thus suburbs were clean, safe, modern, and mainstream middle class, but the inner city supposedly was dirty, dangerous, outdated, poor, and inhabited by minorities. Indeed, the inner city most often served as a backdrop for film noir.

Clearly, depicting the inner city as a homogeneous entity overtaken by social problems was a gross oversimplification. In most metropolitan regions, the inner city was a complex entity, containing both poor areas and elite enclaves. Still, on the whole, the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were not kind to the inner city. As suburban growth proceeded apace, many inner-city districts lost their middle-class populations and thus underwent a steep filtering-down process. Accelerating socioeconomic decline was a reduction in employment as manufacturing relocated to the suburbs, thus severing the symbiotic relationship previously existing between working-class neighborhoods and closeby sources of employment.

As the condition of their housing deteriorated and perception increased about their poor adaptability to a modern, car-oriented lifestyle, many inner-city neighborhoods became a refuge for residents denied access to other parts of the metropolitan region because of low income and racial segregation. This is when the inner city became synonymous in the media and popular imagination with social pathology. Not without justification, the inner city was portrayed as overridden with poverty, crime, addiction, school abandonment, and teenage pregnancies. As social status declined, so did the housing stock, sometimes to the ultimate abandonment stage. In some cases, as in Detroit and Newark, the inner city still bears the scars of the 1960s riots. Analysts associate inner-city living conditions with the transgenerational reproduction of an "underclass."

Inner-city problems became a target for public policy, such as the urban renewal program, first launched by the 1949 Housing Act, whose purpose was to replace "slums" with public housing and commercial development. But relocation problems and difficult living conditions in public housing projects prompted a revision of policies. The Model Cities program of the 1960s attempted to correct some of the problems of urban renewal by making more room for public participation. Also victimizing the inner city was its location between downtown and the suburbs, which

caused it to be sliced by expressways. Whereas land uses in the suburbs adapted to the presence of expressways, in the inner city these highways generally involved a destruction of the built environment and attendant displacement of residents.

Two books contributed to reversed thinking about the inner city. The Herbert Gans 1962 study of Boston's West End revealed the existence of rich social networks in a neighborhood awaiting renewal. Most influential perhaps was Jane Jacobs, who in 1961 wrote a strong defense of the traditional inner city against the then rising popularity of urban renewal. In *The Death and Life of Great American Cities,* she celebrated the role that the original inner-city landscape, particularly the commercial street, played in fostering intense social interaction. She contrasted the high level of activity she observed along her Greenwich Village street with the desolation and high criminality experienced in areas changed by urban renewal. The message of these two works was clear: The social environment of traditional inner-city neighborhoods was generally superior to that provided by urban renewal projects.

In subsequent decades, favorable views on the inner city spread to well-educated young professionals preferring a central area to suburban living. Fueling the resulting gentrification phenomenon was the appeal of historical architecture, the diversity and street life of core area neighborhoods, and proximity to work for dual-income families. Successions of ever richer and risk-aversive households drove gentrification: first bohemians and struggling artists, then young, upwardly mobile professionals ("yuppies"), and, last, wealthy lawyers, doctors, and executives.

Although a clear cause of homelessness (e.g., the conversion of a rooming house containing 20 low-income tenants into an impeccably restored home for a single wealthy couple), the view that gentrification itself is responsible for the replacement of the working class by richer professionals is an oversimplification. First, such a transition stems in part from the shrinkage of the traditional middle class accompanied by the rise of professional and managerial categories. Second, many well-educated newcomers to core area neighborhoods were in fact marginal gentrifiers, sharing the values, tastes, education, and some professional attributes of mainstream gentrifiers, but without a stable financial and professional situation.

Gentrification typically affected former working-class neighborhoods with the most distinctive architecture and best accessibility to amenities and employment, bypassing the ones severely deteriorated and crime-ridden. In large prosperous metropolitan regions, however, the entire inner city is now subject to gentrification or condominium redevelopment, another source of social change.

The inner city evolved into a place of extremes, a mirror of the economic polarization of recent decades. It is not unusual to find expensive condos juxtaposed with parks harboring large homeless populations. Conflicts flare easily in such environments, for example, when marginal residents are displaced to prevent their interference with economic development strategies targeted at the middle class and tourists.

From an urban planning perspective, interest in the inner city has recently been stimulated by the smart growth movement, which relies in part on core area revitalization and intensification to counter sprawl and growing automobile dependence.

Pierre Filion

See also Gentrification; Social Change; Urban Decline; Urban Renewal; Urban Underclass; White Flight

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Inner-Ring Suburb

Inner-ring suburbs, or what some call "first" suburbs, are communities that developed just outside of central cities during the period following World War II. Initially these suburbs were bedroom communities for mostly affluent, white residents who commuted back

and forth, often by streetcar, from work in the urban core to their home life in a safe, low-density neighborhood. Levittowns are examples of such communities.

Studying the characteristics of inner-ring suburbs is not a straightforward process. U.S. Census Bureau data are limited in the definition of suburbs as the residual portion of metropolitan areas that lies outside of central cities. Given this amorphous category, it is hard to distinguish between inner- and outer-ring suburbs. Case studies of specific metropolitan areas, particularly those that are more historical in nature, more clearly distinguish between inner- and outer-ring suburbs.

However, until recently, few studies identified differences among suburbs on a national level. The best strategy, established by researchers at the Brookings Institution, goes back to the 1950 decennial census and identifies counties that were part of the metropolitan United States at that time, which were adjacent to, or included, the top 100 cities. The county or the portion of the county that did not contain the central city was designated as an inner-ring, or first, suburb. In total, 64 counties were identified using this technique, including Nassau, New York; Arlington, Virginia; and Middlesex, Massachusetts.

Using this methodology, researchers have learned much about the character of inner-ring suburbs, relative to newer, or outer-ring, suburbs and central cities. One of the most striking features of inner-ring suburbs is that they housed nearly one fifth of the U.S. population in 2000, while central cities and newer suburbs housed 12.9 and 14.3 percent of the U.S. population, respectively. Equally important is the fact that the nature of the population in inner-ring suburbs is racially and ethnically diverse. In 2000, one third of the population in these areas comprised racial/ethnic minorities, surpassing the proportional representation at the national level (30 percent). Moreover, 29 percent of the U.S. foreign-born population lived in inner-ring suburbs, compared with 28 percent living in central cities. Finally, inner-ring suburbs have maintained a higher socioeconomic status. For example, in 2000, 31 percent of the adult population in these areas had a college education, compared with 26 percent and 28 percent in central cities and outer-ring suburbs, respectively. Likewise, average housing values in 2000 were the highest in inner-ring suburbs.

Whether the future of inner-ring suburbs is as bright as their past, however, remains to be seen. Poverty rates have been growing in these areas, particularly during the 1990s. More alarming is the fact that their poor neighborhoods have grown in recent decades, while there has been a general reduction of such neighborhoods in central cities. With trends in urban sprawl continuing, the future for inner-ring suburbs appears to be a challenging one.

Samantha Friedman

See also Urbanization; Urban Sprawl

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Innocence Project

The Innocence Project is a nonprofit legal clinic that originally focused only on cases where postconviction DNA testing of evidence could demonstrate an individual's innocence. The Innocence Project was started by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld in 1992 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, where students worked (and still do) on cases involving a defendant's innocence under supervision of a team of attorneys and clinic staff. Focusing invariably on indigent defendants, the Innocence Project typically enters into a case as a last resort, after an individual has exhausted all other legal avenues for relief.

As DNA technology became more accessible, other innocence projects began in law schools across the United States. By the end of 2006, innocence projects were operating at 40 law schools in every region of the United States. Increasingly, such projects broadened the scope of their investigation from only cases involving DNA testing to a wide array of cases involving other important indicators of a defendant's innocence, including faulty eyewitness testimony and police or prosecutorial misconduct. The projects have been remarkably successful in proving innocence. Indeed, by August 2006, at least 183 people had been exonerated by postconviction DNA testing, and literally hundreds more had been exonerated based on other types of evidence.

Although the empirical literature on wrongful convictions has grown exponentially in the wake of the innocence project movement of the past 15 years, social scientists began investigating the issue as early as 1932. Edwin Borchard's classic, *Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five Errors of Criminal Justice,* provides fascinating documentation of wrongful convictions stemming from prosecutorial and police

misconduct, ineffective counsel, racial discrimination, mistaken identification in eyewitness testimony, and perjury of witnesses. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, other studies of wrongful convictions, such as E. S. Gardner's *The Court of Last Resort* of 1952, Frank and Frank's *Not Guilty* of 1957, and Edward D. Radin's classic *The Innocents* of 1964 documented similar findings.

The high-profile exonerations of 13 death row prisoners in Illinois in 2000 led to the creation of more innocence projects and more available funding for empirical analysis of wrongful convictions. Recent research on wrongful convictions provided new and important insight into this phenomenon. Sophisticated quantitative analyses of wrongful convictions discovered that the quality of appellate defense was an important and statistically significant predictor of whether or not a defendant was wrongfully convicted of a capital crime.

In the policy arena, innocence projects have recently made a significant impact on the development of national legislation—most notably the passage of the Innocence Protection Act of 2004 (IPA). Relying chiefly on the testimony of Barry Scheck and other leaders in the innocence project movement, the IPA provides rules and procedures for federal inmates applying for DNA testing. Specifically, IPA creates a Post-Conviction DNA Testing Grant Program, authorizes grants to states for improving their capital prosecution and capital defender programs, and provides funding to assist families of murder victims.

Benjamin Fleury-Steiner

See also Capital Punishment; Prison

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Institutional Ethnography

Institutional ethnography is an alternative sociology that examines social relations and social institutions from the standpoint of the experiences of particular, active subjects. It is distinct from other sociological modes of investigation in that it is not under the direction or conceptual control of any sociological theory; rather, inquiry begins in and remains in the social world in which we live.

The aims of institutional ethnography investigations are twofold. The first is to discover how it is that day in and day out we put together our social world, including how our local everyday activities are linked to and coordinated by social relations that are not entirely visible from any one location. Thus, institutional ethnography research expands people's knowledge of their everyday worlds beyond that which they develop through their routine participation. The second aim is to build knowledge of institutional processes in general and to develop new ways of discovering ruling relations. This work involves an examination of studies done in varied institutional settings and drawing out those relations and social processes commonly found across institutions. Throughout institutional ethnography investigations, however, the focus is on the material world: what people are doing, with whom they are doing it, and the conditions under which their activities are carried out.

Canadian sociologist and founder of institutional ethnography Dorothy E. Smith described institutional ethnography in the 1970s as an articulation of the women's movement in North America. She identified two different modes of consciousness active in her life of running a household and being a mother and her life as a scholar in the university. The life in the home was one of particularities and real people, whereas the life of the university was abstract and the social relations were extra-local. Yet, through her involvement in the women's movement, Smith learned to take her own experience as a woman as the basis for how she could know the world. She also realized, as did many others involved in the women's movement, that the academic disciplines were written almost exclusively by men and from their viewpoint. Furthermore, the disciplines—sociology in Smith's case—claimed objectivity while excluding women, their knowledge, and their concerns from the scholarly discourse. Smith concluded that it was necessary to remake sociology from the ground up. This alternative sociology would be a "sociology *for* women," one which would discover the social relations which shaped women's everyday experiences.

In 1986, the term *institutional ethnography* first appeared in print in Smith's article "Resources for Feminist Research." Indeed, the conceptual design of

institutional ethnography was to aid women in understanding the social organization of their lives. Yet, it soon became evident that the social relations shaping the experiences of women shaped those of men as well, and in the 1990s institutional ethnography evolved as a "sociology for people." A network of institutional ethnographers (many of whom were students of Smith at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education) formed, and they initiated research from the standpoint of people with AIDS, teachers, social workers, nurses, nursing home residents, and others.

The topics of institutional ethnography research are generally some issues or problems that people experience in their everyday lives, but the starting point (or point of departure) for the investigation is people's actual experiences. This research is a two-step process. In the first step research begins with one's own experience or with that of another actor, but in either case special attention focuses on what people actually do and on what they say about their activities. That is, the researchers attend to "work" and work "knowledges." In institutional ethnography the term *work* expands beyond the sphere of paid labor to include any intended activity taking time and effort. "Work knowledges" refers to what people know of their work and how this work is coordinated with the work of others. Through the exploration of work and work knowledges, researchers learn of the local social organization and of the actors' knowledge of this organization. Furthermore, people's work and talk of work provide clues to the investigators regarding how local organization connects to the coordinating work of others. In the second step the researchers take up the clues, as evidence of local participation in the institutional practices, and trace this evidence—found in the form of discourse, spoken and textual—to the extra-local social relations.

Institutional ethnography research commonly examines texts, especially those replicable and standardized, since they coordinate people's activities in local settings. They mediate social relations, coordinating the doings of people translocally. Texts, as taken up in local settings, enter actions and organize actions at multiple sites. While one party in the text is fixed, the reader is not. While attending to a text, the reader is active in interpreting and acting upon the text; that is, a text–reader conversation forms. In the text–reader conversation, the reader "activates" the text by taking it up and incorporating it into the local setting, thus hooking the local into the institutional. By activating the text, the reader becomes an agent of the text. This is not to imply that the text completely controls the reader. The reader may resist or disagree with the textual discourse, but through its activation, the text becomes unavoidable. Furthermore, in many work processes, one textual step follows another textual step, each dependent upon the prior step and the anticipated next step, and so on. Thus, filled-out forms and generated reports transform particular events into generalized forms that are critical in coordinating the work of others. Such regulation through texts is widespread in modern, literate societies, and it is a foundational consideration in institutional ethnographic investigations.

Institutional Ethnography of "Social Problems"

In sociology, "social problems" emerge as social objects through the ongoing research and theoretical activity of sociologists, and their existence then becomes taken for granted within the discipline. However, as both the discipline and the historical contexts evolve, a reconstruction of these social problems often follows. Smith, however, noted a difficulty with this objectification of social problems and suggested that social problems be viewed as a form of social organization operating within public text-mediated discourse, a complex of social relations within relations of ruling. As this social organization enters the local and particular actualities, experiences connect with, and translate into, standardized and generalized forms. This is a political process by which a particular experience becomes known as a social problem and other troubles align with it as cases of the social problem. Thus, "social problems" serve as a mechanism by which particular interests acquire objective status. The discourse of social problems provides a statement of general interest which may be contradicted if investigations of so-called social problems begin with experience in the local setting, rather than with interpretations provided by sociological discourse. For example, what appears as a problem of "illiteracy" or of "single-parent families" in the discourse may be found to be a shortcoming of capitalist practices in the local setting.

Paul C. Luken

See also Ethnomethodology; Feminism; Feminist Theory; Social Constructionist Theory; Standpoint Theory

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Intergenerational Mobility

Intergenerational mobility refers to the movement of individuals and groups away from the station of their parents or other forebears. Intergenerational movements across socioeconomic class boundaries are the hallmark of open societies and a central concern among social scientists.

Open societies, sometimes referred to as class societies, are those in which intergenerational mobility is possible. In such circumstances it is common to find adult children fairing better than their parents—upward mobility—on an assortment of socioeconomic indicators. Conversely, we can reasonably expect to find some adult children fairing worse than their parents—downward mobility—though this has less often been the case in more developed and developing societies. Closed societies, often referred to as caste societies, are those in which the socioeconomic statuses of parents are entirely predictive of those of their adult children, with little possibility for any social mobility. The prevalence and character of intergenerational mobility may gauge the extent of meritocratic or democratic practice in a given society, but measuring intergenerational mobility is not straightforward.

Children may outperform or underperform their parents on several different dimensions. Some of the most widely recognized studies of intergenerational mobility compare occupational statuses of adults with those of their parents. Because occupational status changes relatively infrequently, it may be appropriate to compare parents and children at a single point in time. However, because income and wealth tend to increase as individuals advance toward retirement age, there is a crucial temporal dimension that must be considered in any attempt to assess intergenerational mobility.

The most accurate assessments of intergenerational mobility examine the achievements of two or more generations viewed at the same or a similar place in the life course. For example, it may be misleading to compare 50-year-old parents with their 25-year-old children since the former group is, on average, well established whereas their adult children are "just getting started" and may be in transient class locations. Using such a comparison, we might conclude that children are fairing worse than their parents and thus must have experienced downward mobility. A comparison of the same group of adult children with their parents 25 years earlier, when the parents themselves were 25 years old, would likely lead to different, more accurate, conclusions regarding the extent and character of intergenerational mobility.

However it is measured, upward intergenerational mobility was a pronounced feature of the 20th-century American experience. Immigration, urbanization, industrialization, and education are a few of the factors that facilitated this trend by introducing children of relatively humble origins—children of immigrants, children of farmers, lower- and working-class children, and racial minority children—into an opportunity structure that, while not free of discrimination, was more open than at any time in the past. In the early years of the 21st century, declining educational funding and quality, export of entry-level jobs, declining influence of labor unions, a minimum wage not keeping up with inflation, and regressive taxation have made significant (upward) intergenerational mobility more difficult. This is particularly true for lower- and working-class parents and children who are disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities.

Amon Emeka

See also Social Mobility; Stratification, Social

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Interlocking Directorates

Applied to a pair or small group of organizations, *interlocking directorates* are instances of persons serving on the board of directors of multiple organizations, constituting an overlap in membership among the boards of those organizations. Applied to a population of organizations, the term *interlocking directorates* refers to a condition in which there are sufficient board member overlaps among the organizations that a path can be traced between any two organizations in the set, either directly or via a series of board overlaps between intermediary organizations. This condition typifies many interorganizational environments. Often the organizations of interest are large corporations, in which instances of interlocking directorates are also known as *corporate interlocks*.

Organizational theories suggest interlocking directorates may serve organizations in a variety of ways. They provide a channel of communication between organizations, which can then facilitate interorganizational coordination, be a vector for the diffusion of innovations, and enable values and practices to become normative across organizations. Director interlocks may also provide a competitive advantage in surviving in an uncertain environment, by providing information about that environment and acting as agents of the organization. Resource dependence theory specifically sees interlocking directorates as a device for gaining access to needed resources, expertise, price advantages, or lower transaction costs, a view supported by the tendency of firms to have representatives of suppliers, large customers, and experts in law and finance on their boards.

Critics of capitalism see interlocking directorates variously as means by which individual capitalists centralize power and exercise control of corporations in which they have an ownership stake, as a device for capitalist class cohesion and collective control over organizational resources and thus the economy and politics, or as a mechanism of bank control whereby commercial lending institutions ensure the safety of and return on their capital loans to industry while exercising control over the economy.

Interlocking directorates have been viewed as a social problem since the anti-trust movement, circa 1900, because their existence calls into question the independence of corporate governance, they aid in suppressing competition, and they contribute to monopoly or oligopoly control of sectors of the economy, thus upsetting market pricing and possibly retarding product development. As a means by which a power elite may have control of economic and political resources, interlocking directorates are also relevant to the study of social inequalities, the distribution of resources in society, and the understanding of the impact of formal organizations on a variety of social problems.

Conversely, interlocking directorates can aid in addressing social problems by providing channels of resource mobilization, as shown by the tendency of philanthropic donations to follow interlocks between corporate and charity organizations, or providing a mechanism for coordinating service organizations. Interlocking directorates as a strategy for negotiating a competitive and uncertain environment and coordinating with other organizations could also be viewed as a solution to social problems from the perspective of an organization.

As a type of social network, interlocking directorates are often studied using the methodological tools of social network analysis.

Blyden Potts

See also Class; Inequality; Monopolies; Oligopoly; Power Elite; Resource Mobilization

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Intermarriage

Intermarriage is the marriage between spouses of different races or different ethnicities and is therefore either inter-racial or interethnic. Marriage between a white and a black is an inter-racial marriage, while a

marriage between a Japanese and a Chinese is an interethnic marriage. The difference between race and ethnicity, however, is not always clear. Interethnic marriages have a much longer history than do inter-racial marriages in the United States. Even in early colonial times, European immigrants of different nationalities and religions intermarried. Inter-racial marriages, on the other hand, have faced higher social stigma and legal restrictions that did not end until after the mid-20th century.

In scholarly writings, intermarriage can also refer to a union between spouses of different social characteristics. For example, a marriage between an educated person and an uneducated person might be called an educational intermarriage, regardless of the couple's race or ethnicity. References to such intermarriages, however, are rather limited.

Similar to intramarriages, intermarriages occur for reasons such as romantic attractions and status matching between partners, but intermarriages are associated with higher probabilities of divorce than intramarriages, due to the greater social barriers the intermarried couples often have to face. Studies of marital happiness also yielded evidence that intermarried couples tend to report lower levels of marital satisfaction.

U.S. intermarriages have steadily increased in the past few decades, growing from 0.7 percent of all marriages in 1970 to 5.4 percent in 2000, while the actual number of such marriages rose by tenfold in the same period. The Census Bureau reports that the most common type of intermarriage occurs between whites and Asians.

Why do people marry out of their racial or ethnic groups? Sociological theories on intermarriage basically fall into two categories: availability and choice. Availability of potential marriage partners speaks to the structural constraints that either promote or limit intermarriages. The most important structural constraints are the number of racial or ethnic groups in the marriage market and the relative sizes and internal sex ratios of these groups. More groups potentially lead to more intermarriages, whereas group sizes inversely affect intermarriage rates. Because intermarriage involves spouses from two groups, the same number of such marriages dictates different rates between large groups and small groups, with the latter inevitably carrying higher rates. Imbalanced sex ratios of the marriageable population within a group, on the other hand, will "force" the extra men or women to outmarry. Many immigrant groups in the United States initially experienced severe sex ratio imbalances as a result of gender-specific immigration. For these groups, intermarriage rates often differed by gender.

The second category of theories that explain intermarriage focuses on choices for mates, mostly status exchange between couples. The increased intermarriages in the United States in recent decades coincided with higher educational achievements of many minorities and their participation in the labor force with whites of comparable socioeconomic status. Both the educational institutions and the workplace provide opportunities for inter-racial and interethnic interactions between people of similar statuses, thus promoting intermarriages. Rising intermarriages, in turn, reduce stigma against intergroup relations and make intermarriages a more accepted choice. Besides similar socioeconomic status, cultural preference is another consideration of mate selection, with people choosing mates with similar traditions, religions, and other cultural practices. This tendency explains selective intermarriage within large ethnic circles, such as pan-Asian, pan-Hispanic, and pan–Pacific Islanders. For example, Asians of different nationalities tend to intermarry more often than they marry non-Asians.

Choice is, of course, not independent of availability, and the two interact to affect a racial group's interracial or interethnic marriage rates. High concentration of a minority group may provide higher availability of within-group mates, in addition to promoting close-knit cultural settings that strengthen ingroup solidarity that might work against intergroup relations. Asian Americans, for example, are highly concentrated on the West Coast, especially in California, where Asian intermarriage rates are lower than in other states, after controlling for social status.

Choice by gender and race also seems to occur in the inter-racial marriage market. White–black intermarriages are more likely between white women and black men, while white–Asian intermarriages tend to be between white men and Asian women, although the reverse patterns have slowly increased in recent decades.

Intermarriage serves as an indicator of a minority group, especially an immigrant group, integrating or assimilating into the mainstream society, especially through intermarriage with whites. Outmarriage rates by themselves, however, may not indicate how likely a group will be to outmarry, because group size affects these rates. Through the use of complicated statistical models, sociologists can measure tendencies of

endogamy (ingroup marriage) and exogamy (outgroup marriage) by controlling for group size and other factors. Such studies often find that whites are less endogamous than most minorities. That is, minorities actually have a stronger tendency to keep their members in within-group marriages.

Xuanning Fu

See also Assimilation; Cultural Capital; Cultural Values; Race; Segmented Assimilation

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Internal Colonialism

The concepts of "internal colonies" and "internal colonization" embrace expansive interdisciplinary efforts to explain economic, class, cultural, and racial domination and subordination of groups and geographies within the boundaries of a single society. *Internal colonies* refer to geographic sites that are often spatially controlled, dominated, and destabilized cultural lifeworlds and to underdeveloped and exploited regions, communities, and groups. Internal colonies exist even when dominant and subordinated groups intermingle and geographies are blurred. *Internal colonization* refers to the historical and contemporary processes of maintaining domination and subordination. These explorations examine the incorporation and cross-fertilization of class, racial, and sexual domination in a country's internal colonies; the role of the state, market, and dominant civic organizations in disciplining the colonial order; the presence of political subjugation; the function of legal and extra-legal forms of domination and violence; and the significance of ideology and culture.

Studies of internal colonies and internal colonization overlay a broad swath of groups and countries from blacks and Chicanos/as in the United States to Northern Ireland as an underdeveloped English internal colony. Studies utilize the concepts to investigate realities as disparate as the underdevelopment of poor children in public schools to environmental racism.

The concepts have a contentious history. Lenin, Marx, and Gramsci referred to internal colonies in their characterizations of peripheral underdeveloped areas in European countries. W. E. B. Du Bois, Robert Blauner, and other U.S. scholars employed a similar framework in looking at the underdevelopment of blacks.

Despite the promise of the initial conceptual developments, antipathy to Marxist analyses, particularly in the United States, limited the full integration of the concepts of internal colonies into the social sciences, public administration, and development studies. Even though some U.S. analysts at the turn of the 20th century encouraged the study of American colonization and empire, official exhortations and academic texts minimized the country's colonizing history of Native Americans, Mexicans, blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos/as under the rubric of "American exceptionalism." Furthermore, the cold war erected a particularly inhibiting barrier to the integration of the concepts. The United States promoted capitalist modernization as an alternative to socialism, promising newly independent countries that lessons learned from the history of Western industrialization translated into concrete, positive prescriptions for modern industrial development. Few American analysts, notably those shaping and writing the dominant theories and texts on race relations, attempted to show that the underdeveloped "ghettos"—Appalachia and similar peripheral areas in the United States—were not modernized by industrialization. U.S. diplomats also squashed efforts by blacks to present their case of internal underdevelopment to the United Nations.

The concepts reemerged in the 1960s and the 1970s, influenced by a confluence of events and studies, including the global anti-colonial struggles and the civil rights movement, especially the Black Power movement; new theories of colonial hegemony; renewed global interpretations of the core, periphery, and semiperiphery represented by dependency theories; world-systems theory and labor market segmentation; new historical interpretations of

colonialism and imperialism; and the emergence of postcolonial studies.

Walter Stafford

See also Black Power Movement; Chicano Movement; Conflict Perspective; Hegemony; Inner City; World-Systems Analysis

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Invasion-Succession

Ernest W. Burgess and other Chicago School sociologists developed the concept of "invasion-succession" in the 1920s to describe land use in the expanding U.S. industrial cities. Borrowing ecological concepts from natural science, Burgess saw the city's land use as a mosaic resulting from market forces plus the cultural preferences of distinct groups of residents. Enlarged by migration, cities expanded outward from the central intersection of their rail, water, and trolley routes. Profitable enterprises—banks, law firms, department stores—and individuals with an interest in a central location were able to command commercial space in the business district or housing in adjacent "gold coast" apartments. Factories relying on ports and railroads dominated nearby areas. Their need for workers attracted migrants from the rural South as well as displaced farmers and laborers from overseas. Forced by poverty to take the cheapest housing, newcomers congregated in densely packed tenements in and near the factory zones. Speculators facilitated this clustering by building insubstantial rental flats and subdividing older housing that was abandoned as the wealthy moved on. Residents able to pool family wages were sometimes able to purchase buildings in these areas, creating temporary stability and facilitating ethnic homogeneity.

In-migrants, often lacking English, created ethnic enclaves in these zones of first settlement to reproduce familiar cultures. They supported churches and synagogues, religious schools, ethnic shops and restaurants, athletic teams, newspapers, and night life. The congruence between enclaves and political wards allowed residents to elect officials who delivered jobs, contracts, and services. The concentration of enclave populations supported an ethnic small business class and preserved familiar ways of life in otherwise alien cities.

These neighborhoods, however, also experienced disequilibrium. Where central business districts expanded into these zones, office buildings replaced tenements. When residents adjusted to urban life and took advantage of expanding economies, they increased their incomes and sought better housing elsewhere. Many in the native-born generation sought greater independence from ethnic oversight by moving to less-homogeneous areas of second settlement. At the same time, a succession of new groups arrived. Initially, Irish wards became dominated by Jews or Italians. Some of these, in turn, became African American neighborhoods. The transition could be peaceful or conflictive, depending on its speed and the state of competition for the cheapest housing. The fact that the wider society invidiously sorted groups by race and ethnicity at the border, at work, and in politics heightened ethnic tensions while the need to share political and religious institutions promoted accommodating shifts in resources.

In the 1960s, manufacturing began a sharp decline in U.S. cities. Using the power of eminent domain and federal subsidies for "slum clearance," cities sought renewal by demolishing the many ethnic neighborhoods remaining on the edge of their central business districts. Often office towers and convention centers took their place as economies shifted to a service base. While luxury apartment towers lured many white-collar professionals from the suburbs to the urban core, others sought out and renovated what remained of older substantial housing and converted obsolete industrial lofts into spacious living quarters. Artists replaced garment workers and were themselves replaced by attorneys; tenements that continued to house the oldest and least mobile Italians or Ukrainians were converted to upscale housing by speculators and expanding universities. This gentrification, initiated by professionals who saw themselves as "pioneers in the urban wilderness," was quickly seized upon by city governments. They delineated historical districts, zoned streets for pedestrian use, moved cultural facilities downtown, and encouraged developers to create "festival marketplaces" for well-off residents and tourists. In many cases, a restaurant

veneer of an ethnic enclave was all that remained. Government worked hand in hand with the postindustrial economy in this invasion-succession dynamic, enhancing the overall economy of cities but at the price of reducing the stock of affordable housing and ignoring manufacturing employment.

Charles R. Simpson

See also Urban Decline; Urban Infrastructure; Urbanization; Urban Renewal; Urban Sprawl

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IQ Testing

Intelligence quotient (IQ) testing is scientifically controversial and has a varied history. Most IQ tests consist of verbal and performance test items that result in a score with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. As such, the majority of the population (84 percent) lies in a range of 85 to 115 on most IQ tests. Of the numerous discussions of the 20th-century development of intelligence measures, most conclude with one or more of the following precepts:

1. Current cognitive ability measures, traditionally called "IQ tests," now use broader definitions of intelligence factors and less age/development focus, so instead of the descriptor "IQ," "cognitive" or "ability" or "intelligence" or "intellectual aptitude" is more commonly used.
2. Although part of cognitive ability is inherited, debate continues as to the exact proportion and influence of genetics versus environment.
3. IQ or cognitive ability tests are strong predictors of academic achievement and social success within groups, but score variability due to education and opportunity makes individual predictions possible but not definitive.
4. IQ tests effectively screen for cognitive strengths and weaknesses deserving special education opportunities, including programs for the retarded or gifted. Discrepancies between IQ scores and specific areas of achievement are often used to diagnosis learning disabilities.

Despite demonstrated uses of cognitive ability measures (IQ tests) in schools and employment, a number of scholarly works debate social consequences, ethnic discrimination, and biological determinism. Certainly scholars differ on the use or potential misuse of IQ tests; some even hold that intelligence is social in origin.

Recent research examines recognized phenomena not yet completely explained. These include the notion of multiple intelligences, the longitudinal increase in IQ over the past century, and emotional intelligence as a corollary of cognitive intelligence. All of these lines of scholarship start with traditional IQ testing as a historical or psychometric basis for a springboard to new theories and measures.

Regardless, the widespread use of IQ tests continues and will likely be a topic of research and discussions for the foreseeable future. Started in 1946, an international organization (MENSA) open only to the top 2 percent of IQ-tested people now has more than 100,000 members, suggesting that IQ testing has a popularly desirable outcome for high scorers. No doubt the theories and measures of factors underlying the popular notion of intelligence will continue to foster research and debate.

William S. Lang

See also Basic Skills Testing; Minimum Competency Test

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Islam and Modernity

The evolution of religion and its relationship to the rest of society was a major topic of early sociological theory. One of its earliest and most persistent propositions—reaffirmed by many contemporary theorists of the sociology of religion—is that religion, like any other institution, is a dynamic entity and that its functional differentiation is a fundamental part of social processes. In this theoretical framework, religious institutional arrangements are thought to be evolving according to the perceived needs of the sociohistorical time period. As religion impacts the larger society, it too is impacted by the dominant patterns of society. Moreover, the various institutional arrangements either support or are in competition with one another. However, the topic of Islam and modernity, as it has evolved in the modern era, is a complex one largely due to shifting and multidimensional interpretations of both Islam and the concept of modernity.

The word *Islam,* which means "surrender," is related to the Arabic word *salaam,* or "peace." Islam as a religion means "submission to the will of God." It stands in a long line of Abrahimic religious traditions that share an uncompromising monotheism. The foundation of Islamic values and practices is the Koran and Hadith, which are composed of the teachings and the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. For Muslims, the Koran is the Book of God (Allah) revealed to Muhammad by means of the angel Gabriel. In a very deep sense, Islam is the Koran and the Koran is Islam. Today Islam is the religion of one fifth of the world's population (1.2 billion), and, as the second largest religion, it exists not only in the Middle East but also in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, Europe, and the United States.

Modernity is a term used to describe the condition of being "modern." Since the term *modern* is used to describe a wide range of periods, modernity must be taken in context. In the field of sociology, many of the defining characteristics of modernity—such as specialization, rationalization, secularization, and universalism—stem from the relatively small communities to the more large-scale societies. In this context, social changes which are common to many different levels of social integration are not limited to the Western European societies. In other words, modernization is a general, abstract process, also found in non-Western societies, including Islamic society.

The Evolution of Islam

For more than 1,400 years, Islam has been in a constant state of evolution, going through many phases in its development, including the formation of nation-states in the Muslim world. However, Islam has not yet evolved to a point where there is a separation of religion and state, as found in the history of Western civilization. Historically, Islam developed both as a faith and as a political order. While Islam provided the basic framework of meaning and direction for political, social, and cultural life, it has continually adapted to the cultural, political, and social realities of various regions.

Thus, throughout history, Islam manifested itself in different cultures and societies, creating in each case a unique expression of Islamic culture. This evolutionary process gave rise to an Islamic civilization that is multiracial and multicultural.

Islam also inspired a rich civilization in which Muslim scholars made important advances in sciences such as mathematics, algebra (itself an Arabic word), astronomy, and medicine. Muslim scholars have long been recognized for their contributions to the preservation of classical learning during the Dark Ages. It was through Muslim thinkers' translations of the Greek works of Plato, Aristotle, and other classical thinkers that these works reached Europe and contributed to the first flowerings of the Renaissance. Most Islamic thinkers maintain that the initial encounter between Islam and the West during Islam's early years of expansion represented a dynamic and fruitful interaction. According to many historians, this was because Islam possessed ample power to absorb and assimilate intercultural elements. Some historians even maintain that despite the fact that the history of Christianity and Islam has been marked by mutual hostility and confrontation, medieval Islam was a religion of remarkable tolerance for its time, allowing Jews and Christians the right to practice their religions. Thus, in its prime time, during the period that Islam was a dominant and expanding civilization, it exhibited a great amount of tolerance.

However, the "Golden Age" of Islam was short-lived and lasted only a few centuries. By the 12th century, a decline in the political and intellectual development of the Islamic world had set in. Most Islamic thinkers agree that the impediment to change was not Islam itself as a religion but rather the emergence of religiopolitical structure in the Islamic

world. Other historians believe that this decline was due to the reinterpretation of Islam by powerful conservative religious leaders.

Islam in Modern Times

The history of Islam in modern times is essentially the history of the Western impact on Muslim societies. The modern era in Islam's history can be said to begin around 1800 CE, which marks the time when Napoleon Bonaparte and his forces were in Egypt. Following that, the European powers colonized one Islamic country after another. Thus, the rise of modern Europe coincided with European colonial rule, a humiliating experience for Muslims conscious of their proud past. After World War I, the European invasion of the Islamic world intensified as a result of more political and economic dominance.

Cultural and political confrontations with Europe caused Muslims to become defensive and more hostile toward Western political and cultural influences. In the shadow of European colonialism, Muslim thinkers and intellectuals developed conflicting strategies to reconcile traditional Islamic values with modernity. Their responses to modernity provoked a great deal of controversy, particularly among Muslim thinkers and *Ulema* (religious leaders). Secularists, while overemphasizing external factors such as colonialism and imperialism as the cause of the rapid decline of the Islamic world, advocated the restriction of religion to private affairs and its exclusion from public life. Meanwhile, the conservative sectors led by religious leaders conceived of Islam not only as a religion that allowed for no change but also as a total way of life. These religious leaders also became increasingly suspicious of independent reasoning or personal reinterpretation (*Ijtihad*). Ijtihad is an inherent tradition in Islam and serves as a juristic tool that allows for independent reasoning to articulate Islamic law on the issues where textual sources are silent. The conservatives did not favor "opening the door of Ijtihad," whereas the Islamic reformists argued that Ijtihad equipped Muslims to meet the challenge of social change by the reinterpretation of Islam. In other words, to the reformists, Ijtihad was a tool to reconcile Islamic values with modernity.

Like most religious traditions, Islam has had, and continues to have, multiple interpretations and applications throughout its history and even more so today. As a result, there are a variety of Islamic movements, which display the many faces and forms of Islam. However, the phenomenon of interpretation and reinterpretation in Islam is complicated by the fact that no organized hierarchy or centralized religious authority exists in Islam. Religious authority in Islam is distributed among numerous Ulema and jurists whose authority stems from the willingness of the faithful to accept their decrees (*fatva*).

The concept of Islam and modernity as presently conceived can be best explained by focusing on the developments that have occurred in the past 4 decades in the Muslim world. Since the late 1960s, Islamic revivalism has increasingly come to dominate religious and political discourse in much of the Muslim world. Muslim thinkers and political activists in Iran and other Islamic societies have responded to Western-style modernity in a variety of ways. However, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, there has been a sharpened distinction between two general approaches or orientations toward modernization: the traditionalists and the reformists. The key difference between traditionalists and reformists is their understanding and interpretations of the Koran, Islamic history, and prophet traditions. (It must be noted that this categorization is somewhat arbitrary and that individuals and groups may overlap from one orientation to another.)

Traditionalists define Islam in a narrow and restrictive sense. They maintain that Islamic traditions are fixed and fully articulated in the past. Therefore, any change is regarded as a departure from what they call the "straight path" of Islam. The traditionalists emphasize the total self-sufficiency and comprehensiveness of Islam, and when they speak of Islamization, they mean a reinstituting of the *Shariah,* or traditional Islamic law. The traditionalists reject modernity, which they perceive to mean Western secularism and popular sovereignty. They believe Islam is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. However, whereas modernity as a general process is rejected, selective modernization in the areas of science and technology is not. The basic tenet of traditionalists is a demand for a return to "pure" Islam, if not the "original" Islam. This orientation has its roots in the fiercely independent traditionalist interpretation of Islam by the Wahhabists in modern Saudi Arabia.

The reformists' view is in sharp contrast to views held by the traditionalists, particularly the conservative Ulema, who have historically preoccupied themselves with the literal interpretation of the Koran. The

reformists believe that Islamic principles and values can be applied to meet modernity. Whatever the differences in orientation and agenda, reformists believe that Islam is compatible with the core values of modernity, such as individual freedom and democratic values. Leading reformists have argued that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy. They view the traditionalists' view on Islam and politics as too rigid and not workable for the realities of modern life. Moreover, the reformists maintain that Islam itself is evolving as a religion and that the will and beliefs of the majority must shape the Islamic state. However, the reformists do not think of modernity in terms of a total break from the past or historical Islamic culture. To reformists, modernity implies not only new and better technologies and improved standards of living but also a political culture in which Islamic values are cherished and individual rights are protected.

Today, a combination of mass education, mass communication, and political awareness is dramatically transforming the Muslim-majority world. While the conflict between the traditionalists and reformists persists, the reformists have expanded the ongoing debate of modernity and Islam to include democratic issues such as pluralism, women's rights, and human rights. However, the central proposal of the reformists continues to be a demand for the reopening of the door of Ijtihad (modern Islamic interpretation), to allow for the adaptation of Islamic laws to the realities of modern life.

Despite setbacks in recent years, particularly the politicization of Islam by extremist groups (radical Islamists), there is compelling evidence that the reformist movement is growing. Recent developments in Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Egypt offer an even more striking indication of Muslim interest in modernity, democracy, and civic pluralism. The quest for modernity and democracy among Muslims today is one of the most prominent and transformative issues of our time. Today, an increasing number of Muslim thinkers in these countries have concluded that no contradiction between Islam and modernity exists if conceived as the emergence of new kinds of public space and a greater sense of autonomy for both men and women. However, the political realities of most Islamic societies cannot be overlooked, as most Islamic countries still remain largely nondemocratic and authoritarian. At the present time, we are still watching a process of experimentation and changes unfold.

Maboud Ansari

See also Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Religious Extremism; Religious Prejudice

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J

Jim Crow

Jim Crow is the name associated with a system of white supremacy that required racial subordination and exploitation. Essentially, Jim Crow laws divested blacks of their citizenship rights. After the demise of Reconstruction in 1876 and passage of a new state constitution in 1890, Mississippi became the first post–Civil War state to deny blacks the right to vote, the most basic of citizenship rights. That constitution set in motion the restoration of the white supremacist planter class rule and the economic, political, and social exclusion of blacks throughout the South. Once slavery ended after the Civil War, Jim Crow's purpose was to maintain or perpetuate a racialized labor force through debt peonage and the threat of violence in the agricultural economy. Maintaining this system reinforced the social construction of black inferiority, which then served as the basis for reality.

The term *Jim Crow* originated in a minstrel show song, "Jump Jim Crow," of 1828, performed by Thomas "Daddy" Rice, a "blackface" entertainer, whose caricature spawned imitators in minstrel shows everywhere. A white supremacist South embraced this ridicule and degradation. Jim Crow became more than performance art, as a rigid system of social exclusion and segregation became the centerpiece of the Jim Crow pattern of race relations in the South.

Segregation, or Jim Crow, became the system of exclusion that relegated blacks to a then-permanent subordination within a system institutionalized as legal doctrine. What began as an isolated case of permitting racially segregated schools in Boston in 1824 became a law of the land in 1896 in *Plessy v. Ferguson.* In that Supreme Court ruling, the Court ruled that the "equal protection" clause of the 14th Amendment was satisfied by the doctrine of "separate but equal." Buttressed by this ruling, other Southern states followed Mississippi's lead in instituting Jim Crow laws.

At the base of the Jim Crow system was an agricultural economy. Though slavery formally ended with the Civil War, agricultural demand for a servile labor force survived the "peculiar institution." Central to Jim Crow were the previously established Black Codes. The Black Codes were a set of laws that bound blacks back to the fields following Reconstruction. The Black Codes required that blacks serve out labor contracts, often under their former masters. The purpose of these codes and Jim Crow was to maintain white supremacy, even to the extent that in all interactions blacks had with whites, it was mandatory they practice deference as a part of "proper" etiquette. The degradation of Jim Crow served not only to entertain whites by ridiculing blacks but also, more important, to economically exploit blacks.

Robert Newby

See also Black Codes; *Plessy v. Ferguson*; Racism; Segregation

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Job Satisfaction

Job satisfaction refers to an individual's subjective well-being at work. Because of its subjective nature, job satisfaction has not received much attention by mainstream economists in the United States. However, job satisfaction has long been a primary concern of industrial and organizational psychologists and sociologists.

Interest in job satisfaction developed out of, or in response to, early theories of individual work motivation used by industrial engineers in the early 20th century. Following the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915) on so-called scientific management, much of the focus of industrial engineering during the 20th century was based on the theory that workers will shirk or avoid work, if possible, and therefore need to be coerced to expend maximal effort, primarily through close supervision and properly designed wage incentives. An early competing theory of motivation came from the "human relations" movement and, in particular, the work of George Elton Mayo (1880–1949). Based on his Hawthorne experiments, Mayo argued that emotional factors are more important in determining productivity than "logical" factors. Work arrangements, Mayo suggested, must be organized to address workers' subjective needs for satisfaction as well as the requirements for efficient production. The human relations movement emphasized managerial leadership and work design and eventually developed into the modern human resources school of management.

Studying job satisfaction is important not simply for improving the well-being of workers; much of the research attempts to help management improve the efficiency and quality of workers' output. Worker resistance to Taylorist scientific management, often experienced as limiting individual autonomy and increasing stress, has generated resentment and dissatisfaction in the workplace, leading to productivity and quality problems. This worker dissatisfaction has been an important factor in the establishment of human resources departments in many firms, quality of working life programs in the 1970s, and, more recently, efforts to increase employee involvement through arrangements such as quality circles and teamwork.

Much of contemporary theory and research on job satisfaction has been in reaction to a prominent social psychological theory presented by organizational psychologists J. Richard Hackman and Greg R. Oldham in their 1980 book *Work Redesign.* In a new twist on the old human relations theory, they argued that motivation and performance at work are determined more by how tasks are designed than by personal dispositions or orientations toward work. Key to performance at work is job satisfaction, which, in turn, is a function of the "motivating potential" of work. While this "job characteristics" model formally incorporates individual work orientations, it clearly shifts the focus to the work context, suggesting that satisfaction and hence performance may be increased through job enrichment. The relative weight of the work context versus individual orientations and dispositions in determining job satisfaction remains subject to debate.

One problem with the job characteristics model that has been pointed out by psychologists and sociologists is that job satisfaction and work performance may be completely unrelated. Job enrichment, it has been argued, may increase job satisfaction but may be unrelated to job performance. Rather, motivation and performance may be a function of other determinants such as extrinsic rewards (e.g., financial rewards, relationships with managers and coworkers) and superior job design. Similarly, it has been suggested that individual job satisfaction depends on behavioral types of workers. Some workers may advance their own goals as a first priority and thus be satisfied, but they may or may not advance organizational goals. Others, in contrast, may identify with the organization and thus be committed to it, but may be unsatisfied, for example, if they observe less effort on the part of other workers.

Both psychologists and sociologists directly question the link between the work context and job satisfaction. Dispositional approaches in the social psychological literature focus on individual personality traits or attitudes. Social information processing theories emphasize contextual cues and social influences rather than objective situations and argue that job characteristics are subject to interpretation. More

sociological approaches have shown how workers attempt to *actively* create a positive context for themselves at work. In this view, there is no direct effect of external situations—or the work context—on job satisfaction. Rather, satisfaction is a result of successful behavioral strategies in response to a given work situation.

More recent work on job satisfaction examines the effects of increased worker participation in decision making and problem solving on subjective well-being (and on performance). This literature is largely quantitative, however, and on the whole the findings have largely been contradictory, generating little support for a strong, consistent effect of participation on job satisfaction. These inconsistent findings may be explained in part by qualitative work on job satisfaction, suggesting that individual dispositions and orientations vary across individuals, and may not be static and stable even within the same individual. Rather, individual preferences may be more fluid and adaptable than commonly understood. Over time, workers may reevaluate work arrangements and adapt to given situations, particularly when they perceive little alternative choice.

On the whole, there remains significant debate and controversy over two main issues concerning job satisfaction. The first concerns the determinants of job satisfaction, particularly in terms of individual work orientations versus the work context and job design. Questions regarding the stability of individual work preferences are also important here. The second issue concerns the relationship of job satisfaction to performance at work. Here questions remain in terms of the extent to which job satisfaction is related to individual motivation and performance. One thing that seems clear is that there is no single determinant of overall job satisfaction, such as a particular type of work design, and no simple relationship between job satisfaction and work performance that holds across all individuals. So-called intrinsic and extrinsic elements of the work experience may be systematically related to job satisfaction, but these relations depend on dispositions and orientations toward work, which vary across individuals.

Matt Vidal

See also Alienation; Contingent Work; Hostile Environment; Taylorism

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Judicial Discretion

Judicial discretion refers to that area of law that empowers a trial court judge to make a decision in a legal matter that has no absolute answer in the written law. It describes the power of a court to make a choice from among two or more legally valid solutions. Discretion arises when the judge decides which way to resolve a case. This judgment of the trial court occurs in accordance with what is right and equitable given the circumstances and applicable laws. Such a judgment is not made arbitrarily but rendered in an effort to reach a just result, as sometimes occurs in stalking or sexual harassment complaints.

In administrative matters, judicial discretion is very broad. These matters include personnel hiring, courtroom procedures, and the like. In procedural matters, the ruling of a trial judge is presumed to be correct unless a statute or rule exists to the contrary. In substantive matters judicial discretion is very limited, as judges must apply the law to the facts and set forth a decision as a matter of right. Only when no law exists to apply to a specific set of facts does judicial discretion become necessary.

Judicial discretion occurs in every case that comes before the court unless certain circumstances make its use invalid. For example, when the court does not have jurisdiction over a certain matter, it thus has no authority to decide on that matter. Also, where the U.S. Constitution demands performance of certain actions, the court does not have the ability to choose among options. In addition, when statutes or rules are so clear in relation to the facts at hand that only one decision can be rendered, judicial discretion is not warranted.

The use of discretion is not optional but mandatory in any case where the exclusionary circumstances do not exist. The need for judicial discretion is evident when a decision cannot be asserted as a matter of right. When a situation exists in which no clear, absolute answer exists, a determination must be made. A final determination is needed to promote efficiency, fairness, and finality in the administration of justice.

An abuse of discretion is not the result of an unpopular decision and involves more than a mere error in judgment or law. Such abuse involves a higher court finding that the judge's decision was arbitrarily and unreasonably based.

When judicial discretion is properly exercised, the record will clearly show that the trial court considered all the facts of the case and reasoned its way to a conclusion. On appeal of this conclusion to a higher court, the reviewing court will invoke a three-pronged test. The reviewing court will determine if the issue before the trial court was properly determined as one of discretion, then look to see if the decision was one that a reasonable judge would make, and determine if the decision is consistent with applicable law. If the higher court finds that the trial court's decision meets these elements, then it will uphold the trial court's discretionary conclusion even if the higher court would have rendered a different opinion.

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See also Justice; Juvenile Justice System; Sexual Harassment; Social Control; Stalking; Status Offenses; Victim–Offender Mediation Model

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JUSTICE

A fundamental concept in human society, the topic of justice, could take volumes to explore. This entry briefly examines three contexts in which justice applies today: civil or distributive justice; criminal or corrective justice; and international justice. Justice functions as both an ideal and a practical standard, so each section discusses theory and application.

Broadly defined, *justice* is the measure of right and response to wrong—in other words, the fundamental measure and maintenance of integrity. It can be meted out as a policy or system, or it can be held as a virtue or ideal. Justice balances the integrity and rights of the individual with the collective needs of society and dictates the corresponding responsibilities or duties of society and individuals, as well as the essential rights of the individual. The nature of the balance between individual and collective is debated largely according to whether justice is considered a dictate (duty) or a state (right).

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle laid out the basis for our understanding of justice when he specified that justice is either universal or particular. Universal justice, which acknowledges the rights of others, is self-evident and a fundamental virtue. Particular justice governs systems of distribution, rectification (or correction), and reciprocity in economic exchange. Universal justice and particular justice are non-negotiable attributes of the just person demonstrable in the just society. Alternatively, justice is something inherent within an act or policy, not an individual or a society. According to this view, articulated by Kant in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, justice is particular, enacted or thwarted, and fundamentally contextual. Rawls extended this view by insisting that individual rights never be sacrificed for the collective good. Whatever the view and nature of justice, it is prioritized among those qualities essential to the fulfillment of human society.

Civil Justice

A central assumption of the U.S. Constitution is the promotion and protection of a just society. Justice here refers to the assumptions, norms, and laws that permit liberty and equality to thrive, even under the stress of a diverse society with competing needs. Indeed, U.S. society seeks to protect both individuals and institutions against unfair domination, be it intellectual, racial, cultural, economic, or political, and it is the task of justice to do so. To that end, *civil justice* is the system by which a society distributes its resources while maintaining the fundamental ideals on which the country is founded. This is easier to define than to execute, given the tension between individual liberty and collective equality, particularly

when it is acknowledged that liberty includes liberty to acquire and that equality as humans does not mean equal quality of life, at least not in a capitalist society such as in the United States.

Philosophers and political theorists have asserted the centrality of just institutions since Plato (in the European tradition). However, the notion that civil justice denotes the extent to which social institutions attack or promote individual well-being is relatively recent, most notably articulated by Rawls in his books *Theory of Justice* and *Justice as Fairness.* Rawls insists that justice is what is demanded by any reasonable person in the so-called original position—that is, without knowledge of individual attributes and advantage. According to this theory, justice supports the least intrusive demands on any individual and would never support the abdication of individual rights for the collective good. Consequently, the distribution of wealth and other entitlements must be such that no individual is abandoned by society for expediency and that no individual is obliged to conform to moral or other values save those that prohibit harm to others (the realm of criminal justice).

It is the task of civil justice to determine when acquisition unacceptably harms others, what the minimum possessions and possibilities needed by each member of society are, and how access and acquisition are determined and protected. As a nation Americans are only partially comfortable with this role of justice. They may agree that it is better to be rich than poor, but ubiquitous debate about government reach and tax levy demonstrate that Americans are skeptical about giving the U.S. government the authority to redistribute wealth. On the other hand, and after more than a century of effort, as a society Americans agree that the government—indeed the justice system—does have authority to assure that people of all races and both genders have equal access to education, jobs, loans, and other resources.

Practically, then, civil justice requires assessment of the means of distribution within society. The primary resources to be distributed are wealth, of course, but also education, credit, power, the right to vote, mobility, and status. The task of policymakers who guide collective activity is to determine what goods and rights are central to just distribution; and when distribution must be protected, when it must be promoted, and when it must be left to market or other forces. The task for individuals is similarly complex: When is it acceptable to pursue one's own interest, when must one defer to a standard that does not prioritize self-interest, and when may one claim ignorance or passivity legitimately?

U.S. society maintains numerous institutions and systems of social justice. The income tax distributes wealth; publicly funded education provides for children under the age of 18 as a means of setting a baseline of opportunity; everyone over the age of 18 may vote as a means of distributing political will. Despite criticism of all of these systems as inadequate or worse, at least in principle they each seek to distribute fundamental resources among citizens.

Criminal Justice

Perhaps the most recognized form of justice in the United States at this time is in the definition of, and response to, criminal activity. Criminal justice specifies what constitutes a crime; how society polices, prosecutes, and punishes people who commit crime; and the mechanisms for implementing these activities. Criminal justice is administered through three systems designed to be coordinated: police, courts, and corrections. Clearly, crimes consist of violation of law, but which violations are crimes and how those crimes are regarded varies by social norm, statute, and geographical location. Once crime is defined, justice responds to crime. But here, too, there is divergence. Should justice look back at the crime alone to determine appropriate punishment, or should justice look forward to the impact of the crime *and* of the punishment on society as a whole?

Because criminal justice responds to active violation, rather that intrinsic conditions and distributions, it is retributive in its basic function. U.S. society defines these violations as crimes and weighs their relative offense according to fundamental principles, or rights, to which Americans adhere. Because liberty and autonomy are critical to U.S. society, the society regards interpersonal crimes (such as robbery or assault) as more reprehensible, with more severe punishments, than "victimless" crimes with no directly injured party (such as prostitution, drug use, and business fraud). For the same reason, punishment must meet standards of fairness and humanity, at least in principle. At the same time, criminal justice varies by state in law and by locality in practice. Further, some states vary punishment not only based on the nature of the crime itself but also on the criminal record of the person who commits the crime. Criminal justice, then, as practiced in the United States, does not hold that all persons will be treated the same way for the same behavior.

Utilitarian concepts of criminal justice hold that a violation of law is a violation of the principles of society and must be addressed as such. A crime must be punished for the relative harm it caused, and the punishment must promote the public good as much as is possible. Under this system, the individual harm caused to the victim is less the focus of the punishment than the total harm that the crime causes society as a violation of social norms and law. Because utilitarian punishment seeks to redress the wrong to society, it condones punishment that serves both symbolic and practical purposes. The U.S. prison system is intended to incapacitate offenders, thus deterring individuals from re-offending and deterring other people who might otherwise offend but fear that they too would be put in prison. Prisons, according to utilitarian principles, also symbolically remove offenders from society, demonstrating the refusal of society to condone violation of fundamental principles. Finally, utilitarian punishment uses the term *corrections* because prisons are also intended to rehabilitate offenders so that they do not commit crimes upon release, thus restoring the confidence of society.

In contrast to the utilitarian approach, retributive justice looks only at the crime itself to determine appropriate response. Grounded in a moral system that prioritizes autonomy and freedom, retributive justice is tied to the liberal tradition (Kant, Rawls) that maintains the primacy of rationality over sentiment and the centrality of the individual. This approach focuses on delivering punishment to the guilty that is proportionate to the nature of the offense itself as an appropriate—that is, rational, not symbolic—response to the offense and the offender. In this way retributive justice limits the reach of the justice system (i.e., the state or collectivity) and avoids the responsibility of predicting and promoting social benefit. Under this theory prison systems should provide incapacitation and retribution to the offender, but need not rehabilitate the offender or prevent future crimes. In addition, the state must not prolong punishment in the interest of setting an example for the general public, satisfying an individual or collective desire for revenge, or creating more law-abiding citizens from the criminal population.

The implementation and oversight of the justice system are routinely criticized from both ends of the political spectrum for failing to protect the rights of individuals (victims, suspected offenders, and convicted offenders) and for failing to maintain fundamental structures of justice, such as sufficient policing and fair and appropriate sentencing. Plea bargaining, the routine waiver of the constitutional right to trial, accounts for over 90 percent of case resolution, a fact that, on its own, casts a grave shadow over the integrity of the justice system. Yet protections afforded to individuals, such as the right to an attorney and the right of habeas corpus, indicate the commitment of a punishment-focused society to protect fundamental individual rights of all members of society. While these rights may be thwarted because of lack of resources or dedication, they form the basis of the U.S. criminal justice system.

International Justice

The concepts of both civil and criminal justice assume national identity within a society, such as the United States. How are these ideals applied to people outside of that society? What are the obligations of distribution and retribution of nations toward other nations, or toward individuals outside of U.S. society? As commerce and technology have drastically reduced the time and isolation between nations and peoples, the possibility of interdependent global responsibility has developed in response to these questions. International bodies such as the United Nations, as well as many economists and philosophers, claim that a nation is obligated to protect fundamental tenets of justice internationally and that such protection extends to both civil and criminal justice.

Justice requires that states take responsibility to avert harm that can reasonably be anticipated, for example, by stabilizing regions such as the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda that, left alone, would devolve into chaos. At the same time, international justice demands that laws and practices determining conditions in other nations protect fundamental structures of humane existence rather than exploit weak justice systems in those countries for the sake of profit alone. Thus, trade agreements, international labor practices, and environmental phenomena impacting multiple nations can be viewed as matters of international justice, demanding that both the active parties (the beneficiaries) and the passive parties (the recipients) be afforded fair minimum resources. Clearly, these views of international justice reject the position that justice posits the right to fair accumulation. Even that conceptualization of justice, however, may acknowledge that the nation-state provides a link between social norms within a nation and how that nation behaves internationally, in other words, the connection

between domestic and international authority. Whether the nation is obligated to act according to domestic norms depends on whether one views justice as a function of universal morality or finite within the cultural and geographic borders of the state.

International criminal prosecution addresses those violations of human conduct so egregious that domestic prosecution is insufficient. These are cases in which large numbers of people are killed, especially people targeted because of their ethnicity, race, or other defining and unalterable characteristic. Motivation to create an international tribunal developed as nations grew into increasing interaction with each other, following advances in transportation and the corresponding impact of commerce and war. Following World War II, the Nuremburg and Tokyo Courts were established and administered by the winning allies to address war crimes committed by the losing nations. At the end of the cold war, the Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court. In meetings that began in 1998, the court's jurisdiction and administration evolved to try crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. In 2002 the statute was signed and ratified by enough nations (60) to make the treaty binding and effectively establish the court. The statute has been ratified by 104 nations and signed by an additional 35. The United States opposes the treaty, based on concern that U.S. citizens could be tried in the court. Considerable debate exists about the exclusion of other crimes, notably drug trafficking, terrorism, and use of weapons of mass destruction, none of which has unanimous international agreement as to definition.

These two issues, ratification and definition of crimes, speak to the principle challenges of defining the terms of international justice as well as creating effective structures to administer justice internationally. Crimes committed by states or by individuals protected from one state's justice processes by another state are difficult to define without asserting international priority over national sovereignty. Nations, particularly those that are internationally dominant such as the United States, have little practical reason to defer to an international determinant of right and wrong, preferring to define and address violation of law (and not the broader universal ethics) through national systems, including military courts, and thereby avoid seeing harsh punishment meted out in the international arena to citizens who would be absolved or benignly punished for crimes domestically. Indeed, the United States successfully sought assurance from the UN Security Council that no U.S. troop would be surrendered to the court, though the United Nations agreed to the provision only for UN-related activity. This protection, however, was revoked following evidence of abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by U.S. military personnel. Indeed, the War on Terror demonstrates several challenges to executing international justice, including recognition of legitimacy, access to offenders, agreement on how violations are defined, and agreement on purpose and nature of punishment.

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See also Civil Rights; Human Rights; Judicial Discretion; Plea Bargaining; Restorative Justice

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Juvenile Delinquency

Prior to 1899, the concept of delinquency—the idea that juvenile crime is something different than crime committed by adults—was nonexistent. When youth violated laws at that time, most people regarded their actions as crimes worthy of the same court processing

and punishments (even prison and the death penalty) as offenses committed by adults. Experts credit a group of progressive reformers in the late 1800s, known as the "child savers," for inventing the concept. Their efforts resulted in the creation of separate juvenile courts and correctional programs. Crimes committed by juveniles were thereafter construed as having different causes than adult crime. Youth were considered less responsible for their actions and, therefore, more deserving of treatment rather than punishment. The child savers also helped to establish status offense laws that defined activities as illegal for persons under a specified age. For example, underage smoking, alcohol use by minors, school truancy, and youth curfew violations are status offenses.

The first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, and the academic study of juvenile delinquency by researchers affiliated with the University of Chicago commenced shortly afterward, in the early 1900s. Today, juvenile delinquency is a well-recognized social problem in U.S. society and a thriving academic research specialty.

Measuring Delinquency

The two main sources of information on the extent of delinquency and who is most likely to engage in delinquency are official arrest statistics and self-report questionnaires. Each has strengths and limitations, and they sometimes provide somewhat conflicting pictures of the extent of delinquency and characteristics of delinquents.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report (UCR) provides the most comprehensive data on arrests of juveniles in the United States. The UCR is a compilation of information from law enforcement agencies throughout the country on crimes reported to police and those cleared by arrest. For all arrests, the UCR includes information on the age, race, and gender of the person arrested. By combining this information with U.S. census data on the demographic composition of the population, the UCR can report arrests in a given year as a rate per 100,000 U.S. residents in various demographic categories (e.g., white girls ages 10 to 17).

The UCR is a valuable tool for determining changes in delinquency over time, but it has limitations, particularly in undercounting the true amount of delinquency, because most delinquent acts never result in any report to police, let alone lead to an arrest. Especially under-represented in the data are status offenses, the most common type of delinquency. Also skewing the data is the fact that youths living in different communities are subject to greatly varying levels of policing, and police often exercise discretion in deciding whether to arrest a delinquent youth or handle the matter informally without making an arrest. Another UCR limitation is that it reports only a few demographic characteristics of arrestees, thereby limiting its usefulness for understanding the causes of delinquency.

Self-report surveys use either self-administered questionnaires or interviews in which respondents are asked to report on their own delinquent behavior. These surveys can also ask respondents about various characteristics and life experiences that may be correlated with their delinquency. Self-report studies, especially longitudinal studies studying the same youth on multiple occasions throughout their childhood and adolescence, are useful for learning about delinquency causes. Conducted on representative samples of U.S. youth and repeated over time, the self-report studies can suggest prevalence of various types of delinquency and assess trends in delinquent involvement. Two widely cited nationally representative survey studies are the Monitoring the Future study of eighth-grade students and high school seniors, and the National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health sample of youth ages 12 to 17. These surveys chiefly concern tobacco, alcohol, and drug use, but they also include questions about other common forms of delinquency.

The major strengths of self-report studies are that they allow estimates of delinquent behavior that do not involve police reports or arrests, and they allow researchers to understand the causes of delinquency. These advantages overcome some of the limitations of arrest data. Self-report studies, however, have their own shortcomings and limitations. Self-report studies rely on the accurate recall and honest report of behavior that respondents may rather not remember or disclose. On the other hand, some respondents may falsely report engaging in delinquent acts not actually committed. Young adolescents, it turns out, are most likely to falsely report delinquency, so researchers have developed a number of techniques for evaluating the reliability and validity of self-reported delinquency. Safeguards include asking respondents whether they ever used a fictitious drug (e.g., "bindro"). Self-reports tend to be more accurate when respondents believe their responses will be anonymous or confidential.

Despite the limitations of both arrest data and self-report studies, their complementary strengths and consistent findings across methodologies allow for reasonably reliable conclusions about the extent, trends, and causes of delinquency.

Prevalence and Trends

Although many people believe we are currently in the midst of a juvenile violent crime wave, arrests of juveniles for serious crimes have actually decreased in recent years. The number of juveniles arrested for murder in 2005 was 47 percent lower than in 1996. Overall, the juvenile violent index crime arrest rate in 2005 was 25 percent lower than it had been in 1996. Unlike other crimes against persons, however, the juvenile arrest rate for simple assault has not declined substantially since the mid-1990s. This may be due to recent policies that require police to make arrests in school and domestic incidents that previously would have been handled informally.

Property crime arrest rates of juveniles have decreased substantially. In 1981, there were approximately 2,500 property crime index offense arrests per 100,000 juveniles ages 10 to 17 in the United States. By 2005, the juvenile arrest rate for property crime index offenses had decreased to less than 1,500 per 100,000 youths. The burglary arrest rate of juveniles in 2005 was less than half the rate it had been 25 years earlier (i.e., in their parents' generation). Although motor vehicle theft arrests of youth increased between 1981 and 1991, they have since fallen to less than half the 1991 level.

Arrests for drug abuse violations have not followed the declines observed for violent and property crimes. In fact, the rate of arrests of juveniles increased over 50 percent from 1981 to 2005. The large increase in juvenile arrests over this period, however, appears to reflect increased law enforcement rather than greater drug involvement by youth since self-reported drug use by youth in national epidemiological surveys decreased over this same time period.

Characteristics of Delinquents

Age is the strongest predictor of delinquent behavior. For nearly every type of delinquency, involvement is rather low in childhood or early adolescence, increasing steadily with age until reaching a peak in late adolescence. Although the exact rate of increased involvement and peak age of involvement varies across offense types (property crime peaks at about age 16 and violent delinquency peaks at age 18), this general pattern of increased delinquency with age occurs in both arrest rates and self-report studies. An important related concept is age-at-onset. The age at which youth first engage in delinquent behavior is a strong predictor of the seriousness and intensity of subsequent delinquent and criminal behavior. For example, a young age at first arrest (under 14) is strongly predictive of serious, repeat delinquency and continuing criminal behavior into adulthood. Similarly, early first use of the so-called gateway drugs—tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana—strongly correlates with serious drug or alcohol dependency in adolescence or adulthood.

Next to age, gender is the best predictor of delinquent behavior. Boys are more likely than girls to engage in nearly every form of delinquency and are more pronounced in official arrest statistics. For violent index crimes (homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and forcible rape), UCR data from 2005 indicate that male juvenile arrests exceeded female juvenile arrests by a ratio of 4 to 1. For serious property crimes, the male-to-female arrest ratio in 2005 was nearly 2 to 1, and the 2005 ratio of male-to-female drug abuse violation arrests was nearly 5 to 1. Some less-serious offense types show greater gender equality. For instance, boys are only slightly more likely than girls to be arrested for larceny-theft. Self-report studies also indicate boys are more delinquent than girls, but the sex differences in most self-report studies are smaller than the arrest data would suggest. This discrepancy between self-report and official arrest statistics may occur because girls' delinquency is less often observed by, or reported to, police or because law enforcement officials exercise discretion in arrest decisions to the favor of girls. This hypothesis has been termed the *chivalry thesis.*

Race/ethnicity is another characteristic for which official arrest data and self-reports provide discrepant findings. In the United States, white youth have lower arrest rates than black youth. Asian American youth have the lowest arrest rates, whereas rates for American Indian youth are higher for some offenses (e.g., homicide) but lower for other offenses (e.g., drug abuse and weapon law violations). Black youth are more than twice as likely as white youth to be arrested for both violent index crimes and property index crimes. In self-report studies of commonly occurring delinquency such as status offenses and marijuana use,

however, white youth tend to report greater involvement in delinquency than black youth. The greater arrest rates of minority youth may result, in part, from heavier police activity in predominantly minority neighborhoods, yet studies in which researchers ride along with police and record their interactions with youth generally do not find racial bias in police officers' use of discretion in arrest decisions.

Many studies indicate that youth in juvenile detention and correctional facilities are more likely than youth in the general population to come from low-income families. Self-report studies of delinquency, however, do not consistently find greater delinquency among low-income youth. Youth from families with lower socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to report serious violent offenses, but higher SES youth are more likely to report some common forms of delinquency such as alcohol and marijuana use. For most forms of delinquency, self-report studies find no SES differences.

Causal Theories

Early theories of why youth become delinquents focused on the socially disorganized neighborhoods in rapidly urbanizing and industrializing U.S. cities. The common belief was that the problem lay in the exposure of youth in these transitional communities (many of them children of European immigrants and African American migrants from the rural South) to conflicting cultural norms and parents with fewer personal and institutional resources for socializing and supervising them to ensure law-abiding behavior. Although some critics of the social disorganization perspective noted an over-reliance on official statistics that might neglect delinquency by middle- and upper-class youth, the neighborhood disorganization perspective remains influential—especially as an explanation of violent and gang delinquency.

In the 1950s and 1960s "strain theorists" also focused on delinquency by socioeconomically disadvantaged youth. Robert Merton described a "goals-means disjunction" whereby all youth are socialized to desire success, but not all have the legitimate means to attain success. Merton suggested that economically disadvantaged youth might respond to the resulting strain by resorting to illegitimate means (e.g., stealing) or by retreatist behavior such as substance abuse. Albert Cohen also described the strain that lower-class children experience in school when they fail to meet the academic and behavioral expectations of middle-class teachers. They may cope with this "status frustration" by joining delinquent peer groups. Critics argue that strain theory, like social disorganization theory, exaggerates the delinquent involvement of lower-class youth while neglecting to explain why so many middle-class youth also engage in delinquency. Remedying this limitation is Robert Agnew's general strain theory, which suggests that a variety of social strains, not just the strain associated with poverty, can cause delinquency.

Whereas social disorganization and early strain theories emphasized social structural inequalities as the primary cause of delinquency, process theorists focus on social interactions within primary groups such as the family and peer group. Two influential process theories are the social learning theory and the social bonding theory. Social learning theory, also known as differential association theory, suggests that juvenile delinquents learn delinquent values, attitudes, and behavior through their associations in families, peer groups, schools, and neighborhoods. According to this perspective, the delinquent is essentially normal, but through exposure to deviant influences, the youth learns delinquent behavior in the same ways that any other behavior is learned.

Whereas social learning theorists view relationships as the cause of delinquency, social bonding theorists view a lack of strong social attachments as the cause of delinquency. Social bonding theorists assert that many delinquent activities are fun and pleasurable, and therefore, all youth would become delinquent if they were not kept in check by the social bond. Instead of asking themselves why some youth engage in delinquency, bonding theorists ask, Why isn't every youth a delinquent? They conclude that youth who lack strong attachments to peers, school, or family; who are uninvolved in conventional activities such as school or sports; who haven't been instilled with a conventional belief system; and who are not committed to educational or other future goals are most likely to act on their delinquent opportunities and impulses.

Much of the delinquency research conducted today is guided by integrated and life course theories. Integrated theories combine aspects of social structure, social learning, and social bonding theories to predict delinquency. Life course or developmental theories also integrate traditional theoretical perspectives, but in addition, they emphasize that delinquency is a developmental process whereby innate temperament, social stresses, attachments, and opportunities

early in life predispose some youths to later delinquent involvement. Delinquent involvement, in turn, adversely affects normative social relationships and opportunities to increase the likelihood of further delinquency and adult criminal behavior. This snowball effect is especially likely to occur if delinquency results in arrest, juvenile justice system intervention, and resultant stigma.

Current Controversies

Advances in brain science challenge both social scientists and the justice system in their understanding of, and response to, delinquency. It is now known that certain regions of the brain responsible for learning from the present, anticipating the future, and controlling one's impulses are impaired in some serious and chronic delinquents. Head injury, lead poisoning, fetal alcohol exposure, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder are just a few of the identified conditions associated with alterations in brain functioning that could predispose some youth to delinquency. If delinquency is, to some extent, biologically caused, can the justice system hold delinquents accountable for their behavior? This is especially problematic given the trend over the past 2 decades to try more and more juveniles as adults.

Moreover, modern brain imaging techniques reveal that the regions of the brain responsible for foresight and impulse control are not fully developed in the normal brain until age 22 or 23. The challenge is for social scientists to incorporate this biological evidence into their theories of delinquency causation and for the U.S. justice system to reconcile personal responsibility with brain limitations as a mitigating factor. This recognition of developmental limitations influenced the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision that persons who were under age 18 when their crime was committed cannot receive the death penalty.

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See also Deviance; Differential Association; Drug Subculture; Gangs; Juvenile Justice System; Marginality; Social Bond Theory; Social Disorganization; Strain Theory; Uniform Crime Report

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Juvenile Institutionalization, Effects of

The first institution created solely for "wayward," poor, and orphaned children was the House of Refuge in New York City in the late 1800s; most states soon followed New York's lead with their own institutions. The creation of these types of institutions marked the beginning of a shift in the conceptualization of the definition of childhood; before this, children older than age 5 were viewed as small adults, capable of the same moral capacity as adults. Gradually, the idea that children are inherently different from adults and that the state had the responsibility to protect them took hold. The culmination of this evolution occurred in 1899, when the Juvenile Court Act created the first juvenile court.

In response to court cases that pointed to the need for constitutional protection of juveniles against their treatment as adults and confinement as status offenders, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Protection Act of 1974 moved to deinstitutionalize many juvenile offenders. Of main concern were the negative cumulative effects of labeling on juveniles and their confinement as status offenders. (A status offense is behavior that is unlawful for minors, such as truancy or drinking alcohol.) This law identified four protections that states must provide to be eligible for federal funding: the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, "sight and sound" separation of juvenile and adult offenders, removal from adult jails and lockups, and the examination of the disproportionate confinement of minority offenders.

Types of Juvenile Institutions

Out-of-home placement options for juvenile offenders typically include a variety of public and private residential facilities, such as group homes, wilderness programs, boot camps, and training schools, operating under differing therapeutic approaches but sharing the

common goal of rehabilitation. Generally, when authorities determine that institutionalization is necessary, juveniles are sent to training schools. These facilities, either secure or semi-secure, often appear physically similar to a public school, although some look more like an adult facility. Perimeter security is likely, although these facilities typically have a higher offender-to-staff ratio than adult facilities. Approximately 400 long-term secure facilities, mostly state run, exist for juveniles in the United States. Training schools typically house about 50 juveniles, although the larger ones can hold between 100 and 500 residents. Juveniles in these facilities typically have access to a number of treatment options, such as GED (general equivalency diploma) classes, a variety of counseling and vocational training programs, and peer group activities.

Negative Outcomes of Institutionalization

Many believe that juvenile institutionalization has a negative effect on juveniles and may in fact increase recidivism (future involvement in criminal behavior). While incarcerated, juvenile offenders interact with other delinquents, allowing them the opportunity to acquire and hone criminal skills, thereby fostering delinquent values and beliefs. Criminologists find that this bringing together of delinquent youth tends to increase delinquent acts, a process called "peer deviancy training."

Incarcerated juveniles may recidivate at a higher rate than those treated in a nonsecure, community-based setting. Additionally, incarceration may increase the probability of a multitude of problems, such as physical injury while confined, mental health issues, and lower levels of educational achievement than for those treated within the community. Many juvenile offenders have learning disabilities and find it difficult to attain educational success once they are released. Furthermore, after release many find it difficult to obtain gainful employment as well, making them more susceptible to criminal activity to achieve economic goals.

According to labeling theory (also referred to as "social reaction theory"), a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy concept, juveniles who come into contact with the juvenile justice system experience increased alienation and reinforced criminal identity. Official efforts to control crime often have the opposite effect of increasing crime. Juveniles who are arrested, adjudicated, and punished are labeled as delinquents. Others then view and treat these people as criminals, and this increases the likelihood of subsequent crime for several reasons. Labeled individuals may have trouble attaining educational goals and obtaining legitimate employment, both of which increase their level of strain and reduce their stake in conformity. Labeled individuals may find that conventional people are reluctant to associate with them, and they may associate with other criminals as a result. This reduces their bond with conventional others and fosters the social learning of crime. They begin to see themselves in a negative or criminal context, which is reinforced by a society that views them as such. During this formative and developmental stage of self-identification among adolescents, the reaction of those around them helps shape their sense of self. As a result of the adolescent's negative self-concept, he or she may find it more difficult to resist involvement in criminal activity and may be more likely to associate with like-minded negative peers, in turn increasing the likelihood of further involvement in the criminal justice system.

In addition, juveniles often ''age out'' of delinquent behavior, meaning that as they age, graduate, meet a significant other, and become gainfully employed, they desist from criminal behavior and become productive members of society. Institutionalization disconnects juveniles from many prosocial factors, including family, school, and community, and may disrupt the aging-out process. Although many delinquents return to school after institutionalization, they are more likely to drop out and in turn experience higher rates of unemployment, lower pay, and poorer health than those who graduate from high school.

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See also Juvenile Delinquency; Juvenile Justice System; Labeling Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Social Bond Theory; Status Offenses

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Juvenile Justice System

The U.S. juvenile justice system is currently designed to address the special needs of minors who engage in criminal acts but might not yet be held fully responsible for their behavior, as they are not yet legal adults recognized by society. However, juvenile justice has not always been driven by this philosophy. Prior to the 19th century, the criminal justice system treated all individuals over age 5 equally. Around 1825, a reform group called the "child savers" began advocating for more appropriate treatment of children who commit crime, arguing that the justice system should protect and rehabilitate rather than punish juveniles. They claimed that society could control juvenile delinquency if it attacked its causes—namely, poor education, poor morals, and poor standards of behavior—thus alerting juveniles to their wrongdoings in society. The child savers, mostly women, were self-proclaimed altruists and humanitarians who focused on protecting the interests of all children in an increasingly industrialized society, particularly those in the lower class. Their mission was to rehabilitate deviant youth without the stigma of a lifetime criminal record. Although the child savers claimed to be a neutral group, critics contended that the movement was more an effort to control lower-class children than protect these juveniles from societal harm.

In 1899, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act established the nation's first juvenile court in Chicago. While the act did not create a new legal system for juveniles, its rules of procedure, outlining the best court practices when considering juvenile cases, were extensively copied. These procedures followed the British legal concept of *parens patriae*, a doctrine whereby the State acts in the best interests of the child through the protection, supervision, and upkeep of juveniles within its jurisdiction. This gives the court sentencing discretion, such as probation under guardianship, placement in a school of detention or reformatory, and protection from incarceration with adult offenders. One key distinction of the juvenile court is the privacy of a juvenile criminal record, thus preventing the stigma of a permanent adult record. The doctrine of *parens patriae* was so dominant in the early stages of the juvenile justice system that in *Commonwealth v. Fisher* in 1905, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that acting in the child's best interests outweighed the child's constitutional rights, namely, due process and a right to a trial by jury. Acting in the best interests of the child, in most situations, suggests that the goal of the courts is rehabilitation so that juveniles can become productive members of the community.

Key Legal Decisions and Juvenile Justice Policy

Even with the establishment of a system focused on *parens patriae*, opponents questioned its effectiveness in rehabilitation, particularly if juveniles were held in institutional settings not unlike adult prisons. Critics argued that if juveniles faced an institutional setting similar to that of adults, then these juveniles should also have the same constitutional due process protections as adults during the trial and sentencing phases of the adjudication. In response, several U.S. Supreme Court cases ultimately established the constitutional basis for protection of juvenile rights, including *Kent v. US* in 1966, *In re Gault* in 1967, *In re Winship* in 1970, and *McKeiver v. Pennsylvania* in 1971. These cases brought greater procedural focus to the juvenile courts, mandating due process and ensuring other constitutional rights for juvenile defendants.

With these protective gains, early policymakers next focused on prevention within local communities. Addressing rehabilitation issues and the role of the community, the focus for prevention was left to each local community. With no centralized federal, state, or local strategy to reduce delinquency, and no financial or technical support, initial efforts to control delinquency through community organizations was a relative failure, leading Congress to pass the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act in 1968. Later revised in 1974, and renamed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, the goal of this act was to assist states and local communities by providing preventative, community-based services to youth in danger of becoming delinquent, to help train individuals in occupations providing such services, and to provide technical assistance in the field through the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. This initiative reinforced the importance of prevention of juvenile delinquency as a key to

reducing the behavior, but it increased the role of government in providing assistance and training for the states to act in a child's best interests.

The 1970s brought a rise in violent crime rates and a new focus on cracking down on crime. The War on Drugs in the 1980s also fueled the desire to get tough on crime and create a more punitive juvenile justice system. During the 1990s, the United States faced growing fears about highly publicized juvenile acts of violent crime and school shootings, called "juvenile superpredators" by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Public fears mounted about youth who adopt a culture of violence. Despite subsequent acknowledgment that such fear was overstated, the public outcry made a lasting impression on the juvenile justice system and the way in which U.S. society addresses juvenile crime. By the end of the 1990s, almost every state had enacted a law that made it easier for a juvenile to be tried in adult court and face adult sentences by lowering ages for transfer or waivers for violent crimes. The trend toward a more conservative approach to juvenile justice continues, with the marked exception of the death penalty.

In 1988, the case of *Thompson v. Oklahoma* set the precedent for juvenile sentencing when the U.S. Supreme Court held that the execution of juveniles under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. As of 2002, the United States was one of only a few countries to carry out the death penalty on those under age 18. This changed in 2005 when, in *Roper v. Simmons*, the U.S. Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to execute any juvenile, noting in its decision that the death penalty is "disproportionate punishment" for offenders under age 18.

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See also Drug Abuse, Crime; Drug Subculture; Gangs; Juvenile Delinquency; Subculture of Violence Hypothesis

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Labeling Theory

Labeling theory is a critical theory which argues that the application of a deviant label can have the effect of solidifying a deviant identity for the labeled, thus potentially exacerbating the problem that it purports to address. Labeling theory, therefore, prioritizes the study of social and legal processes by which certain behaviors and individuals come to be labeled as deviant, as well as the impact of such labels.

One of the greatest contributions of labeling theory has been its challenge to the traditional notion of deviance as a fixed, objective category of study, suggesting instead that the application of the label of "deviant" is highly context specific. This suggests that deviance is the result of the labeling process, not a quality intrinsic to certain individuals or actions. For example, a labeling theorist would critique the assumption that an 18-year-old who drinks alcohol is inherently deviant; whereas this behavior would be against the law in the United States, it would not be considered deviant in some countries. Thus, deviance is better conceived as a product of labeling processes than as a category of behaviors or individuals.

Labeling theorists suggest that labeling individuals as deviant has the potential of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Drawing from the social psychological concept of symbolic interactionism, labeling theorists argue that individuals' self-concepts form partly through their social interactions; when an individual is labeled as deviant, the individual will incorporate the label into his or her self-definition, increasing the likelihood of future actions consistent with the label.

A deviant label can have an impact extending beyond its effect on an individual's self-definition. The label can directly influence how others relate to the labeled. For example, an individual with a felony conviction might have difficulty finding a job because of the label of felon, even if the label is not incorporated into that person's self-definition.

Labeling theory draws a distinction between deviant acts and deviant labels. Those who perform acts that society considers deviant can evade detection and, as such, avoid the labeling process; alternatively, the wrongly accused can be subject to the consequences of a deviant label without having performed any truly deviant actions.

Labeling theorists note that a wide range of labels have the potential to constitute a master status, in which an individual's actions come to be interpreted in the context of his or her label without regard to other facets of the individual's personality. While initially applied to the concept of delinquency, the framework of labeling has been applied to other forms of deviation as well, most prominently with regard to mental illness and disability.

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See also Deviance; Self-Fulfilling Prophecy; Stigma

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Labor, Child

Child labor occurs along a continuum, with harmful and exploitative work that endangers the welfare and potential of the child at one end of the spectrum and light work and often beneficial training and apprenticeship at the other. National and international labor standard regulations with respect to what constitutes a legally permissible minimum age of employment accordingly depend typically on a range of criteria including (a) the type of work, as distinguished by the degree of hazard a child faces, or whether the child is subject to exploitation, or the worst forms of child labor; (b) the sector of employment, whether in agriculture, manufacturing, or family businesses or the household; and (c) the degree to which child labor work interferes with schooling, depending on the number of hours a child is put to work, say, per week.

Though child labor statistics inevitably paint an aggregate picture, the coverage of national and international statistics has improved, reflecting a diversity of activities that come under the umbrella of child labor work. International Labour Organization (ILO) statistics treat any child as economically active with performance of at least 1 hour of work during the week prior to a survey. The ILO also defines a child laborer as synonymous with (a) an economically active person between the ages of 5 and 11, and (b) an individual between the ages of 12 and 14 who performs 14 or more hours of nonhazardous work per week or 1 hour of hazardous work per week. Based on these definitions, over 200 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 are economically active worldwide, and of these, 186 million are child laborers. In addition, nearly 6 million children are in forced or bonded labor, 1.8 million in prostitution, and 0.3 million in armed conflict.

The absolute incidence of child labor is the highest in Asia (excluding Japan), which hosts around 127 million economically active children, followed by Africa and the Middle East (61 million) and Latin America (17 million). Increasingly, child labor occurs in southern Europe and in the transitional economies of central and eastern Europe. The participation rate of child labor is highest in Africa, where approximately one out of every three children (29 percent) is economically active. In Asia and in Latin America, the figures stand at 19 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Taken together, however, these contemporary statistics still fall short compared with the incidence of child labor in 19th-century, newly industrializing countries, including Britain, France, Belgium, western parts of Prussia, and the United States.

Poverty has been a central theme in child labor research. Income from child labor often constitutes a significant part of household income in poor households, yet child labor employment can also depress adult wages. Left unchecked, a vicious cycle of poverty may ensue in which low adult wages become both the cause and the effect of child labor employment. A related concern is the impact of child labor on fertility decisions. The lack of education as a child, low adult income, and a desire to ensure old age consumption can bias household decisions in favor of an increase in the quantity of children rather than the quality of children through education. A similar vicious cycle of poverty and child labor can likewise ensue, as underinvestment in education in one generation begets underinvestment in the next.

Other pertinent determinants of child labor include (a) credit market failures in the financing of education, (b) the lack of consumption smoothing mechanisms in the face of income uncertainty and seasonal employment, (c) coordination failures on the part of households to bargain for higher wages, (d) failures on the part of households and firms to coordinate education and technology adoption decisions, (e) lack of access to quality education, (f) social stigma and norms, with respect to child labor employment and female schooling, (g) birth order effects, (h) family migration and dislocation from family networks, and (i) low female educational attainment.

In addition to these household-level determinants, a burgeoning literature examines the link between economy-wide factors and child labor. These include ineffective enforcement of legislation to combat child labor, particularly in informal sectors and rural areas; inequality in the distribution of income; trade liberalization; an economy's dependence on agriculture; and political economy considerations.

Running parallel to these correlates of child labor are international and national policy responses to combat child labor employment. With widespread acknowledgment that poverty is a primary cause of

child labor, poverty alleviation and policies promoting adult income naturally rank foremost among efforts to eradicate child labor. Beyond these arguably longer-range policy responses, which target child labor by directly addressing the root of the problem through supply side intervention, governments have also implemented a variety of national-level efforts. These efforts fall into three categories: outcome-oriented legislations, market imperfection targeting policies, and market-based, demand-oriented policies.

Outcome-oriented legislations typically come in the form of a direct ban on child labor or through minimum age employment legislation. International labor standard conventions such as the Minimum Wage Convention and the Worst Form of Child Labor Convention of the ILO also fall under this category. While virtually all countries adopt one or more of these interventions in one form or another, their effectiveness is questionable. This results, in part, from the inherent difficulty of enforcement, particularly in the areas of rural employment, the informal sector, and family unpaid work. In addition, because legislation alone does not address the source of the child labor problem, wholesale implementation of child labor laws can result instead in the displacement of child labor from one sector to the next, where the prospects of effective inspection and enforcement are even more daunting.

Market imperfection targeting policies, in contrast, operate by addressing one or more of the market imperfections that make otherwise "voluntary" child labor employment excessive. Examples of such policies include cash or food for school programs, in which credit market constraints can arguably be relieved by providing families with financial incentives to send children to school. Public employment programs such as rural public works and employment guarantee programs provide public employment as an alternative income source and consumption smoothing mechanism. A new line of research addresses policy measures in the presence of the worst forms of child labor, such as debt bondage, trafficking, and child labor in exploitative work and hazardous conditions. A central theme emerging from this growing literature is that piecemeal policy reforms, without due regard to the precise list of market imperfections that give rise to child labor of the worst forms, can have detrimental consequences for children's welfare.

A third class of policies, and highly controversial of late, aims at combating child labor by impacting final consumer demand. These policies come in a variety of forms and include mandatory trade sanctions on products made with child labor, along with voluntary and industry-based initiatives and labeling schemes that inform consumers about the social conditions under which products are manufactured. These initiatives affect final demand either directly, through a selective import tax, or indirectly, by allowing consumers to price discriminate between products made with or without child labor through appropriate product labeling. These are alternatives to trade sanctions, which some fear could ultimately adversely affect the welfare of children. Meanwhile, voluntary market-based labeling schemes may suffer from credibility problems in the absence of third-party enforcement. In the end, the precise nature of consumers' willingness to pay for higher social and labor standards is nuanced, and its ultimate impact on the welfare of the child depends on whether labeling standards are fine-tuned to benefit the welfare of children or to maximize sales.

Arnab K. Basu and Nancy H. Chau

See also Globalization; Human Rights; Poverty; Poverty, Children Worldwide

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Labor, Division of

The division of labor refers to the partitioning of work tasks between social groups, based on demographic characteristics such as race, sex, age, and social class. Responding to economist Adam Smith's argument that the division of labor would lead to wealth for all, Karl Marx countered that the exploitation of the working classes would lead to alienation and revolution. According to Marx the bourgeoisie extracts surplus value from the proletariat to increase profitability and maintain a position of power.

Émile Durkheim believed that this partitioning of tasks is necessary to maintain the moral social order and cohesion between all social groups. Within simple societies with little cultural diversity, Durkheim claimed that the division of labor exhibits *mechanical solidarity.* Mechanical solidarity represents a division of labor where individuals perform identical tasks as their counterparts, making the society run smoothly. In advanced societies it is necessary to divide labor according to *organic solidarity,* meaning that workers perform specialty tasks to make their community function, like the organs in the human body.

Scientific management pioneer Frederick Winslow Taylor argued that work should be broken down to its simplest parts to maximize productivity. Taylor transformed manufacturing practices by simplifying work tasks, placing control of the labor process in the hands of management, and developing a model of production that inspired Henry Ford's moving assembly line.

For millennia, labor has been divided according to demographic characteristics. Women and nonwhites have historically been barred entry into certain professions. Most sociological literature examines the sexual division of labor and how this favors male workers. This literature explores sex segregation in the workplace and why women and men are expected to perform different—and different levels of—uncompensated work in the home. Ruth Milkman highlighted the cultural underpinning of this sexual division of labor, a process that can shift rapidly according to the economic desires of male workers and management.

A final component of the division of labor is the distinction between economic sectors, especially service and manufacturing work. While some argue that developed nations are entering an era of postindustrial production centered on service provision, others point out that we are simply witnessing the emergence of a new, more complex global division of labor.

Jonathan Isler

See also Discrimination; Scientific Management; Segregation, Gender; Taylorism

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Labor, Migrant

One of the most marginalized communities in the United States is that of the migrant and seasonal farmworkers who pick the crops that feed the most-fed

nation on earth. The social problems that migrant laborers face are bound to their socioeconomic disadvantages. Farmworkers occupy the lowest-paid job category in the United States, with the vast majority of immigrant farmworkers barely surviving on their below-poverty wages.

Historical Overview

The history of migrant labor relates to the four major migrant streams that have shuffled workers to where the crops need tending. Over the past 20 years, scholars have identified migrant streams that are increasingly Mexican immigrant, and due to political pressures to fortify the U.S.–Mexico border, the short-term sojourners are increasingly settling in rural agricultural destinations.

As the agricultural industry concentrated and expanded in the early 20th century to meet rising U.S. consumer demand, large numbers of temporary laborers were recruited to meet the short-term, labor-intensive harvest schedules of highly perishable crops. Berkeley economist Paul S. Taylor detailed the crops associated with the various migrant streams of the 1930s (see Figure 1). Remarkably, the four migrant streams did not alter significantly until the late 1980s. The East Coast migrant stream originated in Florida and the Caribbean and originally brought former African American sharecroppers north to pick apples, cranberries, and strawberries. Later, African Americans were replaced by Caribbean migrants from Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Haiti, and other islands who were first recruited to pick sugar cane in Florida and then moved up the eastern seaboard to pick the New England fall harvest. The Appalachian/Ozark migrant stream was more regionally focused and more crop specific, so wheat, cotton, and fruit pickers each followed their own distinct routes. During the Great Depression, the number of Appalachian and white sharecroppers swelled, but their presence in the migrant stream predated the 1930s. The Midwest migrant stream originated in South Texas and Mexico and most often followed the railroad lines. San Antonio, Texas, became the home base for many sojourners along this Midwest migrant stream. The Pacific Coast migrant stream originated in the Imperial Valley of California and Mexico. Mexican migrants have picked Washington apples, Oregon hops, and Idaho potatoes for well over a century.

Recent Migrant Streams

Over the past 20 years, the increasing reliance on Mexican labor has resulted in a redrawing of the migrant stream map (see Figure 2) and the development of new Mexican migrant streams to all agricultural regions of the United States. Workers in the established migrant streams travel from Mexico, through the border states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, to the Pacific Coast, Mountain States, Upper Midwest, and Atlantic Coast. A number of agricultural communities in California and south Texas also send migrant workers along these same routes, but it is primarily migrants directly from Mexico who now occupy all migrant streams.

A renewed grower utilization of the U.S. government's H-2A temporary visa program accelerated and institutionalized this process. The H-2A program originated in 1952 to meet the labor demands of Florida sugar and tobacco growers along the East Coast migrant stream. It allowed immigrant workers to obtain temporary visas to enter the country for a limited period to harvest predesignated crops. The latest available data show that agricultural firms in all 50 states employ H-2A labor and that there were 45,000 visas issued in 2003, up from 42,000 in 2002. Tobacco is the largest single crop that employs H-2A workers (35 percent of total). Scholars and labor activists readily agree that Mexican workers are the main visa recipients. Today, the fields that feed the nation, and increasingly the world, are almost exclusively harvested by workers of Mexican origin, even as the number of workers employed in agriculture continues to decline.

Data from the 2000 census partially confirm the Mexican predominance in migrant farmwork, but because the category of "migrant worker" is no longer part of data collection, the general occupational group of farming, fishing, and forestry shows that less than 1 million workers occupy this job category, with 79 percent of that workforce males. More Latinos (2.7 percent of all Latinos) are employed in agriculture than are members of all other racial/ethnic groups combined.

Problems Affecting Migrant Workers

The wages associated with migrant farmwork are abysmally low; the California Institute for Rural Studies estimates that each farmworker earns approximately $6,500 per year. Though workers now receive



The chart indicates only direction, not volume.
The number of migratory farmworkers in the different areas varies considerably from year to year.

Figure 1 Flow of Seasonal Migratory Farm Labor in the United States

Source: Taylor, 1940, p. 8.



Figure 2 Travel Patterns of Seasonal Migratory Agricultural Workers

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards; Helsinki Accords, 1992, p. 334.

the minimum wage (even though they have been exempt from minimum wage, workers' compensation, social security, and collective bargaining rights as a result of their specific exemption from New Deal legislation), the chronic underemployment associated with seasonal labor results in such low wages that migrants must constantly move to find gainful employment. Because of the dangers associated with crossing the U.S.–Mexico border, migrants are attempting to settle permanently in the United States. However, the demand for agricultural labor continues unabated, so more undocumented immigrants and H-2A temporary visa holders are moving to tend crops.

Farmworkers are susceptible to life-threatening illnesses caused by exposure to occupational hazards as well as diminished quality of health associated with poverty. The United Farm Workers established the "Wrath of Grapes" campaign to publicize the dangers associated with pesticide exposure and the number of chronic illnesses, birth defects, and deaths that result from prolonged pesticide exposure. Farmworker children are particularly at risk for chronic conditions such as asthma, cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, hepatitis, and many completely preventable "third world" diseases (such as polio and dysentery). Children are also vulnerable in terms of educational access, as many harvests conflict with school schedules; migrant children typically attend three or four schools in any given school year. Their frequent exposure to pesticides leads to a variety of health problems, including respiratory and nervous disorders, cancer, and asthma, which severely affect the life chances of migrant farmworkers, who collectively have a life expectancy of 54 years.

Ronald L. Mize

See also Chicano Movement; Social Movements

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Labor Force Participation Rate

The labor force participation rate is the proportion of eligible people in the population who are involved in the labor force. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the labor force as people over age 16 who are either employed or unemployed but looking for a job. People unemployed and not looking for work are not included in the labor force. Also not included are people in the U.S. Armed Forces or in institutionalized groups (penal facilities, mental facilities, and group homes). The overall U.S. labor force participation rate fluctuates seasonally but usually ranges between 66 percent and 68 percent. Demographic shifts in the population, economic cycles, and cultural changes further influence the labor force participation rate.

The most substantial shift in labor force participation in the past several decades has been the increasing participation of women. Women's increased educational attainment and reduced propensity to marry at young ages have contributed to this surge. In 1975, only 46.3 percent of women participated in the labor force compared with 59.4 percent in 2006. Though women's labor force participation has increased, it remains lower than men's participation rate (73.5 percent in 2006). However, the BLS projects that the gender gap in labor force participation will continue to narrow through 2014.

Labor force participation differences by race/ethnicity are not as great as gender differences. Though the current pattern of white men and women parallels the overall gendered labor force participation rates, the African American gender gap is much smaller (about 67 percent for men and 62 percent for women). Of the race/ethnic-gender groups tracked by the BLS, Hispanic men have the highest labor force participation rate (about 80 percent) and Hispanic women have the lowest (about 56 percent). Due to

immigration and fertility rates of Hispanic groups, the U.S. Hispanic population is younger than the overall population. As these cohorts age, the BLS projects 24 percent of the labor force will be of Hispanic origin by 2050.

Labor force participation rates vary through the life course, increasing from youth to the peak work ages (25 to 54) and declining as people retire. As the large baby boomer generation (people born between 1946 and 1964) ages, the median age of the labor force is increasing and the overall labor force participation rate is expected to decline. As baby boomers retire, the labor force will decline, thus increasing the economic dependency ratio (i.e., the number of people in the total population who are not in the labor force per 100 people who are). Many social scientists are concerned the economy will not be able to maintain necessary production levels of goods and services as the labor force participation rate declines with baby boomer retirements.

Sara F. Bradley

See also Baby Boomers; Dependency Ratio; Pensions and Social Security; Retirement; Unemployment

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Labor Market

Whereas economists analyze labor markets in terms of fluctuations in supply and demand for workers in various occupations, sociologists focus on other factors that influence employers' decisions to hire individuals and workers' ability to position themselves advantageously. Most sociological research explores how employees' *human capital* (i.e., education and training) prepares them for labor force entry and assists them in securing employment. Early attempts were made to distinguish between external and internal labor markets, with the former referring to recruitment outside of any particular organization's jurisdiction and the latter reflecting employers' use of career ladders and incentives to identify the most qualified in-house candidates for promotion.

Another strand of sociological research on labor markets examines how workers find employment. Mark Granovetter acknowledges the importance of human capital variables in helping workers find jobs and highlights the role of social networks in disseminating information about job openings. Granovetter finds that information gathered from those people to whom workers are closest (strong ties) is not necessarily more valuable than tips workers receive from informal associates (weak ties). This is because strong ties rarely are able to share additional labor market information because of cultural homogeneity, whereas weak ties garner diverse data because of their social distance from job seekers.

Oliver Williamson proposes that employers weigh the risks and benefits of utilizing labor *markets* (hiring outside contractors to fulfill specific needs) or *hierarchies* (developing organizational structures that foster long-term, internal labor markets). Successful firms outsource *and* hire workers in-house, according to their needs. By simultaneously relying on external and internal labor markets, firms can adjust to economic expansions and recessions.

Sociologists study how labor markets reflect inequalities, especially according to race and sex. A labor market segmentation hypothesis argues that in the developed world, white males occupy a series of privileged core positions while nonwhites and women are barred from entry into these labor markets and forced into secondary, peripheral jobs. Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos find that employers create schemas (job queues) that set aside attractive, high-paying jobs for white males and relegate nonwhites and women into undesirable positions. This discrimination intensifies labor market segmentation, leading to sex- and race-based segregation at work. Samuel Cohn finds evidence that outright discrimination excludes women and nonwhites from higher-status jobs. A final strand of sociological research of labor markets examines the role of third-party organizations, namely, labor market intermediaries. These organizations are effective in streamlining hiring practices, reducing job search costs, and matching workers with quality jobs.

Jonathan Isler

See also Labor, Division of; Labor Force Participation Rate; Outsourcing; Segregation, Occupational; Split Labor Market

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Labor Movement

Unlike a labor union, which is an empirical reality as a bureaucratic organization, a labor movement is a conceptual, rather than a physical, category. While its components are real (labor unions), it is a construct of people's minds. In common usage it refers to a nation's labor unions and the working class. Viewed as an *ideal type* (a Weberian term referring to the ideal version), it implies unity, coordination, cohesion, and, to draw on the favorite word of supporters of the concept, labor solidarity.

Union leaders promote respect for the concept because it connotes strength and purpose. The idea of the existence of a labor movement gives vote-seeking politicians reason to pay favorable attention to labor's political agenda. It gives union organizers an attractive image to leverage in their ceaseless efforts to persuade the unorganized to vote to join as dues-paying members. It gives members a welcomed sense of personal significance, of being members of a social force for the Good. It also gives hope to the unorganized, as it highlights a force whose agenda includes winning gains, such as raises in the minimum wage level, that accrue to the well-being of all, union and nonunion workers alike.

Critics of the concept also promote its use, though for very different reasons. They use the idea of there being a labor movement to frighten all who fear that special interest groups undermine the general well-being of everyone. They warn that labor "bosses" (aka leaders) hobble the free market with unnecessary rules and regulations (as with those that promote safety and health at work). They use the concept to magnify shortcomings of this union or that one (such as sexist or racist ways), and they generalize from these weaknesses to the entire body of unions. And they use the concept to exaggerate labor's power, thereby making a case for passage of new laws that weaken labor.

In fact, the concept is far weaker than either its admirers or detractors prefer acknowledging. Especially in advanced industrial nations like the United States where individualism is the main cultural motif, there is much that divides union members from one another (including levels of educational attainment, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual preference, political leanings, social class self-identification, industry, craft, etc.). Accordingly, it is hard for union leaders to get members to act on behalf of a cause that is not exactly theirs but is more a concern of other unionists.

Labor movement solidarity, although often displayed at Labor Day parades and picnics where no risk or price is entailed, frequently disappears where it really counts, as in daring to strike in support of the picket line of another union. Likewise, detractors of the concept are reluctant to concede there is far less to it than their calculated use of it as a fear-provoking image suggests.

Whereas in the 1800s, during the early industrial revolution, the notion of a labor movement may have had heft and consequence, there are only two aspects today with substance: political and community affairs. In the United States and most advanced industrial nations, the labor movement remains a voting force of importance. Unions can draw on many volunteers to run phone banks, canvas neighborhoods on foot to distribute campaign literature, and, in many other consequential ways, make a difference in election outcomes. Likewise, in response to a disaster (floods, hurricanes, etc.), the labor movement can rally many volunteers to rush aid to the needy, assist rescue and recovery operations (as during the 9/11 attack in New York), and in numerous other ways, lend a distinct and valuable hand.

Notwithstanding these two strengths (political and community matters), the concept of a labor movement remains a fragile and problematic one. In developing nations it is weakened by the dominance of family and tribal identity over class identity. In more advanced nations it is weakened by all the sources of identity mentioned earlier, and especially by the desire of many in the working class to rise up and out of that class. This wish can translate into disinclination or even refusal to come to the aid of others in the working class.

As if this wasn't enough to weaken solidarity, there is also mean-spirited rivalry among some unions.

Efforts are made to win over members of other unions, and in the process the targeted union is sharply denigrated, leaving both working-class participants in the "raid" and onlookers increasingly skeptical about there being any mutual respect left in the so-called labor movement.

Naturally, far-sighted and progressive labor leaders seek to add substance and worth to the labor movement concept. They understand its importance in promoting a social force that is supple, relevant, and significant. Their unions use educational efforts aimed at raising consciousness of solidarity, creating links among different types of members (as in creating women's caucuses), and forging ties to relevant outside groups, such as the NAACP and La Raza, to extend the "reach" of the labor movement.

Thanks now to labor's invaluable use of computer power to promote an "electronic community" via e-mail, Web sites, and other forms of Internet empowerment, admirers of the concept are more hopeful than ever that the 21st century will see nations host better labor movements than ever before. Indeed, the prospects are good for the welding together of a worldwide labor movement, thanks to the power of the Internet. Already more and more unions around the globe have more and more knowledge of one another and are beginning to cooperate in joint boycotts, protests, and even coordinated strikes. While much remains to divide the unions, including the biases of members (left-leaning unions find it hard to respect right-leaning ones, and vice versa), admirers of the labor movement concept are encouraged as seldom before by the possibility that slowly, carefully, and unevenly, the world's labor unions—and large components of national working classes everywhere—may finally come together in a new labor movement worth the name.

If and when labor achieves authentic global solidarity, the course of world events is likely to change, though whether for good or naught is yet to be decided. A global labor movement could prove to be one of the most significant agents of change, or it could remain as it is at present, a wistful idea in uneven search of substance.

Arthur Bennet Shostak

See also Cyberspace; Global Economy; Globalization; Labor Racketeering; Labor Unions; Transnational Social Movement

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Labor Racketeering

Labor racketeering (not a legal or scientific term) is a popular way of referring to organized crime exploitation of unions and union pension and welfare funds. Unions, like most organizations, have their share of corrupt officers and employees. However, unions are unique on account of the extensiveness of corruption perpetrated by the Cosa Nostra (sometimes called "mafia") organized crime families and union officials with whom they are allied. Indeed, no other country (not even Italy or Japan, with hugely powerful organized crime groups) has experienced the degree of organized-crime-sponsored labor racketeering that has plagued the U.S. labor movement.

Setting the pattern for organized crime labor racketeering early in the 20th century were Jewish, Irish, and other ethnic gangsters like Arnold Rothstein (1882–1928), Jacob Orgen (1894–1927), Louis Buchwalter (1897–1944), and Arthur Flegenheimer, aka "Dutch Schultz" (1903–35). Sometimes hired to help a union defend itself from employers' thugs, these gangsters got a foot in the door and then decided to stay. They took over union locals by means of violence, intimidation, and election fraud. Sometimes, employers voluntarily signed exclusive collective bargaining agreements with gangster-dominated labor organizations because they wanted to prevent communist or socialist dominated unions from representing their workers.

These labor racketeers solicited employer bribes in exchange for sweetheart contracts and other violations of the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, in industries marked by cutthroat competition, the labor racketeers could use the union to establish and police employer cartels. Through their control over the labor force, the union officials could prevent noncartel members from doing business in the city where the cartel operated. The cartels fixed prices and allocated contracts. The mobsters also collected "dues" from the cartels' employer members and sorted out disputes among the cartels' members.

As early as the 1920s and 1930s, dozens of organized crime–controlled unions operated in Chicago, New York, and other cities. The Italian-American organized crime Cosa Nostra (LCN) families that came to dominate organized crime by the 1940s thrived on labor racketeering. Every city with an LCN family had significant labor racketeering. The mobsters took money out of the unions via bloated salaries, fraudulent reimbursement schemes, no-show jobs, and embezzlement. They also benefited from a steady stream of employer bribes. Starting in the 1940s, with the creation of massive employer/union pension and welfare funds, labor racketeering became much more lucrative. The multibillion-dollar Teamsters Central States Fund, for example, functioned as a bank for organized crime. In addition, labor racketeering provided organized crime bosses with social status and political power. Labor racketeers contributed endorsements, money, and manpower to politicians' election campaigns in exchange for the politicians' promise not to interfere with LCN's business interests.

Law enforcement offered little opposition to labor racketeering or to organized crime generally. City police departments were either too corrupt to take on powerful organized crime groups or too lacking in resources, or both. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was a much smaller agency in the early and mid-20th century than it is today, and, arguably, its jurisdiction did not extend to investigating organized crime. In any event, the FBI assigned top priority to fighting Communists and other subversives. Not until the mob bosses' notorious Appalachian Conference in 1957 did the FBI begin to collect intelligence information (via illegal electronic surveillance) on organized crime.

In 1955, Elia Kazan's (now classic) film *On the Waterfront* dramatized the impact of organized crime's labor racketeering on longshoremen and fueled a demand for corrective action. From 1957 to 1959, a U.S. Senate committee (the McClellan Committee) held highly publicized hearings on labor racketeering, especially focusing on Jimmy Hoffa, general president of the Teamsters Union. Robert F. Kennedy was the committee's chief counsel. His combative questioning of Jimmy Hoffa and Hoffa's angry responses made front page news and good entertainment. When, in 1961, Kennedy became U.S. attorney general, he helped pass federal anti–organized crime legislation and initiated a major Justice Department offensive against the LCN crime families. When Kennedy resigned in 1964, the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) anti–organized crime and anti–labor racketeering efforts dissipated, but they did not disappear. More powerful legislation passed in 1968 and 1970, including the famous RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act.

The mob assassination of Jimmy Hoffa in 1975 touched off a major DOJ offensive against the Italian-American organized crime families. Eventually, federal prosecutors brought hundreds of criminal cases. In addition, they found RICO's civil provision the most effective anti–labor racketeering weapon ever invented. The DOJ lawyers filed their first civil RICO union case in 1982 against New Jersey Teamsters Local 560. That suit sought to purge LCN organized crime figure Tony Provenzano and his cronies from a local union that the mobsters had controlled for 2 decades. The judge found in favor of the government and issued a wide-ranging injunction that placed a court-appointed trustee in charge.

In 1988, Rudy Giuliani, then U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, filed a similar civil RICO suit against the general executive board of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). The suit alleged that the IBT's international officers, in league with a number of mafia bosses, ran the entire IBT as a racketeering enterprise. The case was settled on terms favorable to the government and, as in the Local 560 case, with the imposition of a novel court-supervised remedial trusteeship. The remedial phase of the case continues to this day (winter 2007), with no end in sight.

All told, the DOJ has so far brought 21 civil RICO cases against mob-dominated labor unions. The government has prevailed, usually by settlements, in all these cases, with trusteeships of one kind or another

always imposed. The trustees have then tried to purge organized crime members and their allies from these unions and reform union governance to the point where the union will be resistant to organized crime in the future. These trusteeships have met with both successes and failures, with many cases still pending. Nevertheless, the elimination of labor racketeering appears to be a realistic goal.

James B. Jacobs

See also Corruption; Labor Movement; Labor Unions; Organized Crime

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Labor Sectors

Social scientists often refer to labor sectors as divisions of the economy. There are several ways to describe labor sectors, but all of them refer to systems of grouping similar labor or broad classifications of industries.

One common system of labor sector divisions distinguishes between the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. The primary sector refers to the segment of the economy working directly with raw materials from the natural environment. This sector includes industries such as agriculture, mining, and forestry. The secondary sector includes industries producing manufactured goods. Service activities such as banking, retail sales, transportation, and communication services are categorized in the tertiary sector. Social scientists sometimes, though not consistently, extend these divisions to specify a quaternary sector and a quinary sector. The quaternary sector refers to intellectual activities such as education, information technology, and scientific research. The quinary sector, a branch of the quaternary sector, is limited to the labor of high-level decision makers such as top executives in government and other industries.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses a more detailed labor sector system to classify industries into sectors. The BLS lists three "goods producing" sectors and nine "service producing" sectors. The goods producing sectors include natural resources, construction, and manufacturing. The service producing sectors include trade, transportation, and utilities; information; financial activities; professional and business services; education and health services; leisure and hospitality; public administration; other services; and unclassified industries.

The BLS uses sectors to evaluate changes in the national economy, but they can also be used to understand economic structure in other countries. The distribution of labor sectors in a country has implications for the country's development potential. In traditional developing countries, as compared with industrialized countries, a larger proportion of the economy is involved in the primary sector. When investments flow to developing countries, workers leave the primary sector for higher-paying jobs in cities. However, social scientists have noticed that labor sectors in countries developing in the modern economy do not transition in the same pattern as countries that industrialized earlier. Many researchers claim foreign investments influence developing countries' labor sectors and maintain international inequalities.

Rather than focusing on industries in labor sectors, some social scientists define labor sectors descriptively. For example, "nonprofit sector" refers to not-for-profit organizations, and "public sector" refers to organizations for the public good (such as local government). Labor sectors can also be defined by the regulatory status of labor. In this context, the formal labor sector includes all activities reported as labor to the government. The informal sector refers to voluntary labor, unpaid labor, unreported labor, and possibly illegal labor. Often the informal sector refers to volunteers, self-employed workers, or small business employees, but this sector can also include exploitive situations for undocumented workers or other workers with few employment alternatives.

Sara F. Bradley

See also Economic Development; Economic Restructuring; Service Economy

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U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (http://www.bls.gov).

Labor Unions

Organizations of hourly or salaried employees intent on improving both the at-work and off-work lives of actual and prospective members, labor unions often make up the largest social movement in a country. Able often to successfully bargain for better wages, hours, and working conditions than those afforded their matched counterparts in nonunion workplaces, labor unions raise the bar and show the way. Critics, not surprisingly, rush to charge this wage differential comes at a high cost to other stakeholders in a unionized firm, such as investors, nonunion jobholders, managers and executives, and possibly even consumers. Pro-union academics, however, contend that the higher morale, and thereby possibly the higher productivity of unionized employees, compensates for the union's "tax" on company profits; this is one of many such endless economic arguments concerning unions.

Labor unions can trace their origins back to medieval or even Roman guilds, though nowadays they no longer produce products or services or attempt to control prices and product standards. Found in almost every country, especially since the mid-20th century, labor unions' existence fundamentally hinges on their acceptance, or at least countenance, by government. Totalitarian countries either outlaw them or subvert them and turn them into ersatz meaningless puppets of the regime (as may be true at present in Mainland China and several Middle Eastern countries). Generally, the more democratic the political scene is, the greater is the union density (the percentage of eligible members who have joined a union).

A union consists of many worksite-based operations, known in the United States as *locals*. A local is the smallest unit and the one in which most members actually "experience" unionism, warts and all. It generally operates out of an office (or union hall), complete with a meeting room and the equipment necessary to house an election phone bank program, large rallies, celebrations, holiday parties, and the like. In large measure, whatever union members think and feel about unionism is derivative from the strengths and weaknesses of their local rather than from any other aspect of the union apparatus or the labor movement per se.

Locals connect to one another in a union's citywide, statewide, and regionwide organizations. Their union may also enroll them in a sector organization (as when the locals whose employers make this product or that one are grouped together in a niche organization by this or that product line). A local may be also a member of citywide, statewide, and regional organizations along with locals of other unions. These bodies that mix locals of different unions are especially strategic for making consequential endorsements, for getting out the vote, and in many other ways, for boosting labor's political clout.

Contrary to misleading stereotypes as predominantly blue-collar domains, labor unions, especially in advanced industrial nations, attract a wide range of members: Actors, artists, clergy, dancers, engineers, musicians, nurses, pilots, prison guards, professors, secretaries, and social workers are unionized, as are auto, factory, mine, and steel workers. This diversity helps explain the preoccupation of unions with legislative matters, as almost every proposed piece of legislation can touch on some aspect of the life of this or that union member. Likewise, the diversity of dues payers prompts unions to vigorously participate in electoral contests, commonly on the side of populist candidates.

Despite the occupational diversity of unions, critics have long charged that unions employ racist and sexist practices to control membership on behalf of their white heterosexual male members. Much evidence supports this charge, though all such barriers are lower today than ever. Thanks to federal anti-discrimination laws, and in large part to the direct efforts of protestors (especially women, civil rights, and gay activists, many of whom operate openly inside the labor movement), progress continues to be made, albeit never as fast as advocates would prefer.

Union democracy, while dismissed by some hostile critics as an oxymoron, is hailed by labor supporters as a valuable prop of a nation's overarching democracy. The very nature of a union complicates the matter: It is at one and the same time an army capable of either highly disciplined defensive or aggressive moves and yet also a town hall culture that welcomes debate, controversy, and the uncertainties of a popular democratic style, one where leaders can swiftly be voted out of office, almost regardless of circumstances. (Union leaders, not surprisingly, want above all to continue to hold office and not "return to the tools.") A union also endlessly recruits new members, socializing them into a culture foreign to them, one that expects loyalty and a degree of conformity. Also, it can function as a

church of sorts for a small number of ideological devotees for whom the leadership can do no wrong (or, if in opposition, no right). Plainly, then, varied definitions of democracy endlessly joust with one another, a winner at one time readily replaced by another as circumstances change.

Employers vary greatly in their reaction to unions, with most initially hostile and some even rabidly so when an organizer first shows up (a move that generally reflects a call to the union for help from some aggrieved members of the workplace). Much hinges on the national climate: When the people support egalitarian values and frown on class conflict, as in postwar Scandinavia and also in the wishful high-minded doctrine of the 25-nation European Union, employers and unions try to get along. They compromise in bargaining new labor contracts, let the government sit in to help make the deal, and agree to treat each other with mutual respect. On the contrary, when people accept ever-greater income disparities and shrug at outbreaks of fierce class conflict, as in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, labor–management relations are testy at best, and mean-spirited, unrestrained, and ugly at worst.

When the parties lack parity in bargaining or political power, relations typically worsen. The temptation to take advantage of the weaker side is often too great to resist, even though those individuals on the (temporarily) stronger side generally recognize how shortsighted such a course of action is. The dynamic here, for example, might have employers exploit a seeming power dominance, only to have employees soon grow angry and bitter at supervisory excesses. Labor is soon the beneficiary in that new members flock to it, demanding it strike back and help restore at work a semblance of equity in power, a cessation of abuse, and a modicum of mutual respect.

At present, unions worldwide are either barely holding their own or declining in membership as a percentage of the workforce, a trend for about 3 decades. For example, U.S. unions in the mid-1970s had about 35 percent of the eligible, while in 2006 the number was only 12 percent. Explanations focus on five matters: First, federal and state labor laws, while allegedly neutral between labor and management, are damned by U.S. unions as stark hindrances to organizing and winning a first contract after a successful campaign. Second, many jobs in traditional union sectors, such as manufacturing, have been lost to automation and outsourcing. Third, employer opposition, aided by union-avoidance consultants, can be formidable. Fourth, the mass media seldom take labor's side. Fifth, unionism has been besmirched by the presence of organized crime in a few unions and locals. Sixth, union leaders operate defensively and rarely innovate: Young workers may therefore dismiss unions as behind the times, more a relic than a contemporary aid.

Union advocates look for gains from four sources: First, younger leaders, including more women and people of color, are ascending to power. Second, after 50 years of only one labor federation there are now two rival groups: Change to Win, an upstart made up of seven large unions, and the older body, the 45-member AFL-CIO. This rivalry may spur labor's renewal. Third, computers are enabling global boycotts and e-mail campaigns, and other novel tools are beginning to pay off. Fourth, pathbreaking unions are busy experimenting with creative uses of computer power, and this tool could help weld an "electronic community" of strategic aid to labor's reinvention of itself.

Programmatically, in the foreseeable future more mergers are likely, as small unions accept membership into a few very large ones. Closer cooperation with community groups is likely, including a turn toward support for "green" efforts. Services may expand beyond conventional offerings (such as health and welfare benefits, pensions, retirement homes, etc.), with some unions possibly even soon becoming providers of jobs outsourced to a union by employers open to having the unions employ labor. Although all of these are problematic, this much seems assured: As long as employees feel the need for a countervailing power at work, there will be unions. They will be only as meritorious, however, as required by the surrounding culture and their membership. A nation and a workforce get the unions they deserve.

Arthur Bennet Shostak

See also Global Economy; Labor Movement; Labor Racketeering; Social Movements

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Latent Functions

Latent functions are unintended and unrecognized consequences of intended, recognized manifest functions. Robert K. Merton contributed the original sociological explication of latent functions in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* of 1957. Merton, who borrowed the terms *manifest* and *latent* from Freud's theory of dreams, explained that latent functions can be functional, dysfunctional, or irrelevant for a social system. According to Freud, dreams use the images of everyday life as manifest content representing the true latent content of repressed desires. As Merton described, several social scientists—such as Marx, Durkheim, and Veblen—implicitly referred to latent consequences in their writings.

Merton's explication of latent functions relegates these outcomes mainly to the realm of social systems. For instance, an ethnic family may organize festivals to celebrate the achievements of its children (graduations, marriages, etc.) and invite other neighborhood members to the celebrations. The festivals serve the manifest function of observing the achievements of the children and the latent function of reinforcing the solidarity of the neighborhood members.

The condition that latent functions must be unrecognized by social actors is important in order to distinguish between manifest dysfunctions and true latent functions, since the former are unintended outcomes visible to social actors. For example, a local government may develop a large tract of public housing for poor people only to see the housing projects become poverty concentrations ripe with dangerous activities that threaten tenants.

Yet, it is not clear that all latent functions must remain unrecognized forever. Some latent functions may be eventually recognizable, but when they are, they are not necessarily consciously connected to the manifest functions from which they sprang. An example of such a latent case is a university campus that has become a marketplace for locating marital partners. The students may be aware that the campus provides access to potential marital partners but may not make a strong connection between this function and the manifest function of the university providing higher-level education.

The condition that latent functions are unrecognized illustrates the difference between the perspectives of social systems and human agency. Merton seems to restrict the knowledgeability of human agents, while Anthony Giddens credits them with being skilled and knowledgeable practitioners of social action. But, according to Giddens, unrecognized conditions and unintended consequences of social action still bound the knowledgeability of human actors. That is, human agents cannot have complete knowledge of the outcomes of their actions, especially regarding unintended consequences.

Another question is that of the time span for latent functions to develop. At the level of social systems or human agency, nothing can prevent manifest functions from having delayed latent outcomes. One could argue that it is precisely the continuity of some manifest functions that produces certain kinds of latent functions. For example, long-term European colonization fragmented African regions and created artificial, multicultural states that, after decolonialization, lapsed into interethnic conflict.

Nestor Rodriguez

See also Manifest Functions

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Learning Disorders

The term *learning disorders* refers to the problems or difficulties that some students experience in acquiring the necessary knowledge or skills that lead to academic achievement. Explanations for learning disorders are contested. Early understandings of problems

in learning were psychological in nature and based on the medical model. Recently, sociological critiques of psychomedical approaches have led to new educational perspectives.

The medical model suggests that symptoms of a disease are the visible manifestations of an underlying pathology, requiring an accurate diagnosis to define appropriate treatment of the pathology and result in a cure.

A psychological approach to learning disorders based on the medical model sees the symptom of the "disease" as low achievement. The underlying pathology is a categorical label (e.g., learning or intellectual disabilities). Through educational assessment diagnosing the condition, treatment in the form of intervention targets the underlying pathology in order to cure the condition.

The most widely recognized category of learning disorder is *learning disability*, a term coined by Samuel Kirk in 1962 to refer to any limitation beyond intelligence that prevents individuals from a successful learning experience; that is, those for whom conventional categories such as intellectual disabilities could not explain their failure. Kirk described learning disabilities as a retardation or disorder in areas of school achievement such as reading or mathematics. Based on the medical model, he suggested that cerebral dysfunction or emotional disturbance caused learning disabilities. Given the difficulty in detecting the nature of the underlying cerebral dysfunction, Kirk suggested that exclusionary criteria could differentiate learning disabilities from other causes of failure. He stated that the failure was not the result of intellectual disabilities, sensory deprivation, or cultural or instructional factors.

Since Kirk first introduced the term, a number of definitions of learning disabilities have emerged, but they generally adhere to his central tenets. For example, the initial public policy definition developed as part of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1977 stated that learning disability

> means a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes in understanding or using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, read, spell or do mathematical calculations. The term includes such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not include children who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, or emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.

Although *learning disability* is a general term subsuming a wide range of conditions, some researchers and advocacy groups refer to more specific categories of disorders or disabilities, such as the following.

Dyslexia refers specifically to disorders with the written language (reading and spelling). Its use is common in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where its distinction is as a neurological impairment as opposed to an intellectual disability.

Aphasia refers to a disorder in acquiring or using language. Children or adults can have difficulties in understanding language (receptive language) or in speaking (expressive language).

Dysgraphia refers to the inability to produce written text.

Dyscalculia refers to a disorder in the ability to perform mathematical tasks.

Social Critiques of Learning Disorders

Social analysts suggest that labels such as "learning disabilities," "dyslexia," or "learning disorders" and the identification and labeling of students as "learning disabled" are more social constructions than examples of neuropathology.

First, such categories create arbitrary distinctions between children who are "disordered" and those who are "normal." This is problematic in that research shows that no hard boundaries exist between the characteristics of children identified as experiencing learning disorders and those of other children who fail in school or of younger normally achieving children.

Second, researchers consistently have problems in attempting to document logical links in the medical model as it applies to children in classrooms. Many children fail to demonstrate any evidence of underlying neurological impairment or pathology so that a severe discrepancy between performance and potential substitutes for evidence of pathology. Additionally, questions remain about the adequacy of assessment techniques to "diagnose" underlying pathology.

Finally, one of the most serious limitations of the medical model is the lack of educational interventions that target the presumed pathology and are efficacious

in enhancing the development of children experiencing problems in learning. Effective interventions for children identified as learning disabled are the same as successful ones for all other children.

Educational Perspectives

Educational perspectives offer an alternative to both psychomedical and social analyses of learning disabilities. In the past 3 decades, experts have been remarkably productive in identifying key factors that underpin success in learning and in developing instructional programs that enhance the learning of all students—including those identified as having learning disabilities.

From an educational perspective, because children vary on multiple dimensions that affect learning along a continuum, failure to learn arises from an interaction of children's individual characteristics and the instructional programs provided to them. The appropriate response to failure is not a psychological or educational "treatment" but implementation of programs with demonstrated efficacy in promoting achievement.

In the case of reading and learning disabilities, the continuum of necessary skill acquisition is the same for children identified with learning disabilities or dyslexia as for all other children. The key to learning to read is phonological awareness, the ability to detect and manipulate the sound structure of language. Phonological awareness develops before the ability to read and is a powerful predictor of later reading ability. Sensitivity to rhyme is one of the earliest phonological skills to develop, followed by awareness of initial sounds. Among both children with learning disabilities and those without learning disabilities, poor readers often demonstrate core deficits in phonological processing. However, explicit instruction in phonological awareness can address these deficits and promote reading for both groups of students.

A second reason that many children fail to learn to read is the nature of early reading instruction. Effective reading instruction should teach children how to use their knowledge about letter–sound correspondences to work out unfamiliar words (phonics). Students need a systematic, structured program that teaches how to decode text. Phonics-based programs can successfully teach students to read, regardless of their assigned categorical label.

Other effective instructional approaches include minimizing distracting elements in programs so that children can focus easily on the key elements of the task. Finally, teachers should ensure that students have sufficient practice in skills so that they master each step in the learning sequence.

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See also Education, Academic Performance; Education, Special Needs Children

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Life Chances

German sociologist Max Weber first conceptualized the term *life chances* in his work on social stratification. Contrary to Karl Marx's theory of capitalist exploitation, in which social inequality was based on access to the means of production, Weber's theory of stratification involved three interrelated components: social class, status group, and political affiliation. In sharp distinction to Marx's notion of working-class struggle as a process of universal emancipation, Weber argued that membership in a social class did

not necessarily constitute membership in a community with common interests and experiences. Status groups, in his estimation, operated more like communities of people who shared a similar level of prestige, patterns of consumption, and lifestyle.

Weber's concept of lifestyle involved two major components: (1) life *choices*, or self-determined behavior, and (2) life *chances*, which involved structural probabilities, opportunities, and likelihoods. For Weber, these factors operated dialectically in the development of one's life course, involving degrees of freedom and self-direction as well as structural constraints. The term *life chances* refers to the probability of establishing a certain life course, given an individual's position in the social hierarchy. In this respect, the concept points to the relationship between status and class situation and their impact on one's vitality. It also refers to how people in similar class and status situations experience common advantages and disadvantages in the pursuit of a favorable quality of life and satisfaction of their needs.

Social class and status position strongly affect one's ability to access vital social resources, such as health care, food, clothing, housing, and so on, and life chances are often measured in these terms. Studies on health, mortality, crime, and lifestyle, for example, have established direct links between social class and life chances. In times of crisis, affluent and powerful members of society have a better chance of surviving than do members of the lower classes. In addition, researchers have found lifestyle and disease to be strongly correlated. Mortality rates, especially for infants, are often used as a measure of a country's wealth. Illnesses such as lung disease, diabetes, arthritis, and heart disease disproportionately affect low-income populations, in part because of limited access to health care but also because of poor diet, inadequate medical care, lack of health education, and increased exposure to violent crime. In this respect, life chances refer to a group's likelihood of survival.

Heather Gautney

See also Class; Cultural Capital; Social Mobility; Stratification, Social; Wealth Disparities

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Life Course

The life course as a field of study is a relatively new paradigm that developed after the 1950s, based on historical demography, research on the sociology of aging, life histories, and panel and longitudinal studies. Life course research is interdisciplinary in nature and combines several models to describe the social development of individuals across the life course.

Generally, researchers focus on five elements of the life course paradigm: the principle of life-span development, agency, time and place, timing, and linked lives. *Life-span development* refers to an individual's capacity to learn and grow throughout his or her life. *Human agency* emphasizes the fact that people shape their lives through the decisions they make based on social and historical opportunities and constraints. Determining these, to a large degree, are *time and place*; that is, the constraints and rooting of people's lives by the historical context in which they live. However, the way a person experiences life and its consequences also depends on the *timing* of events and transitions. Transitions between family, work, education, and community roles can be either on-time or off-time. Off-time transitions, such as teen pregnancy and early grandparenthood, are usually more problematic than on-time transitions. Last, people's lives interconnect with others, and the effect of *linked lives* can have long-lasting consequences for individuals. For example, a child born to a teen will have different opportunities later on in life than a child born to someone in their mid-30s. The nonnormative timing of teenage pregnancy also produces the off-time transition for the parent to become a grandparent at an earlier age than expected.

The terms *generation, period, cohort,* and *age* are important in life course research. *Generation* refers to

the norms associated with chronological age regardless of the historical context. For example, a person turning 18 becomes a young adult because 18 is the legal age of adulthood. A *period* is a certain slice of history, such as the 1960s, when certain cultural and historical events occur to people of all ages but affect people of various cohorts differently. A *cohort* is a group of people of a similar age who grow older and move through time together and, therefore, share certain historical experiences. *Age* stands for the changes, physical and mental, that occur to individuals as they get older. Shared understanding of these terms allows for an interdisciplinary field that generates rich data. Even though the life course paradigm is new, it has become an important framework in understanding the totality of people's lives.

Orli Zaprir

See also Baby Boomers; Boomerang Generation; Life Chances

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Life Expectancy

Life expectancy is a measurement defined as the number of years a person, at a given age and within a given population, can expect to live. Calculations of life expectancy come from a *life table*, a demographic measurement tool that describes the pattern and level of mortality for a given population, typically on a cross-sectional basis; that is, as a snapshot in time. While any age can serve as a basis to determine life expectancy, it is the expectation of life at birth (represented within a life table as e_0) most commonly presented because it is a summary indicator of mortality conditions across all ages for a given population, is unaffected by the overall age structure of the population, and, as such, is useful in cross-population comparisons. Occasionally, life expectancy at age 1 actually exceeds that at birth, if infant mortality rates are extraordinarily high within a given population.

Life expectancy usually declines with age. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in 2003 life expectancy at birth for both men and women of all races in the United States was 77.5 years. At age 65, life expectancy was 18.4 years; at age 75, 11.8 years; and at age 85, 6.8 years. These calculations imply a 65-year-old could expect to live until 83, a 75-year-old until age 86, and an 85-year-old until age 91. Generally, in conjunction with declining fertility rates, improvements in life expectancy have resulted in the "graying" of many national populations.

When the first reliable U.S. life-expectancy data were produced between 1900 and 1902, life expectancy at birth was 47.3 years. Much of the increase in life expectancy resulted from decreases in infant and child mortality, which reflects systematic increases in public health interventions such as the development of sewer systems that helped reduce the spread of infectious diseases. As history suggests, social conditions affect life expectancy as do demographic and socioeconomic factors such as gender, race, income, and geography. These factors create a range of life expectancies between populations as well as within a given population. Disparities in mortality rates usually result from unequal development among countries, whereas within a given population disparities reflect social inequality or stratification. Life expectancy currently differs dramatically between developed and developing countries, the latter of whose populations lack public health resources and remain subject to high levels of infectious disease. For example, according to the 2006 World Health Report, whereas life expectancy for some women in developed countries can reach as high as 83 years, life expectancy for men in sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases have significantly lowered life expectancies over the past 10 years, is less than 45 years.

Although the United States has one of the highest overall life expectancies in the world, it actually ranks low among other industrialized countries. Despite spending more on health care than any other industrialized country, the United States ranked 29th in life expectancy in 2006 and 43rd worldwide for infant mortality in 2005. In 2006, a study conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health found that the gap

between highest and lowest life expectancy among subgroups in the United States is over 35 years. This considerable gap reflects disparities that result from a combination of socioeconomic factors, including race, gender, income distribution, and geographic location, as well as phenomena such as widely varying rates of HIV infection and homicide and behavioral and cultural barriers to health, leading to increased rates of diabetes, the prevalence of cardiovascular disease, and alcohol-related deaths within specific populations. Further, this gap speaks to structural inequalities that limit access to health insurance and quality medical care, as well as the lack of social policies aimed at reducing socioeconomic differences.

In addition to demographic and socioeconomic factors that increase the range of life expectancies, increased overall life expectancy poses new challenges to populations where increased longevity may not necessarily correlate to improvements in quality of life. As populations age throughout the world, the prevalence of chronic illness also increases, and many public health organizations now distinguish between life expectancy and *healthy life expectancy*, the latter defined as the number of years an individual can expect to live a life free from disability, dependency on others, or disease. In 2000, the World Health Organization introduced the Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE) indicator, which projected that a female baby born in the United States can expect to live 72.6 healthy years, in contrast to 67.5 years for males. The prevalence of chronic illness among older populations raises issues such as the increased costs of medical care, the complications of long-term care, and strain placed on both private and public resources. Without the development of public health care initiatives that can reduce risk factors for chronic illnesses or the adoption of social policies that are capable of buffering the negative health effects of structural inequality, disparities in life expectancy will remain a social and public health concern.

Karen Gregory

See also Birth Rate; Mortality Rate; Population, Graying of; Population Growth

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Literacy, Adult

Adult literacy is an adult's ability to read, write, listen, and speak to accomplish daily events in the community, the family, and on the job. The Adult Performance Level program popularized the notion of "functional literacy," which is defined as reading and writing at a minimal level in day-to-day living. These functional skills include everyday literacy skills, such as reading a bus schedule, writing a check, and completing a job application. This cognitive view of literacy thus includes economic competence.

A social view of adult literacy emphasizes the reading, writing, speaking, listening, and critical thinking skills needed for participation in a democratic society. This view emphasizes social power, action, and change. Researchers, educators, community activists, and adults with limited literacy ability argue for this definition of literacy. In this view, literacy is not simply an autonomous set of generalized skills and practices predetermined by others; rather, literacy is embedded in culture and is socially and politically constructed.

The most prevalent and broadest view of literacy in adult literacy programs is "true literacy," covering individuals who can read and write beyond survival levels, take pleasure from a wide range of reading materials (including the canon or classic literature),

and engage in writing for creative reasons. Expanding the notion of true literacy is the construct of "high literacy," or the ability to think deeply, efficiently, and effectively with concepts and ideas necessary for the new millennium, particularly those abilities needed to keep up with the changing demands of new technologies. What is considered "high literacy" today, however, may become "basic literacy" tomorrow.

Assessments of Adult Literacy

The National Assessment of Adult Literacy (NAAL) is a nationally representative survey that measures English language literacy skills of U.S. adults age 16 years or older living in households or prisons. The NAAL defines literacy as both task based (everyday literacy tasks) and skills based (skills ranging from recognizing words to higher-level skills, such as making inferences from a text). Administered in 1992 and again in 2003, the NAAL examined adults' reading ability in three areas—prose literacy (e.g., newspapers, poems, and fiction); document literacy (e.g., job applications, bus schedules, and maps); and quantitative literacy (e.g., balancing a checkbook). Resulting classifications in prose literacy were either below basic (can do no more than the most simple and concrete literacy activities), basic (can perform simple and everyday literacy activities), intermediate (can perform moderately challenging literacy activities), and proficient (can perform challenging literacy activities). Results from 2003 show that about 43 percent of adults scored below basic or basic, and 57 percent of adults scored at the intermediate or proficient levels. No significant change in prose and document literacy occurred between the two assessments, but quantitative literacy increased.

Adult Literacy Education

Adult Basic Education (ABE) is typically either formal literacy instruction programs, such as that offered at community colleges, or volunteer tutors providing individualized instruction. Literacy tutors receive training through federally funded programs, such as the Peace Corps or AmeriCorps, or from literacy advocacy groups such as ProLiteracy Worldwide, the oldest and largest nongovernmental literacy organization in the world. ABE programs focus on teaching adults to read and write, but they might also offer basic mathematics instruction. ABE programs attract a wide range of participants in terms of ages, grade-level reading abilities, skills, and life experiences. Contrary to popular belief, most ABE participants are not illiterate but rather individuals who have completed several years of schooling yet remain unsuccessful at learning to read. Enrollment in ABE is typically free and open-ended, enabling adults to drop in and out as circumstances allow.

Workplace literacy refers either to the literacy strategies, functions, tasks, and materials needed in workplace settings, or to literacy programs conducted within workplace settings. These programs may focus on specific literacy demands of the workplace or may be any literacy program conducted at the work site, such as preparing to pass the GED (General Educational Development test, the high school equivalency test). Workplace literacy often involves myriad literacy skills, including listening, speaking (including specialized vocabulary), writing notes, reading from a paper or computer screen, doing mathematical calculations, and responding to tasks both orally and in writing.

First identified in the 1800s, workplace literacy issues led to labor union literacy programs at that time. Later, in the early 20th century, Congress heard testimony about the literacy problems among miners. The U.S. military enacted special literacy programs for soldiers during World War I. During the 1980s and 1990s, researchers documented literacy demands in the civilian workplace, finding that workers in most occupations read and wrote more in the workplace than most students did in school settings.

Workplace literacy programs evolved to cope with the growing population of workers for whom English is a second language and to provide training for workers with low literacy skills. The federal government funds workplace literacy programs that address basic language and literacy needs, as well as the more complex literacy demands of the workplace, by providing opportunities for learners to practice reading and writing using workplace examples. These activities usually also include discussion of the participants' beliefs about and plans for literacy and informational talks about their reading and writing processes.

Resources in Adult Literacy

Several agencies and organizations support adult literacy programs and contribute to a continuing reform agenda. For example, the U.S. Department of Education, Division of Adult Education and Literacy, administers grants and supports research and development efforts,

such as funding the National Institute for Literacy, to promote improvement of adult literacy services. The National Center for Adult Learning and Literacy conducts and disseminates research on adult literacy. Laubach Literacy and Literacy Volunteers of America support volunteer and community-based literacy programs. The National Center for Family Literacy provides funding, training, and technical assistance to family literacy programs.

Adult Literacy and Social Justice

The issue of adult literacy is ultimately an issue of access. The culturally diverse and socioeconomically disadvantaged have the fewest opportunities for literacy development and practice both in and out of school. Those with the most resources (e.g., education, books, new technology, language-rich environments, psychological and emotional support) have the greatest access to literacy. Further, the rapid development of information technology not only broadens current definitions of literacy but also widens the gap between those who have access to the widest range of literacy practices and those who have little or no access. This gap is often referred to as "the digital divide," a social problem that is considered a new civil rights issue of the 21st century. Hence, the digital age brings new challenges to the promotion of adult literacy development and practice in today's society.

Barbara J. Guzzetti

See also Digital Divide; Illiteracy, Adult in Developed Nations; Illiteracy, Adult in Developing Nations

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Literacy, Economic

Economic literacy is the ability to understand choices and make decisions regarding limited resources. Those decisions affect what an individual produces or consumes, saves or invests. In a broader sense, the economic literacy of a nation's citizenry affects its productive capacity and standard of living. Personal finances, national policies, and issues of globalization are all subject to the same economic principles. The knowledge and application of those principles foster more efficient use of personal, national, and global resources.

What Does It Mean to Be Economically Literate?

Economically literate individuals understand that they cannot have everything they want and that they have to make choices because resources are scarce. These decisions require an analysis and comparison of the costs and benefits of various alternatives. Each decision will incur an opportunity cost; that is, something of value will be given up. Not all decisions are between two different items; some decisions are intertemporal or between two different time periods as when money is placed in a bank account or used to purchase a bond.

Why Is Economic Literacy Important?

Although few people choose to become economists, most people have to make economic decisions every day. Rapid technological and communications advances have provided ordinary people with more information with which to make decisions and more varied goods and services about which to make them. At the same

time, globalization has made sound economic decision making crucial if we are to compete effectively in the marketplace. Furthermore, articulate, well-informed citizens are critical to the functioning of a democratic market economy. In terms of social policy, economics can help assess the costs of problems such as crime, teen pregnancy, pollution, and terrorism as well as assess the costs and benefits of policies designed to deal with them.

What Are the Dangers of Economic Illiteracy?

Without an understanding of economics, individuals are more likely to fall prey to fraud and credit abuse and exercise poor judgment on such important decisions as home buying, college savings, car financing, and retirement planning. Misunderstanding of the nature of markets may lead to such ill-conceived responses to price increases as price controls that have the opposite of the intended effect, creating shortages and exacerbating price pressures. Failure to understand the nature of competition and the need to build a strong human and physical capital base may lead to measures to protect a few jobs while denying the broad-based benefits of trade.

When Does an Individual Need to Become Economically Literate?

Certainly the earlier these economic literacy skills can be learned, the better. Good habits are best formed before bad behaviors can take root. In a world where credit cards are easily obtained and credit card debt is rampant, it is never too early to learn. In addition, the economic way of thinking is a multipurpose tool with not only a wealth of practical, real-world applications but benefits as well, even for the very young child, in terms of augmenting critical thinking skills. Furthermore, the earlier an individual learns such principles as the time value of money, the sooner he or she can take advantage of compounding his or her savings and building assets for the future.

How Do Science, Technology, and Economic Literacy Interact?

Science, technology, and economics are complements. While science and innovation determine what is technically possible, economics determines what is feasible and efficient—or what the best use of the resources consumed by competing technologies will be. This efficient use of technology drives productivity, and productivity helps drive growth and improve living standards.

How Else Does Economic Literacy Improve Living Standards?

A well-functioning economy demands an educated workforce capable of making sound decisions. To absorb the inevitable shocks, an economy also requires smoothly functioning markets, both for goods and for the financial instruments that facilitate their production. Pools of saving and sound investment decisions are necessary to direct financial resources to support the most productive innovations. On an individual basis, the informed person is better able to plan, budget, and weather his or her own financial uncertainties. The individual is also more likely to save and invest and less liable to fall victim to financial fraud and abuse.

Today's complex issues require the use of sophisticated tools. Economic literacy has a toolset that empowers users to take back control over their lives.

Robert F. Duvall

See also Bankruptcy, Personal; Socioeconomic Status; Wealth, U.S. Consumer

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Living Wage

A living wage is a wage that is high enough for full-time workers to provide a decent life for themselves and their families. As such, calls for a living wage date back to at least *Deuteronomy* 24:14.

In the United States, about one fifth of full-time workers live in poverty. In other words, the free market sets their wage at a level that is less than a living wage. Therefore, only legislation can secure a living wage by compelling employers to pay workers more than the market deems them to be worth. For example, legislation could stipulate a minimum hourly wage just sufficient to enable a full-time worker to support a family of three (or four) at the national poverty line, plus mandated benefits and paid days off.

Critics of a living wage predict that compelling employers to pay wages in excess of what the market deems appropriate will generate one of three scenarios. In the first, firms substitute capital equipment for their "overpriced" workers, thereby having the unintended consequence of causing the unemployment of precisely the people the living-wage legislation was intended to help. The second scenario suggests that the higher wage costs cause a profit squeeze at the affected firms, bankrupting some firms and thus, again, causing unemployment. In the final scenario, the higher wage costs get passed on as higher prices, causing inflation.

Fortunately, some experiments with living-wage legislation at the municipal level, in Baltimore and Milwaukee in 1995 and Los Angeles in 1997, gave specific results instead of hypothesized scenarios. Using data from these experiments, social scientists assessed the effects of a living wage, finding the opposite of what the critics predicted. In these cases, imposing a living wage on firms unleashed a wave of increased labor productivity (i.e., the amount of output per unit of labor input) at the affected firms, making it possible for them not only to pay the living wage but also to increase profits at lower prices. The causes of this burst in labor productivity included reduced absenteeism and decreased labor turnover (i.e., the rate at which workers quit their jobs and firms then have to replace them), better quality work, better cooperation between labor and management, and thus more management flexibility in the operation of the business and, generally speaking, higher morale.

Moreover, far from causing unemployment, the increased spending by the workers receiving a living wage increased the overall demand for goods and services in their communities, with the virtuous ripple effect of creating more investment and employment opportunities for others.

Edwin Dickens

See also Job Satisfaction; Life Chances; Poverty; Wage Gap

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Lynching

The origin of "lynching" as a social phenomenon has several possibilities, but it seems to be primarily related to the practice of vigilante justice dating from colonial days up through the "Wild West." Regardless of the term's origins, the lynchings suffered by African Americans were crimes against humanity, yet these events were festive spectacles. Torture, mutilation, burning alive, and hanging—of African Americans, primarily—was entertainment for celebratory white crowds, often with children at their sides. These "festivals of violence" became commonplace during Reconstruction and continued until the 1950s.

The root of this violence, as a cultural practice, is white nationalism guided by its ideology of white supremacy. As such, the pre–Civil War majority ruling of the Supreme Court in Dred Scott that "the black man has no rights which whites are bound to respect," continued as law well into the 20th century, except for the brief period of Reconstruction in which blacks were enfranchised. The lynching of Italians, the minority group second most often so executed, because of their dark hair, eyes, and complexion, further illustrated this racist mentality.

In slavery, blacks were chattel, property, and of value to most slaveowners. In freedom, though, blacks

often experienced the vicious white supremacist tyrannical forces of debt peonage. Violence or "outrages" perpetrated against freed men and women were commonplace. These events were so much a part of the culture that photos of the hangings and burnings were made into picture postcards to be shared with friends and family. People kept mutilated body parts as "treasure" and sold them as memorabilia. Blacks could claim no rights as protection. For a long time, lynchings were an implicit part of the social contract governing black–white interaction.

With the history of lynching having its roots in mob "justice," the prevailing justification for the savage brutality meted out was often retribution for alleged rapes of white women. In her *Southern Horrors,* Ida B. Wells-Barnett exposed these rape charges as mostly falsehoods. To the chagrin of the white supremacist South, Wells documented case after case of these claims against the lynch victims as fabrications. Many lynchings had more to do with resentment of black success. Wells started her anti-lynching campaign in response to the lynchings of some of her friends in Memphis by whites because their store was more successful than that of a white competitor. In 1921, a mass lynching occurred in Tulsa, Oklahoma—a case of "racial cleansing." This mass lynching or riot in Tulsa occurred when the economically successful Greenwood district, with its "Black Wall Street," was burned to the ground and more than 300 blacks killed at the hands of whites.

Although many of the lynchings occurred in the South, this was a national phenomenon. The "social contract" that normalized these atrocities up through much of the 20th century resulted in more than 3,000 African Americans suffering that fate. Even though the public spectacle waned, the lynching of Emmett Till in 1955 preceded other notable lynchings during the civil rights movement and into the 1990s with the dragging death of James Byrd.

Robert Newby

See also Racism; Violent Crime

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M

Magnet Schools

Magnet schools are public schools of choice that offer specialized curricula or instructional themes in a racially integrated setting. During the 1970s, magnet schools emerged as a voluntary desegregation tool in an era of enforced busing. Magnet schools are intended to provide a school choice option that minimizes the negative effects of "white flight"—the outmigration of white families to private or suburban schools in order to avoid interracial contact in school settings. Reinforcing the goal of developing a diverse student body in magnet schools was the 1975 *Morgan v. Kerrigan* decision in Boston and of federal funding support programs.

The federal government provides funding to promote the development of a diverse student population in order to support court-ordered or voluntary desegregation objectives. Initially, funding was obtained through the Emergency School Assistance Act, but now the majority of magnet schools receive funding through the Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP) developed in 1984. Schools applying for the grant initially declare one of three desegregation objectives: to *reduce* minority isolation through reducing the overall proportion of minority students in a school; to *eliminate* minority isolation by bringing minority enrollments to below 50 percent; and to *prevent* minority isolation by stopping minority enrollments exceeding 50 percent. In fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, MSAP funding was set at $107 million for each year.

Magnet school numbers have increased rapidly since their introduction into the educational landscape. In 1991, 4 percent of school districts offered a magnet school option, and by 1994 this had doubled to nearly 8 percent. In 2002, the National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) reported that 28 states maintained 1,736 magnet school options that educated a total of 3 percent of the national student body. As a comparison, in the same time frame, charter schools, a much-discussed school choice option, educated 1.2 percent of the population. Illinois has the highest percentage of students enrolled in magnet schools (15 percent), followed by Virginia (11 percent), California (9 percent), and North Carolina (8 percent). Half of all magnet schools are at the elementary level, while 20 percent are high schools. Eighty-five percent of magnet schools are located in large urban school districts with student populations exceeding 10,000; 55 percent are located in predominantly minority school districts and in districts with more than 50 percent of students eligible to participate in Free Lunch programs.

The research on the success of magnet schools in promoting racial integration shows mixed results. Several studies found that magnet schools do achieve some success as desegregation tools, but others found magnet schools unsuccessful in developing integrated organizations. The magnet school goal of reducing minority isolation has not been easily accomplished. The NCES reported that only 44 percent of those schools receiving MSAP grants achieved their goal of reducing minority isolation but 72 percent of schools were successful in preventing isolation (maintaining minority enrollment under 50 percent). However, far fewer schools intended to prevent isolation (82) than to reduce isolation (529).

Overall, the studies on magnet schools indicate three critical variables that affect the potential success

of desegregation goals: the overall minority enrollment in the district; the trends in minority enrollments; and the type of magnet school. Research indicates that white families avoid schools with higher percentages of African American students; consequently, schools trying to prevent the increase of minority enrollments will probably be more successful than schools trying to eliminate or reduce minority isolation. The special focus and innovative curricula of the magnet schools, however, seek to overcome the racial fears of white parents.

School districts often provide additional funding to magnet schools to recruit more staff and faculty for such academic specialties as fine arts, computer technology, or health science. The result is often increased expenditures per pupil and lower student–teacher ratios when compared to other schools in the district, and this generates an air of prestige and exclusivity that tends to attract educated, middle-class parents to the schools. Indeed, one third of magnet schools are designated "highly" or "very" selective. Illustrating the popularity of the magnet option is the high percentage of schools—approximately 50 percent—that have student waiting lists.

Research suggests that the perception of academic excellence and student selectivity is more important to parents than is the specialized program of study. Moreover, those selecting the magnet option are more likely to be motivated parents with higher social class backgrounds and strong information networks who support their children's academic activity. Some researchers argue, therefore, that school choice leads to a stratified and inequitable school system.

More recently, the courts have renounced the desegregation goals of magnet schools, specifically entrance decisions based on racial equity goals, as for example, in *Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg* in 2001 and *Wessman v. Gittens* in 1999. Race-conscious programs are suspect in an educational era defined by individual rights. The ever-increasing deregulation of schools and privileging of parental choice, manifest through vouchers and charter schools, coupled with an increased focus on the achievement and accountability goals legislated by No Child Left Behind, results in an education system that is unenthusiastic about the diversity goals integral in the development of magnet schools. Instead, magnet schools are constructed as prestigious schools offering academic excellence, and the opportunity to attend should be available to any child, regardless of race and economic status.

Lorraine Evans

See also Education, Academic Performance; Educational Equity; No Child Left Behind Act; Redistricting, School Districts; School Vouchers

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Malnutrition

See Food Insecurity and Hunger

Managed Care

Managed care and managed care plans typically refer to the way health care plans both provide care and pay for services provided within a network. Networks consist of providers, such as physicians and hospitals, that serve an enrolled population of individuals, also called "enrollees," who receive such services. Introduced in the United States in the 1980s, managed care plans arose as a way to control rising health care costs and to provide coverage to a greater number of individuals. Prior to the 1980s, the most common type of health care coverage was the indemnity system, also known as a "fee-for-service" or "pay-as-you-go" plan. In an indemnity plan, individuals choose physicians and services and receive bills for costs incurred for services—much like an open market system. By the

1990s, managed care plans were the most common method of providing health care in the United States. In fact, according to estimates for the early years of the 21st century, of those Americans with health insurance, between 50 and 75 percent have some form of a managed care plan.

Types of Managed Care Plans

One of the first issues related to managed care is the multitude of plans, often referred to by their acronyms. The three most common types of plans are the health maintenance organization (HMO), the preferred provider organization (PPO), and the point of service (POS). Although subcategories and variations exist for each of these plans, the basic structure and elements of each are as follows. Basic HMOs (also called "staff HMOs") are a closed system in one physical setting in which the organization provides health care to enrollees, sets the rates for services, and pays its service providers, who function as employees. As part of this plan, a doctor, usually a primary care physician (PCP), determines access to other services, such as specialty care. The term *gatekeeper* arose to describe an individual's PCP because of the major role these physicians play in controlling an individual's access to other services. When a PCP refers an individual for services within the network, the individual does not pay, but individuals are responsible for any services outside of the HMO. Hybrid versions of the HMO plan, such as the group model HMO, network HMO, or the mixed model HMO, have also recently sprung up.

The second type of managed care plan, the PPO, differs from the basic HMO plan. Here, providers are not located at one physical setting, but they still function as a network of providers. In this type, both doctors and patients can serve as gatekeeper and make referrals to other services. Unlike the basic HMO model, PPO members make a co-payment when they see providers within the network. Also unlike an HMO plan, members of a PPO can use services outside of their network, and the PPO plan will pay a reduced portion of the cost. However, enrollees pay less for services within the network.

The last general type of plan is the POS. For this plan, the decision to go in or out of the network is condition based; upon each new medical condition, the patient can make that determination. If the patient chooses to make a referral out of the network, only some fees are covered, but if the physician refers a patient out of the network, fees are covered.

Paradoxical Views Toward Managed Care

Surveys indicate that when asked to provide a rating of their own managed care plans, the American public tends to give their individual managed care plans high overall ratings. Yet attitudes of individuals and physicians are quite negative to the concept of managed care in general.

People cite long wait times for appointments, few choices of physicians, and limited access to new medical procedures and technologies. They mention the heavy-handed role of the primary care physician as gatekeeper; and, since the physician's payment does not depend upon quality of service provided, the overall quality of service is poor. Physicians, on the other hand, mention their lower rates of reimbursement, restrictions on their decision making (such as limiting access to new treatments and having lists of approved drugs), threats to their professional role, reduced time spent with patients, and conflicting interests between patient care and fiscal management.

Efficacy of Managed Care Plans

Recently, researchers commonly called into question the ability of managed care plans to provide quality services while managing costs. In terms of cost, two of the greatest proposed advantages of managed care are its reduction in hospital stays and a more efficient use of new medical technologies. Yet, despite these stated advantages, the majority of studies find either zero or only a modest cost difference between managed care plans and fee-for-service plans. Several federal agencies developed standard markers of quality of care to monitor the level of services managed care plans provide. As enrollment in managed care plans continues to increase, federal agencies see monitoring the quality of care as essential to prevent some potential limitations built into the system.

Joyce Weil

See also Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change; Health Care, Insurance

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Manifest Functions

Manifest functions refer to the intended and recognized consequences of a deliberately executed social behavior or action. Upward social mobility, for example, is a manifest function of international labor migration undertaken by populations seeking to improve their economic conditions. Robert K. Merton gave the original explication of manifest functions in *Social Theory and Social Structure* in 1957.

Merton contrasted manifest functions with latent functions, which are unintended and generally unrecognized consequences. For instance, the functioning of a university campus as a marketplace for finding marital partners can be considered to be a latent function of the manifest function of providing higher-level education. As Merton explained, other social theorists, such as Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, implicitly addressed manifest and latent functions in their writings.

Merton acknowledged borrowing the terms *manifest* and *latent* from Freud. This is insightful because it demonstrates how analysts working from a systems perspective could move easily between sociological and psychological perspectives. What brought these analysts together across the fields of human behavior, such as anthropology, sociology, and psychiatry, was that they conceptualized their scientific objectives in terms of the functioning of a system, whether of a culture, society, or of the mind. This theoretical convergence decreased in the late 20th century when interdisciplinary boundaries became more rigid.

The decline of social systems analysis in sociology in the late 20th century reduced the sociological interest in explicit analyses of manifest and latent functions. Social analysts used new perspectives to frame questions about sources and outcomes of social action. One perspective, human agency, gave almost total weight to conscious, willful human action, deemphasizing if not eliminating altogether the significance of impersonal social forces that underpin social change. Anthony Giddens (1995) has offered a partial compromise of sorts through his structuration theory. According to this theory, human agents are knowledgeable practitioners of social action, but their knowledgeability has bounds of unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences. This theorizing moves manifest and latent outcomes closer to the sphere of human consciousness. In other worlds, manifest and latent functions are properties of a knowledgeable human world, but given the imperfections of knowledgeability, the outcomes of willful social action can reach beyond the bounds of human knowledge and intention.

Merton did not reduce manifest functions to an absolute condition. An "item," he explained, can have more than one manifest function, and different manifest functions can have similar outcomes. Moreover, what constitutes a manifest function for one group can constitute a dysfunction for another group. An example of this case is the investment of U.S. companies in Chinese manufacturing. While this business strategy keeps prices down for U.S. consumers and provides some relief for unemployed and subemployed workers in China, it decreases employment opportunities for the U.S. manufacturing workforce.

Globalization is changing the landscape across which manifest functions take effect. Early studies observed the manifest and latent functions of tribal cultures, but research today must measure the impacts of manifest functions across highly populated and interconnected world regions.

Nestor Rodriguez

See also Latent Functions

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Marginality

From an intercultural perspective, the term *marginal* generally refers to an individual identity outcome of being caught between two worlds, with a sense of not quite belonging in either one, following a move into another culture, such as a migrant or study-abroad student. By moving into a new culture, an individual discovers that the known ways of being and doing no longer serve effectively. This discovery is both psychological and social: the initial shock of discovery that no longer does a mutual sharing of assumed cultural knowledge exist leads to difficulties in striving to create connections in this new cultural context. Individual outcomes of such cultural contact vary, and marginality—in the general sense of not quite belonging or fitting into a new culture—is one particular identity outcome of this process.

Ongoing study of marginality has occurred since the social science introduction in early 20th-century Europe of the concept of the stranger who wanders into and occupies a space in a new culture. The stranger stays and, over time, changes from contact with the new culture but remains, in essence, both close to and remote from the host culture so that there is a continuous tension and ambivalence in this relationship because full assimilation is not part of the European cultural milieu. This concept changed in the 1920s, when practitioners of the Chicago School of sociology introduced it to a U.S. audience. Its new interpretation was the construct of the marginal man resulting from cultural contact in the cosmopolitan setting of a pluralistic society whose groups are defined by ethnicity. The marginal man is the resulting cultural hybrid who belongs to two cultural traditions, aspires to assimilate and belong to the wider society, but is excluded on cultural grounds. There is no satisfying resolution, for the individual cannot break free of either culture. In fact, the marginal man has a dual perspective, namely seeing the world through two lenses that present conflicting images of the self.

Mobility and culture contact appear to create a particular personality type, and the marginal man concept dwells on the internal conflict that an individual undergoes during the process of cultural transition. For the marginal man, this process remains at the unresolved stage of not belonging to the new culture, no longer fitting into the previous one, and consequently existing in a state of crisis between the two. Immigrant children are also caught between two separate cultural worlds, as are converts from missionary activity where the resulting cultural hybrid no longer fully belongs to his original group and simultaneously is not accepted by the colonizing group. During the 20th century, the concept of the marginal man continued to intrigue, and a small number of empirical studies appeared to give evidence of the concept. Accompanying these studies were calls for further investigation and fresh attempts to redefine the concept.

The contemporary, intercultural focus on marginality is on its positive or constructive characteristics. At its core, marginality still consists of the idea of dealing with identity in multiple cultural contexts while feeling no full sense of belonging to any of them. However, the ideas of constructive marginality and encapsulated marginality now go beyond discussions of individuals with inner conflicts. The marginal individual is thus someone who can cross cultural borders and employs marginality constructively. Marginality is no longer just a debilitating condition of an individual caught in a paradox but can also mean a plurality of identities, in essence intercultural identity, translating into a dynamic position as constructive marginality. A *constructive marginal* resolves identity issues and is in a state in which identity is multiple and fluid and its truths lie in the multiplicity of cultural contexts in which the constructive marginal operates. Such an individual uses this marginal position constructively in a personal sense or becomes a more public figure: an intercultural mediator able to effect negotiations across cultural boundaries.

In contrast, the *encapsulated marginal* is unable to construct a unified identity but remains perplexed by the situation of marginality and trapped within its context of fluid and shifting boundaries. The encapsulated marginal displays similarities with previous definitions of marginality as cultural and social alienation with pressures existing in both cultures: from one, the pressure of being corrupted, and from the other, pressure to behave in uncomfortable ways to gain acceptance. Friendship is problematic, as the encapsulated marginal feels so unique that there

appears to be no peer group with which to form bonds. However, process-oriented intercultural training for marginals can raise awareness of the existence of other marginals who can fill this existential void as well as crystallize understanding of their particular identity perspectives.

Vera Sheridan

See also Acculturation; Culture Shock

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Marijuana

Marijuana is a mild hallucinogen grown naturally as the *cannabis* plant. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency classifies it as a Schedule I substance, with high abuse potential and no accepted medical utility. Marijuana can be smoked (in joints, pipes, or bongs) or eaten, often mixed with other foods. Short-term effects appear roughly 30 minutes after smoking and last for several hours. Reported effects include heightened sensory awareness, mild euphoria ("high"), hallucinations, dry mouth, loss of coordination, and lethargy. Mexico has been a leading source of U.S. marijuana for decades, although domestic cultivation is widespread as well. Marijuana production and availability have increased sharply over the past decade, and potency has been steadily increasing since the 1980s.

Marijuana is the most commonly used illegal drug in America and is used more frequently than all other illegal drugs combined. Generally speaking, use rates are consistently higher for males than for females, and use is far more prevalent among youth and young adults. Lifetime use rates for high school seniors peaked at around 60 percent in 1980 and have since decreased and leveled off to around 45 percent. On average, more than one third of high school seniors reported semi-regular marijuana use over the past decade. Most law enforcement agencies describe marijuana availability as high.

Construction of marijuana as a major social problem in the United States occurred during the Great Depression, coming out of its use by Mexican immigrants in the Southwest (especially Texas), where support for its illegality originated. White citizens and lawmakers framed the issue in terms of concerns about immigrant workers' marijuana consumption and rowdiness. Such complaints, however, masked a deeper concern about immigrant laborers competing for employment with white males. In the eastern United States, officials framed the marijuana problem by focusing on its use among black jazz and blues musicians of the 1930s in cities such as Harlem and New Orleans. Sensationalized press reports and suspect medical science also linked marijuana use to violent crime. Federally outlawed in the United States in 1937, marijuana later became a prominent part of the 1960s and 1970s counterculture movement.

Use risks include short-term memory loss and psychological dependence, accompanied by mild withdrawal symptoms such as restlessness and irritability. Sustained use often leads to poor scholastic and occupational performance. Research also suggests a causal link between marijuana use and vandalism and income-producing crime, particularly among youth. Some research indicates regular marijuana use can serve as a gateway to the use of more addictive drugs such as heroin and cocaine, and this reasoning has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy for keeping marijuana illegal. However, other research challenges this connection.

Nationwide, marijuana violations account for nearly half of all drug arrests, most for simple possession. Incarceration rates have increased substantially since the mid-1980s, due in part to mandatory sentencing for first-time marijuana offenders. This has exacerbated prison overcrowding. More recently, some U.S. city and local governments have enacted

legislation decriminalizing simple possession of marijuana. Since 1988, eleven states have approved legislation allowing for the possession and consumption of marijuana to aid in treating glaucoma and the chronic pain associated with cancer or other terminal diseases.

Philip R. Kavanaugh

See also Drug Abuse, Crime; Drug Subculture; Gateway Drugs; Smoking

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Mass Media

The pervasiveness of the media in our everyday lives cannot be overstated. Media (short for *mediation* and the plural of *medium*) can refer to any number of categorizations that are collectively and most frequently understood to involve the dissemination of select information (often from a singular or fixed source) to a large audience. The "mass media," then, typically consist of various oligopolistic social institutions that are capable (through technological advances) of broadcasting information to large segments of society and are designed to promote information consistent with news, marketing, and advertising messages (all categorizations of media) that collectively communicate the reproduction of cultural norms and values. Numerous studies of the effects of mass media on society have yielded key insights on the level of importance and social significance these media embody.

One of the first and most notable scholars to address how technological advances of media affected social organization was Marshal McLuhan, whose critical study of popular culture exposed the emergent notion of mass media as well as the resultant cultural and social changes accompanying the introduction of the electronic medium; his classic works include *Understanding Media* of 1964 and *The Medium Is the Massage* with Quentin Fiore in 1967. For centuries, prior to the advent of electronic technologies, the media involved the circulation of printed materials, most notably books and newspapers; 20th-century additions included audio and visual communication technologies (e.g., radio, television, Internet). Few (if any) places in the world have not been somehow directly affected by the media.

The initial ability to disseminate information to the masses is directly attributed to the proliferation of print media, most notably the newspaper. Early newspapers first appeared in the 17th century, and despite advancements in media technologies, the daily print newspaper continues to remain among the most popular mass communication media in the world. Businesses and individuals discovered early on that news was indeed a profitable commodity, and although newspapers often consist of news and general information, they are mostly filled with advertisements. Political use of newspapers soon became widespread and filled socially significant gaps among politicians, government officials, and the general citizenry. Information presented in newspapers was not subject to much scrutiny, as the masses generally tend to rely significantly on media presentations, thus fostering the capability for the creation of a social reality and accompanying forms of social control.

Advent of the radio served as the primary catalyst for the creation of mass media. Radio technology was first developed at the turn of the 20th century and, coupled with the application of technological advances (e.g., vacuum tube, tube amplifiers), created what would become known as the "radio broadcast." Early radio broadcasts can be traced back to the military, particularly the U.S. Navy, who employed the technology strictly as a means of communication (e.g., Morse code). According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, use of the phrase "the media" first appeared in the United States during this time (e.g., circa 1920), its use frequently attributed to the popularity of radio broadcasts. Throughout the 1930s in the United States, these broadcasts increased dramatically in popularity, especially broadcasts that featured musical recordings. However, the most notable increase in listeners occurred during the Second World War, when more frequent news broadcasts informed the public about wartime events.

The most important development in mass media was television, its universal and widespread appeal resting on its combined aural and visual capabilities.

Although early television broadcasts first appeared in the 1930s, the device would not become a staple of the modern American household until the 1950s. Early telecasts featured all types of entertainment, and televised newscasts soon become the dominant source of mass information in U.S. society. The primary goal of television networks was to provide popular entertainment programming in an effort to attract the largest audiences possible so as to increase revenues through advertisements. The television as the dominant source of mass information crystallized the notion of mass media. Its growth continues to be driven largely by technological advances; the most recent and influential advance has been that of the Internet.

The ability to reach a global audience within seconds—thanks to the proliferation of mass media via satellite technologies, global telecommunication networks, and the Internet—is among the most recent and important technological developments. The Internet is a worldwide database consisting of a networking infrastructure that allows for the immediate exchange of information by a multiplicity of users. In the United States, the arrival of the Internet occurred sometime in the early 1990s. The Internet was originally created as a digital storage space designed to safeguard the containment of military information. It is among the more democratic forms of mass media. Unrestrained by national boundaries or censorship, it thus transmits information independently of state-sanctioned organizations and commercial entities. Formal social control agencies often decry the unregulated exchange of information on the Internet because of the potential for fraud and other criminal activities. Attempts to control and regulate the Internet, however, have been largely unsuccessful, and Internet commerce has proven more beneficial to the economy than detrimental. It appears certain that U.S. adjustment to these technologies will likely direct the future of these media.

Christopher Schneider

See also Cultural Diffusion; Cyberspace; Digital Divide; Globalization; Media; Oligopoly

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Mass Murder

Mass murder is the killing of four or more individuals at one given time or in a fairly short period of time, and in one place (in a single incident). Although often confused with *serial murder*—the killing of three or more people over a period of time, with intervals between murders—criminologists distinguish between the two. A variety of motivating factors drive mass murderers, for example, disgruntled employees lash out against a corporation or organization, violence is driven by intolerance of racial or sexual orientation, or an individual responds to perceived injustices.

Mass murder is generally premeditated and deliberate, not impulsive or spontaneous, with firearms most often used, enabling the individual to kill more easily as many people as possible. Oftentimes the perpetrator, after carrying out the murders, commits suicide or engages in a shootout with law enforcement, ensuring death (referred to as "suicide-by-cop").

Characteristics of Mass Murderers

Typically, social isolation occurs in conjunction with some trigger event, most often work or relationship related. Precipitating factors often include love rejection or some form of loss, like getting fired. Women who commit multiple murders typically target their families, most often their children. These women often view their domestic status as central in their lives, and with any threat to that status (or perceived threat), they react violently. They tend to view their relationship with their children as one of complete ownership. Men, on the other hand, more often target

the entire family unit or other close relationships they maintain, such as coworkers.

Typologies

Mass murderers fit numerous profiles and typologies. Among these, *disciples* follow the commands of a leader; initiation into a gang or cult killings would fall into this category. The killings are typically committed in close proximity to the leader's "headquarters," and the selection of victims may be known solely to the leader, for a particular symbolic significance.

Family annihilators generally view their families as extensions of themselves, and as such feel that the family shares in their misery and the killing then holds no greater significance than a suicide. Annihilators also tend to exhibit the greatest degree of mental instability, and the killings result from an eruption of violence; suicide or suicide-by-cop is often the final result.

Disgruntled employees are often former employees or individuals who may have recently lost their jobs. The targets are coworkers and former bosses, but these murderers often kill randomly throughout the workplace.

Pseudocommandos typically amass a large number and variety of weapons, including firearms, rifles, and grenades. They view society or some aspect of it with distaste and want to "get back at it." Typically, a great deal of planning is involved, and victims tend to be selected at random.

Political or *hate killings* are motivated by some ideological cause or by a hatred of a particular group. *Anger* or *revenge killings* are often very personal, directed against specific targets that the killers believe wronged them.

In general, mass murder incidents vary widely in terms of motivation, situational characteristics, and offender characteristics.

Deborah Sawers Kaiser

See also Murder; Serial Murder; Violent Crime

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Mass Transit

Mass transit, sometimes referred to as *public transit* or *public transport,* describes public and private systems that carry groups of people in a variety of vehicular configurations, called *modes*. Typical modes include the bus, rail rapid or heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail, and automated guideway systems. The bus, often powered by diesel fuel, typically operates in mixed traffic on city streets, although dedicated bus lanes are also found. Recent innovations include hybrid diesel-electric vehicles and technologies such as automatic vehicle location using global positioning systems (GPS), electronic fare collection, and traffic signal priority systems. Bus rapid transit (BRT) describes a system of vehicular, operational, and station improvements designed to reduce travel times and improve the trip experience.

Rail rapid (also called "heavy rail") refers to high-capacity and high-speed systems operating on a dedicated right-of-way using third-rail electric power and self-powered cars. Examples include the New York City subway, Washington Metro, and London Underground. These systems are expensive to construct but have the greatest carrying capacity. For example, Washington Metro, which opened in 1976 and has more than 100 miles of track, cost approximately $10 billion. Commuter rail systems operate on dedicated or shared (with freight service) railways and often focus on connecting cities and suburbs. These trains may be pulled by electric or diesel engines, or they may be self-propelled.

Light rail transit (LRT) is the current evolution of the streetcar, tram, or trolley. These rail vehicles are lighter in weight than conventional rail cars and are self-propelled. LRT systems can run on city streets as well as on separate right-of-ways. Popular in Europe for decades, light rail is becoming popular in the United States, with more than 15 new systems installed since 1980. Most LRT systems run in two- to four-car trains and use overhead wire for electric service, eliminating the need for expensive at-ground third-rail power.

Automated guideway transit (AGT) refers to driverless and highly automated operations typically found in high activity centers that span long distances, such as airports. They operate on completely separate guideways, sometimes labeled "horizontal elevators." Airports, such as Dallas-Fort Worth and Atlanta, have

AGT systems. Vancouver, Canada, has the longest automated system in the world, SkyTrain. This urban transit operation is more than 49 kilometers long with 33 stations.

The Long-Range Viability of Mass Transit

Mass transit offers many benefits but generally requires public subsidies to operate. These subsidies are sometimes large and can face political opposition. Amtrak, the U.S. national rail passenger network, faces continual battles over its federal subsidy. Mass transit is environmentally friendly, since energy use is typically less per distance traveled than the automobile. However, transit requires sufficient population densities to operate efficiently in metropolitan areas. Typical U.S. suburban configurations, and increasingly those in other countries, often develop at densities below what is required for successful transit operation. An automobile-dominant culture offers many people a convenient alternative to mass transit, but it penalizes those without access to a vehicle. Transit is important to the carless, often poor, disabled, or elderly. For example, the U.S. urban poor (those households with incomes less than $20,000 in 2001) made four times as many trips by transit than their wealthier counterparts. Carless populations in urban areas can often access transit services. Low-density suburban and rural areas cannot support transit, and households without access to a vehicle are at a serious disadvantage.

Changes in transit ridership levels over time vary widely. Typically, declines in public transit use accompany increases in automobile ownership, but this is not always true. Three different cases—Eastern Europe, China, and the United States—highlight the current situation. In Eastern Europe, cities showed declines in the percentage of trips made by public transit between 1980 and 2000, from around 80 percent to little more than half. Accompanying these declines were increases in per capita income and auto ownership and decentralization of populations from cities to suburbs.

China, however, moved away from nonmotorized travel (walking and biking) toward public transit. While nonmotorized trips in Chinese cities declined during the period from 1996 to 2004, transit trips increased nearly 70 percent. This substantial increase in transit ridership is partly a response to longer trips created by population and job decentralization: biking and walking are no longer possible. Also, private automobile ownership jumped between 1990 and 1998 from 1.6 million to 6.5 million—nearly 400 percent—and the growth continues. Matching China's rapidly increasing auto ownership is traffic congestion, following the pattern of Western countries. Ironically, some cities now discourage use of the bicycle, long a major travel mode, on major roadways to make way for the automobile.

Transit ridership trends in the United States vary widely by mode. Overall, transit ridership rose from 8.8 billion trips in 1990 to 9.6 billion trips in 2004, a gain of 9 percent. The bulk of these transit trips are on the bus, 5.7 billion in 2004. Bus, commuter rail, and rail rapid riderships have not increased substantially since 1990. However, light rail jumped from 175 million trips in 1990 to 350 million trips in 2004, or 200 percent. In spite of this LRT success story, only a small portion of daily trips in the United States occur by public transit: 4.7 percent of all work trips in 2000, down from 5.3 percent in 1990. This low transit use continually faces the challenge of an auto-dominated culture, a fascination with the freedom and status attached to the automobile that other countries emulate.

Beyond its role in serving the disadvantaged and the negative impact of low-density development, transit faces new challenges in safety and security, particularly since the Madrid train bombing that killed 191 people in 2004. Unfortunately, public transit facilities and vehicles are open environments with many stops and stations, making a secure system difficult to implement. Also, the use of transit for emergency evacuations is another recent public safety concern. Hurricane Katrina in 2006, for example, illustrated the need for viable transit operations that can respond quickly and systemically to emergencies.

Urban transit use worldwide faces a continual struggle against increasing auto ownership and suburbanization of development, which reduces the density of riders required for efficient operation. Without concentrations of development at sufficient levels, transit cannot generate sufficient passengers and fare revenues, even with generous public subsidy. Transit supporters argue that coherent investment is essential to provide viable alternatives to use of the automobile, which, if uncontrolled, has grave energy and environmental considerations. For transit to be viable, land use planning must focus on developing residences and employment centers at sufficient densities. TOD

(transit-oriented development) is one new concept, with residences and jobs concentrated around rail stations and bus terminals. Transit is essential to urban life, serves the disadvantaged, reduces traffic congestion, and saves energy. Mass transit is an integral part of a balanced transportation system.

Richard K. Brail

See also Ageism; Disability and Disabled; Environmental Justice; Megacities; Megalopolis; Poverty; Traffic Congestion; Urban Sprawl

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Means-Tested Programs

Means-tested programs provide cash and services to people whose income and other financial assets fall below a certain level. Individuals in need must meet certain requirements to receive benefits. Along with monetary restrictions, means-tested programs may also include nonfinancial categories of eligibility such as pregnant women, children, parents with dependent children, individuals with disabilities, and the aged. Although state and local entities administer some programs, the majority of and most comprehensive means-tested programs come from the federal government. The initiation and management of these programs fall under numerous federal departments: Health and Human Services (HHS), Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor, Education, and Treasury.

Among the most well-known means-tested programs are Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); food stamps; Supplemental Security Income (SSI); Medicaid; public housing or Section 8; Women, Infants & Children (WIC); school lunches; job training; home energy assistance; Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); and special Social Service Block Grants (SSBG). Between 50 and 100 means-tested programs exist on the federal, state, and local levels. Program benefits include income maintenance, food, health care, rent and mortgage payments, shelter, child care, utility payments, tax credits, legal services, and more. An individual or family may receive assistance from multiple programs at the same time. For example, a family may receive TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid and additionally live in public housing, take advantage of a school lunch program, and receive WIC services. Likewise, a single individual may participate in a job training program, receive food stamps, and qualify for the EITC.

Although there are numerous means-tested programs, the rules of eligibility are not uniform and differ according to the regulatory mandates of the governmental agencies from which they emanate. As a result, accessing benefits from these programs often becomes complicated, technical, redundant, and bewildering. Likewise, administration of these programs can be cumbersome, unwieldy, and complex. Most variations in eligibility criteria center around the calculation of income and valuation of assets. In determining who meets the test of need, programmatic variables include what assets to count or exclude in calculations, what amount of assets is acceptable, what income is counted or disregarded, what level of income or assets causes ineligibility, whose income is counted, and whether household or individual finances are the determining factor.

Means-tested programs lie at the core of our social welfare system. Directed at helping the poor and those with low income, they seek to address the ills of poverty. As with most programs designated for the poor, they are highly debated and somewhat controversial. Effectiveness, price, value promotion, and perceived recipient characteristics are all part of the discourse. Many see some programs for the poor as social problems themselves. The issue of poverty and its remedy, as with other social problems, is subject to different understandings and theories of intervention. With means-tested programs, disagreements arise as to what level benefits should be set at, what types of benefits should be advanced, how the benefits should be offered, and who should be allowed to apply. A prime consideration with these programs, as with all other components of the social welfare system, is the cost. How expensive will the program be and what effect will it have on federal, state, and local budgets? Could the monies be spent better in other ways or on

other problems? Many citizens, though sympathetic to the plight of the poor, are apprehensive about what they perceive as bloated and inefficient government bureaucracies that contribute to higher taxes.

Another issue is the long-range effectiveness of these programs in combating poverty. Are the benefits too generous? Do they foster dependence? Do they breed a culture of deviance? At the other end of the spectrum are those who see these programs as stigmatizing and thus worry about hindering full participation by all those in need. An impersonal and bureaucratic service delivery system also concerns present and future beneficiaries by its lack of access and humane conveyance of benefits. Most of the debate about means-testing programs or the social safety net usually focuses on what most people view as welfare: TANF. Although it is a large component of the social welfare system, it is but one of many interrelated initiatives. Means-tested programs have a wide range and function among the institutional measures designed to assist the economically disadvantaged.

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See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Life Chances; Poverty; Stigma; Underclass Debate; Welfare

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Media

Among the chief concerns of this volume are how social conditions get defined as social problems and the ways different social actors and organizations view and try to solve them. Media, by any measure, are central to these processes. When we speak about media, what exactly are we talking about? While there are numerous definitions of *media*, in this volume it is used as a catch-all term that refers to any and all forms of information or entertainment available to a large number of people. Thus, it includes television programming, newspapers, magazines, books, documentaries, popular movies, radio, community newsletters, and, more recently, things like Internet Web sites, electronic mail, and the increasingly popular Web log or "blog." (It is important to note the incredible range of diversity embedded within each of these categories; consider the ever-expanding array of television programming, the substantial number of general and specialized magazines, the wide array of local, regional, and national newspapers, and a seemingly infinite collection of Internet-based materials.)

Some analysts have tried to counter this broad conceptualization of media by dividing it into somewhat smaller classifications, such as *press* (i.e., those media products that deal primarily with "hard" news) and *entertainment* media. But these categories are still exceedingly broad. Further, such a division may no longer remain as viable as it once might have been given the increasing presence of media products that transcend traditional categories by incorporating elements from both news and entertainment formats (this hybrid genre is often referred to as "infotainment").

For our purposes, then, a general definition of media will suffice. Thus, *media* is used here to refer to the entire range of news and entertainment "products" that audience members can consume and through which they can learn about some aspect of the world around them. In fact, a broad categorization such as this may be essential to developing a thorough understanding of the role contemporary media play in the construction of social problems because it gives reason to consider how the entire range of media productions (rather than just the dominant media forms—such as network and cable television news, newspapers from large cities, and national magazines—that most people associate with the term *media*) shape the ways that individuals think about, construct, and respond to social problems.

Understanding the Media–Social Problems Relationship

Media are crucial to social problems; they help shape what conditions get positioned as *potential* social problems, what potential problems become *actual* social problems, how those problems are discussed (i.e., the dominant frames through which they are

presented and considered), and how constructed problems are responded to. Certainly, other forces and social actors (e.g., scientists, academics, experts, activists, and politicians) play an important role in constructing certain conditions as social problems and propelling them into the public consciousness, but without the complicity of mass media, even the most impressively packaged and persuasive claims will find it hard to be heard amid all the competing social problems claims, general news and entertainment content, and the various diversions of daily life.

Why are media so central to how we think about and act upon social problems? While a variety of factors and forces contribute to media's centrality in the construction of social problems, two in particular cement the media–social problems relationship: (1) the pivotal role of media in everyday social life and (2) the processes through which social problems get constructed.

Media and Social Life

The important role of media in how people think about and respond to social problems is first and foremost a reflection of the pivotal role of media in all of social life. We rely on news and entertainment media to learn about the world in which we live. Media serve as a source of information and provide us with many of the texts and images that we use to construct culture, shape our social reality, and navigate our daily lives. The things we see on our televisions or read in our newspapers help direct us toward certain issues or events and shape how we think and talk about those things. This capacity for shaping what issues and conditions public officials, policymakers, and the general public think and talk about, as well as setting parameters on *how* they might talk about them, represents a key element of the media–social problems relationship.

Constructing Social Problems

A second factor that reinforces media's essential role in social problems construction is the very processes by which conditions and issues come to be defined, or "constructed," as social problems. Social problems do not just appear out of nowhere; they are a product of the active efforts of a number of individuals and organizations. Some scholars have suggested that social problems get created through a complex combination of social actions and processes, which can be thought of as *social problems work*. Thus, when someone tries to persuade others that a particular issue or condition is of concern and in need of remedy, he or she is doing social problems work. Social problems work takes place in classrooms (e.g., a professor stands before her sociology class and outlines a condition such as homelessness or teen drug use as a major concern and something we must attend to), in churches (e.g., a sermon on the declining adherence to religious principles and the purported threats this poses to the long-term viability of society), in community halls (e.g., a forum on the perils of a shrinking water supply and what must be done about it), in the halls of Congress (e.g., a debate about domestic terrorism), and in a variety of other social realms.

Doing Social Problems Work: Claims Makers and Audiences

Much of the social problems work discussed here is done by two broad groups: *claims makers* (i.e., those who make "claims" that a particular issue or condition represents a social problem that needs to be fixed) and *audiences* (i.e., the people who evaluate those claims). Claims makers are those who try to persuade others that there is a problem out there that needs attention and resources, which means that there are two basic goals embedded in their social problems work: (1) disseminate their claims to the largest possible audience (in some cases, a smaller audience will do, as long as its membership is comprised of those with tremendous power, status, or wealth, such as politicians, celebrities, or high-ranking media officials); and (2) persuade the members of that audience that there is a troublesome condition at hand that is in need of remedy. Claims makers use rhetoric, statistics, compelling images, and any other verbal, visual, or behavioral claims to try to get audiences to devote their attention to the purported social problem and to take action in its name.

The social problems work of audiences involves evaluating these claims and determining whether the problem is worthy of attention and resources. Thus, the tasks for audience members include gauging whether the condition is as problematic as the claims maker would have us believe, how immediate the purported harms are, and whether these harms are likely to transpire as the claims maker suggests. If the audience is not persuaded that the condition is sufficiently troublesome and worthy of their immediate attention and resources, then that particular claim is likely to be

replaced by other claims deemed more important, believable, newsworthy, immediate, and so on. This renders the audience as a crucial element in the successful creation of a social problem; after all, something cannot become a social problem unless an audience deems the claims important and believable.

Specifying the Media–Social Problems Relationship

If it is true that claims makers and audiences are the two main groups involved in social problems work, what, then, is the role of media in the claims-making process? Recall that we have said that a desired goal for claims makers is to get their claims to a large audience. The best way to do this is to get the message into the media and allow the media to disseminate it to their audiences (this is why we find so many claims makers jockeying for time during the morning network news programs or on the various cable news channels). In our increasingly mediated society, media represent the most effective way to reach a large audience in relatively short order.

Much of the social problems work undertaken by media organizations and their personnel involves packaging and reporting the claims made by others (as opposed to constructing their own claims from scratch), such as a news report that features harrowing accounts, sound bites from public officials, statistics, and gripping images (each of which represents a social problems "claim"). Positioning the media as being oriented more toward selectively repackaging the social problems work of others should not be taken as an indication that media have a passive role in the construction of social problems. Media are not merely a conduit for the claims of others; they do not simply disseminate claims as claims makers proffer them. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Even when media are not the originators of a particular claim, they play an integral part in the form that the claim takes. Claims are constantly shaped and reshaped to bring them into alignment with the needs of media and their audiences.

This transformative capacity furthers the important role of media in how we think about and respond to social problems, because it means that media (as far as their audiences are concerned) get to determine what gets said about social problems, how it gets said (e.g., whether material is delivered as straight news, as an editorial, as a mixture of reportage and eyewitness accounts, as a docudrama, and so on), who says it (media tend to favor official sources, those with experience in the issues at hand, celebrities or others who are well known), and when it gets said (i.e., where it will be slotted in media cycles, how often it will be presented, and for what duration).

The modern media marketplace is extremely competitive, and media personnel must strive to identify and create "products" that can be produced quickly and efficiently while also being able to attract and sustain the interest and attention of a range of audiences. Thus, the decisions of media personnel determine what makes it into the mediated products that the audiences consume. What people see on their televisions or computer monitors, read in newspapers and magazines, or hear on radios and "Podcasts" represent the tangible manifestations of a series of decisions made by media personnel—editors, producers, reporters, anchors, guest bookers, executives, advertisers—as to who or what will be attended to, how much various topics will be covered, and how selected material will be framed.

Of course, these decisions about which potential social problems are transformed into mediated products (and which are not) and when, how, and by whom claims will be presented do not get made in a vacuum. The decision making of media organizations and their personnel is shaped by a number of external constraints, ranging from the structure of the media industry (i.e., media conglomeration, a profit orientation, reliance upon advertisers, and so on) to the daily demands of crafting news or entertainment products (i.e., budget limitations, deadlines, finite broadcast or print space, and so on). From a social problems perspective, a key constraint is the limited amount of time and space that media have to devote to social issues. Quite simply, media have only so much attention available for allocation to the seemingly infinite array of things that might be considered worthy of broadcast time or print space. This renders space within media presentation cycles a finite and hence valued commodity in the media marketplace. Media cannot cover it all, so media personnel have to sift through the seemingly infinite array of information, issues, individuals, and events and determine what will be attended to. What this means for our understanding of social problems is that only a miniscule proportion of the events and issues unfolding at a given time get identified as *potential* social problems, and only a small fraction of these get featured in the mediated products that individuals watch, read, or hear in their daily lives.

The structural, cultural, and practical constraints media personnel face lead them to favor certain types of material over others, which in turn affects the coverage of various social problems. Media personnel must actively select and reconstruct the claims they will deliver so that the claims will fit within the constraints of the structure of their work and remain consistent with the expectations of their audiences. As a result, media personnel tend to place a premium on materials that possess certain elements (i.e., items that seem important, novel, timely, and interesting; they also favor materials that feature interesting characters, can be accompanied by compelling photos or video, packaged in a noncomplex manner, and planned in advance). In short, media play both direct and indirect roles in how claims get constructed and disseminated. The direct role occurs when media personnel construct a claim (i.e., primary claims making) or refashion the claims of others (i.e., secondary claims making) and disseminate them to their audiences. The indirect role of media may be reflected in the efforts of claims makers, who, having become aware of the kinds of claims that are likely to be represented in the media, begin to shape their claims in ways that they presume will appeal to the interests of a given media organization or its audiences. Successful claims makers are those who account for the "realities" and constraints faced by media officials and who are willing and able to adjust their claims-making efforts accordingly.

The media–social problems relationship is clearly a strong one. Much of the social problems work of claims makers requires the complicity of media if it is to be effective, while at the same time media draw upon the social problems work of others to craft news and entertainment products that meet their own unique needs as well as those of their audiences. Media are a vital force in how we construct and react to social problems; how media attend to the efforts of various claims makers helps shape what gets said, how it gets said, who says it, and when it gets said, all of which are crucial determinants of whether a *potential* social problem becomes an *actual* social problem, as well as how political officials, policymakers, and the public elect to respond to constructed problems.

While the media–social problems relationship remains as strong as ever, sociologists and other analysts should take note of recent changes in the overall media landscape that could affect this relationship (not necessarily in its strength, but in its nature). In recent years, several of the mainstream media forms that have traditionally served as core outlets for the claims-making efforts of social problems activists—for example, the major television networks' evening news broadcasts and a number of once-prominent newspapers and national magazines—have seen somewhat precipitous declines in the size of their overall audiences (and in the loyalties of some of those who remain), as many of their former audience members have found more convenient sources (e.g., Internet news sites or 24-hour all-news channels on cable and satellite television) that allow them to get the latest news content whenever they want. At the same time, innovative media forms have emerged (e.g., Internet chat rooms, blogs, Podcasting) that offer new avenues through which claims makers are able to disseminate their claims to a mass audience and provide audience members with new ways to interact with those claims. Thus, it is a time for both excitement and wariness: excitement because these shifts could spur sociologists and other analysts to undertake important empirical assessments of the strength and nature of the media–social problems relationship; and wariness because these shifts and innovations present new complexities for media consumers to navigate as they continue to turn to media to make sense of the world around them.

Brian A. Monahan

See also Claims Making; Mass Media; Social Constructionist Theory

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Mediation

Mediation is a process designed to manage and resolve conflicts between two or more parties. As a facilitated negotiation, mediation provides the parties with the opportunity to identify their interests and needs, present their ideas for possible solutions, explore those options and alternatives, and come to collaborative solutions. Mediation is facilitated by a mediator, whose role is to guide the parties through the process without determining the outcome. Mediation is thus a conflict management and resolution process designed to provide parties with an alternative to more formal, time-consuming, and potentially expensive litigation. In mediation, the parties retain control over the outcome of their case. They may resolve all issues, some issues, or none of the issues (an impasse). Mediation is voluntary and confidential. Courts may order parties to appear at mediation, but they cannot order the parties to participate and resolve their issues.

Mediation has been used around the globe in many settings. Indigenous peoples using mediation typically have mediators who are elders or well-respected community leaders. These mediators are familiar with the parties, their circumstances and context, and the community. This is in stark contrast with the models of mediation used in the West, where the mediator is a neutral third party, unknown to the parties prior to the mediation experience. Differences in the style of mediation also exist. In Western models, the party bringing the action is invited to speak first, whereas in indigenous mediation there are cultural norms that control. These norms may include inviting an older party to speak first.

Mediation has enjoyed increased popularity in the West in the past 30 years, whether in local matters such as community disputes, including conflict between neighbors, or as an alternative to the full litigation process in family, commercial, and other civil matters. Some states provide certification for mediators as well as qualifications, guidelines, policies, continuing education requirements, and remedies for inappropriate mediator behavior and action.

As mediation became an accepted process for managing and resolving conflict, various mediation models evolved. The most common approaches are facilitative models, which encourage the parties to exercise their autonomy over the issues and the resolution. Several of these facilitative approaches include problem solving, transformative, and narrative. Using these approaches, mediators invite the parties to identify the issues, explore various options and alternatives, and determine which if any of these options would best suit their needs.

Mediation sessions begin with the mediator's opening statement, which provides an introduction concerning each person's role, the process, and the ground rules for conduct. Occasionally, the mediator may ask to have a "caucus." A caucus enables the mediator to speak privately with one party. What is discussed in a caucus is private and is not discussed with the other party without consent.

At the conclusion of the mediation, any resolved issues will be formalized in the mediation agreement, which may become part of a court order and thus enforceable under law.

Judith McKay

See also Cultural Relativism; Ethnocentrism; Rational Choice Theory; Social Bond Theory; Standpoint Theory; Stressors

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Medicaid

Medicaid is a joint federal and state health insurance program for low-income eligible children, adults, the elderly, and people with disabilities. This federal entitlement program was established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The nation's largest publicly financed health care program of its kind, it funds nearly half of nursing home care and a significant percentage of prescription coverage in the United States. Federal regulations provide broad coverage guidelines, but the states determine specific services. The program's broad range of medical services include inpatient and outpatient care; rehabilitation services for people with mental and physical disabilities; primary care to women, families, elders, and children; prescription benefits; and long-term care for the aged. Title XIX is administered federally by the Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) but operated by individual state systems.

Each state establishes distinct eligibility standards, defines what type and length of medical care will be available, and also sets its own reimbursements rates to providers. As such, Medicaid eligibility does not cross state lines; anyone who moves from one state to another must seek eligibility anew. The insurance application process is a lengthy one, requiring documentation of citizenship, living situation, and financial assets.

More than 55 million individuals receive care under the Medicaid program, and at least 40 percent of Medicaid expenses are for long-term care in nursing homes. The governmental cost of caring for elders in long-term care is a major social issue because of the rapidly increasing numbers of the population who are aging and concerns about who will pay for their care.

Basis of Eligibility

Financial need determines Medicaid coverage, and each state conducts a means-tested evaluation of the resources of an individual or family, including property and bank assets. Certain categories of individuals are eligible for medical care if they fit into broad groups following the poverty levels set by Health and Human Services (HHS) or fall into the category of Disabled, Aged and Blind (DAB). In some states, individuals who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are automatically eligible. A number of low-income eligible Medicare recipients supplement their health care, including prescriptions with Medicaid benefits, through state-administered programs.

One cannot simply transfer assets to a family member to become Medicaid eligible, since all states require a "look-back period" to determine eligibility to receive Medicaid benefits. This look-back period varies from 3 to 5 years to determine whether property or financial assets were gifted simply to gain Title XIX eligibility. If so determined, these assets are deemed available and the applicant will not qualify for Medicaid benefits. Also, most states have established estate recovery laws to recoup funds from the estates of Medicaid beneficiaries.

Additional Services

Many states offer optional personal services to help seniors and people with disabilities remain at home. Financially eligible seniors and people with disabilities may qualify for personal care programs that offer in-home assistance with daily living activities such as bathing, dressing, and food preparation. The primary purpose is to allow people to live in their own homes or apartments at less expense than nursing home placement paid by Medicaid and to allow more freedom, independence, and choice for people with disabilities.

Since 1997, the states have offered health care programs for children in families with incomes above the poverty level. Children can receive health care services even though the adults in the household may not be eligible, as legislated in the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Even with SCHIP benefits in place, access to services may require additional fees, and if low-income families cannot afford even these minimal costs, their children who are otherwise eligible for SCHIP will still not be able to obtain necessary medical care.

Medically needy individuals may also qualify for benefits even though their income is above the eligibility level set by the state. For example, individuals with acute illnesses, high medical bills, or high-cost chronic medical needs may access Medicaid services for care.

Problems With Medicaid

Major problems with Title XIX include access to minimally adequate care or any care at all. Since the reimbursement rate for Medicaid providers does not meet the actual costs of care, many medical practitioners limit the numbers of Medicaid recipients they accept as patients or do not participate in the program at all. For example, access to dental care and pediatric dental care is quite problematic, given the few providers of this basic medical necessity. Also, because doctors and clinics that accept Medicaid reimbursement are limited, the wait for appointments is often long.

Fraud is another concern, leading states to set up fraud units to investigate false or duplicate charges by providers that could easily be lost in a large bureaucratic system. Fraud committed by patients ineligible for benefits is another problem.

Current Legislative Issues

With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (commonly known as the Welfare Reform Bill), more restrictions exist on who is eligible for Medicaid services. Also, recent trends indicate that the federal

government is shifting the costs of Medicaid care back to the states. Ten years ago, Congress acted to ensure health care access for low-income and near-poor children by passing SCHIP. But SCHIP programs are dependent upon congressional reauthorization, and the federal government renewed the program until 2009, after unsuccessful conservative attempts to tighten financial guidelines to reduce eligibility standards so as to disqualify many children from the SCHIP medical safety net.

The next steps for Medicaid legislation include a nationally standardized Medicaid program to set minimum standards of care for those deemed eligible. Since federal law permits wide flexibility in providing Medicaid services to low-income people, a minimum standard could ensure a medical safety net on a national level. Other advocates propose universal access to health care for all, which implies a major funding increase in the future.

Rosalind Kopfstein

See also Medicare; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

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Medical-Industrial Complex

As editor-in-chief of the *New England Journal of Medicine,* Arnold S. Relman first defined the new medical-industrial complex of the late 20th century as the rise of the for-profit sector in health care, a dramatic market change that challenges physicians' abilities to best represent their patients' interests. Throughout most of the past century, analysts viewed medical care primarily as a social service, where nonprofit public or private hospitals and private solo medical practitioners provided care. During this time, pharmaceutical and medical equipment manufacturers in the private sector comprised the "old" medical-industrial complex.

However, a specific chain of events unfolded, leading to the creation of a multibillion-dollar industry, including managed care insurance plans and pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies whose profits challenge our notion of an efficient nonprofit health care system. Experts suggest that only through the continued development of a new type of physician executive with the necessary skills to manage the future complexities of the health care system will the medical-industrial complex be able to prioritize its focus on patient care.

Corporate entities first became a presence in the health care system in the late 1960s, as the reimbursement of medical care by Medicare encouraged their entry. Proprietary hospitals, nursing homes, and a variety of outpatient care facilities first comprised these entities. Continuous inflation in the cost of care throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, though, eventually created concern among public and private third-party payers, leading to varied cost-controlling interventions. The federal government's measures involved diagnosis-related group (DRG) Medicare payments to hospitals and fee schedules for physician reimbursements. Large employers negotiated prepaid contracts with managed care plans that took the risk of controlling costs through health maintenance organizations (HMOs), independent practice associations (IPAs), and preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and the large majority of these were privately owned for-profit corporations. The boldest move yet consisted of the Clinton administration's proposal to completely overhaul the health care system by controlling costs through government-regulated competition among managed care plans. However, the defeat of this plan in 1994 attracted even more private for-profit managed care plans.

Consequently, the fundamental role of physicians in the delivery of health care changed. In this environment of private managed care insurers run by persons responsible to investors, companies essentially "hire physicians" to take care of a certain number of patients on a capitated or negotiated fee-for-service basis. In addition, these contracts typically include financial incentives for physicians to decrease their use of diagnostic tests and to minimize patient hospitalization. This ultimately enables managed care insurers not only to offer competitively low premium prices to employers but also to retain a large portion of the premium to maximize the financial benefit to the investor-owners.

The relationship between payers and providers imposes potential limits on physicians' autonomy to make decisions in the best interest of their patients with respect to their quality of care. Not surprisingly, some physicians formed groups to negotiate collectively

with managed care insurers. Recognizing this trend as another profitable entrepreneurial endeavor, many physician practice management (PPM) companies formed for the sole purpose of contracting with physicians to negotiate favorable contracts between the physicians and managed care insurers. Even though the industry of PPMs no longer exists, the nature of the relationship between payers and providers in today's managed care marketplace illustrates how, as opposed to independent professionals, physicians in this corporate type of environment are essentially employees of companies that are in effect practicing medicine.

At the same time, though, competition in the managed care market and the rest of the medical care industry may decelerate the rise in medical costs. Competition will continue to grow as unions and state and federal governments demand the most cost-effective provision of care, and the providers who recognize this competition and determine how to employ their resources most efficiently will be the most successful. Providing high-quality care at competitive prices may also entail delegating services that physicians normally perform to physician assistants and nurses. According to the literature, supervised physician assistants and nurses can provide safe and high-quality care that is comparable to that provided by general practitioners. Moreover, the personal level of care afforded by many nurses can improve patient compliance and subsequently reduce hospitalization. Because these outcomes can only occur with utilization of physician assistants and nurses to their full capacity, however, the managerial skill of physicians becomes an important priority.

The global business concerned with the manufacture and sale of drugs and medical equipment also altered the role of physicians in the delivery of health care. Today, it is not uncommon for health care providers in academic medical centers to attend pharmaceutical company–sponsored lunches and grand rounds or to receive pens and pads labeled with the names of proprietary pharmaceutical products. These interactions often also involve medical equipment and drug manufacturers' offerings of consultancies and honoraria, consequently creating a potential ethical dilemma between physicians' economic self-interest and their fiduciary duties to their patients.

Nevertheless, the medical product industry does fund a substantial portion of basic and clinical science research in academic medical centers. In addition, industry research and development sections, as opposed to grant-supported research in academic labs, develop many of the technologies utilized in frontline medical care. Clearly, those in the industry of caring for patients cannot afford to live without pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, and a plan, appropriate for the 21st century, to collaborate with both parties' interests in mind must therefore be developed. Forums with representatives from academic medical centers and pharmaceutical companies have already called for multi- and interdisciplinary educational programming. These companies have also exhibited interest in improving methods to measure the outcomes of established continuing medical education programming that the pharmaceutical industry substantially supports financially.

The growth in the number of physician-executives trained to provide care in today's complex environment must continue in order for physicians to best represent their patients' interests in the medical-industrial complex. With academia focusing greater attention on entrepreneurship within nonprofit and proprietary health care organizations, some suggested that a managerial fund of knowledge is necessary for physicians to interact effectively with all those having an interest in health care. Eight specific skills deemed highly valuable include those in organizational development, financial analysis, cost accounting, micro- and macroeconomic analysis, decision science, marketing, and strategic planning. Medical education has taken early steps to enable physicians to develop these skills, as formal university curricula and continuing education programs in health care management now offer such training. Leading national educational organizations and philanthropic bodies also focus efforts on addressing leadership and management of the medical-industrial complex because of the realization that physician-executives can exhibit an authority unlike nonphysician managers and physicians without management training.

Eric J. Moskowitz and David B. Nash

See also Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change; Health Care, Insurance; Managed Care; Medicaid; Medicare

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MEDICALIZATION

Medicalization is the process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical problems, usually as illnesses or disorders. This process can occur on multiple levels: a conceptual level, with the development of a medical definition of a problem; an interactional level, where the physician applies a medical diagnosis to a nonmedical problem and administers treatment; and the institutional level, where organizations advocate a medical approach.

One area drawing considerable attention is the medicalization of deviance. Behaviors once considered "badness" became viewed, through the process of medicalization, more as "sickness." Here, medicalization diminishes individual responsibility, since experts now look at the behavior as something occurring outside the control of the individual, though often in the person's physiology. Some examples of medicalized deviance include madness, alcoholism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), addictions, and infertility. Another area of medicalization is everyday life processes including childbirth, menstrual discomfort (premenstrual syndrome, or PMS), menopause, aging, and death.

Medicalization need not be complete or discrete, but can be full, partial, expansive, and emergent. With full medicalization, as is the case with childbirth, nearly all the processes and interventions are encompassed by medical definitions and under medical control. Menopause is an example of partial medicalization; some physicians and their patients view menopause as a hormone deficiency state requiring treatment, generally through the medication of hormone replacement therapy, while others feel it is a natural life process that does not need medical intervention. With expansive medicalization, the definitional boundaries for a medicalized problem can expand over time. For example, the diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder originally applied only to children, but in the 1990s grew to include adults also, increasing the purview of medicalization. Emergent medicalization includes problems promoted by some stakeholders (e.g., physicians and/or consumer groups) as official diagnostic categories that still await acceptance as medical disorders by significant parts of the medical profession. Examples include "Internet addiction," "sex addiction," and "female sexual dysfunction."

Medicalization is a two-way process, incorporating expansion and possible contraction. Demedicalization happens when a medicalized problem no longer retains its medical definition, indicating that medical diagnoses or interventions no longer are appropriate solutions. Demedicalization generally occurs only when organized interest groups challenge medical definitions and control. Perhaps the best example is the gay rights movement convincing the American Psychiatric Association in 1973 to no longer define homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder. However, only a few processes become demedicalized as compared to the large number of behaviors and conditions that become medicalized.

Most sociologists have been critical of medicalization, referring to it as the "over-medicalization of society" or the "medicalization of ills," emphasizing its potential for adverse social and medical consequences. They argue that medicalization may decontextualize social problems so that they are viewed solely as individual concerns devoid of a social context. Some types of medicalization produce increased risks or adverse medical consequences associated with pharmaceutical drugs (e.g., with treatment of menopause, an increased incidence of breast cancer, coronary heart disease, and stroke with the use of hormone replacement therapy). Unnecessary therapeutic interventions may contribute to rising health care costs despite uncertain benefits. Additionally, some scholars note that medicalization is yet another way to extend social control onto more aspects of daily life through the use of medical forms of social control (e.g., drugs, types of surgery, or medical surveillance).

While critics voice concern about overmedicalization, some groups with specific problems or disorders advocate *for* medicalization. Here, groups of people with or representing contested illnesses are vying for a diagnosis, in part to validate their experience of illness, since many lack definite physical symptoms. Some examples of contested illnesses are fibromyalgia, Gulf War syndrome, and Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Disorder. Another potential benefit of medicalization is that it can reduce the stigma associated with certain problems through redefinition as physiological or biological rather than behavioral in origin.

Initially, the major facilitating forces for medicalization (e.g., for ADHD and menopause) were the medical profession, interest groups advocating for the medicalization of controversial disorders contested by the medical profession (e.g., alcoholism and posttraumatic stress disorder), and interprofessional struggles (e.g., obstetricians medicalizing childbirth to eliminate midwives). However, because of dramatic increases in medical knowledge and the reorganization of health care during the past 25 years, a few scholars have reframed the process as "biomedicalization" to reflect the impacts of technology and biology on society. Others suggest that medicalization continues and it is just the engines behind medicalization that are shifting to biotechnology, consumers, and managed health care in the 21st century.

Advances in drug development, relaxation of Food and Drug Administration requirements concerning off-label uses of drugs, and direct-to-consumer advertising have enabled the pharmaceutical industry to medicalize problems as they create or expand markets, such as advertising medications for sexual performance and "dysfunction" or for poor performance in social situations (social anxiety disorder). Rapid advances in genetic medicine harken the potential of increased medicalization; genetic enhancement of bodies and/or cognitive abilities will likely lead to new medical categories and interventions. Consumers have become an important factor in the medicalization process, fueled by advertisements in the media, promotion by the medical profession, and widespread dissemination of medical information and advertising on the Internet. Illustrating this are the increasing demands for cosmetic surgery, the rise of adult ADHD, and the use of human growth hormones for treatment of idiopathic short stature. Here, as with contested illness, laypeople play a key role in medicalization. Finally, insurance companies concerned with rising health care costs have become key decision makers, limiting payment for what they consider appropriate treatments. These countervailing forces are likely to chart the future course of medicalization.

Cheryl Stults

See also Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; Deviance; Social Control

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Medical Malpractice

Medical malpractice is any deviation by a health care provider from accepted standards of practice, whether or not it causes injury to the patient. Medical errors can occur in diagnoses, surgery, and prescriptions. In medical malpractice trials, defendants have the burden of proof, and expert witnesses testify against health care providers (including medical doctors, hospital residents, pharmaceutical companies, dentists, nurses, or therapists). Given both the injuries (fatal and nonfatal) associated with medical malpractice and the ensuing rise in costs of insurance premiums, medical liability is a social problem with significant ramifications for everyone's health care.

According to the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, the most common medical mistake is with medication, harming about 1.5 million people annually. Another one third of all claims result

from diagnostic errors (e.g., interpretation of radiology reports). Generally, medical errors cause approximately 100,000 deaths a year. Death from prescription errors increased dramatically in the past 25 years and exceeded all other causes of death except AIDS. Fatal prescription errors are even greater for outpatients than for inpatients, particularly among the elderly. This is due in large measure to increased use of mail order and Web-based pharmacies, enabling patients to self-medicate too much or suffer adverse effects of multiple medications, since they receive no direct professional guidance.

While medical malpractice lawsuits ensure the rights of injured patients and compensate them for medical negligence, the dramatic increase in lawsuits has caused a growing public concern about the ramifications of huge settlements. As liability insurance premiums rise for health professionals, those additional costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher medical fees for goods and services. Furthermore, fear of lawsuits forces both hospital staff and physicians to prescribe routinely tests once considered unwarranted but now legitimated as "defensive medicine," at a cost exceeding $50 billion annually.

Medical errors and preventable adverse drug events are causes for serious concern. Studies indicate that more than 500,000 drug-related injuries occur among Medicaid or Medicare recipients in outpatient clinics—the majority of whom are elderly, bilingual, and poorly educated. For example, poor women who are heads of households typically utilize outpatient clinics rather than private doctor offices. This large segment of society typically experiences poorer health conditions and has great high-risk medical problems.

The actual size of malpractice awards is impossible to calculate, since so many lawsuits are settled before they reach trial. The Congressional Budget Office reports that 15 claims are filed for every 100 doctors each year, and that about a third of the claims result in insurance payments.

A growing number of doctor's groups allege that medical malpractice lawsuits are responsible for the increasing medical malpractice insurance rates. Many doctors, especially in states with higher premiums, move or retire, resulting in severe shortages in some states and within such specialties as orthopedics, neurosurgery, and obstetrics-gynecology.

A 2003 congressional report stated that premium rates grew rapidly since 1998, particularly in the area of obstetrics-gynecology, although these rates varied widely by state. Multiple factors contributed to these increases, including insurers' losses, declines in investment income, a less competitive climate, and climbing reinsurance rates. Advocates of tort reform want a fairer assessment of the relationship among claims, insurance rates, and the overzealous litigation suits by trial lawyers. Earlier, a 1999 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that the single most important factor in the dramatic increase of malpractice premium rates was the falling investment income of insurance companies as a direct result of medical malpractice claims.

Obstetrics, with the delivery of babies, is especially prone to malpractice claims, so insurance rates in most states far exceed $100,000 per doctor. Unfortunately, 1 in 200 babies is born with some form of injury. Although a neurologically impaired infant or neonatal death is a rarity, it provokes strong emotions of empathy for the infant's family. When litigated, such cases often end with unusually large settlements awarded to the families. Increasing professional liability premiums and the fear of lawsuits have caused obstetrician-gynecologists (OB-GYNs) to make dramatic changes in their practices. According to the results from a 2006 American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology Survey, 70 percent of OB-GYNs considered retiring or moving; 65 percent decreased the number of high-risk obstetric patients and stopped performing and offering certain types of high-risk medical care. Eight percent stopped practicing obstetrics altogether. Undoubtedly, such an environment deprives women of all ages of access to experienced health care providers, since the average age of retirement for obstetricians is 48—an age once considered the prime of a professional medical career.

Public opinion supports limits on malpractice damages. In a recent Gallup poll, three fourths of respondents wanted a maximum amount set for awards for patient emotional pain and suffering. Thus, when physicians, medical associations, and insurers joined forces to pressure legislators to limit the amount of medical malpractice awards, lawmakers were receptive. The subsequent tort reforms placed caps on non-economic damages—the so-called pain and suffering and punitive damages—which led to savings, lower premiums, and reduced claims in states that placed caps on non-economic damages. Presently, 34 states have such caps, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, and they have lower insurance costs than the remaining 16 states.

Undoubtedly, both health care providers and patients have suffered through the medical liability "crises" of the past 30 years. Legal, medical, and perceptual barriers to reducing medical errors must be addressed to ensure the health of all citizens of society. While systemic problems reside in the structure of medicine today, especially with regard to the delivery of medicine, some advocates urge the creation of a federal agency to collect and analyze data on medical errors and to make recommendations on procedures for their control and reduction.

Rosanne Martorella

See also Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Insurance

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MEDICARE

The Medicare program is a national health insurance system that currently serves more than 40 million beneficiaries and provides more than $330 million in health care benefits. Participation in the Medicare program is dependent on whether individuals are age 65 or older, have selected disabilities, or have end stage renal disease (ESRD). The majority (about 85 percent) of the Medicare population is aged, while approximately 14 percent of beneficiaries are disabled. The remaining Medicare population (less than 1 percent) is eligible for Medicare benefits because of ESRD. The Medicare program is the largest health insurer in the United States; it is a crucial element in ensuring health care to some of the most vulnerable populations.

The Medicare program actually finds its roots in the Social Security program. Though the original Social Security Act was enacted in 1935, this program to provide minimal income security through social insurance included no provision for coverage of health care expenses. Therefore, despite its goals of providing a basic social safety income net, it became apparent to policymakers that health care costs, particularly for the aged and disabled populations with high health care needs, would quickly undermine the income protections intended to be provided under Social Security. Therefore, after long debate, the Medicare program became law in 1965 as a mechanism to add health insurance to the already existing national Social Security program.

Medicare is partially financed through a combination of payroll taxes, beneficiary premiums, and beneficiary cost sharing. For most of its history, the Medicare program (now commonly referred to as "original Medicare") consisted of hospital insurance (covered under Medicare Part A) and general medical insurance including physician services (Medicare Part B). Coverage under the original Medicare program worked under a fee-for-service system in which Medicare paid medical providers predetermined rates for specific health care services.

Medicare, however, evolved over time to include new programs. During the late 1980s, the program experimented with provision of Medicare services to beneficiaries through capitated health maintenance programs. Managed care programs, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), offered an alternative way for Medicare beneficiaries to receive their benefits. In exchange for enrollment in a Medicare managed care plan, beneficiaries often received additional, nonstatutory benefits, including preventive care. Popularity of managed care (known first as the TEFRA HMO program) grew steadily, boosted further through passage of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. Under the BBA, which created the Medicare+Choice program, Medicare expanded the types of managed care organizations eligible to contract with Medicare. Through the Medicare+Choice program, also known as Medicare Part C, managed care organizations could offer new benefit options, including preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, to the original HMO options. Though a source of great policy interest and change, the Medicare managed care program (currently renamed Medicare Advantage) provides coverage to a minority (about 15 percent) of Medicare beneficiaries.

Possibly the most significant change to the Medicare program came with the enactment of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. The MMA added a benefit long absent from original

Medicare: prescription drugs. The Medicare Part D program, which became effective in January 2006, provides basic and catastrophic prescription drug coverage to beneficiaries through private insurance plans. Under Part D, beneficiaries receive basic coverage of prescription drugs up to (depending on their specific plan) about $2,000. Catastrophic coverage continues after beneficiaries have paid out-of-pocket costs of $3,600. The private plans that provide Part D coverage include a wide range of Medicare prescription drug plans (PDPs) and mandated prescription drug coverage obtained by enrollment in a Medicare Advantage managed care plan. Medicare beneficiaries choose annually which type of mechanism (PDPs or Medicare Advantage plans) they want to elect for their Part D coverage.

The Medicare Part D program is credited with providing critical prescription drug coverage to more than 30 million Medicare beneficiaries, some of whom had no reliable mechanism for coverage prior to the new program. However, Medicare Part D has faced criticism for its complex, hard-to-understand benefit design, the sometimes daunting number of coverage plan options, and a "donut hole" gap between basic and catastrophic coverage.

In many ways, the Medicare program is highly successful. It offers health insurance coverage to the largest single group of Americans, offering the aged and disabled populations the most secure, stable health care in the United States. Medicare is sometimes considered a model for health care reform, particularly as a mechanism for provision of health care coverage to the more than 40 million Americans currently uninsured. Medicare is also an extremely efficient health insurance program. Unlike private insurance plans, in which health administration costs can commonly range from 10 to more than 20 percent of total program costs, Medicare's administrative costs are less than 5 percent. Finally, the Medicare program has an extensive national beneficiary education program that provides programmatic information and support to enrollees through toll-free call centers, printed materials, and Web sites.

Despite these considerable successes, the Medicare program faces some significant challenges. As it evolved over time to include a new provider, reimbursement, cost containment, and benefit program, Medicare grew into a complex program that is often difficult to understand for both beneficiaries and Medicare providers. Understanding and navigating Medicare became particularly challenging for Medicare beneficiaries in 2006 when it required that they select a Medicare prescription drug plan. But the greatest of challenges to Medicare is likely the financial sustainability of the program. As the U.S. working population declines in size and the baby boom population nears retirement and eligibility for Medicare benefits, projections are that the program will face a financial shortfall around 2018. Addressing the looming financial insolvency of the Medicare program has been a difficult policy and political program debate.

Leslie Greenwald

See also Baby Boomers; Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change; Health Care, Insurance; Life Expectancy; Medicaid; Nursing Home Care

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Megacities

Megacities are giant cities. The term has been in common use since the 1980s to characterize metropolitan areas with very large total populations. Most commonly, specialists and UN demographers use the term in comparative urban studies, referring to metropolitan areas with more than 8 or 10 million inhabitants. The underlying argument is that the population size of these metropolitan areas gives them special characteristics. Attention typically focuses on the total population of the metropolitan area—usually a major city and its surrounding suburbs.

Metropolitan areas, also known as *urban agglomerations*, are notoriously difficult to define because administrative definitions vary from country to country and because the cities integrate in many different ways with their surrounding regions. In less developed countries, the rural poor may seek work in the cities as migrant laborers, and villages become integrated with metropolitan labor markets.

On the urban fringe, agriculture, factory farming, and industries like brickmaking intensify to meet metropolitan demand, while commercial strips often line the intercity highways. In more developed countries, towns and villages around the metropolis may evolve into satellite, bedroom, second-home, and recreational communities, while suburbs may sprawl outward at lower and lower densities. Commuters and suburbanites may seek to enjoy rural landscapes and simulate rural lifestyles yet gain their livelihoods in the metropolitan economy. Planners may seek to preserve rural and wilderness areas as greenbelts and parks, but urban development often simply leapfrogs the preserved areas, creating new metropolitan satellites.

As world population rises and urbanization continues, the proportion of the world's megacities located in less developed countries increases, and the threshold size for megacity definition tends to rise. In 1950, only one metropolitan area in the world, New York, had more than 10 million inhabitants. By 2005, however, the number had risen to 19 metropolitan areas, all but four of them in less developed countries. Two alternative terms, *metacities* and *hypercities*, have now emerged to embrace metropolitan areas with more than 20 million inhabitants. Tokyo is the first metacity, but all the others most likely to cross this threshold by 2015—Dhaka, Mumbai, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City, and Shanghai—are in developing countries.

Characterizing all giant metropolitan areas are high levels of congestion, pollution, land values, and living costs in relation to neighboring less densely populated regions. Both in rich and poor countries, however, megacities usually have higher average incomes and productivity levels than smaller cities and rural areas, and they are tremendously important foci of business activity. Anti-urbanists emphasize their problems, pro-urbanists emphasize their dynamism and synergies, and comparative researchers tend to emphasize the development characteristics of the countries within which the megacities are located. Some megacities—most notably Tokyo, New York, and London—are dynamic "world cities" playing pivotal roles in the global system. At the other extreme, descriptions of megacities like Kolkata, Karachi, Lagos, and Kinshasa tend to emphasize mass poverty and diseconomies of urban size.

Ray Bromley

See also Megalopolis; Urban Sprawl

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MEGALOPOLIS

Megalopolis was an ancient mainland Greek city, founded in 369 BCE, whose name quite literally means "large city." In the 20th century, various authors, most notably Lewis Mumford, used the term with the same general meaning as *metropolis*, a large city and its surrounding suburbs. In the 1950s and early 1960s, however, two authors, the French geographer Jean Gottmann and the Greek planner Constantinos A. Doxiadis, gave the term *megalopolis* a different and greater meaning, redefining it as an interlocking group of metropolises, forming a polynuclear urban region with at least 20 million inhabitants.

After 5 years of background research, Gottmann's landmark book *Megalopolis* of 1961 profiled the 53,000-square-mile urbanized region stretching from southern New Hampshire to northern Virginia and encompassing the metropolises of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., together with many smaller intermediate and surrounding cities and suburbs. This region, sometimes known as BosWash, offered the world's first example of a true megalopolis. While preparing his study, and more intensively afterward, Gottmann interacted with Doxiadis, who was developing an emerging new academic discipline—"ekistics, the science of human settlements."

Ekistics provided a comprehensive framework for the spatial and design disciplines—attempting to unify geography, regional science, landscape architecture, architecture, and interior decoration and to encompass economic, social, and environmental aspects of human activity. Doxiadis developed a 15-level scale, stretching from the individual (level 1) to his envisioned, inevitable global city of the future, *ecumenopolis*

(level 15). His model, simultaneously descriptive and predictive, assumed continuing world population growth, economic development, technological advancement, and globalization. He predicted that neighboring metropolises (level 10) would sprawl into *conurbations* (physically continuous built-up areas) and eventually link into a *megalopolis* (level 12); neighboring megalopolises would eventually consolidate as urban regions (small *eperopolis*); urban regions would merge into continental urban systems (*eperopolis*); and the continental urban systems would eventually link and integrate to form ecumenopolis.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Gottmann's megalopolis attracted considerable attention from U.S. academics and political leaders, who often cited it in calls for metropolitan and regional government, regionally integrated utility networks, and high-speed intercity rail services. With metropolitan regions increasingly recognized as functional entities often having overlapping commuter fields with adjacent metropolises, Doxiadis launched studies of what he saw as the emerging Great Lakes megalopolis, stretching from Milwaukee and Chicago to Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Toronto, and in some versions all the way to Montreal. Japanese, Chinese, and Western European researchers began to identify megalopolises, most notably between Tokyo and Osaka, and including Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Milan. By the late 1970s, however, enthusiasm for these studies began to diminish. Long-term, grand-scale planning went out of fashion as the Thatcher-Reagan era of neoliberalism and privatization gained momentum. Most important, perhaps, growing pressure for decentralization and community planning, advocated by such authors as Jane Jacobs and Robert Goodman, reflected the power of local identity and the permanence of political boundaries and divisions. Doxiadis and Gottmann's visions of a long-term upward shift in scale, from local to regional governments and emerging synergies, have yielded, despite globalization, to the reinforcement of local identity.

Ray Bromley

See also Megacities; Urbanization; Urban Sprawl

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Megamergers

A *merger* is a combination of two corporations in which only one corporation survives and the other firm goes out of existence. A *consolidation* is the combination of two or more companies to form an entirely new company, to the point that the original companies cease to exist. *Megamergers* simply refer to very large mergers and consolidations. Examples include the mergers of Vodaphone-AirTouch and Mannesman ($180 billion), AOL and Time Warner ($165 billion), and Citicorp and Travelers ($73 billion).

Corporate mergers and acquisitions are important events because they represent massive reallocations of resources within the economy. Over the past century, there were five merger waves, in which a series of high merger activity was followed by a relatively inactive period. The last merger wave, called the "period of megamergers," occurred from 1992 to 2000. The megamergers during the past decade are just larger than previous ones. The concentration of megamergers in recent years has been in the banking, telecommunications, petroleum, and pharmaceutical industries. Megamergers partially reflect the level of growth in economic activity and globalization of financial markets.

Megamergers occur for numerous reasons, such as synergy, corporate control, tax considerations, diversification, market power, transaction cost efficiency, and purchase of undervalued assets. A common motive for megamergers is *synergy*, which refers to an increase in competitiveness and resulting cash flows beyond what the two companies are likely to accomplish independently. Thus, the synergy motive suggests that megamergers occur for the efficiency that results from merging the resources of the two firms. Synergies come in various forms, including economies of scale due to cost savings and better capacity utilization, more effective management, improved production techniques, and combining complementary resources.

An important issue is whether megamergers create value. Some contend that megamergers increase value and efficiency and move resources toward optimal uses. Others are dubious of this view. They argue that megamergers do not lead to subsequent performance gains and destroy value. Still others believe that any gains to shareholders simply represent the distribution of wealth from other stakeholders. Thus, value is preserved.

To measure wealth effects, studies use either short-run stock performance of the bidder and target or the long-term performance of the bidder for several years after the transaction. The use of short-run stock performance appears to be more reliable, as it accounts for the changes in stock prices that would incorporate any expected changes in firm value as a result of a merger. Long-term studies focus on relative performance of the acquiring firm compared to non-acquiring peers.

The evidence on wealth gains for acquiring firm shareholders is unclear, because they may earn little, no, or negative wealth gains in the short run. The target's stock usually increases upon the announcement of a megamerger, but often at the expense of the acquiring firm's shareholders. Studies that examine the performance of acquiring firms during the 3 to 5 years after the transactions generally find a negative net wealth effect. Whether megamergers are good for consumers, competition, or society at large remains an empirical question.

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See also Conglomerates; Economic Restructuring; Military-Industrial Complex; Multinational Corporations; Oligopoly; Outsourcing

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Melting Pot

The earliest articulation of the melting pot concept came in 1782, from J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur, a French officer turned New York settler, who envisioned assimilated Europeans as ingredients in a vast melting pot of cultures. The concept of the melting pot later expanded to include people from different races and backgrounds, as it became one of the cornerstones of assimilation theory. While many academics dispute the relevance of the term, the model of the melting pot offers an idealistic vision of U.S. society and identity, combining people from diverse ethnic, religious, political, and economic backgrounds together into a single people.

Theoretical Context

Throughout the 19th century, presidents and poets alike echoed the idea of the United States as a unique site for cultural assimilation, as new waves of immigrants sought to put down roots. However, the visual image of foreign assimilation came to the forefront of public culture through Israel Zangwill's popular play, *The Melting Pot* of 1908, which venerated the assimilation of European immigrants, even "the black and yellow races," into a universal American culture. Once established, the icon of the melting pot served to legitimize American ideologies of equal opportunity and independence from European nations, as immigrants could recast themselves as Americans by learning English and adapting to American norms.

Early theoretical grounding for the melting pot took root in the Chicago School assimilation theory of the 1910s. Here, human ecologist Robert Park outlined a "race relations cycle" in which new immigrant groups adopted an accommodating stance to the host culture, copying outward customs and norms to allow successful economic interaction. Park and others expressed belief that, over generations, these cultural compromises gradually led to conformity of language, opinion, and belief.

Even contemporary accounts of assimilation theory interpret the idea of the melting pot as a precursor to the assimilationist idea of immigrant incorporation: a complex and multidimensional yet mostly "straight line" adaptation of immigrants into U.S. society. In his classic 1964 account of assimilation theory, Milton Gordon not only observed seven different stages of assimilation—that is, cultural, structural, identity, and so on—but he also reinforced the idea of a "triple melting pot" (Catholic, Jewish, Protestant) originally put forward by Ruby Jo Kennedy in her intermarriage study of New Haven in 1944. Gordon said that immigrants with common Protestant roots followed a direct path of adaptation into the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant

core of U.S. society, and Catholics and Jews into their own homogenizations, thus associating the melting pot with a nexus of religious values toward which all others eventually integrated. Gordon further argued that racial discrimination prevented blacks, Asians, Mexican Americans, and some Puerto Ricans from participating meaningfully in either the white Protestant or white Catholic communities. His comments made it clear that structural societal conditions prevented the existence of one homogeneous melting pot; rather there were multiple melting pots, and some groups did not belong to any of them.

Contesting the Term

Gordon's contemporaries Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan further demonstrated the problematic aspects of the melting pot idea in their seminal work *Beyond the Melting Pot* of 1963. They showed that ethnic backgrounds and identities can provide resistance to "melting" and are quite central in structuring the immigrant incorporations. In a later 1970 edition, the authors acknowledge that not only ethnicity plays a role in structuring life and conflict in the city, but economic interests and racism are of equal significance in understanding social patterns.

The essence of Glazer and Moynihan's argument is probably best summarized by their sentence: "The point about the melting pot is that it did not happen." Four decades after the book's publication, most scholarly evidence seems to support this conclusion. Scholars show that descendants of immigrants in major U.S. cities neither fully melted nor replicated the culture of the previous generation. Instead, they adopted selected elements of U.S. society while celebrating their own particularities and cultural roots, becoming Americans in their own way.

The significance of race remains a salient factor working against the image of U.S. society as a melting pot. For many immigrants, adaptation continues to be obstructed by racism, through such forms of inequalities as housing segregation and unequal access to economic opportunity and education. A more popular metaphor than melting pot is calling modern America a "salad bowl," in which separate racial and ethnic groups interact without fully assimilating.

While the imagery of the melting pot has held powerful sway over public and academic interest for nearly a century, critical examination of immigrant populations casts doubt on its value as a theoretical concept. New research has opened up avenues exploring the enduring structures of immigrant groups, including ethnic enclaves, immigrant niches, and ethnic economies. At present, the adoption of revised perspectives such as multiculturalism and "new assimilation theory" increasingly proves the melting pot concept of limited use.

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See also Acculturation; American Dream; Assimilation; Ethnic Group; Ethnicity; Segmented Assimilation

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Mental Depression

Moods or emotions change with experience and environment, sometimes reflecting happiness and other times sadness. In emotionally healthy individuals, moods are controllable, but for people with mental depression, the mood itself is in control of both body and thoughts. Mental depression is a mood disorder characterized by specific symptoms that typically occur due to chemical alterations in normal brain functioning. Mentioned throughout history, depression harks back at least since the days of the Old Testament,

when King Saul was said to have suffered from it, causing him to take his own life. The most common and readily identifiable symptom of a depressed person is sadness, melancholy, or despair; however, a person with clinical depression experiences more than transient sadness. Oftentimes it is a sense of exhaustion or a lack of any energy at all that signals the onset of mental depression.

Mental depression is one of the clinically distinct depressive disorders. As a clinically defined disorder, its criteria is identified in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders*, 4th edition (*DSM-IV*) with specific questionnaires and diagnostic interview techniques available for therapists, doctors, and other mental health specialists to employ in an effort to identify clinical mental depression. Two important diagnostic features are severity and duration of symptoms. For a person to be diagnosed with severe depression, the symptoms must exist for more than 2 weeks and can be recurring or single episodes. Subtypes of major depressive disorders include depression with melancholy (loss of interest or pleasure in activities), depression with atypical features like weight gain or hypersomnia (sleeping to excessive amounts), or depression with psychotic features like hallucinations or delusions. Other types of depressive disorders include long-term mild depression called dysthymia; bipolar disorder, in which moods cycle from elation to depression; postpartum depression, which occurs after the birth of a child; and depression that accompanies menstrual cycles, more commonly known as premenstrual syndrome or PMS.

Causes

Depression can occur as a primary diagnosis or secondary to a medical disorder like hypothyroidism, the ingestion of drugs for medicinal or recreational use, or as the reaction to a chronic medical diagnosis. Chronic anxiety, poor sleep habits, and drug use with prescription and illicit drugs can produce mental depression. Excessive use of alcohol or other mood-altering drugs could also signal the individual's attempt to self-medicate against the feelings of depression.

Some psychosocial contributors to depression can be life events, environments, and interpersonal relationships. Long-lasting stress or extremely stressful events can precipitate a depressive episode. Familial psychopathology, or psychological disease patterns existing in families, affects an individual's ability to respond to stressors and recover from, or adjust to, stressful events. Personality types and genetic factors are also determinants.

Depression and anxiety are often a coexisting diagnosis. According to the National Comorbidity Survey (U.S.), 58 percent of Americans diagnosed with major depression also suffered from anxiety disorders.

Prevalence

Among Americans 18 years and older, in any given year nearly 21 million (9.5 percent) have a diagnosed mood disorder, with the daily activities of nearly 15 million of them impacted. Major depressive disorder constitutes a prime contributor to disability for individuals between the ages of 15 and 44. More than 6 million men and 12 million women suffer from depression, but men are 4 times more likely to commit suicide because of depression. Some theories hold that depression is an inheritable trait. Physical changes, such as pregnancy, aging, stroke, chronic disease, or heart attack, can also be accompanied by mental changes. Children diagnosed with depression should be treated by psychiatrists or therapists who specialize in the treatment of children.

Common symptoms include persisting sadness, anxiety, or emptiness that may be accompanied by thoughts of victimization, helplessness, hopelessness, and/or worthlessness. The person might lose interest in activities that were once important or complain of lack of energy or inability to concentrate. Physical symptoms that do not resolve despite treatment, thoughts and ideations of suicide or death, and/or extreme sleepiness or insomnia are other indicators of depression.

Treatment

Long- and short-term therapies are available for individuals diagnosed with some form of mental depression. Approaches can be behavioral (concentrating on changing specific behaviors); cognitive (concentrating on thought processes); or a combination of the two, called cognitive-behavioral therapy. Other treatment can include medications, hospitalization, and/or ECT (electro-convulsive therapy).

Most medications that treat depression must be taken regularly over time to achieve a therapeutic effect, and many should not be stopped abruptly because the body may have a negative reaction. Some

individuals may require a combination of medications in order to achieve the desired effect. Those persons diagnosed with chronic major depression or bipolar disease should understand that the need for medication may continue indefinitely. Some patients may be placed on anti-convulsant therapy, known to be effective in treating mood disorders.

Despite the fact that most people suffering from depression do not seek medical help, depression is a treatable disease. Depression is not an indication of emotional weakness or a condition that can be willed away. Without treatment, depression becomes a chronic disease that affects all aspects of the individual's daily activities. Families can support a person with depression by assisting him or her to get the appropriate help, diagnosis, and treatment for the disease; seeking additional family support; and learning how to provide patient, consistent emotional support. Talk of suicide should never be taken lightly or ignored. Engaging the person in conversation and recreational activities will help demonstrate affection and emotional support. Research demonstrates that, with treatment, people with depression can and do get better and live productive lives.

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See also Mental Health; Stressors

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Mental Health

Mental health was once defined as the psychological state that exists in the absence of mental illness. Contemporary social scientific thought, however, has abandoned the view that mental health and mental illness are antithetical to one another. Now, lack of mental illness no longer simply implies the presence of mental health, just as lack of mental health no longer suggests the presence of mental illness. Thus, the term *mental health* refers to a social psychological state greater than the mere absence of mental illness. Moreover, some scholars suggest that mental health can be present in individuals diagnosed with mental illness, a position that lends greater support to the view that mental health and mental illness ought not to be treated as oppositional categories.

Social scientists believe that mental health exists on a continuum, with optimal mental health occupying one pole of the continuum, poor mental health occupying the other. According to this model, an individual's location on the continuum is subject to change over time and is influenced by some combination of social, psychological, and biological factors. In advocating this model, many practitioners of social work, sociology, and psychology reject definitions of mental health that posit it as a discrete state of being. The continuous model of mental health, however, is at times inconsistent with the definitions articulated within the medical community.

In the field of diagnostic psychiatry, in particular, many experts understand mental health as existing in a dichotomous relationship with mental illness. According to this view, the relationship between mental illness and mental health is not fluid, but discrete—one finds oneself in possession of either one or the other. The dichotomization of the concepts of mental health and mental illness occurs through the application of standardized diagnostic criteria intended to positively identify the presence of mental illness. In this sense, by demarcating cut-off points, mental health becomes bounded from mental illness and, perhaps as an unintended consequence, regarded as falling outside the purview of the research programs of psychiatry.

A systematic study of mental health has yet to emerge within the social sciences. However, even if a movement were to form around the concept, mental health most likely would continue to elude precise

definition. Two interrelated factors contribute to the inherent vagueness of the term. First, the concept as such represents a subjective state of being, varying across individuals and groups. Second, the realization of mental health rests upon culturally and temporally specific definitions of what exactly constitutes normal emotions and behaviors. In other words, the meaning attached to interpretations of mental health, and indeed to the very definition of the term *normal,* is necessarily rooted in cultural value judgments. As a result, even well-intended efforts to develop a universal definition of mental health are unlikely to meet with success.

Despite these issues, efforts to lend definitional clarity to the term have been made. The psychologist and philosopher Williams James, for instance, understood mental health as the achievement of happiness, a state of being largely informed by the possession of a positive outlook on life. Abraham Maslow foregrounded the concept of self-actualization in his understanding of mental well-being, arguing that once individuals meet their basic needs they may ascend to a state of self-actualization—or a state in which one is capable of making the most of his or her unique abilities. Existential psychologists have suggested that mental health rests upon discovery of the meaning of life. Positive psychologists have emphasized the relationship between human happiness and the presence of an optimistic outlook on life. In conceptualizing human happiness, positive psychology underscores a number of virtues and strengths, including wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. Access to these characteristics influences one's capacity to achieve happiness, which in turn affects his or her level of mental health.

Contemporary social scientific research uses the concept of mental health to represent a broad inventory of positive attributes. The relationship between mental health and each implicated attribute is open-ended in the sense that the attribute is treated as a continuous variable (i.e., measured on a scale), and the presence of each attribute within an individual is subject to change over time. In other words, the relationship between these attributes, mental health, and the individual is not fixed. Within the social scientific community, a general consensus exists that mental health involves the presence of five general attributes, all of which correspond to an individual's ability to capably function in society. Included among the list of attributes are (a) living up to one's intellectual and emotional potential; (b) the ability to forge and maintain healthy and satisfying relationships; (c) the ability to cope with normal levels of stress; (d) a sense of self-efficacy; and (e) the ability to adapt to unfamiliar situations and environments. Sometimes a sixth attribute—perceiving things the way they are, or "being in touch with reality"—is added to this list. Each of these components is subject to normative assessment and therefore requires sensitivity to cultural differences. For instance, although healthy and satisfying relationships in many cultures may serve as a central determinant of mental health, what exactly constitutes "healthy and satisfying relationships" is subject to extensive intercultural variation.

According to sociologists, the structural effects of social support and social integration influence the relative presence of these attributes. Research exploring the relationship between these social variables and mental well-being dates back to Émile Durkheim's study of suicide. In contrasting the rates of suicide among single men and members of the Protestant faith to those of married couples and Catholics, Durkheim concluded that—among married individuals and members of the Catholic faith—more intense social relationships function to create a sense of meaning and purpose in life. On a broader level, by imposing moral regulations on behavior, well-integrated communities reduce the occurrence of anomie.

In exploring the relationship between mental health and stressful life events, more recent research cites social support and social integration as avenues through which stress is mediated. The presence of external sources of support—particularly in the form of an intimate relationship with a partner, or strong relations with extended family, friends, and other members of the local community—moderates the effect of stress by improving one's sense of security, self-efficacy, sense of belonging, and self-esteem. Such attributes improve individuals' ability to cope with personal and social stressors and thereby enable them to achieve greater levels of mental health. Moreover, symbolic interactionists suggest that support networks contribute to the development of a strong sense of self, as identity evolves in part through interaction with others. Residing in well-integrated communities and neighborhoods furthermore functions to affirm residents' sense of identity and worth, as individuals act as both the benefactors and recipients of activities intended to maintain the general well-being of the community. In comparison, sociologists

argue that poorly integrated communities increase the likelihood that residents will suffer from low self-esteem, a weak sense of self-efficacy, and general feelings of pessimism, all of which are potential contributors to poor mental health.

With respect to the relationship between social support mechanisms and stress, experts note that strong social support networks improve individuals' access to material resources, such as money, transportation, a place to live, and child care. Access to such material resources reduces exposure to stress while simultaneously improving one's capacity to cope successfully with stressful life events. Social support mechanisms prove to be of particular importance to members of lower socioeconomic classes and minority groups who, on balance, experience greater levels of discrimination, neighborhood crime, unemployment, and poor physical health. In such cases, access to a strong social support network will greatly influence mental health.

The growing emphasis on issues related to mental health has led to the implementation of mental health promotion programs in local communities, through which support structures are developed in order to increase social inclusion and cohesion. Mental health programs also function at the individual level, largely through programs intended to improve self-esteem and coping skills in the workplace and in personal relationships.

Anne McCloskey

See also Anomie; Cultural Values; Social Networks; Stressors

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Methadone

Methadone, a synthetic narcotic with a suppression effect lasting 24 to 36 hours, is the most effective medication to help heroin patients overcome their addiction. Methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) rapidly expanded following its demonstration as an effective medical intervention in the mid-1960s. In the United States, there are 500,000–1 million heroin users, with about 180,000 (about 18 to 36 percent) enrolled in MMT. Nevertheless, an array of controversial issues surrounds this treatment at the clinical, community, and governmental levels.

Principal benefits of methadone are its reduction of cravings for heroin, blockage of such narcotic effects as euphoria, and reduction of withdrawal symptoms. Unfortunately, most who withdraw from methadone return to using heroin. Proper dosage is crucial for retaining patients in treatment. While a dosage of 80 milligrams (mg) per day leads to higher retention rates, many clinics administer an average daily dose of 59 mg, the lower end of the therapeutic range.

Since 1964, in monitoring MMT for medical safety, researchers have noted minor and usually short-term side effects in the initial stages of treatment initiation, such as increased perspiration and constipation. In most cases, length of treatment correlates with improved health of patients. MMT participation also reduces risk for HIV and can be a supplementary source of pain management for cancer patients. In tests of intellectual functioning and perceptual motor skills, methadone patients' results fall into the normal range.

At the community level, the effects of MMT vary. For example, MMT admissions correspond with reductions in drug-related property crime, arrests, hepatitis, and deaths. Yet, community opposition has contributed to blocking the expansion of MMT. A principal concern is the diversion of methadone from patients to a street market, which often seriously affects a neighborhood's quality of life. The reasons for the street market in methadone range from patients' economic motivations to the need of heroin-addicted people to maintain themselves outside of a program when none is available and/or heroin is scarce or unaffordable.

The federal and state governments set regulations for MMT and the criteria for admission. Studies demonstrate that the layers of regulatory bureaucracy, which also sometimes include municipal

agencies, impede the expansion, accessibility, and improvement of MMT. The traditional treatment model consists of community-based clinics to which a patient must report daily. Observed by a nurse, patients drink their prescribed dose. Patients who demonstrate compliance, including submission of a minimum of eight urine samples a year free of heroin, eventually get assigned to a reduced schedule in which they report once a week and receive six take-home doses. There have been widespread and deepening criticisms about the disproportion of resources directed toward program regulation at the expense of enhanced treatment services, such as integration of relevant social, medical, and psychological services. This has resulted in a movement toward diversification of program models. Increasingly, patients now get a range of treatment options, including MMT primary care facilities and office-based practices of a physician.

Russell Rockwell

See also Addiction; Drug Abuse; Drug Subculture

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Middleman Minority

Middleman minority refers to cultural minority populations living in complex interethnic situations and to theories about their livelihood and social position. Their occupational niche generally has been the small family firm or self-employed merchant rather than agro-industrial producer or employee of a large corporation. Accordingly, one can speak of Chinese traders in Indonesia, Indian merchants in East Africa, or Korean green grocers in New York City as middleman minorities. As immigrants or sojourners, they fill a niche as service sector intermediaries between producers and consumers or as buffers between the masses and the elite. Moreover, they are received with ambivalence or hostility by the mainstream or host society.

Many scholars view the conflict between middleman minority and others as part of the tension between "pariah capitalism" and "modern capitalism." Analysts link the presumed universalistic and rational outlook of the latter historically to the rise of Protestantism. Modern capitalists, by this logic, treat all clients by the same ethics and standards.

By contrast, pariah capitalism has been associated with Jews and other Mediterranean and Asian trading peoples. Among its defining characteristics has been an emphasis on frugality, a dual standard of commercial morality, high achievement motivation, and high ingroup morale, among others. A dual standard implies favored treatment for one's own people but less advantageous terms for others. The host population may interpret such behavior as hucksterism and exploitation and thus construct profoundly negative images of the minority. At the same time, a middleman minority may reinforce its separateness via ritual segregation, requiring or encouraging marriage within the group.

A challenge for middleman minority theory is reconciling its ideal concepts about capitalisms and ethnicities with real-life conditions. Useful in this regard are cases in which some aspects of middleman minority dynamics occur, perhaps, but in modified form. In northern Canada, for example, as fur traders among a largely Indian and Métis clientele, Scots have displayed a high ingroup morale, strong attachment to their homeland, and future time orientation, among other features conventionally associated with pariah capitalism. The host population has viewed their behavior as frugal, exploitative, and ethnocentric. Yet, historically, Scot traders derived from a Protestant cultural background and generally worked for large firms like the Northwest Company and the Hudson's Bay Company. They differ from the self-employed trading minorities not so much in their image and behavior, then, as in their position within the larger political economy. Even though they faced some of the hostility of the Jewish and Asian middleman minorities, the possibility of acting upon this hostility by competitors, subordinates, and clients has been limited by the power of the large firm and the Canadian state.

Robert Jarvenpa

See also Cultural Capital; Ethnic Group; Ethnocentrism; Minority Group

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Migration, Global

Human geographic mobility is as much part of human life as of human history, for human beings are a migratory species and migration is a continuum in history. International migration is the crossing of international borders, the movement from one nation state to another that falls into the main categories of labor migration, forced migration, family migration, or migration for reasons of education and training. Dividing lines, however, blur, because political borders change and distinctions between voluntary (labor) migration and forced migration or between labor migration and family migration are problematic.

Analysis and Categorization

At the onset of the 21st century, nearly 200 million people, about 3 percent of the global population, were international migrants. Thirty years ago, the figure stood at 85 million (2.1 percent), and 230 million are projected for 2030. Today, around 100 million are labor migrants, 13 million are refugees registered with United Nations (UN) agencies, and the others are family members or students.

The United Nations and International Labor Organization (ILO) official figures of international (labor) migration require some reservations. First, migration is increasingly taking irregular (illegal) forms (a tenth to a fifth of all migration) that go unrecorded. Since no method can calculate levels of irregular migration, existing figures are only estimations. Second, international migration is increasingly temporary; indeed, it is the fastest growing type of migration, and often it is too short (less than 6 months) to count as migration. Third, migration is increasingly difficult to distinguish from other forms of mobility, namely business trips and tourism. For example, businesses might involve stays of more than 6 months, labor migrants often come on tourist visas because this is often the only available means of legal entry, and retirement migrants to southern countries might be counted as tourists. Fourth, the distinction between international migration across international borders and internal mobility within a country but across administrative boundaries often is implausible. For example, geographic mobility in China, India, Nigeria, or Russia is not understood as migration because no international borders are crossed, even though movements within these countries might involve long distances and the crossing of cultural, linguistic, or religious borders. Finally, the predominant form of migration has long been rural to urban. This primary cause of the growth of cities is mostly internal, so it is not recorded as (international) migration.

Consequently, recognizing other forms of geographic mobility would produce some very different figures, perhaps between 1 and 2 billion geographically mobile people. This would mean that at least one sixth to one third of the world's population are migrants. Putting international migration into the perspective of international travel and of internal mobility is essential, first, to produce a complete picture of human geographic mobility, and second, to judge the relevance of migration within the full range of human behavior in geographic space. In this sense, we can then examine whether migration is the behavior of only a minority (thus an exception from an otherwise sedentary norm) that requires explanation, or whether migration is normal and widespread behavior not requiring any extra justification and explanation.

Of the various major migration patterns, the first notable one is that contemporary migration is mostly from north to north (between developed countries); from south or east to north (from low- and medium-developed to developed countries), and from south to south (between developing countries). Just under half of all migration is toward and between developing countries, while the other half is toward and between developed countries, resulting in about 80 percent of all refugees found in developing countries. These directions, however, are increasingly diversifying, with recently observed large-scale movements from north to south or south to east. Second, most migration is

regional, between neighboring countries. This is because distance is short and costs are low, but also because language, culture, or religion might be similar in sending and receiving countries and historical, cultural, political, and economic links possibly facilitate that migration. In contrast, forced migration is often internal, either because conflicts are of a local nature and people can escape to other parts of a country, or because people are prevented from entering other countries and becoming internationally recognized refugees.

Notably, migration is increasingly feminized, and today women account for about half of all migrants. However, in history women migrated too, a fact often unnoticed by then-contemporary sources. Perhaps it is research finally recognizing the role of women in global migration rather than some major shift in gender migratory activity occurring.

Furthermore, nearly all countries in varying degrees experience various stages of migration, changing from being mostly sending to mostly receiving countries (such as Germany and France), or vice versa (such as Spain, Italy, and Ireland). They can also be countries of transit migration for a limited period of time (such as Turkey and Mexico), and some may experience periods of zero migration (such as modern-day Portugal). Because migration seems to be hardly predictable, it is sometimes described as "turbulences."

Determinants and Conditions

No comprehensive theory of migration yet exists, although experts generally agree that migration is highly dynamic, complex, and changeable, and that migration patterns are fluid and undergo constant transformations. Further, several major determinants and conditions both drive and explain international migration: migration systems, migration networks, macroeconomic forces, non-economic factors, migration politics, and demographic developments.

Migration systems link regions and states historically, culturally and linguistically, economically, politically, and socially. Within such systems are simultaneous flows of information, capital, goods, and people of any kind, for any purpose, and in any direction. Meanwhile, as systems have become global, global markets for information, capital, and goods, and labor now facilitate global and sustainable movements of people.

Migration networks link individuals of sending and receiving communities; they provide potential migrants with preconditions such as information, finances, support with finding accommodation, and employment that encourage migration. Networks can also take the form of migration industries—businesses ranging from human smugglers to recruitment agencies and visa services—that facilitate migration. Networks often explain why migration continues even under adverse conditions, such as lack of economic incentives or unemployment in destination countries.

Macroeconomic forces are mostly the demand for labor and higher wages on the one hand, and by unemployment and lower wages (possibly also overpopulation) on the other hand. Thereby, so-called push and pull factors determine the flow of people, and economic modeling aims to analyze, explain, and predict these migration movements.

Microeconomic and behaviorist theories present migrants as individuals or families assessing their (economic) situation, considering alternative opportunities, and calculating costs and benefits of migration to improve their quality of life. Thus, migration motivations can rest within concepts of individual and collective decision making. Non-economic reasoning instead reflects climatic, cultural, or political criteria, such as warm winters, political stability, and freedom, or opportunities to enjoy a specific culture or to practice a specific religion or lifestyle.

Demographic imbalances—aging and decreasing populations in developed countries and increasing young populations elsewhere—impact on migration, migration discourses, and migration policies. While high-average age, high dependency ratio communities worry about future supply of labor and, at least in Europe, the lack of economically active contributors to pension and other funds, low-average age communities become natural resources to address both these issues by sending migrants.

Migration politics and policies such as recruitment schemes, immigration restrictions, and conditions put on entry and stay shape migration. Thus, the law determines type and character of migration, accepting a migrant as refugee or laborer or refusing entry to a migrant. Individual migrant decision making responds to set conditions and opportunities; vice versa, politics can influence individual decision making. Nevertheless, migration politics also have unintended effects; for example, controls drive people underground and recruitment stops, often resulting in migrants settling down instead of returning as anticipated.

Natural and ecological factors will increasingly cause migration. Global warming, desertification, freak weather, and rising ocean level will almost certainly cause massive population movements.

Challenges and Opportunities

Migration occurs within a triangle of forces: individual aspirations (including human agency, autonomy, and processes of self-selection), economic forces (including macroeconomic push and pull factors and employers' demand for labor), and institutional goals (of political society and civil society activities). This can result in a tug of war between institutional goals and individual aspirations or of individual autonomy versus public policy. Migration brings about an encounter of sedentary populations and mobile populations and, under conditions of the market economy, it can result in competition over employment and social resources. Occasionally, conflict arises, as is most evident in protectionist, even racist responses to migration. On the other hand, migrants often occupy niches in labor markets, housing markets, and society and often do not compete with indigenous populations. Finally, they integrate and become part of the fabric of host societies.

Normative Challenges. Migration affects nation states' sovereignty, hence a state's capacity to control its external borders and access to (a) its territory, (b) its markets (labor market and housing market), (c) its social systems (public and welfare services), and (d) its political system (democratic processes and institutions). Subsequent matters arising are related to legal status (residency, citizenship) of migrants.

Paradoxes of Globalization. Another set of problems relates to some asymmetries and paradoxes of globalization, notably the enthusiasm over unrestricted global flows of capital, information, and goods in contrast to concerns about the flow of people. While some organizations strive for more liberal and unrestrained flows of goods and capital, other institutions aim to control and limit international migration. And while globalization provides for global migration systems and global movements of labor, facilitates the flow of information about opportunities, and brings about safe and affordable transportation, political society often remains skeptical and aims to restrict movement of people.

Liberal Dilemma. Migration represents a major normative and practical challenge to liberalism and liberal democracies. First, the liberal principles of equality, individual freedom, and freedom of movement are met with restrictive immigration practices and exclusive membership practices of otherwise liberal democracies. Second, international obligations—for example, to take care of refugees—are met by increasingly hostile and deterring national legislations. As a consequence, a liberal dilemma arises that is yet lacking both normative and practical resolution.

Migration, Control, and Development. Neoclassical economists argue that migration once liberalized would result in enormous global economic growth; given equal distribution of wealth, this would in the long run have a reducing effect on migration. Equally, shifting immigration control budgets to development politics could instead reduce the need to migrate. Critical views claim that (skilled) migration from developing world countries is a brain drain, reducing the countries' development prospects. Meanwhile, middle-ground views instead emphasize the advantages of brain gain. Hence, human capital accumulated during a stay abroad and reinvested upon a migrant's return contribute significantly to the sending society's development. Finally, remittances made by migrants contribute more to development than development aid or direct foreign investments.

Political Challenges. Migration is one of the top international policy concerns of our time, affecting politics, international relations, and security measures. However, its determinants and conditions are beyond the scope of politics. Authorities can neither reverse history (e.g., interrupt migration systems), nor can they simply manipulate flows within migration networks once developed. Neither can those economic incentives resulting from unequal development be minimized easily, nor can population trends or climate changes be reversed in the short term. In other words, the capacity of politics to control migration is limited. Recent political trends aim to (a) distinguish between costs and benefits of migration, reduce the former, increase the latter; (b) implement selective policies that aim to attract high-skilled migrants while refusing low-skilled migrants; or (c) manage migration to the simultaneous benefit of sending countries, receiving countries, and migrants.

Migration is an intrinsic, inherent, and inevitable part of grand and continuous transformation processes. The departure and arrival of large numbers of people represent a considerable challenge to both sending

and receiving communities and societies. Whether migration as such or ill-prepared social systems and inadequate models of political organization of humanity (nation states) are at the core of the problem, migration has an impact on normative, political, economic, and social dimensions of the affected societies. Consequently, two perspectives address the migration problem: either try to prevent and contain large-scale migration (the predominant and conventional response) or better prepare societies and communities for mobile populations (the constant arrival of newcomers and departure of others).

Franck Düvell

See also Asylum; Bracero Program; Deportation; Human Trafficking; Labor, Migrant; Refugees; Repatriation; Undocumented Immigrants

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Militarism

Militarism refers to the influence of the military as an institution and of the preparations to use military force on the overall social organization of society. The concept has four parts.

The first is the direct participation of military officers in the most important governing structures. This feature of militarism has been largely absent in the United States, where the Constitution provides for civilian control of the armed forces. Military officers have played a major, direct role in the recent history of countries as diverse as Argentina, Greece, Pakistan, and Myanmar. Direct military involvement in key decision making may also be at a secondary but still important level, particularly during wartime.

The second component of militarism is a foreign policy predicted on a strong military, projection of force, and what C. Wright Mills (1956) called "a military definition of reality." Here the focus is less on who makes decisions and more on the assumptions and ideological structure that informs those decisions. In the United States, the capacity of some civilians to embrace militarized policies more thoroughly than those in uniform can be traced in the Cold War, Vietnam, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, "Operation Iraqi Freedom," and the "Global War on Terror."

The third element of militarism concerns the level of support for military values and norms within the overall culture of a society. Different features of popular culture can provide the military with legitimacy, sustain more peaceful alternatives, or create a middle ground where the clash between civilian- and military-influenced values and norms creates a form of "contested terrain." Examples include respect for those in uniform; the patterning of children's play; the content of patriotism; the prominence of the military in books, television, and feature films; and the connections between traditionally understood masculinity and military participation.

Fourth, militarism focuses on the influence of war preparations on key economic, political, and cultural institutions. Military spending can have a significant macro effect on the economy ("military Keynesianism") and play an important role in particular industries and in regional and local economies. Military service may be required or not. Civilians may be encouraged to engage the war effort directly through war taxes, donations, and volunteerism. Preparations to use military force can make a full-scale enemy out of "the Other" or encourage the search for presumed enemies within a society. Finally, the media can be forced or induced to support the military as an institution or militarized policies. Fully militarized societies will provide structures that sustain most if not all of these. Many contemporary societies contain a complex mix of features that sustain militarism while also nurturing social alternatives.

Paul Joseph

See also Demilitarization; Military-Industrial Complex

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Military-Industrial Complex

In his 1961 farewell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of the dangers of the military-industrial complex. While arguing for its necessity, he also stated that we must guard against its potential dangers to our democratic processes and liberties. This was not the first use of the term *military-industrial complex*. Charles Trevelyan of the United Kingdom first used it in 1914, but with Eisenhower's warning it became part of general political discourse. The military-industrial complex refers to the combination of two powerful entities in U.S. society. The first is the military establishment. The federal government spends billions of dollars annually keeping millions of men and women working to ensure national security. Since World War II, a permanent arms industry has complemented this military establishment. With this massive private industrial might symbiotically working with the government's military in times of war or peace, the U.S. government no longer needs to rely on a private sector conversion to military production every time war breaks out.

The pattern of U.S. military spending changed significantly in the middle of the 20th century. Prior to the Second World War, peacetime military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was generally less than 1 percent. During war it rose considerably—for WWI it rose to 7 percent—but still remained at fairly low levels. This all changed with the onset of WWII. From 1943 to 1945, annual military spending increased to more than 37 percent of GDP—the war dominated the economy. After the war there was a significant cutback in military spending to average levels of 5 percent of GDP. With the Korean War, these levels rose again to about 14 percent. They remained above 10 percent for the rest of the 1950s after the cessation of hostilities in Korea—peacetime military spending was at higher levels than earlier wartime levels. This maintaining of high levels of military spending—even during peacetime—marked the advent of the U.S. military-industrial complex of which President Eisenhower spoke.

These massive amounts of military spending fueled the private military-industrial sector. The federal government was now spending large amounts of money on arms production even in relatively peaceful times. Private entities, such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, were able to grow into large companies that were mostly dependent on government contracts for their survival. The relationship of these companies and the U.S. government is the essence of the military-industrial complex.

Since the 1950s, the ratio of U.S. military spending to GDP has declined considerably. During the Vietnam War this ratio was about 9 percent. Then in the 1970s it further declined to about 5 percent. President Ronald Reagan built it back up to about 6 percent in the 1980s, and then it fell to 3 percent by 2000. With the war in Iraq, it has inched back up to its current level of 4 percent.

Based on this more limited role that military spending now has in the United States, some argue that the military-industrial complex no longer exists. This would be an exaggeration. It is true that the military colossus is not quite what it was in the 1950s, but it is still a powerful presence in the U.S. and world economies. First, ratios of military spending to GDP at levels of 3–4 percent are still much higher than they were pre–World War II. Second, the absolute level of military spending is very high—the U.S. government spent more than $540 billion for national defense in 2006. Third, relative to the rest of the world, the United States spends far more on the military. The United States contributes more than half of the approximately $1 trillion spent worldwide annually on the military. In fact, the U.S. government's military budget is more than the next 14 countries combined—it is nearly 7 times that of China, the second largest spender. Simply put, the United States still devotes an enormous amount of resources to military purposes; with arms being manufactured by private firms, the military-industrial complex remains a powerful force in the economy and society.

President Eisenhower, in his farewell address, argued that the military-industrial complex was absolutely essential for our country's welfare. With the sort of national rivalries that existed in the world, the United States needed to be instantly ready for war,

in order to deter potential aggressors: a large and powerful arms industry would provide that readiness. The military-industrial complex is crucial to establishing national security in just such a world.

In addition to this national security argument, some economists argue that high levels of military spending are necessary to sustain capitalist economic growth. The phrase, "the permanent war economy," coined at the end of World War II by Charles Wilson (who later became Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense) in support of the military-industrial complex, is a phrase that describes this. The argument is that if the government does not continually maintain high expenditure levels, then a capitalist economy will fail to grow and will become mired in recessions or depressions.

For Keynesians, the effects of military expenditures are like any other nonmilitary expenditures. An increase in any kind of government spending will increase economy-wide aggregate expenditures, thereby increasing GDP, resulting in a growing economy. As long as the government spends freely, the economy will thrive.

If the two forms of expenditures have equal economic effects, why has it been military spending driving the economy? Military spending has two advantages over social spending. One, it maintains the balance of forces between the capitalist and working classes—too much social spending may tip the balance in favor of the working class. And two, it seems much easier to garner political support for military spending than for social spending, at least in the United States.

The existence of the military-industrial complex raises concerns in three separate areas: the threat to liberty and democratic processes; the increased possibility of political and economic corruption; and its debilitating economic effects. President Eisenhower raised the first concern in his farewell address. When any governmental organization gets very large, the concern always exists that by acquiring undue powers unto itself it may limit individual freedoms. This becomes particularly acute if the organization is involved in national security—the Defense Department is naturally secretive and undemocratic and inherently restricts freedom of speech. This may then carry over into the private arms industry, further undermining democracy and freedom.

In any operation the size of the military establishment, waste, fraud, and mismanagement are practically inevitable. Some analysts even argue that because of the nature of the military, these concerns are greater than for the nonmilitary functions of the government. Whatever the case, there certainly is large-scale mismanagement on the part of the Pentagon. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has repeatedly stated that the Pentagon improperly accounts for billions of dollars in assets, consistently overpays for weapons systems, and makes erroneous and improper payments to its contractors in the arms industry. For example, the GAO reported that the Pentagon could not account for more than 20 percent of its $1.2 trillion worth of property and inventory in the 1990s.

The third concern regarding the military-industrial complex is economic. Opposing the Keynesian argument that high military spending is beneficial to the economy, some economists argue that military spending in fact represents severe opportunity costs. By choosing guns rather than butter, the economy is deprived of much useful social spending. For example, building a missile serves a useful purpose only if the country is at war. And even then, once it is used, it is gone and serves no lasting purpose—it is purely destructive in nature. Building infrastructure, such as bridges and roads, on the other hand, serves a lasting purpose and adds to the economy's use-values. The spending in either case—military or nonmilitary—may give an initial boost to the economy, but nonmilitary spending develops the economy, unlike military spending, which does nothing to enhance future economic output. These economists are essentially arguing that social spending is more economically useful than military spending.

Paul A. Swanson

See also Militarism; Multinational Corporations

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Minimum Competency Test

Minimum competency tests (MCTs) measure the knowledge and skills deemed critical for the test-taker, establishing that he or she possesses these skills at a baseline level. Although often used synonymously with basic skills testing, the term can take some different twists. The typical use of MCTs is at benchmark points in the K–12 system and also for licensure in an employment field.

In the school context, under the No Child Left Behind guidelines, MCT scores influence decisions at two levels: whether individual students can progress to the next benchmark (including graduation) and whether or not the school is making adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward governmental targets. In the employment context, decisions rest on the competency of a potential employee with regard to "safe" practice, thereby protecting the public from harm in such fields as nail technicians, airline pilots, and school teachers.

Among competencies typically tested are the traditional basic skills (i.e., the 3 R's) as well as specific content deemed critical for the decision point. In school-based MCTs this might include science. In the professions it would include job-related skills. Nail technicians would need to know how to prevent fungus infections, airline pilots how to land the plane, and teachers their content areas and pedagogical techniques. PRAXIS II is an example of an MCT for teachers.

The decision about whether or not a test-taker is minimally competent rests on a cut-off score set by the administering agency that, in theory, is the point that divides the competent from the noncompetent. A particular challenge in the cut score setting (or standard setting) process is finding the score that guards against denying a diploma or license to the competent (false negatives) or permitting graduation or licensure to the incompetent (false positives). The potential error inherent in the judgmental process used to establish cut scores adds to the concerns raised about the accuracy of inferences made.

The national trend toward school accountability caused an upsurge in MCTs, and the global social consequences of K–12 MCT testing are not yet clear. Like all standardized tests, protected and special populations tend to perform worse. Most researchers seek more data on whether or not the population is becoming more literate because of the tests. Some educational agencies are also requiring MCT test data from institutions as a potential measure of effectiveness.

Social consequences of MCTs can be positive or negative, depending on one's sociopolitical stance. One's position on "back to basics" could affect perception of curricular and instructional reform as overly narrow or appropriate. Teachers can become more motivated and/or stressed. Similarly, students' motivation and self-concept can be increased or lowered. The credibility of increased test scores depends on whether or not gains are real or content or cut scores are manipulated. Heightened public awareness of student achievement may rely on invalid inferences that might lead to legislative help or interference.

Recent research has mixed results on MCT effectiveness. In one study, the labeling of low-performing schools caused control strategies that rigidified organizations and only weakly led to instructional reforms but noted that some schools were able to use MCT as a useful mechanism to identify and remediate students having difficulties. One study of 18 states concluded that in all but one state, student learning was indeterminate, remained at the same level it was before the policy was implemented, or actually went down when high-stakes testing policies were instituted. However, another study found that states that attached consequences to the tests had better results.

Judy R. Wilkerson

See also Basic Skills Testing; No Child Left Behind Act

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Minority Group

The term *minority group* has an array of meanings. However, the key element in every definition is the relative lack of power. Traditionally, *minority group* referred to racial and ethnic groups. Anthropologist Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris identified five defining elements of a minority group in 1964:

1. The group is a subordinate segment within a political unit that receives unequal treatment compared to other groups.
2. It has easily identifiable and devalued physical and/or cultural traits.
3. It has a sense of peoplehood and a feeling of self-consciousness.
4. Membership is by descent; one is born into the group.
5. Marriage occurs within the group, by necessity or by choice.

The first element is the most important. A *subordinate segment* simply refers to relative powerlessness or oppression. *Identifiable and devalued traits* refer to things such as skin color, language, or dress. A *sense of peoplehood* means that members of the minority groups are aware that they are part of a separate group. *Membership by descent* means that one is usually born into such a group and the group is like a caste; one cannot easily move out of the group. *Marriage within the group by necessity or choice* reveals much about the notion of minority group. Some groups at some times want and desire only marriage within. At other times, other groups forbid members of the minority group to out-marry. For example, in the United States, African Americans were not allowed to marry whites in many states until 1967, when state laws prohibiting intermarriage were declared unconstitutional.

This classical definition lends itself to the traditional notion of minority groups. Examples of such groups today would be African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans. If we turned the clock back to 1900, many other ethnic groups would be defined as minority groups, including Jewish Americans, Italian Americans, Polish Americans, and others.

A shorter definition of *minority groups* is oppressed ethnic and racial groups. Again, we can see that racial and ethnic groups who are or were lacking in power fit this definition as well.

It should be noted that some social scholars emphasize the first element of the definition alone. Doing so increases the types and numbers of minority groups, for many groups can demonstrate a lack of power, not just racial and ethnic groups. Women certainly can show a lack of power using such measures as income, wealth, education, housing, and political representation. Gays also evidence gaps in many of those areas. Using only the first element of the definition—relative lack of power—many other groups could also qualify as minority groups: college students, left-handed people, the elderly, marijuana smokers, tobacco users, and so on.

Finally, although definitions of *minority group* vary widely, it is important to note that the term *minority* does not refer to numbers. Although minority groups in many countries are in fact smaller in numbers, this is not universally the case. Apartheid South Africa and the former Rhodesia illustrate that the minority group can be most of the population.

John P. Myers

See also Ethnic Group; Power; Race; Racial Profiling; Subcultures

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Miscegenation

Miscegenation refers to the marriage or interbreeding of races, particularly of whites with nonwhites. The Spanish equivalent is *mestizaje,* from which we get

the Spanish term *mestizo*, whose English equivalents, derogatory or otherwise, include terms such as *half-breed, half-caste, mulatto*, or *hybrid*.

When the first recorded interracial marriage in U.S. history between John Rolfe and Pocahantas occurred in Virginia in April 1614, negative ideas about miscegenation had hardly formed. Afterward, opposition against miscegenation involved rejection of intimate relations between groups who were phenotypically different and of the legitimacy of mixed offspring.

Reaching a peak number of 30 in 1913, miscegenation laws then existed in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Their statutes varied, and further confusion arose from the decisions interpreting them, especially in defining races other than white and the impossibility of formulating any general rule with regard to the (il)legitimacy of the progeny from such unions. Penalties for violation of these laws ranged from either imprisonment for a few months to a term of 10 years, or fines ranging from small sums up to $2,000, or both. These laws remained in the books until 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court abolished them.

Although no known scientific method existed for ascertaining the difference between the blood of white and nonwhite people, frequent references in the statutes spoke to persons having varying degrees of "colored" blood. This concept gave U.S. miscegenation its most peculiar characteristic, whereby a white woman could give birth to a black child but a black woman could not give birth to a white child. The terms *hypodescent* or *descending miscegenation* refer to this latter phenomenon. In popular U.S. terminology, this is the "one-drop" rule, which defines persons with even "one drop" of African blood in their veins as "black."

In other countries, opposition to miscegenation was less strong and persistent. In 1514, the initial prohibition in Latin America of marriages between Spaniards and Indians ended, replaced by encouragement of intermarriage in the hope that this would bring Spanish adventurers to settle permanently in the New World. Similarly, miscegenation was commonplace in the Portuguese colonies.

The French recognized interracial marriages in their Caribbean colonies until the early 18th century. However, the famous *Code noir* of 1685 punished concubinage between a white man and an African slave, imposing a fine of 2,000 pounds of sugar if any progeny resulted; if the couple married, the woman was freed and the fine rescinded. Enforcement was lax in the colonies, unlike France itself, which officially prohibited interracial marriages in 1778; the ban ended after the French Revolution of 1789.

In colonial Africa, the French, Italians, Portuguese, and Arabs showed more tolerance toward miscegenation than the British and Germans. In the British Empire, the most widespread miscegenation occurred in South Africa, primarily the result of illicit sexual intercourse, leading to a 1927 law making extramarital relations between Europeans and Africans a punishable offense. In other British colonies, the Crewe Circular of 1909 prohibited cohabitation between government officials and "native" women.

In German Southwest Africa (GSA) in 1905, in German East Africa (GEA) in 1906, and in German Samoa in 1910, the governors enacted regulations against interracial marriages. In 1912, when the Reichstag, or German legislature, became aware of the issue of interracial unions in the colonies, it passed a resolution upholding the legality of the colonial laws.

The Arabs in colonial Africa were the most amenable to interracial marriages and concubinage. Their amenability was ameliorated by Islam, which accepts the equality of races. Equally important, due to the patriarchal nature of Arab culture, children of Arab–African unions were recognized as Arabs regardless of how dark their skin complexion was. Thus in contrast with America's "descending miscegenation," Arab–African miscegenation is "ascending miscegenation" because the offspring assumed the status and identity of their Arab fathers.

Lawrence E. Y. Mbogoni

See also Biracial; Intermarriage; Jim Crow; Race; Racial Formation Theory; Racism

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Misdemeanor

The most common way of classifying crime is by seriousness, or misdemeanor versus felony. Misdemeanor crimes are less serious than felonies. The person who commits a misdemeanor is called a "misdemeanant" and the person who commits a felony is called a "felon." In early English law, felonies were those offenses that could lead to death as punishment and forfeiture of the felon's property. Committing a misdemeanor did not necessarily mean that the crime was a minor one. It simply meant the misdemeanant could not be punished with the death penalty or lose his or her property.

Misdemeanors did not exist in English law until the 16th century, and then they were identified generally as transgressions against the royal peace. In contemporary criminal law, the states' penal codes specifically define each misdemeanor crime. Typically, misdemeanors are lower-grade or -degree offenses in criminal codification and of lesser gravity and seriousness. Usually, misdemeanants are treated more leniently by criminal law than are felons, which means they receive less punishment while felons receive harsher sentences. Punishments for a misdemeanor might be a fine, probation, or a jail sentence of less than a year. Some states define the seriousness of the offense according to the place of punishment, such as prison for felonies and jail for misdemeanors.

Examples of misdemeanors are disorderly conduct, petty theft, prostitution, public intoxication, trespassing, and vandalism. However, the list of misdemeanor crimes is nearly endless. For instance, Texas has 903 misdemeanor crimes listed in its penal code. The distinction between misdemeanor and felony affects a defendant's destiny in the criminal justice system. Usually law enforcement agencies use their discretion to arrest those defendants who have committed serious crimes rather than misdemeanor crimes. Misdemeanors also have a different court level than felonies. Trial courts of limited jurisdiction preside only over cases that involve misdemeanors and lawsuits for small amount of money. According to Bureau of Justice Statistics, 15 percent of convicted defendants in courts of limited jurisdiction are sentenced to incarceration, 50 percent receive probation, and 25 percent are fined.

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution says criminal defendants are entitled to a right to trial by jury. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Lewis v. United States* in 1996 declared that this provision only applies to people accused of serious offenses. People who face less than 6 months in jail for a charge are not entitled to a jury trial and instead go for a bench trial, where the presiding judge determines innocence or guilt and, if the latter, the punishment within the prescribed statutes.

Like all other defendants, misdemeanants also are entitled to have an attorney. In *Argersinger v. Hamlin* (1972), the court required adequate legal representation for anyone, including indigents, facing a jail or prison sentence if convicted.

Mohsen S. Alizadeh

See also Crime; Deviance; Shoplifting; Vandalism

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Missing Children

Missing children are young people whose whereabouts are unknown or who are not where they are supposed to be. There are several types of missing children. The most common categories are children who become lost (these tend to be young children, and most are recovered fairly quickly) and runaways

(usually adolescents who return home after a short absence, although some stay away for prolonged periods). Public concern tends to focus on two less common types of missing children: those abducted by family members (typically this occurs during custody disputes between divorced parents); and those abducted by non-family members (such children may be held for ransom, be sexually abused, and suffer other forms of serious exploitation).

The label "missing children" was promoted during the early 1980s by a social movement that claimed the problem was widespread (at that time, activists estimated that perhaps 2 million children went missing each year in the United States), and that too little was done to recover missing children. In most cases, missing children were reported to local law enforcement agencies that, particularly in the case of adolescents, often presumed that the youths had run away and would return on their own, so that officials might not begin searching for 2 or 3 days; there was no system for notifying law enforcement agencies other than those that took the initial report. Activists pointed to cases of murdered children and children who had permanently disappeared as evidence that more needed to be done to locate missing children. The issue attracted considerable media coverage, and the federal government passed laws, including the Missing Children's Act of 1982 (which authorized the FBI's National Crime Information Center to accept reports of missing children); the Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984 (which led to the establishment of the federally supported National Center for Missing and Exploited Children [NCMEC] that could coordinate search efforts, and which also ordered the government to conduct periodical efforts to measure the number of missing children); and the National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990 (which required law enforcement agencies to report cases to the NCMEC). In response to the publicity about the problem, images of missing children began to appear on milk cartons, shopping bags, and so on.

By the mid-1980s, journalists began questioning some of the movement's statistics. While some kidnapped children certainly were victimized in terrible ways, such cases were less common than activists implied. The *Denver Post* received a Pulitzer Prize for stories arguing that there was a "numbers gap" between the movement's estimates (such as claims that strangers abducted 50,000 children each year) and law enforcement records (the FBI investigated about 75 child kidnappings annually). Grouping various kinds of cases under the single heading of "missing children" had rhetorical advantages: including runaways (who far outnumbered abducted children) allowed activists to argue that hundreds of thousands—perhaps even millions—of children went missing each year; including non-family abductions let them point to frightening examples of child victimization to illustrate the problem. Families who had lost children through family abductions (and who had been frustrated by the reluctance of law enforcement to get involved in those cases) provided much of the movement's leadership.

Partly in response to the debate over the number of missing children, the federal government funded the NISMART (National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children) research. NISMART involved large-scale social scientific research that included surveys of law enforcement and social service agencies, as well as household surveys designed to measure the proportion of households that had experienced a missing child. The first study (NISMART-1) was conducted in 1988; it was followed by NISMART-2 (done in 1999). Because missing children statistics had become controversial, NISMART developed two definitions for most categories of missing children: "broad scope" definitions encompassed all cases counted as missing children (for example, all runaways), while "policy focal" definitions included only the more serious cases (such as runaways who lacked a familiar, secure place to stay for at least one night).

In general, NISMART estimated that most categories of missing children were less common than activists originally had suggested. NISMART-1's estimates for the most serious cases in different categories of missing children were non-family abductions: 200–300 cases per year; family abductions: 163,200; runaways: 133,500; and throwaways (children ordered by their families to leave their homes): 59,200–127,100. NISMART-2 found that the rates for most types of missing children (per 1,000) declined between 1988 and 1999.

This missing children movement did affect public policy. Increased public awareness led to various prevention programs (which tended to focus on the danger of abductions by strangers—a relatively uncommon phenomenon) and also to improved search procedures. The NCMEC became a national clearinghouse for reports of missing children, and several

states required all law enforcement agencies to report all cases to newly established statewide clearinghouses. In addition, the movement called attention to the need for improved social services for long-term runaways, as well as thrownaway children who had been rejected by their families.

While intense concern over missing children abated after the 1980s, the issue sometimes is revived following heavily publicized cases. Thus, during the summer of 2002, reports that an adolescent girl had been abducted from her bedroom one night led to renewed media coverage of the missing children problem, including suggestions that there was a "wave" of child abductions (although the evidence for this was anecdotal). This illustrates how heavily publicized cases can revive interest in a social problem, even if the number of people affected is neither large nor growing.

Joel Best

See also Abuse, Child; Abuse, Child Sexual; Child Neglect; Homelessness, Youth

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Mixed Economy

The term *mixed economy* typically describes an economic system that combines the use of market and command mechanisms to guide economic activity. A mixed economy is typically considered a middle ground—a "third way"—between laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism. Virtually all developed economies, including that of the United States, fall into this category. Most modern manifestations of the mixed economy incorporate varying degrees of private economic activity, such as privately owned enterprises, and state regulation and control of the economy, such as social welfare programs, economic and industrial planning and development, and state ownership of economic enterprises. The modern welfare state is often viewed as a type of mixed economy, one that mitigates the vagaries and inequalities that arise in a free market economy.

In 1949, Sir Richard Stafford Cripps coined the term as a way to describe the British postwar economy. As Britain's chancellor of the exchequer from 1947 to 1950, Sir Cripps advocated and implemented a rigid austerity program to revive Britain's economy. The term countered the perception that some of the elements of the program resembled socialism and communism, which were both seen as anathema in the postwar political environment. Earlier, John Maynard Keynes established the intellectual foundations of the approach in his advocacy of an active role for state intervention in guiding and shaping the economy.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the mixed economy was widely embraced as a strategy for economic policy. Initially, the strategy was legitimized due to the economic success of the countries that adopted the strategy. However, a series of economic crises, starting in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1970s, weakened support for the mixed economy. Since the 1980s, the rise of neoliberal economic policies has led to a greater emphasis on the primacy of the market and a growing aversion to government intervention in the economy. In the United States, this was partly manifested in a drive to divest the government of federal assets, such as the sale of Conrail to private investors in 1987.

The literature on the mixed economy is vast. In economics, the contributions range from arguments defending the mixed economy, such as Japan's active role in industrial policy, to rejections of the "sickness" of the mixed economy. In sociology, a number of recent contributions document the social changes that occurred during the transition of formerly socialist economies to more market-oriented policies. These include the changes that occurred as a result of China's gradual adoption of market policies and the social impacts of the so-called shock treatment policies adopted after the fall of Soviet communism.

Jonathon Mote

See also Socialism

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Modernization Theory

Modernization theory focuses on the development and progress of societies. In its examination of social formations evolving from lower levels of organization and production to higher ones, its essence lies in terms of a process of economic, social, and cultural development and change. Of the two major intertwined aspects of the debate on modernization, the first concerns the theoretical articulation and conceptual framing of progress. Here the major question is whether progress exists in history and, if so, whether it occurs in terms of evolution or revolution or—in the sense that evolution occurs in human history—if it leads to revolution. The second aspect of the debate relates to the relationship of developed countries to developing countries, and whether developing countries must follow the path of developed (Western) countries to achieve wealth and civil liberties.

The theoretical debate on modernization looks back to Max Weber's critique of Karl Marx's theory of history and progress (historical materialism). According to this concept, consciousness does not determine material life, but rather material life determines consciousness. Morality, religion, metaphysics, other ideologies, and forms of consciousness are rooted in the process of material production and in the material relationships of human beings. With the production and alteration of their material conditions (structure), human beings produce and change their mode of thinking (superstructure). Weber attacked this concept of history, particularly in the role of superstructure in social change. He argued that it was not changes in material conditions that prepared the way to capitalism but the Protestant ethic instead. Weber later adopted a broader concept of social change, but his aim remained the same: using ideal types to replace Marx's concept of social formation. Weberian scholars like Talcott Parsons, for example, concentrated on the role of religion in social life (secularization) and whether it is necessary for an integrative social life. Other Weberian scholars also argued against Marx's concept of revolution and socialism.

The second debate centers on the question of developing countries. Modernization theorists (foremost economists) claimed that these countries must change their traditional organization of production, culture, and beliefs to catch up with Western modern societies. Dependency theory arose as a critique of modernization theory. It explained backwardness of and poverty in the developing countries by referring to the world system of capitalism. According to dependency theory, this system creates backwardness and poverty systematically by exploiting these countries and destroying their historical-cultural achievements. Many proponents of dependency theory share some of the basic assumptions of modernization theory, but maintain that the modernization of the developing countries can only occur in a postcapitalist society.

Doğan Göçmen

See also Conflict Perspective; Cultural Imperialism; Postindustrialism; Postmodernism; Social Change; Theory

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Mommy Track

Gender discrimination in the labor market manifests in a variety of forms. For decades, researchers have documented asymmetry in the types of work performed, remuneration for labor, and workplace

climates for men and women. The concept of the *mommy track* emerged in the late 1980s, ostensibly as a solution for the glass ceiling effect that prevented all but a small minority of professional women from achieving high-level managerial positions in the corporate sector. The mommy track would comprise one level of a dual labor market among women and function as a formally institutionalized mechanism to distinguish between "career-primary" and "career-and-family" orientations.

Business analyst Felice Schwartz proposed that aspiring professional women should openly declare to prospective employers their intentions with regard to current or future motherhood. Women who choose the mommy track receive less corporate investment in their training and fewer advancement opportunities in exchange for the freedom of prioritizing child care and the purported distractions it presents for working women. Career-primary women would forgo childbearing and prioritize professional advancement; they could expect corporate recognition of their differential time investments through more challenging work assignments and occupational mobility. Given the empirical reality of sex segregation in the labor market that derives, in part, from the concomitant presumptions that all women will establish families and that women are always primary caretakers, the formalization of choice for women would, ideally, eliminate some level of occupational discrimination.

During the ensuing years, the concept of mommy track changed to refer more generally to *both* women's self-imposed limitations to career mobility that result from interrupted labor force participation for child rearing *and* the continued gender bias against women that frequently restricts their opportunities in the labor market. The recent use of the term *mommy trackers* refers to the increasing number of largely white, middle-class, college-educated women who express the desire to delay or interrupt their careers to raise children.

Critics of the concept of mommy tracking (by choice or default) suggest that highlighting women's family roles obscures the extent to which men simultaneously participate in paid labor and bear family responsibilities and, thus, unfairly penalizes working women. Few suggest a parallel concept of a "daddy track" with any seriousness. Moreover, the mommy track concept presumes that women are unable to compartmentalize paid work and family responsibilities or are less proficient at balancing work and family than men. Finally, organizations that practice mommy tracking do not recognize the centrality of family life to all employees, and the extent to which facilitating work–life balance enhances worker productivity and the quality of work experiences for women and men.

Laura L. O'Toole

See also Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Glass Ceiling; Segregation, Occupational

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MONOPOLIES

Monopolies (from the Greek *monopolion,* "one seller") are markets with a single producer or distributor of a certain product or service. In addition, this exclusivity serves as a barrier to free market entry, product differentiation, and a stable (inelastic) demand for products due to the non-availability of close substitutes. In economics, monopolies are the antithesis of free competition markets with multiple producers or distributors (sellers) of a product or service. Neoclassical and most contemporary economists regard monopolies as secondary, imperfect, and deviant markets in relation to free competition as a primary, perfect, and normal market.

Market monopolies can produce social problems on several interconnected grounds. These grounds are concentration of economic and other power, elimination of equality, inclusion and freedom in economy and society, economic and social inefficiency, and the transformation of economic into political and other domination.

First, market monopolies generate social problems by their concentration and abuse of economic as well as political and other power and domination. Economists measure this concentration by the Lerner (1955) index of the degree of market power (given by the difference between price and marginal costs). The

index is assumed to be the maximum (1) under monopoly and the minimum (0) in free competition. Monopolies can become serious social problems due to their tendency toward abusing such concentration of economic and other power. In short, the concentration of power corrupts and generally makes problematic market monopolies.

Second, market monopolies trigger social problems through elimination or restriction of economic and other equality, inclusion, and freedom. Monopolies reproduce economic and other social stratification through inequality and exclusion based on status, class, and power. In general, market monopolies usually act as the forces of economic and other exclusion, closure, privilege, and un-freedom.

Third, market monopolies breed social problems by their economic and social inefficiency, as reflected and measured by their typically higher prices and lower production and employment in comparison with competitive markets. Adam Smith suggested in 1776 that under market monopolies price is the maximal, while production and consumption are the lowest, as compared with free competition. Like Smith, J. S. Mill concluded in 1884 that, due to their limitation of supply and maximal price, monopolies are so economically inefficient and destructive in that they amount to the taxation of the industrious for the support of indolence, if not of plunder.

Fourth, market monopolies cause social problems in their tendency toward transforming and expanding economic into political and other power. Monopolies seek to dominate not only a certain market and the economy, but also society as a whole, including politics and government. Alternatively, due to their economic power and influence on the government, market monopolies can gain even more monopolistic privileges. Monopolies tend to expand from markets into polity and all society in the form of monopolistic political and social domination (plutocracy and oligarchy). No wonder economist Leon Walras presented in 1936 the image of market monopolies as fortifications spoiling and tyrannizing society as a whole.

Milan Zafirovski

See also Megamergers; Oligarchy

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Moral Entrepreneurs

Moral entrepreneurs are individuals committed to the establishment and enforcement of rules against behavior they define as deviant. As such, they are especially visible and active agents of social control. Howard S. Becker, who coined the term *moral entrepreneurs* and introduced it in his classic 1963 book *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, identified two kinds of moral entrepreneurs: *rule creators,* or those who work to bring about new prohibitions; and *rule enforcers,* or those who work to enforce prohibitions already in place.

Rule creators generally express the conviction that some kind of threatening social evil exists that must be combated. This is most true of "crusading reformers," described by Becker as "the prototype" of rule creators. Having perceived a social evil, crusading reformers take vigorous action against it. They do so by drawing public attention to the behavior they condemn; inciting people to high levels of concern and outrage over it; and convincing legislators that it is necessary to establish rules against it. Examples of rule creators abound. In *Outsiders,* Becker describes those active in the early 20th-century American Prohibition movement as classic examples of moral crusaders. Additional examples can be found in the many activists at work today against drunk driving, tobacco use, other kinds of drug use, abortion, pornography, child abuse, rock and rap music lyrics, environmental damage, cruelty to animals, illegal immigration, and many other behaviors.

If moral crusaders succeed in their efforts to create new rules, further social control of the acts they condemn falls to rule enforcers such as the police. As a group, rule enforcers typically do not exhibit as much moral zeal as rule creators. For them, the enforcement of rules is a job that must be performed day in and day out, and they tend to have less invested in the actual content of the rules. If the rules change, their enforcement efforts change with them. Becker suggests that it is more important to most rule enforcers to receive

respect and cooperation from the people whose behavior they control, and to establish to the public that there is an ongoing need for their efforts. Nonetheless, rule enforcers can demonstrate considerable moral fervor in taking action against certain offenders under certain circumstances.

The sociology of social control seeks to predict and explain the behavior of both rule creators and rule enforcers. Donald Black (1993), a prominent sociologist in the field, sees the creation and application of explicit rules as characteristics of moralism, or the tendency to treat people as enemies. Among the social conditions that he identifies as sources of moralism are status superiority and social remoteness between the agents of social control and the people whose behavior they regulate. Thus, the most likely targets of both rule creators and rule enforcers are those who are socially inferior, culturally different, and personally unknown. It is their behavior that is most likely to seem objectionable and to call forth the strenuous efforts of moral entrepreneurs.

M. P. Baumgartner

See also Deviance; Social Control

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Mortality Rate

Mortality rates provide information about deaths in a population. The most basic measure, crude death rate (CDR), is the number of deaths in a population per 1,000 individuals in that population in a given year. CDR is an inadequate, and sometimes misleading, descriptor of mortality because it obscures populations' age and sex structures. In order to understand who is dying and when, mortality rates need to be broken down into meaningful categories. Age, sex, cause of death, race/ethnicity, social relations, geographical factors, socioeconomic status, and human and environmental hazards can all influence levels of mortality. Due to age-specific patterns of mortality, age-specific and age-standardized rates are crucial to understanding populations' mortality profiles.

A typical age pattern begins with high mortality from birth to age 1, declining mortality from ages 1 to 5, mortality further decreasing from age 6 through late adolescence, and then mortality steadily climbing again through adulthood. This pattern makes the rates important: infant mortality rate (IMR < 1), child mortality rate (CMR 1–5), and 5-year age groups through the rest of the life course. The age pattern described is altered in high AIDS-prevalence populations, with a bump in mortality rates at prime ages (25–50), and a drop before climbing again at older ages.

While age-specific rates mirror CDR's computational structure, decomposing rates by age allows for more specific geographic and group comparisons. Age-standardized rates, on the other hand, compare mortality in one population to another by applying the age structure of Population A to the age-specific mortality rates of Population B, thus making evident where and how the age structure influences the overall level of mortality. Age-specific mortality rates make up one column of a *life table*, a central tool in demography, which allows mortality rates to be translated into a number of other measures, including the probability of surviving a certain age interval and life expectancy. Other important mortality rates include those that highlight specific causes of mortality; for instance, maternal mortality rate (MMR) captures the number of maternal deaths due to childbearing per 100,000 live births.

According to Population Reference Bureau statistics, in more developed countries CDR is 10/1,000, while less developed countries' CDR is 8/1,000. The larger percentage of older people, with a higher risk of dying in a given year, in more developed countries is what increases the CDR in these countries. When it is broken down, however, very different patterns emerge: IMR in more developed countries is 6/1,000, whereas it is 57/1,000 in less developed countries, and life expectancy at birth is 77 and 65, respectively. High HIV/AIDS prevalence leads to high IMR and low life expectancy (e.g., Swaziland: IMR 74/1,000, life expectancy 34 years). Important patterns also emerge when looking at racial/ ethnic and socioeconomic differences within developed country settings, with higher IMR and CMR among minorities and the poor. Such differences provide evidence for looking beyond CDR to mortality rates by age, cause, and sociocultural categories.

Enid Schatz

See also Birth Rate; Demographic Transition Theory; Fertility; Population Growth

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Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is a belief, ideology, movement, or policy that has several interpretations, but essentially advocates the peaceful coexistence of different cultural, ethnic, and/or racial groups within a single society interacting with one another on a mutually respectful, equal basis. Generally, nativists and those favoring assimilation oppose multiculturalism in any form, fearing its threat to national unity. Whereas proponents view multiculturalism as the foundation of a truly democratic society, opponents consider it as quicksand that will swallow up the core culture of the country.

Evolution of the Concept

Although a fairly new term coming into widespread public use in the 1980s, multiculturalism is actually a reformulation of the older concept of *cultural pluralism*, a term coined by Horace Kallen (1882–1974), a philosophy professor and immigrant from Eastern Europe. In the early 20th century, educator John Dewey and social worker Jane Addams both expressed concern about the loss of the cultural values of immigrants through assimilation. Kallen gave formal voice to their advocacy for cultural pluralism (the differences in language, religion, and value orientations) in an essay appearing in the *Nation* in 1915. Not until the early 1970s, though, did the concept gain widespread support, epitomized in the American Jewish Committee's creation of the Institute on Pluralism and Group Identity. This organization held numerous conferences and workshops and published dozens of working papers, articles, and books.

In the 1970s, multiculturalists first advocated adapting school curriculum materials in U.S. history to include the contributions of non-European peoples. In an inevitable progression, next came efforts to reform all curriculum areas, from the early grades through college, as an all-inclusive recognition of U.S. diversity and to inculcate in students a greater awareness and appreciation for the cultural impact of non-European civilizations. The intent of this movement was to advance an expanded American identity that incorporated previously excluded groups into an integral component, both in heritage and in present actuality.

Some multiculturalists subsequently abandoned this integrative approach in favor of the maintenance of separate group identities. In doing so, they not only rejected a common bond of identity among the distinct racial and ethnic groups, but in advocating minority nationalism or separatist pluralism they also rejected compliance with the dominant culture as well. Not surprisingly, this position angered those already suspicious of unassimilated minorities and triggered in many a condemnation of multiculturalism as a threat to societal cohesion.

Types of Multiculturalism

Today, multiculturalists themselves are still not in agreement as to what they are advocating. Generally, they fall into one of three categories.

Generating the most controversy are the *separatists*. They promote maintenance of a separate group identity, resistance to assimilation, and maintenance of their own customs, language, and values. Because first-generation immigrants are commonly visible to the native-born population in appearance (clothing and/or physical features), language (accent and/or limited command of the host country's language), residential clustering, customs, and parallel social institutions (e.g., churches, schools, social clubs, media), societal members often assume that they will remain a persistent subculture. Although most immigrant groups assimilate over two to three generations (race or religion may slow or prevent this process), contemporaries see only the present reality of a non-mainstream group in their midst. If that reality is mislabeled as a separatist threat, it can generate feelings of anti-multiculturalism.

At the other end of the spectrum, closer to the assimilationist view, are the *inclusionists*. Their position—comparable to the 1970s effort to include curriculum material about, by, and of non-European peoples—promotes a common identity but also a pluralist perspective by recognizing not only diversity

within society, but also society's multiethnic, multiracial heritage and ongoing derivative elements. Instead of allegiance to a specific racial and/or ethnic group, the emphasis is on a united cause through a shared identity and appreciation for the intermingling of cultures.

Falling midway between these orientations are the *integrative pluralists.* Using such metaphors as *salad bowl, kaleidoscope,* and *symphony,* these multiculturalists emphasize that the nation's strength lies in its diversity, that the blends and contrasts of its different peoples generate a dynamic synergy in its culture, quality of life, and achievements. This viewpoint suggests that both society and all individuals benefit through cultural enrichment from the presence of diversity. Society can become more cohesive when its members find common superordinate goals without insisting on a loss of racial or ethnic identity.

Opponents of Multiculturalism

Those against multiculturalism usually express concern about one or more of its aspects: immigration, language, culture, and race.

Immigration. Large-scale immigration fuels the debate over multiculturalism perhaps more than any other element. The presence of newcomers dissimilar from the native population typically generates negative reactions that can range from suspicion and anxiety to outright hostility. Prompting this response might be resentment against the changing nature of society, fears about economic competition (jobs, wages), or increased social welfare costs borne by taxpayers.

Language. Newcomers normally speak their own language with compatriots and only slowly acquire mastery of the new language. In the United States, where most native-born Americans are monolingual, the presence of so many individuals with limited English proficiency—compounded by bilingual education and signs—raises the ire of many who insist on rapid assimilation. A good example is passage by 30 states of official English laws to reduce the language aspect of multiculturalism.

Culture. When people assume the homogeneity of their culture (even though most societies have heterogeneous subcultures), they have a sense of a national identity, a feeling that they share with their fellow citizens a commonality of values and practices. If too many others speak a different language, hold beliefs unlike theirs, and do not identify with or participate in mainstream social institutions, the native population fears a loss of social cohesion and national identity.

Race. Most difficult to overcome of all objections to multiculturalism is a growing presence of racial minorities, especially if it is a significant demographic change or occurs in a previously homogeneous region. Except for extremist group members, few talk openly about race in their opposition to multiculturalism. Yet racial bias is often a prime factor. Whether subtle or overt, peaceful or violent, racial animosities are another manifestation of opposition to multiculturalism.

The International Scene

Switzerland, never ethnically homogeneous, has long been the prototype of a multicultural nation. It has four official languages (German, French, Italian, and Rumantsch), is home to multiple religions, has a 20 percent foreign-born population, and its Cantons (cities) have substantial autonomy. Although all ethnic groups live a peaceful coexistence, in reality they lead parallel, separate lives, not ones within a fully integrated society. Its German majority (64 percent of the population) lives mostly in the northern and central regions; its dominant French minority (20 percent) are mostly in the western region; its Italian minority (7 percent) reside mostly in the southern region; and those speaking Rumantsch (less than 1 percent) live mostly in the southeastern region. English is the unofficial fifth language, both in the corporate world and in popular culture.

Recognizing the linguistic and cultural diversity among their indigenous, immigrant, and immigrant-descendant populations, both Canada in 1971 and Australia in 1973—two major immigrant-receiving nations—adopted multiculturalism as official national policy. Today both countries have the most fully evolved implementation of multicultural policies, but they also have numerous critics and organized opposition, leading both countries to temper their policies somewhat. For example, Quebec now uses the term *intercultural* instead of *multicultural,* and the Australian government in 2007 renamed its Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.

With low birth rates and a growing labor shortage, most European countries sought foreign workers to meet their economic needs. Creation of the European Union (EU)—and the free movement of its citizens to live, travel, and work anywhere within its confines—led to its rapid adoption by most member states. However, a growing concern about unassimilated immigrant communities, particularly Islamic, led to reversals in official endorsement of multiculturalism. Denmark and the Netherlands recently returned to an official policy of monoculturalism (preservation of the native culture and exclusion of foreign influences). Other countries—notably France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—have been considering similar reversals.

Elsewhere in the world, India—with its numerous ethnic groups descended from several ancient racial stocks—is one of the world's most culturally, linguistically, racially, and religiously diverse countries. A democratic republic, its strong central government endorses a pluralist history, not a shared one, and its constitution officially recognizes 18 languages. Japan and South Korea are among the world's most ethnically homogeneous countries, while others, such as China and Malaysia, are culturally diverse but their governments are striving to become monocultural nations.

Vincent N. Parrillo

See also Assimilation; Bilingual Education; Cultural Diffusion; Cultural Imperialism; Cultural Relativism; Culture Wars; English as a Second Language; English-Only Movement; Ethnocentrism; Identity Politics; Nativism; Pluralism; Racism

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Multinational Corporations

One of the most important phenomena of the latter half of the 20th century in international business was the emergence of the multinational corporation (MNC). The many different definitions of MNCs usually rest on one of the following common characteristics: (a) company headquarters far removed from the country where the activity occurs, (b) foreign sales representing a high proportion of total sales, and (c) stock ownership and management that are multinational in character. Perhaps the most common definition of a MNC, however, is that it is a company that manages and controls facilities in at least two countries.

MNCs diversify their operations along vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate lines within the host and home countries. Vertically integrated MNCs produce intermediate goods in a subsidiary that are later used for the production of final goods in other countries. For example, the General Motors plant in Tonawanda, New York, produces engines to supply GM auto plants worldwide. Horizontally integrated MNCs produce basically the same or similar goods in several countries. One example is the auto manufacturer Toyota, which produces automobiles in both Japan and the United States. Conglomerated MNCs produce different or even totally unrelated goods in various countries. For example, in the 1980s the U.S. oil company ExxonMobil acquired a foreign copper-mining subsidiary in Chile in response to anticipated declines of future investment opportunities in oil and gas.

From the Past to the Present

The phenomenon of MNCs is not new, instead tracing back to the late 18th century when firms like the British, Dutch, and French East Indian companies sought raw materials overseas. The modern-day counterparts of these raw material–seeking firms are the multinational oil and mining companies, as recent advances in transportation and communications technology increased the feasibility of global production, enabling MNCs to grow rapidly over the past 60 years.

Direct foreign investment usually allows the formation of MNCs, although their existence does not necessarily reflect a net capital flow from one country to another. MNCs can raise money for the expansion of their subsidiaries in the host country rather than in the home country. Furthermore, a good deal of

two-way foreign direct investment occurs among industrial countries: U.S. firms expand their European subsidiaries and at the same time European firms expand their U.S. subsidiaries.

Among the major factors that influence firms' decisions to go global are (a) appropriation of raw materials, (b) reduction in costs, mainly labor costs, (c) search for new markets and consequently for demand, (d) circumventing trade restrictions such as import tariff barriers, and (e) taking advantage of government policies offered by the host country, particularly relatively lower taxes.

The three largest MNCs worldwide in 2006 were ExxonMobil, with headquarters in the United States and revenue of $339.9 billion; Wal-Mart, with headquarters in the United States and revenue of $315.6 billion; and Royal Dutch Shell, with headquarters in the Netherlands and revenue of $306.7 billion.

Impact of Multinational Corporations

MNCs can create several problems in the home country. Among these the most important are reduction in potential production and employment; transfer of technology to other nations, which might undermine the current and future technological superiority of the home nation; and reduction of potential tax revenue of the home country.

MNCs can positively affect the host country by increasing production and employment (number of employees and skills), and promoting technical progress. However, MNCs often come under attack in the host country for several reasons, one of which is loss of national sovereignty. MNCs may dominate the economies of the host countries and consequently influence political decisions. For example, MNCs may resist government attempts to redistribute national income through taxation. One example of political influence is in the case of Chile. When Salvatore Allende, the president of Chile, was in the process of winning the presidency, U.S. businesses opposed him, fearing that his government would expropriate their Chilean operations. Specifically, International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) tried to prevent his election and subsequently attempted to foment civil disturbances that would lead to his fall from power. Another example is the case of United Brands (now Chiquita, producing mainly bananas), which in 1974 paid a $1.5 million bribe to the president of Honduras in return for an export tax reduction. When the bribe was discovered, the president was removed from office.

A second criticism is MNC utilization of inappropriate technologies. In many developing countries, MNCs use capital intensive production techniques that are inappropriate for labor abundant nations, where they would increase unemployment. In addition, the technology transfer usually has very limited linkages with the other sectors of the host country and consequently "the spillover effects" are very limited.

A third criticism is MNC exploitation of domestic resources. MNCs use minerals, raw materials, unskilled labor, and entrepreneurial talent acquired from the host country for production. They obtain these resources at a very low price, which results in high profits for the multinational firm, profits usually not reinvested in the host country or shared with the country yielding its natural resources and human capital.

Regulation of Multinational Corporations

In order to mitigate the harmful effect of MNCs and increase the possible benefits in the host country, several nations have attempted to regulate their conduct. Some developing nations now allow only joint ventures (i.e., local equity participation and set rules for the transfer of technology and the training of domestic labor); impose limits on the use of imported inputs and the remission of profits; set environmental regulations; and so on. In addition, the EU (European Union), OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), UN (United Nations), WTO (World Trade Organization), and UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) elaborated codes of conduct for MNCs.

Increasing evidence indicates that some MNCs engage in illegal activities, such as using child labor, discriminating against women, and suppressing trade unions. However, the governments in developing countries are often unable or unwilling to prosecute these violations because they are desperate to promote exports and attract investors. Rendering MNCs accountable for abusive conduct constitutes a major world order challenge, particularly because the codes of conduct provided by international organizations are still on a voluntary basis. While there are no magic bullets here, naming and shaming coupled with consumer boycott can at times produce the desired effect.

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See also Capital Flight; Global Economy; Globalization; World-Systems Analysis

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Multiracial Identity

Census 2000 identified 6.8 million Americans, or 2.4 percent of the total U.S. population, as multiracial. Of these, 93.3 percent identified with two races, 6 percent identified with three races, and 0.6 percent identified with four races. Though not the first time the U.S. Census Bureau counted multiracial individuals, Census 2000 did mark the first time individuals were able to check all races that apply on their census forms. The primary intellectual debate about multiracial identity focuses on whether such an identity is needed to give individuals of mixed racial descent greater latitude to express who they are or whether the proliferation of multiracial identities supports the status quo by subdividing traditional racial communities.

Notably, both sides of this debate agree that race is a social construct. Although commonly thought of as a biological attribute, race actually has no gene to explain its existence. Rather, racial designations result from a complex interplay between individuals' phenotypical characteristics, social labeling and definition, culture, and individual identity. Furthermore, biologists find as much variation within racial groups as between groups on skin color and other biological characteristics typically associated with race.

Historically speaking, race relations had less to do with skin color than patterns of domination and control among groups in society. Various mechanisms reinforce the social construction of racial groups over time and to such an extent that racial categories seem legitimate and natural and are taken for granted. For example, the rule of hypodescent enables white Americans to circumscribe membership in their racial group and perpetuate their privilege by dictating that one drop of black blood (i.e., having any black ancestors) made one black. The rule of hypodescent also applied to mulattos, persons of mixed white and black parentage. Mulattos historically enjoyed higher social status than blacks, but lower than whites, giving rise to a structure of unequal privilege in black communities.

The Census Bureau itself gave legitimacy to the concept of race and hypodescent by identifying and sorting Americans into mutually exclusive groups. The Census Bureau also identifies Americans based on Hispanic origin. Hispanics (or Latinos), sometimes thought of as comprising a "brown" race, actually can be of any race, and their designation is that of an ethnic group, due to their cultural heritage.

A long history of writing, scholarly and otherwise, established a "marginal man" notion of multiracial individuals who did not fit neatly into the Census Bureau's mutually exclusive racial categories, or into the worlds of either parent. Despite traditional pressure on people to identify with one (and only one) race, these individuals often were unable to do so. Prior to the post–World War II civil rights movement, exclusive racial categories enforced white privilege vis-à-vis other groups, serving as the basis for prejudice and discrimination. In more recent times, exclusive racial designations served as the basis for civil rights monitoring and group solidarity.

Despite change in the use of racial categories, failure to fit neatly into one of these categories due to multiracial identity continued as a personal problem. However, recent scholarship supports multiracial persons, maintaining that they are not inherently different from monoracial persons and even have the advantage of multiple social perspectives. The essence of acceptance of one's social identity is public acknowledgment of that multiracial heritage as a source of pride and character. Multiracial identity also allows an individual to include (or exclude) any ancestral group's heritage in defining oneself, and allows for an identity that may be different from other family members. This identity may also change over time, finding different expression in different social situations. What remains important in all instances is the right to self-define race rather than having race imposed externally by society.

The issue of multiracial identity will undoubtedly become more poignant with the passage of time as the

U.S. multiracial population grows. Many trace the modern origin of the U.S. multiracial population to the civil rights movement and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Loving v. Virginia* in 1967 that declared unconstitutional state miscegenation laws that prohibited interracial marriage. Since then, the multiracial population has grown alongside an ever increasing number of interracial unions.

Also growing has been an intensification of concern for what multiracial identity means on a personal, social, and political level. This concern inspired the multiracial movement, which transformed the personal problems of self-esteem and identity for interracial couples and their children into a public issue over race and its meaning. In its current form, the multiracial movement is an organized effort to deconstruct race. Pressure arising from the multiracial movement resulted in the Census Bureau acknowledging the modern complexity of race by allowing individuals to check boxes on census forms that represent their entire heritage. With the prospect of an almost unlimited number of possible racial combinations, and the accompanying analytical complexity, some scholars and activists suggest that race will eventually cease to exist as a viable construct.

The multiracial movement also spurred a countermovement that believes that acknowledging multiracial identity in census data and other public forums only reinforces the hierarchical racial structure of U.S. society and undermines efforts for civil rights monitoring. This countermovement worries that nonwhite communities will be divided by a host of new mulatto-like racial identities and confuse who is and who is not a member of a minority group.

Nevertheless, sociological deconstruction of race still leaves room for examining real inequalities between groups related to culture, politics, and economics. Uncertainty remains about what the next stage of debate regarding multiracial identity will be and whether that dialogue will result in further refinement of socially constructed racial categories or an intellectual discussion of "race" as it was once conceived.

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See also Biracial; Countermovements; One-Drop Rule; Race; Racial Formation Theory

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Murder

Generally defined, *murder* is the unlawful killing of one human being by another. Although precise legal definitions may vary somewhat across jurisdictions, murders are usually classified into two categories: first-degree murder and second-degree murder. First-degree murder is unlawful killing involving malice aforethought (i.e., intent to kill) and premeditation. Killings also may be classified as murder in the first degree if they occur during the commission of another felony (e.g., a robbery or burglary). Second-degree murder involves malice aforethought but lacks premeditation or other aggravating circumstance (such as killing in the act of another felony). Murder is a subcategory of a broader umbrella term, *homicide,* which also includes manslaughter (killings lacking malice and premeditation) and killings that are considered excusable (i.e., accidental) or justifiable (e.g., police killing of a suspect who threatens life of the officer or another citizen).

Murder is generally considered to be the most reliably reported and recorded serious crime. Thus, it often serves as a barometer for the broader crime problem in the United States. For example, a modest spike in murder during the mid-1980s to early 1990s received a great deal of public attention and led many citizens to believe that the crime problem was progressively worsening. In reality, most types of serious crime had been in fairly steady decline since the 1970s.

Although a large share of murders have fairly mundane origins—resulting from arguments between acquaintances or family members—the frequent depiction in popular culture of rare but sensational murders has created a mystique and aura around murder that many people find intriguing.

Like many social problems, murder is not randomly dispersed in the population. Rather, specific demographic, social, and geographic patterns exist that have remained fairly consistent over time. For example, murder rates tend to be higher in larger cities and in places characterized by high rates of concentrated disadvantage (e.g., poverty, unemployment, school dropout, racial segregation). Murder offending and

victimization rates also are several times greater for males than for females, for African Americans than for whites, and for young adults (e.g., ages 18–34) than for older adults (e.g., 55+). In addition, murder has shown a long-term regional pattern with higher rates occurring in the southern parts of the United States. The majority of murders occurring in the United States are committed with handguns or other firearms.

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See also Lynching; Serial Murder; Vigilantism; Violent Crime

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N

National Crime Victimization Survey

Developed to measure victimizations that were both reported and not reported to police, the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) began in 1972 and has been conducted annually since that time. Sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, it relies on a national probability sample of about 50,000 noninstitutional household addresses, which results in a sample of approximately 100,000 individuals ages 12 and over. Respondents remain in the sample for a total of seven interviews, once every 6 months, over a 3-year period. The response rate for the NCVS is generally around 95 percent.

The screening questions used by the NCVS are behaviorally specific and avoid technical and legal terms such as *robbery* and *aggravated assault*. For example, instead of asking respondents if they have experienced an aggravated assault in the past 6 months, the questions ask whether the respondents have been attacked or threatened with any weapon; attacked with anything like a baseball bat, frying pan, scissors, or stick; attacked by something thrown, such as a rock or bottle; or attacked by any grabbing, punching, or choking, and so forth. The NCVS categorizes victimizations into both personal and property types and includes the violent crimes of rape and sexual assault, robbery, and simple and aggravated assault and the theft-related crimes of purse snatching and pocket picking, burglary, personal theft, and motor vehicle theft. The NCVS does not measure commercial crimes (e.g., robberies in stores) or homicide.

Victims uniquely describe each incident, giving information about (a) the date, time, and location of the incident; (b) the relationship between the victim and the offender(s); (c) characteristics of the offender, including gender, age, race/ethnicity, perceptions of drug and alcohol usage, and weapon use by the offender; (d) self-protective actions taken by the victim during an incident and the consequences of those actions; (e) consequences of the victimization, including injuries and medical care utilization and property loss; (f) whether the crime was reported to police and the reasons for reporting or not reporting; and (g) other consequences such as time lost from work and medical expenses.

Estimates of victimization from the NCVS are consistently higher than the U.S. Justice Department's other source of data, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The UCR, and its new program, called the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), both rely on victimizations reported to local law enforcement agencies, which are then reported to the FBI. The intent of these data is to provide criminal justice statistics for law enforcement administration and management. The NCVS, on the other hand, seeks to uncover the true magnitude of crime, including both victimizations that were reported and not reported to police. As such, the NCVS remains the primary source of information on the characteristics of criminal victimization from the victim's perspective and on the number and types of crimes not reported to police.

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See also Crime; Crime Rates; Property Crime; Uniform Crime Report; Violent Crime

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Nation Building

Nation building is a term used in conflict resolution to explain the actions of the international community in postwar societies. In this context, the term refers either to a preventive measure to avoid the breakup and social fragmentation of the state or to an element of post-conflict peace-building strategies.

Sociologists view nation building as a distinct process but one closely linked to state building. Nation building in this sense is one of the most common processes of collective identity creation. Its intention is to legitimize a constructed state authority within a given territory. The nation is defined as a community of individuals who share common values, language, and/or customs and may become aware of the need for political sovereignty.

From this perspective, the two key elements of nation building include a unifying ideology and an integration of society. *Unifying ideology* refers to the existence of some variation of "nationalism," the function of which is to legitimize policies of nation building as well as to mobilize socially for its end. *Integration of society* entails the incorporation of different groups into a common society. Close communication among the groups is essential for a successful outcome of nation building. The key pillars of the integration process involve development of national communication, media, and education in order to establish a national political and cultural dialogue.

In contrast to nation building, the term *state building* refers to the creation of viable political and administrative institutions that enable a political entity, the state, to function efficiently as an independent unit. The key elements of state building include the assertion of monopoly on violence through control of the police and military forces. This is essential for the state's ability to rule over its territory. Finally, state building also entails the creation of an effective fiscal system as a basis for the establishment of a functioning legal and administrative system.

In cases where the society is integrated and a "nationalist" ideology is present, state building becomes a political expression of that society's will to act independently in the pursuit of its interests. Recent experiences of international nation building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq indicate, however, that the creation of state institutions is the least complex part of nation building, while ideological legitimacy and social integration present difficult challenges for outside actors.

Roland Kostic

See also Conflict Resolution; Democracy; Human Rights; Peacekeeping; Police; War

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Native Americans, Cultural Degradation

Scorn for the Native Americans' ways of life became apparent soon after their first encounters with Europeans. Disparagement of, and disrespect for, tribal cultures continued thereafter and, unfortunately, still continues today. For centuries, much of what people have known about Native Americans has rested on misinformation, stereotypes, and media creations that have led to biased attitudes and negative beliefs. The very term *Indian,* in fact, comes from a misconception.

Prior to the arrival of Europeans, Native Americans had rich cultures and social systems. The Aztec, Arikara,

Anasazi, Clovis, Hidatsa, Hohokam, Inca, Inuit, Mandan, Mayan, Mogollon, Mounds Builders, Oneota, Pueblo, and others developed flourishing cultures long before 1492. Although the many tribes varied significantly in language, clothing and bodily adornment, housing, social organization, and ways of life, they were mostly similar in their belief systems and primary relationships that were built on a clan or friendship system. Despite the cultural diversity among the hundreds of tribes, Europeans essentially saw them as a single entity and denigrated their culture by describing them as "savages," "pagans," or "uncivilized," for the Europeans believed the tribal ways of life to be inferior to their own.

The rich cultures that Europeans and European Americans failed to recognize would disintegrate through disease, conquest, loss of ancestral lands, and subjugation.

Today, as Native Americans struggle to maintain their cultural identity, restore their lost heritage, and improve their quality of life, they still endure stereotypical assaults on their dignity, such as children playing cowboys and Indians (no one plays Asian, Irish, Hispanic, or Mormon, for example), or sports team mascots (such as the Atlanta Braves, Chicago Black Hawks, Cleveland Indians, Kansas City Chiefs, Washington Redskins).

Forced Isolation and Acculturation

Between 1850 and 1880, the U.S. government embarked on a policy of containment, establishing most of the nation's reservations and forcing Native Americans to live on them. Segregated and isolated, the once self-reliant tribes became wards of the government, with bureaucrats responsible for their welfare, issuing them food rations and supervising virtually every aspect of their lives. Forbidden to engage in their own spiritual practices, they instead faced zealous Protestant missionaries who were anxious to convert the Native Americans and were encouraged to do so by the government, which gave them some reservation land on which to build churches and religious schools. Not until the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act restored their freedom of religion could Native Americans publicly return to their ancestors' ways.

White patriarchal assumptions about proper families disrupted families that were matriarchal or egalitarian. Families were not allowed to make decisions or to direct their own lives, as everything became subject to approval by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Policies were designed to weaken or break up families.

Government programs and boarding schools thus attempted to dismantle kinship patterns by taking children from their families and placing them in boarding schools or with white families. These programs also coerced Western ways at reservation schools, forcing acculturation by forbidding historical tribal languages, dress, hairstyles, religion, and culture. Children of different tribes, even warring tribes, were boarded together. When school was not in session, children were often boarded with white families to prevent them from renewing tribal ways. Children were often abused, neglected, and mistreated. While some Indian schools did teach American Indian children some vocational skills such as pencil making, programs encouraged them to move away rather than promote employment opportunities on the reservations. This coercive acculturation led to loss of culture, tradition, and way of life.

Religion

Native American religions do not focus on sin, denial of personal pleasure, or fear of hell to guide them. The Protestant ethic of working and accumulating wealth instead of seeking personal pleasure is missing. Rather, the Native American religions focus on spirituality and spiritual practices. Native Americans generally prefer that strangers not attend spiritual services unless invited, yet many come, take pictures, record, or videotape services without permission. A visitor does not take the Muslim prayer rug home after using it in a mosque, yet many people will take sand paintings, dream-catchers, pipes, or other sacred items from Native American services. Unfortunately, such callous disrespect for Native American culture is a merely a modern manifestation of similar actions in the past.

Christian practices have greatly influenced Native American practices. Flathead and other Plains groups, for example, have incorporated many Christian practices into their own. The sign of the cross, "In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit," is translated as, "L'squest's Le-eu u Sku-se u Sant Spah-pah-paht. Ko-mee e-tse-hyl." Flathead funerals include wakes, and feast days are celebrated.

Like many tribes, the Flathead have combined Christian and quite often Catholic traditions with their own traditions. A few "Blackrobes" (priests) allowed

the Flathead to include some of their own traditions, including peyote and songs, and showed some respect for the Native ways and religion. Catholic hymns, prayers, and rituals were translated into Kalispel dialect, the Salish or Flathead dialect, and others. (The Flathead are also known as the Salish, Bitterroot Salish, and as the Pend d'Oreille or Kalispel.)

The Afterlife

Native Americans send their dead to the next life with rituals and practices that reflect their religious beliefs about death and spiritual afterlife; they view desecration of the dead as a serious and offensive act. They believe that disease and even death can befall those who violate the dead and their resting places.

Archaeologists have for generations been digging up human remains to study what was buried with them to learn about cultures. The tombs of ancient civilizations have yielded great knowledge of their cultures. Reportedly, Thomas Jefferson dug up a burial mound in Virginia in pursuit of similar knowledge. Physical anthropologists have long studied Native American skulls and human bones to learn more about our various indigenous peoples. Following the Civil War, the U.S. Surgeon General ordered Army personnel to obtain Indian skulls for study at the Army Medical Museum in Washington, D.C. The U.S. Army acquired heads from Arapahoe, Cheyenne, and Kiowa killed at the Sand Creek Massacre in Colorado. Many other museums soon made comparable acquisitions.

Only in 1990, with passage of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), were their burial sites protected and a process created for returning their cultural artifacts and human remains. Museums are now slowly returning their inventories of such items, putting an end to what Native Americans considered institutional sacrilege.

The Present Scene

Today, slightly less than half of all Native Americans live on isolated, rural reservations, many with inadequate housing, plumbing, and electricity. However, tribal schools and colleges enable new generations to study their tribal languages and cultures and to acquire traditional skills that would otherwise be lost. Desperate for economic relief, some tribes have forsaken their values about the land to allow nuclear waste storage facilities or strip mining on their reservations. Some tribes are doing well from oil and gambling revenues but have abandoned much of their culture. Is it too late to save the cultures? Should the cultures be saved? These are not idle questions, for they go to the heart of a debate that has continued for generations between those who advocate assimilation and modernization on the one hand, and those who believe Native American culture should be preserved and maintained as a way of life on the other.

Cultural diffusion (the spread of values and practices from one culture to another) is one way at least parts of a culture endure. Many nontribal members hang dream-catchers from their rearview mirrors, give Kachinas to children for toys, use pipes, have "sweats," and engage in traditional rituals in nontraditional ways. By contrast, the "Blackrobes" and other clergy who work with tribal groups adorn the Virgin Mary in traditional Hopi or other tribal garments, promote the "Black Madonna," and hang pipes, beaded items, shawls, and other traditional items in their churches. Many nontribal peoples attend, take part, respect, and become part of traditional American Indian ceremonies.

Some do respect and admire traditions and practices of Native Americans. Yet, others seem inclined to either ignore or suppress the indigenous cultures that outsiders have tried to destroy since they first arrived. Many "Blackrobes" and other clergy do go to great lengths to respect and preserve traditional ways, as do many funeral directors.

After centuries of denigration, exploitation, discrimination, poverty, and despair, some hope exists. Symbolic is the opening of the National Museum of the American Indian in the mall of Washington, D.C., in 2005, an unusual positive happening in Washington for Native Americans. The future is both positive and negative. The economic future for some tribes is greatly improving. For others, the economic picture is quite bleak. Conflicting views about their cultures, languages, and way of life continue.

Gerry Cox and Vincent N. Parrillo

See also Native Americans, Reservation Life

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Native Americans, Reservation Life

During the 18th and 19th centuries, the United States pursued a strategy of ethnic cleansing to force hundreds of linguistically, culturally, and politically distinct indigenous peoples with their own rich histories of alliances, trade, and cultural exchange onto Indian reservations—remote, poor vestiges of their vast former holdings. The prevailing political discourse cast Native Americans as savages standing in the way of progress and the Manifest Destiny of the white race to settle the continent all the way to the Pacific. On the reservations, proud independent peoples were classified as wards of the federal government, denied individual and collective rights, and subjected to a variety of measures designed to destroy their cultures and assimilate them.

A variety of often contradictory policies, administered at first by the Department of War, and later by the Department of the Interior through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, wrought havoc on the lives of Native Americans but failed to achieve the overall aim of assimilation. Resistance was widespread and sustained. Native leaders often turned the tools of the colonizer to their own account in ongoing efforts to define their own futures. Many Native Americans today express pride in being survivors of a disastrous and vast experiment in social engineering, in having retained significant aspects of their cultures, and in their increasing success at asserting control over their own lives.

Indian reservations, including pueblos in the Southwest and *rancherias* in California, occupy 56.2 million acres, or 2.3 percent of the United States, a startling figure compared to the 2.38 billion acres they occupied before contact with Europeans a half-millennium ago. Reservations range in size from the 16-million-acre Navajo Nation that sprawls over parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, to tiny homelands with less than 100 acres. There are nearly 300 in 36 states, with concentrations in the West and Midwest. Some were delineated through treaties with the U.S. government; others were established by Congress or through executive orders.

Maintaining a land base is critical to Native American identity, although today only 34 percent of the 3.1 million Native Americans who identify as members of a specific tribe live on Indian reservations. Nevertheless, reservations are seen as homelands, are the locus for the assertion of tribal sovereignty, and have served as enclaves sustaining kinship relations and preserving and elaborating rich cultures.

Tribal governments exercise inherent, albeit limited, sovereignty and officially enjoy government-to-government relationships with the United States. Although situations vary, tribes generally raise revenues, promulgate and enforce laws, manage natural resources, enter into contracts with private companies, negotiate with state and federal authorities, and administer federal programs including education, health, and welfare.

Nevertheless, life for Native Americans on Indian reservations is fraught with the difficulties associated with limited resources, poor economies, inadequate health care and education, and a legacy of ruinous policies promulgated by a colonial or quasi-colonial regime. Too often, the people themselves are blamed for the problems that continue to beset them. But in virtually every instance of a social problem identified on reservations today, other instances of Native people hard at work, attempting to provide creative, culturally sensitive solutions to problems, exist as well.

Health problems on reservations are especially severe when compared with the rates for the United States as a whole. Native Americans on reservations are 7 times more likely to die from cirrhosis and nearly 4 times more likely to suffer from diabetes. The suicide rate is nearly double the national average, and in some reservations in the Dakotas is 3 to 4 times the rate, with many young people taking their own lives. Deaths from accidents, often related to substance abuse, are 2.5 times the national average for youth ages 15–24.

Federal resources directed toward addressing public health concerns are simply inadequate. The Indian Health Service (IHS), charged with providing health care to an expanding service population, a charge

understood by many Native Americans as a treaty obligation, routinely denies care if it determines that the need is not life threatening. In 2006, IHS determined that its hospitals and clinics were funded at less than 60 percent of parity with the benchmark mainstream health plan. Individual tribes and intertribal organizations like the National Congress of American Indians routinely lobby for increased support, but their efforts are seldom successful. Some tribes, alarmed at the toll taken on their youth, are taking the lead to hold intertribal conferences to develop collective responses to the carnage.

Native Americans on many reservations are tapping into their indigenous knowledge and practices, actively using them to design and deliver mental health services that are otherwise unavailable or culturally inappropriate. They effectively use new knowledge and practices, rooted in tribal traditions, to intervene on behalf of high-risk youth. Also, youth and their families are rediscovering their traditions in a process that branches beyond the field of mental health, spilling over into areas including language preservation and treaty rights.

Education, like health, is shamefully underfunded. Allocations for Bureau of Indian Affairs schools and schools contracted by tribal governments under the Indian Education and Self-Determination Act of 1975, amount to only about half the per pupil rate of nearby public schools. Dropout rates are higher than national averages, as is attainment of higher education. The response by Native Americans on reservations includes development of consortia to study and address the problem, the creation of departments of tribal education to review and enhance curriculum, and sustained, successful efforts to supplement meager federal allocations with soft money from grants.

In the 1970s, Native Americans on several reservations determined that their members needed more access to higher education to secure jobs, to strengthen tribal culture and tradition, and to better serve the people. They organized an effort to establish their own institutions of higher learning, and now there are 32 tribal colleges providing associate's, bachelor's, and some master's degree programs. Native students overwhelmingly emphasize that their motives for seeking higher education are to help their people—a sentiment in keeping with the communal impulse that continues to mark tribal communities in contradistinction to more individualistic U.S. values. Graduates have been very successful at securing employment among their people on reservations. In some instances they have transformed the service delivery sector, effectively changing the composition of the workforce away from non-Native to Native. The old situation, where non-Natives provided necessary services on reservations, is giving way. Now it is not uncommon to find that the preponderance of teachers, nurses, administrators of tribal programs, and counselors in schools are Native American. Vocational and business education provided by those institutions has swollen the ranks of entrepreneurs who provide a wide range of services and employment opportunities. The phenomenon is not yet well studied, but its existence is supported by anecdotal reports, surveys of students, and observations by trained observers. A hope some tribal educators express is that a critical mass of graduates will create a tipping point leading to systemic change.

Living conditions on reservations vary greatly, but privation is widespread. The overall unemployment rate is 49 percent. Jobs that are available often pay poorly, with 32 percent yielding wages below the federal poverty line. Theories advanced to account for the vast disparities in the unemployment rate that exist among reservations—around 20 percent on White Mountain Apache in Arizona, compared with more than 70 percent on Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, for example—tend to focus on variations of dependency theory and resource theory.

In recent years, however, a paradigm focusing on institution building within the context of the policy climate of self-determination ushered in during the mid-1970s, and supported by a large number of case studies, supports the notion that tribes that create strong governments to effectively assert their sovereignty are more successful at sustained economic development. The model stands the conventional wisdom that polity follows economy on its head. The more successful tribes have instituted separation of powers, strengthened their judiciaries, reorganized governance to ensure a cultural match, worked toward transparency and accountability, and made themselves, instead of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the chief decision makers in tribal affairs. Determining what factors move some tribes to take steps to strengthen their institutions of governance, or that keep others from doing so, continues to be an open question, though analysts have advanced theories of action and models of leadership as explanations.

Reservation homelands distinguish Native Americans from other minorities. Their sovereign status and

their special relationship with the U.S. government, which entail a raft of similar problems and opportunities, bring them together in a community of interest that cross-cuts their rich cultural diversity. Tribal leaders are collectively engaged in a battle—in state, regional, and national arenas—to sustain reservations as viable homelands; leaders on the reservations are engaged in the complementary work of cultural recovery and affirmation in a bid to help their people and the future generations. Sensitive, collaborative studies of those phenomena could help infuse the mainstream of discourse.

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See also Culture of Dependency; Ethnic Cleansing; Nation Building; Native Americans, Cultural Degradation

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Nativism

Nativism refers to the beliefs and policies favoring native-born citizens over immigrants. Nativism emerged in dramatic fashion in the mid-19th century as Europeans arrived in large numbers from countries other than Great Britain and the Netherlands. Roman Catholic settlers in general and the Irish in particular were among the first Europeans to be ill treated. Anti-Catholic feeling originated in Europe and was brought by the early Protestant immigrants.

From independence until around 1820, little evidence appeared of the anti-Catholic sentiment of colonial days, but the cry against "popery" grew as Irish immigration increased. Prominent citizens encouraged hatred of these new arrivals. Samuel F. B. Morse, inventor of the telegraph and an accomplished painter, wrote a strongly worded anti-Catholic work in 1834. Many readily believed Morse's warning that the pope planned to move the Vatican to the Mississippi River Valley. This antagonism was not limited to harsh words. From 1834 to 1854, mob violence against Catholics across the country led to death, the burning of a Boston convent, the destruction of a Catholic church and the homes of Catholics, and the use of Marines and state militia to bring peace to U.S. cities as far west as St. Louis.

By the 1850s, nativism became an open political movement pledged to vote only for "native" Americans, to fight Catholicism, and to demand a 21-year naturalization period. Party members were instructed to divulge nothing about their program and to say that they knew nothing about it. As a result, they came to be called the Know-Nothings. They blamed immigrants for virtually any economic, political, social, and political problem. Although the Know-Nothings soon vanished, the anti-alien mentality survived and occasionally became formally organized into such societies as the Ku Klux Klan.

The even more dramatic outbreak of nativism in the 19th century was aimed at the Chinese. If there was still the lingering belief that the United States could quietly and harmoniously accommodate all, debate on the Chinese Exclusion Act would negatively settle the question once and for all. Nativism sentiment continued into the 1900s, targeting Italian and Polish immigrants, Japanese immigrants after Pearl Harbor, Eastern European Jews after World War II, Vietnamese and other South Asian refugees of the 1970s, and the Cuban "Marielito" refugees of the 1980s.

Anti-immigration views and organized movements have continued into the 21st century. Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1996) referred to the continuing immigration as a clash of civilizations that could only be remedied by significantly reducing legal immigration and closing the border to illegal arrivals. Beginning in the 1990s and continuing through the present, recent immigrants and their descendants are stereotyped as responsible for a variety of social problems, such as overcrowded housing, unemployment, crime, overstretched health services, and burdened public schools.

Nativistic sentiments are not unique to the United States. Virtually all nations that have attracted immigrants have, at different historical periods, developed anti-alien sentiments, especially when the immigrants are culturally different from the host society. Concerns about terrorism have added a new nativistic element in countries like England, Spain, and the

United States, which have witnessed high-profile attacks in recent years.

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See also Immigration; Immigration, United States; Migration, Global; Prejudice; Stereotyping; Terrorism; Xenophobia

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Nature–Nurture Debate

The social and behavioral sciences have in recent years played host to what has come to be called the "nature versus nurture debate." This is the question of to what degree our genes ("nature") explain human differences in certain phenotypic variables such as intelligence, personality predispositions, criminal tendencies, and so on, versus the degree to which the social environment ("nurture," which includes many social structural variables such as schooling, one's social class status, one's parent's or parents' social class status, one's family socialization practices, nutrition, peer group influences, and so on) also explain intelligence, personality, and criminal tendencies.

Comprising part of this debate is the question of whether and to what extent there is *interaction* between genes and environment upon intelligence or personality predispositions. This is the issue of whether and to what extent the effect of genes depends upon what social environment(s) the individual is raised in, and also whether the effect of social environment itself depends upon a person's genes. Thus gene–environment interaction would be present if both genes and environment *combine* in particular ways to account for a person's intelligence and/or personality.

The whole issue is a debate, because while some researchers argue that the effect of genes is the greatest (in the neighborhood of 70 percent, if expressed as a percentage, thus leaving only 30 percent to social environment and gene–environment interaction), other researchers argue that the effect of the social environment is the greatest, comprising 50 percent or more of the effect on intelligence and personality. Then there are researchers who argue that gene–environment interaction is the largest component, though they are reluctant to place a percentage estimate on its effects.

The evidence and the methodology of the genetic effect as well as the effect of social environment lead to the conclusions (a) that the effect of genes on intelligence (and personality), though estimated by some researchers in the past to be "high" at around 70 percent, is instead more in the neighborhood of 50 percent, and very possibly less, in the neighborhood of 30 to 40 percent, if appropriate new methodological considerations are introduced; (b) that the effect of the many variables in the social environment (assuming for the moment that gene–environment interaction is zero) is at least 50 percent, and very probably more; and, further, that (c) while gene–environment interaction is no doubt a reality, it is not empirically estimable at the present time. So leaving aside the question of gene–environment interaction, the nature–nurture debate boils down to the question of whether the effects of genes on intelligence and personality predisposition are greater than or approximately equal to the effects of the social environment, or whether the effects of the social environment are greater.

Measurement of Intelligence

To estimate the effects of genes versus social environment upon something like intelligence, intelligence must first be measured accurately—that is, measured with little or no measurement error. Considerable debate exists about this issue—even apart from the question of the relative effect of genes versus social environment. Some researchers argue that intelligence and academic potential are quite accurately measured today, with little measurement error. At the same time, other researchers argue with equal verve that standardized ability tests today are not very accurate or fair measures of intelligence or academic potential of minorities as opposed to whites, of women as opposed to men, and of working-class persons as opposed to upper-middle- and upper-class persons. Both sides note, however, that achievement (specific subject) tests, as opposed to "ability" tests, are somewhat more valid across these groups.

Intelligence is an abstract concept; individuals are presumed to differ or vary from each other. "Intelligence" is itself not directly observable or measurable, but it is inferred to exist, to greater or lesser degrees, from actual results obtained on a test or *indicator,* such as an IQ test or the SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test). Thus "intelligence" (concept) is distinct from "intelligence test" (presumed indicator). The extent to which the indicator accurately measures how individuals differ on the concept is called the *validity* of the indicator or test. If the test lacks validity, then by definition some measurement error exists in the test. For example, what is called the "predictive validity" of a test, such as an IQ test (like the Stanford Binet or the Wechsler test) or the SAT, is the extent to which it predicts some later measured criterion, such as freshman-year college grades earned after taking the test. In other words, does the test do (predict) what it is supposed to? Hence, if for a sample of individuals, the higher one's SAT score and the higher one's freshman grade average (that is, if the test and grades had a high correlation), then the test would by definition have high predictive validity. If one's SAT score bore no such relationship (no correlation) to freshman grades, then the test would have low or no predictive validity.

The *differential predictive validity* of a test is the degree to which it predicts the same or differently, test-to-criterion, for different racial/ethnic groups, different social classes, or the two different genders. Thus if an ability test taken in high school predicts freshman grades in college to the same degree (with the same correlation and/or slope) for whites as for blacks, then the test would be considered to be of equal predictive validity for both racial groups. By definition, the test would then be considered racially *unbiased*—even if whites scored *on the average* higher on the test than blacks—as is the case with the SAT, on which blacks (and Hispanics) score about 100 points less on average than whites (on the 200–800 points scale per section). The lower average score for blacks would then be attributed to two possible causes. First, the genetic (nature) explanation, which states that, assuming the test is not biased, the average difference in test score is due to fewer "intelligence" genes on the part of blacks and Hispanics. (More on this follows, under "Heritability.") Second, the social environmental (nurture) explanation states that, again assuming that the test is not biased, the average black-white (and Hispanic-white) difference in test score occurs because of fewer educational opportunities and more environmental deprivation for blacks and Hispanics, rather than different genes.

But all this assumes zero measurement error; that is, the same predictive validity between racial groups. The fact of the matter is that, as shown in more than 100 studies of differential predictive validity, considerably more studies show different (lower) validities for blacks and Hispanics than for whites. A small number of studies do indeed show the same predictive validities for all three racial groups, but those showing different validities—thus measurement bias (measurement error) in the test—are far more numerous and also more recent. This means that the tests are significantly more biased—with significantly more measurement error—in the case of blacks and Hispanics than in the case of whites. (Asians tend to fall between whites on one hand and blacks and Hispanics on the other on predictive validity, even though Asians score on average higher than whites on the SAT math sections and somewhat lower on the verbal sections.)

The same issue applies to comparisons of females to males and to comparisons across social classes, as upper (or middle) class versus working class. While females and males score on average about the same on the SAT verbal (and writing) sections, men have consistently outperformed women on the mathematics (quantitative) sections. Some argue that this is because of "inherent" (genetic?) intellectual differences between men and women—a position once taken by the president of Harvard University, Lawrence Summers. But the results of quite a few studies on test bias strongly suggest otherwise: differential predictive validity, predicting college grades from SAT math scores, is higher (in correlation) for men than for women. This means that by definition, the test is biased (in the prediction sense) against women. And women tend to get higher grades in the sciences in college than their SATs would predict. In this sense women's grades are *underpredicted.* This finding is buttressed by two kinds of evidence. First, the SAT, as well as intelligence tests, contains a number of sex-typed (thus biased) questions on the word-math problems (questions more relevant to traditional male socialization practices, like calculating the volume of an automobile crankcase, than to traditional female socialization practices, such as calculating the volume of a pot on the stove). Second, evidence, especially recent evidence, shows that overall socialization practices in general differ between boys and girls as children and as teens, thus leading to

different *cultures* for men and women. Thus cultural differences between female and male show up as test bias on tests such as the SAT, as is the case also with racial/ethnic comparisons.

Finally, there is the case of social class differences. In general, the higher one's family (parents') income (and education), then the higher one's test score. *This is a consistent, well-documented, clear relationship found in literally all studies.* This relationship remains the same even when one compares people of different social classes who are of the same race. The richer your parents are, the more likely you are to score on average higher on the SAT (and the ACT as well). The poorer your parents, the lower your test score. In addition, the lower the social class of the test-taker, the less the predictive validity of the SAT test. So the SAT has some class bias in it, just as it has bias on the basis of race and of gender. Two arguments for all this are, first, families of higher social class (higher parental income, education, and occupational status) are more able to give their children better educations, wider experiences, and more cultural advantages, which all translate into higher test scores and also higher predictive validity of the test. Second, families of higher social class are more likely able to foot the bill for a test-taking seminar (such as the well-known Kaplan Seminars or Princeton Review series), which are expensive and currently cost $1,000 or more for one sequence of test prep sessions. Thus, the often heard argument that the lower a person's social class, the less intellectual genetic endowment the person has (the argument advanced a few years back by the best-selling book entitled *The Bell Curve* [1994]) is untenable given the evidence of *both* less test validity for lower-class persons and fewer economic and cultural advantages for them.

Heritability

The question of whether human differences in intelligence and personality are caused more by their genetic differences or by their differences in social environment has been addressed by studies in several behavioral science disciplines using what is called the "heritability coefficient." The heritability coefficient is the proportion of the total differences (total variance) in a phenotype (phenotypic variable) that is causally attributable to genetic factors. Typical phenotypic variables studied are intelligence, personality predispositions like aggressiveness, criminal tendency, and self-reported criminal acts. Equivalently, the proportion of variance in the phenotypic variable is accounted for by genetic similarity between pairs of biological relatives. Consequently, if heritability of a phenotypic variable (say, intelligence) is 70 percent, then, statistically speaking, 70 percent of the differences in intelligence (assuming no measurement error) in that population are due to genetic factors. That would mean that 30 percent of the differences in intelligence would be due to environment and to gene–environment interaction. A 50 percent heritability would mean that the differences in intelligence are equally caused by genetics and by environment (including gene–environment interaction). The heritability estimate applies only to the population studied (e.g., whites) and cannot be generalized to another population (e.g., blacks) or between populations (e.g., comparing blacks to whites), although many researchers throughout history have tried. (Those who have tried, via such faulty between-group comparisons, to say that heritability calculated on whites applies as well to other groups, such as blacks, have been, for example, Sir Francis Galton in the mid-1800s; Sir Cyril Burt in the 1920s through the 1960s; Arthur R. Jensen and Richard Herrnstein in the late 1960s and early 1970s; Charles Murray—focusing on between-class differences—in the 1990s; and J. Phillipe Rushton in the 1990s and since 2000.) The same applies to between-class comparisons and to between-gender comparisons.

How can one estimate heritability on a single population? There are generally two methods. One is to note that as the biological overlap between pairs of relatives is greater, then so is the similarity between them in the phenotype of interest. Thus, identical twins raised together (such twins are by definition exact genetic duplicates, or clones, of each other) are more similar in measured intelligence to each other than are fraternal twins raised together similar to each other. Estimates of heritability based on such comparisons tend to be in the neighborhood of 70 percent for intelligence.

The problem with this method is that as biological overlap between pairs is greater, then so is their intrapair similarity in *social environment.* Identical twins raised together are not only high in genetic similarity, but high in environmental similarity also. Thus genetic causation is confounded with social environmental causation, and the relative effects of the two cannot be viewed separately. A way around this is the second methodology: the study of identical twin pairs

separated early in life and raised in separate environments. If this is true, then any similarity between them in intelligence is due to genes alone, and not social environment, since their environments are separate and uncorrelated. Estimates of the heritability of intelligence (and of certain personality predispositions) using the study of separated identical twins center around 70 percent.

This separated-twins method makes considerable sense and is methodologically sound. The problem with it is that for the actual studies of twins separated at birth because of the early death of a parent, family problems, and so on, some twin pairs are *more separated* than others. Some pairs were indeed separated at birth and raised apart, never meeting prior to being tested for intelligence; they were raised in completely separate families in different towns and attended different schools. Yet other pairs—said by the researchers to be separated—were in fact raised next door to each other, attended the same schools in the same grades, and had other similarities in their familial social class environments. Some were separated considerably after their birth or were reunited for a time after an initial separation. The heritability estimate for these not-so-separated twins is around 80 percent, but the heritability estimate for the remaining *quite separated* twins is around 40 percent—considerably distant from an estimate of 70 percent. In general, *the more separated identical twin pairs are, the less similar they are in such phenotypic variables as intelligence and certain personality predispositions.* This is evidence that, although genes as well as the social environment have strong effects, the effects of the social environment are greater.

In conclusion, while both genetics (nature) and the many variables comprising the social environment (nurture) affect phenotypic variables such as intelligence, personality predispositions, criminality, and others, it appears from the relevant data that the effects of the social environment are somewhat greater than the effect of genetic heritability. This assumes no measurement error for the measurement of intelligence—an implausible assumption, given the evidence of lack of predictive validity, plus evidence of racial, social class, and gender bias in current measures of intelligence and academic ability. The most convincing evidence concerning the genetic heritability of intelligence comes from reanalysis of data gathered on samples of identical twin pairs separated at birth and raised in different environments, showing that some pairs were more separated than others, and further, that the more separated the pairs are, then the less similar they are in intelligence, and thus the less the size of the heritability estimate characterizing them. No recent estimates of the effects of gene–environment interaction are available.

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See also Educational Equity; Genetic Theories; IQ Testing; Standardized Testing

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Neighborhood Watch

The Neighborhood Watch program is a crime prevention effort that has been in existence across the United States for more than 30 years. Founded in 1972 by the National Sheriffs Association, it originally aimed to deter an increasing residential burglary problem that was affecting many towns and cities throughout the United States. The program provides a means for local officials, law enforcement, and citizens to work together, forming community-based partnerships to enhance safety within their community by improving the reporting of suspicious activity in a neighborhood to the proper law enforcement authorities. While citizens are discouraged from actively getting involved in crime fighting activities, they are strongly encouraged to become the eyes and ears of local law enforcement, providing heightened community awareness.

Through the 1960s, U.S. society became more mobile and faster paced, and more and more households had two-income families. This left vast numbers of homes empty during a typical weekday. Further, some suburban neighborhoods of the 1950s began to deteriorate and families began to keep more to themselves, losing some of the familiarity that once existed in neighborhoods. As the suburbs expanded, suburban sprawl forced law enforcement to attempt to cover larger and more developed geographic areas. Law enforcement agencies sought ways to deter burglaries, instituting Neighborhood Watch as a way to train people to be more observant and attentive to the surroundings within which they lived.

In the typical Neighborhood Watch program, the local police department identifies a neighborhood as a geographic area comprised of residents who have something in common, such as the physical location of their homes. Representatives of the police department then reach out to the residents of the identified neighborhood and solicit volunteerism for the purpose of heightening awareness and looking out for each other. As a crime prevention effort, the police train neighborhood residents how to be more aware and observant of their surroundings so as to readily spot suspicious activity and report it to the police. The police department assists the watch group by providing accurate and current data on the criminal activity in and around the neighborhood, distributing anti-crime information to the citizens, and providing training on how to detect and deter crime in a neighborhood.

When initiating a Neighborhood Watch Group, police will typically make contact with a resident and ask that he or she host an informational meeting, inviting surrounding neighbors to listen to a police presentation on the Neighborhood Watch program. Interested residents will then be asked to join in the effort. A block captain is usually chosen from among the volunteers, and a phone or computer chain is set up to help coordinate the movement of information. Through periodic meetings, neighbors get to know each other and what is normal activity in their neighborhood. The neighbors also become more familiar with the police officers who service their neighborhood, greatly enhancing overall communications and providing a means for efficient and effective communication when an increase in crime is detected and/or in times of emergency. As an added deterrent, when a Neighborhood Watch forms, it posts signs advising of the watch throughout the neighborhood, warning potential criminals that the neighborhood is protected by an organized group of citizens who watch out for each other and their property.

As part of the Neighborhood Watch program, residents are asked to participate in Operation Identification. This is another crime prevention effort in which citizens engrave personal identification numbers onto their valuable property to aid in identification and recovery should it be stolen. Other activities that Neighborhood Watch Groups often get involved in include home security surveys, street lighting improvements, safe houses (for children), and hosting of community safety lectures and demonstrations.

The Neighborhood Watch program is effective because the residents of a neighborhood are better equipped than most police officers to notice things that are out of the norm in their neighborhood. The most diligent and dedicated police patrol officer can still spend only a limited amount of time in a particular neighborhood, restricting his or her opportunity to become totally familiar with the comings and goings

of the people who inhabit the area. A resident of a street inevitably spends more time on and around that street of residence. Simply by spending that much time in the street's environment, a resident will be more aware of what belongs and what seems to be out of the ordinary. Even in the busy society within which we presently exist, we still know what our neighbors look like, what type of vehicles they drive, and what type of vehicles their common visitors drive. A car parked legally in front of a neighbor's house might not arouse the suspicion of a passing police car; however, a resident might recognize it as being unfamiliar to that neighbor's house. Passing such information on to the local police ensures that all is safe and secure or perhaps deters the committing of a crime.

Neighborhood Watch programs have proven to instill a greater sense of security in neighborhoods, reduce the fear of crime, and enhance a sense of community in areas where they are used. An effective Neighborhood Watch program can be set up in any neighborhood, regardless of the socioeconomic level of the area, as there is little cost involved to operate a basic program. The biggest resource needed is a number of caring and dedicated citizens willing to get involved in an effort to improve the quality of life within their own neighborhood.

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See also Burglary; Community; Community Crime Control; Property Crime

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Neo-Malthusians

The neo-Malthusian movement is one of the most prolific and fatalistic groups among public intellectuals examining the fate of the environment. This movement's ideology rests on the premise that an out-of-control rate of population growth is one of the single most important factors adversely impacting human deprivation and the Earth's resources. One cannot fully appreciate the intellectual impact of the movement without first situating it within the historical context of ecological and sustainability doctrines.

Historical Context

Neo-Malthusian thinking traces its roots to the ideas of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834). In 1798, Malthus published the first edition of his iconoclastic *Essay on Population,* asserting that population increases in a geometric rate (i.e., 2, 4, 8, etc.) in contrast to the arithmetic rate of food production (i.e., 1, 2, 3, etc.). This observation led him to conclude that, unless some measures of population control take place, humans will suffer hunger, calamities, and deprivation, since they will exhaust the Earth's necessary resources to sustain life. He also asserted that population growth has a positive correlation with the rate of production, adding to further demands for nonrenewable resources. When Malthus wrote his treatise in the 18th century, he was responding to the intellectual optimism of the Enlightenment, particularly the potent influence of the Marquis de Condorcet's *An Essay on the Principle of Population,* as well as the optimistic views of his own father.

Ecological sociology is indebted to Malthus for much of its analysis of the various ways humans impact their own environment. Environmentalists often cite his cautionary pessimism when they analyze the state of the Earth's resources. Demographers are indebted to him for his first examining the social impact of fertility rates and thus justifying the need for a national census to keep track of population movement and growth. His ideas also influenced evolutionist thinking in economics and biology.

Neo-Malthusianism

During the first half of the 20th century, conservationists argued that scarcity of resources and population pressures necessitated the establishment of sanctuaries to preserve ecosystems, thereby influencing the creation of national parks and a federal agency to oversee them. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich published his best-selling book, *The Population Bomb,* and generated one of the most contentious and prolonged debates within the environmental movement. In his

book, this unabashed neo-Malthusian attributed most of the environmental degradation to the ever-increasing population and made several controversial predictions, such as the possibility that millions would face starvation. In a nutshell, Ehrlich's argument was not much different than that of Malthus. He insisted that the Earth's capacity to produce food was reaching its limits; attempts to increase food production would further degrade the environment and in turn cause such problems as plagues and even social upheavals. However, neo-Malthusian critics countered that there were other, more significant causes of degradation, such as technology, in particular nuclear contamination, energy pollutants, and even "the tragedy of the common"—the selfish motivation of individuals to maximize their own utilization of resources, disregarding the common social good—among others.

These and other writings helped institutionalize sustainable development ideas in the policy arena. Just 4 years after Ehrlich's book, the neo-Malthusian argument resurged again, this time with publication of the global think tank Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth.* Yet, the most radical position in the spectrum of the environmental debate was held by a new generation of neo-Malthusians. Far from unified and cohesive, this radical approach draws on several philosophical positions to argue that wilderness preservation must be the cornerstone of any theorizing about contemporary life. The two most prominent groups among radical environmentalists are the advocates of deep ecology and Greenpeace. The latter established its reputation by leading perilous confrontational actions—which they regard as "bearing witness"—to stop what they view as outrageous exploitation of the Earth's natural resources and the human condition by commercial interests.

In general, radical neo-Malthusians exhibit a profound distrust for multinational corporations and their practices; they link environmental degradation to the growth of capitalist development throughout the world. As such, this viewpoint perceives degradation not just as endemic of voluntary human action, but also as a derivative of deterministic advanced capitalist laws. They advocate a reexamination of industrial production practices and a scaling down of consumption patterns. The bulk of their work is in four "campaign" areas: toxic waste, energy, nuclear issues, and ocean and terrestrial ecology.

Development economists caution that a sizable population ultimately increases the poverty rate among developing nations without sufficient productive capacity to absorb the number of newcomers into the labor force. Expenses to support safety net policies such as education and public health can also affect per capita income. However, some skeptics argue that underdevelopment results from inappropriate policies, institutional regimes, and ill-advised interventionist tendencies.

In addition to criticism for its dire predictions, neo-Malthusianism also endures critics from both sides of the political spectrum. Conservatives highlight that many assumptions of the neo-Malthusian models are simply wrong. For instance, they point out that the production of synthetic foods will actually produce an overabundance of staples. The fact that some people remain poor and hungry is not because of the lack of resources but rather because of faulty distribution networks. Critics from the other side knock the neo-Malthusians for their failure to account for class interests. They argue that the benefits of capitalism are unevenly dispersed along class lines, and therefore population is not the problem as much as the amount of political power accrued along class lines to influence policy.

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See also Birth Rate; Demographic Transition Theory; Food Insecurity and Hunger; Population Growth

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Neuroses

Neurosis is a mostly outdated term that has had a number of meanings throughout the history of psychology. Its usage continues today, although more so in everyday language than in academic or clinical language. Coined in 1769 by William Cullen, a physician and professor in Scotland, the term originally referred to any disorder related to the nervous system, including

disorders with elements of anxiety, hypochondriasis, or irritability. The word itself derives from its connection with the nervous system (Greek *neuron* means "nerve," and *osis* indicates a disease). First listed in Cullen's diagnostic guide, *System of Nosology,* the category of "neuroses" consisted of a range of disorders that would now be classified as neurological and psychological, but all with an ultimate physical cause. This was a significant advance, because prior to Cullen's classification, such disorders were thought to be caused by such elusive phenomena as demons or "vapors."

Philippe Pinel started as Cullen's translator but eventually criticized his ideas, defining neuroses as moral disorders as well as physical disorders, and suggesting that moral component warranted psychological treatment. The medical model, however, remained the dominant paradigm of mental illness until the late 1800s. The role of physical causes in mental illnesses took a back seat to psychological causes, and the word *neurosis* no longer signified an organic etiology.

A century after Pinel defined *neurosis,* Sigmund Freud and others used the word to describe mental illnesses with a psychological origin but with no characteristics of psychosis—that is, no disconnect from reality. Freud connected the concepts of psychosexual conflict, defense mechanisms, and the unconscious with neuroses. In 1896, a renowned textbook by Kraepelin explicitly divided disorders into neuroses and psychoses. The neuroses included a range of anxiety disorders, from phobias to obsessions and compulsions. *Neurosis* referred to milder cases, whereas *psychosis* referred to more serious cases more likely to have an organic cause and justify more extreme treatments. At this point, the word *psychosis,* and not *neurosis,* referred to diseases that were related to the nervous system and that had a physical origin—the original meaning of *neurosis*!

In the present day, the word *neurosis,* along with its associated adjective, *neurotic,* is frequently used to describe anxiety-related, dissociative, or somatoform disorders, but clinicians seldom use these terms. Since publication of the third edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (*DSM-III*) in 1980, neuroses have not been listed among diagnosable psychiatric disorders. Instead, most clinicians use a more specific diagnosis, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder or generalized anxiety disorder. Today, the term communicates little clinical information but remains widely used among the general population.

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See also Mental Health; Psychoses

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NIMBYism

NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard) refers to the protectionist attitudes of, and oppositional tactics adopted by, community groups facing an unwelcome development in their neighborhoods. NIMBYism is an acute sociopolitical problem since it typically involves opposition to projects that place most of the burden on those living closest to the site while dispersing benefits to the much wider community (e.g., city, region, or nation). Waste disposal and landfill sites, hazardous waste and nuclear facilities, airports, homeless shelters, low-income housing, prisons, schools, and even convention centers and sporting stadiums all pose NIMBY problems.

In the United States, since the 1970s NIMBY opposition has drastically hampered the siting of many facilities considered important and even necessary to the well-being of the overall polity. Some frustrated observers have developed a series of wry acronyms to classify NIMBY attitudes. These include NOOS (Not On Our Street), BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything), and NIMTOO (Not In My Term Of Office), which reflects the propensity of local politicians to ride NIMBY waves.

The Essence of the NIMBY Problem

The NIMBY problem is inherent in any democracy and especially any form of government that recognizes the right of local residents to have input into decisions that affect them. The central difficulty is that polities that allow local residents to play a significant role in planning decisions regarding their neighborhoods are likely to end up with a dearth of socially needed projects. This is because the benefits of NIMBY projects are usually spread broadly among a large population, while the drawbacks and costs of these projects tend to be focused in concentrated form on the small group who inhabit the host community. The latter are therefore highly motivated to oppose the

project strenuously. However, because the benefits of the project are diffused over the broad community, the beneficiaries are often less vocal than the opposition groups.

One solution to the unequal distribution of costs and benefits that characterize NIMBY problems is to use part of the economic surplus that would result if the project was implemented as compensation for local residents (e.g., providing neighborhood parks, lower local taxes, and other desirable amenities). However, redistributive solutions are hampered by a number of obstacles, including transaction costs. These include difficulties in determining who should represent the local community in compensation negotiations; the prevalence of holdouts because some residents may be opposed to the project under any circumstances; residents' fears of possible risk to their homes and neighborhoods; difficulties in getting accurate information about the project's likely costs; and the uncertainty created by the fact that no democratic government can guarantee that future governments will not reverse a particular program or course of action designed to compensate for, or mitigate the impact of, a NIMBY project.

Of course, not all NIMBY projects are, in fact, desirable to the broader community. Thus NIMBYism can halt projects that should never have been proposed in the first place. It can also result in improvements being made to proposed projects that are eventually built.

NIMBY Opposition

NIMBYism tends to develop in three stages. In Stage 1, word of the project breaks, and opposition, often in fairly visceral form, starts from those living closest to the proposed project. Indeed, one iron law of NIMBYism is that the closer people reside to a proposed project, the more likely they are to oppose it. In Stage 2, the debate moves into a public arena, and the opposition arguments become more reasoned. Stage 3 often consists of a long, drawn-out conflict, which may involve some kind of arbitration. The winner is often the side with the greatest stamina for a long, drawn-out conflict.

Opposition arguments generally focus on two areas: the possible threat to property values, and safety. With respect to the property values, studies show that oppositionists often wrongly perceive a negative impact on the value of their property. Local property values tend to be more closely associated with broader phenomena rather than specific projects. As regards concerns about safety, these vary with the specific group associated with the project. Most likely to trigger alarm are such substance abusers as drug addicts and alcoholics and certain types of ex-convicts. Next would be those with mental disabilities. Other concerns that opponents commonly express about a project's impact on the neighborhood include fears of more traffic and bringing in unkempt-looking people.

The opposition generally uses a range of tactics—letter writing, marches, political lobbying—but their most effective weapon is the zoning hearing. Since NIMBY projects typically involve a land-use variance, there are usually public hearings at which the opposition can gather strength.

Strategies for Overcoming NIMBYism

If the group intent on introducing the project wishes to pursue a conciliatory (nonregulatory-based) strategy, it has several options for attempting to win community-based support. These include education (television, radio, public meetings, mailings, and leafleting campaigns), the creation of community advisory boards, and making concessions. The concessions can include modification of the project's design and the inclusion of programs to benefit the neighborhood. However, voluntary cooperation is unlikely to succeed alone, given the transaction costs discussed earlier.

Regulatory Approaches

As a result, an alternative strategy for those wishing to implement NIMBY projects is to seek regulatory protection, typically from the state, that can bypass local politics and opposition. States have developed a variety of regulations that can be sorted by how hierarchical and interventionist they are. The effectiveness of each of these approaches depends on the context, especially the local political regime, and on the nature of the NIMBY project. For example, a hazardous waste siting will usually be implemented only if there is a highly hierarchical regulatory regime in place. Yet the presence of such a regime does not guarantee success, and indeed the project may fail if it triggers civil disobedience.

Among the least hierarchical regulations are those that are information enhancing and designed to produce a full exchange of data between the parties involved. Among the most important are environmental impact statements (EISs), which show the likely effect of a project on the local physical and natural environment (e.g., population size, traffic, air quality, sewage facilities). The 1969 National Environmental Policy Act requires an EIS under many circumstances, and numerous states have passed analogous legislation. Other information-enhancing regulations are determination of need statements, which obligate a project's developers to demonstrate why the project is needed (at the proposed site). Information-enhancing regulations may ease a project's acceptance by reassuring residents about a project's likely impact. On the other hand, they may hamper a project's acceptance by providing data with which opponents can discredit it.

More hierarchical and interventionist are process-enhancing regulations, which influence the mechanisms by which the parties involved negotiate. Such regulations may call for the creation of specific local committees intended to ensure the representation of parties affected by a proposed facility. Other regulations may stipulate public participation measures, which are designed to allow broad public involvement (e.g., public representatives on siting and oversight boards), and still other regulations may include negotiation and arbitration regulations, which provide a further framework to the negotiations between developers and community representatives (e.g., by specifying the timing of negotiations, by imposing penalties for refusing to negotiate in good faith, and by setting up dispute resolution mechanisms such as binding arbitration). These process-enhancing regulations seek to reduce certain transaction costs (e.g., by specifying who will represent the community). On the other hand, by introducing extra layers into the process, they may slow down and even be detrimental to the project's acceptance. Even with these process-enhancing regulations, the main decision-making authority remains in the hands of the developer and the local negotiating parties.

The most hierarchical category of siting regulations gives the state broad powers to preempt negotiations between developers and the local siting committee or to overturn decisions made at the local level. These measures—administrative controls—substitute state mandates for local decision making. Examples include state overrides, which give a state agency the authority to veto decisions made at the local level; state preemptive authority, whereby specific state agencies may make siting decisions themselves; and state inventories and ownership, whereby state officials may inventory, and even buy, suitable sites and then enter directly into negotiations with potential developers.

Civil Rights Approaches

Another approach taken with some success by supporters of certain NIMBY projects has been to appeal to the civil rights of the project's direct beneficiaries. For example, in 1989 the Illinois legislature obligated every home rule municipality to address the local need for group homes. Broadly helpful here have been the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which broadens the scope of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include the disabled; and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1989, giving the handicapped the protection of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act), which outlaws housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, and national origin. The latter has been interpreted to prohibit discrimination against the developmentally and physically disabled (e.g., recovering alcoholics, the mentally disabled, people with AIDS).

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See also Community; Disability and Disabled; Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Justice; Environmental Racism; Homelessness; Housing; Prison; Resource Mobilization

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No Child Left Behind Act

President George W. Bush signed No Child Left Behind (NCLB) into law on January 8, 2002, declaring a new era in U.S. public education. The legislation enjoyed overwhelming bipartisan support in the post–September 11, 2001, context. Since then, support has eroded and the policy has been criticized on many fronts.

While NCLB is revolutionary in some respects, it also contributes to a long history of attempts to address educational disparities evident in U.S. public schools. These disparities—also referred to as the "achievement gap"—show white and Asian students generally outperforming their African American and Latino/a counterparts and students from wealthier communities outperforming those from poorer ones. The root cause of this "gap" has been variously attributed to poverty, racism, discrimination, inequitable resource distribution, poorly managed schools, unqualified teachers, and low expectations.

NCLB reauthorized and renamed legislation that had been in place since 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson signed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Under ESEA, federal resources were funneled into economically disadvantaged school districts for compensatory educational services. Education was seen as a tool for combating poverty and diminishing institutional barriers.

A fundamental shift in thinking is traceable to a report entitled "A Nation at Risk" issued in 1983 during the Reagan administration. The report alleged that U.S. public schools were tolerating mediocrity and urged states to take action. It shifted the focus from "inputs" (such as resources) and began to focus on "outputs," which placed emphasis on testing to ensure that performance standards were being met. Funding was linked to higher expectations and greater accountability. What followed was a "standards and testing" movement.

President Bush referred to the "soft bigotry of low expectations," and NCLB targeted expectations. The original legislation rested on four major pillars: stronger accountability, more local freedom, proven methods, and choices for parents.

Stronger accountability rests on mandatory testing in reading, math, and science to measure achievement and provide evidence of progress. In addition to these annual measures, NCLB required universal proficiency in reading and math by 2012. Tests would determine whether schools and school districts were making adequate yearly progress (AYP). States must disaggregate their test data and report the progress of subgroups by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status as well as by groups with special needs, including students with disabilities and those with limited English language proficiency. Schools must then demonstrate AYP for each subgroup.

Schools and school districts that do not meet AYP standards for 2 consecutive years are labeled "in need of improvement." For schools so designated, a series of progressive sanctions and remedial remedies are introduced. These include the opportunity to attend another school or to receive supplemental tutoring or remedial educational services. If schools continue to fail, they must take corrective action likely to produce meaningful change, and, finally, if failure is ongoing they must design and implement a restructuring plan.

More local freedom rests on notions of local control and greater flexibility. Maximizing local control is part of a broader Republican agenda to delegate authority for social welfare to state and local governments. Under NCLB, states have flexibility to manage federal funds and to shift funding streams based on program preferences.

Proven methods refer to the idea that programs should be grounded in scientifically based research and reflect best practices. This is part of a much larger public movement known as "evidence-based practice." Considerable controversy exists over what constitutes "best evidence" or proper "science." In addition, this section of NCLB mandates that only highly qualified teachers (HQTs) be hired in core subject areas (reading, math, language arts, English, foreign languages, science, civics and government, economics, history, art, and geography), but it defines *highly qualified* in a prescriptive manner. Critics contest the theory that enhancing teacher credentials results in better teaching, which in turn translates into improved student achievement.

Finally, *choices for parents* are evident in provisions relating to failing schools or those deemed to be persistently dangerous. Parents may choose to send their child to another, higher-performing school, including a charter school. *Charter schools* are public schools that operate independently of local school districts and are supervised by state or state-authorized bodies pursuant to a state statutorily defined performance contract.

Some criticisms of NCLB include fears that high-stakes testing leads to teaching to the test and will result in constricting curriculum to subjects that are the focus of accountability standards; that both the content and quality of state tests are problematic; that motivating schools and districts through threats and punishments is not effective; that measuring schools is being confused with fixing them; that achieving 100 percent proficiency by 2012 is unrealistic; that provisions of NCLB are uniquely problematic for rural districts; and that school choice will actually lead to segregation and stratification of public schools. Critics also charge that NCLB is an unfunded mandate that imposes burdens without providing adequate resources. Others argue that no amount of funding can correct bad policy. There are additional controversial provisions embedded in NCLB—such as those permitting the U.S. military access to student information for recruiting purposes—that have received critical attention.

Interestingly, the Children's Defense Fund (CDF), a long-standing child advocacy organization, used the slogan "Leave No Child Behind" to refer to a comprehensive and progressive legislative agenda for promoting child-friendly policy. The CDF advocates reform that would provide poor and minority children a Healthy Start, Head Start, Fair Start, Safe Start, and Moral Start. The CDF's Leave No Child Behind agenda goes well beyond the limited education policy articulated in the No Child Left Behind Act.

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See also Academic Standards; Charter Schools; Education, Academic Performance; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; Minimum Competency Test; School Dropouts; School Funding; School Vouchers; Standardized Testing

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Nonrenewable Resources

Nonrenewable resources are all those materials and energy sources consumed by our industrial society at a rate that exceeds the rate at which natural processes can renew those resources. This contrasts with renewable resources such as food and timber, which, presumably can be replaced continuously at the same rate as they are used up. Almost exclusively, these nonrenewable resources come from the Earth and from processes that operate within the Earth. Therefore, nonrenewable resources are essentially the same as Earth resources. Included among nonrenewable resources are such things as metallic and nonmetallic minerals, fossil fuels, and clean, fresh water.

Humans have a voracious appetite for every possible resource, but relative demands for any particular resource fluctuate with desire and need. Social, economic, and political factors that are not entirely predictable need to be balanced against our incomplete understanding of Earth processes. Shifts in technology or fads can turn a renewable resource into a nonrenewable resource and vice versa overnight. For example, the use of chromium in the manufacture of automobiles changed drastically as auto makers shifted away from chrome-plated bumpers and trim to painted rubber bumpers and cleaner design.

In any discussion of resources, one fact must be kept clearly in mind: the ultimate resource is energy quality. Of all the things we humans use to maintain our standard of living, all but energy quality are available in essentially infinite amounts. At least some measurable, if minute, quantity of every possible resource exists everywhere. What matters for the ultimate, useful exploitation of natural resources is the distribution concentration and form that those resources take. Finding, concentrating, and refining natural resources requires the expenditure of energy currency—expenditure inevitably accompanied by the conversion of high-quality energy to less useful and lower-quality energy (the second law of thermodynamics—entropy). For example, the gasoline or diesel fuel burned by a tractor or truck is high-quality energy that represents the accumulation of the sun's energy in organic matter and its slow transformation and concentration in the form of fossil fuel. But, once an engine consumes that fuel, it is dissipated as heat that is practically useless as a source of energy to do work. Given a choice, we will always select as a source for any resource those

deposits that are easiest to find, collect, and refine into useful products. It is the fundamental uncertainty about exactly where nonrenewable resources leave off and renewable resources begin that leads to the conflict between those who view resources within a Malthusian perspective of limits to growth and those who hold there is no practical limit to resources exploitation.

Use of Nonrenewable Resources

The production and consumption of most nonrenewable resources is so removed from our daily lives that most people have no idea of what and in what quantities materials are needed to provide our current standard of living. For example, while we might have some idea of how much energy we consume, say in the form of fossil fuels to heat our homes and power our automobiles, we are, for the most part, totally unaware of the energy costs that go into food production, transportation, and so on. The overall per capita consumption of natural gas in the United States is, for example, several times the average per capita consumption used for heating homes. Similarly, huge nonrenewable industries such as the mining of sand and crushed rock aggregate for producing concrete and cement are essentially invisible to the general public.

Extent of Nonrenewable Resources

As stated before, it is possible to find a measurable if minute quantity of any potential material almost anywhere. If you looked hard enough, you could find tiny diamonds blown around by the wind in dust storms or a few atoms of gold in a gallon of sewage. What makes a resource a recoverable resource is its concentration and availability as an ore.

The estimation of the quantity of any given resource is an integral function of modern industry and government, and many authors have taken novel approaches at making such estimates. Perhaps the most soundly based of these approaches was made by Brian J. Skinner in 1980 and 1986.

Skinner systematically examined two aspects of the distribution of metallic elements: their overall abundance and the frequency distribution of ores of various grades (concentration). To understand the overall abundance of metal resources, Skinner looked at data available from the mining industry itself within the context of what geochemists know about the likely overall concentration of those same elements in the Earth's rocks. Skinner based his analyses on the fundamental difference between what he classifies as the "abundant" and "scarce" metallic elements. Abundant elements (such as iron, aluminum, calcium, sodium, etc.) are those that are integral components of the common silicate minerals that make up the majority of Earth's surface rocks. The scarce elements (such as gold, silver, tin, chromium) exist only in minute quantities within most silicate minerals and rocks at concentrations even less than might be expected, given their overall abundance in the Earth. Thus, some fraction of the scarce elements shuffles off by geologic processes over time into local concentrations that we call "ores." The frequency of discovery of ores of different quality for the common elements resembles a single-peaked bell-shaped curve, because the distribution of such elements is more or less a random process. In contrast, the frequency distribution for scarce elements is bimodal—one small peak represents the discovery of an ore, while another low-concentration peak represents the rare substitution of a scarce element for an abundant one in a silicate mineral.

The results of Skinner's analysis have two important implications. First, since he found that nearly all economic dimensions of metal resources correspond to the known crustal abundance of the elements, it appears that humans are near, if not at, the point at which we either know about or have already used up all known nonrenewable resources. Second, the consumption of scarce metals (gold, silver, platinum, chromium) may well be near or at the point where further exploitation may no longer be profitable in energy consumption terms. We have plucked the easy pickings; what is left will cost us dearly.

Continued Availability of Earth Resources

Perhaps no other aspect of nonrenewable resources generates as much controversy as attempts at estimating how long any particular resource will last (and the parallel question of how much it will cost). M. K. Hubbert of the U.S. Geological Survey was among the first scientists, in 1975, to place calendar dates on the peak and ultimate production of specific nonrenewable resources. His approach was deceptively simple. If we know the history of the production of any particular resource, Hubbert reasoned, then that history will

inevitably follow a logistic type progression; that is, production will rise slowly and reach some peak, after which it will gradually decline. The logistic curve is similar to the well-known bell-shaped curve of statistics. Based on the analysis of U.S. and world oil production, for example, Hubbert predicted that U.S. production would peak in about 1975, while world production would peak in about 2005. His predictions were essentially right on the mark.

The accuracy of Hubbert-type predictions has not led to their universal acceptance. In a now-famous incident in the repertoire of environmental folklore, a group of scientists at Stanford University that included the neo-Malthusian Paul Ehrlich accepted a challenge from Julian Simon at the University of Maryland. The challenge was that the cost of a specific list of metal commodities totaling $10,000 in 1980 would fall by 1990. If the value of the list rose, Simon would pay Ehrlich the difference; if it fell, the reverse. The price of the list was less in 1990 than it was in 1980, and Ehrlich sent Simon a check for the difference. This exercise underscored the danger in making too simple an analysis of the future economic behavior of resources.

The availability of a nonrenewable resource is not just a function of a well-defined quantity divided by a well-known rate of consumption. The quantity of a resource is, in fact, a function of the technology that can be applied to its extraction, while the rate of consumption and demand can change with human whims and changing needs. Ultimately, we can be certain that all resources have limits and cannot be exploited endlessly, but we must always keep in mind the limitations on our ability to predict the future.

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See also Ecosystem; Water Organization; Water Resources

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Norms

Descriptive norms are typical patterns of behavior, generally accompanied by the expectation that people will behave according to the pattern. *Injunctive norms* are prescriptive (or proscriptive) rules specifying behavior that persons ought (or ought not) to engage in. Such norms are usually informal, emerging from and operating through everyday social interaction rather than enforced by the criminal justice system or other formal authority.

Most social scientists regard norms as prescriptive or proscriptive rules, but no consensus exists on the precise boundaries of the norm concept. The various definitions of the term imply different theoretical problems and different approaches to measurement. For example, many scholars include pervasive *compliance* as part of the definition of norms, and use observed uniformity in behavior as an empirical measure of norms. By this usage, a behavioral rule that people do not typically obey is not really a norm.

Most scholars also include *enforcement* as part of the definition of norms. This usage presupposes that violating a norm brings punishment (e.g., shaming of someone who behaves indecorously in public) or complying with a norm invites rewards (e.g., praise for someone who contributes generously to a group project). Observed enforcement then serves as an empirical measure of norms. By this usage, a rule that people do not typically enforce is not really a norm.

Still others regard the norm as the prescriptive or proscriptive rule itself; they see both enforcement and compliance as theoretical problems that may or may not be solved in any given case. Groups may fail to enforce norms for a variety of reasons, and thus the norms may fail to regulate behavior. To resolve this problem, *metanorms* may emerge as second-order rules that regulate enforcement of norms.

Prominent rational choice accounts regard norms as collective goods because norms may provide solutions

to problems of selfish or antisocial behavior in groups. In this usage, scholars define norms as promoting behavior that benefits the group and prohibiting behavior that harms the group. Others regard the content of norms as a phenomenon to be explained and identify conditions under which dysfunctional norms may emerge and persist.

There are a variety of accounts for why people comply with norms. It may be that people internalize norms, voluntarily obeying because they believe they ought to do so. It may be that people are motivated to conform to behavior that they see in their peers or that they are motivated to comply with the expectations of their peers. Last, it may be that people comply with norms because they believe that their behavior will be monitored and that sanctions will follow from their behavior, such as ostracism for violating rules of grammar in school.

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See also Cultural Values; Deviance; Illegitimate Opportunity Structures; Rational Choice Theory; Social Constructionist Theory; Social Control; Values

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Nuclear Proliferation

Given the immediate explosive and incendiary force of the atom and the long-term human and environmental consequences from release of radiation, curbing nuclear weapons use has been of special concern since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic energy can serve military purposes (weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] and powering submarines) or peaceful purposes (nuclear power to light the land).

Major multilateral treaties seek to discourage proliferation of the former while facilitating the latter: the 1956 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT); the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (CTBT), not yet in force. Other efforts against proliferation include the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the related initiative of the UN Security Council to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMDs to non-state actors. Particular countries are also subject to current council attention, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, seen as backsliding from the basic nonproliferation instruments. Iraq was subject after 1991 to (apparently successful) efforts to strip it of nuclear weapons (and other WMDs).

The IAEA is part of the United Nations family of organizations and has 143 nation members. Its purpose is to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy to improve health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure, so far as it is able, that its assistance does not serve to further any military purposes. It can apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement or—at the request of a state—to activities in the field of atomic energy.

One strategy to inhibit proliferation, both by aspiring nuclear states (*horizontal proliferation*) and by old ones seeking new weaponry (*vertical proliferation*), is to limit testing. Thus, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water ("Partial Test Ban Treaty") obligated parties to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under their control in the environments listed in the title of the treaty. It also prohibited explosions elsewhere if they cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosions are conducted. China and France were the main holdouts to this treaty. After Australia and New Zealand brought actions against it in the International Court of Justice for testing in the Pacific, France moved its tests underground in the early 1970s, as did most other testing states. The PTBT stipulated that the parties seek to achieve, in the long term, a treaty resulting in the banning of *all* nuclear test explosions. That proved daunting.

Meanwhile, the NPT sought to confront proliferation frontally. The NPT lists several premises in its preamble: the potential devastation of nuclear war, the dangers from proliferation of nuclear weapons, the value of peaceful nuclear technology and of IAEA safeguards, and the desirability of nuclear and other

disarmament. Substantively, the NPT draws a distinction between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. The former—the United States, the USSR (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China—were those openly possessing nuclear weapons technology at the time (not altogether coincidentally, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council); the latter was everybody else. These five countries agreed that they would not distribute nuclear weapons or explosive devices or give the control over such weapons or explosive devices to any other nation. Non-nuclear-weapon states agreed not to seek possession of nuclear weapons and to accept safeguards against diversion of peaceful nuclear energy in agreements to be negotiated with the IAEA. Stopping proliferation is not enough, however. It is necessary to rid humanity of existing stockpiles capable of destroying Earth many times over.

Although 188 states are parties to the NPT, three states known to have nuclear weapons never joined: Israel, India, and Pakistan; the DPRK purported to withdraw in 2003. In 2006, Congress approved an agreement between India and the United States under which the United States would supply material to India for its civilian nuclear facilities and India would open those facilities to IAEA inspection. Proponents regarded the deal as the recognition of reality; it subjected India to essentially the same regime as the nuclear-weapons states under the NPT. Opponents saw it as a breach of U.S. obligations under the NPT and a "reward" to India for proliferating. Meanwhile, Pakistan supplied this technology to others. South Africa, Libya, and Brazil—which probably had nuclear weapons capacity at one point—have all foresworn it and are parties to the NPT, although some doubt Brazil's compliance with IAEA safeguards.

A Review Conference of NPT Parties meets every 5 years and examines the treaty's operation to ensure realization of its purposes. The NPT had an initial life span of 25 years from 1970 to 1995; the 1995 review extended it indefinitely, but not without controversy, given what many saw as the intransigence of the nuclear states in negotiating nuclear disarmament. To secure this extension, four nuclear powers—France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—gave "negative security guarantees," promising not to use nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear state unless that state carried out an attack in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapons state. China made a similar promise, without the exception. The conference in 2000 resulted in an "unequivocal" undertaking by the nuclear powers to pursue disarmament. This brought no concrete results. Indeed, at the 2005 meeting, where participants failed to agree on a final document, some slippage in this commitment was clear. Hopes for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, expressed in 2000, also proved illusory. Some progress did occur, however, in declaring nuclear free zones, such as in the Pacific and Latin America.

Adopted in 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) had 138 ratifications in mid-2007, but it is not yet in force. That requires ratification of the treaty by all 44 states listed in Annex 2 as having nuclear power or research reactors. Thirty-four of them have ratified, but the People's Republic of China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Iran, Israel, Democratic Republic of Korea, Pakistan, and the United States are holdouts. The U.S. Senate's rejection of the treaty in 1999, which some viewed as a death knell, came over arguments that breaches could not be properly verified and that the United States could not continue stewardship over its existing stockpile without some testing. Proponents vigorously denied these arguments. Undaunted by the absence of some Annex 2 powers, a de facto moratorium on testing since the mid-1990s has been broken only by India, Pakistan, and the DPRK.

The PSI was launched by the United States in 2003 and currently involves 15 core countries and another 60 who cooperate on an ad hoc basis. It aims to inhibit transfer of banned weapons and weapons technology—nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological. One offshoot is a set of bilateral ship-boarding agreements between the United States and Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Marshall Islands, and Panama, that among them represent the flags of registration of about 60 percent of ocean freight traffic tonnage. The treaties facilitate searches for WMDs (nuclear, chemical, and biological), their delivery systems, and related materials. Another offshoot of the initiative is UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), aimed at non-state acquisition of WMDs. A Committee of the Council endeavors to enforce the resolution.

The Security Council has also been reacting strongly under Chapter VII of the Charter to proliferation issues involving particular countries. Thus, Security Council Resolution 1718 addresses the situation created by the DPRK's nuclear test of October 9, 2006. The resolution condemns the test and seeks to have North Korea suspend nuclear activities and return to the NPT and IAEA regimes. Security

Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, from 2006 and 2007, pressure Iran to comply completely with the IAEA regime.

While moves such as these act against horizontal proliferation, the failure of the Nuclear Five to negotiate seriously on nuclear disarmament means that vertical proliferation remains relatively unchecked and a double standard applies to haves and have-nots. Critics of the U.S. 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which includes the option of nuclear force in response to the use of WMDs, and of developing British policy debate on how to replace their aging Trident missile system, detect further possibilities of backsliding from the commitment to negotiate an end to vertical proliferation.

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See also Arms Control; Collateral Damage; Terrorism; War; War Crimes

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Nursing Home Care

Nursing homes are facilities that have at least three or more beds at which health care workers (nursing assistants, licensed practical nurses, and registered nurses) regularly provide nursing care services for persons unable to care for themselves due to physical or mental health problems, cognitive impairment, or disabilities. Despite extensive governmental regulation, nursing home care has become a social problem that is often synonymous with elder abuse, neglect, maltreatment, and despair. Many Americans see nursing homes as places of last resort for the unwanted elderly—a place where one goes to die. Recent studies by the Institute of Medicine confirm these categorizations: care deficiencies in nursing homes have caused harm to patients, and the numbers of nursing home staff are often not adequate to provide quality care. However, many older people also receive superior care and benefit from the security and stability that nursing homes provide.

Despite a common belief that most elderly people live in nursing homes, according to the U.S. 2000 census, only about 4.5 percent of those age 65 and older reside there—a decline since 1990, when 5.1 percent of those over 65 lived in nursing homes. The reduction is due, in part, to changes in governmental funding, increased usage of alternatives to nursing homes, such as home health care services, assisted living facilities, family caregiving, adult day care, assistive devices, and an overall decline in disabilities for the elderly. However, the aging of the baby boom generation (those born between 1946 and 1964) will likely result in increased demand for quality nursing home care in the near future. Although a small number of disabled and chronically ill children and adolescents live in nursing homes, most residents are elderly: in 2000, more than 1.5 million nursing home residents were age 65 and over.

The likelihood of living in a nursing home increases with age. According to the U.S. census in 2000, 1.1 percent of the 65–74 age group live in nursing homes, increasing to 4.7 percent of the 75–84 age group, and greater than 18 percent for those 85 years and older. The majority of older nursing home residents are women (around 75 percent) due in part to the longer lives of women and the reality that most female residents of nursing homes are widowed. Elderly women are more likely than elderly men to be isolated, left without a partner caregiver, increasing the risk of nursing home institutionalization. In terms of race and ethnicity, most nursing home residents are white (around 80 percent, according to the U.S. census) followed by African American at around 10 percent, and an additional 3 percent who are Latino/a, American Indian, or Pacific Islander. The difference in proportion to population rates may be due to different cultural beliefs for the aged, resistance to institutionalization of elderly, and greater kinship and support networks among some minority group

members, although nursing home utilization rates for African Americans are increasing and rates for whites are on the decline.

Increasingly, proprietary or for-profit nursing homes are replacing state-funded nursing homes. While the cost of long-term care at nursing homes is high (averaging around $160 per day), older people with the need to be institutionalized tend to have limited health insurance coverage for that purpose. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare provides only limited coverage for long-term nursing home care, skilled facilities, and home health care. Once Medicare benefits are exhausted, many nursing home residents use Medicaid, a needs-based program that varies greatly from state to state. A recent study found that 16 percent of nursing home users began as private payers and then had to convert to Medicaid use once funds were gone. An additional 27 percent were covered by Medicaid upon admission and remained on it throughout their nursing home stay. Medicaid is the largest payer of nursing home care, with costs that totaled about $38 billion in 2005.

Most nursing home residents, particularly the oldest-old (85+), need assistance with multiple activities of daily living (ADLs), such as help with bathing, showering, and dressing, to more intensive services such as assistance with eating meals and toileting. Nursing home residents are often frail and in failing health; some are confused, needing to be fed, many with bladder and bowel incontinence problems that require adult diapers. Only about 11 percent of nursing home residents are able to care for their own basic needs. Compared to the nursing home residents of 30 years ago, today's nursing home patients tend to be sicker and in greater need of intensive services such as intravenous (IV) medications. Nursing home staff members often complain to administrators and researchers that they lack sufficient time to adequately care for the residents, given the high level of patient needs.

One of the main issues identified in nursing home care is the problem of neglect, which is a crisis both of quality of care in terms of meeting mandated governmental standards and quality of life issues for residents. Increased governmental regulation has been a possible solution to the crisis of nursing home care. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 raised the quality of care standards in nursing homes that receive Medicare and Medicaid funds (approximately 76 percent) and provided nursing home residents with a mechanism to ensure protection of their rights. According to the Administration on Aging, nursing homes in every state must provide advocacy for the elderly under the Older Americans Act. Long-term care ombudsmen intercede on behalf of residents' complaints of improper care; elder abuse such as slapping, hitting, or verbal assaults; complaints concerning chemical or physical restraints; withholding of medical care; lack of privacy; and untimely discharge. These ombudsmen handle approximately 260,000 complaints per year. However, many complaints go unreported because nursing home residents and their families fear reprisal from nursing home staff and administrators.

Currently, nursing homes operate under elaborate systems of rules and regulations designed to maintain caregiving standards for the elderly. Nursing homes must collect and report data on use of physical restraints, presence of skin pressure ulcers, patient weights, and other quality assurance measures. While standards have improved quality of care in some states, there is wide variation. Such regulations have also had unintended consequences. Critics charge that the "human element of care" is lost in the paperwork, as the emphasis on federal and state bureaucratic documentation takes nursing time away from the provision of the emotional care that patients need. With positive and negative sanctions for nursing homes determined by the successful completion of paperwork, the completion of the paperwork becomes a goal in and of itself. As a result, nursing home residents suffer when it becomes more important to document care than to actually give it. However, proposals to change the structure of nursing home care, including the paperwork systems, frequently meet with resistance from the nursing home industry.

Although there is no single solution to the problem of poor-quality care in nursing homes, advocates suggest that increasing levels of staffing and raising wages of nursing home workers should be high-priority actions. Because nursing assistants (also called nurses' aides) provide approximately 60 percent of direct nursing home care, their training, retention, experience, and supervision merit our attention. Nursing home workers work for little pay (median wage of $9.86 per hour in 2004) and tend to be disproportionately drawn from lower socioeconomic class backgrounds. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, nursing assistants may or may not be required to have a high school diploma or GED as a condition of employment. Nursing assistants are almost always

women and frequently are racial and ethnic minority group members.

Nursing home care appears to be a contradiction between capitalism and care giving. In some ways, we are getting what we pay for. Changing philosophies concerning the valuation of caring work can improve the problems in nursing home care, as can the willingness to look to other, less institutionalized forms of care delivery. For example, the Eden Alternative committed to decreasing the dehumanization of the elderly gives them the opportunity to care for plants or pets or to assist in childcare, depending on their level of ability.

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See also Abuse, Elderly; Activity Theory; Ageism; Disengagement Theory; Life Expectancy

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O

Obesity

The United States is now the fattest country in the world. In July 2007, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that more than 60 percent of U.S. adults and 25 percent of children were overweight or obese, making obesity one of the major health challenges facing the nation. From a medical perspective, those individuals likely to experience health problems as a direct result of excess weight are considered *overweight. Obese* is the term for individuals who are overweight to the point that their lives will be cut short as a direct result of excessive fat, whereas *morbidly obese* is reserved for those more than 100 pounds overweight or whose body mass index (BMI), a measure of height and weight, exceeds 40.

Over the past several decades, cultural eating patterns changed such that more Americans dine outside of the home more frequently, eating foods containing significantly higher calories, saturated fats, and cholesterol. Americans are quite literally stuffing themselves to death. Somewhat opportunistically, a billion-dollar diet and exercise industry exists to help the obese shed pounds and inches. Because this weight loss is elusive at best and temporary for most, the weight loss industry thrives on repeat business, those searching for the weight loss miracle cure.

Associated with obesity are many health risks, including heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes. Adult onset (Type II) diabetes is increasing at an alarming rate, coinciding with expanding waistlines. In addition to overt health risks, obesity strains the health care system with medical interventions, both surgical and pharmaceutical, at great cost to individuals and insurance companies. Some interventions, such as the weight loss drug Fen-Phen, promised miracles but produced devastating, even deadly outcomes.

In response to the rising tide of obesity, grassroots movements have had some success in reducing Americans' girth. Following a public outcry, many schools have removed candy and soda machines, packaged foods require nutrition labels, exercise facilities are more readily available in workplaces, and many fast food restaurants now offer more health-conscious meal alternatives.

In addition to the health risks linked to obesity, excessive body weight relates to a host of social-psychological problems, ranging from weight discrimination to social isolation and diminished self-esteem. Three areas of research address different aspects of obesity, and excessive weight more generally, as a social and social-psychological problem: the cultural emphasis on thinness, weight discrimination, and self-esteem problems.

Culture of Thinness

A large body of research shows a linkage between the recent increase in eating disorders, especially in girls and young women, and the cultural emphasis on thinness. The desire to achieve the cultural thinness norm, in conjunction with the fear of deviation, leads individuals to strive for thinness, causing an array of devastating eating disorders, including obesity. An individual's deviation from the idealized image of physical thinness may provoke others to judge and condemn individual behavior, resulting in embarrassment,

severe isolation, or alienation. While attempting to adhere to the norm of thinness, many people get caught in a vicious cycle of short-lived weight loss followed by weight gain.

While both men and women are obese, women receive most of the social condemnation of obesity (although rates of eating disorders among men are growing). For this reason, researchers study the media and other cultural products as explanations for the pressures exerted on women. Of particular interest is the representation of women on television, in the movies, and in advertisements. Generally speaking, the size of women in the media has been shrinking as real women have grown heavier. One example of cultural variation over the past 55 years is the White Rock mineral girl, who was 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighed 140 pounds in 1950, while today she is 5 feet 10 inches tall and weighs 110 pounds. Similarly, 1950s actress and sex symbol Marilyn Monroe wore a size 12 dress, while contemporary supermodel Kate Moss is a mere size 4. The White Rock mineral girl and Kate Moss are indicative of a literally shrinking media woman.

By holding up an image of female perfection—such as slenderness, daintiness, or demureness—the media insinuates that women who fall short of that perfection are somehow lacking. Print ads, magazines, television programming, and movies exemplify this, as does merchandising toward females of all ages. The "feminine failing" not only jeopardizes a woman's happiness but also questions her femininity.

Much research on women's obsession with weight assumes that all women and girls are equally affected by the culture of thinness, but some evidence suggests that not all women are affected similarly. Compared to black females, white women are under significantly greater social pressure to be thin, so that the rates of eating disorders are higher among white women than among women of color.

When it comes to obesity specifically, however, the rates are higher among African Americans and other minorities than among whites. A number of factors contribute to the prevalence of obesity among the poor and disenfranchised, including the cost of food, with fast food and fattening snacks being relatively inexpensive while healthier options are more expensive. Additionally, it takes time and resources to maintain a healthy lifestyle.

Weight Discrimination

Not only is flagrant weight discrimination pervasive in many areas of social life, but overweight people comprise one of the few remaining groups still openly ridiculed with little public condemnation for such action. In the past 15 years, numerous lawsuits have attempted to identify obesity as a civil rights issue, citing cases of discriminatory hiring and firing practices, housing violations, and a lack of access to mandatory safety devices and public transit. Some of these challenges have been successful. However, because no federal laws currently prohibit discrimination against the obese, weight-based discrimination continues to flourish.

Economic Discrimination

Perhaps the most widely accepted form of weight-based discrimination comes in the form of workplace prejudice, insensitivity, and inequity. The loss of livelihood may be blatant; examples range from the aerobics teacher fired because she did not meet the "image" of an aerobics instructor to flight attendant applicants not hired because of their size. Less cited is institutional discrimination, flourishing from stereotypes held about obesity as a perceived disability.

Research shows that obese women earn 12 percent less than non-obese women. Obese men do not face the same wage penalty as women but do tend to be underrepresented and paid less than non-obese men in managerial and professional occupations. Estimated time for an overweight person to find a new job is an average of 3 weeks longer than non-obese job seekers.

Health

Discriminatory attitudes among health care professionals may affect clinical judgments and deter obese persons from seeking care. Many health professionals associate obesity with poor hygiene, hostility, and dishonesty, believing that obese patients are lazy and self-indulgent, lacking self-control. These biases negatively impact medical judgments and practices, such that physicians report discussing weight loss programs with obese patients less than half as often as discussing weight loss programs for mildly obese persons. The National Health Interview Survey reports that obesity is associated with decreased preventative

care measures such as breast examinations and gynecological examinations.

Social

Growing research evidence reveals that the obese are more socially isolated than others. For example, both adults and children consistently rank obese children as least likable when compared not only with non-obese children, but also with children with various physical handicaps and disfigurements. This social distancing makes it more difficult for the obese to develop relationships, thus further increasing social isolation and decreasing self-esteem.

Self-Esteem

Repeatedly, physical appearance links integrally to self-esteem, most notably among adolescents but also among the population at large. Sixty percent of adolescents, females in particular, report lower self-worth because of their appearance. As social animals, humans tend to define themselves by the attitudes of, and their interaction with, others. As such, the obese often suffer from lower self-esteem and a negative self-image, creating heightened levels of psychological distress with the result that those who are overweight are at risk not only of a host of physical problems and ailments but also of ridicule, social isolation, and discrimination.

The social pressure on Western females to literally buy into the culture of thinness is overwhelming. Women are constantly vigilant, their self-esteem hanging on the determination of whether adherence to social norms has been satisfied, allowing escape from condemnation. For some, this escape is elusive, causing self-esteem to plummet.

Leslie R. S. Elrod

See also Body Image; Cultural Values; Discrimination; Eating Disorders; Media; Sexualization of Mainstream Media

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Obscenity

The term *obscenity* denotes offensiveness to modesty or decency, typically in terms of human communication about sex or sexuality. As a legal concept, the term long resisted clear definition, especially during a 16-year period between 1957 and 1973 when the U.S. Supreme Court encountered the issue repeatedly. No majority of the High Court, before or since, ever deviated from the view that obscenity, like libelous and seditious expression, had blanket constitutional protection for socially injurious content. Yet, the subjective nature of the concept produced multiple failed attempts by the judiciary to delineate its scope and limits.

In 1957, the Court first engaged in extended analysis of the constitutional status of such communication in companion cases styled *Samuel Roth v. United States* and *David Alberts v. State of California*. The relevant provisions of the U.S. Constitution that the defendants invoked were the freedoms of speech and press imbedded within the First Amendment. Ratified in December 1791, these expressive liberties have remained at the apex of the Bill of Rights ever since, often inspiring momentous confrontations in this country's courtrooms and legislative chambers. Typical adversaries in obscenity cases are government officials seeking to protect the social interest in public morality challenged by an individual, organization, or commercial entity claiming the legal right to convey a message by verbal, printed, or visual means.

Samuel Roth had been convicted of violating a federal statute that criminalized mailing obscene advertisements, which had been seized by U.S. postal inspectors. David Alberts had been convicted under a state law prohibiting similar conduct. A divided

Supreme Court affirmed both convictions. Associate Justice William Brennan observed that the government need not show empirical evidence of harm to society because speech or press that exhibits no redeeming social importance cannot find shelter in the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Brennan relied on the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute to point out that obscenity was synonymous with a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion that goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo Black disagreed. For them, the legality of communication should not pivot on the reaction of the reader or listener. From their perspective, Roth and Alberts were being punished for thoughts provoked in others rather than for overt antisocial conduct.

Over the course of the following decade, as the membership of the Supreme Court underwent only moderate change, arriving at a consensus about the legal standard of obscenity proved elusive. By 1964, for example, Associate Justice Potter Stewart conceded that to him formulating a legal standard that consistently distinguished constitutionally unprotected obscenity from constitutionally protected pornography was an impossible task. Justice Brennan was not so easily deterred. In 1966, a case styled *A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts* elicited a quite different standard than had *Roth* and *Alberts.* Brennan's far more permissive definition stipulated that three elements must coalesce in order for prior criminal convictions to be sustained on appeal. In broad outline, the *Memoirs* standard required proof beyond reasonable doubt that expression alleged to be obscene was (1) wholly devoid of social value; (2) patently offensive to prevailing social sentiment across the country in its description of sex; and (3) thematically focused on salacious depiction of sexual conduct.

By the start of the Supreme Court's 1972 annual term, Chief Justice Warren Burger had replaced Earl Warren and Associate Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan had given way to Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. On June 21, 1973, a pair of cases decided by the narrowest of margins in *Miller v. California* and *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton* heralded a remarkable judicial about-face in the constitutional law of obscenity that has persisted ever since. Miller had been convicted of mailing unsolicited, sexually explicit advertising brochures in violation of a provision of the state criminal code that had incorporated the obscenity standard announced in *Memoirs v. Massachusetts.* Fulton County, Georgia, District Attorney Louis Slaton had sought an injunction against the owners of Paris Adult Theatres to restrain commercial exhibition of two films alleged to be obscene under a state law that tracked the *Roth* standard more closely than *Memoirs.*

Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist sustained enforcement of both the California criminal code provision and the Georgia civil injunction. Their endorsement of what became known as the Miller Test served as a model for subsequent national legislation enacted by Congress and as a minimum standard of the freedom of speech and press in state-by-state legislation as well. Under this so-called Miller Test, the defining characteristics of obscenity are that (a) the average person would find the expression to appeal to prurient interest in sex; (b) the expression is patently offensive in its description or depiction of sexual conduct in light of local community sentiments; and (c) the expression is devoid of serious value on a political, literary, artistic, or scientific basis.

Nine years later, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a unanimous decision in *State of New York v. Paul Ferber.* Ferber owned an adult book store in Manhattan. He had been convicted of violating a 1977 New York statute prohibiting production or dissemination of films or photographs involving children or using children in live sexual performances, even if such expression was legally obscene. While this opinion written by Justice White did not alter the Miller Test for obscenity, it did establish a new category of expression—child pornography—as outside the protection of the First Amendment and a novel rationale for censoring it: the physical and psychological well-being of minors. Then, in 1990, the Supreme Court extended the reach of *Ferber* by rejecting a First Amendment challenge and upholding Ohio legislation that criminalized possession or viewing of child pornography in the home.

With the 1990s advent of electronic communication, the U.S. Congress passed a series of statutes designed to curtail access by minors to sexually explicit material found on the Internet. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 criminalized posting *indecent* content readily accessible to children on the Internet. A unanimous Supreme Court invalidated the CDA in 1997 in *Janet Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.* The

vagueness of the concept of indecency, said the Court, violated the First Amendment due to overly broad government suppression of speech addressed to adults.

The next year, 1998, Congress approved the Child Online Protection Act. Known by the acronym COPA, the statute required that commercial Web sites verify proof of age before granting access to sexually explicit expression defined by law as obscene for minors. Variable obscenity—the principle that expression entitled to First Amendment protection when intended for adults might still be classified as obscene when intended for minors—had received a qualified endorsement in 1968 by a divided Supreme Court in *Ginsberg v. New York*. By June 2004, the judicial reception was less accommodating, as the Supreme Court sustained an injunction against enforcement of COPA previously imposed by a federal district court in 1999. *American Civil Liberties Union v. Attorney General John Ashcroft* ordered the lower court to consider whether ongoing advancements in filtering technology could protect children more effectively and with fewer affronts to the freedom of speech than the criminal sanctions provided by COPA.

Finally, in 2000, Congress enacted the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA). Under provisions that became effective in April 2001, libraries and schools receiving federal technology funding were required to install pornography-blocking software on their computers. The American Library Association (ALA) filed suit in federal court in Pennsylvania, alleging that the statute as written abridged the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Following a trial court decision in favor of the ALA in May 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that result, upholding the law as it applied only to libraries in June 2003. The school provisions of CIPA remained in effect without legal challenge thus far.

Steven H. Hatting

See also Cultural Values; Pornography; Pornography, Child; Pornography and the Internet; Values

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Occupational Safety and Health

Occupational safety and health deals with reducing and eliminating all work safety hazards, including illnesses, diseases, stress, injuries, and repeated trauma. The field of occupational health comprises multiple specialty areas such as statistics, social sciences, health sciences, ergonomics, safety engineering, and biohazard waste and control. Individuals pursuing this career can find employment in private industry, federal and state government, and colleges and universities.

Occupational health specialists seek to understand the injuries and illnesses that occur within the workplace, as well as causative factors associated with the injuries. Such an understanding is a critical step in prevention. Tracing injuries and illnesses back to their underlying causes helps occupational health specialists establish primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention programs to reduce the amount of worker displacement and psychosocial anguish and, therefore, increase productivity.

History of Worksite Health Protection

The Industrial Revolution sparked the need to reform the working environment when the textile industry switched from human and animal power to machines. Machines allowed textiles to be produced at a rate

much faster than before. The machines used by the textile industry had a tremendous impact on production, and soon machines and technology became the cornerstone of the U.S. workforce. The benefits of using machines and alternate forms of technology are well known (i.e., increased production), but not many people examined the negative side effects of machinery and the use of technology on workers' health. Even today, we still struggle to understand how machines, chemicals, and working environment affect workers' bodies.

From 1850 to the 1900s, Lemuel Shattuck prompted a period of organization and reorganization of legislation to promote health. His 1850 report to the Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts called for an establishment of local health boards to deal with issues such as sanitation, safety, health of children, and drug use. The Lalonde Report, a landmark publication providing clarification on the causes of diseases and death, along with a series of national and international conferences, spurred the health promotion and occupational safety movement in the United States. During the next 100 years, health promotion remained linked to occupational health. Not until the 1970s, however, did worksite health promotion and protection begin to gain strength.

Health promotion and protection provides the conduit between the science of the medical community and the U.S. workforce. The governmental organization charged with keeping every working American healthy is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) formed by President Richard Nixon on December 29, 1970. From 1970 to the present day, OSHA has helped facilitate new laws and regulations to keep the workforce safe in an ever-changing world, ranging from the first safety standards adopted for workplaces in 1971 to protecting workers against terrorism in 2001.

Fatal and Nonfatal Injuries

According to OSHA, motor vehicles cause the most deaths among working Americans. The highest rates of fatal accidents occur within the professions of transportation, mining, agriculture, forestry, fishing, construction, fabrication, laborers, precision production, craft, and repairs. However, OSHA reports a steep reduction in fatal injuries counterbalanced with an increase in nonfatal injuries and their effects on the workforce and society. The professions with the most nonfatal injuries are construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing, private industry, and mining. Anxiety, stress, and neurotic disorders comprise nonfatal injuries resulting in the largest median time away from work, more than all other nonfatal injuries combined. The only competing nonfatal injury is musculoskeletal disorders, also known as repeated muscle trauma.

Reduction of Injuries and Deaths

Many methods attempt to reduce injuries and deaths among U.S. workers, primarily government legislation, alternative management techniques, and the creation of on-site injury prevention programs. The government document *Healthy People 2010* outlines specific objectives for worksite health promotion and protection. According to Goal 7, Objective 5, more worksites ought to offer comprehensive employee health promotion programs to their employees. A reduction in work-related injuries resulting in medical treatment, lost time from work, or restricted work activity accomplishes Goal 20, Objective 1. Goal 20, Objective 3 from *Healthy People 2010* relates to the area of reducing the rate of injury and illness cases involving days away from work as a result of repetitive motion or overexertion.

In the worksite, occupational health specialists analyze possible threats to employees' health while working for the company. The managers of corporations have made many efforts to help reduce on-site job injuries. Total Quality Management (TQM) is a continual improvement process that combines common sense, education, and training with the abilities to communicate and work as part of a team. This approach offers two steps in work injury reduction. First, an audit program assesses and provides specific measurements of medical programs, ensuring that the medical program provides all three levels of prevention; that is, primary, secondary, and tertiary. The second approach is for a team to develop an alternative return-to-work program, which assists with early rehabilitation of injured employees. Early rehabilitation of the injured person is essential for bringing the patient back to full health and activity as soon as possible.

TQM programs positively impact the health and productivity of workers involved and set the gold standard for health promotion programs in the workplace setting. Regarding effectiveness in improving the health of employees and lowering health care costs, each of these programs meets the objectives set

by the National Coordinating Committee on Worksite Health Promotion.

A worksite health program involves a combination of organizational, educational, and environmental activities that have the ultimate purpose of developing and supporting behavior that promotes a healthy work style of employees. Worksite health programs not only address safety issues at the worksite, but they also utilize the modern definition of health that comprises the physical, social, mental, emotional, and spiritual dimensions to help target the largest nonfatal injury: anxiety, stress, and neurotic disorders.

Specific objectives for worksite health involve increasing the number of worksites that offer comprehensive employee health promotion programs to their employees; reducing work-related injuries resulting in medical treatment, lost time from work, or restricted work activity; and decreasing the rate of injury and illness cases involving days away from work.

Jamie L. Johnson

See also Environment, Hazardous Waste; Labor, Migrant

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OLIGARCHY

When organizational survival and leader interests displace an organization's goals, an organization experiences *oligarchy*. In a 1911 study of the German Social Democratic Party and labor movement, Robert Michels discussed how bureaucratization, or large-scale organization, allows leaders' interests to dominate over the masses. Michels's iron law of oligarchy asserts that organizations are specialized. To pursue goals such as social change, individuals must collectively organize. As the collective grows, members designate leaders to take care of administrative and coordination needs. The resulting hierarchy gives leaders access to power and resources but also reduces members' influence and participation. To protect their positions, leaders become conservative, resistant to reform, and even repressive. As leaders replace unattainable goals with more diffuse goals or make goals conform to those of the larger society, organizations undergo goal transformation. Organizing activities shift from attaining goals to organizational maintenance, such as securing members, funds, and other resources. When power is concentrated to a few individuals, the organization relinquishes democratic practices and thus fails to reflect members' interests.

Using Michels's law, several social movement researchers have critiqued formal organization as derailing effective mobilization. To secure resources and support, particularly from elites and the state, organizations may soften their strategies and thus moderate their agenda. To maintain their power, for example, leaders may refuse to help newcomers because of concerns that new demands will alter power relations. To avoid such concentration of power and conservatism, a few researchers have recommended spontaneous grassroots disruption as a more effective means for gaining concessions from opponents than formal organizing. However, critics agree that organizations are crucial for successfully mobilizing persons and resources.

Increasingly, researchers have posited oligarchization as conditional rather than inevitable. An organization's susceptibility to oligarchy depends upon conditions such as the type of organizational goals and membership, congruency of organizational goals with larger societal norms, and competition with other groups. Recent studies show that not all organizations abandon their goals as they grow or appoint leaders. When environmental conditions render mobilization difficult, professional management can improve a social movement's abilities to reach goals. Under conditions such as a political crisis within the organization, previous activist experience, and support from other organizations, leaders can reinvigorate organizational efforts in a more radical rather than a conservative direction. In addition, checks such as a two-party system can temper oligarchization.

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See also Bureaucracy; Corruption; Labor Movement; Labor Unions; Power Elite; Resource Mobilization; Social Movements

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OLIGOPOLY

The term *oligopoly* designates a market form in which a few sellers dominate the market sector. This creates disequilibrium in the market, affecting both its efficiency and the entire society.

In an ideal free-market economy, firms operate in perfect competition, producing each product at the lowest possible cost and selling it at the lowest possible price. In an oligopoly, however, many parameters that characterize perfect competition are unfulfilled: products and services are less differentiated, buyers and/or sellers lack information about prices and traded goods, entry barriers exist for new sellers, and individual buyers and sellers lack independence.

Product differentiation is the process of distinguishing a product or service from those of competitors, with the aim of making it more attractive. Indeed, often differentiation is achieved by means of changes related not to the product itself, but only to its packaging, distribution, and marketing. However, buyers may perceive these small differences as important. Therefore, a large firm's marketing strategy is to produce a variety of similar goods. Retailers are interested in showing a wide variety of merchandise; if the same firm produces many of the offered goods, this firm obtains a competitive advantage over its rivals.

In many sectors, a small number of firms exercise a dominating influence over the market, and this in turn contributes to an increase in their market share. In fact, an oligopoly exists when four firms in the industry have a market share above 40 percent. Competition for market share contributes to the growth of oligopolies, because large firms with great financial power have the opportunity to force minor producers out of the market.

Thus, firms seek to grow, either on the domestic or on the international market. In an internal market a firm can expand by increasing sales, mergers, and acquisitions. Abroad, a firm can expand by buying local brands and/or introducing brands to new markets. When a leader firm enters foreign markets, its rivals follow suit: this behavior, called "oligopolistic reaction," increases the number and size of multinational corporations. This form of enterprise, characterizing firms that manage production establishments or deliver services in at least two countries, may threaten job security in a country.

As the decisions of one firm influence and are influenced by the decisions of its competitors, there is a high risk of collusion. Explicit collusion, in which competing firms cooperate, for instance, in raising prices, is illegal in many countries. However, rival companies can enact friendly competition: they can tacitly collude by monitoring each other's prices and setting them at the same level. This behavior, aimed at avoiding a price war and/or excessive advertising costs, benefits the colluding firms and damages the purchasers.

In Western countries, oligopolies exist in many sectors of the economy. In the United States, for instance, oligopolies can be found in the soft drink, cookie, razor blade, commercial jet airline, and comic book industries.

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See also Global Economy; Megamergers; Monopolies

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One-Drop Rule

Arguably, one of the most permanent racialized ideas in the history of the United States has been the insistence on human classification. Regardless of its biological and scientific invalidity, the notion of "race" is an endemic feature in social relations and continues to artificially separate individuals who have more in common, racially speaking, than they have differences. Personifying the illogical reality of a racialized social construct is a particular term—*the one-drop rule*—in which anyone known to have even "one drop" of African ancestry was deemed or classified as African American. The social engineering of this term is inextricably interwoven within the context of the enslavement and segregation eras (1600s–1960s).

However, it was not until the late 19th and early 20th centuries that the "nadir" in segregationist legislation passed, mainly throughout the southern states. Notably, the enactment of these laws was specifically, sometimes indirectly, to enforce the one-drop rule. Previously, no state legislation enforced the segregation of *all* African Americans, regardless of the amount of mixed heritage from their African, European, and Native American ancestry. However, the "passing" of light-skinned African Americans into the majority white population had become increasingly common and played a role in prompting the legislation.

In particular, Homer Plessy (1862–1925), a man who described himself as seven-eighths white and one-eighth African American, was the person behind a key piece of segregationist policy (*Plessy v. Ferguson*) that cemented de jure segregation for nearly 6 decades. The Supreme Court decision on May 18, 1896, upheld a doctrine of "separate but equal," bringing forth the age of official or constitutional segregation: Jim Crow. Two generations later, the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court ruling made segregation in the schools unconstitutional, thereby overturning the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision.

A salient feature of the one-drop rule is the notion that a person has a static social identity, that a person of mixed heritage is "fixed" to the status of the "racial group" with the least social status. Therefore, having a one-sixteenth portion of African heritage could determine one's status as a designated African American, regardless of a fifteen-sixteenths white ethnic makeup.

Overall, the one-drop rule was a sociopolitical construct that enabled the U.S. dominant culture to limit miscegenation and social integration with those of African American heritage. Not until 1967, with the *Loving v. Virginia* Supreme Court ruling, did the banning of interracial marriage become unconstitutional. However, this ruling did not deny the continued predominance of the one-drop rule, and today it still largely remains the social identifier within the African American experience.

Mark Christian

See also Multiracial Identity; Race; Racial Formation Theory; Racism

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Oppositional Culture Theory

Oppositional culture theory primarily explains the academic underperformance of young African American males. It holds that black youth have constructed an oppositional collective identity in response to a society they perceive as racist and antagonistic to their general well-being. From this oppositional perspective, black youth interpret the institution of education as a tool of oppression controlled by whites who serve as the gatekeepers of racial inequality. They therefore perceive academic success as conforming to a society that is antagonistic to their cultural moorings and a symbol of "acting white."

Oppositional culture theorists place the adoption of stereotypically white behavior ("acting white") as appearing at the end of the Civil War period and again after the civil rights movement, as African Americans increasingly integrated into the cultural

and social life of white Americans. For some African Americans, "acting white" became a way of wielding power in a society that deemed black people as an inferior social group. For other African Americans, particularly in the civil rights era, a collective black identity emerged criticizing the practice of "acting white" and embracing a sense of cultural and racial pride, as evidenced by the Black Power movement. According to oppositional culture theorists, today's collective oppositional identity of black youth emulates the sentiment of this racial and cultural pride.

According to oppositional culture theorists, young black males are skeptical of schooling as a vehicle toward success, have a general distrust of the U.S. labor opportunity structure, and also believe that academic achievement is not masculine and not "authentically" black. The negative assessment—coupled with the positive assessment of illegal activities, sports, and entertainment as rewarding enterprises—results in many young black males coming into conflict at school and/or dropping out. Their peers reinforce and reproduce this oppositional framework, while academically successful African American students experience internal psychological stress and general feelings of alienation. Accordingly, the stigma of academic excellence is greater for African American males than for African American females and females in general. Therefore, many young black males consider resistance to schooling as a masculine trait and academic success as a feminine one.

Critics of oppositional culture theory argue that (a) when controlling for socioeconomic factors, the relationship between the oppositional culture of black youth and academic achievement significantly diminishes; (b) ingroup differences reveal "resilient" African American students who reject an oppositional relationship to schooling; and (c) the oppositional culture of African American males *does* sometimes include the importance of schooling as a vehicle to racial pride, as evidenced in the hip-hop artistry of Tupac Shakur. Hip-hop music, to some, is the embodiment and reproducer of an oppositional black identity.

Vaso Thomas

See also Cultural Capital; Education, Academic Performance; Illegitimate Opportunity Structures; Minority Group

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Organized Crime

Organized crime constitutes in and of itself a social problem, but, in reality, it becomes an influential factor in producing many other types of social problems.

Attempts at finding a definition of organized crime acceptable to all the disciplines that deal with its subject matter have met with frustration; hence, here its major characteristics are distinguished by the word *organized*, which means that it is committed by two or more or a group or groups of individuals working together. Another distinguishing feature lies in the criminal goals, motivations, or ends that these groups seek to achieve.

There are four basic types of organized crime. The first is *mercenary organized crime,* in which the major goal is attaining a direct financial profit from engaging in the crime. This category includes gangs that burglarize homes, auto theft rings, pocket-picking rings, and groups that perpetuate various forms of confidence games. By contrast, those who participate in *ingroup organized crime* do not have financial gain as their major motive; instead their purpose lies in the individual's psychological and social gratification attained by belonging to a group that engages in "rumbles" and other risk-seeking thrills for the sheer adventure itself. *Political-social organized crime* also does not have direct financial profit as its goal; instead the goal is that of changing or maintaining an existing political-social structure; terrorist groups and the Ku Klux Klan are examples of this type. Finally, *syndicated organized crime,* the type that receives the most attention from

researchers, journalists, and politicians, has as the goal of its criminal participants that of attaining direct financial gain by providing illicit goods and/or services to the public through the use of threat, violence, and procuring police or political "protection" to safeguard its participants from legal interference. Illicit gambling, prostitution, and illicit drug trafficking have been its major enterprises.

In the United States, the subject of syndicated organized crime has enjoyed a romance with the terms *Mafia* and *Cosa Nostra*. In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. governmental committees captured the public imagination and concluded that syndicated crime was primarily an Italian and Sicilian import. Critics of these conclusions were quick to point out that these governmental investigations had two serious flaws: (1) historically, they argued that syndicated crime began with Sicilian involvement in the 1930s and that its membership was exclusively of Italian and Sicilian origin. Historical fact reveals that syndicated crime has existed in America throughout its history, including during colonial times. And (2) studies show that syndicated crime is not and never has been the province of any one ethnic group. In reality, *mafia* as syndicated crime is better understood as a method rather than an organization, a method that includes the use of force, intimidation, or the threats of such, requiring a group whose purpose is that of providing illicit goods and services and does so by obtaining political or police protection. As such, mafia or syndicated crime can exist anywhere. As for being exported, it is individuals who migrate; the growth and survival of the system itself is ultimately dependent upon the social conditions and social system of the country where it operates, which either allows or stifles its development.

The reasons syndicated crime continuously captures the attention of those who study it as well as the general public itself lie in its moral, ethical, and legal implications. Its continued existence speaks to an eternal dialectic between good and evil, one in which governments seek to make certain goods and services illegal with the intent of controlling morality, only to find that there are always enough individuals who seek and are willing to pay for these goods and services and enough criminals willing to risk life and imprisonment in order to make them available. Thus, there is no country in the world without organized crime among its social problems. To estimate the profits rounded to an exact amount would be impossible other than noting that, yearly, around the world, the profits amount to billions of dollars.

Each country has its criminal groups; in China, we have the *Triads;* in Japan, the *Yakuza*. Because of their large membership and power, these groups exert influence on the financial affairs of their respective countries. Each group operating in the world varies in the enterprises it engages in, depending upon the social structure and the needs for illicit goods demanded by its customers. Typically, the organized criminals watch and wait for trends among the populations in which they exist. Thus illicit drug trafficking in the United States did not become a major enterprise until the 1950s when the "beatnik" and "hippie" movements made its use popular. Indeed, the entire history of U.S. syndicated crime consists of organized criminals taking advantage of changing U.S. trends and needs for illicit goods.

Clearly illustrative of this reality is the Prohibition Era ushered in by the passage of the Volstead Act in 1920. The act made the sale of alcoholic beverages illegal, other than for medical purposes. This spawned the creation of criminal syndicates throughout the country. One of its celebrated criminals was Alphonse "Al" Capone, who ruled the underworld in Chicago during the Prohibition era. Taking his power from establishments paying large sums for protection, he also made certain that he controlled the political arena by helping elect political candidates who, in return, would protect his enterprises.

Although mercenary and ingroup forms of organized crime such as petty swindlers, pickpockets, and warring gangs were prevalent on the streets of New York City in the second half of the 19th century, it was the Prohibition era that allowed syndicated criminals in the major U.S. cities to produce a level of profits unknown to them at any time before in U.S. history. The development of sophisticated avenues of corruption on a worldwide scale and a worldwide increase in the desire for illicit drugs has, since the 1950s, increasingly allowed not only U.S. syndicates but those in foreign countries as well to make extreme profits from this trade. An example of this phenomenon is Pablo Escobar, a Colombian cocaine drug lord, who in 1989, at the young age of 40, was considered the world's most powerful criminal. In his rise to power, he killed Colombian Supreme Court justices, police chiefs, and presidential candidates. It took the

joint effort of the U.S. military and the Colombian government, using the most sophisticated surveillance equipment and weapons, to bring him out of hiding and kill him.

The power that can be amassed by criminal syndicates speaks to the issue of why this form of crime is of relevance to the creation of social problems. The single element of the corruption it generates serves to create a loss of faith in government among the citizens of local and federal governments. Mercenary forms of this crime bring financial loss to citizens and corporations such as those incurred in scams in which imitation designer bags or clothing is sold to unsuspecting customers. The customer receives an inferior product, while the designer company loses its profit from the potential sale of its legitimate and superior product. Citizens are robbed at gunpoint by gangs; autos are stolen by auto theft rings, each of these adding to the yearly financial loss of property by citizens. So, too, some Chinese and Russian syndicates within the past decade have developed enterprises that transport alien citizens from one country to another. In some cases the aliens request this service themselves, hoping to find better jobs in foreign lands. In other cases, particularly among female victims, these aliens are promised jobs only to find that once they arrive in their new country, they are turned instead into prostitutes or forced to work as cheap labor in "sweat shops."

Probably the most serious future social problem presented by organized criminals emerges from the current and developing globalization phenomenon that allows criminals to more readily cross borders and view the entire world as a potential marketplace for their ventures. As stated earlier, these criminals are quick to take advantage of social and technological change, and now the entire world has become their stage. Add the rise within the past 2 decades of political-social organized crime in the form of terrorist groups, and we see the threat this presents to the future security of the world and the continued presence of organized crime itself as a social problem.

Joseph L. Albini

See also Crime; Drug Abuse, Crime; Human Trafficking

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OUTSOURCING

Outsourcing is a business arrangement in which one organization contracts with another organization to perform services that it normally would have done itself. This occurs generally in areas outside of an organization's core competencies in order to take advantage of cost savings.

Several different types of outsourcing should be distinguished. Probably the most common kind involves a private company hiring another company in its own country to provide certain services. For example, a computer manufacturer, such as IBM, may hire an outside contractor to clean its facilities. In this case, the service provided is clearly outside of IBM's core competencies.

A second kind of outsourcing would be a government organization hiring a private company to do some of its work. A typical example here would be a school contracting out its food service, so that the workers providing the food service are private employees and not government employees. Here again, serving food is clearly not within a school's core competencies.

The most controversial type of outsourcing occurs when a private company hires a foreign company to do work for it. This outside contracting, known as "offshore" outsourcing, has become more and more common in the past 20 years. Much computer technical support for U.S. companies has been outsourced to India through a variety of subcontractors in recent years.

Why do organizations outsource? Not surprisingly, the chief reason is to reduce costs. If the company has its own employees perform the service, then it must pay them as it would any of its employees. For a company that treats its employees well, this could be a large cost—the company may well be able to find outside workers who can do this non-core service adequately at a much lower price. The workers may be cheaper because they live in a foreign low-wage country (in the case of offshore outsourcing), or they may

be cheaper because they are nonunion or live in low-wage areas of the United States (in the case of domestic outsourcing).

Outsourcing may also provide the company with access to more expert employees and more up-to-date technologies. The vendor—the company to whom business is outsourced—often has highly skilled employees who are specialists in specific areas. By focusing on particular services, vendors are more easily able to adopt new technologies and avoid technological obsolescence. A company that tries to perform services that are outside of its areas of core competency may be stretching itself too thin and be unable to take advantage of new technologies as they come into use.

By hiring outside workers, a company is able to turn fixed costs into variable costs and avoid the costs associated with constantly hiring and training new workers. The ease of changing vendors compared to changing full-time, in-house employees gives the company significant flexibility in running its business. The fixed costs of the in-house employees are by definition unchangeable in the short run; they can make it that much more difficult for the company to respond nimbly to market conditions. Outsourcing turns these into variable costs, thereby enabling management to react better to the vicissitudes of the market.

The main disadvantage of outsourcing is that the company may lose some control over production; it must rely on some outside entity that is under different management. Instead of dictating how production should be organized, the company must accept whatever organization and management the vendor chooses. This would generally not be acceptable in core operations, but in ancillary operations it can be a risk worth taking.

Another disadvantage concerns offshore outsourcing. A company in a developed country, such as the United States, can count on political-economic stability for its domestic operations; it is unlikely that its production will be disrupted by external social or political forces. If, however, it outsources to vendors in an unstable country, it may be subject to such disruptions. This, of course, is not as great a concern as it would be if the company was producing for itself (not through a vendor) in these countries, but it still can cause problems. On the other hand, this is an advantage of outsourcing—a company can take advantage of a low-cost country without fully committing itself to producing in that country. If disruptions do occur to the vendors, the company can fairly easily leave; a company that is producing under its own auspices will have a more difficult time getting out.

Although outsourcing is generally undertaken by individual, private companies to increase their own profitability, it has socioeconomic ramifications beyond the company's bottom line. It is offshore outsourcing, in particular, that generates the most controversy, since it affects workers and society in two different countries.

First, how does outsourcing affect the vendor country? Clearly, jobs shift to this country to take advantage of the low wages, a benefit to the workers involved. As long as the pay and working conditions are reasonable—within the socioeconomic context of the country—then the vendor's employees are positively affected by outsourcing. If they are being exploited, again by the standards of their country, then it is perhaps not such a positive situation. Even in this case, however, from the point of view of a free market economist, the workers must be benefiting as they have voluntarily offered their services to the vendor. Supporters of globalization consistently argue that foreign workers take these jobs precisely because they are better than the alternatives.

The situation is quite different from the point of view of workers (or potential workers) in the company that is outsourcing. These workers are clearly losing jobs to the foreign country. These losses, which are increasingly affecting higher-skilled, better-paying service workers, have consequently become a rising source of contention over the past decade in the United States.

How significant are these losses to the U.S. economy? An estimate by Forrester Research puts the losses due to offshore outsourcing at 3.4 million white-collar jobs between 2000 and 2015. Given that the U.S. workforce currently consists of about 152 million individuals, this amounts to an annual loss of about 0.15% of that labor force to offshore outsourcing. Thus the macroeconomic effects are not particularly significant. In absolute terms, though, 3.4 million unemployed people represent a tremendous loss to society as a whole. These numbers are even more problematic to the individuals losing their jobs or not getting jobs in the first place (and incidentally, we would never know who these people are). No job means no income, regardless of the reason—unemployment is one of the worst things that can happen to an individual under capitalism.

Historically, manufacturing has been outsourced for many years. For example, U.S. clothing manufacturers

have been hiring outside contractors to make the garments for a long time. Currently, a large portion of clothing sold in the United States under a U.S. company's label is produced in China by companies contracted by that U.S. company. This, in essence, is shipping U.S. jobs overseas and has been a concern of U.S. workers for some time.

What has changed recently is that it is no longer only manufacturing jobs that are outsourced. With advances in technology, services can now be offshore outsourced to places far, far away from the original company. Now it is not only blue-collar workers who are directly affected by outsourcing, but also more skilled, white-collar workers who have reason to complain. Newly outsourced technology services include such activities as software development, Web site designing, and technical service call centers. Certain non-core business processes are also now widely outsourced, such as back office operations, finance and accounting, payroll maintenance, and sales and marketing. The reach of outsourcing extends to many occupations, therefore putting it as a problem on the agenda for most U.S. workers.

White-collar workers, who in the past could conveniently ignore the manufacturing jobs being shifted overseas, now must confront the very same problems themselves. What was argued in the past—that the loss of jobs to foreign workers was simply the result of competitive, free market forces that only strengthen the economy—seems hollow now. Many white-collar workers have joined the chorus calling for restrictions on offshore outsourcing.

Paul A. Swanson

See also Current Account Deficit; Global Economy; Globalization; Postindustrialism

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OZONE

Atmospheric ozone (O_3) is found mostly between about 9 and 23 miles above the Earth's surface in a region called the *stratosphere*. This ozone layer acts as a barrier protecting life on Earth from harmful ultraviolet (UV) radiation from the sun. From 1970 on, scientists expressed concern that human-made chemicals, particularly chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), were thinning the ozone layer. A 1976 report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that the ozone depletion hypothesis was supported by scientific observations. Calculations suggested a global ozone loss of 5 to 7 percent by 1995, with attendant increases in skin cancer, probable damage to human and animal DNA, as well as harmful effects on some crops.

As emergent social problems, the slowing of ozone depletion and the subsequently discovered ozone hole are remarkable success stories. Prior to the NAS report, environmentalists had put the ozone problem at the top of their list, and in 1978 the United States and several other countries moved to eliminate the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans. The "styro wars" mounted by environmentalists led to successful public boycotts of McDonald's for using Styrofoam and rapid decreases in the use of aerosols.

While these initial successes diminished concern about the issue, 1985 brought the surprise discovery of an "ozone hole" over Antarctica. Where scientists had expected a steady and relatively slow depletion of ozone, this crater in the ozone column was so shocking that it took just 2 years to forge an international agreement. Indeed, the Montreal Protocol was signed *before* scientists established that the ozone hole was due to human-made chemicals rather than the unique conditions found in Antarctica.

The Montreal Protocol not only was the first international treaty on a global ecological problem but is

widely regarded as a landmark regime and prototype for future negotiations. Its significant innovations include automatic provisions for review—these have led to a ratcheting up of the agreement—and funding by rich nations for adaptations by poorer nations. The United States took the lead in negotiating the protocol, and U.S. corporations began an energetic pursuit of substitute chemicals that, significantly, were not difficult to develop.

Sociologically, the stunning success of the solution to the ozone problem can be attributed to the availability of bridging metaphors to the popular culture and its practical intrusion into everyday life. The ozone hole can be encapsulated in a familiar "penetration" metaphor. The idea of lethal rays penetrating a damaged "shield" meshes nicely with resonant cultural motifs that include *Star Wars* and many video games. Practically, leakage through the shield is linked with melanoma, a deadly skin cancer, and the issue created a cultural whirlwind with President Ronald Reagan's skin cancers, political gaffes, warnings about the outdoors becoming dangerous, and the vulnerability of children, as well as the growth of a "safe sun" industry.

Observations and calculations suggest that ozone depletion has stabilized globally and long-term recovery is anticipated. Ozone depletion has become a lesser social problem, attracting mainly "news briefs," while concern with safe sun has attenuated.

Sheldon Ungar

See also Global Warming

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P

PANDEMICS

A pandemic is the spread of a highly infectious disease across a large area, such as a continent or worldwide. In the World Health Organization (WHO) definition, the microbial agent that causes a pandemic must be a new one, never before found in human beings, and spread easily and comfortably among humans. SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and avian flu are among the most recent examples. Concern about these diseases has resulted in intense debates within the scientific community and various nation-states, as well as within international organizations such as WHO and in the media.

WHO first identified the SARS microbe—the coronavirus—as a virus never before seen in humans in March 2003. SARS posed an immediate threat because the virus spread rapidly, either by droplets or by direct and indirect contact. The fear was that, at a time when people and things traveled from one point of the globe to another at an almost dizzying pace, and large numbers of people with no respiratory protection came into close contact with each other, the virus would in no time enter and thrive in new hosts. The medico-scientific community immediately suggested a threefold preventive strategy: detection of cases, their isolation, and identification of close contacts. Similarly, avian flu, despite its insignificant risk to travelers, prompted a global plan, whereby an international consortium of countries and agencies like WHO would monitor the possibilities of an influenza outbreak propagated by infected birds. The rationale underlying these programs is that in an age when globalization encourages widespread travel, any infectious disease can in no time become a pandemic.

Further compounding that concern are the limitations of available drugs and vaccinations. The last three influenza pandemics—the Spanish flu of 1917–18, the Asian flu of 1957–58, and the Hong Kong flu of 1968–69—confirmed that newer and more formidable strains of the flu virus can emerge for which no vaccination may be immediately available. Further, the extensive reliance on antibiotics has been waning, because a condition called antimicrobial resistance (AMR) looms large on the horizon. AMR constitutes the biggest global health crisis according to many health experts. For example, evidence exists of resistance to crucial antiretroviral drugs, the "weapon" of choice in the battle against HIV/AIDS. Production of bulk and generic antiretroviral drugs and their common use have created a possibility that antiretroviral resistance might become a global phenomenon. For example, tuberculosis (TB) has resurfaced with a vengeance in recent years, both in the developing and in the developed world, including the United States. Approximately 1.5 million people die annually from TB, and 1 to 2 percent of them are dying from the multi-drug resistant strains.

Diseases like SARS and avian flu have led many scholars to argue that in order to explain the emergence of these new ailments, there is a need to critically study the new, neoliberal world order. Economic processes like globalization can serve as powerful forces exacerbating economic, political, and social inequalities that can quickly convert an infectious disease into a destructive pandemic form. Global inequalities created through an aggressive market

order in turn contribute to major disparities in health resources. Excessive foreign debt, negative economic growth, and increasing levels of foreign aid have impoverished the social welfare structures of many developing countries. The debt repayment burden and a concern to integrate with the global economy further impoverished the social welfare programs in these poor countries.

Globalization has resulted in a number of processes that have led certain low-income countries to spiral into the worst nightmares of global pandemics like AIDS. For example, accompanying the steady economic and political deterioration of rural Haiti is one of the worst epidemics of HIV/AIDS. While not a cause and effect, behind the deepening AIDS crisis lie poverty, inequality, and political disturbances. Intense population pressures (Haiti is one of the most densely populated nations in the world), deepening economic catastrophe (through the decline of agricultural land and production), and "structural violence" against poor Haitian women have pushed the AIDS crisis in Haiti truly beyond control.

Ebola, Lassa fever, Legionnaires' disease, and toxic shock syndrome are more than freak occurrences of disease caused by novel bacteria and viruses. On the contrary, the mutation of new viruses and bacteria become possible because of errant human activities. The global order can go awry epidemiologically when the trio of poverty, war, and drugs contribute to the depletion of valuable resources that can protect people from epidemics.

The realization that any infectious disease, if formidable enough, can quickly become a pandemic in turn emphasized the importance of another crucial issue: restoration of public health services decimated by war, poverty, or deteriorating infrastructure. While medical technologies may advance future medical research, numerous scholars and activists argue that, beyond a certain threshold, medical technologies and drugs can hardly save the global human populations from threats like avian flu or Ebola. Therefore, public health emerges as a vital element.

According to some, public health is at a crossroads—split between a narrow focus on individual health and a broad agenda on major health problems of human populations. Unfortunately, public health has been eroding in many rich and poor nations. Epidemiology and public health must have a strong alliance with public policy. Public health movements should be rooted within communities, and responsible international organizations should practice a form of global communitarianism. Pandemics, therefore, cannot be treated as simple epidemiological issues that can be tackled only by developing better drugs and vaccinations; they require a new vision of health in which development of new drugs and vaccinations, social concerns, and public health are intrinsic elements of a war of strategies to contain their widespread impact.

Srirupa Prasad

See also Epidemics, Management of; Health Care, Access; HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations

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PAROLE

Parole is the conditional release of a person in prison (the "parolee") before he or she completes the terms of a sentence. Parolees are under supervision of a state or federal parole agent who monitors the parolees' adjustment to society until completion of the time of the originally imposed sentence. Those persons serving time on parole can be returned to prison to serve out the sentence for violating any of the conditions outlined in the parole order or if the parole agent determines that the parolee is making poor adjustments in society.

Prior to the abolishment of federal parole in 2002, the United States had two levels of parole: federal and state. Federal parole was given to persons convicted of federal crimes and state parole is given to persons convicted of state crimes. On both levels, parole

required the courts to impose an indeterminate sentence. An indeterminate sentence is a sentence that includes a minimum number and a maximum number (10–14 years or 10–life) but must exclude "life without parole." Parole varies between jurisdictions, and good conduct while incarcerated is not a guarantee that parole will be granted.

The idea for parole came from Captain Alexander Maconochie in 1787, when he was in charge of the penal colony at Norfolk Island, off the coast of Australia. This particular penal colony had a reputation as one of the most dangerous and violent establishments of its time. Maconochie believed that these prisoners could be rehabilitated not through the typical brutality then inflicted on prisoners but through rehabilitative means like education, skill building, labor, and behavior modification. Under Maconochie's system, a prisoner received "marks" (good behavior credits) for each program successfully completed. These marks could be used for furloughs and early release from the colony. If at any time the prisoner exhibited poor behavior toward the programs, the prisoner could lose these marks and the opportunity for early release. By 1844, Maconochie had transformed this colony into one of controlled stability. Despite Maconochie's proven success, many countries at that time, like France and England, refused to adopt this model. However, the United States incorporated it into its criminal justice system in 1865, and it became the prototype for the modern U.S. parole system.

Today, in the United States, parole is a controversial and politically charged topic. Many believe those individuals convicted of crimes should be punished by serving their entire sentences and not granted early release. Nevertheless, research findings reveal that parole does work. The U.S. Department of Justice reported that 57 percent of parolees in 2006 completed their sentences successfully, while 18 percent were returned to prison and 4 percent absconded, with the remaining 21 percent still on parole. Regardless of the statistics, parole's existence is in jeopardy. "Tough on crime" policies and the "war on drugs" have influenced the federal government to abolish federal parole, and on the state level, many states, such as New York, no longer have parole for persons charged with violent crimes.

Christina Voight

See also Community Corrections; Judicial Discretion; Justice; Prisons, Overcrowding; Probation

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PATRIARCHY

Patriarchy has many different interpretations, depending on the theoretical and disciplinary orientation of the writer or speaker. Within anthropology, for example, *patriarchy* defines a condition in which male members of a society predominate in positions of authority. In female-dominated societies, the term *matriarchy* is used. For feminists, however, patriarchy has a different, and more political, connotation. Here, *patriarchy* refers to the systematic oppression and exploitation of women vis-à-vis their male counterparts. Patriarchy therefore refers more specifically to a relational and gendered process of dominance (by men) and subservience (of women). This dominance involves three basic forms of power: control over women's labor, control over women's reproductive abilities, and control over women's affections.

Given the many different types of feminism, varying accounts attempt to explain the origins, meaning, and practice of patriarchy. In general, however, all see patriarchy as resulting from the existence of gendered relations within all societies. Gender, as an organizing concept, imparts an ordering of society based on perceived differences between men and women. Thus distinguished, gendered norms construct appropriate positions and responsibilities for women and men and allocate resources differentially based on these divisions. Societies characterized by male dominance of positions and resources are described as patriarchal.

As a concept, patriarchy was most explicitly analyzed by Marxist feminists during the 1970s and 1980s. They identified a material basis to patriarchy, arguing that in capitalist societies, men control women's labor power through, for example, the institution of monogamous heterosexual marriage and the control over women's reproductive rights.

Depending on their viewpoint, feminists take different approaches to understanding, analyzing, and working to overturn patriarchy. Liberal feminists, for example, insist that gender equality and justice will occur when the rules of society are made fair and when women are no longer discriminated against in social or occupational settings. This approach was clearly evident in the work of first-wave feminists whose goal was to achieve equal rights for women, most saliently in the right to vote. Marxist feminists, conversely, maintain that it is not possible to eliminate sexism without also addressing classism within society. Rather than working within the existing system, as proposed by liberal feminists, Marxist feminists maintain that women's liberation will only result following the replacement of a capitalist system with a socialist system. Last, radical feminists emphasize the complex intersections of not only sexism and classism, but also, among other things, racism and ableism (discrimination against people with disabilities). Radical feminists also highlight the social and cultural, and not just economic and political, institutions that oppress and exploit women.

Patriarchy is an important concept in connecting gender to women's inequality in society. As a concept, however, it is not without its share of critics. Some critique the concept of patriarchy as too simplistic and too reductive, arguing that many early conceptualizations of patriarchy assumed the practice to be universal, thus ignoring important geographic and temporal variations in the oppression and exploitation of women. This led to a false view of patriarchy as static and unchanging. Post-structuralists and postmodernists criticize the patriarchy concept as limited to a structured set of inequalities, questioning not only the use of preexisting categories such as male and female but also the theoretical understanding of power itself.

James Tyner

See also Gender Bias; Gender Identity and Socialization; Sexism

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PATRIOT Act

The USA PATRIOT Act or "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" was signed into law without legislative committee debate on October 26, 2001. Despite the fact that Senator Russ Feingold was the only senator to vote against the bill, it was the subject of much public debate from the outset, and there continues to be little agreement about its implications for law enforcement and civil liberties in the United States.

The voluminous bill is little understood, and some of its most radical aspects were ruled unconstitutional by the courts. However, the bill expands the powers of investigation first brought about through the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO), along with providing significant financial and institutional support to law enforcement for intelligence-gathering efforts. The better-known aspects of the bill are those that permit third-party searches of personal data such as financial or travel history and library use without notification to the subject under investigation; allowance for "sneak and peak" searches with significant delays in notification to the subject; and the dismantling of Watergate-era firewalls between law enforcement and intelligence gathering. Finally, the bill might be most dangerous to immigrants, who can be detained—based on suspicion alone of association with a terrorist organization for an indeterminate amount of time—or deported altogether.

The most troubling aspect of the bill, however, may be the lack of public information about how and why the various aspects of the law were enacted and the nonpublic manner in which the powers created under the bill may be exercised. Despite widespread public concern and several ongoing court challenges, the USA PATRIOT Act was subject to an "Enhancement" Act in 2003 and was renewed, without major revisions, in 2005.

The most well-known section of the act is Section 215, which allows the Department of Justice to access third-party records. This includes that party's travel history, financial records, and even library use. Section 215 significantly expanded the original provision of FISA confining the search to investigating foreign intelligence; now it includes any investigation

that involves terrorism. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) need only certify to a FISA judge this aspect of the investigation without demonstrating probable cause, and the FISA court cannot refuse the search. Originally, this section of the act did not allow libraries or banks to protest the search or notify the subject about the search request. The most vocal opponent of this section was the American Library Association, who filed suit and made a successful public education campaign against the original provision. A modification of this prohibition in 2005 enabled the third party to get legal representation. The renewed USA PATRIOT Act also mandated that the director of the FBI or the deputy director or assistant director for National Security must personally call for the search, thereby limiting the powers to persons more easily held accountable for their actions.

Sections 216 and 505 also relate to intelligence gathering on private citizens. Section 216 formalizes federal tracking of Internet activities and treats Internet activity similarly to that of phone records. The act does distinguish between movement on the Internet and content of communication and calls only for the tracking of contacts, though civil liberties activists are concerned that "content" is not defined and thus it is unclear what aspect of e-mail communications will be tracked. Section 505 authorizes the attorney general to send out "National Security" letters, which compel record holders to provide information, but these are not legal warrants nor are they overseen by any court. Furthermore, Section 505 is a significant shift from FISA in that it allows these warrantless searches to be used, at a future date, as criminal evidence. In January 2007, *The New York Times* revealed that the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were also using National Security letters, claiming that they fell under the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.

Two sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, Sections 218 and 213, change the rules for search and seizure (guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment). Section 218 allows for a secret FISA court to authorize searches—based solely on assurances from the attorney general that such searches have to do with foreign intelligence—without public notification. Section 213 allows for searches with delayed (sometimes indefinitely) notification of the subject. It also expedites intelligence sharing between the FBI and CIA and the Department of Justice, dismantling many of the former protocols for the sharing or dissemination of warrantless searches. Section 213 has to do with "sneak and peek" searches that permit the search of private property without the notification of the subject if "immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result." Once again, the vagaries in the act's definitions permit wide latitude in the exercise of the powers created therein and, as a result, may result in the infringement of civil liberties.

The USA PATRIOT Act also raises significant concerns for immigrants and immigration organizations. The act allows for the detention and deportation of immigrants for "terrorist activity," which, according to some experts, can include legal aid (such as monetary donations) toward organizations not necessarily on a CIA list of terrorist organizations. In order to avoid deportation, immigrants must prove that they have no connections to the "terrorist," something that is often difficult while under detention.

Strong reactions to the USA PATRIOT Act have occurred at the public, court, and legislative levels. According to a University of Connecticut poll in 2005, of those Americans who could correctly identify the purpose of the act, 57 percent supported renewing it. Many organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Library Association, maintain ongoing public education campaigns against the bill. Both organizations also brought lawsuits against the bill. Numerous lawsuits have been filed against the act, including a Freedom of Information Act suit brought by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, in which a federal court ordered the FBI to turn over 1,500 pages of documentation on the use of USA PATRIOT Act provisions. Another lawsuit, brought by the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, Michigan, against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, claimed that Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act was unconstitutional. In both 2003 and 2005, the Democratic Party in Congress attempted to amend the bill. The 2004 presidential campaign also involved some debate about whether the act should be renewed in 2005. However, the bill was expanded in 2003 and renewed by both houses of Congress, with some revisions, in 2005 and signed into law in March 2006.

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See also Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is the intervention by a third party (a neutral actor) in armed conflict, a practice utilized in both conflict management and conflict resolution. Primarily, military components, such as regular troops and military observers, intervene between warring parties and oversee truces or the implementation of peace agreements. However, as peacekeeping operations have become increasingly complex in the post–cold war era, police and other civilian components often complement the military.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations identifies four categories of peacekeeping: preventive missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and transitional authority missions. The latter two categories differ from the first two in that they not only seek to establish a "negative" peace—that is, the abatement of military violence—but also attempt to contribute to the establishment of a sustainable peace through peace building. The latter operations thus handle a wider range of social problems considered to increase the risk of a resurgence of violence.

Since the end of the cold war, the increased debate about peacekeeping deals both with peacekeeping operations as a solution to war and a range of problems in the context of conflict and with how to manage social problems to which operations themselves contribute.

Peacekeeping as a Solution?

Interpositioning of neutral forces occurred prior to the establishment of the United Nations, whose embryonic peacekeeping role, using military observers, was in the Middle East in 1948. However, "peacekeeping" as a concept, commonly ascribed to former Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, began as a practice with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. Although peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, Hammarskjöld drew upon the principles enshrined therein to handle the Suez crisis in 1956. Although the United Nations set the precedent, the number of peacekeeping operations deployed by non–UN actors exceeds the number of UN operations between 1948 and 2007. Moreover, not all operations mandated through the United Nations have been under UN command. Large international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have at times acted on UN mandates as peacekeeping forces.

With few exceptions, operations prior to 1988 were by third-party military contingents, with the majority of interventions handling interstate conflicts by deploying troops to oversee a ceasefire or truce. With the end of the cold war and the increased focus on war-affected populations, peacekeeping operations in new conflict regions entailed additional mandates to handle the social problems created by conflict. Humanitarian emergencies, human rights abuses—including those of women's rights and children's rights—and civilian protection increasingly became questions of international peace and security. Ironically, with the widening of the mandate, more unintended consequences of the operation followed, and the media increasingly brought attention to the problems that peacekeeping in itself can create for the local population.

In the United Nations, the debate on reforming peacekeeping began in the early 1990s, driven foremost by the changing context of peacekeeping operations. Events that spurred the evolution of peacekeeping were operations in Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Somalia, and Rwanda, where deployment into these internal conflicts did not include changing the structure of the missions or securing

sufficient resources to implement assignments successfully. Lessons learned involve both the nature of the mandate and rules of engagement, particularly allowing peacekeepers more latitude in the use of force beyond just self-defense. Apart from affecting the efficiency of the mission directly, weaknesses in the operation structure can have an effect on the peacekeeping staff's behavior toward the local population. In addition, a need exists for more integrated missions.

The debate on peacekeeping practices also rages in academia, originating in its policy-oriented discipline and contesting the use of peacekeeping in conflict management and resolution. The issue is what possible benefits peacekeeping operations can have for establishing security and, in turn, if peacekeeping thereby influences the success of a conflict resolution process. Results are contradictory; some statistical studies display a positive relationship between establishment of peacekeeping operations and successful conflict resolution, while others find no such connection.

The complexity of the conflict into which a peacekeeping operation is deployed appears to be connected to the outcome in terms of success, as peacekeeping tends to be used in conflicts that are notoriously difficult to solve. Of central concern, then, are under what conditions peacekeeping operations are established and the role of the peacekeeping mission in relation to local parties in the conflict resolution process. On the one hand, critics contend that peacekeeping is completely irrelevant, since peace primarily depends upon the behavior of the warring parties; moreover, a peacekeeping operation may even have a negative effect by prolonging conflict through its conflict management and thus preventing conflict resolution. On the other hand, advocates call peacekeeping vital for ensuring resolution as well as sustainable peace, and, equally important, decreasing the suffering of the affected populations.

Peacekeeping as a Cause of Social Problems?

Besides the debate over peacekeeping's effectiveness in conflict resolution, the implementation of peacekeeping is another growing issue. Critics attack the "quick fix" introduction of democracy and economic transformation by external parties through peacekeeping operations. Critique centers on the rapid building of new political and economic structures without sufficient local involvement or knowledge of the local context, sufficient resources, and adequate local building capacity. Such flawed operations risk creating additional local problems and increasing existing ones.

Critics also argue that democracy and economic reform require a higher degree of internal ownership and more time to develop successfully than those few years and limited resources usually granted peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, democratization and economic reform can be conflict-creating processes by themselves, particularly in an unstable post-conflict situation. The "light footprint" approach used in Afghanistan, where the international staff mainly supports local parties, is partly in response to this critique.

Initial research findings indicate that the implementation process of peacekeeping operations has contributed to a range of social problems. Sharp increases in inflation—"bubble" economies resulting from operations with budgets substantially larger than that of the host country—resulting in higher prices for food and housing; trafficking in women and children for prostitution from surrounding countries; sharp increases in prostitution and child prostitution in the host country and surrounding countries; and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS are all serious social problems observed following peacekeeping operations. These social problems all place a high cost on the host countries—the majority of which are poor developing countries—particularly when an operation withdraws. A large number of "UN babies"—children with a local mother and a (former) peacekeeper as an absent father—is another result of many missions. The last aspect relates specifically to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Based on the mentioned effects, some researchers question the normative underpinnings of operations and the perceptions that peacekeepers hold about the local society.

The UN system has responded to the growing critique forwarded in both policy and research. For example, critique contributed to passage of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), dealing with women, peace, and security, and General Assembly resolution 57/306 on investigating sexual misconduct of peacekeeping staff. Policies, codes of conducts, and training manuals have also been developed to improve interaction with the local population, although these policies remain far from sufficiently implemented.

Taken together, peacekeeping operations increasingly attempt to handle local phenomena identified by

international law as social problems, such as violence against civilians and humanitarian emergencies. However, for a number of local social problems—ranging from economic and political side effects; human rights abuses and insecurity for vulnerable groups in the host country; and social traumas for children growing up without fathers—peacekeeping is part of the cause. The jury is still out on whether peacekeeping facilitates resolution of the social problem of armed conflict and war.

Louise Olsson

See also Conflict Resolution; Democracy; HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations; Human Rights; Inflation; Prostitution; Prostitution, Child; Sex Trafficking; War

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Pedophilia

Pedophilia, a term coined in 1896 by Richard Krafft-Ebing, refers to a pubescent individual who is sexually attracted to prepubescent individuals. U.S. concern about child molestation dates back to 1894, when a wave of legislation geared toward increasing the age of sexual consent was enacted. This interest was revitalized in 1932 with the media frenzy surrounding the Charles Lindbergh baby abduction and homicide. The panic led to the first wave of sexual psychopath legislation. In 1938, Illinois enacted the first sexual psychopath law, allowing judges to commit offenders convicted of sex offenses to mental health facilities in lieu of prison. Similar statutes followed elsewhere, but most had fallen out of favor by the late 1970s and early 1980s.

After several years elapsed, child protection issues again gained public attention with the 1987 case of Earl Shriner raping and mutilating a 6-year-old boy, the 1990 disappearance of Jacob Wetterling in Minnesota, the 1993 abduction and murder of Polly Klaas in California, and the sexual molestation and murder of 7-year-old Megan Kanka in New Jersey in 1994. Societal responses included the creation of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to increase public awareness concerning the safety of children, and passage of the National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990, mandating the immediate reporting of missing children. In addition, sexual psychopath state legislation regained popularity with passage of sexual predator laws and/or civil commitment statutes. Seemingly unaffected by constitutional challenges, the statutes gathered increased popularity and adoption in numerous states and the District of Columbia. Restricted movement of pedophiles through global positioning satellites (GPSs) and pedophile-free zones are even more extensive.

Even more far-reaching is the implementation of Megan's Law statutes. The 1994 Megan Kanka case produced an enormous amount of public outrage, resulting in the enactment, only 2 months later, of a New Jersey state statute commonly known as Megan's Law, that eventually led to federal legislation that included offender registration, community notification, civil commitment, discretionary use of the death penalty, discretionary life imprisonment, the development of a national sexual offender registry, lifetime supervision, DNA testing, fingerprinting, and the right to refuse good time credits. President William Clinton signed this legislation into federal law in 1996, and today all 50 states have some form of Megan's Law.

More recently, crimes perpetrated against Dru Sjodin and Jessica Lunsford by previously convicted sexual offenders resulted in other legislation: the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Database Act (part of the 2006 Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act) at the national level and the Jessica Lunsford Act in Florida in 2005. "Dru's Law" established a national sex offender database that links state information. The Jessica Lunsford Act mandates minimum 25-year sentences and lifetime electronic monitoring, and other states are considering similar legislation.

Prevalence

Given the private nature of sexual crimes and the limited forum children have to speak out about sex crimes, experts believe incidents of child sexual victimization are undercounted. While determining the full extent of child molestation is difficult, official reports and offender and victim surveys provide some insight into the frequency.

Despite increased publicity, sexual molestations and abuses decreased in recent years. The Children's Bureau reports that the rate of sexual victimization per 1,000 children in the population dropped from 1.9 in 1995 to 1.2 in 2004. The overall number of arrests for forcible and nonforcible sexual crimes also dropped from 75,229 in 1996 to 67,539 in 2005. Finally, self-report rape victimization in individuals ages 12 and older has continuously gone down since the 1970s, from a 1979 peak of 2.8 per 1,000 to 0.5 per 1,000 in 2005. Victimization estimates in meta-analyses display much less consistency, positing the prevalence of child sexual abuse anywhere from 7 to 40 percent in girls and 3 to 13 percent in boys.

Panic

Despite the numerous publications citing a decrease in sexual abuse of both children and adults, U.S. media broadcasts persistently report an "epidemic" of child abductions, molestations, and homicides. The dramatic shift in the terminology used to describe offenders offers an additional indicator of the heightened concern over child predation. Child sexual offenders have most often been described as "predators" or "fiends," with the specific intention of metaphorically describing offenders as predatory animals aggressively seeking out innocent prey. While the term *predator* has no legal or psychological basis, American legislation bearing this terminology has recently been enacted, and its usage has increased dramatically.

The temporal coincidence between a decrease in child sexual abuse cases substantiated by child welfare services in the United States and an increase in pedophilia coverage in the *New York Times,* as well as the constant intensification of child sexual abuse repression laws, tends to indicate the existence of a moral panic centered on pedophilia in this country. The primary catalyst of this pedophilia panic has not been the increased frequency of child molestation; rather, sensationalized media reports and political crusading are responsible. This perceived threat of child molestation plays an important role in the generation of legislation. The resulting panic legislation is most often a knee-jerk reaction developed by the legislature to resolve the publicly perceived "emergency situation." More often than not, these types of laws are crafted amid a state of panic and lack the calm deliberation that effective legislation exhibits. While in theory the various types of legislation are attempts to keep children safe, the practical obstacles to each may outweigh their efficacy. Plagued by issues of misdirection of attention and vigilantism, the enactment of legislation begs the question of whether its initial implementation was necessary.

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See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Deviance

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Pensions and Social Security

Pensions and Social Security are programs designed to provide some measure of financial security to people during their retirement years. A variety of policies and programs have developed over time to address the kinds of problems faced by many, although not all, of the elderly. The situation can be

particularly challenging for those widows and widowers who seldom worked and thus depend on resources acquired by their spouses.

To address the problem of many elderly losing their savings and jobs during the Great Depression, a variety of new social welfare programs came into existence under Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, including a new system of old age insurance, Social Security. It offered some federal aid for traditional local means-tested public assistance measures, such as assistance for the elderly and children, but it also provided a social insurance system for those 65 and over, regardless of financial need. Unlike European systems, which used general tax revenues to finance old age security, the U.S. approach stressed the combined assets of the private sector and its employees. In 1939, the addition of survivors insurance provided benefits to widows and other surviving dependents of a worker who died prematurely.

Originally, the act excluded domestic and agricultural workers, many of them African Americans, due largely to pressure from southern legislators. Eventually, however, most workers were brought into the system and, today, nearly all retired people receive Social Security benefits. Expansion of coverage reflected a shift in the philosophy and financial principles of Social Security. Whereas the government originally stored contributions and paid them back with interest to those over 65, current workers now pay the benefits of those already retired. This shift of current obligations to future workers has led to predictions of crisis in the system, including a recent forecast that, given the rapidly aging population, Social Security will run out of funds by 2042.

The idea of a social security crisis is not new. Fears about Social Security's insolvency arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when various factors led to a decline in the program's trust funds. Responses included an increase in payroll taxes, a gradual rise in the age at which individuals could first receive benefits, and taxation of benefits received by taxpayers with incomes over certain levels. Although policymakers hoped these changes would shore up the system for the next 75 years, the latest labor force and demographic data suggest that the reserve fund will be depleted in about 40 years. Today, about 1 of every 8 people in the United States is age 65 or older. The change in the dependency ratio between workers and beneficiaries is changing dramatically. In 1936, 15 workers supported each retiree. By 2025, the ratio may fall to 2.25 to 1. Even though baby boomers are earning more and have better private pension packages than their parents, a sense of crisis remains.

Various solutions to the Social Security problem have been suggested in more recent years. President Ronald Reagan promoted tax-exempt Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) as a way to build retirement income. Another approach, the use of employer-based retirement savings programs, or 401(k) plans, grew rapidly in the 1990s. In the latter, employers supplement workers' contributions, although a specific benefit is not guaranteed. These plans are essentially supplements to Social Security benefits, not a replacement, so funding remains an issue.

In 1996, a special Social Security Advisory Council appointed by President William Clinton recommended a radical approach to shoring up retirement income: investing funds in the stock market instead of just low-interest government Treasury bonds (where the government lends itself money). It suggested this be done either by the government or by workers themselves. Critics argued that not everyone has the skills and knowledge to invest money wisely and that this approach lacks protection against stock market failures. Furthermore, government decisions about investments could be politically charged.

President George W. Bush supported adding a private investment element to Social Security. His special commission, consisting solely of people in favor of private investment accounts, recommended legislation to partially privatize the system. Met by a firestorm of criticism from congressional Democrats, organized labor, and other groups, the legislation failed. The president renewed his push for private accounts in his State of the Union address in 2005, adding new details to the plan. He proposed that workers should be able to place as much as 4 percent of their taxable earnings in the accounts. However, congressional Republicans were unenthusiastic, and Democrats were almost unanimously opposed. This attempt to change Social Security also failed.

Public and private company pensions, another source of income for older Americans, have been eroding since the 1980s. Formerly, pensions were guaranteed income; if you worked long enough, you could depend on a predetermined and steady stream of income upon retirement. However, in recent years, many large companies have either cut back on their

pension plans or gone bankrupt, unable to honor their commitments to retired workers.

In 1983, more than two thirds of households headed by a worker age 47 to 62 included someone earning a pension. In 2001, only half did, and in 2005, only 20 percent of all U.S. workers were covered by traditional pensions. Some companies either never had pensions or simply stopped providing them. Those who retained pension programs often changed them from defined-benefit plans (which guarantee a predetermined monthly income after retirement that is generally based on salary and numbers of years worked) to defined-contribution investment plans such as 401(k)s. In these plans, employees set aside part of their pay for retirement tax deferred, with the company contributing a partial match. Upon retirement, employees get whatever is in the investment account; thus their retirement money depends on the ups and downs of the stock market. In addition, there is no restriction blocking employers from reducing or terminating their contributions to employees' 401(k)s if business declines.

The federal government backs up pensions through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which collects premiums from corporations and uses the money to help workers when companies cannot fulfill their pension obligations. However, the recent bankruptcies of large companies—particularly in the airline, automotive, and steel industries—have taken a toll on the resources of the PBGC. United Airlines is a good example. Declines in passenger travel and increasing fuel costs led the company to declare bankruptcy in 2003. It won the right in bankruptcy court to terminate all four of its employee pension plans. United Airlines' $3.2 billion in obligations was shifted to the PBGC. Similarly, General Motors tried to slash costs in 2006 by dismissing many workers and reducing the benefits of those who remained. When Bethlehem Steel shut down its pension plan, it was up to the PBGC to meet the company's $3.7 billion in obligations to retirees.

The status of pension funds for public sector employees has also become precarious. These employees, including policemen and teachers, were generally guaranteed retirement benefits much higher than private pensions, but elected officials often failed to set aside the money necessary to cover benefits. A dramatic example was the New York City transit workers' strike in 2005, which brought the city to a standstill. The walkout was precipitated largely by the Transportation Authority's proposal that all new workers contribute 6 percent of their wages toward their pensions, compared to the 2 percent paid by current workers. The proposal was a response to the tripling of pension costs in the previous 3 years.

In 2006, Congress passed a major pension bill that made pension plans more expensive for many companies, requiring 100 percent funding rather than the previous 90 percent level. This legislation may temporarily aid a troubled pension system, but it is a far cry from preserving it for future generations and may even lead to some companies dropping their pension plans altogether. Some analysts predict that the defined-benefit pension approach is coming to an end and that most workers today will only receive retirement benefits through a self-contribution plan like the 401(k).

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See also Baby Boomers; Population, Graying of

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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

President William Clinton, on August 22, 1996, signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. The intent of this law was to transform the U.S. welfare system into one that provided government assistance in exchange for work. The plan contained specific work requirements and a performance bonus for states that moved welfare recipients into jobs. The bill offered benefits to children and families, including enforced child support, increased child care funding, and guaranteed health care coverage.

Legislators deemed the "from welfare to work" reforms necessary due to a perceived misuse and abuse of public funds in the previous welfare system, as well as a limited scope of assistance in some areas. Based on experimental evidence that new approaches could bring about improved attitudes and fiscal advantages, Congress and the president encouraged and supported these reforms. Teen mothers would continue their studies and the law would require federal employees to support their children financially. There would also be a crackdown on those who owed child support and avoided their responsibility by crossing state lines. The act encouraged welfare recipients to enter the workforce, assisted in vocational training as well as job searches, provided for child care funding, and guaranteed some level of family health care coverage. This act thus promoted personal responsibilities and established penalties to ensure achievement of its goals.

Teen pregnancy prevention was encouraged, and unmarried parents who were under age 18 were required to stay in school and live with an adult who was willing to take responsibility for the teen and her child. Under the 1996 law, after 2 years of assistance, the recipients were required to work—single-parent families a minimum of 20 hours a week the first year and dual-parent families at least 35 hours per week. The bill provided $14 billion in child care funding to assist more mothers in entering the workforce, a $3.5 billion increase over previous government child care assistance. With the passage of this law, families who received assistance were ineligible for income aid after 5 cumulative years. States were able to exempt up to 20 percent of their cases from the time limit and to use their own discretion in providing other forms of family assistance through either the Social Services Block Grant or state funds. The bill required states to maintain their own welfare spending at least at 80 percent of the 1994 levels. The welfare law allowed each state to take money that was previously used for welfare and create jobs, provide hiring incentives, or give income subsidies for employers who were willing to hire previous welfare recipients.

This act appears to have been a move in the right direction. However, not all components have been ideal and may require amendment in the future. No consensus exists about the success of this plan in improving the welfare system, and critics have been vocal in their opinions about disturbing trends.

On a positive note, welfare caseloads dropped dramatically, from a 1994 high of more than 14 million recipients to about 4.5 million recipients in 2006. A large number of welfare recipients did indeed join the workforce and develop a new work ethic. Estimates place between 40 percent and 70 percent of those who received welfare prior to 1996 as currently working, thus significantly decreasing the poverty level for children.

However, these changes still leave many current and former welfare recipients in a desperate situation. Some are not working in full-time positions or for the whole year. Others who leave the welfare lines and enter the workforce are not able to maintain their jobs for any length of time because of the exorbitant cost or poor provision of child care, because of limited funding for child care workers. Furthermore, most welfare recipients in the workforce are earning between $6 and $8 an hour, a wage insufficient to elevate them from poverty.

Although statistics indicate that the rate of poverty has declined in general, it increased among the poor working families and especially among single-parent families. The families with the least financial resources have become poorer in the years since the implementation of the act, and, although caseloads have fallen, poverty rates rose among this group. Furthermore, while caseloads fell generally, they did not do so uniformly and, in fact, increased in some areas, especially in the large urban areas of the more populous states.

Through the act, each state receives a block grant, a lump sum of money to use toward welfare reform as the state determines. The block grant structure appears to benefit some states and communities more than others. As welfare recipients move to more concentrated

geographic areas, a reallocation of funds becomes necessary.

Another disturbing trend is that poorly educated wage earners seem to stagnate in the lower wage levels with little hope of improvement, while the graduates of secondary school and vocational training can potentially improve their incomes. This pattern may influence future public policy. Many working people, especially single mothers, have fallen deeper into poverty since the implementation of the 1996 law. The idea of working, alone, does not contribute to the elevation from poverty or afford a family adequate housing, food, health care, and child care. Nearly 90 percent of former welfare recipients are mothers. The success in helping these women transition to work and make a decent wage that raises their families from poverty will dictate the long-range success of the 1996 welfare reform act. Narrowing the gender gap of pay for workers and involving male parents in welfare families are only two proposed methods that might raise incomes for poor families.

Although Congress allocated more money to programs that provide child care for working poor families, unfortunately, many families still are not receiving adequate assistance. The tax credits remain too low to help poor working families with the high costs of child care. Head Start programs, which are free, serve fewer than one half of the eligible children. The quality of the low-cost care is marginal, which is again probably due to the limited funding available for child care providers.

Another problem is that health care is often out of reach for families who have given up welfare and returned to work. The working poor cannot afford most of the plans offered by employer-based health care plans. Even though the federal government expanded the Children's Health Insurance Program, more than 6 million children are not enrolled in any health care government program. Another difficulty with the welfare reform legislation is that it does not recognize the major role of housing in the financial plan of poor families, especially in larger cities where the cost of housing has risen significantly since the mid-1990s. Inadequate financial support for housing (minimal affordable housing) has resulted in increasing poverty in welfare families, suggesting the need for additional assistance.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act has clearly accomplished only some of its goals of reform and improvement in the U.S. welfare system. With greater experience and further research, it may well be necessary to address the act's shortcomings and to institute reforms that improve the country's welfare system and better meet the needs of the poor in society.

Amy Levin

See also Class; Culture of Dependency; Culture of Poverty; Homelessness; Income Disparity; Poverty; Working Poor

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Personhood, Evolving Notions of

What it means to be a "person" is a question that has intrigued philosophers for millennia. At least two major schools of thought in philosophy have considered personhood: deontology and utilitarianism.

Deontology, sometimes called "duty-based" or "rule-based ethical theory," was advanced by German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant, building upon the work of Greek philosophers

Aristotle and Plato, thought that the intrinsic worth of man was based on his ability to reason and to exercise rational autonomous choices. The Greek philosophers considered speech to be a defining characteristic of personhood and that women, children, and slaves were capable of only limited reasoning and were, therefore, not full persons.

A serious problem with the Kantian approach is that, by these standards, many humans are not persons; the most vulnerable populations (i.e., infants, children, people with advanced forms of autism or Alzheimer's disease or other cognitive disorders) do not have the rational, self-reflective capacities associated with the Kantian idea of personhood. The failure to acknowledge moral status or respect for these vulnerable populations led to a rejection of a purely Kantian approach.

Classic utilitarian theory regards the ability to experience pleasure and pain, not ability to reason, as the defining quality for personhood and the minimum criteria for moral concern and regard. Originally proposed by David Hume (1711–76), and developed more fully by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73), utilitarian theory laid the groundwork for careful consideration of how we treat other beings, whether they be nonhuman, infants, or the cognitively disabled. Bentham argued that a horse or a dog was far more rational than an infant child and that the law should extend protection to all, because they all have the same ability to suffer.

The primary drawback to utilitarianism, some people argue, is that it puts humans and animals on equal footing. However, neither classic nor modern utilitarian theory requires the *equal treatment* of human and nonhumans; rather it argues that what does matter is that suffering counts equally, be it human or nonhuman.

The tension between deontology and utilitarianism is reflected in the current state of the law. Traditionally, the law divided entities into two categories: persons or property, and one had to be human to be a person. The difficulty arises, however, when one looks back at the history of the law and realizes that women, children, and slaves were once considered as mere property under the law. At the same time, corporations, municipalities, and even ships were declared to be "persons" under the law. Although the law has evolved to ban slavery and recognize the legal rights of women and children (in the United States, at least), new challenges face the courts, legislatures, and law-making bodies. Laws are evolving to recognize categories that fall somewhere in between property and personhood, creating a continuum.

Three areas of emerging technology challenge traditional concepts of what it means to be a "person": assisted reproductive technologies, transgenics, and human–machine mergers. Some current examples include the legal status of fetuses and embryos, companion animals, and great apes. Examples of future challenges include human–machine mergers (popularly known as "cyborgs"), artificial wombs, and intelligent transgenic creatures.

Linda M. Glenn

See also Genetic Engineering; Genetic Theories; Racism

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Pink-Collar Occupations

Occupations traditionally considered women's work are termed *pink collar*. These occupations typically include the clerical, sales, and service fields. Nurse, waitress, elementary school teacher, secretary, administrative assistant, sales clerk, cashier, child care worker, and beautician are among the most common female-dominated occupations. They are termed *pink collar* in relation to the more common terms *blue collar* and *white collar*. These jobs do not fit in as blue collar since there is little or no manual labor, nor are they as prestigious as white-collar occupations. Often these occupations do not pay well and offer little expectation of advancement. While some pink-collar jobs carry prestige and a certain amount of autonomy, their pay is not usually reflective of this. These careers are not the lowest in status, but they often do not allow movement up the career ladder.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, more than 20 million women work in the fields of health, education,

and social services. Many jobs in these fields are considered pink collar and carry with them a stereotype that women are more suited for this work because it requires a caring or nurturing nature, such as among kindergarten and preschool teachers, where women are over-represented. Even as men enter the field of teaching in greater numbers, women are more often teaching the younger grades, often seen as less prestigious work.

Historically, women who had to work performed domestic services in sewing, laundry, and housekeeping—jobs that utilized domestic skills they had learned in the home. They would complete such work in their own homes or the homes of more affluent families, or else they worked in factories or sweatshops where the pay was bad and conditions worse. Eventually, some women were able to move into less manual positions that offered more freedom, such as secretary, clerk, or service-related occupations. Even then, occupations that began as well respected and male only, such as clerks, were downgraded in status once women entered their ranks. For awhile, the pink-collar label applied to work once associated with "women's machines": telephones and typewriters.

Job requirements in pink-collar occupations can range anywhere from little education to a college degree, but one thing is consistent: the lack of equal work for equal pay regardless of gender. In 2006, for example, female workers made only 77 cents per dollar compared to males with the same level of education. Despite breakthroughs in gender roles and employment in recent decades, women are still heavily represented in clerical, service, and sales occupations. While they are taking positions in other fields as well, women often hold lower-level, lower-paid positions than males. This wage gap, until equalized, remains a problem for working women.

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See also Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational; Sexism; Wage Gap

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Piracy, Intellectual Property

From a legalistic point of view, *intellectual property* refers to the exclusive rights to intellectual objects. In the United States, intellectual property includes the rights conferred by copyright, patent, and trademark laws. Copyright law grants an author the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, and adapt a literary, musical, or artistic work; patent law gives an inventor the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell an invention; and trademark law grants a business the exclusive right to use a particular symbol to identify its products. More conventionally, intellectual property refers to the intellectual objects themselves—the original expressions of ideas fixed in tangible forms, such as books and records, and novel applications of ideas embodied in machines and technical processes.

In the United States, violation of the rights to intellectual objects is a civil offense. The offender is liable to civil prosecution and remedial sanctions, such as compensation of the victim. For example, a person who wrongfully makes a patented tool is liable for civil action, as is a person who wrongfully copies a book's plot or labels a product with a mark resembling the one used by a company for its product. Forms of copyright and trademark infringement that are willful and oriented toward financial gain also are criminal offenses; the offender is eligible for criminal prosecution and punitive sanctions, ranging from fines to imprisonment. The unauthorized duplication of computer software for commercial gain is a criminal violation of copyright law, and the fraudulent labeling of apparel as genuine designer clothes for commercial gain is a criminal violation of trademark law.

Piracy and Theft

One type of intellectual property offense is piracy. Piracy is a violation of copyright law; it involves the unauthorized acquisition, reproduction, distribution, or performance of a creative work. Some people limit the definition of *piracy* to misuse that is willful and oriented toward financial gain—purely criminal violations of copyright. Other people, including most copyright owners, embrace a more expansive view, regarding piracy as virtually any unauthorized use of a creative work. For example, the Software and Information Industry Association defines *piracy* as

"the unauthorized use of software." It includes downloading a legitimate copy of software onto multiple computers, producing and distributing copies from a legitimate source, renting software without permission, and exchanging software on the Internet without permission.

Although copyright owners commonly characterize piracy as theft, these actions differ in several ways. They differ in the nature of the victim's loss. In theft, the offender acquires a physical object and thus deprives the victim of that object. In piracy, the offender misuses an intellectual object and thus deprives the victim of an opportunity to profit from the use of that object. Unlike a customary form of property, a creative work is both nonexclusive (it can be in many places at the same time) and inexhaustible (use does not deplete it). Misuse, then, does not deprive the victim of the object; a person can obtain a sound recording, reproduce it, and disseminate copies without touching the master. Rather, misuse threatens the victim's capacity to exploit the object fully, a loss that is less certain and less tangible than the loss typically suffered by victims of theft.

Piracy and theft differ in the degree to which the objects covered by law are vulnerable to wrongful behavior. Unlike a customary form of property, a creative work is nonexclusive and thus relatively difficult to protect. Further, unlike a typical property owner who seeks to secure a belonging, a copyright owner seeks to make a creative work accessible to people. Creative works can be viewed as "diffuse" private property, for they are spread across the physical and social landscape. Such diffusion is a function of owners' economic pursuits. Creative works are owned primarily by corporate actors—publishing houses, record companies, and so on—and these actors seek to exploit their works. What owners market are tangible items—books, compact disks, and the like—not the works fixed in them. Law permits consumers to do anything they want with these items. But it forbids consumers from exploiting the works fixed in them, as owners maintain dominion over these objects. To make a profit, owners want to market the tangible items widely. Yet wide distribution of the items means making the works embodied in them accessible to many people, including potential offenders, and this increases the vulnerability of these works to misuse.

Piracy and theft also differ in the degree to which they can be discerned. In theft, the offense often is apparent; for example, the victim quickly recognizes that her car has been stolen. In piracy, the offense often is elusive, if not invisible. Wide distribution of the items in which creative works are fixed not only makes the works accessible to many people but also places them in the domain of consumers. And owners are limited, practically and legally, in their capacity to monitor how consumers use their works. Thus, victims of piracy have a relatively hard time detecting offenses.

Although piracy and theft differ, piracy is increasingly being identified as a problem not unlike theft. Piracy is not new; unauthorized copying of creative works can be traced as far back as the invention of the printing press. However, piracy was long ignored, largely because it was inconsequential to owners. This view has changed. Piracy is now regarded as problematic, especially by copyright owners. This is so, in part, because technological innovation has upset the long-standing dominance of owners. Recent years have witnessed the development and proliferation of affordable, easily manageable exploitative information technologies—devices that enable people to access, reproduce, and distribute creative works and thus use works in ways that violate the rights of owners. Given greater control over creative works, consumers have misused them more frequently. Owners have pressed for the declaration of various uses as wrongful and the recognition of piracy as a serious problem.

The Extent of Piracy

It is difficult to determine the extent of piracy, as statistics are meager. According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the federal district courts in 2005 processed a total of 4,595 civil cases of copyright infringement, an increase of 124 percent over the number of civil cases handled in 2000. According to the Executive Office of the United States' Attorneys, the district courts in 2005 also processed 81 criminal cases of copyright infringement, an increase of 153 percent over the number handled in 2000. To be sure, these figures are considerably smaller than the numbers of conventional property crimes processed by the criminal justice system. However, they reflect only a fraction of all incidents of piracy. While the figures refer to cases handled by the federal courts, some copyright owners employ state rather than federal law to manage piracy. In addition, the number of incidents that do not come to the attention of officials is substantial. Some owners do not take legal action against minor forms of infringement, such as copying for personal consumption. Most owners also are unaware of many offenses. The diffusion

of creative works, people's access to them, and the difficulty of monitoring use make it nearly impossible for owners to know whether or how frequently their rights have been violated.

Sensitive to the likelihood that court records reflect a small percentage of piracy, copyright owners have furnished statistics on the magnitude of piracy. These statistics take several forms, including losses from piracy. The Recording Industry Association of America, for example, reports that piracy costs the record industry at least $300 million a year in the United States and $4.2 billion worldwide; the Motion Picture Association of America claims that piracy costs the film industry $1.3 billion a year in the United States and $6.1 billion worldwide; and the Software and Information Industry Association states that piracy costs the software industry $3.2 billion a year in the United States and $12 billion worldwide. Such figures, of course, are questionable. Owners rarely indicate how they calculate the figures or identify the source of data used to compute them. Accordingly, the figures can be easily inflated, and it may behoove owners to inflate them.

Explaining Piracy

How can we account for piracy? Copyright owners commonly explain this offense in terms of easy access to information technologies coupled with a weak system of legal control. However, this argument is little more than speculation, for the problem has not been a subject of systematic investigation. Routine activities theory offers an alternative explanation. This theory proposes that piracy flows from the convergence in time and space of three elements: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardians.

Piracy requires a motivated offender, a person who is both willing and able to violate the law. In the United States, the desire to misuse creative works seems pervasive. It may stem partly from the ideology that informs copyright law, an ideology that taps basic cultural values. While intellectual property law endorses the economic principle that authors have a right to remuneration for their labor, it also endorses the democratic principle that citizens have the right to as much information as they deem necessary. The idea is that if people are to lead rich, meaningful lives, they must be able to draw upon and use the creative works of others. This principle encourages people to regard intellectual objects as free and to use them in any way they see fit. The desire to misuse creative works also may stem from the belief that the behavior is harmless. Piracy lacks the clear, tangible loss associated with conventional forms of crime, and this seems to make the behavior justifiable, even acceptable. Partial confirmation of this view comes from a 2006 Harris Interactive survey of American opinion about Internet file downloading. The survey found that 54 percent of youth regard downloading as wrong, while 92 percent regard shoplifting as wrong. It's important to remember that a person who is willing to engage in piracy must be able to do so. The offense is facilitated, if not made possible, by exploitative information technologies, such as optical scanners, digital cameras and recorders, and personal computers.

Piracy requires a suitable target, an object that is appealing and vulnerable. In the United States, creative works have considerable value; they are in great demand and a source of enormous wealth. Creative works also are vulnerable to misuse. Obviously, they are accessible to people. Because they are designed for consumption, owners strive to make these objects affordable. Because access to information is cherished, democratic governments attempt to make many of these objects available through public channels, such as libraries. Moreover, the reduction of words, sounds, and images to a digital form has made it easier to reproduce, alter, and distribute creative works.

Finally, piracy requires an absence of capable guardians. In the realm of copyright, capable guardians have been limited. On the one hand, government efforts to protect creative works have been modest. Historically, the government has done little to control misuse. For the most part, agencies have registered works and assigned exclusive rights to them; owners have been responsible for guarding their rights and enforcing them. On the other hand, owners' efforts to protect their works have been constrained. The diffusion of creative works, people's easy access to these objects as well as exploitative information technologies, and people's rights to use these objects in private have made it difficult for owners to monitor the use of their works and ensure that their rights are respected.

Controlling Piracy

Given the appeal and vulnerability of creative works and the availability of exploitative information technologies, copyright owners have endeavored to control misuse. These efforts have taken several forms.

Owners have mobilized the legal system to control piracy. In the United States, owners have urged lawmakers to provide better protection for creative works. The recording and film industries, for example, asked Congress to increase the penalties for record and film piracy. At the same time, owners have urged lawmakers to regulate exploitative information technologies. The film industry sought to control piracy by getting Congress to prohibit the manufacture and distribution of devices for defeating anti-copying treatments. More recently, copyright industries have asked lawmakers to regulate Internet services that enable people to freely exchange creative works online. In addition, owners have pressed law enforcement officials to identify and prosecute offenders, and many owners have developed programs to assist in this enterprise. They have encouraged people to report wrongdoing, and they have established security offices to investigate complaints, identify offenders, and assist officials in prosecuting them. Although owners have long emphasized the legal process in protecting against misuse, they recognize that it offers limited security and should be supplemented with other modes of control.

Owners have used technology to control piracy. Recognizing the difficulty of identifying and prosecuting offenders, owners have tried to make it difficult for people to misuse their works by erecting technological barriers to misuse. For example, to protect against unauthorized reproduction of works, recording companies have added digital watermarks and inaudible copy protection ciphers to recordings, film studios have applied anti-copying treatments to prerecorded DVDs, and computer software manufacturers have used copy-resistant distribution disks and encryption processes. Although technology has become an important means for controlling piracy, owners acknowledge that technological barriers are more likely to thwart the average user than the sophisticated user.

Owners have used education to control piracy. In the hope of getting people to recognize and honor their proprietary rights, owners have tried to shape popular attitudes toward the use of creative works. Through various media, they have expressed the obligations of consumers and drawn on familiar cultural frameworks in arguing against deviation from these obligations. Owners have claimed, for instance, that piracy is "theft," a breach of "mutual trust," and detrimental to the national good as well as to everyone who benefits from the creative enterprise. It should be noted that persuading people to honor the rights of owners is a formidable task, as many people do not seem to regard creative works as meriting the respect they accord conventional forms of property.

For years, piracy was modest at most, for many people were limited technologically in their capacity to misuse creative works. The tide has turned. The development and proliferation of exploitative information technologies coupled with the diffusion of intellectual products, the ease with which these objects can be obtained and manipulated, and the circulation of values and beliefs encouraging misuse have facilitated piracy and exacerbated the problem of controlling the activity. Not surprisingly, the viability of intellectual property has become a matter of serious concern.

David F. Luckenbill and Kirk Miller

See also Cyberspace; Property Crime; Theft

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PLAGIARISM

To represent oneself as the author of some work that is in fact the work of someone else is to plagiarize. Plagiarism may include the "passing off" of the form of the work—for example, the exact words of a piece of writing—or the intellectual content, or both.

Plagiarism exists as a serious social problem within the halls of Western academia. Only exceptional circumstances bring plagiarism of someone outside of academia to public attention. Plagiarism is an ethical, not a legal, issue and it does not equate with the breaking of copyright or patents, though at times both may also involve plagiarism. The advent of the World Wide Web and vast electronic databases brought this issue to the fore within academic institutions, resulting in new methods of both

plagiarism and detection. The global nature of the Web and the increase in transcultural education through the movement of students and scholars increased awareness of a cultural dimension to plagiarism.

Types of Plagiarism

The seriousness of plagiarism and its problematical nature rests on the likelihood that each instance is a deliberate act of deception. The simple definition of "passing off" therefore expands to consideration of how the material was "passed off," by whom, and for what purpose. Plagiarism thus falls into three main types, depending on the original author's level of awareness of intent to deceive.

Author Is Aware of Deception

Work on Behalf. The author of the work gives or sells the original work to another who takes credit for it by appending his or her own name. The most common example is the college "paper-mill" Web sites on which a student purchases an essay that someone else sold to it for the purpose of their reselling the work online. A different example is that of New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, who engaged someone to paint pictures that she then signed and sold at a charity auction. In both instances the intention is to deceive deliberately, with both form and content plagiarized.

Collusion. Collusion occurs when the author of the intellectual content and sometimes the form of presentation of that content is part of a group who exchange ideas and information. Another member of the group presents the entire work as if all of it were that person's own. One example would be students getting together to discuss an assignment intended to be an individual assignment. They each write up the assignment on their own but use each other's ideas. The intent may or may not be to deceive deliberately. In such cases, content is always plagiarized, though form may not be.

Author Is Unaware of Deception

Cut and Paste. An individual, in this instance, copies the form containing the intellectual content without acknowledging the original author's form, content, or both, and consequently gives the impression of ownership of form, content, or both. One such example is the cutting and pasting of a paragraph from a Web site into an essay or article without acknowledging the original source. Another example is historian Steven Ambrose's failure to use quotation marks in some stories that gave the impression he was the author of the form of the story even where he had acknowledged the author of the content.

Paraphrase. Here, a person copies the intellectual content and changes the form without acknowledgment of the original source. Examples would be a journalist writing an article based on one press release and does not acknowledge the source, or the use of Ibrahim al-Marashi's thesis by British Director of Communications Alistair Campbell that included both cutting and pasting and paraphrasing.

Use of Content Only. This refers to the use of intellectual content in a context without making use of the original form of presentation. Examples would be a grant application by someone based on the ideas of a former colleague or a screenplay based on a novel without acknowledgment.

In all these cases the intent may be to deceive. However, ignorance of referencing conventions or lack of skill may also play a part.

Author Claims Partial Credit

This occasionally happens in academia when the original author(s) of content and form are required to share credit, through coauthorship, with a more senior colleague or mentor by virtue of that person's position in the organization rather than any contribution to the research or article. The noncontributing colleague is plagiarizing by allowing the readers to believe he or she was in part responsible for the intellectual content.

A Brief History of Plagiarism

Historians attribute the origin of the term *plagiarism* in its current sense to the first-century CE poet Martial, who stated that it was shameful for another poet to publicly read Martial's poems as if they were his own. The word he used was *plagiarus*, which normally referred to someone who kidnapped a freed person and then enslaved him or her. Martial may or may not have been claiming ownership, but he was decrying the assigning of ownership to someone else, as in the modern sense of plagiarism.

The embedding of the belief into the modern Western psyche that an individual may own ideas and words may emanate from the Enlightenment and the rise of individualism. The separation of the created from the creator enabled the ascribing of ideas to the individual instead of the divine. The emergence of the printing press enabled the greater dissemination of these ideas, which had both economic and reputational consequences. The Statute of Anne of 1710 in Britain is considered the first copyright law attributing ownership and monopoly rights to authors. Since then, although copyright laws have changed, the right of an author of a piece of literature or artwork to be identified as the author has remained constant and is the dominant Western paradigm in which the concept of plagiarism resides. Consequently, many use the term *theft* to describe plagiarism, not in a legal sense, but as a metaphor to emphasize there is a "rightful" owner to form and a lowly social status to those who do not acknowledge that owner.

In Academia

Academia treats plagiarism seriously for two reasons. First, it devalues a profession based on honesty, and second, it undermines the fabric of advancement where recognition is through publication and citation.

Failure to properly acknowledge another academic is regarded as cheating someone out of that which is rightfully his or hers. Lack of acknowledgment may slow advancement and have financial implications for the individual and institution. Academics found to have plagiarized at any point of their career may find their careers cut short, as did Vice Chancellor (President) of Monash University Professor David Robinson.

Expectations are that students will operate within the academic paradigm by learning and obeying referencing conventions. Failure to do so affects not just the individual but the worth of the degree in the eyes of employers. Hence, the plagiarism of a few has social consequences for many.

Frequency

The Center for Academic Integrity, on the basis of self-reporting by 50,000 U.S. students, reported that half of them plagiarize in written assignments each year. Others estimate the plagiarizing of written assignments at 10 percent. Although many perceive plagiarism to be on the increase, its actuality awaits documentation from longitudinal studies.

The Cyber Arms Race

Countering students cutting and pasting from the World Wide Web or purchasing papers from paper mills are search engines and specially designed anti-plagiarism software. This software can detect even paraphrasing, not just wholesale copying.

Approaches to plagiarism include regulation and punishment, persuasion, and social change. Some academics are reluctant to follow up on possible plagiarism because of the personal cost to them in time and increased stress; others use the detection software as a deterrent, even having students use it before submitting papers. Most academics attempt to persuade through using their position of authority and educational skills. Some institutions try to change the values of the students through, for example, honor codes.

Cultural Dimensions

Plagiarism in the West rests on the assumptions that individuals can and do own their own words and content. This assumption remains strong despite philosophies such as deconstructionalism and relativism that tend to break down the assumption of absolute ownership of a work.

In many non-Western cultures, people find value in their relationships and position in society rather than in their expression of self. In such collectivist cultures, plagiarism is not recognized as a social wrong. Students from these cultures studying in Western institutions sometimes fail to grasp the significance to the Western academic of acknowledging the source of particular words or ideas. In addition, they may be reluctant to paraphrase or include their own ideas in a piece of writing, for this may be considered conceited. The globalization of education is, therefore, challenging the assumptions on which plagiarism rests.

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See also Cultural Relativism; Piracy

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Plea Bargaining

Plea bargaining refers to the practice, common in U.S. courts, wherein a criminal defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for leniency by the prosecutor or district attorney. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 95 percent of criminal convictions in U.S. courts are obtained through guilty pleas. Although it is not clear what percentage of guilty pleas entail an explicit "bargain" (i.e., defendants may plead guilty without any formal agreement), it is likely that most guilty pleas include some concession on the part of the prosecutor, or at least the assurance that the judge will be more lenient.

Three types of plea bargains are most common. *Charge bargaining* refers to the defendant pleading guilty to a less serious offense or to fewer charges than would be brought if the case went to trial. For example, a charge of first degree murder may be dismissed if the defendant agrees to plead guilty to second degree murder, or a charge of delivering narcotics might be reduced to possession of narcotics. Alternately, a prosecutor might dismiss several less serious charges if the defendant pleads guilty to the most serious charge. In *sentence bargaining,* the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the prosecutor recommending a less severe sentence than would be likely to follow a trial conviction. Finally, *fact bargaining* entails negotiating over "facts" that can increase the sentence, such as the quantity of drugs involved, the possession of a weapon during the crime, or that the conviction constitutes a "third strike." Fact bargaining is especially important when the crime is subject to a "mandatory minimum" sentence.

Although judges are not required to comply with prosecutors' recommendations in plea agreements, they typically do. Research also finds consistently that judges sentence defendants to jail or prison less often, and typically order shorter terms of incarceration, if defendants plead guilty. This "plea reward" (or "trial penalty") is found even among defendants convicted of similar crimes and having similar criminal histories. Many studies find the type of plea entered is one of the strongest predictors of sentence severity, after the seriousness of the crime and the defendant's criminal history.

Reasons for Plea Bargaining

The most common explanation for courts' and prosecutors' reliance on plea bargaining is that it is the most efficient means of resolving the large volume of criminal cases handled in state and federal courts. Jury trials are time consuming for prosecutors, and it would be virtually impossible for most criminal courts and local jails to accommodate jury trials for most defendants. By negotiating plea bargains in most cases, all parties benefit. The courts are able to process a larger volume of cases, prosecutors are ensured a high rate of convictions, and local jails are relieved of the need to hold a large number of defendants awaiting trial. Of course, by pleading guilty, defendants receive a less severe punishment than likely would follow a trial conviction, they spend less time in jail prior to sentencing, and they minimize their criminal record. Plea bargains are also attractive because they reduce the uncertainty inherent in a trial, for both the prosecution and the defense. Research typically finds that prosecutors also take into consideration the seriousness of the crime, the defendant's level of culpability, and the threat that the defendant poses to the community when deciding whether to grant concessions for a guilty plea. Community norms and political considerations may also become a factor in plea bargaining decisions, particularly in high-profile cases.

Controversy Surrounding Plea Bargaining

Some critics charge that plea bargaining is unconstitutional, in that defendants essentially are coerced into relinquishing their most fundamental civil liberties—the right to a trial by jury, guaranteed in Article III and

the Sixth Amendment (i.e., the Bill of Rights) of the U.S. Constitution; and protection against compulsory self-incrimination, provided in the Fifth Amendment—by the threat of more severe punishment should they exercise these rights. Given that most trials result in convictions, exercising one's right to trial is a risk that many defendants will be reluctant to take, so they may plea bargain for a lesser sentence rather than gamble that they might be among the few defendants acquitted by a jury. Defendants can also be pressured into pleading guilty because often they would spend more time in jail awaiting trial than if they pled guilty and were sentenced. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the practice of plea bargaining in a series of decisions, provided the plea is voluntary.

Plea bargaining may also be a source of racial/ethnic, gender, or social class disparities in punishment. Class disparities may result, for example, if wealthier defendants obtain greater plea concessions by hiring more effective legal counsel. This is perhaps most evident in cases involving white-collar or celebrity defendants with substantial resources. Research on the effects of race, ethnicity, and gender on plea bargaining is mixed. Some studies find that minority defendants and males benefit less through plea bargaining than do white or male defendants, but other studies find no differences. Also, some research finds that, among the vast majority of criminal cases, public defenders are as effective as privately retained attorneys.

Plea bargaining also enables prosecutors to circumvent sentencing laws designed to ensure greater uniformity in punishment or that require more severe punishment for certain crimes. For example, most states have adopted mandatory minimum sentencing laws requiring judges to order prison terms for offenders convicted of specific crimes, usually drug or weapon offenses, or for "habitual" offenders. In practice, though, prosecuting attorneys routinely agree to not file charges that would trigger a mandatory sentence if defendants plead guilty. For example, with the exception of California, most states that enacted "three strikes" laws in the 1990s have sentenced relatively few offenders under these laws.

Rodney Engen

See also Deviance; Justice; Prisons, Overcrowding; Stratification, Social; Three Strikes Laws; White-Collar Crime

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Plessy v. Ferguson

One of the more notable events in U.S. history with regard to the status of African Americans was the 1896 Supreme Court ruling *Plessy v. Ferguson.* It legitimized African Americans' subordinate status in society, and cast segregation as a fundamental law of the land and made constitutional what became known as "second-class citizenship."

Even in colonial times, the status of Africans in "white America" was problematic. The shift from "nonracialized" indentured servitude in the early 1600s to "racialized" slavery by midcentury was a major status change for Africans, from human to chattel. *Chattel* refers to valuable property or investments that can be moved from place to place. These "investments" were equivalent to owning cows, horses, or other farm animals. Not even fighting in the Revolutionary War was sufficient for blacks to gain citizenship, as the nation's first citizenship law, the Immigration and Naturalization law of 1790, restricted citizenship to whites. After 200 years as chattel in the South and noncitizens elsewhere, blacks benefited from the Union's Civil War victory and the outlawing of slavery with passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment provided due process and "equal protection of the laws" for African Americans, and the Fifteenth Amendment struck down prior servitude as a basis for denying black males the right to vote. Known as the "Civil War Amendments," they

extended to blacks full citizenship rights that lasted for the brief Reconstruction period (1865–76).

The beginning of the end of Reconstruction, however, began with the Hayes-Tilden compromise. As a result of an electoral crisis in the 1876 election, Samuel Tilden, a New York Democrat, surrendered his electoral votes to the Republican Rutherford B. Hayes in exchange for removal of troops from the South. The compromise essentially ended protection for Reconstruction governments and their black constituencies.

What followed next was "redemption," or the restoration of white supremacy that undid black gains, including their voting rights and right to be elected to political offices. Southern states began enacting segregation laws, such as Louisiana's 1890 law mandating separate railway cars by race. In this climate, the *Plessy* ruling would provide a legal framework for further segregation.

The *Plessy v. Ferguson* case involved Homer A. Plessy, a New Orleans mulatto, who was one-eighth black and seven-eighths white, but was classified as African American under Louisiana law. He was arrested in 1892 for refusing to leave the white passenger car on the East Louisiana Railway. Denied that first-class accommodation, Plessy challenged the Louisiana racial segregation law under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. After losing his appeal in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which upheld a lower court ruling in favor of the railroad's segregation policy, Plessy took his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Earlier, the Supreme Court ruled in the *Slaughter House Cases* in 1873, and the subsequent *United States v. Cruikshank* in 1876, that dealing with the widespread murder of blacks practicing their constitutional political rights at the hands of white mob violence "rest[ed] alone with the states," not on any protections from the federal government. Even earlier, in the 1857 *Dred Scott* decision, the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, himself a slaveholder, stipulated that "the black man has no rights which whites are bound to respect." These postwar rulings varied little from that of Taney and essentially encouraged the tyranny of the Ku Klux Klan. As white supremacy was being restored, the random, though ever-present violence to which blacks were subjected reaffirmed that blacks had no citizenship rights. Their assailants were seldom brought to justice.

Rather than uphold the basic principle of the Fourteenth Amendment of blacks having "equal protection under the laws," the 1896 Court held in *Plessy* that things could be "separate but equal." In his majority opinion, Justice Henry Billings Brown wrote that it was not the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment to "abolish distinctions based on color" or to enforce "a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either." He added that separation of the races, a state right, does "not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other."

Justice Brown's reasoning was consistent with other Court rulings in this interpretation of the law. In suits to enforce the civil rights laws granting equal opportunity in public accommodations, housing, and so on, the Court reasoned that since blacks were no longer slaves, distinctions based on "race, or color, or class distinctions" had nothing to do with their denial because of prior servitude. By endorsing the railroad company's refusal to allow blacks to ride in the "first-class" car, the status of African Americans as "second-class citizens" was established as a settled constitutional matter. *Plessy* froze the "Jim Crow" system in time and protected remnants of the black codes, including debt peonage and racial subordination. White supremacy as the nation's law was upheld.

The case that overturned *Plessy* in 1954, *Brown v. Board of Education,* ruled that "separate was inherently unequal" and segregation was therefore unconstitutional. In this new context, it was the lone dissent of Justice John Marshall Harlan in *Plessy* in 1896 that gave guidance in the *Brown* ruling. As a result of the 1954 ruling, and the civil rights movement, the basic citizenship rights of blacks (e.g., public accommodations, housing, employment, and the right to vote) were reinstated for the first time since Reconstruction.

Robert Newby

See also Civil Rights; Jim Crow; Justice; Life Chances; Segregation; Segregation, De Jure; Slavery

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Pluralism

Pluralism refers to theories and practices that favor the inclusion and tolerance of human differences. These differences could involve politics, religion, ethno-racial identity, cultural tradition, language, or something else. The study of pluralism varies with academic discipline. Political scientists describe pluralism as a feature of an open, democratic society in which people have political freedom, can express dissenting opinion, and can pressure government. Religion scholars examine differences within denominations as well as cooperation between different denominational and theological traditions. Sociologists and anthropologists focus on cultural pluralism, or the interrelationships between distinct groups—particularly ethnic, racial, or cultural groups. Their various approaches have led to lively debates about how best to conceptualize and empirically study pluralism.

These different disciplinary approaches to pluralism tend to share a concern with how social problems can arise when an individual or group is restricted from peaceful participation in the political system, cultural traditions, religion, or some other domain of social life. These various approaches also raise some similar questions about the relationship between groups and society at large. How do members of different ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and political groups participate in a shared society? How should they relate to each other, the state, and other key institutions? Do societies have a core culture to be preserved, and if so, who determines its openness to change? Most analyses of pluralism agree with certain pluralist assumptions: unlike fundamentalism or totalitarianism, a common pluralist sentiment is that some diversity is inherently good and distinct cultures should be protected. Said differently, the scholarship about pluralism encompasses both empirical investigations into group relations and normative statements about how groups *should* relate to one another.

The Concept of Pluralism in U.S. History

Horace M. Kallen, an immigrant who taught at the University of Wisconsin in the early 20th century, first coined the term *cultural pluralism*. According to the prevailing nativist view at that time, new immigrants moving to the United States should become "Americanized" by strictly conforming to the social practices and even the blood lines of a singular, generic national culture. In 1924, Kallen introduced the term and made a radical argument: immigrants' unique, persistent nationalities could coexist within American democracy in some kind of harmony. Since then, *pluralism* has meant different things at different points in U.S. history, depending on trends in academic disciplines, popular ideology, social movements, and geopolitical circumstances.

James Madison introduced one of the initial arguments for political pluralism in the 1780s when he proposed that factions would prevent any single group from dominating American politics. Not until the 1950s, however, did analysts popularize political "pluralism" as a theory of interest group politics. They understood the U.S. political system as interplay among corporate associations, labor unions, and other organizations that used resources to shape policy making. They believed that this system represented citizens, since power and influence were spread across many groups. Diversity could flourish and even enhance politics as long as everyone abided by certain American ideals, such as the democratic process and civility. This view of political pluralism, as well as popular ideas about cultural pluralism at the time, verbally lauded diversity while assuming a societal consensus around certain U.S. values.

In the 1960s, U.S. ideology about pluralism shifted toward two conflicting visions—corporate pluralism and liberal pluralism—amid social movements challenging discrimination at home, anti-colonialism abroad, and new laws allowing immigration from regions such as Latin America. Under corporate pluralism, ethnic and racial groups have formal legal status and rights, and individuals' rights depend, in part, on the groups to which they belong. The Black Power movement and its separatist call for black power

exemplified this vision. Some critics of this view called for liberal pluralism, in which democratic individualism and equality of opportunity are governing principles. They believe that the state should prevent discrimination against ethnic and racial groups but not control these groups or affirm their potentially divisive differences. Similarly, policy analysts have worried that some groups, especially poor black families, failed to adequately assimilate to a shared national culture. Critics of this view argue that it focuses on cultural deficiencies and largely ignores issues of structural inequality.

Contemporary pluralism emphasizes multicultural tolerance and the value of cultural diversity. Unlike earlier versions, it also suggests that intergroup interaction produces measurable, positive outcomes. For example, in two U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning affirmative action in 2003, the University of Michigan successfully argued that race-conscious admissions policies create a diverse student body, which leads to a better academic environment; students learn more when they interact with students of different backgrounds. Some progressive critics argue that contemporary pluralism emphasizes individuals' cultural identity while downplaying concerns about systematic discrimination and societal injustice. Others view this vision of pluralism as congruent with a neoliberal international order, globalization of capital markets, and rising U.S. conservatism because it treats diversity as a means to economic competitiveness rather than greater equity. Conservative critics question the government's role in promoting diversity or portray rhetoric about diversity as a repackaging of corporate pluralism—granting minorities and women unfair advantage that undermines principles such as merit.

Contemporary Areas of Research Focus

Theories and empirical studies of pluralism and its social problems offer different perspectives on the relationship between groups and society. Political theorists survey the political structures of pluralist countries such as Canada, India, and the United States and propose models for the proper relationship between cultural populations and the modern state. Some social scientists investigate how groups form from a macro-level perspective, examining the broader economic, political, and social forces, like race and racial distinctions, that shape institutions. For example, some scholars argue that the rise of modernity and Western capitalism depended fundamentally on processes of racialization that justified the exploitation of nonwhite "others" from Africa and the Americas. Other scholars point to the organizational processes of ethno-racial formation, such as the five racial categories created by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget in 1977 for data collection. Still others examine group formation and its related social problems closer to the ground by looking within groups, at their boundaries, social networks, and identities. Research on ethnic groups, for instance, focuses on immigrants' economic activity and their children's socialization, as well as the impact of churches, geographic concentration, and transnational movement.

Another common research area looks at the resources and opportunities available to racial minorities, women, and other historically excluded groups. Many sociologists study minority group representation and stratification in different sectors of society. For instance, the current U.S. power elite—those who own large banks and corporations, fund political campaigns, and serve in government—includes more women, people of color, and openly homosexual men and women than it did in the 1950s, but white, Christian males still predominate. The new and old members alike tend to come from wealthy families and attend similar private schools. A related approach examines how organizations and law can increase minority group representation. For example, workforce policies that assign responsibility for improving diversity, such as affirmative action plans, move more women and black men into managerial ranks than do diversity trainings that try to minimize bias among managers.

Ellen Berrey

See also American Dream; Assimilation; Black Nationalism; Cultural Relativism; Ethnomethodology; Multiculturalism; Power Elite

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POLICE

Police forces are agencies empowered by some level of government—local, county, state, or federal—to maintain social order through legal means, coercion, or use of force. Police serve as the enforcement arm of the criminal justice system, which consists of police, the judiciary, and corrections.

Unlike many other countries, the United States has decentralized police forces. With localism distinguishing U.S. police forces since their conception, municipal government and police chiefs have been fundamental to shaping police activities, resulting in police forces in different places that are often quite different from each other. This legacy of decentralized police organization and lack of coordination among district, county, and state police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Secret Service was cited as problematic in *The 9/11 Commission Report* and led to the development of the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate with local police departments, although it still has an undefined jurisdiction over local police.

Although many textbooks still describe the first U.S. police forces as emerging in the mid-1800s in northeastern cities, many contemporary scholars of police studies cite police forces' initial emergence in southern cities near the turn of the 19th century. These forces, which often patrolled on horseback and in some cities lived in dorms, were paid, civilian, patrolling entities created to help contain the urban slave population. Their duties included checking slaves for passes allowing them to be out on the street, searching for runaway slaves, and monitoring the free African American population and keeping them from gathering or interacting with slaves. However, because these forces had jurisdiction to arrest any city resident and did so, and interacted with the courts, they are by definition police forces and thus push back the origin date of police forces in the United States to the first years of the 19th century and geographically to southern cities rather than northeastern ones.

Boston and New York developed police forces in 1838 and 1844, respectively, and did so under pressure from local populations for more social order in a time of civil unrest. By the end of the 19th century, nearly all metropolitan areas had police forces, and starting in 1905 in Pennsylvania (which organized its state police in response to the unrest around the Great Anthracite Strike), state police forces began serving rural areas. By the start of World War II, all states had statewide police forces.

The discontinuity of the inception of police forces speaks to the most prevailing characteristics of policing in the United States, namely, its history of local autonomy and organization, which has only recently begun to change. By the mid- to late 19th century, urban police forces were deeply tied to local political parties and machines. In many larger cities, such as San Francisco, New York, and New Orleans, police were so intimately connected to local political parties that if their party lost its majority in the city council, the police department would be purged and new officers brought in who were loyal to the prevailing party. Therefore, employment in the police was contingent on political connections, and there was rarely any kind of formal training or serious application process. Combine this with the facts that no preprinted secret ballot yet existed and that police officers marshaled elections, and one can see the origins of the prevailing violence found on Election Day in many large cities.

Among the many calls for reform during the Progressive Era (1890s–1920s) were demands for the separation of local police forces from political machines. Progressives called for police officers to be put through a system of application and training and to receive pay increases and promotion through a merit-based system of exams. Perhaps foremost among the champions for this professionalization was August Vollmer (1876–1955), Berkeley's first police chief, who persuaded the University of California at Berkeley to establish the first criminal justice program, in which he subsequently taught. Known as "the father of modern law enforcement," he was the first

to create both bicycle and motorized patrols, to establish a police academy, and to require that officers earn college degrees; he also hired the first women police officers and was noted for his support of African American officers. After the Progressive Era, urban police forces, while still sometimes awash with corruption and brutality, no longer had the same level of connection to local politics. This value of "professionalism" in policing remains one of the central tenets of policing today and characterizes police reforms throughout the 20th century.

The riots that plagued U.S. cities in the mid-20th century—almost all sparked by instances of police brutality—were a serious challenge to the legitimacy of local police forces. As a result of this unrest, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice suggested in their 1967 report the development of "team policing." This concept, which became "community policing" in the 1980s and 1990s, called for greater coordination between police and community and for civilian oversight into police actions, particularly in investigating instances of police brutality. This emphasis on police intimacy with local communities and civilian participation remains popular today. However, the dictates of zero-tolerance policing that emerged in the 1990s (in which police forces are "arrest driven," concentrate on a deep knowledge of local crime hotspots, and arrest people for minor crimes in the hopes of preventing more serious ones) can strain police–community relations and sometimes be at odds with community policing.

Indeed, tensions and violence between local police forces and the communities they police have long characterized U.S. policing. Police corruption, brutality, and racial profiling have been among the more prevailing complaints about police comportment. Often citizen outrage has sparked substantive police reform. Various commissions were set up throughout the 20th century to study police problems and suggest changes. Furthermore, federal lawsuits became a major purveyor of police reforms, with changes in police organization or training as part of the lawsuit settlement.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed the Department of Homeland Security. Designed as an overarching entity overseeing all manner of threat to the United States, be it natural disaster or attack, this department has profound implications for local police forces. This influence is twofold. First, the Department of Homeland Security gives grants to local police departments and state governments to fund emergency preparedness equipment and personnel. Second, it provides training to local police forces against terrorist attacks. However, the dictates of the Department of Homeland Security in connection with both provisions are controversial. First, those concerned with civil liberties worry that the call for police officers to be intelligence gatherers rather than "responders" to crime or disorder has the potential to substantially change the nature of policing by asking police to spy on citizens. Second, the federally organized Department of Homeland Security calls to question the value of local citizen participation in policing or even the ability to express concern with police actions when jurisdiction is federal. For the most part, however, the structure and sanctioned actions of the Department of Homeland Security are still evolving and the long-term changes to be brought about by the new agency remain uncertain at this time.

Stacy K. McGoldrick

See also Civil Rights; Community Crime Control; Crime; PATRIOT Act; Police Stress; Policing, Community; Policing, Strategic; Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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Police Stress

Continual exposure to sudden life-and-death experiences, human suffering, and the frustration of strictly codified responses to violence, injury, and insult creates a unique set of potentially debilitating psychological stimuli often referred to as "police stress."

During everyday activities, whether on duty or off, the police officer is exposed to a higher than average number of life-threatening activities that precipitate sudden activation of the *fight-or-flight* mechanism within the physiology of the human body. Unlike the average citizen, the police officer often does not have the option of flight, which normally provides both escape and relief from the stress of confrontation. Chronic exposure to this accelerated physiological state and the subsequent release of body chemistry designed to stimulate mental acuity and body defense mechanisms has been clinically shown to produce mental health–related disabilities such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and general anxiety disorder. As a result, increased numbers of cases of dysfunctional marital and family relationships, suicides, chemical addictions, and personality disorders are prevalent among police officers.

Additional factors that exacerbate the detrimental effects of police stress upon the officer include poor diet and eating habits stemming from frequent motor patrol assignments, disrupted sleep patterns resulting from around-the-clock shift work, the strict discipline inherent in a paramilitary work environment, and frequent displays of disrespect offered by offender and citizen alike.

An important factor that aggravates the identification of police officers whose work product and quality of life are negatively affected by police stress is an archaic belief that officers with stress-related disorders must be relieved of duty. In recent years, more departments have developed enlightened policies on the management of police stress and the treatment of officers from both a preventative and rehabilitative aspect. Many departments now mandate psychological debriefings or *de-stressing sessions* after an officer is involved in a high-stress incident, such as an officer-involved shooting (OIS), the loss of a partner, or response to a high-order disaster such as the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001. Many police officers are particularly affected by incidents involving small children who are victims of heinous or brutal crimes.

The life partner of a police officer can be particularly helpful in identifying symptoms of police stress and in making sure that professional treatment is obtained in a timely fashion. Symptoms of mental health issues caused by police stress include nightmares and disturbed sleep patterns, restlessness, avoidance of activities previously enjoyed by the person, withdrawal from social interaction, uncharacteristic outbursts of anger, increase in blood pressure and pulse rate not due to underlying medical conditions, excessive work absences due to nonspecific illnesses, weepiness and melancholy, and an unusual preoccupation with death and dying.

A mental health professional can be very effective in treating police stress-related disabilities. Through the introduction of analysis, cognitive changes, and the use of psychotropic medications, the mental health practitioner can often reverse the ill effects of police-related stress and restore the individual's quality of life to a normal level. The education of police practitioners and those who command police departments is a key factor in the recognition and prevention of new police stress cases.

While many modern police administrators embrace community policing as a method of lowering crime rates within their commands, the concentration on police accountability inherent in the practice has recently become a major source of police stress, with ramifications for top-level commanders and administrators as well as front-line personnel. For example, the press reported that the use of the Compstat program (an accountability process driven by computer mapping of problem areas) within the auspices of the New York City Police Department apparently led to the death of at least one precinct commander who experienced a fatal coronary event in preparation for his appearance before the Compstat board. When a precinct commander fails to meet the expectations of such a board, the trickle-down effect to executive officers, supervisors, and the rank and file is palpable. The resulting stress affects each person in various ways and degrees.

On the positive side, other results of community policing practice may have an ameliorating influence on police stress. The reinstitution of such classic police techniques as foot patrol and bicycle patrol have healthy side effects for police officers by providing increased opportunity for aerobic exercise, a medically accepted antidote to stress, and the concomitant benefit of popularity within the community, which can help lessen the tension between officer and citizen. Community policing practitioners are frequently encouraged to make their own hours and set their own patrol style within the community. By taking advantage of the particular knowledge of crime patterns learned through patrol, the officer has the opportunity to become directly involved in crime prevention strategy at the beat level. Since the officer is directly involved in results-oriented behavior, a sense of control over

events is experienced, which can alleviate a portion of the frustration inherent in cruise-and-respond styles of policing.

Few jobs provide such a high level of responsibility to the common citizen. The police officer is part soldier, part lawyer, part psychologist, and part social worker. In the authorized use of deadly physical force, the officer becomes both judge and jury. This is an awesome responsibility further encumbered by the split-second timeline within which to make a life-and-death decision. In the wake of such a decision, the officer must maintain proper decorum and provide aid and assistance to the individual who may have, just seconds before, attempted to take away a life. This dichotomy of violent threat versus courageous behavior takes its toll on the police practitioner. It is an unknown factor that determines just how many stressful incidents an individual officer can experience before exhibiting a decline in work performance. Furthermore, officers may be exposed to the detrimental effects of stress not yet affecting work performance but nevertheless impacting negatively on social interaction and normal family life.

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See also Alcoholism; Burnout; Mental Depression; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; Stressors

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Policing, Community

Emerging from the tradition of locally organized police forces in the United States, community policing is a philosophy of police administration that focuses on cooperation and empathy between local police forces and communities. This style of policing embraces visible policing practices like foot or bike patrol and interactions with community members outside of emergencies, car accidents, or crime. Furthermore, this approach encourages substantive dialogue between police representatives and local organizations and sometimes goes so far as offering incentives for patrol officers to live in the communities in which they work. Based on the idea that police and the public should know each other as well as possible to be effective, *community policing* was a favorite buzzword throughout the late 1990s. While sometimes frustrating police officers because it was thought to be more style than substance and at other moments in contradiction to popular ideas of "zero-tolerance" policing, in fact community policing is thought, under the right circumstances, to improve quality of life. Today, community policing is in jeopardy due to budget retrenchment and the dictates of homeland security.

Examples of community policing efforts are police representation at Neighborhood Watch meetings and in civic organizations; police working with youth in athletic leagues or Explorer Clubs; police attending educational meetings at schools on drug education, violence, and abuse; and foot patrols that offer both police and the public opportunities to interact informally. Furthermore, community policing efforts are often equated with sustentative reforms such as civilian review boards and accountability on the neighborhood level for quality of life issues.

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice produced a report that recommended, among other things, "team policing." This idea, informed by the riots in U.S. cities against urban police departments, called on local police forces to become better informed about community problems and sensitive to their concerns. A series of studies on expanded foot patrol in the 1970s led to an influential study of police and community relations, which was conducted in Newark, New Jersey, in 1981 and concentrated on what are now viewed as the major dictates of community policing. This study claimed that while increased foot patrols and everyday interactions between officers and community members did not decrease crime, it did make people feel better about their community and the police and generally less fearful of random street crime.

After several more studies of community-based policing reforms, a 1987 report on community policing efforts outlined substantial reforms in police administration and organization and found them to be largely successful. After the published report and

accompanying conference in Racine, Wisconsin, that same year, community policing grew in popularity as a paradigm of police reform. The peak of public recognition of the movement may well be President William Clinton's 1994 campaign promise to fund 100,000 police officers for community policing efforts. Throughout the late 1990s, community policing continued to be a very popular concept both within police organizations and in public discussions of policing.

However, as a result of the September 11 attacks, community policing has been largely usurped in the public imagination with police as "first responders" who respond to and protect communities from terrorist attack and work closely with the Department of Homeland Security. Furthermore, while sometimes thought to be positive but not necessary, community policing efforts are often the first to be cut as police departments deal with decreased revenues and increased responsibilities for the "War on Terror."

Although sometimes used in tandem, the reforms of community policing should not be mistaken for the philosophy of "zero-tolerance" policing, where police forces arrest perpetrators of small-scale offenses such as vandalism, trespassing, and truancy in order to maintain public order. While zero-tolerance policing does concentrate on community knowledge, that information often comes from sophisticated computer geographical programs that track crime rather than community perceptions of crime problems. Further, community policing requires significant police discretion that arrest-driven, zero-tolerance policing cannot accommodate. In fact, some controversial aspects of zero-tolerance policing, such as stop-and-frisks, diminish community opinion of police activities. Furthermore, many critics connect zero-tolerance tactics with police brutality. For example, the New York police force, prior to September 11, 2001, was fully entrenched in zero-tolerance policing and was the target of five federal government investigations and one lawsuit.

While challenged by the dictates of homeland security, no study ever questioned the tremendous potential of community policing at the neighborhood level, and it remains popular throughout the United States. In fact, college campuses are some of the most successful sites of community policing activities, where campus police work closely with universities and their students in order both to respond to crime and to inform students about drug addiction, domestic abuse, and sexual violence. College campuses have, in the past 15 years, seen an increase of reporting of rape, thought to be partially due to police efforts on campuses to take the shame out of victimization and relate to the student population.

Stacy K. McGoldrick

See also Crime; Police; Policing, Strategic; Reasonable Suspicion; Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches; Zero-Tolerance Policies

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POLICING, STRATEGIC

Strategic policing refers to proactive measures that police take to prevent crime, control disorder, improve citizens' quality of life, and resolve community problems. To achieve these goals, the police employ tactics within a general, community-oriented strategy commonly known as "community policing."

While community policing is the dominant paradigm of policing, police strategies have evolved since the origin of modern police departments in the United States. For example, local politics heavily influenced U.S. police departments in the second half of the 19th century, and officers served largely at the discretion of ward politicians. Officers then provided a variety of community services to the public and generally had an intimate knowledge of the beats they patrolled. However, poor training, questionable standards regarding hiring and promotion, and political influence led to corrupt, incompetent, and often brutal practices.

Reformers in the early and mid-1900s, in an effort to improve policing and elevate the status of officers, sought to separate police from the corrupting influences of local politics. They attempted to accomplish this goal by shifting the police strategy from one that addressed a broad array of community issues to one that focused on "law enforcement"—especially the enforcement of serious felonies. Police agencies essentially removed officers from neighborhood beats and instead organized around centralized dispatch systems, whereby officers could respond quickly to calls for service. Their superior officers discouraged police from proactively handling minor community problems and providing other social services to the public. Instead of an intimate relationship with citizens, officers received encouragement to remain professionally remote "crime fighters." The popular 1950s television show *Dragnet* effectively depicted this image of the impartial law enforcement officer with Sergeant Joe Friday's famous line, "Just the facts, ma'am."

This law enforcement strategy did much to enhance the image of police, develop better training and supervision of officers, and improve internal management and organizational concerns. Questions remain, however, as to the extent to which this strategy improved the quality of policing services overall. Crime rates, as well as citizen fear of crime, continued to rise despite the emphasis on the police "crime-fighting" image. Empirical research studies conducted during the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the preferred police patrol and investigative tactics of the time had little impact on crime prevention or on arrest rates. Supreme Court cases, such as *Mapp v. Ohio* of 1961 and *Miranda v. Arizona* of 1966, pointed to the inadequacies and inappropriateness of police procedures. Finally, tensions between police and minority communities—often the result of unfair or heavy-handed practices on the part of police—escalated to the point of rioting in several major U.S. cities.

In light of the deficiencies of the "law enforcement" strategy, several ideas on police practice emerged during the 1970s and 1980s that influenced the development of the community policing model. Building on the results of foot patrol experiments, for example, analysts criticized the remoteness of police officers and suggested that citizens desired more intimate contacts with police. They revealed that citizens greatly valued the broadly based, order maintenance and service functions that police can provide, which police administrators had been actively discouraging. In addition, they were critical of the reactive nature of police work, arguing that police can control crime through more proactive, problem-solving techniques.

Although community policing is difficult to define, most agree that the strategy involves a combination of enhanced partnerships between police and citizens as well as a more proactive approach to solving community problems. As community policing evolved, police departments across the United States altered their structures and operations to better fit the goals of the community-oriented approach. For example, many departments now assign officers to regular geographic beats, with foot and bicycle patrols growing in popularity. These efforts seek to increase officer familiarity with specific community problems on their beats, foster order maintenance and problem management activities by officers, and enhance relationships between police and citizens.

From the operational perspective, police strategists now attempt to shift away from the reactive approach to crime control that dominated during most of the 20th century. In an attempt to return to the more proactive notion of crime prevention, they now address specific crime problems with more focused initiatives utilizing modern analytical techniques. Through the analysis of crime data, for example, agencies are often able to identify specific, crime-prone "hot spots" and determine the specific situational circumstances that generate crime at those locations. With a better understanding of neighborhood problems, utilization of special preventative techniques can reduce future opportunities for criminal activity. Police programs designed specifically to reduce gun carrying in "hot spots" of violent crime, for instance, have been effective in reducing violence in those locations. Another popular technique calls for officers to pay more attention to minor offenses, such as prostitution and public alcohol and drug use. The idea behind this tactic suggests that a linkage between minor disorders and serious felonies exists. Therefore, by controlling minor offenses, police may prevent occurrences of more serious crime.

Although responses to community problems often involve traditional police tactics such as arrests or citations at a specific location, simply making arrests or issuing citations may not resolve a recurring problem. More innovative methods draw upon the resources of the community or other government agencies. It is not unusual, for example, for police to partner with prosecutors to enhance civil penalties for

violators or to work with environmental engineers and architects to "design out" opportunities for crime in public places.

William H. Sousa

See also Community Crime Control; Policing, Community

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Political Action Committees

Political action committees (PACs) are organizations dedicated to fundraising and supporting the election or defeat of specific political candidates. Their existence traces back to 1944, when the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) supported efforts to reelect President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. To avoid violation of the Smith Connally Act of 1943, which prohibited federal candidates from receiving contributions from labor unions, the CIO encouraged its union members to voluntarily contribute directly to the PAC's effort to support the Roosevelt campaign. These efforts proved so successful that numerous other PACs soon appeared. Today, PACs literally raise billions of dollars in support of thousands of political candidates at both state and federal levels.

Although the number of PACs grew continuously through the 1950s and 1960s, they reached their real prominence during the 1970s. It was then that Congress attempted to limit some of the "big money" influence in national elections by enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of FECA in *Buckley v. Valeo.* At issue was the conflict between limiting campaign abuses and infringing on the rights of free speech and association contained within the First Amendment. Since all political groups require money to grow and to convey their message, any restrictions on fundraising or campaign spending could impact an organization's First Amendment rights. In a decision nearly 300 pages in length, the Supreme Court distinguished between contributions and expenditures by stating that, constitutionally, restrictions on contributions were less harmful to freedom of association and speech than were limitations on expenditures. As a result, while the Court struck down FECA provisions limiting presidential candidates' use of their own or their immediate family's money to $50,000 and restricting "independent spending" by others in support of a federal office candidate, it upheld FECA provisions placing maximum limits on the amount individuals or groups can contribute to federal office candidates. It also limited the public finance process for presidential candidates whereby funds are matched in primaries and caucuses, while allowing the general election to be fully funded, in exchange for spending limits by candidates.

In subsequent decades, the Supreme Court continued to examine a number of issues concerning independent expenditures. In *Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee* in 1985, the Court struck down a spending restriction on independent political committees supporting presidential candidates who had accepted public funding, ruling such expenditures "produce speech at the core of the First Amendment." Then, in 1996, the Supreme Court addressed a provision of FECA limiting the amount of "coordinated expenditures" a political party could spend in connection with the campaign of a congressional candidate. Ruling that such spending should not be presumed to be coordinated, and maintaining that First Amendment protections applied to these expenditures, the Court in *Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I)* said that spending limits are unconstitutional as long as the party's media campaign develops independently of the party's nominee. Finally, in 2001, the Supreme Court examined the issue of expenditures that were, in fact, coordinated between a political party and the candidate's campaign in *Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II).* Ruling that such coordinated expenditures were similar to contributions to the candidate, thus circumventing contribution

restrictions, five justices ruled the First Amendment was not a protection against "coordinated expenditure" limitations.

In an effort to prohibit all "soft money" or unregulated contributions to national party organizations, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in 2002. Responding to the 2000 elections, when Republicans and Democrats raised nearly $500 million in soft money, the law raised the yearly limits for individual contributions but specifically banned unregulated donations to national party organizations, placed restrictions on contributions to state and local party organizations, and limited broadcast advertising in support of a candidate unless funded by a party's "hard money" or regulated contributions. As expected, the Supreme Court reviewed BCRA in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission* in 2003. Adopting the same 5–4 positions they took in *Colorado II*, a majority of the Court upheld the restrictions on "soft money" as well as the limitations on "electioneering communications" in an effort to continue the decades-long fight against expenditure corruption or the appearance of corruption.

Over the course of the past quarter-century, some of the most prominent PACs have emanated from specific corporations (such as Microsoft) or labor groups (such as the Teamsters Union). Politicians have also formed leadership PACs in an effort to support the campaigns of other candidates or test the support for a run at a higher office. PACs not connected to specific corporations, labor groups, political parties, or politicians may be referred to as "nonconnected PACS." The National Rifle Association is an example of such a PAC. Rather than soliciting contributions from just their employees and members, these organizations can fundraise from the general public as well. With election costs escalating dramatically each year, primarily because of television advertising, the influence of PACs has correspondingly increased. For example, between January 1, 2003, and June 30, 2004, the Federal Election Commission reported that, of the $629.3 million raised by PACs, $514.9 million was spent and $205.1 million was contributed to federal candidates. During the 2004 presidential election, the top ten PACs in spending money were EMILY's List; Service Employees International Union; American Federation of Teachers; American Medical Association; National Rifle Association; Teamsters Union; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; National Education Association; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees; and Laborers' International Union of North America.

By enacting the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Congress attempted to restrict any further abuses in campaign finance regulation, but with various factors guaranteeing that money will continue to play a vital role in politics, it seems likely groups will continue to discover ways they can use the BCRA to their advantage. Some of the more prominent factors ensuring the role money plays in politics include (a) the fact that in 2004, those Senate candidates who spent the most money in their campaigns won 88 percent of the time, while those House of Representative candidates who spent the most won 98 percent of the time; (b) the influence political parties have on the general public has declined, opening the door for direct lobbying by single-issue PACs and interest groups; (c) computer technology has provided organizations with a fertile avenue for recruiting members and disseminating their message; and (d) the dramatic increase in diversity among the U.S. population has greatly encouraged the development of single-issue PACs and interest groups.

Since concerns continue to be expressed over the perception that the more powerful PACs possess the ability to purchase policy or take advantage of inequitable opportunities for access to government, numerous proposed reforms seek to help alleviate these issues. Generally, these suggested reforms fall into four categories: (1) supply-side reforms, such as raising or lowering contribution limits or extending limits to a greater range of groups and activities; (2) demand-side reforms, such as reducing the need for money by providing candidates with free or reduced-cost television and radio time or mail; (3) informational reforms, such as having government broadly publicize required disclosures on all contributions made to candidates before an election; and (4) the elimination of the appearance of corruption reforms, such as preventing officeholders from participating in legislative decisions affecting donors who have minimal restrictions on contributions and prohibiting such donors from obtaining state contracts under certain conditions.

Whether these reforms are enacted will depend on a number of factors. The first factor to overcome is the general lack of consensus present over the reform proposals. A wide variety of disagreements exist at present concerning both the category of reform needed and the specific type and degree of reform required.

The second factor involves the high degree of self-interest inherent among the legislators and their constituents. The third factor to overcome will be any legislation's eventual judicial review by the Supreme Court. Although a majority of the Court upheld the provisions challenged in *Colorado II* and *McConnell*, the slim majority in those cases may well shift to the minority as the new members of the Court, Justices Samuel Alito and John Roberts, have jurisprudent views generally similar to the minority's ultra-conservative philosophy.

Regardless of any criticism and reforms, PAC activity will continue to flourish over the course of the foreseeable future and, as such, both public and private interest groups will be relied upon to convey and advance the interests of their constituents to legislators. Although, at present, federal election laws prohibit PACs from contributing more than $5,000 to a candidate per election or $15,000 to any national party committee per year, since there are no current restrictions placed on PACs for advertising monies spent in support of candidates or in the promotion of their philosophy or priorities, they will remain a prominent player in the game of politics.

Michael Luis Principe

See also Labor Unions; Political Fragmentation; Politics and Christianity; Religion and Politics; Special Interest Groups

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Political Fragmentation

Political fragmentation, the existence of multiple units of government in urban and surrounding suburban areas, is not new. It has existed in the United States since the late 1800s, when people began to move away from urban areas and establish independent suburban communities. Political fragmentation also occurs through the proliferation of special purpose governmental units, such as transportation authorities and school districts, whereby citizens are governed and taxed by many different governmental agencies at once.

Different theoretical perspectives—such as public choice, human ecology, and social reform theories—provide dissimilar ways to examine and deal with the ramifications of political fragmentation. While public choice and human ecology theorists stress the voluntary nature and positive impact of the racial/ethnic and class divisions that tend to arise in the wake of political fragmentation, social reform theorists note the negative implications of the segregation and inequality that tend to accompany political fragmentation. For example, while public choice theorists see such fragmentation as fostering healthy competition among local governments to offer residents more and better services for less tax money, social reform theorists note that only economically secure citizens actually have a choice as to where to reside. In turn, communities that can't afford to offer the best services and opportunities for their residents tend to be populated by those with the fewest economic and social choices.

At various times over the past 100 years, movements have arisen to consolidate local governments in order to make them more efficient and fair. The first such effort was part of the Progressive movement's late 19th-century drive to clean up corruption and decrease the power of political machines in local government. The second occurred in response to the great growth of the suburbs during the 1950s and 1960s. However, while many Americans have complained about inefficient government and high taxes, relatively few have voted to consolidate local governments into regional ones. According to the National Association of Counties, just 21 of the 131 referendums on consolidation put forth between 1921 and 1996 passed.

The few regional and metropolitan governments that have been created are not uniform. They vary as to how much power is given to larger, regional or metropolitan governments and local governments. For example, Jacksonville–Duval County, Florida, is a regional-level government with power to directly govern the region, while the Miami-Dade, Florida, county government shares power with cities under its umbrella.

Today, there is once again a strong movement to curb political fragmentation. However, the most popular proposals to address political fragmentation in this era call for cooperation rather than consolidation. Many members of local communities are wary of big government and afraid of losing their distinct political voices. While concerned about political fragmentation, they advocate for increased cooperation between local governments and consolidation of particular services across different towns and cities rather than the creation of large regional or metropolitan governments. Motivations behind the current drive to curb political fragmentation vary but include the following: making government more efficient and thus less costly; combating urban sprawl; allowing sectors of geographic regions to collaborate in order to better compete in the global marketplace; and spreading resources from richer to poorer areas of our nation. While consolidation has not been a popular answer to the social problems related to political fragmentation, cooperation may be a more politically viable and effective means of addressing this persistent social issue.

Kathleen Korgen

See also Economic Restructuring; Redistricting, School Districts

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Politics and Christianity

Most researchers studying the intersecting and influence of Christianity and politics on one another frequently quote Matthew 22, in which Jesus, in response to the Pharisees' question about the legality of paying taxes to Caesar, says, "Give therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's." Some Christians cite these words as a warning, even a command that the church should stay out of politics. They contend that the purpose of the state is to govern this world, to tend to our material and physical needs, and the purpose of the church and religion is to tend to our spiritual needs and to prepare us for the world to come.

On the other hand, many Christians interpret these words rather differently. They contend that this trick question from the Pharisees, a question intended to trap Jesus, results in a trick answer, with its meaning hidden in plain sight. These individuals suggest that everything in the world belongs to God, who created everything, even Caesar. So in the end, even Caesar belongs to and is accountable to God.

The first commandment in Exodus 20:3 proclaims, "You shall have no other gods before me," a priority that the U.S. government officially recognizes; every time Americans say the Pledge of Allegiance, they declare they are "one nation under God." Religious advocates argue that any attempt to compartmentalize life, to say this belongs to the state and this belongs to God, violates the first commandment. They maintain that since God is Lord of all life, the church should therefore be concerned about and involved in all of life, including politics.

However, real dangers exist in both of these interpretations if taken to the extreme. Believers insist that life cannot be separated neatly into the physical and the spiritual. For instance, many doctors insist that a patient's attitude toward his or her cure is as important as the remedy prescribed for the cure, and they endorse a holistic approach to health care. Just as water is no longer water when separated into hydrogen and oxygen, Christians contend that humans lose their essence of being when separated into the physical and the spiritual. Because they believe in the resurrection of the body as well as the immortality of the soul, Christians maintain that the body and soul cannot be separated; they are one.

In contrast, Karl Marx described religion as the "opiate of the people," partly because the only religion he was familiar with refused to get involved with the physical needs of the people. As an example, in 1917, when the citizens of Petrograd were starving and rioting in the streets, the Russian Orthodox Church was meeting in that same city debating the length and color of their liturgical vestments.

Many Christian leaders insist that the church must care about people's physical needs as well as their

spiritual well-being, and if caring for others involves politics, then so be it. They contend that it is impossible to love one's neighbor in the abstract. When people of faith remain silent and do nothing in the face of evil and injustice, they in effect condone that wrong. This reasoning was behind the Sanctuary movement of the 1980s, when clergy and congregations defied the government and offered aid to Ecuadorian refugees.

However, danger exists in the other point of view as well. When religious groups think they know best, when they set themselves up as the only interpreter of God's will, when the church tries to get directly involved in legislation and governing by endorsing candidates and party platforms, disaster often follows, such as the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, and the burning of heretics and witches at the stake. More recently, religious intolerance violently divided countries like Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq. On another level, the intrusion of religious beliefs into the political process on such issues as abortion and gay marriage has polarized U.S. politics.

In 1887, the British statesman Lord Acton wrote that power tended to corrupt and absolute power corrupted absolutely. History has shown that this statement is as true for the church as it is for individuals. This reality is one of the reasons that Thomas Jefferson promoted the doctrine of separation of church and state, and it remains a compelling reason that Americans still strive to protect and promote this doctrine. Freedom of religion and freedom from religion are two of the factors that motivated many immigrants, past and present, to come to the United States.

Moderate Christian activists suggest that the middle ground between these two extremes is revealed in the Bible. They contend that, without ever seeking the power to govern, the Hebrew prophets spoke what they considered to be the truth again and again to those in power. For example, Amos spoke up for the poor and oppressed and against the indifference of the political and religious powers of his day when he thundered in Amos 5:24: "Let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream." This quotation, frequently used by Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in his speeches, is inscribed on the Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery, Alabama. It is not at all coincidental that many Christians—ministers and laity alike—were in the forefront of the civil rights movement.

In all of Jesus' teachings, he never endorsed a particular political system, economic program, or any detailed plan of social reform. Instead, he gave broad guiding principles rather than specific instructions. British scholar and Christian author C. S. Lewis once observed that while Jesus told people to feed the hungry, he did not provide a cooking lesson. Feeding the hungry is not optional, but how to do so rests with the ingenuity of each generation and culture. That ingenuity, say Christian moderates, rests with the collective will of the people, not the imposed will of one religious group over others.

Consequently, some Christian scholars suggest that, on the issue of war and peace, the church should be asking, among other things, whether or not the violence is justified and the only viable solution, and whether or not we have exhausted all avenues of diplomacy, negotiation, and compromise. In the midst of the debate on immigration, they maintain that church leaders should refrain from endorsing a particular piece of legislation, but they clearly and forcefully state repeatedly that every person should be treated as one of God's creatures. On the question of gay marriage, they suggest that religious people should consider not only its morality but also what constitutes fairness and justice.

The still-continuing debate about how the United States should treat prisoners of war affords another example of potential Christian involvement in seeking to influence national policy. The Bush administration consistently refused to voluntarily adhere to the Geneva Convention and to speak to its transferring prisoners of war to sympathetic countries that routinely use torture as an interrogation technique. Christian scholars lamented that, in contrast to the spontaneous, nearly unanimous outrage in 2006 at the possibility that some U.S. port facilities might be owned and operated by an Arab company, there was a surprisingly apathetic response to the revelations about torture.

The challenge for Christians, then, lies in their recognition of a society's social problems not just as reality, but in determining how they can, on the one hand, be true to their beliefs and take steps to make a difference, yet still respect the rights of the non-Christian community, who may well have another perspective on righting societal wrongs.

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See also Culture Wars; Faith-Based Social Initiatives; Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Religious Holidays as Social Problems; Sanctuary Movement

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Pollution, Credit Trading

See Environment, Pollution

Population, Graying of

The 1870 U.S. Census enumerated the elderly—people 65 years of age or older—at about 1.2 million people (3 percent of the total population of 40 million). However, during the 20th century, with industrialization and changes in fertility and mortality patterns, a new age structure emerged for the population of the United States. Twenty-eight million people were added during the 1950s, at the height of the baby boom era that began after World War II and ended in 1964. The years between 1960 and 1980 were especially dramatic in their contribution: although the total population increased by nearly 19 percent, the population of people ages 65 and older increased by 34 percent (about 25 million in 1980). When age 65 was set as the threshold for Social Security benefits in 1935, the predicted average life expectancy at birth was barely over 60 years. In comparison, the average life expectancy presently is about 78 years. This growth and change has resulted in the "graying" of the U.S. population, and the phenomenon has not diminished since.

In 1986, 12 percent of the population was made up of senior citizens, or about 29 million people over the age of 65. By 2030, the proportion of Americans age 65 or older is predicted to increase to nearly 20 percent, or about 72 million elderly people. In 2000, the median age of the overall population was 35.3 years; barely a century ago, the median age was 22.9 years. In 2030, according to current Census Bureau projections, our median age will be 39.0 years. We are the oldest that our population has ever been, but younger than it is projected ever to be again.

The expansion of the elderly population has been especially pronounced for the "oldest old," that segment of individuals who are age 85 and older. The proportion of the oldest old in our total population has increased so dramatically that it is no longer unusual to encounter people who are age 100 or more. By 2050, the Census Bureau's middle-range projections suggest that the proportion of Americans ages 85 and older will be nearly as large as the proportion that were age 65 or older in 1930.

As the U.S. population continues to grow, demographers project that programs for the elderly will consume a larger share of federal tax dollars. In 1980, federal spending on the elderly was nearly a third of the federal budget and may well be nearly half the federal budget in 2015. The future problems with Social Security costs, as the baby boomers approach retirement, though, will pale in comparison to the continually rising costs of health care and prescription drugs; the expectations are that Medicaid and Medicare program costs will triple by 2015.

What these data suggest is that the aging of the population will have a significant effect on society. Median age has increased, as has life expectancy; people are living much longer, and therefore there are more elderly people in competition with the young for societal resources. Two questions emerge about the conundrum of the graying of our population: With the rising costs of Medicaid and Medicare and Social Security, and the challenges of demographic change, how are we going to take care of the graying population, without short-changing current and future generations? Also, how does the situation in the United States compare with the rest of the world, in both the industrialized and developing worlds?

Generational Conflict

Before 1960, Medicare and Medicaid did not exist as social programs. One of President Lyndon Johnson's goals in his "War on Poverty" in 1964 was to provide assistance for health care needs and extended medical insurance under the Social Security system and to reduce poverty among the elderly. Prior to the assistance of these social programs, about 35 percent of Americans over the age of 65 had incomes below the poverty line; in comparison, by the year 2000 the poverty rate for elderly people had dropped to 10 percent.

However, poverty figures don't take into account factors that may push the elderly population into a fragile economic state, despite an income status that places them above the official poverty line. For senior citizens, a sizable chunk of income is claimed by rising health care costs. Alternate measures of poverty suggest that, all other factors being equal, if out-of-pocket

health care costs were taken into account, nearly 20 percent of elderly Americans would be classified as poor.

Changes in the demographic landscape also contribute to a genuine concern for assessing the dependency thresholds in both younger and older age groups in our population. It is assumed in public policy that dependency thresholds exist for particular age categories; the dependency ratio is currently defined as the number of people under age 18 (children) or ages 65 and over (elderly) per 100 people ages 18 to 64 (defined as the working population). The dependency ratio in 1900 was 80; children accounted for nearly all of it (73), whereas in 1960, the ratio was 82, with child dependency at 65. With the baby boom population now in the midlife stage, the current dependency ratio at 62 (the child dependency ratio is 41) is the lowest it has been since the 1930s, but once this generation is beyond age 65, the dependency ratio will increase if current demographic trends continue. Census projections are that in 2050 the dependency ratio will be about 80, with children accounting for less than half. That increased dependency suggests that the needs and expenses of the elderly will outweigh that of youth.

However, current trends suggest that actual dependency for young people extends well beyond age 18, as many college students are moving back in with their parents after college. Furthermore, dependency for many older people now comes much later than age 65, as people put off retirement or move into new careers. Another concern is that of the "Sandwich Generation," when adults simultaneously provide a home and/or care for both their parents and their children. This is reflected in debates over family leave policies to accommodate changing needs. Multigenerational households are becoming more commonplace and complex, as families adapt to the changes going on around them.

Global Comparisons

Compared with other industrialized nations, the U.S. population is relatively young, with 12 percent age 65 or older, compared to the "oldest" country, Italy, with 19 percent. Except for Japan, the world's 20 oldest countries are all in Europe. But less developed nations also have large numbers of older citizens, and the numbers are increasing rapidly. Sixty percent of the world's older population now lives in less developed countries; by 2030, this proportion is projected to increase to 71 percent as societies experience downturns in their natural population increases. This is similar to the decline that previously occurred in industrialized nations with decreases in fertility and mortality and resulting changes in the age structure.

Demographers project that the older population will become an ever-larger proportion of each nation's total population across the globe. The older population within countries is also changing, and in many countries the oldest old are the fastest-growing segment of the population. In 2004, more than half of the world's oldest old were living in six countries: China, the United States, India, Japan, Germany, and Russia. This simultaneous graying of population and overall decline in the total size of some populations poses new challenges for societal and policy adaptation to these demographic changes.

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See also Ageism; Baby Boomers; Dependency Ratio; Family, Extended; Health Care, Costs; Medicaid; Medicare; Nursing Home Care; Sandwich Generation; Stratification, Age

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Population Growth

The modern expansion of human numbers began in the late 18th century in Europe and North America. Since then, population growth has spread to all continents and has accelerated: the first billion was reached in 1800; the second, third, fourth, and fifth billions took 125, 35, 14, and 13 years, respectively; and the sixth billion was added in just 12 years, between 1987 and 1999. Today's world population of 6.5 billion is expected to continue to grow, reaching 9.1 billion later in this century before stabilizing. This projection implies that the world's population will have grown by more than tenfold—from 0.8 to 9.1 billion—between 1750 and 2050.

The Demographic Transition

Accompanying the development process that transforms traditional agricultural societies into modern industrial ones is a distinct pattern of secular population growth and demographic change called the "demographic transition." Before the transition's onset, population growth is near zero as high death rates more or less offset the high birth rates typically found in traditional societies. Population growth is again near zero after the completion of the transition, as birth and death rates both reach low levels in modern developed societies. During the intervening transition period, population growth is positive, as the death rate drops before the birth rate. Over the course of the transition, the population size typically grows by an order of magnitude.

Until the mid-18th century, global birth and death rates were both high, at approximately 4 percent per year, and growth rates were close to zero. Over the past two and a half centuries, the death rate declined steadily, to below 1 percent per year by 2000. The birth rate changed little from its historic high levels until the early 1970s, when a precipitous drop began that demographers expect to continue in future decades. The population growth rate of the world peaked at 2.1 percent per year in the late 1960s, when the birth and death rates stood at 3.4 and 1.3 percent per year, respectively. Since the 1960s, the growth rate has declined, reaching an estimated 1.1 percent per year in 2000–2005. In contrast, the annual additions to the population of the world peaked later and will remain high for longer (above 70 million per year until about 2020), because the slowly declining growth rate applies to a rapidly expanding population base. The half-century from 1970 to 2020 represents the period of most rapid expansion of human numbers ever, with the addition of nearly 4 billion people.

The timing of the onset of the transition, the duration of its different phases, and the levels of birth, death, and growth rates differ widely among countries and regions. The developed world, also called the North, was the first to enter the demographic transition in the late 18th century with a decline in mortality, and the birth rate began its decline in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Today the North has reached the end of the demographic transition, and growth averages near zero. The transition in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, also called the South, started much later than in the North. A sustained reduction in the death rate did not occur until the beginning of the 20th century, and the birth rate remained high until about 1970. Since 1970, fertility in Asia and Latin America declined sharply, while Africa's birth rate remains relatively high.

Table 1 shows past trends in population from 1950 to 2005 by region. Asia is, and has been by far, the largest region, containing well over half of the world's

Table 1 Population Size by Region

	Estimates		*Projection*	*Ratio*
	1950	*2005*	*2050*	*2050/1950*
World	2,519	6,465	9,076	3.6
North	813	1,211	1,236	1.5
South	1,707	5,253	7,840	4.6
Africa	224	906	1,937	8.6
Asia	1,396	3,905	5,217	3.7
Europe	547	728	653	1.2
Latin America, Caribbean	167	561	783	4.7
Northern America	172	331	438	2.5
Oceania	13	33	48	3.7

Source: Data compiled from United Nations Web site, 2005.

population. Population growth between 1950 and 2005 averaged 157 percent for the world as a whole. Over this period, Africa experienced the most rapid growth (304 percent), and Europe the slowest (33 percent).

Prospects for the Future

The United Nations biannually publishes projections to 2050 for the world, major regions, and countries. Projected population trends vary widely among world regions (see Table 1). In 2005, Asia had a population of 3.9 billion, which is expected to reach 5.2 billion by 2050. Africa, with 0.91 billion inhabitants in 2005, is likely to experience the most rapid future expansion, more than doubling in size by 2050. Latin America, with 0.56 billion in 2005, is the smallest of the regions of the South; this should remain the case with a growth pattern similar to Asia's. Projected trends for the two principal regions in the North diverge between 2005 and 2050: an increase from 0.33 to 0.43 billion in Northern America, but a decline from 0.73 to 0.65 billion in Europe. These divergent regional trends imply that nearly all future growth will take place in the South, while the North as a whole will see little change. Another consequence of the wide diversity of growth rates is that the regional distribution of population will shift significantly over time. While Asia's (60.8 percent) and Latin America's (8.3 percent) shares change little, Europe's declines sharply (from 11.3 to 7.2 percent) and Africa's rises substantially (from 14.0 to 21.3 percent). Between 2005 and 2050, the North's share should decline from 18.7 to 13.6 percent.

Notably, population growth continues at a rapid pace in Africa despite the large numbers of deaths due to the AIDS epidemic. The impact of this epidemic can be assessed by comparing the standard population projection for Africa (which includes the epidemic's effects) with a separate hypothetical projection in which AIDS mortality is excluded. The former projects Africa's population to increase from 0.91 billion in 2005 to 1.94 billion in 2050; the latter expects population size to reach 2.20 billion in 2050. The difference of 0.27 billion between the projections with and without the epidemic is due to deaths from AIDS as well as the absence of births of their descendants. The epidemic clearly has a large effect on population growth by raising the death rate, but expectations are that the birth rate will remain higher than the elevated death rate for the next half-century, thus ensuring continued rapid population growth.

Policy Implications

The policy implications of current demographic trends are very different for the South and the North. In the already crowded South, the addition of several billion more people will hamper ongoing efforts to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development. Concern over these adverse consequences provides the principal rationale for past investments in voluntary family planning and reproductive health programs that help couples avoid unwanted childbearing. Expanding this effort could be social investments in young people—for example, in the education of girls—that help offset population growth momentum, in addition to bringing many direct benefits for the quality of individual lives.

In the North, the potential adverse consequences of very low birth rates, rapid aging, and declining populations prompt extensive discussions but little effective action. Among the numerous policy options proposed to encourage childbearing are free or subsidized child care, reduced taxes for families with children, paid parental leaves, and subsidized housing for young couples. Unfortunately, little useful experience exists to draw on in assessing the potential effectiveness of various options. The reluctance of most governments to pursue explicit pronatalist policies is due to a range of factors, including the awkwardness of domestic pronatalism while subsidizing fertility reduction programs in the developing world; a reluctance to interfere in the personal matter of reproductive choice; the large expense entailed in implementing an effective intervention; and the benefits for the global environment of fewer rich consumers of natural resources. Nevertheless, the urgent need to address these adverse demographic trends is likely to lead to more vigorous action in the near future.

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See also Birth Rate; Demographic Transition Theory; Life Expectancy; Mortality Rate

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PORNOGRAPHY

Pornography or sexual materials are seemingly a part of human culture. From antiquity to the present, many societies have employed forms of sexual materials in writing, images, song, or dance for entertainment and/or sexual enjoyment. Not all cultures approve of such material, nor is there societal consensus regarding them. Over the past several decades, the debate in the United States about pornography has become increasingly salient, with a rise in political attention, in part as a result of increased consumption of pornography due to technological advances in the availability of sexual materials and in part from societal reactions to this greater availability. In response, pornography is the subject of research from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and has become a hotbed of contention both within feminist discourse and outside the academy.

Problem of Definition

Discussions about pornography often begin with questioning how to define it. Pornography is difficult to define, as the constructions are politically loaded regarding censorship and given the various ideological positions on pornography. Extensive research exists on the relationships between pornography and society, with followers of each position able to cite findings to bolster their position. Sociodemographic factors also affect individuals' beliefs concerning pornography. Another factor affecting the debate is that pornography is a lucrative financial industry that generates billions of dollars in revenue despite its disreputable social standing.

Various attempts at regulation have attempted to address problems of definition regarding pornography, obscenity, erotica, and art. Some differentiate between hard-core and soft-core pornography, gay and lesbian pornography, and fetish pornography. All definitions, imbued with subjectivity, have social, political, and moral ramifications. Further, the meanings and understandings of pornography have changed over time, influenced by legalistic and scholarly interpretations or changing societal values. Consensus about a definition thus remains elusive and controversial.

Legislation in the United States has played an integral role in societal conceptualizations of sexual materials. The first federal law regarding pornography was the Comstock Act of 1873. The Comstock Act prohibited transport by mail of any material related to sexuality and contraception. The 1957 *Roth v. U.S.* Supreme Court decision narrowed the interpretation by defining as obscene only material that was utterly without redeeming social value. In 1970, the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography recommended repealing all laws prohibiting the distribution of sexually explicit materials to consenting adults, as it did not find a causal link between viewing pornography and violence. The commission suggested that pornography could even be beneficial in some circumstances, in allowing for a release of sexual tension. The commission also advocated sex education programs in schools to counterbalance incorrect sexual information gleaned from pornography.

Some differentiate between pornography and materials defined as obscene. In 1973, a pivotal court case, *Miller v. California,* changed the criteria to assess whether a work, be it literary or video, was obscene. One resulting criterion, the S.L.A.P.S. test, evaluates whether a work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Other criteria include whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the given work appeals to prurient (lewd) interests. Finally, if the work depicts in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state laws, it can be judged obscene. These criteria for evaluating work, resulting from *Miller v. California,* made banning pornography easier.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, federal prosecutions of obscenity cases and condemnation of sexual imagery increased considerably. For example, a large

group of congressmen denounced the homoerotic imagery in the photography of Robert Mapplethorpe in a publicly funded exhibition as pornographic despite Mapplethorpe's well-respected status in the art world. Fueling the growing intolerance of sexual imagery was the 1986 Report of the Meese Pornography Commission that identified four types of sexual imagery: violent pornography, degrading (nonviolent) pornography, nonviolent and nondegrading sexual imagery, and simple nudity.

The Final Report of the commission claimed that most Americans opposed pornography, but there was a lack of enforcement of obscenity laws; some types of pornography were harmful; and organized crime controlled the pornography industry. The Meese Commission encouraged further legislation using obscenity laws as defined by *Miller* and recommended that legislators consider restitution for victims of pornography. Many pornography researchers criticized the commission for its anti-pornography ideology and agenda. In addition, numerous scholars condemned the commission's research as biased and methodologically flawed. Despite the criticism, the Commission's report is still the benchmark often used when referring to federal guidelines on pornography.

In addition to judicial and legislative decisions, contemporary intellectuals and scholars have influenced definitions of pornography. One definition commonly used is sexual materials intended to cause sexual excitement. This definition, however, assumes a consensus in human response to sexual materials and simplifies the many intentions that a work could have, be it artistic, literary, or political commentary. Some scholars describe pornography as any materials that are degrading and/or dehumanizing to women. These definitions often look at the portrayal of women in sexual materials in relation to men's behaviors. This type of definition emphasizes gender inequality in society and oppression of women through sexuality. Defining sexual materials in this manner links pornography with various social consequences, especially to the detriment of women.

Other scholars define pornography as explicit depictions of men and women as sexual beings. This definition does not visualize pornography as inherently harmful to women and focuses on the consensual nature of the depicted sexuality. From this viewpoint, pornography is a venue for sexual exploration and even liberation for men and women.

Pornography may be juxtaposed against *erotica*, which is often seen as less vulgar or explicit and depicting loving and affectionate human sexual interaction. In addition, many recognize the blurred lines among pornography, erotica, and art. Some scholars suggest that finding distinctions among pornography, erotica, and art, however, may be subjective and indicative of social class bias.

Ideological Positions on Pornography

Scholars identify four ideological positions on pornography: religious conservatism, civil libertarianism, anti-censorship feminism, and anti-pornography feminism. Each position has various beliefs about pornography and its regulation that stem from social, moral, and political ideologies.

Religious conservatism focuses on the moral aspects of pornography, mainly that it is sinful and leads to further immoral behavior by inciting lust. Religious conservatism concerns itself with the harm to the family, children's moral development, and the sanctity of marital, heterosexual sex. This ideology may include beliefs that pornography leads to rape and sexual abuse. Here the concept of pornography is that it is addictive, leading individuals to need more and more to satisfy their cravings. Proponents of this ideology support censorship and define a wide array of materials as pornographic.

Civil libertarianism, in contrast, strongly opposes censorship of any sort. Libertarians emphasize individual rights and strive for limiting state regulation and involvement in citizens' freedoms. This view does not see pornography as harmful or as a domain appropriate for state involvement. While some libertarians acknowledge that they might personally find pornography offensive or distasteful, the principles of freedom supersede distinctions of individual taste.

Pornography has been a divisive topic within feminism, resulting in heated debates and alliances among various scholars. Anti-pornography feminism focuses on the harm to women resulting from pornography. The roots of this ideology lie in a radical feminist approach to sexuality that views sexuality, specifically heterosexuality, as a venue for male domination. Men have co-opted female sexuality and reproduction and embodied this practice in pornography. Anti-pornography feminism sees pornography as created

with a male gaze for male viewers with unrealistic and degrading portrayals of female sexuality and subservience. Pornography is thus another form of patriarchal control of women through sexual exploitation, much like rape and prostitution. Pornography both causes further harm to women and reinforces the gendered status quo. This position has led to a tenuous alliance between anti-pornography feminists and religious conservatives in campaigns against pornography, despite their disparate ideologies.

Anti-censorship feminism, however, does not see pornography as inherently dehumanizing for women. Sexuality, according to anti-censorship feminism, can be a means of sexual repression of women's desires, but sexuality can also be a means of empowerment for women. This ideology, which shares similarities with sex-positive feminism, focuses on consensual exchange in sexual interactions. Thus, while acknowledging gender inequality, this position conceptualizes pornography as a means of sexual liberation for women. Anti-censorship feminists fear that censoring pornography could suppress feminism, homosexuality, and other non-normative aspects of sexuality.

Social Factors Affecting Beliefs

Despite high rates of pornographic consumption in the United States, no consensus exists regarding beliefs about pornography. Social scientific research has identified a variety of social factors that affect individuals' beliefs about pornography, including gender, religion, age, political ideology, and race or ethnicity.

Gender is an important predictor of beliefs about pornography, with women having more negative attitudes toward sexual materials. Many studies find that women are more likely than men to believe that pornography leads to rape and a breakdown in morals. Some researchers believe that these gender differences may be a result of pornography's creation for a male audience. Others contend that this discrepancy lies in the different socialization of the sexes regarding sexuality.

Religious traits are quite influential in attitudes toward pornography. Conservative Protestants are the most common religious group that espouses the harm of pornography. The Religious Right has been vocal and influential in its condemnation of pornography. The cognitive structure underlying this opposition rests in their belief in the inerrancy of the Bible as well as belief in social contagion of immorality. Even more important than religious affiliation is strength of religiosity. Persons who report strong religiosity, often assessed through attendance at church services, are more likely to view pornography as harmful.

Politically conservative individuals tend to oppose pornography for reasons similar to religious conservatives. Those with conservative beliefs are concerned about the effects of pornography on the family and morality. This political ideology supports censorship of pornography and does not see pornography as a civil liberties issue.

Age is also a significant correlate concerning beliefs about pornography. Older individuals are more likely to believe that pornography has negative effects. Education also affects views toward pornography: the higher one's educational achievement, the greater one's tolerance of pornography.

The evidence on the relationship between race and beliefs about sexual materials is equivocal. Some suggest that African Americans are more accepting of erotic materials than whites, while others report that African Americans are just as likely as whites to believe pornography leads to a breakdown in morals and an increase in rapes.

As a whole, females, whites, persons who attend church frequently, politically conservative individuals, and people with no exposure to pornography are more likely to support censorship. During the past several decades, U.S. public sentiment has grown increasingly intolerant of pornography, reflected in the growing beliefs that pornography has a variety of negative effects and should be censored.

Relationship Between Pornography and Society

Many critics of pornography express particular concern with the violence depicted in sexual imagery. Numerous reports of abused women reveal that their partners used violent pornography and forced them to enact scenes from films. The majority of research on the effects of pornography, however, relies on experimental methodology that critics question for credibility and accuracy. Scholars point out that the inherent problems with this research include discrepancies in definitions of pornography, extrapolating laboratory research to "real-world" experiences, the use of undergraduates as subjects, linking erotic stimuli with anger

and provocation, and questionable amounts of exposure to pornography in such research. Some suggest that violence, whether sexual or not, leads to desensitization toward violence directed at women and acceptance of rape myths. As a whole, experimental research findings are inconclusive regarding the relationships between sexually explicit materials and subsequent attitudes and behaviors toward women.

Researchers also analyzed rates of pornographic consumption and effects. The 1970 President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography reported that as pornography became more widely available in the late 1960s, sex-related crimes decreased. Following the repeal of laws banning pornography in Denmark in the late 1960s, sex offenses decreased. Other research looked at circulation rates of soft-core pornography and the relationship to beliefs about women's status. Beliefs about gender equality are higher in U.S. states that have higher circulation rates of soft-core pornography. Thus, some surmise that consumption of some types of pornography can coexist with egalitarian beliefs about gender. Research does show a correlation between higher circulation of pornography and rates of rape, but scholars suggest that hypermasculinity and proclivity to violence may be the key variable in the relationship.

The Pornography Industry

Pornography is a booming business, with conservative estimates at $10–$14 billion a year just in the United States. Even many mainstream companies gross millions from pornographic sales. For example, pornographic films in hotel rooms generate nearly $190 million a year for hotels. In fact, more than 10,000 adult films are released every year in the United States, compared to about 400 Hollywood films.

Technological advances have played an integral role in the proliferation of pornography. The introduction of the VCR in the 1970s forever changed the ability to consume pornography privately rather than in an adult theater. Pay-per-view adult films made viewing pornography even more accessible. Finally, the Internet has made pornography readily available. Research estimates that 1 in 4 regular Internet users visits a pornographic Web site at least once a month.

The adult film industry employs many men and women, although careers are often short lived. Women generally earn more than men in the pornography industry. The industry's biggest growth market in consumers is women and couples. Many women are now directing and owning adult film companies that appeal to a female audience. Although testing for sexually transmitted infections and HIV is mandated as a part of workplace safety laws, cases of transmission do occur, as unprotected sex is still normative for many adult film companies. Despite the growth of the adult film industry, this type of work has not gained societal acceptance and remains highly stigmatized and subject to legal scrutiny.

Critics voice concern that women, especially, are coerced into pornography; this view is supported by accounts from people formerly involved in pornography that corroborate these assertions. In contrast, vocal advocates of the pornography industry cite individual choice, freedom, and autonomy. Numerous actresses from the industry have publicly supported their career choices and denied allegations of abuse and coercion in pornography.

Consumer demand for pornography shows no signs of waning, and the industry is a major source of revenue. Scholarly and legal attention to pornography will continue because of the myriad social, political, moral, and health factors involved in evaluating and regulating pornography.

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See also Obscenity; Pornography, Child; Pornography and the Internet

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Pornography, Child

Child pornography, which is illegal in the United States, refers to images, literature, or other materials that depict a child (any individual under the age of 18) engaging in sexual activity or that portray the child in a sexually explicit manner. Child pornography may involve either the creation of materials depicting minors engaged in sexual activities or the production and distribution of materials harmful to minors. Many individuals, groups, and agencies—inside and outside the criminal justice system—make both proactive and reactive attempts to reduce and/or eliminate this crime. As with many crimes, child pornography has existed for centuries, and until relatively recently, it was not a major societal concern. Today, most attempts to reduce child pornography focus on those children as victims of sexual abuse.

Cases involving the production and distribution of child pornography are increasing, as are specialized law enforcement units focused on combating these crimes. With the introduction of technology and the Internet, the cases of child pornography have multiplied, because it is no longer unusual or difficult to access different forms of child pornography. Officials have documented that some sex offenders use the privacy of the Internet to identify vulnerable children who are utilizing the Internet unsupervised and are therefore easier prey. Also, despite U.S. federal and state laws prohibiting the transmission of child pornography over the Internet, the locations of many of these sites are in other countries, thereby complicating the lines of authority, enforcement, and police jurisdiction. Finally, records show that many of the perpetrators of child pornography are relatives of the child victim. Child pornography is thus a phenomenon involving different dynamics and variables that are unique to criminal activity.

Specifically unique to child pornography is that, in most instances, physical contact between the children and the pornography viewer never occurs. Nevertheless, the children initially victimized during the production of the pornography become repeatedly victimized as the pornography is distributed to the thousands of viewers in the market for child pornography.

At one time, when someone described people who distributed child pornography, the characteristics were of middle-aged, uneducated, white males. Today, law enforcement is discovering ever-increasing numbers of teens and individuals in their 20s involved in producing and distributing child pornography. With men and women of all ages involved in the production and distribution of child pornography, no simple demographic description or profile of a perpetrator of child pornography is valid.

Finally, another type of child abuse often involving child pornography is the use of child sex rings. The term *sex ring* refers to any situation in which one or more offenders are simultaneously involved in the sexual abuse of several children. Operation of a sex ring thus brings a different set of organizational characteristics to child sexual abuse. A sex ring is a business—the business of child prostitution. Just as an adult may pay to have consensual sex with an adult partner, adults pay or trade children to satisfy their desire to have sex with a child. Often, adults interested in participating in a child sex ring identify desired child victims through pornographic pictures of them. In fact, there are often lines of communications among the offenders in regard to the desired demographic characteristics of the child and the sex ringleader's ability to locate the sought-after child.

Several U.S. laws address the issue of pornography and computer technology. The 1977 Sexual Exploitation of Children Act prohibited the transportation of child pornography by mail or computer. In 1984, the Child Protection Act defined anyone younger than 18 as a child. In 1988, the Child Protection Enforcement Act made it unlawful to use a computer to transport child pornography, and, in 1996, the Child Pornography Act amended the definition of a child to include computer-generated children. However, in 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that computer-generated children were not children.

Today, the U.S. government and the criminal justice system attempt to reduce the production and distribution of child pornography through action programs and funding efforts. Specifically, the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) organization sponsors a program to provide citizens with an avenue for reporting the use of the Internet by child molesters to solicit children, and local law enforcement agencies, such as the Bedford County Sheriff's Office in Virginia, have established specific units (Bedford County's is called Blue Thunder) within their agency to focus exclusively on the detection of cases and apprehension of perpetrators involved in child pornography. In addition, law enforcement not only proactively promotes hot lines that individuals can call to report suspected cases of child pornography, but

it also welcomes opportunities to talk to children and the general public on the warning signs for child abuse through pornography.

This growing social problem remains a concern locally, nationally, and internationally. However, through cooperative efforts by law enforcement, social services, the media, and the public, the United States is beginning to address the problem in the hopes of reducing the prevalence of this crime.

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See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Family, Dysfunctional; Pornography; Pornography and the Internet; Sex Trafficking; Violence, Sexual

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Pornography and the Internet

With the invention and extensive dispersion of the Internet since the 1990s, pornography distributed via the World Wide Web has become a widespread social phenomenon. Some of its popularity stems from the fact that the Internet, like VHS tapes and DVDs, allows people to view pornography in the privacy of their homes. The problem often connected to the anonymity and easier availability of online pornography is that people (for example, children) may retrieve and view virtually any material in cyberspace—even if their access might otherwise be socially or legally restricted. Also, the Internet expanded the distribution of illegal pornographic material, like child pornography or material with sexually violent content.

The Internet, a complex international network of interconnected computers with an ever-growing population of users, offers an almost infinite selection of sexually explicit material in the form of photos, text and audio files, video clips, as well as streaming media, like live Webcam access offering interactive sexual encounters. Pornographic content is mostly distributed via free and commercial Web sites as well as peer-to-peer file sharing or Usenet newsgroups. The latter, a form of discussion groups prevalent mainly in the early days of online pornography, exists in the form of free services of uploaded pictures and short videos. A large number of pornographic Web sites are in fact free and function to attract users to viewing commercial Web sites by offering a sampling of their more explicit content in the form of thumbnail images or galleries.

Along with the rise of the Internet is growing general concern over the sheer volume of pornographic material available online as well as its legal status concerning both distribution and content—particularly the number of Internet users under the age of 18. (The average age of first Internet exposure to pornography is now 11.) The anxiety over minors' exposure to obscene material results from the easy availability of sexually explicit Web sites and the incredible growth of the Internet pornography industry in general. More than 4.2 million pornographic Web sites now exist, about 12 percent of all total Web sites online. Their popularity is undeniable: U.S. pornography revenue (more than $6 billion) exceeds the revenues of ABC, CBS, and NBC combined, and pornography revenue is also larger than all combined revenues of all professional baseball, basketball, and football franchises.

Legal regulation of the distribution and accessibility of online pornographic material is difficult. The Internet is a truly international phenomenon, and presently no international laws regulate the circulation, purchase, or possession of Internet porn. Each country has its own individual legal frameworks, but foreign Web sites are unaffected by national regulatory or law enforcement efforts that limit the distribution of online material.

Nonetheless, numerous attempts continue to prohibit the distribution of certain types of pornography (e.g., featuring violence, bestiality, or child pornography), to prevent minors from accessing pornographic

content, and to ensure that actors in pornographic media are of legal age. In the United States, several legal efforts to regulate primarily commercial sources of pornographic content often met with heated debates revolving around the issues of censorship and the First Amendment. The Communication Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, for example, covered a wide variety of activities, including the distribution of pornography on the Internet. Challenged in federal court by civil rights groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the portion of the CDA relating to indecent speech was found unconstitutional due to its infringement on the speech rights of adults on the Internet. A second attempt, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998, which demanded all commercial Web publishers offering "material harmful to minors" to restrict their sites from access by minors, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2004 as unconstitutional. A year earlier, however, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 2000 law, the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), challenged as unconstitutional by the ACLU and the American Library Association (ALA). CIPA mandates that schools and libraries receiving federal funds for Internet connections must block or filter access to visual depictions that show obscenity, child pornography, or other material "harmful to minors."

Technology-based tools, such as software filters that limit access to certain Web sites, constitute another attempt to control the distribution of sexually explicit material online. Many Web sites provide a warning of their pornographic content upon entry, requiring users to affirm that they are at least 18 and wishing to view sexually explicit material. Commercial Web sites often restrict access by using an online Adult Verification System, which seeks to differentiate between adults and minors by requesting a valid credit card number to buy a "membership" to the site.

Antonia Levy

See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Cyberspace; Obscenity; Pornography; Pornography, Child; Violence, Sexual

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POSTINDUSTRIALISM

Technological advances in the 19th and 20th centuries gave rise to industrialism and improved the overall quality of life in the United States and most of Europe. With the general rise in income came an increasing demand for services to sustain this higher standard of living: improved education, leisure activities, entertainment, health care, and information provision. However, many of these new services, unlike a majority of manual tasks in agriculture or industry, could not be mechanized. Because these tasks were more complicated to reproduce and often required more education, service industry workers became much sought after, more of a commodity than industrial or agrarian laborers and more expensive to employ. This shift from industrial, manual labor to a service-focused industry centered on the distribution and production of information is often referred to as "postindustrialization."

The Rise of the Postindustrialist Society

Sociologist Daniel Bell was one of the first to develop the idea of the postindustrial society. In his book, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973), Bell suggested that the postindustrial society—the information society—is not merely characterized by a shift from goods- to knowledge-based industry, but particularly by the nature of this knowledge. The transformation of an industrial to a postindustrial or information society is accompanied by, if not caused by, an increasing dominance of scientific rationality in the political, economic, and social spheres. In industrial societies, most people are involved with the production of material, tangible goods. The postindustrial society, on the other hand, is led forward by information,

knowledge, and services. It is also dominated by science-based industries. Subsequently, the "old" industrial elites gradually yield to "new" technical elites whose human capital—their technological and scientific knowledge—places them at the top of the restructured social and economic hierarchy. While industrialization systematically kept certain segments of society in marginal positions to maximize profits, the postindustrial society emphasizes educational achievement for transcending social boundaries and leveling the social playing field. Supposedly, the new nature of capital would thus give everyone equal opportunities to benefit financially from the opportunities information and technology development provide.

Some scholars, convinced of the egalitarian powers of the postindustrial society, view the social, cultural, political, and economic effects of postindustrialism within utopian or dystopian perspectives. They suggest that the emphasis on merit, information, and technological development will eventually level the social and economic playing fields. Furthermore, they argue that the postindustrial society's reliance on human rather than nonrenewable natural capital places less pressure on the world's natural resources and is, therefore, much more environment-friendly than its predecessor.

Others believe that the leveling powers of the information society are exaggerated, even elevated to mythical levels. They think the intellectual (educational) demands necessary to be competitive in the information society—paired with a decreasing demand for manual industrial labor—put historically marginalized groups at an unbridgeable social disadvantage. Given the inherently capitalist nature of society, postindustrialism may improve the overall standard of living for the working and middle classes, they maintain, but for those at the top end of society, this will occur at a much greater rate. The gap between the lower and upper classes will thus actually increase. Furthermore, critics note that instead of relieving some of the damaging effects of industrialization on the environment and its resources, postindustrialism places different yet additional pressures on it.

Most Western societies are currently in or working toward postindustrialization, leading to a gradual realization that such utopian views of the postindustrial society are erroneous or, at least, too optimistic. Studies show that, often, historical economic and cultural privileges give industrial elites and those who benefit from industrialization the necessary human capital to take the lead in the developing information and service industries. Many of those who benefited the least from industrialization continue to face institutional roadblocks that hinder the necessary intellectual and technological development necessary to compete successfully in the new information society. It would appear that utopian views of postindustrialism falsely assumed that the information-based capitalist system is inherently different from, or not as competitive as, industrial capitalism.

The speed with which advances in information technology are taking place suggest that only those with the necessary intellectual and financial resources are able to keep or catch up with those already involved in the industry. Furthermore, inequality in educational resources available for students in the West, particularly in the United States, indicates that, as long as social class influences educational opportunity, the democratizing forces of the information society are limited. On a global scale, the growing (economic) dominance of information technology, and thus of educational achievement, means that the divide between rich and poor countries may widen further in years to come, making it increasingly difficult for industrial societies to catch up with those in postindustrialization or already postindustrial.

Finally, while some scholars maintain that service industries place less pressure on natural resources and are much more environment-friendly than their predecessors, the increasing standards of living in postindustrial societies have also led to an increase in waste that food and restaurant businesses produce or else do little to decrease their reliance on oil. In fact, increasing standards of living also increase demand for material goods, continuing to strain natural resources all over the world. In theory, the democratizing forces of the postindustrial, information society seem promising, though in practice, it would appear that postindustrialization in most societies has yet to effectively diminish socioeconomic inequality.

Marc JW de Jong

See also Cyberspace; Deindustrialization; Downsizing; Economic Development; Global Economy; Globalization; Income Disparity; Labor Market; Mass Media; Media; Modernization Theory; Outsourcing; Urban Underclass

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POSTMODERNISM

Postmodernism is a complex term, and it is important to define its boundaries as it concerns social problems. Generally speaking, analysts examine the postmodern world with a focus on four areas: the self-concept; moral and ethical discourse; art and culture; and globalization. In the context of social problems, the conceptual development of postmodernism and globalization has been influenced by the ideas of such leading exponents as David Harvey, Jean-François Lyotard, and Michel Foucault.

Harvey describes modernity as the period after the end of the Enlightenment that began at the start of the industrial revolution and went well into the 20th century. The Enlightenment promoted thinking in a more rational, uniform way in order to achieve rational but conditional progress. Postmodernists, however, question the validity of such a single truth or uniformity. Society, to them, is more complex than belief in a rational, singular truth, and social problems have more causes than any formalized list. In the age of greater globalization, social problems have become international, with a greater comparative focus on issues such as education and poverty. The new postmodern conditions thus lead to a questioning of modern ideology.

Postmodern theory focuses on a critical, almost skeptical, view of society. Lyotard argued that grand narratives such as Marxism were in decline. Grand narratives are stories that contain knowledge or a discourse that supports a universal truth. A grand narrative is a story big enough to encompass social problems and provide potential social solutions. Lyotard highlighted the Marxist concept of class—in particular the division of society into the proletariat and bourgeoisie—and the argument that the working class would overthrow the middle class through class conflict and consequent social revolution. Marxism implied that history is progressive and knowledge is liberating. However, Lyotard questioned the notion of the emancipation of humanity and that knowledge produced by science is truth and therefore eternal. Lyotard argued that these arguments had lost respectability since the end of the Second World War. The Marxist argument that the proletariat would overthrow the bourgeoisie after a political and consequent social revolution did occur in some cases, but not universally. Lyotard suggested that people still believed in grand narratives, but as time progressed, society changed and the grand narratives fragmented. Indeed, grand narratives are visible in both nationalist and religious conflicts. Lyotard thus questioned the validity of grand narratives in a postmodern world that has witnessed enormous changes.

The construction of both modern and postmodern knowledge and its usage relates to social issues and problems. Foucault's work examined the complex histories of social knowledge as codified within institutions. He argued that institutions (e.g., the penal system) could never be neutral. Foucault wanted a focus on how institutions were linked to operations of power in society. He argued that the self was intertwined with social structures. Power was visible through the knowledge of control (i.e., surveillance, rules, and regulations). Discourse, for Foucault, involves the institution (e.g., the prison service) putting language to use (e.g., the state formulating a prison policy), and a discipline (e.g., the law governing criminals). Foucault was interested in how knowledge evolved before, during, and after modernity. The control of knowledge has become a continuing political issue with its own discourse. In a postmodern context, times changed but the institutions remain, with little more than incremental changes. Discourses remain systems of exclusion (i.e., for criminals in jail), but the social categories that have been created (e.g., the criminal) remain. Foucault suggests that we question current discourses and examine forms of power and knowledge that are around us in society.

Globalization is nothing new and was certainly visible in the premodern and modern worlds within trade, commerce, and imperial conquest. However, creation of the World Wide Web enables us to see the nature of globalization through a postmodern lens. The social construction of knowledge has changed dramatically with the creation of new social spaces where knowledge can be disseminated, discussed, and critiqued. There are many truths, and the World Wide Web has witnessed the debate concerning what information and knowledge should and should not be controlled in a postindustrial age. China is an interesting example of a national state that has attempted to control knowledge dissemination on the World Wide Web.

Another example of the distribution of global knowledge concerns the pictures of the execution of Saddam Hussein in January 2007. Was it morally correct to telecast these images and the audio exchange between Hussein and his executioners? These images were posted on the World Wide Web, so the decision, be it a regulated or unregulated one, occurred without any political or ethical debate. Does the Internet give us the right to be a postmodern humanist; that is, having the moral and ethical right to make up our own minds on all social issues and problems? The World Wide Web, whether it is morally correct or incorrect, has widened social contexts because more individuals and groups can use this means of communication to express differing viewpoints. However, does this create more social problems than it solves? Postmodernist theories provide a critical theoretical framework that attempts to answer some of these questions.

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See also Globalization; Multiracial Identity; Postindustrialism; Social Change; Social Revolutions

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Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a psychiatric disorder that may develop after experiencing or witnessing a traumatic, violent, or life-threatening event. Traumatic events may be natural or human caused. Natural events may include earthquakes, hurricanes, or medical illnesses; human-caused events may include military combat, child sexual or physical abuse, rape, torture, domestic battering, or physical assault. Some of these traumatic events may occur at one point in time or may be ongoing, with repeated exposure to the trauma. PTSD often goes undiagnosed for a variety of reasons, particularly if the traumatic events are not readily apparent or occurred in the past. If untreated, PTSD may lead to other social issues such as alcohol and drug abuse, suicidality, and violence directed at loved ones or others, which in turn may affect an individual's family situation, diminish job or school performance, and increase social isolation.

PTSD is a debilitating condition that can affect anyone at any age and has significant consequences for well-being and functioning. Data from the National Comorbidity Survey show an estimated lifetime prevalence of PTSD of 7.8 percent for adults between the ages of 15 and 54. Women are more than twice as likely as men (10.4 percent compared to 5 percent) to develop PTSD at some point in their lives. Prevalence rates of PTSD among children and adolescents range from 3 to 14 percent in community samples. Among children who have experienced specific stressors, however, the prevalence rates are much higher. For example, 35 percent of children diagnosed with cancer and 58 percent of children who experienced both physical and sexual abuse meet the criteria for PTSD.

Veterans are also at high risk for PTSD. For example, studies of combat veterans from the Vietnam War estimate a lifetime prevalence of PTSD of 19 percent. Veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 have sought mental health treatment at higher rates than those returning from other deployments, such as Bosnia. More than 3 months after returning from Iraq, 17 percent of veterans reported mental health problems and 12 percent met the criteria for PTSD. Given the number of troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, the number of veterans with PTSD will likely increase significantly.

According to the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,*

PTSD symptoms are evident in three clusters: reexperiencing, avoidance, and increased arousal. *Reexperiencing symptoms* may appear as intrusive and persistent flashback memories, nightmares, or frightening recurring thoughts, particularly when exposed to triggering events or objects associated with the trauma. *Avoidance symptoms* include emotional numbness and persistent efforts to avoid stimuli associated with the trauma. *Increased arousal symptoms* include sleep disturbance, irritability, difficulty concentrating, hypervigilance, and exaggerated startle response that did not exist before the trauma. It is important to note that children and adolescents may have different responses to trauma depending on their developmental stage, and their symptoms may change over time.

Although PTSD symptoms often begin within 3 months of the trauma, some individuals experience *delayed onset*, where symptoms appear months or even years after the trauma and may reoccur. With delayed onset, the symptoms develop more than 6 months after the traumatic experience, and the prognosis is often worse. The development of PTSD depends on the severity and duration of exposure to the trauma and a complex array of risk and protective factors that may affect the individual's response to the trauma.

Complete recovery occurs within 3 months for about half of those diagnosed with PTSD; however, many individuals have symptoms lasting longer than 12 months after the trauma. Co-occurring disorders such as major depressive disorder and alcohol or other substance abuse often accompany PTSD. Patients sometimes visit their primary care physician with symptoms such as headaches, gastrointestinal problems, immune system problems, chest pain, or dizziness. In these instances, the underlying cause of the physical symptoms may be PTSD but may not be discovered without a thorough exploration of the patient's psychosocial history. Once properly identified, PTSD is usually treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy to help individuals change their thoughts and actions and learn new coping skills to manage the symptoms that may be affecting their quality of life. Depending on the duration and severity of the symptoms, some combination of individual psychotherapy to address the symptoms, peer support groups, and medication is effective in treating PTSD.

Studies show that after the traumatic event, a crucial early intervention is education for the survivor and family about PTSD and the possible effects that trauma reactions may have on them. This allows for recognition that PTSD is a medical disorder that occurs under extreme traumatic stress and opens the pathway for effective treatment. Early diagnosis, assessment, and treatment are essential to diminishing the effects of trauma. Research has shown that crisis intervention immediately after a traumatic event may reduce some symptoms and possibly prevent the development of the disorder. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, the New York State Office of Mental Health provided free crisis counseling services to people in New York City and the surrounding counties, including those not typically served by public mental health services. This flexibility on the part of the state mental health agency allowed many more individuals to receive help than would normally have been possible. Although prediction of such traumatic events is not possible, preparation by local, state, and federal governmental agencies to quickly respond can be effective to mitigate the effects of trauma.

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See also Abuse, Child; Abuse, Child Sexual; Abuse, Intimate Partner; Assault; Disasters; Domestic Violence; Mass Murder; Mental Health; Murder; Prostitution, Child; Rape; Violence; War

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Poverty

Poverty is one of the world's most costly and serious social problems. It represents the vast unused and underused potential of millions of people; it costs societies in lost revenues, in lost productivity, in ill health, social dysfunction, and environmental degradation

and in vast sums that must be spent either to alleviate poverty's worst symptoms through social welfare programs or to police or control its unruly victims.

Social scientists generally define poverty in two ways. *Absolute poverty* is the condition in which people are unable to achieve the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter. *Relative poverty* refers to some socially constructed norm of well-being in comparison to some proportion of a society thought to be lacking. The "poor" in the rich industrialized countries are not, for the most part, materially deprived in the absolute sense. With the help of government transfer programs, such as income support and food and housing subsidies, they may have an apartment to live in, enough food to eat, clothing, and even some amenities like television and cars. Yet in relation to the rest of the society, they are "poor." Their housing is substandard, their neighborhoods are run down and high in crime, their stores lack the variety and quality of more affluent sectors, their clothing is limited to cheap clothing chains or thrift store hand-me-downs, and their potential is limited by poor schooling and health care.

A new definition of poverty as "social exclusion" has begun to take root among European social scientists and UN researchers. This concept implies that along with material deprivation comes exclusion from some or all of the avenues that ensure the development of one's full human potential as well as one's ability to participate in economic, social, and political life—conditions that the economist Amartya Sen calls "substantive freedoms." The struggle to survive leaves poor people with no time to participate in the life of their communities or to exercise their citizenship rights. Social exclusion, then, connotes both lack of choice and lack of power.

Poverty as both absolute and relative deprivation has been part of the human condition for thousands of years, but it was only during the 20th century that poverty came to be recognized as a social problem for which there could be public remedies. Traditional societies met people's needs through a combination of the individual's own labor and the obligation of the kinship group to care for its own. In such societies, the poor were those who remained outside this sphere of care, set adrift through war, famine, or the loss of family. Others were at the bottom of culturally sanctioned strata systems, such as the Indian caste system or various kinds of slavery. In the feudal era, the lord of the manor was obliged to care for his serfs so that, although relative poverty existed, there was little poverty in the absolute sense.

The Emergence of Poverty Legislation

The destruction of the monasteries that had provided care for the poor and the emergence of capitalism in the West began to disrupt this age-old pattern. The enclosure of the commons in England and the mass evictions of peasants displaced large numbers of people from the lands that had sustained them. Some, unable to find work in the emerging industries of the industrial revolution, became beggars and vagabonds or turned to crime. The individualistic ethos that accompanied capitalism—derived from the Protestant ethic's equation of prosperity with righteousness and "idleness" with sinfulness—ushered in a new attitude toward the poor. Most—especially able-bodied men who could not find work—were considered responsible for their poverty, leading to a new form of punitive legislation. Under the first such legislation, enacted in England in 1530, beggars old and unable to work received a beggar's license, while poor able-bodied men were whipped and imprisoned.

The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 established public responsibility for the relief of the poor—an admission that economic and social conditions and not just personal culpability lay behind poverty. But the recognition was only partial. This and subsequent "Poor Laws" still made a distinction between the "deserving poor"—those whose poverty was not of their own making, such as widows, the old, the blind, the infirm, and orphaned children-–and everyone else, the "undeserving poor." These were sent to "poor houses," little more than prisons with forced hard physical labor. If they refused, they were even more severely punished, sometimes even executed. The British Poor Law Reform Act of 1834 stipulated that the poor were never to be paid more than the lowest prevailing wage in the surrounding society, thus acting as a disincentive to choose public charity over work.

The attitude that the poor are responsible for their own poverty was carried to the United States and continues to shape U.S. attitudes and policies, despite the fact that the government now spends vast sums on social welfare programs. Poverty in the United States, however, was different from that in England, in that both indentured servants and Africans held in slavery were ineligible for poor relief. Slavery created a

castelike system based on skin color that, despite its abolition, continues into the 21st century to affect the chances for upward mobility of large numbers of African Americans.

Emergence of the Welfare State

During the latter part of the 19th century, labor organizers and social reformers called attention to the appalling conditions suffered by the poor in the age of laissez-faire capitalism. The growth of a social welfare establishment composed of charity organizations, settlement houses, and a social science research industry resulted. Fearing social unrest, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck reacted by erecting the first welfare state in the 1880s, establishing obligatory health, accident, old age, and disability insurance programs, whose principles continue to guide the development of social policy in the industrialized world. The experience of the Great Depression spurred other countries, including the United States, to erect welfare systems that provided basic safety nets beneath their most vulnerable citizens and cushioned their economies against further depressions. The United States, however, is the least developed welfare state among all of the major industrialized countries.

Measuring Poverty

The way society measures poverty has both political and ethical implications. The poverty rate is a significant indicator of how well or how poorly a country's economy is doing relative to its own goals and in comparison with others. Second, it is an indicator of how much priority governments place on mitigating inequality and relieving human suffering through welfare state provision. The collection of statistics on poverty, income, and wealth was necessitated by the international community's recognition, following World War II, that poverty was a human rights issue, and by the need for cross-national comparisons accompanying the growth of globalization in the late 20th century.

Not until the mid-1960s, however, did the U.S. government create a poverty index by which to measure who should benefit from government programs targeted to the poor. Public concern about poverty grew as a result of the civil rights movement, urban rebellions, and Michael Harrington's book, *The Other America,* which called attention to the persistence of poverty in the midst of economic growth. A government statistician, Molly Orshanksy, established the poverty line. She determined that in the mid-1960s the average family of four spent one third of its total living expenses on food. To arrive at the poverty line, she then multiplied by 3 the cost of the least expensive (and least nutritious) food basket established by the Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Census Bureau has used this formula—adjusted for family size, age, and inflation—to define poverty ever since. The poverty line serves as a rough gauge in determining who is eligible for a variety of income-targeted programs administered by the states.

Critics of the U.S. poverty index point to numerous flaws in its formulation. For one thing, the ratio of expenditures on food compared with other consumption items has changed over time. For example, families now spend more of their income on housing than on food, and more women are in the workforce, requiring greater expenditures for child care. Second, the formula does not recognize changes in regional living standards. Third, it does not take into account changes in household configuration—for example, the growth of single-parent and nonfamily households—and finally differences in out-of-pocket health care costs borne by different population segments.

For these reasons, the National Academy of Sciences proposed a change in determining the poverty index. Other researchers developed what they call the "Self-Sufficiency Index," which they argue is a more accurate demonstration of need. This index reflects the differences in standards of living in different regions, by calculating how much it costs average families of various sizes and configurations to live at a minimum standard of living, including ability to purchase the basic necessities, but little else. Despite this, the original formula remains the standard, probably because budget allocations for poverty programs would rise if the poverty rate were adjusted upward.

For cross-national comparisons among developed countries, poverty is usually calculated as some proportion—usually 50 percent—of median disposable household income for households of the same size. This measurement recognizes actual incomes and accounts for changes in the standard of living, unlike the absolute measure used in the United States. However, the World Bank and the UN Millennium Development fund define poverty in Africa and Latin America in absolute terms—as those living on less than $1 and $2 per person per day and in Eastern and Central Europe as $2 and $3 per day.

Who Is Poor?

Poverty is unevenly divided across the world. The highest rates of absolute poverty are in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, while the lowest rates are in Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The United Nations estimates that 2.7 billion people live on less than $2 a day and 800 million go to bed hungry every day, the greatest proportion living in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its highest per capita income in the world, the United States has the highest rates of overall poverty and the highest rates of child poverty among the industrialized nations and is second only to Italy and Ireland in having the highest rates of poverty among one- and two-parent families and the elderly. This ranking results from most other industrialized countries having more extensive welfare programs that mitigate the unevenness of market incomes.

Poverty's burden is also unevenly shared in the United States. White, non-Hispanics have the lowest rate of poverty, followed by Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and African Americans, whose poverty rate is generally 3 times that of whites. Females—especially those heading families—are more likely to live in poverty than males. One out of every 6 children in the United States faces the likelihood of growing up poor, and 1 out of 10 seniors over the age of 65 were poor in 2004. Poverty is highest in the southern states.

Causes of and Remedies for Poverty

The causes of poverty are the subject of fierce debate among social scientists. Beyond obvious causes such as wars, famine, political corruption, and economic collapse, the presence of persistent poverty finds explanation in several theories. Some attribute poverty to macroeconomic structures and policy decisions beyond the influence of individuals. Marxists argue that poverty is endemic to the system of capitalism, because to function it needs a "reserve army of labor" to keep wages low and the working class disciplined. Public welfare programs, in this view, serve as a way to regulate labor by expanding in times of labor turmoil and contracting when it subsides. Poverty elimination, in the Marxist view, can only occur through eliminating capitalism and replacing it with socialism.

World system theorists attribute global unevenness in the incidence of poverty to political and economic decisions made by colonial and neocolonial powers that drained large parts of the world of its resources to benefit the elites and developing middle classes of the colonial powers. Thus, over the centuries the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America were deliberately robbed of their natural resources and their populations reduced to cheap labor to feed the industrial machines in the metropolitan markets.

In contrast, U.S. neoconservatives argue that poverty is either the fault of some character flaw in the poor themselves (laziness, alcoholism, drug addiction, inability to defer gratification, loose morals, etc.), the fault of a "culture of poverty" that passes on such traits from one generation to another, or the fault of an overly generous social welfare system that acts as a disincentive to work. For conservatives and neoconservatives, inequality is beneficial because it feeds the competitive spirit needed for economic growth. Their remedy for poverty is "tough love"—cutting social welfare programs to force people into the labor market.

Economic liberals, following the British economist John Maynard Keynes, argue that the normal workings of capitalism produce periodic booms and busts that throw large numbers of people out of work. Government can and should mitigate the ups and downs in the business cycle by using its fiscal policies (taxing and spending) and monetary policy (manipulating the money supply) to even out the business cycle and provide a safety net under the most vulnerable. Keynesian remedies, however, failed during the economic crisis of the 1970s, so liberals turned to other explanations for persistent poverty, attributing it to macroeconomic trends like deindustrialization, outsourcing, the failure of government to provide the supportive services needed to "make work pay" for the unemployed, and gender and racial discrimination. Their answer to poverty is to increase support for human capital (e.g., improved education and training) to "make work pay" while outlawing discrimination and providing affirmative action for those left behind.

With the growth of neoliberal globalization from the 1980s on, still other explanations arose to explain persisting poverty. Some point to the spread of epidemic diseases, such as AIDS, affecting large sectors of the productive-age population in the developing world. Critics of neoliberal globalization (not only civil society groups, but also many developing country governments) point to the decisions of policymakers and their corporate allies in the rich countries of the North to write the rules of global trade and investment so as to benefit the rich nations—especially their elites—at the expense of the poorer nations. They cite

onerous debt repayment schemes, structural adjustment programs, and rich country subsidization of key agricultural commodities as sources of the problem. What is needed, say these critics, is debt forgiveness, a fairer system of world trade and investment, and compensatory programs for less developed countries funded by the rich countries.

Sheila D. Collins

See also Bankruptcy, Personal; Feminization of Poverty; Homelessness; Relative Deprivation; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Underclass Debate; Welfare

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Poverty, Children Worldwide

According to the UN Children's Fund, worldwide, about 1 billion children currently live in poverty. Of these children, 674 million are living in absolute poverty. Further, the International Labor Organization estimates that 218 million children engage in some form of illegal, hazardous, or exploitative child labor. The Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS estimates that 143 million orphans live in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean, and that every minute a child under age 15 dies of an AIDS-related illness. The World Health Organization estimates that more than 10 million children under age 5 die each year from preventable or treatable diseases, such as diarrhea, malaria, measles, and pneumonia, while more than half of that number die from malnutrition. Clearly, as these statistics demonstrate, millions of children around the world live in poverty and are subject to exclusion, vulnerability, disease, and exploitation.

However, child poverty is not only a phenomenon in the developing world. Child poverty is also rising in the developed world. According to UNICEF, since at least the year 2000, in 17 out of 24 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the proportion of children living in poverty has increased. Determining the poverty level in these countries is a combination of three factors: social trends, labor market conditions, and government policies. Unfortunately, commitments to reducing child poverty in OECD countries often do not match resources or social spending.

Poverty and Vulnerability

Poverty is a sustained low standard of living and lack of resources. In real terms, poverty is hunger, lack of shelter, no access to medical care, no access to education, no job, powerlessness, and lack of representation and freedom. Moreover, an intrinsic link exists between poverty and vulnerability. Because children are still developing and are dependent on adults for their survival, they are especially vulnerable to the impact of poverty. Research shows that children are more sensitive to and affected by poverty than adults generally appreciate or understand. Children keenly feel the effects of poverty from the lack of basic goods and services, as well as its associated divisiveness, stigma, and humiliation. Thus, any attempt to address child poverty must tackle the problem holistically, dealing with both physical and psychosocial needs.

Millennium Development Goals

Recognizing the need to eradicate poverty, achieve universal access to education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat diseases, ensure environmental

sustainability, and build a global partnership for development, the international community committed itself to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the year 2015. These goals serve as a framework for measuring development progress, since their achievement will have a significantly positive impact on the lives of millions of children around the world.

However, current poverty reduction strategies do not reach the poorest and most vulnerable. Most countries are currently off target to achieving the MDGs, especially those goals focused on the most poor. In some countries, the indicators are negative and gains have been reversed. Thus, achieving the MDGs by 2015, especially for children, will require new and innovative global partnerships—partnerships among governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and individuals. In order to achieve the MDGs, many poor countries need financial and technical assistance and look to the rich and donor countries to provide it. In turn, rich and donor countries will need to respond to the needs of poorer countries.

Youth: The Forgotten Children

Although children over age 12 make up about 30 percent of children in the 0–18 age range in developing countries, they receive little attention. Youth are vulnerable to unemployment and idleness; lack access to and retention in school; engage in risky behaviors (early pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, violence, and crime); have few skills or prospects; and have limited participation in society.

In many poor countries, some progress has occurred in providing basic education to children. However, these school systems are ill equipped to face the learning needs of youth. Today, a big challenge for many countries is providing access to secondary education, especially lower secondary school. Notably, almost half of all unemployment is among young people of legal working age, with the unemployment rate for youth 2 to 3 times that of adults.

Given the size and vulnerability of this global group of youth, and the risks they face, targeted attention and programs are necessary to address their needs, such as programs promoting healthy behavior and life skills, as well as programs on livelihoods and employment, including nonformal and vocational education. Social tensions may increase around the world if governments are not able to meet the needs of their youth.

Combating Child Poverty

The World Bank maintains that children can flourish only if equipped with advanced skills beyond literacy. In order to stay healthy, they must face the challenges of new diseases, such as sexually transmitted diseases and obesity. Ensuring that children are well prepared for the future is vital to reducing poverty and increasing economic growth. Missing the opportunity to educate, prepare, and invest in today's children will be costly to reverse. However, poverty and vulnerability are unlikely to be reduced unless adults and children have access to social services and protections.

In order to combat child poverty, parents and caregivers must have equal access to employment and livelihood opportunities so that they can provide for their children. Children and youth must have access to health care and safe, free, quality, and relevant education. Youth must have access to life skills training and employment opportunities. Governments must ensure that basic services (access to food, clean water, shelter, etc.) and social protections are available to all children, especially those who are poor and vulnerable, and that their rights are protected and respected.

Mirellise Vazquez

See also Food Insecurity and Hunger; HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations; Illiteracy, Adult in Developed Nations; Illiteracy, Adult in Developing Nations; Life Chances; Poverty

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Power

Power lies at the heart of a political system. According to Max Weber, *power* is the ability to exercise one's will over others. To put it another way, whoever can control the behavior of others is exercising power. Power relations can involve large organizations, small groups, or even people in an intimate association. Power plays a critical role in both creating and addressing social problems.

Max Weber's Conceptualization

German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) established the widely accepted conceptualization of power as people realizing their own will in a communal action, even over others' resistance. Critical to this notion of power is that it emerges from a social relationship. Power does not exist in the abstract but is exercised over others.

Weber did not contend that power is complete; rather he argued that it affected nearly all significant decision making. This qualifier of "nearly all" accounts for the limited influence of altruistic actions. Often these are actions such as relief drives to hurricane victims or creation of a homeless shelter that can obscure to the casual observer the social consequences of how power operates typically in a society.

Because Weber developed his conceptualization of power in the early 1900s, he focused primarily on the nation-state and its sphere of influence. Later scholars argued that power was exercised through a power elite of an interlocking network of government officials, the military, and big business. Scholars today recognize that the trend toward globalization has brought new opportunities, and with them new concentrations of power. Power as the ability to exercise one's will over others is now exercised on a global as well as a national stage, as countries and multinational corporations vie to control access to resources and manage the distribution of capital worldwide.

Sources of Power

There are three basic sources of power within any political system: force, influence, and authority. *Force* is the actual or threatened use of coercion to impose one's will on others. When leaders imprison or even execute political dissidents, they are applying force; so, too, are terrorists when they seize or bomb an embassy or assassinate a political leader. *Influence,* on the other hand, refers to the exercise of power through a process of persuasion. A citizen may change his or her view of a Supreme Court nominee because of a newspaper editorial, the expert testimony of a law school dean before the Senate Judiciary Committee, or a stirring speech by a political activist at a rally. In each of these cases, such efforts to persuade people are examples of influence.

The term *authority* refers to institutionalized power that is recognized by the people over whom it is exercised. Political scientists and sociologists commonly use the term in connection with those who hold legitimate power through elected or publicly acknowledged positions. A person's authority is often limited. Thus, a referee has the authority to decide whether a penalty should be called during a football game but has no authority over the price of tickets to the game.

Social scientists have not limited their consideration of power to purely economic aspects of society. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) argues that power, typically wielded through the nation-state, could determine the behavior and cultural values followed by the people, the masses. He referred to these values and beliefs as a hegemonic culture that becomes viewed by the general public as normal and common sense. Power creates a consensus culture that also serves to maintain the status quo and, therefore, the interests of those in power.

Power in the 21st Century

In the 20th century, large states, particularly Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, came to be identified with maximizing nation-state power through their totalitarian governments. Yet in the latter 1900s and the 21st century, private corporations were as likely to be the focus of concerns about unbridled power. Motion picture documentaries focused on big box stores (*Store Wars* and *Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price*) or fast food restaurants (*Super Size Me*) and their negative impact on society. This corporate power, rather

than being seen as reducing unemployment, is likely to now be identified with impacting the environment and people's health in very negative ways.

The nation-state level of power analysis by Weber has also given way to the recognition of globalization, whether it is through multinational corporations and the continuing global influence of major economic powers like the United States. Superpowers and multinational businesses proceed in what they view as their best interests, with minimum interference worldwide. This kind of power challenges attempts to check or even regulate global economic and political powers.

Power also has assumed a new social significance as people feel their privacy invaded through surveillance of their own lives. Therefore, data-gathering agencies, whether they are government based or private, can influence people through the monitoring of their movements, financial dealings, or medical records. While sometimes this exercise of power is based on lofty motives, such as with the USA PATRIOT Act, others see this as an abuse of power.

Richard T. Schaefer

See also Globalization; Hegemony; Multinational Corporations; NIMBYism; Obesity; PATRIOT Act; Power Elite; Surveillance

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Power Elite

Power elite refers to societal power under the control of a small number of actors or organizations sharing common interests. Working together, this elite can either create or ameliorate social problems. For many people, the very existence of a power elite would be a social problem.

Who really holds power in the United States? Do "we the people" genuinely run the country, through our elected representatives? Or is it true that behind the scenes, a small elite controls both the government and the economic systems? This is not an easy question to answer, for it is difficult to determine the location of power in a society as complex as the United States. In exploring this critical question, social scientists have developed two basic views of the nation's power structure: the elitist and the pluralist models.

Elitist Models

The elitist view of power usually derives from the analysis of Karl Marx. For Marx, economics was the basis of society, with other social institutions like the family, law, and religion playing marginal roles directed by the economic elite.

The significance of the elitist perspective is that a relatively small segment of society exercises power. Furthermore, while decision making may be shared, those who exercise power are largely in agreement on major issues. So, for example, one might argue that elitists would be in agreement in efforts to avoid overtaxation but be less concerned about eliminating homelessness.

Karl Marx believed that 19th-century representative democracy was essentially a sham. He argued that industrial societies were dominated by relatively small numbers of people who owned factories and controlled natural resources. In Marx's view, government officials and military leaders were essentially servants of this capitalist class and followed their wishes. Therefore, any key decisions made by politicians inevitably reflected the interests of the dominant bourgeoisie. Like others who hold an elite model of power relations, Marx believed that society is ruled by a small group of individuals who share a common set of political and economic interests.

Mills's Model

Sociologist C. Wright Mills (1916–62) took the Marxist model a step further in his pioneering work *The Power Elite.* Mills described a small group of military, industrial, and government leaders who controlled the fate of the United States—the *power elite.* Power rested in the hands of a few, both inside and outside government. At the top of the power pyramid

are the corporate rich, leaders of the executive branch of government, and heads of the military (whom Mills called the "warlords"). Directly below are local opinion leaders, members of the legislative branch of government, and leaders of special interest groups. Mills contended that these individuals and groups would in essence follow the wishes of the dominant power elite. At the bottom of the pyramid are the unorganized, exploited masses.

The most striking difference from Marx is that Mills believed that the economically powerful coordinate their maneuvers with the military and political establishments to serve their common interests. Yet, reminiscent of Marx, Mills argues that the corporate rich were perhaps the most powerful element of the power elite (first among "equals"). And the powerless masses at the bottom of Mills's power elite model certainly bring to mind Marx's portrait of the oppressed workers of the world, who had only their chains to lose.

A fundamental element in Mills's thesis is that the power elite is indeed a societal problem and not only includes relatively few members but also operates as a self-conscious, cohesive unit. Although not necessarily diabolical or ruthless, the elite comprises similar types of people who regularly interact with one another and have essentially the same political and economic interests. Mills's power elite is not a conspiracy but rather a community of interest and sentiment among a small number of influential people.

Mills failed to clarify when the elite opposes protests and when it tolerates them; he also failed to provide detailed case studies that would substantiate the interrelationships among members of the power elite. Nevertheless, his challenging theories forced scholars to look more critically at the democratic political system of the United States.

In commenting on the scandals that have rocked major corporations such as Enron and Arthur Andersen, observers have noted that members of the business elite *are* closely interrelated. In a study of the members of the business elite of directors of *Fortune* 1,000 corporations, researchers found that each director can reach *every* other board of directors in just 3.7 steps. That is, by consulting acquaintances of acquaintances, each director can quickly reach someone who sits on each of the other 999 boards. Furthermore, the face-to-face contact directors regularly have in their board meetings makes them a highly cohesive elite. Finally, the corporate elite is not only wealthy, powerful, and cohesive; it is also overwhelmingly white and male.

Pluralist Model

While the notion of powerful elite interests does not seem as news breaking now as it did in the 1950s, criticisms of the power elite thesis have continued. The major criticism has been that decision making is more broadly shared ("the pluralist model") or that even if power is concentrated there are counteracting interests ("checks and balances").

Several social scientists insist that power in the United States is shared more widely than the elite models indicate. In their view, a pluralist model more accurately describes the nation's political system. According to the pluralist model, many competing groups within the community have access to government, so that no single group is dominant.

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See also Democracy; Military-Industrial Complex; Pluralism; Power

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PREJUDICE

Prejudice is a term with many connotations. The most common definition of prejudice in the social sciences is an attitude toward members of a given social group that rests on the fact that they are members of that group (e.g., members of a particular race, ethnicity, religion, or gender; individuals of a particular age, economic class, sexual orientation, or disability status). Generally, most researchers consider prejudice to

be the emotional component of reactions toward others based on their social category membership. It is also associated with stereotypes—specific ideas about the members of the group—and with discrimination—behavior toward the members of that group. Discrimination can be either overt (e.g., refusing housing or seating on a bus based on race) or subtle (e.g., administering job qualification tests that favor some ethnic groups based on criteria that are not job related). The notion of groups is central to the concept of prejudice; although prejudice can be felt for specific individuals, it is specifically based on their group membership.

The finding that prejudice often leads to discriminatory behaviors makes the study of prejudice a major focus in the social sciences. Indeed, classic research demonstrates that prejudice and behavior are related, although not always reciprocally. Contemporary researchers therefore seek to understand when prejudice influences behavior and when the situation or the personal characteristics of the perceiver override prejudice's influence.

Key Developments in the Social Scientific Study of Prejudice

Several major recent trends have been noted in the research literature. Perhaps the greatest change in the study of prejudice has been a shift in the usual conceptualization of prejudice. Early researchers focused their models on extreme cases of prejudice, with the goal of understanding the "bigot" or prejudiced individual. The underlying model, usually implicit but sometimes explicit, was that prejudice should be considered a pathology, the source of which can be understood and ferreted out. Contemporary researchers, in contrast, suggest that prejudice is a natural—if oftentimes deleterious—by-product of normal patterns of human thinking. Accordingly, the social cognition literature is replete with evidence that human memory systems rely on social categories largely because such organization of information is particularly efficient. For example, individuals often use categorical thinking because they are "cognitive misers." Upon encountering an individual from a given category, we can "know" quite a bit about him or her simply by accessing the many rich associations (i.e., schemas) we already have with that social category, saving a great deal of time and effort. This approach largely reconceptualizes prejudice from the extraordinary and deviant to the ordinary and normal. A problem arises, however, when a schema about a group is biased, not fully representative (i.e., weighted toward negative information about the group), inaccurate (i.e., based on myths about the group rather than facts), or—perhaps most damagingly—when the perceiver's schema does not accurately depict a given individual.

The literature on prejudice has changed from an earlier viewpoint that prejudice is volitional. More recent research shows that attitudes toward outgroups can operate unconsciously or outside of a perceiver's awareness, a result that illuminates the robust finding that reductions in conscious or expressed prejudice do not necessarily coincide with reductions in discrimination. That is, although an individual may resist the expression of prejudice consciously, he or she may harbor unconscious prejudice and consequently behave in discriminatory ways. The scientific study of such "implicit prejudice" is yielding interesting insights into the relationship between implicit and explicit prejudice and the behaviors that each one uniquely predicts.

Other interesting recent work finds that individuals differ in their motivations to respond without prejudice; for example, they may be internally or externally motivated. These differences in turn help explain expressions of prejudice.

The foci of research on prejudice have also evolved. Early researchers primarily studied the prejudice of majority group members toward minority group members, whereas recent work also examines the prejudice of minority group members toward other minority groups and the prejudice of minority group members toward majority group members. Other research examines how the prejudices of majority groups in society affect the targets of those prejudices. A classic and powerful study conducted by Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark reported that black children as young as 4 preferred white dolls to dolls that were closer to their own skin color. Influential recent research on stereotype threat and related research on stereotype susceptibility examine how prejudice influences its targets via stereotypes. Other work considers psychological implications and emotional responses of being the target of prejudice, including coping, victimization, stigmatization, and feelings of social exclusion.

Prejudice and Social Problems

An understanding of prejudice is critical for resolving many pressing social problems because prejudice

(a) *contributes* to many social problems and (b) is a *consequence* of social problems. These cyclical factors make prejudice ubiquitous in society.

Prejudice as a Cause of Social Problems

Negative prejudice directly contributes to social problems in the form of discrimination. For example, prejudice toward certain groups is associated with discrimination in employment. In one classic study, a cohort of white participants was assigned to interview either a black or a white job applicant. The research revealed that black applicants were treated differently than were white applicants. White interviewers of black applicants kept greater physical distance from black applicants, made more speech errors during the interviews, and ended the interviews sooner. Research demonstrates that prejudice toward groups influences employment decisions, educational disparities across groups (e.g., teachers' expectations and student achievement), patterns of housing (e.g., residential segregation), political representation and underrepresentation, and even jury sentencing. Beyond these disturbing consequences, prejudice can motivate hate crimes, police brutality, and personal conflicts. Globally, prejudice played a role in some of the most heinous genocides from the Holocaust to those in Bosnia and Rwanda. Thus, prejudice can fuel both antipathy and active aggression.

Prejudice as a Consequence of Social Disparity

Social scientists have shown that prejudice not only contributes to social problems but also results from them. When people witness disparities between groups, such as disparities of poverty and educational achievement, they develop prejudices. For example, system justification theory argues that psychological and ideological motivations lead individuals to justify and preserve the status quo, often via unconscious prejudices and stereotypes. This is an example of a social problem leading to prejudice, because to maintain the existing social order in which the majority group enjoys dominance and privilege, *both* minority and majority members may experience prejudice *against* members of the minority group and *for* the majority group. Indeed, studies show that members of minority ethnic groups actually favor majority ethnic group members, thus perpetuating inequity. Additionally, because people are generally motivated to believe the world is fair and that people "get what they deserve"—the "just world phenomenon"—prejudice becomes an efficient way to justify the status quo. When the status quo includes a host of social problems, such as ethnic or gender stratification in work or education, the result is prejudice.

One can quickly identify a troubling state of affairs—a vicious cycle in which negative prejudice can contribute to social disparities that, in turn, contribute to prejudice. For this reason, negative prejudice is often considered a social problem, and breaking this cycle via prejudice reduction has been a major concern of social scientists and practitioners.

Reducing Prejudice, Achieving Tolerance

Even as evidence suggests the decline in some countries of certain forms of prejudice, other evidence suggests that more subtle, indirect, and pernicious forms of prejudice have emerged. Further complicating matters, prejudice has a multitude of causes. Characterizing searches for the causes of prejudice are two broad perspectives, one emphasizing individual differences and the other emphasizing intergroup processes. Based on these perspectives, scholars have theorized and demonstrated that many factors can contribute to prejudice, including competition for resources, power, or prestige; economic hardships; social categorization and subsequent social comparison processes; psychological processes; personality characteristics; social stereotypes; socialization influences (e.g., through families, classmates, or the media); and conformity motives. Although reducing such a multicausal problem as prejudice is not simple, programs to reduce prejudice are ubiquitous and can be found in employment organizations, schools, and society more generally, and in both private and public organizations.

One major approach to prejudice reduction is encapsulated in the *contact hypothesis*, which states that contact between majority and minority group members will decrease prejudice, but only when members of two groups have (a) equal status, (b) shared goals, (c) active cooperation with each other, and (d) the support of authorities. These conditions can be very difficult to fulfill in everyday life. Notably, research and theory on contact played a significant role in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling desegregating schools.

Importantly, a recent meta-analysis (an integrative examination of a variety of studies) found that intergroup contact effectively reduces intergroup

prejudice—a finding that generalized across ethnic, racial, and other categories studied. The meta-analysis also found that instances in which the four conditions were met were the most effective in reducing prejudice amid intergroup contact.

Other approaches to reducing prejudice include the *conversion model*, which hypothesizes that encountering an atypical member of a group will provoke a change in one's prejudice, and the *bookkeeping model*, which hypothesizes that exposure to prejudice-contradicting information will gradually lead to the reduction of prejudice. Still other approaches to prejudice reduction focus on social categories. These include *decategorization models*, which focus on increasing the extent to which individuals are seen as individuals rather than as members of groups, and *recategorization theories*, which posit that prejudice is reduced to the extent that groups are reconceived so that "we" and "they" are combined into a single "us." Recategorization may be achieved by creating superordinate identities (e.g., "We are all Americans") or superordinate goals (e.g., "We are all working to preserve the environment"). More recent work emphasizes dual categorization—concurrent emphasis of shared and distinct identities—in order to avoid counterproductive reactions that might be instigated by the emphasis of shared identities at the expense of distinct identities. Still other work focuses on reducing prejudice through cross-categorization, which considers each individual's multiple group identities, particularly those identities shared by individuals who see each other largely as members of different groups. For instance, a young person prejudiced against an older person (ageism) might experience a reduction in prejudice if reminded that they are both Christian women (and thus share a religious group and a gender group).

A much-discussed and controversial approach to prejudice reduction is *blindness*, often called *color blindness* in the case of race and ethnicity. This perspective argues that, if prejudice involves attention and consideration to difference, then policies—and indeed society—should be blind to difference in order to reduce prejudice. Critics of this perspective charge that it paradoxically impedes prejudice reduction by underappreciating the structural barriers that codify prejudice into the structures and forms of our social institutions. They further argue that color-blind approaches impede collective action by groups suffering from prejudice and encourage blindness to difference that can make communities vibrant, interesting, and rich in potential.

Beyond Tolerance

Historically, the term *prejudice* has connoted negative prejudice—negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward the members of a group. To achieve tolerance across groups, research has primarily sought to reduce negative prejudice. But what lies beyond tolerance? Recent work on intergroup attitudes answers this question by investigating positive intergroup thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Research on *allophilia* (from the Greek for "liking or loving the other") has focused on such attitudes and finds that positive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors about members of other groups are as central to understanding positive behaviors across group divisions (e.g., proactive support of the "other") as negative prejudices are to understanding negative ones. This work also suggests that negative prejudice and allophilia have distinct antecedents: what it takes to reduce hating across groups is different from what it takes to increase liking. In sum, this work supports a two-dimensional model of intergroup attitudes in which liking and disliking—allophilia and negative prejudice—are often negatively correlated, but also exhibit significant independence (different antecedents and different outcomes).

Whether the focus is on reducing the negative (e.g., employment discrimination) or on increasing the positive (e.g., increasing an individual's comfort, kinship, and engagement with those of another group), the prejudice construct has been a vibrant, fertile, and productive area of inquiry for social scientists and a place where science has met practice in service of society.

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See also Discrimination; Stereotyping

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Premarital Sex

Premarital sex refers to sexual interaction between heterosexual men and women prior to marriage. Many scholars chart changes in both attitudes and behavior related to premarital sex to explore the connection between this issue and social problems, such as divorce and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Given the interconnectedness of sexual behavior and other important aspects of society, every society has guidelines for single men and women for what is permissible sexual behavior. Considerable cross-cultural variation exists in what is deemed acceptable sexual contact before marriage. Attitudes and behavior related to premarital sex also differ by race, social class, gender, religion, age, and historical time period. In many Western societies, prior to the 20th century, sexual activity before marriage was not socially acceptable. Communities and families both played a role in monitoring the sexual behavior of unmarried persons to ensure that a child was not born out of wedlock. In addition to the practical consideration of avoiding pregnancy, many religions strictly regulated sexual interaction among unmarried men and women. Despite the continued influence of organized religion, premarital sex changed from being forbidden to becoming the norm by the latter part of the 20th century.

Throughout the 20th century in the United States, there have been different rules for men and women with regard to sex before marriage. In the first half of the 20th century, the ideal was for both men and women to wait until marriage to have sex. However, men had more freedom to flout society's rules; as a result, men were free to engage in sexual relations with prostitutes or other disreputable women. Society expected women, on the other hand, to remain virgins until their wedding night or risk ruining their reputations and chances of securing a husband. This sexual double standard governed the sexual behavior of single men and women, affecting what they were willing to do sexually, whom they would have a sexual relationship with, and the roles they would play during a sexual encounter. Typically, men would play the aggressor role by initiating sexual advances, and women would play the "gatekeeper" role by deciding how much they would allow a sexual encounter to escalate.

Over time, attitudes and behaviors related to premarital sex began to change. These changes were brought about by other changes in society. In the 1920s, dating replaced traditional courtship as the primary means for young men and women to interact. Unlike traditional courtship, dating took place in the public sphere, away from close parental supervision. This change, along with more young people moving to cities and attending college, allowed for a greater degree of sexual activity prior to marriage. The sexual norms for the dating era included kissing, necking, and petting; however, oral sex and sexual intercourse were still off limits. Despite these standards, Alfred Kinsey's mid-20th-century reports on male and female sexual behavior shocked Americans by suggesting that many were not living up to this ideal. Although Kinsey's study was not representative, his data indicated that more than half of women lost their virginity prior to marriage.

The decades that followed brought about the most significant changes in attitudes and behavior for premarital sex, particularly for women. Some of these changes were brought about by women's rights activists in the 1960s and 1970s demanding equality with men in all areas of life, including sex. In this era, the increasing availability of birth control, including "the pill," made it possible for sexual intercourse to occur without a significant risk of pregnancy. This technological advance fueled the change, which was

already underway, that sexual intercourse could be for pleasure, not just procreation. Attitudes toward premarital sex changed as a result of this sexual revolution. Youth cultures in particular began to reject premarital chastity as an ideal. At this time, it increasingly became socially acceptable for men and women to have sexual intercourse outside of the context of marriage.

Along with these attitudinal changes came changes in premarital sexual behavior. Martin K. Whyte's classic 1990 study examined premarital sex rates among three generations of women and found that premarital sex became increasingly common throughout the 20th century. Approximately one quarter of women who were married from 1925 to 1944 had engaged in premarital sex, compared to one half of women who were married from 1945 to 1964. For women who married after the sexual revolution, from 1965 to 1984, approximately three quarters had engaged in premarital sex. Whyte characterized these changes as an "intimacy revolution" more than a sexual revolution per se, given that the majority of women from all three generations had sex only with their eventual spouses. Whyte did note that sex with someone other than one's eventual spouse did increase significantly over time: one third of women in the latest cohort had engaged in "pre-premarital sex."

By the turn of the 21st century, sex before marriage had become the norm for most men and women with the exception of those who were very religious. Young people remain single longer than ever before, with the median age at first marriage now at approximately 25 for women and 27 for men. Although men and women may delay marriage, they are often sexually active from adolescence (the average age of first intercourse is 17). People now spend a longer time sexually active and unmarried, thereby acquiring more sexual partners in their lifetimes than previous generations. Despite the increase in years for engaging in premarital sex, the context for sexual intercourse did not change from marriage-only to "anything goes" as is often assumed. Most Americans approve of premarital sex only in the confines of a committed relationship between consenting adults. Although premarital sex is increasingly common and accepted, significant differences still remain in how men and women are evaluated with regard to sexual behavior. Unlike women, single men continue to have greater freedom in sexual activity under a variety of circumstances without risking their reputations. The sexual double standard that dominated in the first half of the 20th century may have diminished, but it has not disappeared.

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See also Cohabitation; Contraception; Extramarital Sex; Sexually Transmitted Diseases

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PRESTIGE

Prestige is an intangible good (such as esteem or honor) accorded to high-status social positions and enjoyed by persons who occupy those positions. As such, prestige may be intertwined with other dimensions of social stratification.

Occupational prestige is a core dimension of socioeconomic status. Most research on occupational prestige uses public opinion surveys—such as the General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center—to measure respondents' evaluations of occupations and to construct prestige scales across occupational categories. Methodological issues at stake include the dimensionality, reliability, temporal stability, and cross-cultural validity of occupational prestige rankings. Research also suggests that prestige may be accorded differently for sex-typical and sex-atypical pairings of individuals and occupations.

Like related concepts of power and status, prestige is inherently comparative. Prestige benefits recipients only at the expense of others. At the macro-level, this competitive quality of prestige is implicit in the ranking of social categories. At the micro-level, researchers in group dynamics regard prestige as one of the primary modes of differentiation in groups. Prestige may accompany high-status roles within a local hierarchy, such as the captain of an athletic team

or elder member of a clan. It may also emanate from asymmetries in everyday social exchange, such as the exchange of deference for advice.

Research in social networks offers operational definitions of prestige for individuals or groups by applying methods of centrality analysis to patterns of social relations. Such methods may identify prestigious persons or roles within a group or reveal hierarchies of prestige among organizations embodied in historical structures of exchange. For example, several researchers have modeled prestige rankings of graduate departments by analyzing patterns of hiring across departments.

Collective action theorists posit that prestige may serve as an incentive for members to contribute to collective goods. For example, a group may give prestige to members who make important contributions to the group's welfare, rewarding such efforts at little cost to the group. On the other hand, because prestige is inherently comparative, such rewards may impose costs on members who do not receive the rewards. This may lead to unintended side effects, such as when competitiveness undermines cooperation and informal norms emerge that punish the individuals who receive the most prestige.

James A. Kitts and Blaine G. Robbins

See also Socioeconomic Status; Stratification, Social

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Prison

A prison is both a physical container and an institution. A prison contains people, typically those who have violated criminal law and have been sentenced to a period of incarceration. Prisons, also called "penitentiaries" and "correctional facilities," are distinguished from jails in the United States by length of confinement: jails incapacitate those who are charged with but not yet convicted of criminal offense or who are serving shorter sentences, typically one year or less. Prison and jail, along with probation, constitute the corrections component of the criminal justice system. Prisons have also been used as tools of governments seeking to incapacitate critics of their practices, hence the term *political prisoners*.

Originally used to hold persons before trial, the prison as a penal institution—that is, the modern prison—came into existence by the end of the 18th century. As such, it denies inmates a range of basic personal rights and privileges. Restrictions on prisoners can extend from solitary confinement, in which access to space outside one's cell is held to an hour or less per day, to restrictions on one's movement, as in the case of people who serve sentences in their homes—house arrest—but may be required to wear an electronic sensor attached to their ankle.

Prisons fall into several classifications, depending on the level of custody required for inmates. In the United States there are minimum, medium, maximum, and super-maximum security prisons, with more intensive control and security at each higher level. Prisons and jails also separate male and female inmates. States and local jails maintain separate facilities for juvenile offenders; there are no juvenile federal facilities. For the most serious crimes, prosecutors may sentence youth to prisons as adults.

According to the International Centre for Prison Studies, as of February 2005, the rate of incarceration in prison and jail—737 inmates per 100,000 population—ranks the United States as the nation *most likely* to use imprisonment, with a rate of imprisonment 6 to 8 times higher than other industrial democracies. Following a period of explosive growth in the prison population dating back to the implementation of mandatory, structured, and determinant sentencing policies in the late 1970s, as of 2006, more than 7 million people in the United States were under some form of correctional supervision, including probation, prison, jail, and parole. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 2,385,213 people were incarcerated by the United States at the end of 2006, including prisoners in federal, state, and territorial prisons; local jails; military and juvenile facilities; facilities of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and jails in Indian country.

U.S. prisons and jails incarcerate black and Latino/a people in numbers disproportionate to their presence in the U.S. population. African/black Americans constituted 12.4 percent of the U.S. population, according to the 2006 American Community Survey; whites made up 73.9 percent of the population and Hispanics or Latinos/as of any race, 14.8 percent. At the end of 2006, 42 percent of inmates in prison were black; white inmates were 33 percent, and Hispanics 21 percent. The over-representation of blacks and Latinos/as in jails is similar to prison: whites are 44.3 percent of the 2005 jail population, blacks 38.9 percent, and Hispanics 15 percent.

The BJS estimates that 32 percent of black males will be incarcerated in prison at some point in their lifetime, compared to 17 percent of Hispanic males and 5.9 percent of white males. Males are an overwhelming majority in prisons and jails, yet the rate of incarceration of females in the United States has increased dramatically in the past 30 years. According to the Institute on Women and Criminal Justice, the number of women serving sentences of more than a year grew by 757 percent between 1977 and 2004. Women currently make up 7 percent of all U.S. inmates.

The Logic of Incarceration: Punishment, Correction, or Incapacitation

Prevailing theories about human behavior, the causes of crime, and ideology about how to address criminal behavior have always influenced how and why society uses prisons. Prisons are intended to meet a variety of social goals, including incapacitation, deterrence, discipline, punishment or retribution, and rehabilitation or reformation.

The logic of incapacitation is simple on its face: if we contain people who would otherwise be engaging in criminal behavior, we will reduce the crime rate and improve public safety. Known as the "incapacitation effect," the theory holds that by reducing opportunity—particularly during an individual's prime crime years—crime will be reduced. Research evidence on this effect is inconclusive; there is also little evidence that incarceration deters future criminality. In terms of deterrence, the argument is that the threat of punishment, in this case, of incarceration, will dissuade people from engaging in criminal behavior in the first place. However, evidence suggests that the more incarceration experiences one has, the more likely one is to recidivate.

The notion that the punishment should fit the crime, sometimes known as retributive justice or *lex talionis* ("an eye for an eye"), is best understood as an attempt to retaliate with a punishment matching the level and quality of an offense.

In 1974, a now-infamous report by New York sociologist Robert Martinson asked the question "What works?" about prison reform. Because his answer to that question was "Nothing," and in keeping with surveys that failed to find rehabilitation programs that successfully prevented recidivism, rehabilitation came under attack and public policy took a turn toward rational choice theory, which argues that criminals are rational actors who decide to engage in criminal behavior. Consequently, authorities dramatically reduced programs meant to reform offenders, including education in prisons.

Some social theorists are particularly critical of prison as actually a tool to warehouse people who otherwise lack a place in a capitalist economy. Incarcerated persons often suffer from both mental illness and poverty before prison; these theorists thus suggest that prison is simply a means to discipline a population that cannot and will not labor. Recent efforts at restorative justice—which seeks to involve victims of crime as well as the community of people impacted by wrongdoing—and alternatives to incarceration—which include community courts and programs that divert offenders from prison and jail—have shown some promising results.

Prison as a Social Problem

In keeping with the arguments of Marxist-influenced scholars, some maintain that prison is used as a stopgap measure to deal with social problems that society and government have failed to adequately address, such as racism, poverty, and mental illness. In this view, as Ted Conover noted in his compelling journalistic work on his year spent as a corrections officer at New York's infamous Sing Sing, prison itself has become a social problem.

According to the most recent survey of inmates in prisons and jails, jail inmates report the highest rate of mental health problems (60 percent), followed by state (49 percent) and federal prisoners (40 percent). Partly as a result of the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and the lack of community mental health services,

some say prison has become a de facto mental health system.

Prisons are often built in areas with high unemployment rates, and work in prison then becomes a major feature of the regional economy. The privatization of prisons has led many to question whether punishment should be profitable and left to the workings of the market. Prison labor has been another area of debate, with corporations criticized for exploiting the labor of prisoners, and prison officials supportive of any activity that occupies the time and attention of inmates.

Some theorists have gone beyond consideration of prison as a social problem and beyond the host of social problems that occur within prisons. Historian Mike Davis is credited with first using the phrase "prison industrial complex" to describe the collection of interests, mainly political and economic, that have fueled the expansion of U.S. prisons regardless of their efficacy or cost-effectiveness in preventing and reducing crime.

Michelle Ronda

See also Incarceration, Societal Implications; Innocence Project; Juvenile Justice System; Prison, Convict Criminology; Prisons, Gangs; Prisons, Overcrowding; Prisons, Privatization; Prisons, Riots; Prisons, Violence; Rational Choice Theory; Recidivism; Restorative Justice; Sentencing Disparities; Total Institution

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Prison, Convict Criminology

Convict criminology is a new research perspective in criminology led by ex-convicts who are now academic faculty. They especially focus on how the problem of crime is defined, the solutions proposed, the correctional policies enacted, and the devastating impacts of those decisions on the men and women confined in prison. Stephen C. Richards and Jeffrey Ian Ross coined the term *convict criminology* in 2001, and 2 years later published an edited book, *Convict Criminology,* that included nine chapters by ex-convict professors. This was the first time ex-convict academics appeared in a book together discussing their own criminal convictions, time in prison, and experiences in graduate school and as professors at universities.

Next came the New School of Convict Criminology, informally organized as a writing and activist collective. Comprising this group are ex-convict professors, graduate students, undergraduate students, and "non-con" critical colleagues and friends including non-con academics who have contributed in many ways to the formation, growth, and activities of the group.

Convict criminology also includes ex-convicts or "non-convicts" who work outside of academia in government agencies, private foundations, or community groups, where they do research or administer criminal justice programs. Although these members do not hold full-time positions at universities, they may teach part-time or write research reports that contribute to academic publications or criminal justice policy.

The Convict Criminology Group also includes a growing group of men and women behind bars who hold advanced degrees and have published academic work about crime and corrections, often coauthored books and academic articles with "free world" academics. Presently, the group includes male and female ex-con academics from North America, Europe, United Kingdom, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States, with the largest prison population in the world, contributes the most members.

Individuals voluntarily decide to associate with the group, which has no formal membership or leadership roles. Different members of the group lead or take responsibility for assorted functions, as lead author on an academic article or monograph, collaboration on a research proposal, organizing sessions at regional and

national conferences, conducting program assessment, mentoring students or junior faculty, or developing media contacts.

The Convict Criminology Group helps organize and support numerous groups and activities related to criminal justice reform, provides consulting services, and organizes workshops for criminal defense attorneys, correctional organizations, and universities. Collectively, the group has published books, journal articles, and book chapters using "autoethnographic" or "insider" perspectives. The group continues to grow as more prisoners exit prison to attend universities, hear about the group, and decide to contribute. Convict criminology, in fact, is now taught in universities and prisons.

Matthew J. Sheridan and Stephen C. Richards

See also Cultural Criminology; Prison; Standpoint Theory

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Prisons, Gangs

Most incarcerated individuals share several underlying characteristics, including delinquent and criminal histories, poverty, substance abuse, and lack of education, but it is their diversities that are most crucial within prisons. Inmate racial, ethnic, religious, and geographic differences become problematic to correctional administrators when they contribute to the formation or continuation of gangs in prison.

Most researchers describe two primary types of prison gangs, also known as "security threat groups" (STGs). Inmates can import their street gang culture into the prison environment or they can join prison gangs that function mainly inside the prison walls. Entering street gang members may seek to join up with their fellow incarcerated ex–street gang members on the inside. Other entering inmates may join a prison gang because of losing contact with family, friends, or jobs that may have functioned to inhibit street gang membership. These inmates find strength in shared philosophical beliefs, racial or ethnic origins, religious perspectives, or geographical locations advocated by the prison gang. The distinction between street gangs and prison gangs may be misleading, however, because many prison gang members and incarcerated street gang members form alliances, even entering into partnerships to further illegal enterprises within and outside the facility.

Accurate measurement of gang membership is difficult because of differences in measurement methods and definitions. One study estimates 1,625 validated gangs in U.S. prisons, while estimates of the numbers of gang members range from 15,398 to more than 16,000 in just the three states of Ohio, Texas, and California. The largest and most active prison gangs are Nuestra Familia, Aryan Brotherhood, Texas Syndicate, Mexican Mafia, and Black Guerilla Family.

Although gang members are a small proportion of all inmates, they represent a serious threat to institutional management and to the outside world. In 1998, for example, Nuestra Familia members ordered death hits and drug deals, orchestrated extortion rackets, and tampered with witnesses from inside a secure housing unit in Pelican Bay State Prison in California. A complex federal, state, and local investigation called "Operation Black Widow" uncovered these crimes, resulting in the indictments of 13 gang members on 24 federal counts.

Prisons employ identification of gang members, suppression efforts, and programming to control gang activities. Identification may occur during the classification process. Outward signs of gang affiliation, such as brands, tattoos, or other identifiers (e.g., cut eyebrows) are systematically documented. Intake officials also ask about current or prior gang affiliation, not only to ensure institutional safety but also to provide for the safety of the entering inmate. Most prison policies try to restrict mixing of inmates from rival gangs to reduce the possibility of violence related to gang rivalries. This de facto racial segregation may be difficult, however, due to a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court ruling (*Johnson v. California*) banning the long-term racial segregation of inmates.

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See also Gangs; Prison; Prisons, Riots; Prisons, Violence

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Prisons, Overcrowding

Prison overcrowding, also called "prison crowding," is a matter of great contention and concern in current criminal justice public policy debates in both Canada and the United States. Coming to public attention as a social problem most recently in the United States in the late 1970s, prison overcrowding has coincided with the unprecedented growth in the nation's prison population over the past several decades.

Because of the "war on drugs" and mandatory sentencing, the United States has become the world's foremost jailer. With just 5 percent of the world's population, the United States has 25 percent of its prisoners, approximately 2.4 million, a number that steadily increases by about 3 percent each year. In 2006, federal prisons were operating at 37 percent above capacity.

The criminal justice system responded to what some jurisdictions call the "crisis" of prison overcrowding through diversion strategies, relying more heavily on jails for the overflow of prisoners, doubling up prisoners in one cell (also called double bunking), hotly debated early release strategies, and an increasing reliance on private (for-profit) prisons, to name a few. However, policy focus on capacity issues sometimes detracts from the actual conditions of privacy, security, and manageability (including meeting basic needs for nutrition, health, and sanitation) within prisons.

In 2006, the Vera Institute of Justice's Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons held public hearings, which included expert testimony on prison crowding. The conveners pointed out that no academic literature shows an established connection between overcrowding and violence. However, this research is not from the perspective of corrections officers and inmates whose daily experience may lead them to different conclusions. The debate on overcrowding in part thus hinges on experiential viewpoints and definition of terms.

The human experience of "crowding" or "being crowded" has both physiological and psychological components. Research studies show that among the many negative effects of prison overcrowding on inmates are competition for limited resources, aggression, higher rates of illness, increased likelihood of recidivism, and higher suicide rates. Prisoners in overcrowded prisons often cannot get prison work assignments, leading to idleness-related frustration and the higher likelihood of interpersonal conflicts, assaults, and rapes. Staff cannot monitor activities as effectively or identify prisoner problems. If they do identify a problem situation, they have few options to reduce animosities. For example, they may be unable to separate prisoners and place them in different facilities.

Certainly, the amount of space per inmate is a factor in determining at what point a prison contains too many inmates. In fact, the official definition of prison crowding relies on measures related to capacity: either *design capacity,* the number of inmates that the prison architect originally intended to be housed in that institution, or *operational capacity,* the number of inmates that a facility's staff, existing programs, and services can accommodate. However, perceptions of crowding may be equally or even more important.

Experiencing a space as crowded or overcrowded—inside prison or not—is related to social density, exigent circumstances, and individual expectations. Residents of urban areas may have lower expectations of personal space than people living in less densely populated areas. Individuals housed in cells alone may feel less crowded than those housed in a large barracks with greater objective space but much less privacy.

Data from the end of 2005 showed 23 states and the federal prison system operating at 100 percent or more of their highest capacity. Despite some prisons operating below capacity, perceptions of crowding may remain, particularly as space inside prisons that was originally meant to house fewer inmates is converted to house more. Experts report that the average U.S. prisoner has living space of about 60 square feet, an area just slightly bigger than the size of a king-sized bed.

Prison overcrowding also includes a lack of appropriate programming available to the incarcerated. With high levels of illiteracy, few educational or substantive employment programs, as well as limited access to mental health resources, the potential for disorder in prisons is high. In addition, corrections staff may face greater difficulty in managing an inmate population that exceeds a building's planned capacity, particularly if those professionals are understaffed or inadequately trained.

By the late 1980s, successful crowding litigation brought by prisoners' rights advocates and prisoners

led to prisons in 36 states compelled by court order (or engaged in such lawsuits) to reduce crowding. In 2006, the states spent a combined total of nearly $35.6 billion on corrections, with a budgeted total of $37.6 billion for 2007. A major factor driving this increased spending is prison overcrowding.

At least eight states now transfer some prisoners out of state and often into private prisons to cope with crowded conditions. In 2007, a successful class action lawsuit on behalf of state prisoners in California resulted in a court ruling that inmate overcrowding contributed to constitutional violations of inadequate medical and mental health care in the state's prisons.

Michelle Ronda

See also Community Corrections; Prison; Prisons, Privatization; Prisons, Riots; Prisons, Violence; Sentencing Disparities; Social Control; Total Institution; Violent Crime

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Prisons, Pregnancy and Parenting

The number of adults under some form of correctional supervision has been increasing steadily. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2006 more than 7 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole. This accounts for 3.2 percent of all adult residents in the United States. Prison authorities at the federal and state levels had more than 1.4 million inmates in custody. More than 1.5 million children under the age of 18 have parents incarcerated in state and federal prisons; children under the age of 5 years old made up 22 percent of these children.

Research indicates that when a family member goes to prison, the whole family suffers. Incarcerated females are more likely to have been the primary caretaker, so what happens to their children is different than for children of incarcerated male parents. For males, the children are more likely to be with their children's mother. Children of females in prison are often placed in the care of other family members, typically grandparents (usually grandmothers). In many states, family members are not eligible for foster care money, so poor families who cannot afford another mouth to feed may not be able to take on this burden. The children may then be placed in foster care, where siblings may be separated and uprooted from all that is familiar to them. For some of these children, this may be the first time that they have been away from their mothers for any length of time.

Incarcerated parents, particularly mothers, face the problem of how to maintain the bond they had with their children before incarceration. Interestingly, males tend to get more visits from their children under the age of 12 years old than females. The mothers of the children of male prisoners tend to bring the children to see their fathers. Because mothers who are in prisons are usually the primary caregiver, they are less likely to have their children visit them. There are other reasons as well. Though their numbers have been increasing at a more rapid rate than their male counterparts, females still make up a significantly lesser proportion of the prison population. Most states have only one women's prison, often in rural and/or suburban areas far from where these women lived. There tends not to be public transportation to the facilities. So even for those substitute primary caregivers who would like to bring the children to visit their mothers, it is a daunting, if not impossible, task. Another factor that may explain the lack of children visiting their imprisoned mothers is the stigma attached to a woman in prison. Some women inmates do not want their children to know that they are imprisoned, so they make up stories to explain their absence, saying they had to "go down South" or that they will be away for a while or that children are not allowed where they are.

Most research on parents in prisons focuses on the female. The majority of females in prisons are single parents, so their parental role is more obvious. Traditionally the male parental role has not received as much attention as that of the mother, but recent research shows that the long-term consequences of having either parent (or both) incarcerated are just as serious. Also, with an emerging pattern of intergenerational crime, in some prisons the parent and the child, and in some instances even the grandparent, are in the same institution. Parents in prison, for the most part, do not want their children to repeat their mistakes. Experts thus recommend the implementation of programs in prison that work toward maintaining and improving the parental bond between children and their incarcerated parents.

Mothers and fathers in prisons have similar concerns, but females face some gender-specific problems of parenting. Recent surveys by the Bureau of Justice found that 6 percent of women who enter jail and 5 percent of those entering prisons are pregnant. Health care for incarcerated women in general is horrendous, but for pregnant women, additional problems arise since there is little to no prenatal care. Women wishing to terminate a pregnancy (usually those in jails) may have stumbling blocks placed in their paths, and women who want to continue their pregnancy (usually those in prisons) may be encouraged to abort. Women who do continue the pregnancy may find themselves in situations threatening to themselves and or their fetus. Sometimes correctional officers may tell them that they are not in labor when they really are, thereby putting their babies in danger of being born without proper medical attention. Those who make it to the hospital find themselves shackled to the bed as they give birth, even when a correctional officer is in the room. Some women have their babies immediately taken away and placed in a foster home. Few prisons allow new mothers to keep their babies with them, even though research on such programs as the one at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility show the positive impact of letting mothers keep their babies for the first 18 or 24 months.

Incarcerated parents face challenges similar to parents in the outside world, but they also have additional hurdles. As more and more people become imprisoned, society must be cognizant that the long-term punishment of parents also punishes their children. Society in general, and children of incarcerated mothers in particular, may be better served by keeping nonviolent female offenders with children in community-based programs where they can pay their debt to society yet continue their roles as primary caregivers of their children. For those women who must be incarcerated, programs that maintain and strengthen the parent–child bond should be created. Parenting classes, visitation programs, nursery programs, and programs such as Girl Scouts Behind Bars are just a few of such programs. In addition, all re-entry programs should have a component that deals with parenting, especially for female offenders.

Policies and laws that are more holistic and systematic are needed to deal with this social problem.

Charley B. Flint

See also Family; Family, Dysfunctional; Foster Children, Aging Out; Prison; Prisons, Overcrowding; Single Mothers

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Prisons, Privatization

The term *prison privatization* commonly refers to the policy of contracting out the management and operation of prisons and jails to private, for-profit companies. Prison privatization is a controversial public policy issue, with ongoing debate over the ethics of delegating the punishment function of the criminal justice system to private actors, whether private prisons

cost less to operate than public facilities, and if the quality of security and conditions of confinement differ between public and private prisons. In 2005, approximately 200 private correctional facilities operated in the United States, housing a total of 107,000 inmates. Four companies—Corrections Corporation of America, Geo Group, Management and Training Corporation, and Cornell Corrections—provide more than 90 percent of private prison capacity. About 6 percent of all state inmates and 14 percent of federal inmates are incarcerated in privatized facilities.

The idea of privatizing prisons emerged in the 1980s as a policy remedy to the problem of growing incarceration rates, severe prison overcrowding, and constraints on increasing government funding of new prison space. Public investment in new prisons climbed eightfold from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, but was at or approaching its limits in many jurisdictions due to voter rejection of construction bonds, statutory ceilings on state debt, or general taxpayer unwillingness to support increases in government spending. With privatization used as a way of reducing costs and increasing capacity in other areas of government services—such as public works and infrastructure (e.g., utilities, building maintenance, and highway construction) and social policy (e.g., health care, pension plan management, and welfare services)—supporters of prison privatization argued that the benefits of privatization in those areas could apply to prisons as well. Private companies could build new prisons more rapidly than the government and draw upon private investors to help fund prison construction, while competition for contracts would help to contain costs and promote more efficiency in operations. On the strength of these arguments, the first private prison opened in 1984. Within the next 20 years, private correctional facilities arose in 33 states.

On the other side of the debate, critics of prison privatization argue that the profit motive of private companies encourages them to cut corners, resulting in diminished conditions of confinement for inmates, a risk to public safety, and more dangerous environments for both prison inmates and staff. Correctional worker labor unions are among the most vocal of private prison critics, with their opposition based in part on the fact that the wages of correctional officers in private prisons are generally lower than in public prisons. Correctional officer unions have organized campaigns to defeat prison privatization attempts in many jurisdictions. Reflective of their efforts, the number of private prisons around the country correlates inversely with labor unions' strength: 47.5 percent of private prison beds are in southern states, 25.1 percent in western states, 17.7 percent in midwestern states, and 9.7 percent in northeastern states. Since the late 1990s, a number of faith-based organizations have also voiced opposition to prison privatization on ethical grounds, arguing that the business ethos of economy and efficiency is an insufficient rationale to drive policy in a criminal justice system founded on principles of justice and public service.

Research comparing the operating costs and conditions of confinement in public prisons and private prisons has produced mixed findings. Numerous studies, sponsored by state-level agencies, simply investigated whether states could save money by privatizing some of their prisons. While the studies generally indicate that private prisons are less expensive—by 8 to 15 percent—the true cost of operating either type of facility is difficult to ascertain due to substantially different procedures in private and public accounting. For example, the reported expenses of private facilities do not generally include indirect costs incurred by the government in providing services, such as contract monitoring and prisoner case management. Similarly, other state agencies may absorb some public prison costs (e.g., utilities, personnel management) that are not reflected in total correctional agency costs.

In noting the difficulty of making valid comparisons, the U.S. Government Accountability Office criticized the methodological validity of much privatization cost comparison research and concluded that the jury is still out on which type of prison is the more cost-effective. Other studies suggest that differences in facility size, age, and security level are more predictive of facility costs than private versus public ownership. Research on the quality of services provided by private prisons shows that, systemwide, private prisons generally provide a quality of inmate care on par with public facilities. Observance of low performance in individual private prisons appears to be more a result of poorly written contracts or inadequate contract monitoring than inherent differences between the public and private sectors.

The ethical issues surrounding prison privatization engage questions of values and beliefs not easily settled by empirical studies of costs and conditions. Supporters of prison privatization tend to place a high value on limited government and free market solutions to social problems. Conversely, opponents tend

to place greater value on the role of government in solving social problems. Where supporters have been successful in implementing prison privatization policy, opponents have been successful in moderating the extent of the practice.

Prison privatization has served as an expedient remedy for prison overcrowding in times of rapid growth in the correctional population. As the growth in incarceration rates began to slow somewhat at the end of the 20th century, growth in the private prison industry slowed accordingly. Post–September 11, 2001, concerns with illegal immigration have provided a boost to the private prison industry, with the federal government entering into new contracts with private companies to create more detention centers for illegal aliens. But as the ethical issues remain intractable, the debate over prison privatization will likely continue for some time.

Richard Culp

See also Prisons, Gangs; Prisons, Overcrowding; Prisons, Pregnancy and Parenting; Prisons, Riots; Prisons, Violence

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Prisons, Riots

The first correctional disturbance reportedly took place in Simsbury, Connecticut, in 1774, in a prison constructed over an abandoned mine. Since this time, individuals have sought to define this phenomenon while seeking an understanding of its causes and solutions.

Experts have developed various definitions that describe the elements of a "riot." An early definition was "an incident involving 15 or more inmates and resulting in property damage and/or personal injury." However, one problem that emerged from the use of this definition was the omission of occurrences that did not meet the "15-inmate" criteria. Responding to this, the American Correctional Association (ACA) suggested three categories of violence and disorder that may occur within a correctional institution: incidents, disturbances, and riots.

An *incident* involves only one or a few inmates who control no portion of the facility for any period of time. A *disturbance* is larger than an incident, with more inmates involved who control little or no portion of the facility for a short time. A *riot* involves significant numbers of inmates controlling significant portions of the facility for significant periods of time.

The ACA classification produced a level of consistency when comparing events, such as numbers of inmates, time of the year, causes, property damage, and actions taken to end the riot. However, these classifications are somewhat ambiguous, requiring a significant amount of discretion from the individual or institution doing the reporting. As a result, researchers interested in studying this topic may get varying information.

Many situations and events may contribute to prison riots, from inmate dissatisfaction with institutional food to racial tension. On occasion, inmates react to rules, regulations, and policies of prisons by rioting, and the escape motive may be the cause of many more riots than is reported. Another major factor in riot causation is the continued emergence of inmate gangs, also known as "security threat groups." Even mere rumors or the attitude that staff may have about security can trigger a prison riot. Because of the heightened level of violence, many inmates feel the need to fight for their safety and possessions. A riot can result from conflicts between correctional staff and inmates or inmate use of alcohol and other drugs. Finally, many riots have no known cause and seem to erupt spontaneously.

Prison riots have cost the American public millions of dollars. The accumulated research suggests that the trend of prison disturbances continues to accelerate in terms of the numbers of riots, inmates involved, violence, and monetary losses.

These realities suggest a pressing need for changes in the U.S. prison system.

Gordon A. Crews

See also Prisons, Gangs; Prisons, Violence

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Prisons, Violence

Prison violence occurs when prison inmates or personnel use, or threaten to use, physical force in violation of prison regulations and/or criminal law. Prison violence does not include the routine use of force by correctional officers in response to rule violations or disruptive behavior by inmates, although correctional officers sometimes "tune up," or beat inmates who refuse to obey orders or threaten officers. Inmate violence may or may not involve the use of weapons. In maximum security prisons for men, fistfights are rare. Inmates frequently fashion homemade knives called "shivs" or "shanks," or shape other objects such as broomsticks into weapons for self-protection. Incarcerated women are just as likely to fight as men, but they are unlikely to use weapons.

Inmate violence may be routine or nonroutine in nature. Routine violence among inmates occurs as a result of disputes over drugs, sex, or gambling debts. Prison gangs are often involved due to competition over the control of the distribution of illegal drugs in prison. Racial or ethnic tension often leads to gang violence, including sexual assault and murder. Inmates who are victims of sexual assault are often placed in "protective custody" to prevent further injury. Sex offenders, especially those who victimize children, are often victims of violence at the hands of other inmates. The prison informant, or "snitch," may also require protective custody to avoid harm. Nonroutine violence such as riots, a form of collective violence, occurs infrequently, but when it does, serious injuries, many of them fatal, may result. Prison officials have authorization to use exceptional means, including deadly force, when facing serious threats to the safety and security of the prison.

The causes of prison violence depend on its source. Riots often occur during periods of rapid social change and corresponding rising expectations for inmates concerning better prison conditions and increasing prisoners' rights. Routine inmate-on-inmate violence occurs due to alienation (powerlessness), prisonization (adaptation to the prison subculture), and overcrowding. In the 1960s, prison gangs formed as self-defense organizations during a period of heightened racial tension. Judicial reform and the expansion of prisoners' rights in the 1970s made prison management more difficult. The failure by prison administrators to adapt to these changes created a power vacuum that prison gangs soon filled. Violent prison gangs, such as the Mexican Mafia and the Aryan Brotherhood, began to dominate prison life during this period.

The amount of prison violence has decreased in recent years. Increasing professionalism in the management of prisons contributed to this reduction, as unit management places case managers and correctional counselors in direct supervision of inmates. Furthermore, prison expansion has reduced overcrowding, and court decisions no longer permit correctional officers to rely on inmate trustees to maintain order through intimidation and violence. Correctional officers who use excessive force are now considered to be in violation of an inmate's civil rights. As a result, prisons have developed use-of-force policies that restrict the use of force by correctional officers.

Matthew Silberman

See also Prison; Prison, Convict Criminology; Prisons, Gangs; Prisons, Overcrowding; Prisons, Riots

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PRIVACY

The concept of privacy has a prominent place in historical debates and numerous scholarly works. In the past decade, however, the issue of privacy ascended to the forefront of social debates, frequently centering on the impact of technology (the Internet, data mining, satellite observations), government surveillance, national security, and corporate intrusions into private lives.

The integration of the Internet and other technologies into the daily routines of citizens presents unique challenges to privacy rights. Many corporations, schools, and government and civic institutions now store personal information about their members, clients, and employees in databases that are accessible via the Internet. Camera surveillance systems in many cities monitor for various traffic violations, while some law enforcement agencies use it to monitor city streets in search of people who display suspicious or unlawful behavior. Some private institutions even want to monitor employee e-mails and files and track employee computer work habits. In recent years, some companies, worried about their images, fired employees because of content on the employees' personal Web sites, blogs, or Myspace.com pages. Advanced surveillance technology monitors phone conversations and e-mails, and even allegations in the news speak to the U.S. government tracking consumer purchases, library reading lists, and travel itineraries.

Historical definitions of privacy are not uniform, and debate continues over the meaning, value, and scope of the concept of privacy. In the United States, one could argue that there are three main camps in the privacy debate: those who believe privacy is a legal right (and under attack); those who believe privacy is not a legal right (and citizens have too much privacy); and those who fall somewhere in between.

Scholars who believe privacy is a legal right argue that, although privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, a right to privacy is implicit in the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, providing protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. Scholars who contend that privacy is not a legal right argue that because the Constitution does not mention the word *privacy,* citizens do not have privacy rights. They are also quick to point out that, regardless of how one interprets the Fourth Amendment, a compelling state interest must prevail over a person's right to privacy in order to properly protect the underpinnings of liberty. Scholars who fall somewhere in between assert that the Fourth Amendment may protect citizens against actions by the state but that it rarely protects them from intrusions by other citizens, corporations, or the press.

For some scholars, privacy rights in the United States are being stripped away at an alarming rate. Many maintain that since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a pervasive government surveillance, with little oversight by the U.S. Congress, is sacrificing personal liberty and privacy for national security. Others contend that recent privacy debates are not historically unique. On the contrary, they argue that U.S. history is rife with instances of public authority violating citizen's privacy, such as the actions of Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover and Senator Joseph McCarthy.

Some people contend that the only reason people need privacy is so they can do things that are unethical or illegal. Others argue that because of technology, citizens have zero privacy anyway and therefore need to wake up to reality. Some even suggest that surveillance has positive consequences because it helps to establish reputations and credentials, which permit individuals to establish and maintain trust in strangers.

Most countries have laws that place limits on the privacy of citizens. For example, tax laws require individuals to provide detailed information about their income. In many countries, judicial rulings tend to treat privacy as a highly subjective and conditional commodity. Moreover, even where court precedents support a particular privacy right, the general public often ignores these rulings. For example, the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 made it unlawful for federal, state, or local governments to deny an individual any rights or benefits for refusing to provide a Social Security number. Even though Social Security numbers are not officially a form of national identification, many citizens must provide this information in order to receive loans, fill out a job application, or rent a movie.

A recent example of the privacy debate at a global level centers on the Safe Harbor proposal between the United States and the European Union. Under the proposal, companies voluntarily self-certify to adhere to a set of privacy principles and, once certified, can continue to receive personal data from the European Union. Privacy advocates are critical of the European

Commission's decision to approve the agreement, because it rests on a self-regulatory system through which companies promise not to violate their declared privacy practices. Critics contend there is little enforcement or systematic review of compliance policies. Individuals do not have the right to appeal or right to compensation for privacy infringements.

If a working definition of *privacy* refers to the ability of individuals or groups to preserve an anonymous identity, control the flow of information about themselves, and be unbound from unwarranted intrusions, it would appear that the laws in the United States and elsewhere need to catch up to technology.

Thomas Brignall III

See also Crime; Cultural Lag; Cyberspace; PATRIOT Act; Social Change; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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PROBATION

Probation is a period of conditional release granted to some criminal offenders at the time of conviction. Probation involves the suspension of a sentence of incarceration contingent upon the offender's agreement to abide by a number of conditions during a period of community supervision. If the offender violates any of these conditions of release, probation can be revoked, returning the offender to serve the sentence for the initial offense. The courts most often grant probation to those believed to pose a minimal threat to the community, such as juveniles and first-time offenders. More offenders are on probation than under any other form of correctional control.

Those on probation fall under the supervision of an agent of the court, known as a probation officer or agent. Probation agents fulfill a dual role: they assist offenders by connecting them with community resources while also monitoring offenders for violations of the conditions of their release. The extent of supervision will vary depending on the court-ordered conditions. For example, offenders who are considered low risk might be ordered to report to the supervising agent monthly, while those considered to pose a greater risk to the community might be subject to electronic monitoring and more frequent reporting.

Conditions of probation include but are not limited to an expectation that the offender will abstain from further legal violation. Common conditions include reporting to the supervising agent, fulfilling court obligations such as fines and court costs, and maintaining employment. Additional conditions are routinely tailored to the specific history of the probationer; for example, an offender convicted of drunk driving may be expected to abstain from the purchase, possession, and consumption of alcohol.

Probation was initially conceived as an alternative to punishment in cases for which it was believed that the offender could be successfully rehabilitated without serving a period of confinement. While precedents to probation exist in English common law, probation in its current form harks back to 1841, when a Boston shoemaker named John Augustus volunteered to supervise and assist a convicted offender whom he believed could be diverted from further criminality. The offender successfully reformed, and other men followed Augustus's lead in volunteering to assist the reformation of convicted offenders. Massachusetts enacted the first probation legislation in 1878, with the rest of the United States following suit by 1925. Probation in various forms became widely adopted internationally in the early 1900s.

Recent concern regarding jail and prison overcrowding renewed interest in probation as a cost-saving alternative to incarceration. This resulted in the implementation of intensive supervision programs (ISPs) in an effort to expand the use of probation to more serious offenders. While ISPs vary by jurisdiction, their typical characteristics are frequent contact between probationers and supervising agents; the use of electronic monitoring to enforce curfews or house arrest; and a greater use of treatment programs than is characteristic of traditional probation.

Julie L. Globokar

See also Community Corrections; Crime; Sentencing Disparities

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PROHIBITION

The term *Prohibition* can refer to the Eighteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, to the approximate historical era during which the Prohibition Amendment was in force, or to the political conditions, extant in this time period, in which the manufacture, distribution, and importation of alcohol were illegal. Constitutional prohibition of alcohol was in place for about 13 years. After ratification on January 16, 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect one year later, on January 16, 1920. With ratification on December 5, 1933, the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution repealed the Prohibition Amendment.

By the time that the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, 33 states had already enacted legislation prohibiting alcohol within their borders. In fact, the Twenty-First Amendment stipulated that states, territories, and possessions of the United States that chose to continue to prohibit alcohol were free to do so when Prohibition ended.

The Volstead Act (passed October 28, 1919), referred to in its own text as the War Prohibition Act, specified the method of enforcement of alcohol prohibition that was to remain in place "until the conclusion of the present war [World War I] and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States."

In giving the Volstead Act the title "War Prohibition Act" and linking its duration to the end of the war and the subsequent demobilization, Congress framed the prohibition of alcohol as a part of the war effort. Other social forces were at work, however, that contributed to its creation. In the mid-1800s, many temperance organizations began to move away from the ideal of moderation toward the more extreme idea that the only way to moderate alcohol consumption effectively was to prohibit the consumption of alcohol altogether; in 1867 the Prohibition Party was founded on this platform. There was also a movement to bring consumptive goods under legal control. The Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 (the Wiley Act) targeted "adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors."

An anti-ethnic bias against the Irish and Germans was another important factor. Most U.S. breweries were German owned and operated, and German beer gardens, where the entire family would gather, scandalized pious Christians. Irish saloons, viewed as bastions of political corruption, and stereotypes about Irish heavy drinking also evoked condemnation from the "dries."

Prohibition policies were by no means universally accepted. Demand for alcohol remained high, and organized methods of manufacturing and distributing alcohol arose to supply that demand. Met with forcible opposition from U.S. Treasury agents enforcing Prohibition laws, these distributors began to employ more violent and aggressive measures, giving rise to Al Capone and the infamous organized bootlegging syndicates. Thus Prohibition generated the social problem of racketeering; when Prohibition ended, these syndicates turned to organizing other illegal pursuits, such as narcotics.

Daniel Howard

See also Temperance Movement

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PROPAGANDA

In its broadest sense, propaganda is simply "persuasion in bad faith." That is, it is a species of persuasion, but one distinguishable from other varieties along several dimensions:

Accuracy. Propaganda is most commonly assumed to consist of willfully inaccurate communication. But

while propaganda can and often does involve deception, this is not uniquely indicative of propaganda. The selective and strategic use of truth and half-truth is as characteristic of propaganda as is untruth, and likely much more effective. Indeed, a recurrent theme among successful practitioners is that messages must be as accurate as their goal allows.

Method. Of somewhat more diagnostic value is propaganda's emphasis on bypassing its target's reasoning and critical faculties. Accordingly, it typically presents one-sided arguments that rely on nonrational influences such as instinctive or conditioned emotional responses to stimuli. Witness the ever-enduring efficacy of the atrocity story as a propaganda technique. In this light, it bears emphasis that successful propaganda is less a matter of changing the targets' beliefs than of invoking their extant prejudices and anxieties to evoke the desired action from them.

Intent. The most definitive but least observable aspect of propaganda is that it is intended to induce the target to act in ways that are in the interests of the source alone. It is not necessary that a message be exclusively in the source's interests, but only that the source's interests be motivationally sufficient to the creation of the propaganda.

Scale. Least distinctive but still relevant is the fact that propaganda is primarily associated with mass communication media, and thus mass audiences.

Within these parameters, it is often useful to further differentiate between various kinds of propagandas along at least two other dimensions: in terms of transparency, propaganda comes in shades of *white* (overtly disseminated, accurately sourced), *black* (covertly disseminated, unsourced, or deceptively sourced), or *grey* (some admixture of the two). In terms of purpose, it can be *agitative* (inducing targets to act in opposition to a perceived threat or power) or *integrative* (aligning, unifying, and reconciling targets with an extant power). Relatedly, one can further distinguish between propaganda itself and sub- or pre-propaganda (messages intended to lay the cognitive and emotional groundwork for future propaganda campaigns).

The most obvious examples of propaganda occur during wartime, when it is used domestically to foster support, recruitment, and production for war, and externally to enlist allies, deceive enemy combatants, or persuade them to surrender. In peacetime, its most salient form is advertising, but propaganda is ubiquitous and polymorphic in the modern world—from political spin, lobbying, and voter suppression to commercial public relations and marketing, religious proselytizing, and bureaucratic reports. More expansive conceptualizations further extend the term to encompass most forms of education, journalism, and mass communication in general.

Its pervasiveness may well be an inevitable feature of the modern world. Integral to the Western democratic ideal is the privileging of public opinion as the basis for public policy and collective judgment, along with a reliance upon persuasion as its *modus operandi*—as manifest in Western culture's historical emphasis on rhetoric in education, and as institutionalized in its constitutional protections of the rights of speech and assembly, its adversarial legal systems, and its elected and divided government. Meanwhile, the Enlightenment ideal of rational individuals has produced a world in which information is the most valuable commodity and instrument of persuasion. The consequent sovereignty of public opinion and power inherent in informational control has led those parties with political, commercial, or other interests in public policy or behavior to see propaganda as a necessary means to their ends. Greatly abetting the efficacy of propaganda at securing these ends are three other characteristically modern factors: the explosion of mass media technologies and their subsequent penetration of culture; the application of scientific methodology to social research, especially with regard to attitude formation and persuasion; and the reliance on market-based systems of media financing, which amplifies the leverage that interested parties can wield via concentrated ownership, promises to provide (or threats to revoke) sponsorship, and actual or threatened legal action in civil court. Finally, modernity may also create a complementary demand for propaganda among target citizens whom it has deprived of the identities, certainties, and purposes of traditional social arrangements, and which propaganda may in part provide.

The inevitability of propaganda is by no means a warrant for complacency about it. While it may be a predictable by-product of Enlightenment rationalism and democratic faith in public opinion, it is in a real sense antithetical to both. In its dependence upon peripheral means of persuasion, it reveals and endorses a decidedly counter-Enlightenment assumption that individuals are cognitively incompetent and manipulatable. In their willingness to use

such tools to sway public opinion to serve their interests at the expense of those of their targets, propagandists undermine the real and presumptive viability of public opinion as a basis of government, and thence of democracy itself. The defenses of abject cynicism or self-serving selective credulity that those subject to propaganda erect against it are no less ominous for democracy than is the obverse naïveté. To many observers, the prevalence of propaganda among a population that has developed a taste for the willful manipulation of its responses for entertainment purposes and that increasingly lacks the factual ammunition or theoretical footings to adequately challenge it presents a significant threat to democracy. The prominent role of propaganda in the debacles and horrors of the past century does little to assuage such concerns.

But the demonization of propaganda per se is as unproductive as is complacency toward it. Especially in its integrative forms, it is arguably not only inevitable but necessary to the creation and maintenance of the large, modern, and heterogeneous states that house, however imperfectly, the ideals of reason and democracy. Even in its agitative forms it has legitimate uses—it is likely better for all concerned that an enemy soldier peaceably surrender earlier rather than be killed later in a conflict. Furthermore, propaganda is a product of its environment. That is, it is as powerful as it is only because of the preeminent place of the individual and public opinion in modern society. History shows that in less "enlightened" environments, power and coercion take forms that are decidedly more direct, violent, and absolute. Indeed, modern abuses of propaganda have typically produced significant, albeit belated, counter-responses. Its pivotal role in WWI led to widespread public outcry and the establishment of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. The Vietnam conflict led to a similar, if less institutionalized, response in the 1970s. Finally, the 1990s saw a reemergence of oppositional interest in commercial propaganda, and there are signs that a resurgence of interest in more political forms is presently underway.

Douglas A. Marshall

See also Mass Media

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Property Crime

The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines property crimes as the offenses of burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. (Shoplifting and vandalism are also property crimes but are not reported in the UCR.) These crimes do not involve force or threat of force against victims, and their purpose is generally the taking of another's money or property. In 2006, law enforcement nationwide reported to the FBI a total of 9.98 million property crimes, accounting for an estimated $17.6 billion in losses. Two thirds of all these crimes were larceny-thefts.

In the United States, during 2006 an estimated 3,335 property crimes per 100,000 inhabitants occurred. These numbers, however, vary by environment. For example, in 2006, for every 100,000 inhabitants, the nation's cities collectively had 3,991 property crime offenses, while suburban counties had 2,478 and rural counties had 1,667. Overall, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics data, property victimization rates have been declining since 1975, when the estimated number of victimizations per 1,000 households was more than 550. In contrast, in 2006, this number was 159.

The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute reports that with a rate of 10 percent (people victimized by property crime as a percentage of the total population), the United States has the seventh-highest property crime victimization rate (the top three are New Zealand, Australia, and Italy, with respective rates of 14.8, 13.9, and 12.7 percent). The weighted world average is 8.6 percent and points to the relatively small differences between nations. Also, crime statistics often do not reflect actual crime prevalence as much as they reflect the prevalence of law enforcement, the effectiveness of law enforcement, and the willingness of people to report crime.

The social response to property crime raises the issues of how law, law enforcement, and punishment

function as a protection system for property owners. On the one hand, classical criminologists point to property crime as commonly being a "crime of opportunity" and consider this evidence for a "rational choice" theory of crime. On the other hand, critical criminologists argue that modern Western societies are defined by large and far-reaching systems of social control, put in place by the organizational work of those who own the larger share of community resources (e.g., economic wealth, social capital). Critical criminologists characterize such social control work as an antidote to the problems of unequally distributed wealth and the lack of equal access to opportunity for all members of society. While the former consider the moment the crime is committed as central, the latter focus on the reality of class struggle; the presence of social, political, and economic inequality; and the impact of social-structural forces in the definition and management of crime.

Michael J. Coyle

See also Burglary; Class; Crime; Piracy, Intellectual Property; Rational Choice Theory; Shoplifting; Social Control; Theft; Uniform Crime Report; Vandalism; Wealth Disparities

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PROSTITUTION

Prostitution, known as the world's oldest profession, exists in all countries and cultures, and is as old as recorded history. Prostitution consists of male or female exchange of sex or sexual intimacy for money or resources such as food, shelter, or clothing. It can take the form of street prostitution, escort prostitution, sex tourism, and a host of other varied forms. Prostitutes solicit customers at street corners or provide sexual services at the customers' residences, in hotel rooms, or in brothels. A new and growing form of prostitution involves sexual services in developing countries for wealthy tourists from developed countries.

Feminists' Views on Prostitution

Since most prostitutes are women, prostitution is a highly controversial issue in feminist thought and activism. Generally speaking, there are five camps of feminists who express their strong views on prostitution.

The first camp is *anti-sex feminists* such as Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon. Proponents of this view claim that the very meaning of sex is male domination and that the nature of prostitution involves male power and female subjugation. According to Dworkin and MacKinnon, the act of sex, created by and for male supremacy, turns women into no more than objects.

The second camp, made up of *pro-sex feminists*, is anti-prostitution, arguing that prostitution robs women of control in sex acts and the ability to experience sexual intimacy outside of work. Selling sex acts and illusions of sexual desires leads to an impoverished sexual and emotional life that deprives women of the ability to experience sex in a non-instrumental way.

The third camp is *romanticist feminists* who argue that prostitution corrupts and undermines positive sex based on love. Prostitution, to them, is the antithesis of positive sex because sex should only be associated with love, intimacy, and affection. Feminists such as Kathleen Barry argue that positive sex can only emerge with trust and sharing rather than with cash and contracts. Prostitution encourages violence against women, thereby jeopardizing positive sexual experiences and contaminating the society like a virus. They thus advocate cleansing the society through abolishing prostitution.

The fourth camp is *libertarian feminists* who argue that it is women who have complete control in prostitution. The fact that men have to buy women's attention with money is a confession of men's weakness rather than a sign of their power. In other words, men feel powerless facing women's sexual power. To them, prostitution is the source of women's power rather than the root of oppression.

Feminists in the fifth camp represent a variation on the libertarian view. They argue that prostitutes threaten patriarchal control over women's sexuality

and invoke sexual subversion through prostitution. They contend that the state regulates and punishes women's bodies by criminalizing non-procreative sex and restricting access to birth control and abortion. Prostitution is a terrain of struggle where women, far from being passive sexual objects, exhibit sexual agency and challenge the existing sexual order.

State Policies

Generally speaking, four types of official policies toward prostitution currently exist.

The United States, with the exception of the state of Nevada, represents the *prohibitionist policy,* making the buying and selling of sexual services illegal. Some feminists argue that in this system, law enforcement targets prostitutes rather than those who profit from their income and morally condemns women who choose prostitution. According to these feminists, illegality drives prostitutes underground and makes prostitutes totally reliant upon pimps and police officers.

A *regulatory policy* exists in such countries as Germany, the Netherlands, and Senegal. These countries legalize and regulate prostitution through registration, collection of taxes, and regular physical tests. Prostitutes by law must register with the police and have regular tests for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and they face penalties if they fail to do so. Some women choose not to register to avoid the accompanying stigma.

Some European countries, such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, and France, have an *abolitionist policy.* This policy rejects the state's regulation of prostitutes but makes it illegal for third parties such as brothel keepers or pimps to be involved with prostitution. This view holds it immoral and unethical for the state to regulate prostitutes, recognizing them as victims of social and economic hardships. By making third parties illegal, it pursues a policy of discouraging prostitution while not prosecuting prostitutes themselves, who are considered victims.

A fourth policy, adopted by New South Wales, Australia, and New Zealand, is to legalize prostitution but leave it totally unregulated. This *decriminalization policy* acknowledges that women have the right to determine their lives and choose their profession. This policy is favored by many organizations in full support and protection of prostitutes' rights, believing that criminalization of prostitution can only lead to exploitation, violence, and abuse. Thus exploitation and trafficking in women cannot be stopped unless the law recognizes and protects prostitutes' legal and social rights.

Prostitution in Western Europe

Prostitution is legal in most of Western Europe, although most countries have restrictions against streetwalking and brothels. In Germany, hundreds of thousands of women from Russia and Ukraine are sex workers in escort agencies, apartments, houses, or clubs such as sauna clubs, massage services, and bars. Their income is taxed, and they are free to advertise their services in public media. Although the law does not require physical examinations for prostitutes, many brothels do require them.

In Western Europe generally, women are trafficked from Africa, Asia, South America, Iran, and the Caribbean. In Italy, for instance, 60 percent of all prostitutes are trafficked from Nigeria; in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, Iranian women account for 10–15 percent of the prostitutes. In Amsterdam, even though non-European prostitutes without parents in residence are illegal, foreign women make up almost 90 percent of the prostitutes who are displayed in windows in the red light district. While this law is obviously not enforced, its intent is to provide economic protection for the Dutch prostitutes.

Prostitution in the United States

Prostitution is illegal in the United States except for the state of Nevada. In 12 counties of Nevada, there are more than 30 licensed brothels, and mandatory physical examinations are required of these registered prostitutes. Despite the prohibitionist policy, prostitution is common throughout the rest of the United States. Prostitutes may work alone, may be controlled by pimps, or may be associated with escort agencies. A common cause of prostitution is drug addiction. Escort prostitutes masquerade as entertainers or companion hostesses in escort agencies, bars, chiropractic offices, and massage parlors. A relatively new source of prostitutes in the United States is foreign-born women who are trafficked around the globe each year. An estimated 20 percent of the 1 million-plus females trafficked worldwide are smuggled into the United States to work in brothels.

Prostitution in Developing Countries

Many prostitutes in developing countries choose the profession to support their children, siblings, and parents, or because they are divorced or disowned by their families. Some children are even sold into prostitution by poor parents. In many developing countries, young girls between the ages of 10 and 16 are in high demand by clients. Many of these countries are both the source and destination for trafficking of women. For instance, women may be trafficked from Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and China to Bangkok, Thailand; from Nepal to East and South Asia, and the Gulf; and from Thailand and China to South Africa.

Because prostitution is illegal in many developing countries, it occurs in brothels camouflaged as massage parlors, hostess bars, karaoke bars, nightclubs, or teahouses. Prostitutes are subject to police harassment, incarceration, and HIV infection. Condom use is inconsistent among sex workers due to cultural norms, financial concerns, and the power hierarchy between sex workers and clients. While HIV prevention programs have been quite successful in countries such as Thailand and Uganda, most developing countries are experiencing an increase in HIV/AIDS infection due to the secret nature of sex work and political inertia.

Tiantian Zheng

See also Feminist Theory; Prostitution, Child; Sex Trafficking

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Prostitution, Child

Generally, prostitution or involvement in commercial sex means sexual transactions for money or some form of material goods. Recent research into the problem of child prostitution confirms that, far from abating, its incidence may be higher than ever, particularly in the form of international trafficking of children for commercial sex. Precise information is difficult to obtain, since, by its very nature as an illegal and covert practice, it remains largely hidden. The involvement of children in prostitution exposes sensitive cultural areas, especially in the West, where ideals regarding childhood, the family, and sexuality have become increasingly defined. Many historians agree that the idea of childhood as distinct and requiring particular recognition and accommodation became established in the West by the end of the 19th century. The involvement of children in commercial sex clearly negates an image of children as asexual, dependent, and innocent.

Child prostitution often occurs where there is poverty, conflict, economic and social instability, and/or child labor. For example, in the late 20th century, instability and conflict in Eastern Europe increased the flow of both children and women into the commercial sex industries of the European Union. Generally, unequal power relations around gender, age, and market factors tend to make children vulnerable to adult control and exploitation and historically enabled their prostitution both inside and outside the family in the West and across the globe. Furthermore, the global mass marketing and commercialization of child prostitution enables a greater supply of exploited children from many parts of the world.

One of the first and possibly most notorious of national media exposés of child prostitution was in July 1885 in the London newspaper *The Pall Mall Gazette.* This series of articles reported a clandestine trade in young girls for brothels in London and Europe. The sensational and salacious "Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon" stories excited the first national moral panic on the subject of child prostitution. These accounts helped entrench for the next century the dual depiction of children and young people involved in commercial sex as either abducted and betrayed innocents or tainted and corrupted. These "Maiden Tribute" articles and the events surrounding them provided the crucial force in Britain to ensure the final passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in 1885, which increased the age of consent from 13 to 16 (previously raised from 12 in 1875) and augmented police powers to deal with vice. The balance between control and protection became an enduring feature of debates on child prostitution and on youthful delinquency in general.

This issue of a mythology of the white slave trade with origins in the late 19th century remains widely held in modern society. This narrative has in part served to distort representations of the social problem of child prostitution by distancing it from connections with recognizable daily life. The story dramatized as the white slave trade in Britain, Europe, and the United States was of forced abduction of innocent young white girls and women, usually by foreigners, to work in brothels overseas. While this story had, and still has, a great deal to say about racism and social fears during the 20th century regarding increasing freedoms enjoyed by women, changing sexual mores, migration, and new locations of leisure activity, it reveals little about child prostitution. In the early 21st century, with Western governments increasingly concerned about human trafficking and the supply of children, the mythology of the white slave trade often serves to obscure more than it exposes real experience. The terminology of trafficking and of slavery remains a part of the debates on child prostitution, but the imperialist and racist emphasis on the victims as white has essentially ended. After the mid-20th century, trafficking became defined in terms of movement and exploitation rather than of color.

Historically, it is the international traffic in children that prompts the most forceful official action, although trafficking also occurs within a country, often from rural to urban areas, as well as across national boundaries. In 1953, the United Nations amended the League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926, which highlighted the human rights issues of slavery and "slavery-like practices," including the slave trade, sale of children, child prostitution, and the exploitation of child labor. During the 20th century, agencies working to combat the exploitation of children in its many forms multiplied, and the problem of child prostitution became part of the work of international organizations such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Labor Organization, and also various nongovernmental organizations. Article 34 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child called for appropriate action to prevent the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in unlawful sexual activity. In the late 20th century, extraterritorial legislation sought to enable countries to prosecute their citizens for sexually abusing children while overseas, the so-called sex tourism. This was a major theme of the 1996 First Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, organized by ECPAT, UNICEF, and the nongovernmental Group for the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Alyson Brown

See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Human Trafficking; Prostitution; Sex Trafficking

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Psychoactive Drugs, Misuse of

Any substance that chemically alters the functioning of the brain or nervous system is a drug. A *psychoactive drug*, also known as a psychotropic drug, is a chemical substance that affects consciousness, mood, perception, and/or behavior. Such drugs are often used to treat various forms of mental illness—including anxiety or bipolar disorders, depression, and paranoia—as well as to assist people in ending their addiction or overdependence on alcohol or other drugs. Other medicinal uses are in anesthesia, as painkillers, or as a prescribed stimulant to treat attention deficit disorder (ADD) or help curb one's appetite. In addition, throughout human history people worldwide have used psychoactive drugs, especially hallucinogens, as part of their religious practices. Native Americans are one such group, and in the United States they alone may legally cultivate and use the hallucinogen peyote.

Depending on the substance, ingestion of a psychoactive drug can be accomplished orally (drinking an alcoholic or caffeine beverage; chewing [such as coca leaves]; or digesting [such as psychedelic mushrooms]; swallowing a capsule, pill, powder, or tablet) or through inhalation, injection, rectal suppository, or smoking. Though varying in intensity and impact, all

psychoactive drugs have some specific effect on one or more neuroreceptors or neurotransmitters in the brain. That temporary effect is the targeted goal, whether medical or recreational. Some drugs are more addictive and dangerous than others. One danger is that drug abuse and long-term exposure to many psychoactive drugs may lead to desensitization or tolerance, encouraging the user to increased usage, then addiction, brain or other physical damage, even death.

The misuse of psychoactive drugs for recreational use is what constitutes a social problem. Moderate recreational use of some drugs—such as alcohol, caffeine, and, some would even argue, marijuana—does not pose as great a threat as experimenting with such addictive drugs as cocaine, crack, and heroin, or club drugs (synthetic drugs such as ecstasy, Rohypnol, GHD, and ketamine). These drugs are neurotoxic; they damage brain cells in parts of the brain critical to thought and memory. Increasing the dangers to one's health is multiple drug use, most commonly the mixture of alcohol and other psychoactive drugs.

The National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported that in 2006 an estimated 20.4 million Americans (8.3 percent of the population) ages 12 or older were current (past month) illicit drug users, 125 million (50.9 percent) were current drinkers of alcohol, and 72.9 million (29.6 percent) were users of a tobacco product. With such extensive use, perhaps it is not surprising that the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported that in the same year more than 1.4 million visits to hospital emergency departments involved drug misuse or abuse in 2005.

Vincent N. Parrillo

See also Addiction; Alcoholism; Club Drugs; Cocaine and Crack; Drug Abuse; Drug Abuse, Crime; Drug Abuse, Prescription Narcotics; Drug Abuse, Sports; Drug Subculture; Gateway Drugs; Harm Reduction Drug Policy; Methadone; Smoking

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Psychopath

Hollywood fueled popular perceptions of psychopathy with film representations of deranged serial killers such as Dr. Hannibal Lecter, played by Anthony Hopkins in *Silence of the Lambs,* and unhinged jilted lovers such as Glenn Close's portrayal of Alex Forrest in *Fatal Attraction.* Off screen, the real-life characteristics of psychopaths can be equally mesmerizing, and include the ease with which the psychopath victimizes others without any remorse or empathy. This frightening characteristic was on display in high-profile crime cases of serial murderers such as Ted Bundy, who confessed to killing 28 women before being executed, and Dennis Rader, the "BTK Killer" from Wichita, Kansas.

The core characteristics of the psychopath are antisocial behavior coupled with the inability to connect with other human beings on an emotional level. For some, the allure of the psychopath is that it is inconceivable that people who appear so "normal"—or as one psychiatrist wrote, wear a "mask of sanity"—feel no guilt or remorse for their antisocial behavior.

Definitions of *psychopathy* ranged from "insanity without delirium" and "moral insanity" in the 18th century—both indicating moral deficiencies without subsequent deficiencies in intellectual functioning—to the mid-20th-century clinical profile of the psychopath, which contained 16 characteristics, among them egocentricity, lack of remorse, antisocial behavior, absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking, and untruthfulness. A more recent contributor defined psychopathy as consisting of characteristics along two dimensions: emotional/interpersonal and social deviance. Along with social deviance characteristics such as impulsivity, poor behavioral controls, need for excitement, and antisocial behavior are also the characteristics that address emotional and interpersonal areas. Among those are glibness and superficial charm, egocentrism and grandiosity, lack of remorse and empathy, deceitfulness, and shallow emotions.

While sometimes used synonymously, psychopathy may be distinguished from antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) as defined in the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-R.* Criteria for ASPD emphasize behavioral characteristics such as disregard for the law, deceitfulness, impulsivity, aggressiveness,

irresponsibility, and lack of remorse. Unlike the concept of psychopathy, the ASPD does not include additional emotional deficits such as shallow emotions, superficiality, and grandiosity. Though there is much overlap among antisocial personality, psychopathy, and criminality, not all criminals are psychopaths. Research reveals that psychopathic offenders are more likely to be aggressive and violent than nonpsychopathic offenders and also more likely to recidivate. The prevalence of psychopathy is estimated at 15 to 25 percent among incarcerated federal offenders.

The most well-known diagnostic tool for psychopathy, is the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL), first developed in 1980 and later revised. The PCL-R is a tool to aid clinicians and researchers in identifying psychopaths and is widely recognized as a reliable predictor for violent behavior. Other instruments used for risk assessment that feature a measure of psychopathy include the Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management Scale and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide.

Nickie D. Phillips

See also Serial Murder; Sociopath

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Psychoses

Psychosis is a state in which one loses contact with reality. Originating from either mental or physical conditions, its symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech or behavior, and a decrease or loss of normal functions. A hallucination can be hearing a voice that is not actually there, while a delusion is a fixed false belief that is not true. A decrease or loss of normal functioning may mean difficulties speaking and expressing emotions. Mental and physical disorders associated with psychoses include schizophrenia, psychotic depression, bipolar disorder, delusional disorder, and drug-induced psychosis. Those dealing with a psychotic episode often experience social withdrawal. In addition, they may not realize that they have a mental illness and go for years without treatment. At the same time, their mental state may affect their education, employment, and relations with friends and family.

Denial, stigma, and fear are barriers to seeking treatment. Psychosis can cause feelings of shame and stigma not only to those individuals but also to family and friends. In 1963, Erving Goffman described stigma as "deeply discrediting" attributes that are normally undesirable. Manifestations of stigmatization are embarrassment, anger, avoidance, fear, stereotyping distrust, and bias, any of which can reduce patients' access to resources and opportunities, leading to low self-esteem, isolation, and a sense of hopelessness. Many people with serious mental illness deal with both internal and external challenges. That is, the disabilities and symptoms stemming from psychosis challenge them, as does dealing with the discrimination, assumptions, and stigma that result from misunderstandings about mental illness.

Fear and stigma about the mentally ill abound in society. Those experiencing psychosis often experience myths and misunderstandings about their illness. While societal understanding about different forms of mental illness has increased, the belief continues among many that people with psychosis are more violent now than they were in the past. Perceptions and misconceptions that people with psychosis are dangerous are a critical factor in others keeping or desiring social distance from them. As a result of these misunderstandings, people with mental illness often experience discrimination and lack access to the full range of opportunities such as employment, adequate health care, safe housing, and integration and/or socialization with diverse groups.

Grace J. Yoo and Sachiko K. Reed

See also Mental Health; Stigma

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Public Opinion

Public opinion is a collective attitude or preference concerning political issues shaped by a varied and complex interplay of factors. Group membership, personal experience, gender, race, education, class, media, government officials, elites, religion, geographical region, culture, and political ideology all affect socialization and knowledge acquisition that influence and are influenced by public opinion. Public opinion tends to be stable over time, but historical and catastrophic events, economic or technological changes, personal experiences, and group replacement may cause it to shift. Polling is a primary means to collect public opinion, and, despite its shortcomings, most agree that polls are invaluable to democratic societies.

Public opinion is vital to the concept and practice of democracy. The U.S. Declaration of Independence, for example, decried the British Crown for not adhering to the people's voice. However, the institutional structure of the U.S. political system hinders democratic responsiveness. Staggered elections, gerrymandering, the Electoral College, single-member winner-take-all plurality elections, voting discrimination, a non-elected judicial branch with the power of judicial review, a large non-elected bureaucratic sector, and unequal representation in the Senate are all structures that insulate policy making from public opinion. Moreover, representatives have no legal obligation to adhere to public opinion. Consequently, many Americans believe their opinions do not matter in policy making.

Media and Public Opinion

Most scholarship agrees that the media are central to opinion formation and expression. Critical theorist Jürgen Habermas conceptualized that a "public sphere" is necessary for democratic societies to deliberate and reflect on substantive issues to develop and ascertain the common good. The media play a crucial role in that public sphere, especially in large societies like the United States. Walter Lippmann observed that the media play a vital role in shaping the public's reality of the world around them. Many scholars since then have documented the significant influence the media have in shaping public opinion. The media perform an agenda-setting function that does not necessarily tell the public what to think but has considerable power to tell the public what to think *about.* In short, the media make some issues more salient than others. Numerous studies demonstrate that issues receiving heavy coverage like drugs or crime often become top priorities in opinion polls, but that the news media disproportionately convey the views and interests of those with power. Corporate conglomerates own and control most mainstream news organizations, and political and economic elites often define and dominate the news. The result is an information system that reflects dominant interests.

In addition to shaping opinion, the media report public sentiments mainly through polling data. Opinion surveys have become so central to politics and the news that many media outlets operate their own polling organizations or frequently commission surveys. Media use of polling data, however, is selective. For example, polls are prominently featured, often in superficial "horse race" surveys, on matters of presidential and congressional elections. Yet polls lack this centrality when the media cover most areas of policy, because, as some scholars argue, public opinion does not coincide with elite preferences. Furthermore, this point highlights that individuals are not in a passive, vegetative state when consuming the media. They actively construct and interpret information and messages.

Elites and Public Opinion

Some well-known commentators such as Walter Lippmann believe that the public is best treated as spectators to political life, asserting they hold irrational and conflicting preferences. Though they would rarely disclose these sentiments publicly, according to

one Pew Research Center survey, the vast majority of policymakers polled agree with Lippmann that the public is incapable of making informed judgments about policy. Other analysts, however, demonstrate, mainly through aggregate polls, that the public often holds more rational or prudent views than most political and economic elites.

Despite declarations to the contrary, policymakers routinely ignore public opinion, especially in areas of economic and foreign policy. Research shows that political leaders track public opinion not to shape their policy positions to the public's preferences, as is generally assumed, but to craft their policy message in order to move public opinion to the politician's preferences. The objective is to minimize potential opposition to policies not supported by the majority of the public rather than to alter the policy. This threatens the very notion of popular sovereignty.

Many policy elites rely on the news media and other elites for public opinion rather than polling data. Scholars argue that the corporate community uses its structural, social, and knowledge advantages to articulate and convey its policy preferences to the public and government. Through policy-planning, opinion-shaping, and candidate-selection apparatuses, socioeconomic elites ensure more political access and policy responsiveness than the general public. Thus, policymakers' indicators of public values are class biased and often do not represent the general public.

Collecting Opinion

Despite institutional barriers to political participation, technological advances have increased the *possibility* for greater public involvement in policy making. The United States is one of the most heavily researched societies in terms of public opinion, with the government alone conducting more than a million surveys a year. However, public opinion is a complex phenomenon and in a society of more than 300 million residents, collecting and ascertaining public opinion is not without its obstacles.

All forms of opinion collecting are indications and interventions of public opinion. Critics argue that pre-coded survey questions and forced-choice answer responses, the most widely used opinion measure, fail to capture the complexities of an individual's decision-making process. For example, responses such as "strongly agree" and "agree" fail to empirically quantify the magnitude of public preferences. Furthermore, some polls construct opinions rather than capture them, because surveys may make an issue more salient than others, thus creating the impression of public importance.

Polling may not capture actual public sentiment, since research shows that Americans are misinformed on many policy issues. A notable example is citizens' views toward U.S. foreign aid. Those polled preferred cutting foreign aid spending by half but perceived that it took up nearly 20 percent of the U.S. budget. In reality, the United States allocates less than 1 percent of its budget to foreign aid. The paradox for opinion measurement is that those polled prefer drastic cuts while simultaneously advocating massive spending increases.

An additional problem is framing. Research shows that the way questions are framed or worded may significantly affect the outcome of the answer and not capture true preferences. For example, programs for "the poor" receive significantly more support than "welfare" programs, despite referring to the same policies. The difference reflects the meaning of the terms, since most language lacks neutrality. Elite discourse, especially in the media, often influences and defines the terminology. At the extreme end of framing are "push polls"—loaded questions intended to influence the survey's outcome. Measurement and sampling errors hinder accurate assessments of policy preferences. Sampling is important because of the high transaction costs that would incur gathering everyone's opinion; accurate sampling is also important because public opinion is not homogenous, varying by gender, class, religion, and other factors. Also skewing polls are the respondents' private views and the preferences expressed, assuming they answer the questions at all. Thus, it may be difficult to determine genuine public opinion concerning sensitive topics because of participants' unwillingness or fear of the potential costs of expressing actual sentiments. Furthermore, research shows that knowledge is unequally distributed and the resource rich are more likely to effectively link and express personal preferences.

In addition to shaping opinion, technology changes the collection of public opinion as cell phones, call screening devices, "Do Not Call" lists, and wariness toward strangers make it increasingly harder for pollsters to ascertain public preferences. The Internet, however, presents new avenues (and problems) to opinion collection and expression.

Polls measure what we claim to know but often fail to determine how and why we know it. They lack

context by focusing on opinion outcomes without considering the social forces and assumptions that inform those opinions. These issues are not to imply that polls are meaningless, but rather to acknowledge that surveys establish a specific framework for which opinion is measured and it is imperative to understand the limits and constraints of the frameworks. Moreover, the act of measuring opinion itself requires considerable resources that are mainly enjoyed by a small population segment.

Mark Major

See also False Consciousness; Mass Media; Media; Power Elite; Propaganda; Voter Apathy

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Public–Private Dichotomy

Using the public–private dichotomy to describe social policies can be misleading.

Characterizing any dichotomy are two mutually exclusive parts that together comprise the whole. A public–private dichotomy fits a social policy system if its components are clearly public or private, but not both. Together, public and private exhaust all kinds of social policies. If any policies fall outside this either/or categorization, then it is a *false* dichotomy, or a mistake to use the dichotomy label.

The importance of social policies rests in their affecting welfare through provision and regulation. Social policies often provide such services as education, health care, and psychological counseling. Social policies may also provide income or in-kind benefits, such as food stamps, subsidized housing, or school vouchers. Social policies may regulate human behavior, particularly if enacted as law to regulate food quality, require school attendance, or mandate medical testing.

Conceptualization of public–private qualities of social policies considers five key characteristics: accountability, management, stimulus, eligibility, and who pays. *Public* implies democratic accountability. Public social policies are established, managed, modified, and sometimes eliminated by government officials who are either elected or *accountable* to elected government officials. *Private* does not mean a lack of accountability, but that another entity, perhaps the individual alone, is responsible for the program. For example, an individual can decide to establish a savings account for eventual retirement, how to invest the funds, and eventually when and how to withdraw the funds.

A key component distinguishing public and private programs is who or what *manages* the social policy program. Government officials or a government institution manage a public program, such as the federal government administering Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security public program that provides a pension to individuals who have low incomes. Private entities manage a private program; for example, for purposes of saving for retirement, an investment company forms a fiduciary relationship through contract when managing an investor's savings.

Another key component for characterizing a social policy program as public or private is the program's *stimulus.* Many public programs obligate an individual to participate. The Social Security program mandates that nearly all paid workers contribute to the Social Security program. In contrast, an individual is not required to place his or her earnings in a private savings account.

Perhaps the most visible components for characterizing a social policy program as public or private are *eligibility* and *who pays.* Typically, we think everyone

is eligible to enroll in a public social program or benefit from a public social service. A clear example is public elementary education. All children in the United States are entitled to a free and appropriate public education. In contrast, private schools establish procedures to decide on admission of a child, including application fees, admission tests, and interviews. The private school controls eligibility and can decline to admit an individual.

The last key component is *who pays.* Medicaid is a U.S. public health insurance program that is financed by federal and state government revenues. An individual who self-pays for private health care relies on his or her own funds and health and financial acumen to protect his or her well-being as the sole payer.

When applied to social policies, public and private labels can hide critical aspects of social policies, including similarities. As is true for public programs, the federal government does stimulate and manage many private social policy programs. For example, it obligates employers who offer defined-benefit pension programs to contribute premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal organization that insures payment of pensions in case the employer is incapable of doing so. The federal government regulates vesting and portability of employment-based health insurance and pension plans through laws like the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and other laws. Because government regulates many private social policies, it is incorrect to say that many public–private social policies can be categorized into one or the other.

Public–private designations can be confusing. An important example is who pays for Medicare hospital insurance in the United States. Medicare is the largest U.S. public health insurance program, yet the federal government does *not* pay for Medicare Part A. Employers and employees pay for Medicare Part A, which is hospital insurance, through payroll taxes. In contrast, U.S. employment-based health insurance plans are considered private, but these plans enjoy tax advantages paid for by U.S. taxpayers. In debates over the number of Americans without health insurance, spiraling costs, and Medicare's uncertain future, what frequently goes unnoticed is the fact that many U.S. taxpayers financially support others' private health insurance even when their own employers do not offer health insurance. Private health insurance is an example of a social policy in which it is difficult to exclude public from private efforts because social policy has purposely made it difficult to divide public from private efforts.

The public–private dichotomy can weaken eligibility and accountability. Across the country, many communities are responding to failing public school systems by offering vouchers to parents and caretakers to apply to a nearby school, whether that school is a public school, private school, or religious school. A problem with this voucher system is that many children are eligible only to attend the public school system where they reside. Most children cannot enroll in some of the private and parochial schools because they require supplemental tuition, which most low-income families cannot afford. Because of this barrier, many children are eligible only to receive education from public systems that their governments regard as failures.

In *Zelman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Ohio, et al. v. Simmons-Harris, et al.*, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Ohio public voucher scheme does not violate separation of church and state because the state government does not directly fund parochial education. Instead, this public–private relationship allows the Ohio state government to transfer tax revenue to private individuals, who can then apply the tax revenue to a private, religious school. Because it is private and religious, the school's curriculum is beyond democratic accountability; voters cannot hold school officials accountable for what is taught, despite the school receiving tax revenues. This voucher example highlights that *private* is a label not only for market, but also for religious and nonprofit undertakings.

With the potential harms of these social policy complexities, should we reject the public–private dichotomy? The public–private dichotomy is useful for identifying inconsistencies in and revealing inequities arising from social policies. An important example is the decision to have a child or adopt a child. Although considered among the most private of decisions, for some people becoming a parent is a public decision. Laws and social policies influence this decision and, in some cases, prevent choices. In the United States, strenuous debates continue on whether a gay couple has the right to adopt a child, with some states completely prohibiting adoption and some states requiring gay couples to follow a legal process. Public debate also centers on whether a parent or caretaker should be able to control a minor's decision on whether or not to become a parent.

In nearly half of the states, a minor must have a parent's consent to have an abortion, and in most of the remaining states, a minor must prove she has first notified her parents. What is a private decision for many people is a decision shaped by laws and social policies for gay couples and minors.

Despite these instances of government intervention into private matters, some decisions are still considered beyond the realm of public social policy. One instance is corporal punishment of children. If I strike a neighbor's child, the police will probably charge me with assault. If I strike my spouse inside our home, the police will probably charge me with domestic violence. If I strike my child, however, it is not an assault, and inside my home, it is not domestic violence. The public–private dichotomy thus raises questions of why public intervention toward some groups is legal but toward other groups is not acceptable.

The public–private dichotomy is frequently used to define and designate social policy responsibilities. A review of key characteristics suggests the public–private dichotomy is a false dichotomy, because many social policies incorporate public and private efforts to provide benefits and services. Nevertheless, even if a false dichotomy, the public–private dichotomy may still be useful for exposing inconsistencies in and inequities arising from social policies.

Brian Gran

See also Medicare; Pensions and Social Security; School Vouchers

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Q

Queer Theory

Queer is often used as an umbrella term by and for persons who identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, intersex, and/or transgender, or by and for individuals who use the term as an alternative to *LGBTI* (lesbian-gay-bisexual-transsexual-intersex) labels. Some individuals, depending upon their race, class, personal experience, and also their generation, find the term derogatory. Recently, heterosexuals whose gender or sexuality does not conform to popular expectations have used the term *queer* to define themselves. Thus, queer theory is a framework of ideas that suggests identities are not stable or deterministic, particularly regarding an individual's gender, sex, and/or sexuality. Queer theory focuses on critiquing and problematizing previous ways of theorizing identity. While heteronormativity assumes that heterosexuality and the relations of the binary masculine and feminine genders expected within it are secure and constant, queer theory is a discourse model that destabilizes the assumptions and privileges of secure heteronormative models of study and everyday life and politicizes and acknowledges the fluidity and instability of identities.

Queer theory is a part of the field of queer studies whose roots can be found in women's studies, feminist theory, and gay and lesbian studies, as well as in postmodern and post-structuralist theories. In 1991, Teresa de Lauretis used the words *queer theory* to describe a way of thinking that did not use heterosexuality or binary gender constructs as its starting point but instead argued for a more fluid concept of identity. Most researchers consider the works of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler as the founding texts of queer theory. Lauren Berlant, Michael Warner, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick are also major early writers in defining queer theory.

Proponents of queer theory argue that it prompts the acceptance and understanding of the complex reality in which we live. Queer theory provides scholars, activists, and others with ways of thinking and talking about identity beyond simple binaries, especially in fighting homophobia and transphobia (unreasoned fear and hatred toward homosexuals and homosexuality, and transsexuals, transsexuality, and transgender people, respectively). Examples include doctors performing surgery on intersex infants to select their gender and LGBTI people as the targets of violence. Queer theory often serves as a framework to study transvestitism, drag performance, the disparity between desire and gender, hermaphroditism, and gender identity disorder and gender corrective surgery. However, queer theory can also extend beyond the realm of gender of sexuality; in particular, when studying the politics of racial, ethnic, or class identities, scholars may wish to "queer the subject" by writing about these identities as fluid rather than as rigid or binary subjects.

Jen Gieseking

See also Feminist Theory; Sexual Orientation; Social Bond Theory; Social Constructionist Theory

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R

Race

The term *race* in its modern sense was first used in the 1700s by Europeans and European Americans to refer to what is now also called a "racial group." Initially, *race* referred to biological differences believed to exist as distinctions between individuals or groups; however, racial groups can be understood as identity groupings as well as government-protected categories. Although race was once believed to signify significant biological differences, nearly all social scientists now refer to race as a social construct.

Race as a social construct can also signify differences or distinctions in an existing racial hierarchy. In a society, the process of racial "othering" or differentiation of "us" from "them" often causes significant changes in major societal institutions through embedded forms of racial discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping. Given a racial hierarchy—a system of stratification—substantial inequality among a society's racially defined groups can persist for centuries. As a racial hierarchy can exist in various institutions, its effects continue as an outcome of inaccurate stereotyping and imaging. Although the initiation of racial stereotypes as a means of differentiating or categorizing individuals evolved centuries ago, they can still persist as a method of enforcement of a racial hierarchy.

As a concept, race is a societal problem in the area of social differentiation when manifested in racism, with its many types of discrimination. White-generated racism today takes various forms. *Symbolic racism* involves the beliefs held by many whites that blatant racial discrimination is no longer significant and people of color are now making illegitimate demands for social and racial change. A related view is *color-blind racism.* A consequence of symbolic or color-blind racism occurs through what some call "reverse discrimination." *Reverse discrimination* is a recent term used to signify belief in the existence of unfair government remedial policies induced to benefit people of color at a direct cost to whites. Another term held by social scientists is *systemic racism*, which encompasses not only white prejudices and stereotypes but also white emotions, discriminatory practices, and discriminatory institutions that are integral to the long-term domination of African Americans and other Americans of color. The reality of systemic racism is visible in discriminatory practices in areas such as, but not limited to, housing, health care, education, labor markets, politics, and government.

In 1997, the Census Bureau revised its data collection methods of race to signify the self-selection of race by respondents. Now, the conception of race held by the Census Bureau reflects a social definition of race. The Census conception does not use biological or genetic criteria but refers to what an individual in question perceives his or her own race to be. Because of this change, the Census Bureau currently has racial categories of American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; and White. In addition, a new category of "Other Race" now appears on the Census questionnaire, as well as an ethnic category of "Hispanic" to encompass people of Latin American origin, who can be of any race.

Racialized Institutions

Racism as experienced in various societal institutions can have severe consequences for various racial groups. For instance, the educational system is one primary area of U.S. society that continues to reveal the significance of racism in the form of extensive racial segregation. Through a large number of whites moving to the suburbs ("white flight"), school segregation is an ever-pressing issue that typically leaves children of color with substandard educational facilities, inexperienced teachers, and inadequate books and supplies. Not only is segregation an issue in elementary and secondary education, it exists in higher education as well. Given the increasing white accent on symbolic and color-blind racism, admissions policies and practices have changed and often exclude certain racial groups primarily because of scores on standardized tests and grade point averages. These policies often allow historically white institutions to remain predominantly white.

Race is also significant in the U.S. criminal justice system and in other U.S. government programs. In the early to mid-20th century, for example, U.S. social security programs were designed to ensure the economic security of older Americans, yet often excluded many African Americans and other people of color from receiving many of these benefits because their employers seldom made contributions to the system. U.S. governmental decisions dealing with welfare, work, and war during the 1930s and 1940s excluded or differentially treated African Americans—often playing a role in their becoming more disadvantaged vis-à-vis whites with the emergence of the modern middle class during and after World War II. After World War II, the government and private employers often excluded workers of color from many better-paying jobs. After decades of this exclusion, the rise of the 1960s civil rights movement (organized primarily to insist upon the rights of African Americans and other racial groups in society) and new government policies such as affirmative action helped to end openly discriminatory practices against individuals or groups based on race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion. With the introduction of affirmative action and other remedial policies, race as a means of overt and blatant exclusion was generally no longer acceptable.

In the area of the U.S. criminal justice system, racial profiling continues to be a significant problem for society. Racial profiling can best be understood as a practice in which law enforcement agencies treat a person as a suspect because of race, ethnicity, or nationality. This system is problematic because of the targeting of certain racial and ethnic groups more than others, as revealed by the disproportionate number of people of color targeted, harassed, or arrested by the police.

As history informs us, the United States was built on economic oppression in the form of the institution of slavery. From its incarnation, slavery oppressed African Americans by or through the systematic dominance of their labor. Several early intellectuals, such as Immanuel Kant and Thomas Jefferson, often wrote about the racial hierarchy that innately existed in our new society; this hierarchy places whites at the top and all people of color at the bottom. Thomas Jefferson, one of our country's founders and a slaveholder, often spoke of the superiority of "whiteness" through his early writings on race. When the institution of slavery ended with the Civil War, soon thereafter Jim Crow (legalized segregation) sought to keep African Americans separate from whites through the introduction of laws. These laws were designed and instituted to keep African Americans, and later other people of color, in inferior racial positions. Jim Crow segregation was in place until the civil rights movement, when civil rights laws benefiting all individuals in society were fought for and eventually instituted. Although the civil rights movement made significant societal progress, racism is still far from eliminated.

W. E. B. Du Bois was the first U.S. social scientist to write about the social psychological aspects of race. He coined the term *double consciousness,* the twoness felt by African Americans and other people of color. For Du Bois, this term represented the difficulty felt by black Americans in being defined as "black" (by whites) and yet trying to be themselves (as Americans) in a country that was not accepting of African Americans. Du Bois also pioneered in the early 1900s what can be understood as "whiteness studies." Yet, it has only been in the past 2 decades that whiteness as a social construct has been significantly researched. Today, many social scientists view whiteness as a privileged category when understanding the significance of race and racism.

Louwanda Evans and Joe R. Feagin

See also Affirmative Action; Black Codes; Hypersegregation; Jim Crow; Race-Blind Policies; Racial Formation Theory; Racial Profiling; Racism; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure; Segregation, Residential; Slavery; White Flight

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Race-Blind Policies

Race-blind policies, also referred to as color-blind policies, are policies that seek to eliminate racial or ethnic categories and preferences from admissions or applications processes. Race-blind policies are a response to affirmative action policies that use race as one of the factors in determining admission to an institution or in awarding government contracts. The integration of these policies is usually debated at the collegiate level, where recent events at the University of Michigan and in the states of California and Texas illustrated the ongoing controversy over these policies. Debates over the two types of policies thus provide information on current attitudes on the status of race and racial equality within the United States.

A distinct set of values, concerns, and political practices drives the proponents and opponents of race-blind policies. Often the debate about the integration of race-blind policies coincides with debates about affirmative action policies. Two recent Supreme Court rulings on affirmative action profoundly influenced advocates on both sides of the issue. In the 2003 *Grutter v. Bollinger* court case, the Supreme Court ruled that a university benefits from diversity, and thus a points system for admission factoring the race of the applicant into the process is constitutional. In another 2003 court case, *Gratz v. Bollinger,* the Supreme Court ruled that the points system applied at the University of Michigan to underrepresented racial groups—including African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans—was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve the university's goals of diversity and was thus unconstitutional. Both Court cases present the complexities associated with the integration of race-conscious policies at the university level. In response to race-conscious policies, proponents of race-blind policies argue that this type of policy will alleviate the problems created by affirmative action.

Those in favor of race-blind policies argue that diversity and racial inequality are no longer important in determining or informing admission to colleges and universities. Proponents argue that racial inequality is no longer present in the United States, and therefore race-blind policies will create an even playing field for applicants. Many supporters of race-blind policies also argue that current affirmative action policies are a form of reverse discrimination denying whites access to institutions, thus causing them to experience institutional discrimination. This side of the debate also espouses the value of a meritocracy in which individuals should gain admissions slots and contracts based solely on each individual's qualifications and achievements, not racial status.

Another group appears to espouse neo-segregationist ideas in their argument for the inclusion of race-blind policies at the collegiate level. They argue that the presence of students of color in the classroom lowers the standard of education for all students. This argument rests on the assumption that university or college students of color are not as qualified as their fellow white students, thanks to an application process concerned only with avoiding institutionalized racism. This group focuses on the belief that students should be held to a high standard of education, regardless of their race.

Opponents of race-blind policies argue that race is still an important factor in determining how a society's resources should be distributed. They insist that the United States is still a country in which certain races have unequal access to society's resources. Those who seek to retain policies acknowledging race in the application process believe that affirmative action policies work against the institutionalized racism that students of color otherwise face, thus working to end institutionalized racism and discrimination at the collegiate level.

Other opponents of race-blind policies argue that diversity is an important aspect of higher education and that policies that ensure racial diversity on a campus should be protected. They argue that institutions should thus use race as a determining factor in the admissions process to ensure a diverse student body. The Supreme Court supported this viewpoint in the 1978 court case *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.* Justice Harry Blackmun argued that universities already supported policies that provide preference toward other groups, including alumni, the wealthy, veterans, and athletes. Similarly, universities also have the right to show preference to students of color to illustrate their support for a diverse learning environment. For opponents of race-blind policies, race-conscious policies provided a forum in which racial equality could be valued and pursued at the institutional level.

As the debate over affirmative action continues in the United States, so too will the debate over the integration of race-blind policies. In her remarks on the decision of the 2003 case of *Grutter v. Bollinger*, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor offered the hope that the United States would eventually reach a point of racial equality in which the policies of affirmative action were no longer necessary. Until racial equality is reached, the debate between race-blind policies and race-conscious policies will remain.

Heather Downs

See also Affirmative Action; Discrimination, Institutional; Education, Policy and Politics

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Racial Formation Theory

Racial formation theory is a theoretical perspective created by sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant that focuses on race relations in the United States. By *racial formation,* they refer to the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed, and they treat the concept of race as a middle ground between extreme social construction and a rigid, fixed biological definition. Omi and Winant argue that extreme social constructionism, embraced by both right-wing and left-wing ideologues, leads to an understatement of how deeply racialized U.S. society is. On the other hand, they continue, proponents of the idea of race as a fixed biological constant, also covering the range of the political continuum, understate the contested and changing nature of the structure and meanings of racial categories. To rectify the problem with each position, Omi and Winant propose racial formation theory.

Racial formation theory conceptualizes two dimensions of race in the United States: (1) contest and struggle over distribution of resources, institutions, and political power along racial lines and (2) contest and struggle over the applied cultural meanings and the signification of race to individual identities, issues, and experiences. These two distinct but interrelated processes underlie what Omi and Winant call "racial projects." Racial projects encompass attempts to redefine group-level racial identity as well as to reorganize or redistribute resources along lines delineated by racial identity. Racial projects link the meaning of race to the organization of social structures. Various social actors such as elites, political groups, cultural organizations, or intellectuals may initiate racial projects, which take place on both macro- and micro-levels. At the micro-level, individual identity interacts with race at the macro-level of social structure. Racial injustices and inequalities at the macro-level, for instance, compel actors at the micro-level to mobilize social movements that challenge the racial order. Such projects reorganize the sociopolitical meanings of race, generating a new racial order. However, the new racial order itself then becomes the subject of future contention.

Racial formation theory emphasizes the role of the state in shaping and creating racial categories, as these are not constant across time. Importantly, governmental policies, laws, and institutions have racial categories written into them as a basis for the allocation of resources. For instance, the *Federal Housing Authority Manual* of 1934 restricted loans to African Americans while guaranteeing them to European Americans in a practice commonly known as "redlining."

Scholars criticize several aspects of racial formation theory, particularly its heavy focus on racial

categories while ignoring the centrality and deeply rooted systemic nature of racism. Racial formation theory conceptualizes racism as an ideology instead of a social system around which U.S. institutions are organized. While racial formation theory acknowledges the construction of racial categories, the theory downplays the genesis of race in the 17th-century American colonies during the dawn of capitalism. By failing to acknowledge the invention of race and the inherently hierarchical and unequal design of racial categories, racial formation theory promotes the idea of their permanency, thereby making the concept of race into something concrete. One of the strengths of this approach, however, is pointing out that the meaning of *race* changes over time and that the state plays a role not only in shaping those meanings but in distributing resources predicated on those meanings.

Thomas Volscho

See also Race; Racism; Redlining; Social Constructionist Theory

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Racial Profiling

Racial profiling is the increased scrutiny or selective enforcement of rules, norms, and laws for members of specific social groups. The increased scrutiny or selective enforcement results in the increased likelihood that these racial groups will experience significantly higher levels of negative sanctions than would be expected given their numbers in the population. The cumulative effect of these higher levels gives the impression that these groups are more prone to deviance than other groups. Such selective rule enforcement has led some to associate a culture of poverty or deviance with the group. Racial profiling, a more subtle form of racism, occurs in many countries besides the United States, including England, France, Japan, Germany, Mexico, Russia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

Evidence of this systematic singling out of racial and ethnic non-elites for differentially negative sanctions exists throughout the United States. While most recent research and concern focus on police and crime, a well-documented, long history of racial profiling exists. Sustained efforts, led by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), resulted in the initiation of multiple lawsuits, passage of a series of laws, and numerous policy changes. Unfortunately, as long as racial profiling is treated as a problem and not a symptom, few actual remedies will be forthcoming. To treat racial profiling as the problem, much like smokers' cough, is to treat the symptoms. Racial profiling is part of a larger, more ingrained problem in Western culture.

In the raging debate over racial profiling, it should be understood that most Americans, both racial elites and non-elites, agree that racism is bad, that vestiges of racism yet remain, and that laws and their enforcement should be racially neutral. The degree to which groups and individuals assess such neutrality is dependent upon which side of the racial divide they find themselves. As in the 1995 O. J. Simpson trial, many racial elites view the criminal justice system as fair, while many racial non-elites view the same system as being unfair. Most racial non-elites know with certainty that police, the courts, and the laws unfairly target, systematically restrict, and regularly harm members of their groups. Alternatively, most racial elites know with certainty that their only protection from an increasingly hostile and criminal underclass is the police, the courts, and the laws.

Although several factors may account for these differences, the force of the news media cannot be ignored. Evidence seems to support the vilification of racial non-elites. Specifically, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be presented as criminals than as victims or more positively. These types of perceptual biases have dire and negative consequences when racial non-elites confront the legal system. Thus both blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped, searched, and charged with trivial offenses simply because they are members of racialized non-elites.

These types of observations are not limited to the United States but rather are universally associated with racial and ethnic discrimination. For example, research conducted in South Africa documents how racial elites inflate their own superiority by deflating that of racial non-elites. Consequently, while they perceive themselves as superior, they describe racial non-elites as greedy, lazy, sexually aggressive, deviant, disrespectful, irresponsible, dependent, and backward. Further, as seen in Russia, when racial elites

also dominate the police, these types of attitudes can result in selective enforcement, extremism, and ethnic intolerance.

Globally, since September 11, 2001, a fear of immigrants and anti-immigrant hostilities has increased. Xenophobic fears have surfaced in Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, to name but a few. Xenophobic fears in the United States since 9/11 have led police, customs, and other entities to target Arabs and Muslims, particularly men, at airports and other ports of entry, under the presumption that they pose a threat to national security.

Within organizational culture, specific code words reflect racial profiling. Important promotions and recommendations for hire are often couched in terms that on the surface seem innocent, but in reality reflect the racial bias of the dominant group. Often, the parties involved suggest that they are reflecting the "best interests" of the company and the individual, when they say that one candidate is "ready" for a "stretch" while another might be more "risky." Often, the candidates suggested as encompassing the most risk are also the racial non-elite, with whom the racial elite feels the most uncomfortable.

Racial profiling in hiring can be more complex. That is to say, managers (regardless of race) often are more likely to hire whites than blacks. Further, non-black managers (i.e., Asian, white, and Hispanic) tend to hire significantly fewer blacks than do black managers. While the researchers note larger racial gaps in the South, all regions and store types reflect these patterns. Racial profiling also negatively affects black and Hispanic welfare recipients in their attempts to secure viable jobs. White workers benefit most from welfare-to-work programs, suburban location of employer, and higher skills or salary thresholds. Alternatively, minority-owned or governmental subsidies tend to erase some of these differentials for both black and Hispanic workers. Racial non-elites may also be more critically scrutinized for promotions than their white counterparts. By implication, a presumption of guilt or incompetence exists with regard to racial non-elites and one of innocence or competence with regard to racial elites. The constant battle to prove oneself worthy of credit, employment, housing, admissions, promotions, and so on represents a constant struggle for legitimacy.

In retail, security officials and store personnel also may employ racial profiling, as they are more likely to concentrate on the race of their customers than their conduct. Within these establishments, racial non-elites are targeted and therefore may be more likely to be caught. Therefore, "shopping while black," another form of racial profiling, may lead to the increased likelihood of blacks being caught, while the failure to monitor whites will give the impression that whites are less likely to commit the same crimes. Some store security personnel use codes to signal that a black, Asian, or Hispanic has entered the store. When, for example, one hears "Code 3," store personnel have instructions to monitor suspects of particular racial or demographic groups.

Racial profiling, regardless of form, continues to stigmatize, restrict, and further marginalize group members. Consequently, what seems on the surface to be random or coincidental in actuality preserves racial hierarchies.

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See also Police; Prejudice; Racism; Terrorism; Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches

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Racism

Racism refers to ideologies, actions, and policies that create and maintain a system of social inequality based on race (socially constructed categories on the basis of physical characteristics imbued with social significance). As a social problem, racism has been connected to substantial inequalities between whites and African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos/as in such areas as life expectancy, education,

employment, health, housing, income, poverty, and wealth. These disparities have remained remarkably consistent in the United States in recent years. Racism is also manifest in unequal access to and treatment by criminal justice, health care, political, and economic institutions, as well as in the impact of policy decisions (e.g., housing, transportation, and location of environmentally hazardous sites). On a societal level, analysts connect racism to the loss of human potential, the economic costs of poverty- and inequality-related social problems, and the social conflicts stemming from segregation and division.

The Changing Nature of Racism

As Michael Omi and Howard Winant observed, the nature of racism varies according to historical and social context. Consequently, it is useful to outline how both racism and scholarly thinking about racism evolved over time. Most observers agree that the use of race-like categories for differential treatment stretches far back into history; however, the use of such categories was by no means widespread or consistent. Perhaps the most significant development in the history of racism was the late 18th-century emergence of a more systematic racist ideology. Often termed *classical racism,* this perspective held that (a) the human race could be divided into biologically distinct subspecies; (b) members of each race inherited shared physical, intellectual, cultural, and moral traits; and (c) races could be rated as "superior" or "inferior" in terms of these inherited traits. Accompanying the rise of classical racism was a flurry of "scientific" activity (later discredited) that purported to prove the superiority of Northern Europeans and the inferiority of other races. Socially, theories of racial superiority were used to legitimize European colonization and the dispossession of native peoples, the practice of slavery in the Americas, and other forms of domination such as racial segregation and exclusion. In Europe, classical racism reached its peak with the Aryan racial superiority theories of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, which provided the justification for the genocidal murder of millions of European Jews during the Holocaust.

Countering classical racism in the mid-20th century were emerging scientific attacks against its basic claims, most notably by anthropologists such as Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Ashley Montagu. Benedict is often credited with the first use of the term *racism* in her 1943 critique of classical racism. Subsequent events, including post–World War II decolonization and the civil rights movement in the United States, and additional work by scientists led to the further decline of classical racism, to the extent that its present support is generally limited to a few scholars and marginalized groups of white supremacists.

Given changes in society and in the nature of race relations, scholars have attempted to describe the changing nature of racism. Beginning in the 1950s, much of the attention of mainstream social science focused on racism as *individual* prejudice and discrimination. This in turn led to social-psychological research that attempted to understand the roots of prejudice. One significant development in the 1960s was the emergence of a distinction, first proposed by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, between individual and *institutional* racism. In contrast to individual racism, institutional racism is the cumulative and unequal effects of institutional policies and practices in such areas as housing, education, health care, politics, employment, and the environment. This is evident in unequal rates of treatment for disease, approval of mortgage loans, graduation, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing and in exposure to environmental hazards. Subsequent work distinguished between *direct* institutional racism, such as the system of segregation in the U.S. South prior to the 1960s, and *indirect* forms, such as a system of public school attendance and funding that, in concert with other social forces, creates a significant number of public schools that are highly segregated and unequally funded. One final distinction often made is the difference between *overt* and *covert* racism, the former being unequal treatment that is obvious and blatant, the latter being discrimination that may be invisible to the victim (e.g., telling a prospective tenant that a vacant apartment has already been rented because the landlord does not want to rent to individuals from certain racial groups).

Following the civil rights movement, researchers continued to study the changing nature of racism in the United States. One strand of investigation attempted to explain the paradox between an apparent decline in individual racial prejudice among white Americans, as manifest in survey results that showed increasing acceptance of African Americans as political leaders, neighbors, and even family members, and continuing white opposition to policies such as busing and affirmative action that were designed to promote

racial integration and increased equality. This led to the notion of *symbolic* or *modern* racism, which described an individual belief that rejected the ideas of classical racism but maintained that racial minorities, especially African Americans, experienced social and economic problems because they failed to conform to traditional U.S. values of hard work, persistence, and relentless pursuit of success. Instead, minority group members made excessive demands for government action and requested preferential treatment that violated basic ideas of fair play and equal treatment. Some scholars working in this tradition also suggested that symbolic racism was driven by overt or covert fears that gains for minorities would come at the expense of whites. Although it was quite popular in academic circles, symbolic racism theory was also criticized for its individualistic focus and lack of a clear causal mechanism.

Another, more recent, perspective on racism began with the assertion that racism was subsiding as a significant factor in U.S. society in the face of declining prejudice and social and economic gains for racial minorities. Thus, it is only a matter of additional time before racism and racial inequality would be eliminated. One important variant of this perspective is the position that the persisting racial inequality in the United States is an effect of social class more than racial barriers. This "declining significance of race" thesis, whose most notable proponent was the sociologist William J. Wilson, maintained that while racism is declining, the impact of past racism and current social changes (deindustrialization, globalization) have combined to create a minority underclass for whom social and economic progress is very difficult. Both of these positions are also compatible with the assertion that racial inequality is due to the cultural deficiencies of minority communities.

During the past decade, significant analytical attention centered on what has been characterized as *color-blind racial ideology* or color-blind racism. Indeed, for many scholars of race and ethnic relations, color blindness is viewed as the dominant racial ideology in the contemporary United States. As described by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and others, the core of color-blind racial ideology is the claim that race no longer matters in any meaningful way in U.S. society. What remains is a superficial identity that can serve as an indicator of "diversity" in organizations or communities but is not connected to life chances or social experiences. If racism does persist, it is in the form of prejudice or hate crimes by individuals who may be of any race and who will face condemnation from most members of society.

A key question for color-blind racial ideology is that if race no longer matters, how does society explain the persistence of racial inequality? One type of response is "naturalization," the claim that racial patterns in such areas as housing and health care or the impact of disasters such as Hurricane Katrina either are coincidences or reflect the accumulation of individual preferences. Another explanation is "cultural racism," the claim (shared with other perspectives discussed previously) that any remaining racial inequality or social problems are due to pathological behavior on the part of minority individuals and communities. In either case, social problems can be dismissed as not resulting from race and therefore require no corrective action on the part of society. Race-based remedies such as affirmative action can then be denounced as unwarranted special treatment that violates norms of racial equality—and even cited as "reverse discrimination" or racism against whites. Critics of color-blind ideology have asserted that it ignores the realities of persistent institutional racism and makes it possible for white advantages to continue without significant challenge.

Racism and Racial Politics

Despite a mainstream belief in the declining significance of race, claims regarding racism continue to play an important role in U.S. racial politics. Indeed, it could be argued that the discussion of the nature of racism and what constitutes racism takes on even more importance as a political question than as an academic issue. Given the discrediting of classical racism, charges of institutional racism or that an individual is a racist carry an extremely negative valuation and become a serious matter for all concerned. In recent years, U.S. society experienced a series of "racial events" that triggered extensive national discussions of issues of race and racism. Examples of this include comments by entertainers and public figures such as Michael Richards and Don Imus, the debate regarding allegations (all charges were eventually dropped) that white members of the Duke University lacrosse team raped a black woman, and the claim that the government response to Hurricane Katrina would have been faster had the victims in New Orleans been white. In each case, charges of

racism produced an intense debate between those who adopt a color-blind perspective and those who believe in the continuing significance of racism in the United States.

Once a claim of racism is made, it generally initiates a debate regarding whether or not the act was racist and a series of counterclaims regarding the initial accusation. One common response is denial; that is, the assertion that race had no bearing on the actions or policies in question. A second reaction is minimization, either by stating that any offense or harm was unintentional or to suggest that those claiming injury are oversensitive or "always bring race in" to the discussion. Countercharges are also a frequent tactic, including the allegation that the claim of racism constitutes "name-calling" or the suggestion that the individual or group making the claim is "playing the race card" for personal or organizational gain. On a more general level, advocates of color-blind racial ideology have claimed that racial categories are a form of racism and have even proposed legislation, such as the unsuccessful Proposition 54 in California to ban the collection of racial data by government agencies. Another general claim is that the problem of racism would be minimal if advocates would stop making claims about racism and racial inequality in the United States. Given trends in the recent past, it is likely that U.S. society will continue to experience a series of racial events and debates between those who minimize the role of race and those who make claims about the persistence of institutional racism.

Racism and Social Change

It seems apparent that the 21st century will bring changes to race relations in the United States. The estimated 15 million immigrants per decade in the 1990s and the 2000s, approximately 50 percent of whom are from Latin America and another 25 percent from Asia, have and will continue to change the racial demography of the United States. If current trends continue, the U.S. Census Bureau projects that by 2050 non-Hispanic whites will be a bare majority of the population and that shortly thereafter no majority racial group will exist in the nation as a whole (a situation that is already true in California, Texas, and Louisiana). These demographic changes, in concert with such other changes in the distribution of groups, the increasing number of multiracial individuals, and the slow movement of minority group members into higher social, economic, and political positions, carry the potential for significant local, regional, and national changes in intergroup relations.

What is less apparent, however, is *how* the nature of race relations and racism in the United States will change. Certainly issues of immigration and racial diversity will dominate the political arena in the near future; however, their direction remains to be determined. It is possible to foresee increased racial conflict as whites, threatened by a loss of power, seek to defend their current advantages in face of increasing claims from a rapidly growing minority population. It is also possible to envision increased racial equality amid shared political and economic power in a pluralistic society. Some scholars of race and ethnic relations have suggested a more nuanced view. Bonilla-Silva argues that the United States in the future will undergo a "Latin Americanization" of race relations with various Asian and Latino/a groups occupying an intermediate position in a more complex racial order. George Yancey asserts that the key issue in the future will be the division between blacks and "non-blacks" and that many recent Latino/a and Asian immigrant groups will be absorbed into the dominant white group. Both arguments contend that racial inequality will remain a fact of life, either through a blurring of boundaries and privilege or by expanding the relative numbers and power of the dominant racial group. How the U.S. racial order adapts to social and demographic changes in the coming decades will be the key factor in shaping the nature of race relations and racism in the future.

Ashley Doane

See also Discrimination; Discrimination, Institutional; Environmental Racism; Hate Crimes; Jim Crow; Race; Race-Blind Policies; Racial Formation Theory; Racial Profiling; School Segregation; Segregation; Segregation, Residential; Stratification, Race; Underclass Debate; White Supremacy

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Rape

Rape is a pervasive and serious social problem, brought to greater attention with the second-wave women's movement of the 1960–70s. The connection between rape and gender inequality is one of control. Rape, and the fear it produces, is a mechanism of social control that men in a patriarchal society use to maintain gender stratification. This type of social control occurs when women restrict their movements and behaviors due to the threat of rape. For example, women may be restricted from working late into the evening in fear of not getting home safely after dark. If a woman does not take responsibility for protecting herself by restricting her actions, and an assault does occur, she is made to feel responsible for the assault because she took such a risk. In a male-dominated society, rape both reflects the low valuation of women and contributes to their subordination in the sexual stratification system. Research shows that the lower the status of women relative to men, the higher the rape rate.

At present, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) legally defines *rape* as gaining carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. This definition only takes into account heterosexual rape of an adult woman. However, some states now define rape in sex-neutral terms to include sexual assault on a male victim, usually by another male. Some states have laws that distinguish among various degrees of sexual assault, each carrying a different penalty according to the seriousness of the offense. Although we know that men and children are also victims of rape, the most common form of this crime is rapes perpetrated by men with women victims.

Most rapes occur between persons who know one another. Women are most frequently raped by their husbands, ex-husbands, current or past boyfriends, relatives, and acquaintances. Stranger rapes do occur, but they only account for approximately 20 percent of all rapes. Rapists and victims tend to be of the same race and age group. Additionally, most rapists are "normal" in personality, appearance, intelligence, behavior, and sexual drive.

Consent

Since the vast majority of victims know their attacker, the main legal issue is not identity of the rapist but rather that of consent. Did the victim consent, or agree, to have sex with her attacker? Unfortunately, the courts often adjudicate rape cases from the standpoint of the accused, not the victim. Feminists object that the legal question in rape is *not* about the man using force to have sex with the woman (girl) against her will, but rather whether the man had reason to believe (or convincingly say he believed) the woman (girl) consented to have sex. Given this standard, defense attorneys routinely allege that victims led rapists to believe they consented. Whether a woman actually consented is less critical than the "acceptability" of a defendant's claim that he believed she did. Given this dynamic, many contend that such legal collaboration lets rapists off the hook and fosters a "second assault" of rape victims.

Current Statistics

In 2006, although local U.S. police departments reported 92,455 cases of forcible rape and attempted rape in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), federal victimization surveys found that many more incidents occurred. The 2006 NCVS (National Crime Victimization Survey) uncovered 115,010 rapes and sexual assaults of women, 24 percent more than the number reported by the FBI in data gathered from

local police departments. The newest estimate comes from the National Women's Survey, which estimates the total number in all years of completed forcible rapes in 1990 to be 683,000 (1 out of every 145 U.S. women). The methodology for this survey was different from the UCR and NCVS data collection methods. The National Women's Survey interviewed 4,008 women, who were chosen as a cross-section of the American adult female public, over the phone. Regardless of the exact figures, the point is that rape is a pervasive social problem that is under-reported in the United States.

The variability in these statistics is due to differences in methodology, sample size, and estimating procedures. The UCR data only account for those rapes reported to police, but rape is a highly under-reported crime. The NCVS data include a survey of victims that includes those rapes not reported to the police, but critics argue that these statistics also are too low. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 49 percent of all violent crimes go unreported, often because the attack was by a spouse, partner, boyfriend, or another family member. Such victims are unwilling to report crimes to police because they see the offense as a private or a personal matter. Other victims may avoid the police because they feel stigmatized by the sexual attack or anticipate police insensitivity.

Campus Rape

The National College Women Sexual Victimization (NCWSV) survey carried out in 2000 gathered data by telephone from a randomly selected, national sample of 4, 446 women attending a two- or four-year college or university during the fall of 1996. The researchers concluded that 4.9 percent of college women are the victims of rape or a rape attempt during any given calendar year, and 20 to 25 percent of college women are victimized during the course of their college careers. Asked if they considered the incident rape, 46.5 percent of victims said they did, 48.8 percent said they did not, and 4.7 percent were uncertain. The failure of nearly half of the victims to define their victimization as rape does not, however, mean that it was not. Factors such as embarrassment, ignorance of the legal definition of rape, unwillingness to consider the offender a rapist, and the belief that they contributed to their own victimization can keep victims from acknowledging assaults that are legally rapes as such. The NCWSV study was consistent with prior surveys in finding that most victims were acquainted with the men who had committed the rapes. Other studies of campus rape have found that 90 percent involve the use of alcohol by the perpetrator, victim, or both.

Theories of Rape Causation

Several theories concerning the causation of rape are important because they beget strategies for rape prevention. Psychopathological explanations of rape focus on individuals, while sociocultural explanations emphasize the importance of the social structure.

Psychopathological explanations make the assumption that male aggressive sexual behavior is unusual or strange. These approaches remove sexual violence from the "everyday" norm, portraying sexually violent men as outsiders and thus eliminating any connection or threat to "normal" men. Such models view rape as no more than a collection of individual problems, thereby ignoring the cultural and structural contexts in which rape occurs. Consequently, these theories of individual disorder cannot account for the vast number of rapes committed in the United States. Nor can theories predicated on individual pathology account for the norms and values of the larger culture concerning rape. It is precisely these individualistic theories that produce rape myths.

Sociocultural theories rest on a presumption of normality rather than pathology and generate questions from the experiences that women, not men, have of rape. The primary assumption of the sociocultural perspective is that rape is a socially learned behavior. The fundamental premise is that all behavior is learned through direct association with others as well as indirectly through cultural contact (behavioral techniques, rape myths).

In this view, U.S. culture produces rapists through the socialization of its societal members when it encourages men to subscribe to values of control/dominance, callousness/competitiveness, and anger/aggression and when it discourages expression by men of vulnerability, sharing, and cooperation. At the same time, it socializes women to be submissive/indecisive, empathetic/giving, and subtle/non-aggressive and not to be authoritative, strong willed, and assertive. We then throw such differentially socialized individuals into dating situations and expect everything to go smoothly. When it doesn't, we blame the

individuals. From a sociocultural perspective, such blame is ludicrous.

Those who adhere to the sociocultural model explain date or acquaintance rape as the logical extension of a cultural perspective that defines men as possessors of women, thus making women legitimate objects of sexual aggression. The American dating system, in particular, places females in the position of sexual objects that men purchase. Women are groomed to compete for men who will shower them with attention and favors, men who are socialized to expect sexual reward (or at least try for that reward) for their attention to women. This perspective presents the woman as a legitimate object of victimization: if a man is unable to seduce a woman and yet has provided her with certain attention and gifts, then he has a right to expect sexual payment. Only the situation of rape by a total stranger escapes the influence of this reasoning.

Research reveals many gender attitudinal differences about date rape. For example, males are significantly more likely than females to hold attitudes condoning aggressive sexual behavior. The sociocultural model suggests that these gender differences are the result of gendered socialization and education. Sex role socialization regarding dating behavior leads to a rape-supportive culture in which the use of coercion and physical force to obtain sex is seen as normative rather than deviant behavior. Traditional sex roles, sex role expectations, and attitudes toward women all play a part in molding one's attitudes regarding rape.

The common thread through all of the findings is that these attitudes and behaviors are learned. Rape is not the result of some uncontrollable impulse, but rather, a socially constructed behavior that men learn. Therefore, this is behavior that can be unlearned.

Solving the Social Problem of Rape

Among the many solutions offered to prevent rape, or serious injury if rape is imminent, women learn never to walk unaccompanied at night, to stay out of certain neighborhoods, to take self-defense courses, and to carry mace or use keys as weapons, to name a few suggestions. They hear conflicting messages about how much physical force a "would-be" victim should use. Local police departments tell women to submit if rape is imminent to avoid further injury or death. At the same time, many courts demand *evidence of resistance* before defining the offense as rape.

One common theme to these solutions is that women in some way need to alter their own behavior in order to avoid rape. Another commonality is their assumption of stranger rape, which completely ignores the vast amount of acquaintance rape. In any case, all of these solutions define rape as a woman's problem and neglect to confront the behavior of the assailants, namely men.

One solution that focuses on both women and men is education about rape, and research suggests that a feminist education program can counter the effects of gender-based socialization and definitions of rape that are shaped in the context of sexual inequality. Ideally these educational programs would start in high school and continue at the college level.

A more far-reaching solution to the social problem of sexual assault is to continue to work toward gender equality. Only true gender equality will dismantle the mechanism of rape as a form of social control.

Frederika E. Schmitt

See also Rape, Acquaintance or Date; Rape, Marital; Violent Crime

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Rape, Acquaintance or Date

Acquaintance rape, commonly known as "date rape," is a form of sexual violence. Acquaintance rape is nonconsensual sexual intercourse where penetration is achieved with the use of or threatened use of force, occurring between individuals known to one another, such as a current or former friend, acquaintance, spouse, dating partner, or relative. While many theories, including social, biological, and situational theories, have been postulated as to why acquaintance rapes occur, there is no single explanation.

Criminal justice professionals and the general public often perceive acquaintance rape as less severe and less prevalent than stranger rape. This is problematic

because it subtly perpetuates the belief that this form of sexual violence is acceptable. While the fear of stranger rape is greater, it is more likely that the victim will be raped by someone she knows. Women and girls are most often victimized, particularly high school– and college-age girls in the context of a date or party, although it should be noted that acquaintance rape is not limited to females and heterosexual encounters or relationships.

Accurate statistics on date rape are difficult to compile because victims are less likely than stranger rape victims to report the incident to the police, crisis centers, school officials, and friends and family or may not perceive themselves to be victims, depending on the circumstances surrounding the incident. Prosecuting an acquaintance rape case is difficult because a victim must prove she did not give consent for sexual intercourse. Unlike stranger rape, rape shield laws do not necessarily apply. Legally, date rape carries the same penalties as stranger rape.

Research demonstrates that a variety of factors, including peer pressure, alcohol and drug use, and preexisting beliefs are associated with young women's increased risk for being date raped. Some research indicates the women can correctly determine the risk of victimization for other women but not for themselves.

Alcohol and/or drug use, particularly Rohypnol and GHB, are correlated with an increased likelihood of date rape occurring because of lowered inhibitions of the victim and perpetrator, victim's loss of motor control so she may be unable to resist an attacker, or unconsciousness. Some perpetrators use alcohol and/or drugs as a justification for their behavior. Oftentimes, both offender and victim have consumed alcohol.

Research shows many males and females believe acquaintance rape is acceptable under certain circumstances, such as if the boy spent a substantial amount of money on the girl, if the girl has a real or perceived promiscuous sexual history, or if the male and female have been dating or are married. A victim may experience secondary victimization from the police, prosecutors, and friends and family; she may be blamed for her behavior, the way she dressed, or for being alone with a man. Consequences include victims blaming themselves for the incident and depression. Finally, some males may think that when a girl says "No" she really means "Yes" to intercourse. Some males may not even realize that they have committed sexual assault.

Renee D. Graphia

See also Rape; Violence, Sexual

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Rape, Marital

Marital rape (also called "wife rape" or "spousal rape") is forced, nonconsensual sex in which the perpetrator is the victim's spouse. Marital rape was criminalized in all U.S. states by 1993 with the deletion of the "spousal exemption" that had defined rape as forced intercourse without the consent of the woman *other than one's wife.* However, the spousal exemption remains in effect in most non-Western countries. Marital rape is the form of violence against women with the greatest cultural and legal support, and it is not recognized as a social problem in most of the world.

Marital rape prevalence rates indicate a global epidemic of sexual violence within intimate relationships. Researchers estimate that 10–14 percent of married women in the United States have been raped by their husbands. One-third to one-half of women in battered women's shelters report being sexually abused by their partners as well. A 2005 WHO (World Health Organization) study documented rates of sexual violence by a partner that ranged from under 10 percent in urban Japan to over 50 percent in rural Bangladesh and Ethiopia.

Research indicates that women who are raped by their intimate partners are usually assaulted numerous times and, at least in the United States, experience forced oral and anal as well as vaginal sex. Researchers have identified three basic types of marital rape. *Force-only rape* involves only as much physical force as necessary to coerce compliance. Women report having arms pinned down, faces smothered by pillows, and overall differences in body weight as means by which their resistance is overcome. *Battering rapes* take place in the context of more severe physical assaults. Sexual assault may occur during or after a beating as a means of inflicting more harm. Subsequently, threats of such violence may be used to force sexual compliance. Finally, *obsessive/sadistic rapes* are those in which physical violence is sexually arousing to the perpetrator and may involve pornography, perverse acts, and torture.

Evidence from interviews with marital rape survivors indicates that these assaults have serious immediate

and long-term consequences that can be more traumatic than sexual assault by a stranger. Physical injuries include genital or rectal tearing and hemorrhaging, sexually transmitted disease (STD) or HIV infection, miscarriage, and unwanted pregnancy. Emotional consequences include shock and disbelief, intense fear, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Furthermore, marital rape is experienced as a betrayal and a violation of trust, effects that are felt for years as women try to build new relationships.

Despite the high rate of marital rape, specific services for wife rape victims are virtually nonexistent, and rape crisis shelters or battered women's shelters do not fully meet victims' needs. Attention to forced sex in marriage is increasing with wider recognition of its relation to the spread of HIV/AIDS. The UN Declaration on HIV/AIDS calls for women's sexual autonomy as a key to stemming the global pandemic.

Kersti Yllo

See also Abuse, Intimate Partner; Rape, Acquaintance or Date

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Rape, Statutory

Statutory rape refers to sexual relationships occurring between two individuals when at least one of the individuals cannot legally consent to sex. While common belief holds that a uniform age separates an adult from a minor in regard to making decisions about one's sexual behavior, several factors determine this, depending on the state or country in which the behavior occurs, including age of consent, the minimum age of the victim, the age differential between sexual partners, and the minimum age of the defendant in order to prosecute. Only 12 states in the United States have a single age of consent, meaning that once individuals reach this age, they may engage in sexual intercourse with another person above the age of consent. The remaining states may consider the other three factors in their statutes. To complicate matters, few states use the term *statutory rape* in their criminal codes; rather, the codes identify the legality of explicit sexual offenses.

Age of consent (between 16 and 17 years of age) is the age ordained by law that a person can agree to have sex. In addition to variations by location, the age of consent varies by sex (gender) and sexual orientation. Males may legally have sex at a younger age than females, and gay males and lesbian females may be subject to different statutes because of their sexual orientation. Below the minimum age (between 10 and 16 years of age), an individual cannot consent to sex under any circumstances.

The use, or threatened use, of force is a distinctive component in most rape cases; however, in a statutory rape case consent is typically not the issue. The rationale for statutory rape laws is grounded in the belief that below a certain age an individual does not have the mental maturity to make informed decisions for him- or herself. An older individual may exploit and manipulate the younger person's naiveté, so laws exist to protect the younger partner from this imbalance of power.

Historically, statutory rape cases focused on young women as victims. In patriarchal societies, if a woman lost her virginity and/or was impregnated before she married, she would be perceived as both morally ruined and shameful to her family. Sexual relationships or encounters involving young males were often overlooked and inherently perceived as less troublesome; however, in recent times this social stance has changed, as indicated by high-profile cases often involving female teachers and male students. Other social problems stemming from underage minors having sex with adults is the prevalence of out of wedlock teen pregnancy and parenthood and sexually transmitted diseases, each carrying a host of correlated problems.

Other problems include the unwillingness of victims to prosecute partners and the perception by police, prosecutors, and the general public that statutory rape is less harmful than forcible rapes or other sexual offenses involving children, thus designating less prioritization to such cases.

Renee D. Graphia

See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Extramarital Sex; Rape; Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting; Violence, Sexual

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Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory (RCT) is a social-scientific approach that explains social phenomena in terms of deliberate decisions that self-interested individuals make.

One of the key assumptions of RCT is the notion of the *purposeful actor.* Rational choice theorists portray social actors as distinct entities with knowledge of alternative courses of action available to them, as well as their possible consequences. These actors are conceived to have given preferences (i.e., wants, goals) organized in a hierarchical order. Between two alternatives, say, A and B, the actor either prefers A to B, or B to A, or remains indifferent. In their actions, social agents have the immediate purpose of attaining ends consistent with their preferences. In other words, the actions of social agents are intentional and reflect actors' preferences.

Utility maximization, another key assumption, relates closely to the idea of the purposeful actor. Actors' preferences represent a utility function that assigns a numerical value to each possible alternative facing the actor or decision maker. The assumption of utility maximization holds that an actor's choices or decisions attempt to maximize this mathematical function.

An important part of the choice process is the existence of *constraints.* In attempting to achieve their goals, social agents often act on the basis of the information that they have within specific institutional settings. This information and setting limit the feasible set of available actions. At its simplest, the relationship between preferences and constraints is that of a means to an end. Since individuals cannot achieve everything that they want, they must make choices in relation to both their preferences and the available means for attaining them.

The assumption of *rationality* follows from these axioms. When rational choice theorists speak of *rational behavior,* they mean that individual actors consider their preferences vis-à-vis the constraints they face and attempt to optimize their utility functions.

RCT provides several benefits to researchers. Although variations occur in particular empirical applications, RCT provides scholars with a unifying, general theory. The investigators clearly know the elements of the theory, and how they should carry out the analysis. This explains why RCT, long a dominant paradigm in economics, has become popular in recent decades in such disciplines as political science and sociology.

However, for other scholars, RCT presents some serious problems. Critics find its behavioral assumptions to be highly unrealistic. Assuming that individuals are primarily utility maximizers, they argue, neglects the possibility of other goals directing social agents. Rather than maximizing something, people often engage in habitual, value-oriented, or affectual action. Instrumental rationality thus cannot give a complete account of social action.

Critics also contend that the rational choice approach suppresses most real-world complexities by leaving out anything that it cannot model. Scholars whose approaches are inductive and empirical are particularly critical of this reduction of social phenomena to an outcome of agents' self-interested actions. Such analysis, they maintain, omits much of the rich historical, contextual detail that they meticulously assemble.

Another stream of criticism attacks the notion of preferences. While rational choice theorists contend that social agents act with the purpose of reaching ends that are consistent with their preferences, this does not explain why actors have those preferences in the first place.

Basak Kus

See also Ethnomethodology; Theory

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Reasonable Suspicion

Social problems can arise from many sources; one of the most interesting of those sources is the official manifest structure of social control, the legal system. In U.S. law, with its foundations primarily in English "common law" traditions, the use of reasonable suspicion to justify governmental interference with the liberty of persons is one such social problem. The implications of reasonable suspicion can be understood by looking at its definition in legal terms, the legal debates surrounding this doctrine, illustrations of its extension to other areas of social life, and, finally, some of the reasons to consider this development as a social problem.

Legal Terms

The use of reasonable suspicion as a standard to justify police intervention initially received official recognition in the U.S. Supreme Court decision *Terry v. Ohio,* one of a series of opinions issued by the Warren Court as part of the "due process revolution." This "revolution" refers to the Warren Court's use of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to place limitations on state actions that interfere with individual rights when they violate federally protected rights considered to be fundamental rights. Accordingly, when the Court determines that a right found in the Bill of Rights is fundamental to the concepts of liberty, that right is "selectively incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. It thus protects these rights from state government interference, just as the Bill of Rights protects them from federal government interference.

So why is this case sociologically intriguing as a social problem and perhaps an example of selective social control? In *Terry v. Ohio,* the Warren Court was asked to determine "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest" under the Fourth Amendment. This legal question arose from the facts of the case. Codefendants Terry and Chilton had been stopped by Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden after surreptitious observation. The detective testified that while he was unable to say what initially drew his attention to the defendants, their behavior made him suspicious enough to stop and watch them more closely. In his professional opinion, they exhibited behavior consistent with "casing" the area for an armed robbery. After watching the defendants for a short time, the detective confronted the men, who "mumbled something" in response to his challenge. Officer McFadden then patted down the exterior of Terry's clothing, feeling a pistol in the process. In the search of the second defendant, Chilton, he found another revolver. In the subsequent search of a third man, Katz, he found nothing, and this suspect was ultimately released. Both Chilton and Terry were eventually charged with carrying concealed weapons.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in these searches. The motion was not denied because the trial judge agreed with the prosecution's claim that these facts amounted to probable cause; rather, the Supreme Court instead agreed with the trial court's determination that when the police have "reasonable suspicion" that is based on "specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences reasonably warrant that intrusion," the search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Court said that a limited search, or pat-down of the clothing, of the person(s) being stopped is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such "frisks" will only be permitted where there is "reasonable suspicion" that the person stopped might be armed and dangerous to the police officer who has stopped them, thereby justifying the search to protect the safety of the officer.

Legal Debate

Legal experts criticize this decision as expanding the area within which the government may lawfully interfere with citizen rights. They point to Bureau of Justice Statistics, for example, that show, on average, about one-fifth of U.S. citizens over the age of 16 reported that they had contact with police, more than half for traffic stops. They assert that so many interactions allow for a significant expansion of police authority, a significant widening of the social control net, and that this widened net increases the range in which police can justify coerced interactions with people and that it disproportionately impacts minorities.

Defenders of the *Terry* decision agree with the Supreme Court's reasoning that these stops and frisks

are essential law enforcement tools if police are to be able to keep the peace. They argue that the police need this authority to investigate and proactively prevent criminal behavior. They contend that police must have the authority to stop and speak to those whom they have a reasonable basis for suspecting of ongoing criminal behavior and, because it is a "limited" search and "limited" stop, that the authority to do so is not overly broad, thus making it a reasonable application of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In recent years authorities have pointed to the need, in a post–September 11 world, to use interdiction against potential terrorists who have the potential of disrupting society and causing significant injury to innocent bystanders. They cite this specific example of the compelling societal interest served by granting police this authority.

Widening the Net: Other Suspicious Applications

The widening net of reasonable suspicion has not been limited to the police or the war on terrorism. In *New Jersey v. T.L.O.*, the search by a public high school vice principal of a student's purse and subsequent determination of delinquency was deemed warranted because of "reasonable suspicion," thus permitting schools to use the *Terry* decision to justify searches of students' possessions when there is less than probable cause for a search. In the decision, Justice Byron White specifically noted that age and sex are factors that can be considered in determining whether or not a search is reasonable.

Court decisions applying the standard of reasonable suspicion to governmental actions characterized as "stops and frisks" have resulted in expanding the range and types of circumstances in which police have the authority to coerce compliance. These extensions include such behaviors as appearing agitated in public (e.g., belligerence), running away from authorities when first sighted, and interfering with the movements of anyone who "matches" the description of a suspect and is found in the same general area as the crime. These extended circumstances in which this doctrine applies give evidence to the dynamic nature of court interpretations of laws. As binding precedent, they are meant to be used in other similar cases in the future and, as such, expand the scope of police authority through the extension of this legal standard to more and more aspects of social life.

Why Does This Matter?

Widening the net used by police to limit ability of the members of society to encompass ever more aspects of social life is disturbing in and of itself, since it represents the significant social problem of ever more social control by the government. However, this is only one area of controversy that arises when looking at decisions that apply the "reasonable suspicion" standard to governmental intrusions into the private activities of people. Another is the socially constructed nature of the interactions between the citizen and the official agents of social control. Here issues of race, age, gender, and many other variables come into play and beg the question of the "reasonableness" of the justification for the police interactions. Is being African American enough "reason" to stop a person who may only resemble a suspect because of skin color? Does shying away from the police, who may not be held in the highest esteem in that neighborhood, become a reason for a coerced stop and frisk?

These questions show the relativeness of the *Terry* standard and point to the significant social control implications of it and its progeny. The legal system may wish to believe it is blind, but defendants in such cases and under such circumstances perceive the "law" as being used to selectively oppress certain easily identifiable segments of society. Many groups may find such legally sanctioned intrusions harmful: minorities of various types, the poor, males, Muslims, and many others. This may be the most compelling reason why many consider this legal doctrine to be tantamount to an invitation to the police to engage in selective social control.

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See also PATRIOT Act; Police; Social Control; Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches

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RECIDIVISM

Recidivism refers to the repetition of behaviors that society sanctions, particularly those related to criminal offenses and substance abuse. In criminology, *recidivism* refers specifically to the rate at which people who have been released from prison are rearrested, reconvicted, or returned to prison (with or without a new sentence) during a specified period of time following the prisoner's release. Those persons are also known as "repeat" or "chronic" offenders.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), which conducted a groundbreaking study of recidivism in 15 states in 2002, of the 272,111 persons released from prisons in 1994, 67.5 percent were rearrested for a new felony or serious misdemeanor within 3 years of release. Of those 272,111 persons, 46.9 percent were reconvicted of a new crime and 25.4 percent were resentenced to prison for a new crime. In addition, 26.4 percent were back in prison within 3 years because of violations of some technical condition of their parole, such as failure to attend an appointment with a parole officer or failing a drug test.

Most studies of recidivism focus on individual-level characteristics and find that people with prior offenses, drug addictions, and low levels of education tend to offend again. The 2002 BJS study found that men were more likely than women to recidivate in each of the four measurement categories they selected: rearrested, reconvicted, resentenced to prison for a new crime, and returned to prison with or without a new prison sentence. Black people were more likely than whites to recidivate. Higher rates of recidivism occurred among prisoners who were younger when released from prison. These data may underestimate the rate of recidivism, as the measures were based on statistics gathered from only 15 states and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Official crime data, including the Uniform Crime Report, are known to underestimate the crime rate, as demonstrated by surveys of victims, such as the National Crime Victimization Survey, as well as by self-report surveys of criminal involvement.

In a now-classic study that defined the concept of "career criminals," Marvin Wolfgang and his associates followed the criminal careers of a cohort of 9,945 boys born in Philadelphia in 1945 from birth until age 18. The most widely recognized finding of this research was the identification of the "chronic offender": today referred to as "the chronic 6 percent": a group of 627 boys from the total sample were responsible for 52 percent of all the offenses committed by the cohort.

Today, criminologists increasingly focus their research on desistance from crime or strategies for deterrence from crime rather than recidivism. The contemporary thinking is that by focusing on recidivism, or why people repeatedly engage in behaviors that return them to prison, we fail to consider the factors that lead people away from criminal careers. *Desistance* is conceptualized as the causal process by which people cease engagement in criminal activity. Most popular in current criminology are developmental theories that consider criminal careers across the life span. This research asks why and how people first engage in, continue in, and eventually terminate criminal activities. Crime deterrence strategies are popular with the law enforcement community and by proponents of the rational choice theories in criminology. In this view, people who engage in crime are rational actors who choose to break the law after weighing the costs of benefits of such behavior. The theory, in keeping with classical theories in criminology, assumes that the threat of punishment will influence and control decisions to engage in crime. One model in particular, specific deterrence, advocates meting out harsh punishment for people convicted of crime, arguing that severe sanctions will ensure that people who commit a crime and pay a high price for that deed will not repeat an offense.

Unfortunately, research finds that people who serve prison sentences do not have lower recidivism rates than people who serve more lenient community service sentences for the same or similar crimes, particularly in the case of white-collar criminals. In some instances, harsh sanctions have also provoked defiance instead of deterrence. The more times a person has been in prison, the more likely that person will return to incarceration within a year of release.

U.S. public policy now focuses on incapacitation, supplanting the goal of rehabilitation, since apprehension and punishment have had little effect on chronic offenders. The problem with this approach is that no confirmation exists that such policies as mandatory sentencing for violent or drug-related crimes and "three strikes" policies either reduce the crime rate or incarcerate only a small percentage of people who commit the most crimes.

With more than 7 million people under some sort of correctional control in 2005, and more than 2 million people incarcerated, approximately 600,000 people are released from U.S. prisons each year. In a process called "reentry," persons released from prison often return to live in the neighborhoods they left when they were arrested. Access to employment upon release is one important factor in desistance from crime. Unfortunately, funding for reentry programs fails to meet the demand, thus perpetuating the phenomenon of the revolving door of prison.

Michelle Ronda

See also Crime; Crime Rates; Deterrence Programs; Incarceration, Societal Implications; Misdemeanor; Parole; Prison; Probation; Rational Choice Theory; Rehabilitation; Three Strikes Laws; White-Collar Crime

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Redistricting, Congressional Districts

Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution calls for representation to the House of Representatives to be apportioned among the states according to the respective number of individuals residing in each state. The initial apportionment, or assigning of seats to individual states, gave 10 districts to Virginia, 8 to Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, 6 to Maryland and New York, 5 to Connecticut, North Carolina, and South Carolina, 4 to New Jersey, 3 to New Hampshire and Georgia, and 1 each to Rhode Island and Delaware. For subsequent Congresses after 1790 and then repeated every 10 years, the enumeration has relied on a census of the population. The census is an actual count, rather than a sample, of every person—citizen and noncitizen alike—residing in each of the states. As such, the danger exists of some groups of people undercounted or others overcounted.

The Constitution as originally written called for one district for roughly every 30,000 residents and a guarantee of at least one representative per state. Elections were to be held every 2 years in the districts to elect members who would then serve in the House of Representatives. Unlike the Senate, vacancies due to death or resignation must be filled by a special election, not by appointment.

Apportionment

Over time, the number of districts increased as the population grew and new states entered the Union. In 1911, Congress arbitrarily set the total number of congressional districts at 435, and states would thereafter gain or lose representation in the House based on relative population growth or decline. The House temporarily increased to 437 seats when Hawaii and Alaska entered the Union.

Once the census is complete, each state is initially assigned one representative irrespective of population. Then, since 1941, the rest of the 385 seats are distributed according to the "method of equal proportions." According to the U.S. Census Bureau, this system ranks the states by assigning a priority value calculated by dividing the population of each state by the geometric mean of its current and next seats. The 51st district is then assigned to the state with the highest priority value, and the process is repeated until all

435 districts have been distributed. Prior to 1941, different methods were used, and states stood to gain or lose seats depending on which method Congress employed to assign districts. When the size of the House was initially capped at 435 members, the average district size was 210,000 persons. As of the 2000 census, there were about 650,000 residents per congressional district.

Redistricting

The practice of drawing district lines for political (or other) gain has been around since Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts sketched the first gerrymander around 1810. However, most modern redistricting is shaped by a trio of Supreme Court cases from the 1960s. In 1962, the court ruled in *Baker v. Carr* that the drawing of districts was in fact open to judicial interpretation. Two years later, in *Reynolds v. Sims*, the resulting "one-man one-vote" doctrine required the populations of legislative districts to be as equal as practicable. This standard was then applied to congressional districts in the 1964 case *Wesberry v. Sanders.* Afterward, nearly every state with more than one district was forced to redistrict to comply with the new rulings.

Redistricting plans can be either *partisan* or *bipartisan* and are implemented by state governments, redistricting commissions, or the courts. Partisan gerrymandering, which has the goal of attempting to remove as many minority party incumbents as possible, strengthens the average electoral security of some minority party incumbents while causing others to lose their seats. The idea is that greater safety for a few minority party members leads to a less efficient use of their political power overall. This procedure causes the minority party as a whole to be worse off (as measured in terms of the effective number of wasted votes), since they are "packed" into highly partisan districts, while at the same time making individual members more secure. Bipartisan plans, which generally occur under divided government, strive to make incumbents of both parties as safe as possible.

Unlike legislatures, redistricting commissions and courts are not subject to the same electoral and institutional constraints in the districting process. For example, commissioners are often not elected officials and, in some cases, are not even allowed to hold elected office for several years after the districting cycle. This in turn weakens their ties to voters and the party since they are not beholden to either group as a result of the "one-shot" nature of the redistricting process. However, in other instances, commissions are made up of members of the state legislatures and representatives from the governor's office. When commissions are independent from the legislature, the districts they draw can differ from those drawn when the commission is made up of elected officials.

While one cannot expect judges or commissioners to always behave in a nonpartisan fashion, their means of selection makes it less likely that they will be susceptible to influence from the political parties compared to the behavior of elected representatives. In addition to electoral factors, commissions are also subject to a variety of institutional constraints in terms of the redistricting process. For instance, commission-drawn plans and their underlying goals may vary for states that employ these mechanisms in redrawing district lines. Among states employing commissions for the purpose of redistricting, variations persist in terms of tie-breaking rules, overriding objectives, and deadlines for submitting completed plans. At other times, commissions may get involved in the districting process only when the legislature and the governor cannot agree on a plan by the specified deadline. If good government groups get their way, we might expect to see more districts drawn by commissions rather than legislatures in the future.

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See also Gerrymandering; Special Interest Groups; Voter Apathy

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Redistricting, School Districts

The term *school redistricting* refers to the redrawing of school district boundaries, typically with the intent to increase student diversity. As such, it is one of several methods for reallocating students and resources

within the educational system of a geographic area. In recent years, redistricting typically sought to redress the various inequalities stemming from the residential segregation of students by race, ethnicity, and class. Unlike political redistricting, which typically seeks to consolidate the power of a single interest by decreasing voter diversity within a political boundary, school redistricting usually seeks to equalize student performance by increasing student diversity within an educational boundary.

The structural issue at the heart of school redistricting is the U.S. system of local funding for public schools. Because Americans exhibit a high degree of residential segregation by class, local funding tends to relegate children from the least materially advantaged backgrounds to schools with lower per-pupil expenditures, while more privileged students tend to live in areas with higher per-pupil spending. Higher per-pupil spending correlates with the ability to attract more experienced and qualified teachers, better infrastructure, better and more extensive technological resources, and more diverse programs for assisting students occupying a broad spectrum of abilities and needs, which in turn produce better student outcomes on measures such as grades, graduation rates, standardized test scores, and college attendance rates.

While other methods of student redistribution (such as voucher programs) address the problems of geographic disparities in funding by making per-pupil school funds portable to other school districts and/or to private and parochial schools on a strictly voluntary basis, school redistricting instead addresses the problem by redrawing the boundaries themselves. As such, redistricting ameliorates the problem of selectively helping only those of the best abilities or motivation; however, redistricting necessarily entails an involuntary redistribution of students and resources across unequal school contexts, a zero-sum game that is almost universally unpopular.

Adding to the politically and emotionally charged nature of school redistricting is the issue of unequal educational access and outcomes by race. De jure public school segregation, ending with the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of 1954, gave way to de facto segregation that persists to this day, abetted by continued residential segregation and persistent inequalities of power and resources.

In the past, a natural racial division legitimized segregation, reflecting the preferences of parents and students of all racial groups. More recent arguments against attempts to ameliorate segregation by redistricting supplant the racial logic of segregation—that is, that students prefer to associate with members of their own racial group—and replace it with a class-based (albeit still heavily racialized) logic that attempts to justify segregation on behalf of minority students as well as poor and working-class whites by invoking students' preferences and abilities. First, it is argued that lower-status students would not be well served in school settings with a large proportion of privileged students, because they will feel their own difference more acutely and thus be at a social disadvantage. Second, because some students are coming from inferior schools and thus are more likely to need remedial academic services, combining them with more privileged students will increase the academic diversity of schools to the disadvantage of students at either extreme of the spectrum of academic abilities. Upper-middle-class parents may spearhead efforts to maintain class-distinct schools, but the underlying logic of different social preferences and abilities compels both professional-class and working-class parents to resist efforts at redistricting.

When redistricting attempts to address both race and class disparities, the actions and preferences of parents and administrators become complicated, as illustrated by the recent case in Omaha, Nebraska. An amendment to legislation reiterating the boundaries of the Omaha school system in 2006 divided the system into three districts on racial-ethnic lines (one white district, one black district, one Latino/a district). Supporters of this redistricting effort, among them Nebraska's sole African American legislator (who authored the amendment), asserted that it would restore local control of student education, increasing the power of black parents and educators to oversee and control the education of their own children. Critics of the move were incensed by the explicitly racial character of the schools and felt that it could not help but impoverish the identifiably minority schools through the continuation of administrative negligence of minority students. Additionally, they pointed to the designations of "our" children as a racial designation as making racial divisions in the city more concrete. Almost immediately, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) moved to block the implementation of the law by filing suit in federal court on the grounds that it violated the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* that ruled against the principle of "separate but equal" educational facilities; later that year, an injunction from the district

court temporarily halted the implementation of the law, which is scheduled to take effect in 2008.

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See also Education, Academic Performance; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; School Funding; School Vouchers; Segregation; Segregation, Residential

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Redlining

Redlining primarily refers to an illegal discriminatory practice by real estate lenders or insurance companies who decide that certain areas are high-risk investments. Despite strong credit qualifications of would-be borrowers, lenders refuse to give mortgages to buyers wanting to purchase properties in those designated areas or to give building improvement loans to the current owners. Similarly, insurance companies redline when they refuse to issue property insurance policies to applicants who live in those areas. The term is also used when large supermarkets abandon low-income communities, leaving residents with limited access to affordable, quality food.

Redlining originated in 1935 when the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, at the request of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, created "residential security maps" between 1935 and 1940 to identify the level of risk for real estate investment in 239 U.S. cities. It put out maps with underwriting guides that were color-coded as A (blue), B (green), C (yellow), and D (red) levels of credit worthiness. "Type A" neighborhoods were the most affluent, while "Type D" neighborhoods were the highest-risk, low-income, and often predominantly black neighborhoods.

Even more influential than the maps, which had a limited distribution, was the Federal Housing Administration's *Underwriting Manual*, whose biased appraisal guidelines lenders had to follow if they wanted to receive FHA insurance. Whatever its cause, redlining played a role in the decay of America's cities in the mid-20th century with frequent denial of funds for improvement and/or redevelopment.

In the 1960s, consumer activists in Chicago spearheaded reform, and congressional scrutiny led to corrective legislative action: the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 was intended to end all redlining practices by requiring banks to apply the same lending standards in all neighborhoods. Critics contend, however, that such discrimination persists.

After a six-month investigation of 24 million mortgage records and 200 interviews, *U.S. News & World Report* in 1995 reported the continuance of redlining, prompted in large measure by urban crime, vandalism, and declining property values. As a result, poor and minority homeowners were 50 percent less likely to secure full-coverage property insurance than the residents living in predominantly white, middle-class areas. Seven years later, a 2002 study—after controlling for business size and credit quality, industrial mix, and neighborhood income—revealed that small businesses in black neighborhoods still received fewer loans. A 2003 study also reported the continuance of racial profiling in the banking and insurance industries. Though not as blatant or prevalent today, evidence suggests the continued presence of redlining.

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See also Discrimination; Economic Development; Urban Decline; Urban Renewal

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REFUGEES

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently recognizes 27 million persons as refugees (persons who have sought refuge across national boundaries) and another 26 million as internally displaced persons (IDPs) (persons who have sought refuge within their own countries). These people have fled war and political persecution based on ethnicity, religion, or race. Sometimes refugees result from natural disasters that force the migration of people into regions away from their homes. The Geneva Convention of 1951 defines a *refugee* as one who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted . . . is [living] outside [their] country of nationality." Advocates for refugees suggest the broadening of the convention definition to include IDPs.

Most of the world's displaced persons (refugees and IDPs) are found in Africa, Asia, and Europe, with a disproportionate number in the developing world. Ninety per cent of war refugees exist in the developing world, with the poorest countries—such as Malawi, Pakistan, and Zaire—harboring that same percentage. In 1999, about 9 million refugees existed in Africa, as a result of conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan. Asia harbors 8 million refugees who fled political persecution and war in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Palestine. In Europe, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Caucasus region (Armenia and Georgia) resulted in the creation of 8 million refugees. Significant numbers of IDPs are in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Algeria, Ghana, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, India, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Croatia.

A significant cause of the refugee crisis around the world is ethnic, political, and military conflicts fostered by the process and ideology of nation and state building. For example, the partitioning (boundary revising) of Africa by Europeans at the 1878 Berlin Conference ignored the territorial and ethnic collectivities of African social groups, thereby dividing traditional ethnic communities and encompassing socially distant African communities into a common territory ("nation"). This nation-building process set off conflict between the dominating colonial governments and the subjected Africans, as well as conflict between culturally different ethnics forced to live together in the arbitrarily drawn African nations.

Throughout the 20th century, the conflict between the colonized Africans and European colonizers manifested into the major African independence movements of countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Mozambique and exacerbated the conflict between the culturally diverse Africans living within the same territorial and political boundaries. An example of this bi-ethnic conflict is the ongoing war between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. The mass slaughters in 1994 of Tutsis by Hutus resulted in a forced migration of millions of Rwandans into Zaire, Burundi, and Uganda.

Although the ideology of nationalism assumes the right of nations to protect their people ("citizens"), its extreme version often creates a refugee crisis. In the 20th century, for example, ethnic nationalists interpreted this vying for nationhood as a right to expulsion, abuse, genocide, exclusion, and political persecution, leading many people to flee into neighboring countries.

The Phases of the Refugee Experience

A common framework in the study of refugees is the delineation and characterization of phases in the refugee experience. The *pre-flight* phase involves economic hardship and social disruption caused by war and political persecution. During this phase, by stealing livestock, closing down stores, and threatening violence, enemy soldiers undermine residents' ability to make a living. Schools close, family members are killed, and people are forced to leave their homes and become refugees. Characterizing the *flight* phase of the refugee experience is emotional turmoil caused by an uncertain future, a longing for the culture left behind, the sometimes impersonal interrogation of UNHCR interviewers, and the harsh conditions of the passage to the country of asylum. Women are especially vulnerable to violence and rape during this phase.

Next is the *settlement* phase; at this time, governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or

international agencies guide the refugees to settle in the country of asylum. Often, for example, in sub-Saharan Africa, refugees are settled in the camps of border countries or choose to "self-settle" there as farmers seeking to integrate with the indigenous population. Generally, self-settlers fare better economically and socially than the camp refugees, who develop identities based on a sense of victimization and dependence vis-à-vis the helping nations and agencies. Some refugees remain in camps for more than 5 years.

In the last phase, *resettlement*, the government or nongovernment entities might place the refugees in a third country of asylum (often a neighboring country) or help to repatriate them into their home countries. Repatriation is the most durable and cost-effective solution to the refugee crisis. Except for the refugees for whom repatriation is a viable option, cultural conflict, employment difficulties, and prejudice characterize the experiences of refugees in the resettlement phase.

Refugee Children

According to the United Nations' 1996 report, *Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, women and children constitute the majority of displaced persons (refugees and IDPs). Likewise, the Beijing Platform for Action recognized that 80 percent of the world's refugees and IDPs are women and children. Children make up the largest age group in refugee camp populations, and half of these children are under the age of 16.

Refugee children—traumatized by war and sometimes separated from their parents or orphaned—arrive in countries of asylum undernourished, sick, dehydrated, and sometimes maimed by the landmines often used in contemporary warfare. A 1996 UN Children's Fund report identified 1 million such children, reporting that 5 percent of the refugee population consists of "unaccompanied" children. The disruption of refugee children's familial, religious, and school networks undermines their developing sense of community, identity, and safety. NGOs attempt to join children separated from their parents with distant relatives or organize them into groups under the watchful eye of a benevolent local community. Studies show that refugee children cope best with the experience of conflict and forced migration when they have family and peer support, a personality that is goal oriented and sociable, and when camp practices reflect sensitivity to the emotional and social needs of children.

Refugee Women

The 1985 Nairobi Conference, 1970s UN Decade for Women, Fourth UN World Conference on Women, Beijing Conference on Women, and the UNHCR's 1991 *Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women* all highlighted the sexual violence, economic inequality, and human rights violations that refugee women experience. Mozambican, Ethiopian, and Thai refugee women have told their stories of forced prostitution, sexual favors, and domestic violence. In Djibouti, border guards, policemen, or soldiers raped Eritrean and Ethiopian refugee women. At peril is the physical safety of women who must walk through desolate and long paths to collect food or fetch water. Refugee women legitimately claiming their share of food relief often come into conflict with local men who disproportionately keep greater shares for themselves. Men taking over most of the income-producing work in the camps displaced Eritrean refugee women from their traditional and income-generating roles.

Advocates for refugee women interpret the sexual violence, economic inequality, and persecution of these displaced women as human rights violations resulting from gender bias and male dominance. On the policy level, advocates suggest the managing and control of food relief distribution, spatial camp designs that foster the physical safety of women, and broadening the international definition of persecuted groups to include women.

Vaso Thomas

See also Immigration; Migration, Global; Nation Building; Repatriation; Resettlement

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REHABILITATION

Whether one is talking about the latest actor, politician, or average person, the term *rehabilitation* is likely to pop up in casual conversation. This is testimony to how quickly the term has entered the pop culture lexicon. Partially because of this, it is difficult to disentangle the different meanings associated with it. After all, everyone has a feeling that rehabilitation cures something. That "something," however, can range from substance addiction to any number of social problems. This variation occurs in the social scientific community as well, partly because of the link between rehabilitation and disability as social constructs.

Like rehabilitation, *disability* has several definitions. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act defines *disability* as difficulty in performing expected tasks. Using that definition, disability affects 12.6 percent of all working-age adults in the United States. Additionally, the number of days with some role impairment varies by condition. Seven of the top 10 leading causes of role impairment in the United States are physical illnesses, while three are mental illnesses.

Despite the various uses of rehabilitation in both popular culture and the social problems literature, most experts agree that the goal of rehabilitation is to return a body, individual or social, to a condition of health and well-being. What marks a social scientific approach to its study as a social problem is the focus on how social factors and culture make the rehabilitative process problematic for different societal groups.

Rehabilitation Perspectives

In the social sciences, a diversity of analytic and theoretical models of rehabilitation exists. Some contemporary research focuses on how discourse constructs rehabilitation, while others focus more broadly on processes of social construction. Given this dichotomy, offering a single summation of rehabilitation as a social problem is difficult. What complicates matters even more is the scope of much research in the field. Some focus on the psychological state of those who experience rehabilitation, while others focus on the effects of group dynamics on the rehabilitation process. Also, much research focuses on specific types of rehabilitation, while other research focuses on rehabilitation as a more general process. As a result, research on rehabilitation as a social problem developed concepts that focus both on specific rehabilitation practices and theories and on rehabilitation itself. That division points to some fundamental questions. For example, is vocational rehabilitation as a social problem the same as it is for substance abuse rehabilitation? How similar are the constructions of rehabilitation as a social problem for the mentally ill and the physically impaired? How might they differ?

Traditional views of rehabilitation as a social problem often led to building models that identified the different stages individuals move through to adapt to their disability or addiction. Problems arise when individuals are stuck in one stage or another. Such an approach is based on a medical model that defines disability and addiction as illness. The Americans with Disabilities Act has such a model at its base. However, many rehabilitation researchers have increasingly abandoned this stage modeling approach in favor of a quality of life perspective that focuses on an expanded conception of adaptation and life satisfaction.

Developed in part as a rejection of the medical model of disability, the quality of life perspective comes in large part from social psychologists. Their studies focus on the impact of the rehabilitation process on the self. Research in this tradition draws attention to the multidimensionality of the self and its social construction, focusing on issues of self-esteem, stigma, self-concept, mastery, and the like. These models highlight a social constructionist approach and make the case that rehabilitation, as a social problem, affects not only the person undergoing rehabilitation but also the assorted social relationships in the environment in which the rehabilitation occurs.

Rehabilitation and Criminology

Rehabilitation has had a long history among criminologists. The criminological view loosely defines *rehabilitation* as providing treatment that will allow ex-offenders back into society without the risk of future criminal behavior. This perspective has been

criticized as a theoretical "blind alley," lacking in empirical support and opposed by research findings that suggest the impossibility of reforming criminals. Recently some have argued that rehabilitation as treatment is again in ascendancy and displacing competing views offered by labeling, social constructionist, and critical perspectives.

Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation from drugs or alcohol has received a great deal of attention by both the lay public and social scientists. This is largely because of the extent and variety of social problems associated with drug addiction and alcoholism. Family disruption, lost lives, ruined careers, and antisocial behavior are often by-products of substance abuse. According to the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, more people die and are disabled from substance abuse each year than from any other cause.

In counterdistinction to other rehabilitative treatments, rehabilitation of the alcoholic or addict is likely to take place in self-help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. Not only are these groups fairly successful in their efforts, but they have become household names and now serve as rehabilitative models for treatment of other conditions, ranging from anger to sexual addiction. These groups, often alone but sometimes in combination with medical treatment centers, have as their focus the holistic treatment of the alcoholic or addict consistent with the quality of life and social constructionist perspective. Their goal is to make whole both the addicted persons and their relationships through a recovery process that recognizes how each is embedded in the other. Key to this process is the reintegration of the individual back into the group by requiring the addict or alcoholic to make amends for past wrongful behavior.

Critical Perspectives on Rehabilitation as a Social Problem

Critical social scientists, including some criminologists concerned with issues of domination and inequality, raise the possibility that rehabilitation as treatment and diagnosis can subordinate groups by providing rationale for increased levels of surveillance and social control. Here rehabilitation as a social problem emanates from unequal power relations in society and the capacity of powerful groups to label the behavior of subordinate groups as problematic. From this perspective, rehabilitation serves as a mechanism of social control by hiding the impact of class, race, and gender on relatively powerless groups through its common focus on individual behavior. One example is the different penalties attached to drugs of choice by blacks before the 2007 Supreme Court ruling ended this disparity.

A Rehabilitation Industry?

The individual deficit model implicit in most rehabilitation therapy is also problematic from a social science frame, because it creates experts, therapists, and treatment expertise. From this perspective, as therapists come to define the rehabilitation process, they simultaneously create criteria to define its boundaries and assessment measures of success. One result has been the growth of a rehabilitation industry. The rehabilitation industry relies on creating disabilities and their treatment. This transformation of rehabilitation from treatment to commodity has had a dual impact: the development of a popular industry of rehabilitation and the proliferation of the number and types of rehabilitation. Both trends culminate in the ability of individuals to self-diagnose their condition and to choose a suitable rehabilitation treatment. Selling rehabilitation as a product leads to an estrangement of self by producing a body constantly in need of repair and one that is not quite sure of its normality, health, and happiness.

Associated with promoting rehabilitation through self-help programs and books is a culture and style of life that in turn defines the rehabilitation process. One aspect of this culture is that those who have a condition of disability cannot cure it. The goal is to manage the condition. This approach thus reinforces an individual deficit model of disability—a medical model of sickness. However, constructing "recovery" from the condition is social treatment, often entailing the adherence to new norms and reestablishing status in relevant social networks. The degree that this "spoiled" identity is negotiated determines the social integration of the individual but is not the main criterion for rehabilitative success. Success is defined by ending the problematic behavior and making amends to others for the damage caused by that behavior.

Growth in the rehabilitation industry as a social problem encapsulates many of the themes discussed. A focus on the self and the structural context that

informs it will remain vital to the study of rehabilitation as a social problem. Accordingly, stigma, self-esteem, treatment, and inequality will continue to occupy attention in its study.

Garry L. Rolison

See also Addiction; Alcoholism; Chronic Diseases; Crime; Disability and Disabled; Drug Abuse; Mental Health

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Relative Deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation proposes that people view their well-being as compared to the situations of others. If individuals perceive themselves to be worse off than their comparison (reference) group, then they will feel relatively deprived. This is opposed to absolute deprivation, in which a person measures his or her well-being against an objective standard. Relative deprivation theory has been used extensively in fields such as sociology, political science, economics, and social psychology.

Samuel Stouffer coined the term *relative deprivation* in his study of the U.S. military, although the concept predates his work. Stouffer found that members of the U.S. Air Force who did not get promoted felt more relatively deprived than those in the U.S. Army who did not. This resulted from more frequent promotions in the Air Force than in the Army and military personnel viewing their own situations as compared to others around them. The first in-depth exposition of the theory of relative deprivation was the work of Walter Runciman, who gave the conditions for relative deprivation to occur and laid the foundations for its applications to criminology and other fields. His conditions for person A to feel relatively deprived of X are as follows:

- Individual A does not have X.
- Individual A knows of other persons who have X.
- Individual A wants to have X.
- Individual A believes obtaining X is realistic.

The most widespread use of relative deprivation theory in sociology is in criminology. Because some areas or countries with lower levels of absolute deprivation have higher crime rates, experts argue that inequality in the United States has led to increased crime for reasons of both opportunity and mass anger. The "opportunity" aspect of crime arises from inequality creating more opportunities for lucrative property crimes by poor individuals. The "mass anger" hypothesis seeks to explain violent crime as a result of feelings of relative deprivation fostered by increasing inequality.

Sociology and political science also use relative deprivation to explain social movements and revolutions. This work began in the early 1800s with Alexis de Toequeville's work on France and Germany. He found that one of the reasons for a revolution occurring in France but not in Germany was that the social conditions had been improving for the French (but not the German) peasantry. The improving situation in France raised the expectations of French peasants, and when these expectations were not fulfilled, the French Revolution followed. This type of process is known as a "revolution of rising expectations." Such revolutions are a concern in countries like China that are experiencing rapidly rising expectations. If economic growth and social progress stalls in China, social unrest may occur.

Relative deprivation can explain social movements in general. Social movements occur when individuals believe they are not getting their fair share of political or economic power, especially in a time when others are making gains. In fact, this problem worsens when conditions improve in a country, as one group feels relatively deprived because another group's situation improves more than their own. For example, some analysts have used this theory to explain the civil rights movement (with regard to voting), the women's

rights movement (with regard to equal wages), equal rights demands by gay and lesbian groups, and the "living wage" movement. One of the problems with this theory is that it fails to explain why some groups of relatively deprived people form social movements and others do not.

Economists also have many uses for the theory of relative deprivation. The relative income hypothesis, for example, proposes that individuals' consumption is based on that of their peers or neighbors, which can have the negative effect of people spending more than their incomes can support and result in unsustainable levels of debt. The common phrase "keeping up with the Joneses," taken from a comic strip in the early 1900s in which a couple tried to keep up with the luxurious lifestyle of their neighbors, typifies this concept. John Maynard Keynes applied relative deprivation to his theory of how workers react to changes in wages, proposing that workers resist cuts in real wages specific to either them or their industry, but not ones that affect all workers. Some analysts have even used relative deprivation to explain why people move; individuals feel deprived if they are poorer than their neighbors. Relative deprivation also served as a basis to construct new poverty indexes based on incomes relative to median household income, not on absolute standards.

Michael A. Quinn

See also Class Consciousness; Conflict Perspective; Crime; Poverty; Social Movements; Social Revolutions

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Religion, Civil

Civil religion in the United States is a concept most closely associated with Robert N. Bellah, whose 1967 seminal work argued that a "religion"—separate and distinct from church or synagogue—provides the unifying civil underpinning that bonds and guides U.S. society. According to this argument, a "biblical republicanism" was expressed from the outset in the conviction that the Creator gave inalienable rights to be realized and protected by these United States and a higher, sacred force continues to permeate, evoked by the words and rituals that celebrate and reaffirm the nation. The founders, the protectors, the martyrs—Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr.—inhabit the pantheon, with the defining events memorialized and re-created in communities throughout the country, thereby institutionalizing the history and values that serve to form the cultural union.

As with so many foundational concepts in the United States, civil religion has its philosophical and political roots in Enlightenment thought. The "civil religion" of Rousseau's *Social Contract* included belief in God—and rewards and punishment as sanctions to safeguard desired norms. Montesquieu argued that virtue was essential to a republic—both flowing from and creating love of country. The "Creator," "Nature," "God" of social contracts, however, was deistic and not explicitly a Christian god. While Christianity—indeed Protestantism—was indisputably the dominant and dominating religion of the minority who were "churched" in early America, civil religion turns to a god of morals and oaths and battles, leaving the particulars of Christ to private worship. The exceptional secularism of the United States—its dual clause of freedom from religious dominance and freedom to exercise religious beliefs—uniquely enabled the a-specific nature of this moral force while nurturing its strength.

The sociological roots for civil religion rest firmly with Émile Durkheim, who posited that religion was both the product and the producer of social cohesion. In *The Elementary Forms of the Religious*

Life, Durkheim argued that the sacred is something "added to and above" the real—an ideal above the profane world in which humans function, but of their own thought and making. According to Bellah, U.S. civil religion provides the ideal, the sacred authority and imperatives that function above the mere "will of the people." America is for truth, justice, freedom, equality . . . ideals above the politically profane.

The shape and content of U.S. civil religion inevitably changed and re-formed itself over time. Its religiously nonparticular nature enabled this accommodation. U.S. civil religion is, on the other hand, not aggressively secular. It is not a "cult of state" that eschews allegiance to all but itself rather than protecting against the pull of religion (as with French *laïcité*); it in fact assumes religion. The question of the day, however, is, does it assume—or can it accommodate—the episodic surges in diversity and intensity of the cultural and religious allegiances existing outside of but pressing upon the public realm?

Peter Berger's "sacred canopy" suggests that, as competing ideas are taken up, the enveloping tent of unified values and beliefs weakens and tears. Over time, waves of immigration and shifts in the geographic and cultural origins of that immigration have challenged the fabric of civil religion as well. A nation of Protestants has become a nation of Protestants (and Evangelical Protestants) and Catholics and Jews and Muslims and Hindus and Buddhists and Wiccans and so on—with atheists and agnostics in good measure as well. And a "melting pot" nation defined by Northern European culture is redefining itself in a veritable eddy of races, ethnicities, and religious traditions. The traditions Durkheim looked to as transmissions of culture from one generation to the next are now as competitive as they are unifying. The "they" out there—shared enemies of World Wars I and II and the cold war, which fanned the unifying forces of conflict—are less clear. The unifying ceremonies and mourning triggered by the attacks of September 11, 2001, remain in flag displays and car decals, but they too are losing their grip as some of "us" are so easily mistaken for "them." Recent research on today's "second generation" notes that the children of immigrants are not quick to identify themselves as Americans—a label they identify with a white bread existence they do not share.

How, in the face of these changes, these tugs on the canopy, does civil religion continue to be the glue of social cohesion? The specifics of the "higher power" must become vaguer and vaguer as competing religions vie for space in the public realm—the specifics of the culture and values likewise being heatedly debated. Social dynamics as problematic as these compel a rephrasing of Durkheim from declaration to question: If the old gods of civil religion are "dead or dying," are there "new ones yet to be born"?

Emily H. Mahon

See also Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Religious Prejudice

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Religion and Conflict

Conflict and religion both are ubiquitous social processes, but at first they may appear to be autonomous, even contradictory, social processes: Conflict presumes division, distress, and discord; religion presumes cohesion, tranquility, and peace. However, conflict can also be integrative and religion can move actors to challenge and overturn the social and political order. Consequently, following Lewis Coser's observation that all social life "always involves harmony *and* conflict, attraction *and* compulsion, love *and* hatred," analysis reveals a similar dichotomous affinity between conflict and religion, one that can be observed at all levels of the social structure: individuals, groups, social classes, societies, and civilizations.

Individuals

Recognizing that religious action has an individual as well as a social component, Sigmund Freud locates the very origins of religion in a primordial conflict between a human being's instinctual impulses and the necessary restraints each person must impose on his or her expression to gain membership in an accepting and orderly social world. The gods and religion enter to compensate individuals "for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in common has imposed on them." But religion at the same time disquiets them with its normative demands. In past ages, religious imperatives moved the likes of Arjuna, Siddhartha, Confucius, Muhammad, Ignatius Loyola, and countless others to disregard prevailing worldly or profane logics to exert themselves to conform the ways of the world to the demands of the sacred as they understood it. Similarly, in modern times, it is the felt force of compelling normative directives that, for example, oblige a pharmacist to refuse to honor a prescription for the "morning-after" contraceptive because of its putative abortifacient qualities.

Finally, religion as an agent of both social conflict and social integration at the level of individuals exists in Santería as practiced among many of Latino/a heritage in the United States. Santería had its origins in a syncretic amalgam of the religion of the Yoruba people of West Africa brought as slaves to Cuba and the Catholic religion that the Spanish slave owners imposed on them. Centuries later, carried on the waves of the Cuban diaspora in the latter half of the 20th century, Santería's appeal widened to encompass other groups, particularly other Spanish-speaking U.S. immigrant communities. Taking refuge in the spells and magical practices of Bruharía, the dark side of Afro-Cuban religion, served to relieve tensions arising out of interpersonal disagreements and hostilities; and the traditional religious practices and meanings of Santería, once established in the new land, served to restore a sense of cultural coherence to members of these communities amid the anomie of their marginalized social status.

Groups

When conflict and religion intersect at the level of communities embedded within larger, more encompassing societal configurations, it can occur either within such groups or between them.

Within-Group Conflict

Early Christianity was fragmented by widely divergent understandings of what could legitimately be accepted as orthodox and what should be condemned as heresy. Absent any means of arbitration, each body thought its version was "the truth" and had its own scriptures to back up its claims. The struggle among groups adhering to these varieties of belief—Ebionites, Marcionites, Gnostics, and, last, those that came to be accepted as orthodox—endured until the fourth century, when a clerical hierarchy under the church at Rome achieved the dominance necessary to promulgate an authoritative canon of scripture and formulate statements of faith to which all believers must adhere. Those who continued to hold to beliefs that were not assimilated into the newly proclaimed orthodoxy were regarded as deviants and were relegated to the outgroup; the ingroup found strengthened cohesion in its sense of doctrinal purity.

Between-Group Conflict

While acting out division, between-group conflict concurrently increases the antagonists' intragroup cohesion by reinforcing unity of purpose in the face of assault on the group's boundaries. Illustrative of this process is U.S. politics, which, according to many analysts, beginning in the last quarter of the 20th century and running into the first decade of the 21st, has become increasingly polarized, and in which the two main political parties have become ideologically both more homogenous and more adversarial.

Marking much of the division between the parties is its manifestly religious coloring, although many of the issues separating the parties, on their face, are religiously neutral. Often gathered under umbrella terms like "family values," battle lines are drawn over controversies such as contraception, abortion, and end-of-life decisions; prayer in schools and school vouchers; evolution and embryonic stem cell research; homosexuality, same-sex marriages, and premarital sex; and feminism and capital punishment. On none of these matters are normative postures based on explicit scriptural warrants, nor do they come with traditional doctrinal formulations. However, each is fraught, at the level of culture, with unresolved disputes as to life's origin and end, its nature and meaning, and appropriate ethical organization of the social world during the span that bridges life's alpha and omega.

The growing conflict and polarization between the parties is a consequence of intensifying cohesion as each group faces off against a threatening enemy. The political right sees giving any ground to the left on what it considers core moral norms as another step on a slippery slope to moral relativism. The political left sees subjecting the progress of reason and science to limits arising out of the right's position on contested matters to be little more than surrender of social progress to atavistic superstition. Each group strives to make its norms prevail in the broader community at a time of anomie when governing social norms appear to be ambiguous or changing in ways thought undesirable by the contending parties.

Classes

The concept of class conflict—a specific type of between-group conflict that served as the motive force for social change in his theory of history and society—was Karl Marx's legacy to sociology. Perhaps the most important significance of religion in Marx's notion of class conflict is indirect. Ludwig Feuerbach argued in *The Essence of Christianity* that it is not God who created man, but man who created God; that humans are ruled by their own creations, not by an independent, all-powerful God. Marx later took this insight of Feuerbach and concluded that, if the structures of society (state, economy) that eviscerate vast swathes of humankind are the product of human action, then human action (revolution) can change them.

In the *Social Principles of Christianity,* Marx spoke directly to the relation between religion and the class struggle: the ruling class uses religion as an ideological device to suppress the underclass. In what is perhaps Marx's most oft-quoted comment on religion, he wrote in *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* that religion "is the opium of the people." He exhorted the working class to reject their false consciousness, to refrain from taking refuge in the promises of happiness in an afterlife, and instead focus on the realities of their current circumstances and the causes of their misery, and act to change them.

It is an ironic twist in the history of ideas that it was local Catholic bishops in Latin America along with their lower clergy (as the principal theorists and practitioners of liberation theology) who responded to Marx's exhortation in *Critique.* They counseled the poor and oppressed to reflect on the conditions of their lives, and, by growing in understanding that God does not will it thus, to recognize their state of dependency and oppression and to develop the capacity among themselves to act rationally and self-reliantly to alter that reality. However, in yet another example of within-group conflict, by the late 1980s the Roman Catholic Church's governing hierarchy reined in the movement for fear that it threatened its own legitimacy.

Societies

War is the ultimate social conflict. As does conflict at other levels in the social order, war intersects with religion. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, now over half a century in duration, is an example: two peoples, each self-identified as followers of an Abrahimic religion, engage in deadly pursuit of incompatible goals. Israel's goal in the struggle is to guarantee the security of its borders as a nation-state within the territory of the former League of Nations mandate for Palestine. By contrast, Palestinians seek precisely to eliminate not individual Israelis but Israel as a nation-state within traditional "Palastina."

Through the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel united Jerusalem as its capital and increased the territory under its control by three and a half times its original size. Since then, various initiatives sought final resolution of the conflict in terms of a land-for-peace principle: assuming that both parties wanted peace, Israel would exchange territories captured in the war for guarantees from the neighboring Arab states that Israel would be secure within its borders. While Egypt and Jordan negotiated individual treaties of peace with Israel, the central conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people has remained without resolution. The land-for-peace principle does not permit resolution of their conflict because the combatants' goals are incompatible.

Internal politics make it untenable for Israel even to consider sharing Jerusalem, and the same politics require Israeli leaders to equivocate about surrendering the West Bank, the covenanted lands of Samaria and Judea, to a Palestinian state. Conversely Palestinians developed a sacralized political claim on the land as a driving force in their emergent solidarity as a nation. The targeted outcome for each side is political control over the entirety of the land. The mutual incompatibility of the two goals (reclamation of the Abrahimic covenant versus Palestinian sovereignty) makes

unworkable a land-for-peace exchange and its implicit vision of two independent states, side by side, sharing ancient Palestine.

Civilizations

The concept of civilization refers to a complex social grouping that subsumes all other forms of structured social activity including nationality, kinship, ethnicity, and, in particular, politically organized societies. Today, obvious to all is a split between the *umma*—the totality of Muslims in the world—and historically non-Muslim populations. In another irony of history, what some in Islamic civilization see in modernity, Christianity, and the West as evil is itself the spawn of conflict *within* an earlier civilization, Christendom, a half-millennium ago.

The precursors and leaders of the Reformation acted to shift the locus of authority from a centralized papacy to local institutions responsible in varying degrees to individual believers. Martin Luther and England's King Henry VIII by their ecclesial defections fractured papal political sway over huge swatches of Europe's territory. Soon bourgeois revolutions in the political sphere followed revolutions in the religious sphere to realign the balance of power from feudal nobility and monarchy to new classes made influential and wealthy by economic changes. Economies, characterized through the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance by medieval guilds, mercantilism, and chartered corporations, were freed from these constraints by the rise of modern capitalism, first commercial, then industrial.

In parallel with these transformations, intellectual emancipation from ecclesiastical and political dominance was precipitated by Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum*, the economic thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, and the political thought of the French *philosophes*. Christendom's social cohesion, embodied in Pope Gregory VII's paradigm of the monarch's dominance in earthly matters and the church's dominance in heavenly matters, was forever lost to the secularized, contradiction-laden logics of modernity's autonomous value spheres.

Religion, then, does not obviate the likelihood of conflict but offers fertile soil in which the dichotomous dynamics of conflict—both division and cohesion—can take root and flourish. In many historical cases—seen especially among monotheistic traditions—religious groups, viewing themselves as the only legitimate religion, have erected both structural and cognitive frameworks to maintain an "ingroup/outgroup" dichotomy and to ensure internal purity. In other cases, although claiming commitment to a transcendent relationship with an ultimate reality and a constructive relationship with others in the world, religious people for religious reasons have and continue to turn violent and destructive.

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See also Abortion; Capital Punishment; Conflict Perspective; Cultural Imperialism; Fundamentalism; Hegemony; Homosexuality; Identity Politics; Moral Entrepreneurs; Religion and Politics; Religious Prejudice; Same-Sex Marriage; Sanctuary Movement

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Religion and Politics

Religion and politics share a common concern: the order of human beings in the social world in order to avoid the problem of chaos. If at least one definition

of *politics* is the means by which we order our community and even our personal conduct through the formulation and acceptance of certain rules, laws, and institutions that oversee them, then religion has always had a political function by structuring the world—both inner and outer—in order to provide or enforce some kind of organizing order and meaning of the community. Dominating premodern or pre-Enlightenment concepts of religion and religious life was the notion that the individual was ensconced in a broader order of things, one ordained supernaturally that structured communal relationships as well as personal attitudes toward authority and social power by linking that order of things to some transcendental authority. Religion possessed a political function precisely because it served as the undergirding rationalization for law and the ways that social relationships were governed and organized within the community.

At the same time, religion also, and most important, provided an inner sense of obligation on the part of individuals that legitimized certain forms of social power and hierarchy. The separation between the inner or private life and the outer or public one was always unified in traditional religious societies, or at least mostly so. The result was that ritual and belief served a political purpose in the sense that they provided a legitimation for authority, since they were able to unite the political hierarchies that existed within the community with a cosmological schema. Thus, the relation between religion and politics has always dealt with the problem of value orientations: individuals must orient their subjective values, at least in some degree, toward the acceptance of the order in which they live. Both religion and politics therefore find a common ground in that they seek, albeit in different ways, to orient individuals toward social order and in some way to legitimize that order.

The word *religion* is a compound of two Latin words: *re* ("again") and *ligare* ("to bind"). In this sense, it denotes a strong connection with origins, with the foundations of the past, as an authority for grounding or validating the present. But its connection with politics becomes more explicit when we realize that the past participle of the verb *ligare* is *lex* ("bound"), which is the Latin word for "law." Religion, therefore, becomes more than simply a metaphysical doctrine in this sense, for it takes on the status of an order between members of a community by "binding" them to certain acts and beliefs. Religion, therefore, can be said to possess a political function in the sense that it provides a framework—either through subjective ethics or through sacred law—to orient individuals toward a particular social order, usually a social order that has some grounding or validity in a transcendent authority (i.e., a god or gods). Historically, religion and politics existed more as a unity—each one informing the other—to the extent that, in some cases, as in ancient Egypt, little distinction existed between religious understanding of the universe and social order and political authority.

The relation between religion and politics becomes a distinct problem once politics becomes secularized; that is, once the foundations of political meaning and authority no longer synchronize with religious worldviews. In Western political history, this begins with the closing decades of the Renaissance and, most explicitly, with the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who provided a rationalization of politics outside the bounds of religious authority, and Benedict Spinoza, who argued against the sacred authority of religious moral teachings. Religion bases its claim to moral authority not upon social conventions, institutions, and values, which are created by humans themselves, but on God or god(s) as a transcendental source of moral authority. As a result, religion and secular politics can come into conflict, since they offer different grounds for moral and ethical duty and obligation as well as different rationalizations for the sociopolitical order.

Max Weber rigorously pointed this out in his discussion of "other-worldly ascetic religion." For Weber, the key problem was that individuals who cling to religious belief as the rationalization of the social world come into tension with the secular world. The sanctity of religious conventions comes into a dissonant relationship with secular social and political institutions and values. Indeed, for Weber, the key problem was that of *secularization*, or the "disenchantment" (*Entzauberung*) of the world through the spread of rationalism and modernity. The encounter with modernity (i.e., with secularism, rationalism, and so on) therefore tends to undermine the traditional authority of religious worldviews, and the political function of religion must compete with the autonomy of secular politics. This can give rise to religious extremism and/or other forms of religious life and activity that engage, in a critical way, secular political and ethical life.

A different approach to the relation between religion and politics stems from the work of Émile Durkheim. Durkheim's idea about religion was that it constituted a symbolic order that served as a mode of

social cohesion. Religion serves a social function since it provides a continuity of belief through which social order is maintained. From this theoretical perspective, religion and politics become a problematic mix once political institutions and ideas begin to change their modes of cohesion. Secularization therefore leads to a problem of a certain incommensurability of value claims, since it rationalizes the structure of social relations differently from religious systems.

Although distinct from one another, the rise of both religious fundamentalism and religious extremism thus becomes understandable as a response to a crisis in social meaning and modes of cohesion. Once the forces of secular modes of social ordering begin to fragment sacred or religious modes of cohesion, religion becomes deprived of its political function. Traditional forms of social cohesion are then called into question by the emergence of secular social and political institutions and by the cultural and social pressures brought on by the process of secularization. Religious worldviews become challenged, and a crisis of meaning begins to take place. The radical return to religious values to combat the emergence of secular worldviews becomes a major field of contention and plays itself out, sometimes through violent means.

This breakdown of the relation between religion and politics can also explain less radical forms of religious resurgence. In liberal societies, issues such as abortion, attempts to include religious morality into public education, and other related attempts at blending politics and religion are also responses to this breakdown of collective meaning. Since liberal societies allow for the plurality of worldviews through tolerance and an avowed separation of church and state, there emerges a perceived breakdown of moral cohesion. The rise of religious conservatism and its increasing political activity and influence—as exemplified in U.S. politics during the closing decades of the 20th century and beyond—can therefore be seen as a reaction to this "fragmentation" of ethical meaning as prescribed through religious worldviews.

However, the religious response to political life is not always of a reactionary or conservative character. Religious, ethical worldviews can also transform political life in progressive ways. Sometimes it is simply a rhetorical device, clothing more secular political arguments, such as in the U.S. civil rights movement, when the power of the pulpit in black communities was particularly important in mobilizing opposition to racial segregation. The essential critique of the institutions of racial segregation was always basically liberal in character, but when clothed in religious language, it became a potent mobilizing force. Similarly, what is known as "liberation theology" in Latin America was a reshaping of the teachings of Catholicism to provide a political vision of liberation from tyrannical political regimes and institutions during the 1970s.

In the end, however, the relation of politics and religion consists in what can be called the "political function of religion": in the ability of religion to offer an alternative interpretation of both social order and subjective value orientations that legitimate social relations and the sources of moral authority. To the extent that there is some dissonance between religious worldviews and secular political worldviews, the possibility of social problems arising from the relation of religion and politics is always a lingering concern.

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See also Islam and Modernity; Moral Entrepreneurs; Politics and Christianity; Religion and Conflict; Religious Extremism

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Religious Extremism

Religious extremism is a radicalized and intolerant viewpoint that typically sanctions the use of violence to promote a defined, religiously motivated political agenda. Religious extremist groups share several

interlocking characteristics. Among the most important are a sense of persecution, a sense of injustice suffered at the hand of a larger force or ideological entity (such as secularism, the state, a colonial power, or an invading military force), a perceived lack of cultural or political control over one's preferred way of life, a perceived loss of traditional values and mores, and finally, the idea that sacrifice is necessary to achieve the ends of the group. Religious extremists usually do not identify themselves as extremist. Rather, they identify themselves alternatively as victims, defenders, and saviors.

Religious extremist groups and organizations tend to place adherence to a single religious interpretation as the basis for all other relations. In other words, these groups will embrace and promote a single interpretation of a religious text or ideal that differs significantly from that of the mainstream religion. Acceptance of this interpretation is a key criterion for membership. Religious extremist groups usually have distinct political goals derived from and defined by this interpretation. Acceptance of these political goals is another criterion for membership.

Some people mistakenly identify religious extremism with fundamentalism. However, while extremists tend to promote violence as a means to a political end, fundamentalists need not embrace a religiously motivated political agenda, violent or otherwise. While some extremist groups are fundamentalist, not all fundamentalists are religious extremists. People also confuse religious extremist groups with terrorist organizations. Although many extremist religious groups endorse terror as a means of furthering their religious and political agendas, it would be a mistake to label all groups who use terrorism as religious extremists. For example, the Tamil Tigers, a terrorist organization in Sri Lanka, identify as Tamil nationalists against their enemies, the Sinhalese. While it is true that most Tamils tend to be Muslim and most Sinhalese tend to be Buddhist, the Tamil Tigers' mission and identity center around nationalist and secular lines, not religious ones.

Thinking of religious extremism as a modern phenomenon is a controversial interpretation. Medieval history, for example, is rife with violence in the name of religion. The Crusades and the Inquisition in its various forms and stages are but two examples. By the same token, Muslim expansion into Western Europe during the eighth through twelfth centuries and Europe's Thirty Years War between Catholic and Protestant nations in the 17th century could also be described as extremist. Yet to expand the definition of religious extremism to include these and many state- (or civilization-) sponsored wars waged for geopolitical and imperialist ends, even if they were fought in the name of a particular religion, is not helpful in understanding the nature of religious extremism as a contemporary social problem.

The work of Samuel Huntington, a prominent U.S. scholar, supports this view. In 1993, Huntington wrote a watershed article in the periodical *Foreign Affairs* in which he claimed that the end of the cold war spelled the end of secular ideologies (such as liberalism and communism) as the fault line for violence. In their place, "civilization" would arise as the new identity marker and rallying point for violence. Huntington defined *civilization* as comprising ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, and geographic identities. Implicit in his argument was the sense that the modern era, with its emphasis on reason, secularism, enlightenment, and science, for a time was able to quash ethnicity, nationalism, and religion as primary identity markers but it did not eradicate them. Huntington predicted that the end of the ideologically driven cold war, waged by the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and the USSR and Eastern Europe on the other, would bring the resurgence of these preexisting civilization-driven identities and, it may be added, the creation of new ones.

In the contemporary world, religious extremist groups embrace extralegal and violent means to further their ends, which often clash with the state's goal of keeping the peace and maintaining a monopoly over the means of violence. This is not to say that religious extremist groups exist only in recognized nation-states. These groups can spring up in failed states, or in territories unrecognized as states, or where state control is lax due to geography or lack of resources. Hamas, which stands for Islamic Resistance Movement, is one such example. It is the largest Palestinian militant organization, and its political goal is to establish an Islamic state in place of Israel. Hamas has a large network of social services that provide aid to the Palestinian poor. It promotes its own interpretation of Islam, emphasizing *jihad* (holy war) against the Zionists, and it uses terrorism to further its political and religious agenda.

Many popular views concerning the nature of religious extremism are rife with misunderstanding. A common mischaracterization of religious extremism among many in the Christian West is that Islam lends itself to extremist views more than do other religions.

This view has been particularly rampant in the United States since the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. The attacks brought the discussion of religious extremism and terrorism to the forefront in political, academic, and popular circles. Political leaders and others of influence in the West have perpetuated, or at the very least not refuted, claims that it is within the nature of Islam itself to be violent. Yet moderate Muslims worldwide are no more prone to violence than are moderate Christians or Hindus. Religious extremist groups, regardless of religious affiliation, have more in common with each other than they do with the mainstream religions that spawned them.

Examples of Religious Extremist Groups

Religious extremist groups spring from almost every major world religion. Four examples—one each from Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism—illustrate this point. The list is far from exhaustive, as many different religious extremist organizations exist for almost every world religion. As these four examples illustrate, religious extremist groups often reinterpret the tenets of the mainstream religion to justify their violent political agendas.

Army of God

Original mainstream religious affiliation: Christian

Rallying point: Pro-life activism

Religious interpretation: Biblical passages must be interpreted literally and inform everyday practice (Christian fundamentalism).

Political goal: To make abortion illegal in the United States

Religious goal: To desecularize U.S. society by emphasizing the evils of birth control, abortion, and feminism and to place the nuclear family at the center of U.S. values

Means endorsed to achieve political goal: Targeted assassination, notably the murder of doctors who perform abortions, and intimidation, including the physical blocking of entrances to clinics that provide Planned Parenthood services

Jewish Defense League

Original mainstream religious affiliation: Judaism

Rallying point: The Five Principles: Jewish unity and indivisibility; upholding pride in Jewish faith, culture, history, and land; self-sacrifice for their greater good; discipline and willpower; and faith in the indestructibility of the Jewish people

Religious interpretation: The Torah clearly delineates between good and evil and right and wrong. Wrong is all things harmful to the Jewish people. Right is all things that promote the Jewish people.

Political goal: To reserve the land of Israel for Jews. Thus no concessions to the demands of Palestinians or Jews promoting compromise should be made.

Religious goal: Those who harm Jews and thus the faith must be overcome by any and all means necessary.

Means endorsed to achieve political goal: Self-sacrifice, the targeted use of force, and murder

Al Qaeda

Original mainstream religious affiliation: Islam

Rallying point: Muslims must be freed from the corrupting influence of the West.

Religious interpretation: Militant Sunni Islam

Political goal: To end Western presence in, and unify, the Middle East

Religious goal: The creation of a new pan-Islamic caliphate as the legitimate successor to Muhammad

Means endorsed to achieve political goal: Self-sacrifice through targeted terror attacks

Bajrang Dal

Original mainstream religious affiliation: Hinduism

Rallying point: Their official motto is *Seva, Suraksha, Sanskar,* which translates to "Service, Security, and Embellishment." The youth arm of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal serves as its security force.

Religious interpretation: True Hindus choose death before relinquishing freedom.

Political goal: To reverse imperial incursions of Christianity and Islam in India, and to restore disputed places of worship to Hindu control

Religious goal: To defend downtrodden and victimized Hindus from those who do not respect Hinduism in India, notably Muslims, Christians, and moderate Hindus

Means endorsed to achieve political goal: Terrorism, particularly indiscriminate communal violence against Muslim and Christian enclaves

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See also Islam and Modernity; Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Religious Holidays as Social Problems; Religious Prejudice

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Religious Holidays as Social Problems

The holiday of Christmas has become a global social problem because it invites terrorism and other forms of violence. In fact, violence is a part of many religious holidays. On Purim in 1996, Palestinian terrorists killed 13 people and injured 125. During 2006 Ramadan, the spike in U.S. military deaths showed how religious holidays can motivate violence. Around the world, people remember Christmas violence—in the United States, Indonesia, Philippines, Tibet, Mexico, Romania, Algeria, the United Kingdom, Bosnia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Israel.

Puritans of colonial Massachusetts insisted that no proof existed of Jesus' birth on December 25 and outlawed Christmas in the second half of the 17th century. They were also protesting what they considered the pagan orgy of Christmas misrule. Elsewhere, the commemorations often led to relaxed norms against public excess and worker unrest. Drinking and mumming were central commemorations between colonial and Civil War eras. Mummers were rowdy groups of poor young men who sang carols or shouted rhymes and demanded food and drink from the wealthy, whose homes they boisterously entered. Insufficient "gifts" would cause mummers to riot through homes. Such commemorations thus inverted and perpetuated violent class relations.

As industrialization developed, observance of the Christmas holiday changed. Mythmakers like Washington Irving and Clement Moore borrowed the image of Santa Claus from German immigrants, and stories, poems, and drawings popularized Santa, the Christmas tree, presents, and family. By the 19th century's end, Christmas was codified in law, and a commercialized, family holiday replaced boisterous Christmas commemorations.

Throughout the 20th century, Christians continued periodic Christmas protest, fighting secularism and commercialism. In the contemporary United States, Christmas philanthropy increases, but conflict persists. Feminists target domestic violence even though scientists debate whether there are holiday spikes. Anti-suicide activists claim Christmas season as their bane, even though scientists deny a holiday spike. Christians resent deletion of Christmas carols from school assembly programs, while non-Christians object to nativity displays on municipal tax-supported property.

Recently, neoconservative *Fox News* anchors Bill O'Reilly and John Gibson and televangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson organized a two-pronged Christmas campaign. First, a legal team zealously defended Christmas celebrations that had been banned. Second, a cultural team politicized Christmas commercialism. The televangelists' previous campaign was "keep Christ in Christmas"; their newer campaign asked to keep Christ commercialized, sponsoring boycotts of stores that refused to change advertising or in-store greetings from "Happy Holidays" to "Merry Christmas." By 2005, campaigns successfully changed advertising and store practices, and according to Gallup polls, induced a major change in public opinion.

U.S. Christians may protest on a peaceful Christmas, but elsewhere, Christians more likely link Christmas and overt violence. Christmas terrorism emerged in the Far East on Christmas Eve 2000, when bombs exploded during Catholic and Protestant church services in Jakarta and five other Indonesian cities, killing over a dozen people, wounding hundreds, and worsening religious relations in the predominantly Muslim country. In 2004, in a Philippine port city, a bomb exploded in a market packed with Christmas shoppers, killing 15 people, injuring 58. In this predominantly Christian nation that had seen little terrorism, authorities blamed Muslim terrorists from the South Philippines. On Christmas 1997, a bomb exploded in the Tibetan capital, the biggest explosion in a series of previously ignored terrorist incidents. This Christmas bombing, however, brought international attention and meant Beijing could no longer ignore the problem of Buddhist terrorism.

Christmas violence in Mexico helped topple a government. Repression of Zaptatista protesters occurred before, but the "Acteal massacre" was especially brutal. On Christmas Day 1997, in Acteal, Chiapas, Indians buried their dead after government paramilitary troops killed 45 unarmed Indian peasants, including 15 children. Politicians initially denied foreknowledge, defined it as a family feud, orchestrated arrests, and promised investigations. However, Christmas repression ignited the citizenry. Protests prompted the president to fire several top officials, but public outrage continued. Two weeks later, thousands protested the Christmas Day massacre; protesters threw rocks, and police returned fire, killing one woman and injuring her baby. That Christmas Day massacre and its aftermath sparked public outrage and created an electoral end to corrupt leadership.

In 1989, regime change deposed communist dictators in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. None did so with the violence as the mostly Christian nation of Romania, whose citizens' fight for freedom succeeded after a Christmas Day massacre that took hundreds of revolutionary victims. Romanians remember Christmas 1989 as the brutal day they overthrew an evil dictator.

Algerian Islamists specialized in Christmas terrorism. Between 1991 and 1994, Algerian radicals attempted a coup to remove Christian immigrants and instill a Muslim theocracy. On Christmas Eve 1994, they hijacked an Air France jet, demanded release of political prisoners, executed three passengers, dumped the bodies on the runway, and flew to France, where they planned to crash into the Eiffel Tower. When they landed to refuel, police stormed the plane and killed the terrorists. During Christmas 2000, a young Algerian Frenchman was arrested in a failed plot to bomb the cathedral in Strasbourg, France.

Christian terrorism has outpaced Muslim terrorism in the United Kingdom. While they promised an official Christmas Day ceasefire, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or splinter groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army or Real IRA for decades annually planned to explode bombs during the Christmas season. The IRA vowed attacks until Ireland was liberated from British rule. Annual IRA promises of a Christmas Day ceasefire were overshadowed by increased violence around the holiday season. Bombings targeted London shopping areas and disrupted the economic system. Shoppers stayed home. Armed soldiers protected shopping areas. Bombs continued. For more than 20 years, until the peace accords in 1998, the pattern continued. In 2000, officers began an overt public relations campaign, including a holiday advertising campaign to warn of Real IRA violence. The following year, officers arrested six men who planned to detonate six car bombs during the Christmas season. The success story continued; in 2002, police arrested four Real IRA members for Christmas bombing plans.

Muslims in Bosnia consider warlord Naser Oric a hero for defending them, but Serbians (90 percent of whom are Christian) blame him for the "Bloody Christmas" massacre of January 1993. Oric's men assassinated many Serbian leaders and led ethnic cleansing of many Serbian villages. The most notorious was the raid on Orthodox Christmas, when Oric's men killed at least 30 Serbians and looted and burned the town. The brutality of the attack was not especially greater than others, but the symbolism motivated a massive Serbian retaliation that established the first demilitarized safe zone in the war. After the war, Muslim *mujadeen* regularly harassed returning Catholic Croatians; a mujadeen killed a Croat family as they were getting ready to attend Christmas Eve mass.

Most Jihadists were college educated, but in Pakistan this was less so. Al Qaeda and others recruited undereducated Pakistani to drive out the Christian minority. In 2002 on Christmas Day, two terrorists dressed in women's clothing threw hand grenades into a Christian church, wounding 11 and

killing 3. In 2003, Islamist terrorists attempted to assassinate the Pakistani president on Christmas Day.

Before the war began in 2003, Christian Iraqis (who make up less than 5 percent of the population) helped celebrate Ramadan, and Muslims regularly celebrated Christmas as a secular and religious holiday. Jesus the prophet was celebrated as Muslims attended Christmas pageants that reenacted the nativity scene. Muslim celebrations commonly included secular symbols like Christmas trees, gift exchanges, and the Muslim version of Santa, Baba Noel (who drove a reindeer and stopped only at good Muslims' houses). However, churches experienced periodic bombing, and many Christians fled the country, essentially extinguishing Iraqis' Christmas celebration.

After stabilizing leadership of the Palestinian Authority in 1995, Yasser Arafat regularly attended Christmas services in Bethlehem. However, he could not control radicals; their annual Christmas bombings and hijackings disrupted pilgrimages to Bethlehem. Beginning in 2002, Israel again occupied Bethlehem and banned Arafat from attending Bethlehem services. Palestinian attacks continued, and on Christmas Day 2003, Israel killed a senior Jihad militant in the Gaza Strip, preventing a major Christmas Day terror attack. In 2004, radical Palestinians claimed responsibility for killing four in a Tel Aviv Christmas Day suicide bombing.

Terrorists attack on religious holidays because they seek a moment defined as sacred by the terrorized. Taking part in Christmastime violence reinforces terrorists' plans to join a cosmic war. Terrorists gain power if people view them as more evil, committed, dangerous, or powerful because they attack innocents on a sacred holiday. In part because of our reactions, usurping a sacred holiday increases the terror level of a potentially violent act. Religious holidays should be protected so that they retain sacred meaning and are enacted through free public expression. How that protection is secured can be debated, but one promising solution is institutional. Leaders must operate political, religious, cultural, and economic institutions in ways that acknowledge, empower, and incorporate religious outsiders. The public must demand that leaders transform institutions to incorporate religious outsiders. If institutions fail to incorporate religious outsiders, then religious holidays will likely be transformed into social problems.

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See also Religion and Conflict; Religious Extremism; Terrorism

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Religious Prejudice

The gap between the humanitarian ideals of most religions and the often inhumane actions of their practitioners is wide and widely observed. Religious people are clearly not immune to the tendencies toward biased judgments, intolerance, contempt, and even violence that are apparently universal features of human societies.

The specific relationship between religion and prejudice, however, is complex. During the past 4 decades, social science research has focused on the following sets of questions: If religiosity correlates with *higher* levels of prejudice, as many studies show, is that correlation a matter of individual personality features or intergroup dynamics? Are some religious worldviews more likely than others to foster prejudice; that is, does *what* they believe affect the kind and degree of prejudice found among religious people? Are different groups—racial or ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, or religious others, for instance—more or less likely to be targets of prejudice among various religious groups?

Historically, most research on religious prejudice focused on the racial and ethnic bias of religious people. Recent work on religion and prejudice suggests that findings in that area cannot be generalized to religious groups' attitudes toward other forms of difference, and that besides psychological and social factors, researchers must consider theological and philosophical aspects of religious worldviews in order to define, recognize, and understand religious prejudice.

Definitions of prejudice usually include both cognitive and affective aspects—ideas about a person or group in the absence of relevant information as well as feelings for or against that person or group. Religious prejudice can refer to the ideas and judgments that

religious people hold toward others or to the prejudices of nonreligious people toward those who are religious. Although most research shows a high correlation between religiousness and prejudice, important definitional challenges emerge when worldview—rather than such traits as race, ethnicity, or even sexuality—defines the targets of negative responses. At issue is whether or not negative assessments about what others *believe* should be understood as prejudice.

Because it emerged from the field of social psychology, unsurprisingly, research on religion and prejudice most often sought personality-based explanations. Redirecting most of this research was Allport and Ross's 1967 study that found a high rate of prejudice among those whose religious orientation the authors characterized as "extrinsic"; that is, defined by motivations (social status, a sense of belonging, etc.) unrelated to the authentic teachings of a religion, and decreased levels of prejudice among those with "intrinsic," or sincere and mature religious faith. Despite challenges to, and the complexity of, the intrinsic–extrinsic model, religious personality trait analysis remains a prominent tool in the study of religious prejudice. Additional scales using categories like authoritarian, orthodox, fundamentalist, and "quest" personalities also show correlations with various levels and types of prejudice.

Most recent studies show little or no correlation between religion and racial or ethnic prejudice regardless of personal religious orientation, a finding that coheres with the egalitarian teachings at the core of most religions. When the target is sexual minorities, however, prejudice runs high among those with both extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations, as well as among fundamentalists and those with orthodox beliefs. Negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians cut across these various scales and therefore must be understood in terms other than individual personal religious dispositions. Some research shows that whether the teachings of religious groups proscribe or tolerate prejudice toward gays and lesbians has a significant effect on the attitudes of members, although other studies suggest that the controlling factor is right-wing authoritarianism, not the specific ideologies of any religious group. Also, researchers have found that anti-gay prejudice exceeds that mandated by the religious ideologies of many of those who express it, suggesting a persistent personality component to this type of prejudice.

Sociological dimensions of religion come to the fore when offering intergroup rather than interpersonal dynamics as explanatory models for understanding negative attitudes held by religious people toward those who are different. Marketplace models of religion posit that competition for members and for the social resources that accompany religious affiliation fosters high levels of commitment to ingroups and negative judgments toward religious outgroups. In particular, researchers have analyzed the strict boundaries drawn between insiders and outsiders (and negative views of the latter) by fundamentalist groups in terms of their ability to protect ingroup identity and self-esteem in times of social upheaval and crisis. This approach helps explain the negative attitudes those of one religious group hold toward those of others, a type of prejudice found to be pervasive among religious people regardless of individual religious orientation.

The question remains, however, whether or not there is anything properly *religious* about this religious prejudice. That is, do religious worldviews themselves, independent of personality types and intergroup dynamics, predispose people to judge negatively those who are religiously different? The positions taken by different religious communities and different individuals within those communities on the question of religious others are diverse and complex. Since the 1980s, theologians and philosophers of religion have employed a typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism to classify these positions. *Exclusivists* believe that their own religion has unique access to religious truth and salvation, whereas *inclusivists* see other religions as imperfect though valid routes to a truth revealed most perfectly in their own. *Pluralists* affirm that no single religion has privileged access to truth, and that there is no a priori basis for denying the validity of any religious path. While particular religions may tend explicitly or not to foster one of these attitudes more than another, they exist within nearly all major religions. For instance, Evangelical Christians are most often exclusivist, while several liberal Protestant denominations affirm pluralism, and the position taken by the Catholic Church at the Second Vatican Council was explicitly inclusivist. Similarly, there are exclusivist and pluralist Hindus, inclusivist and exclusivist Muslims. Furthermore, inconsistencies often exist among the positions on religious others taken by religious institutions, texts, leaders, and individual members of religious communities.

Religious worldviews, unlike race and, by most measures, sexual orientation, have a significant volitional element; people adopt sets of religious beliefs and practices because they find them to be meaningful and enriching to their lives. Negative assessments of alternative views may, in that sense, be inevitable. The person who believes firmly in only one god will tend to view negatively those traditions that teach there are many, and he or she may maintain that position in spite of positive feelings for, and relationships with, those who believe differently. Modes of religious knowing, rooted as they often are in spiritual experiences irreducible to rational analysis, may thus involve a priori judgments, but not necessarily interpersonal antipathy. Studies of American interreligious relations, for instance, show surprisingly high levels of respect and tolerance for religious others among those with strongly exclusivist belief systems. Furthermore, pluralist affirmations of religious difference are not always as conducive to harmonious intergroup relations as might be expected. The pluralist premise that no religion has unique access to truth and that such claims are metaphorical or simply wrong strikes many as its own form of prejudice, if not intellectual imperialism.

These incongruities raise important questions about how best to reduce religious prejudice. Simply defining all negative assessments of other worldviews as prejudice shuts down the conversation with most religious people. As with any form of social bias, exposure to and education about religious others is a necessary but insufficient condition for improving inter-religious relations. The most successful interfaith dialogues in the United States have occurred when people collaborate on projects of mutual importance, whether building a community homeless shelter, passing a piece of legislation, or, in the growing number of U.S. interfaith households, raising a family. Recent trends in American religion toward less institutionally defined, more individualized spiritualities may diminish the intergroup dynamics that foster religious intolerance. To the extent that individuals find themselves not only exposed to, but incorporating aspects of, different religious traditions into their own eclectic spiritualities, the category of religious "other" itself becomes less significant.

The most helpful research on religious prejudice in the coming years will be that which (a) expands beyond the current and historical focus on North America and on Christian groups to develop truly cross-cultural and multireligious models; (b) explores the significance of new patterns of eclectic spirituality and religious combining; and (c) distinguishes carefully between the truth claims of religious people and their attitudes toward those who do not share them.

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See also Collective Consciousness; Groupthink; Religion and Conflict; Religious Extremism

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Reparations

Loosely defined, reparations are something done or paid to compensate or make amends for a wrongdoing. More specifically, the term *reparation* refers to compensation given for loss, suffering, or damage suffered by an injured party. Reparations exist in different forms. For example, war reparations are payments from one country to another as compensation for acts of war. In the legal system, reparations can refer to compensation for civil damages or restitution to the victim of a crime. A third situation, which may be the form of reparations most people are familiar with, is reparations for oppression based on a group's race or ethnicity.

Reparations in the United States

The subject of reparations is controversial in contemporary U.S. society, particularly when discussed in the context of oppression. In some cases, reparations can directly compensate individuals or groups for economic losses suffered as a result of oppression. More frequently, they involve symbiotic payments that officially acknowledge wrongdoing by the dominant group and investment in efforts to address present-day inequalities that have resulted from past injuries. Reparations can thus symbolize a step toward equality, but there is disagreement about whether oppressed groups need to be compensated in order to achieve equality.

Despite the controversy over whether oppressed groups should be compensated or not, there are some cases of the U.S. government giving reparations to address violations of justice and equality in localized settings. For example, in the late 1860s, Russia sold Alaska to the United States without any consideration of the native inhabitants' rights or ownership of the land. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) restored 44 million acres of land and $1 billion to Alaska Natives. Also, in 1994, residents of Rosewood, Florida, an all-black town destroyed by lynchings and property damage in 1923, received monetary compensation from the state of Florida for their loss of property. Most contemporary discussions of reparations focus on two examples of national inequity, namely Japanese American internment and African American slavery, that have been addressed in contrasting ways.

Japanese American Internment

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japan in 1941, the United States entered into a war with Japan, Germany, and Italy. Many people questioned Japanese Americans' loyalty to the United States. In February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, authorizing the relocation of all U.S. citizens of Japanese, German, or Italian ancestry to internment camps. The order required that Japanese Americans, German Americans, and Italian Americans living in designated regions leave their businesses, homes, and many of their belongings to live in poorly constructed, cramped living quarters for an indefinite period of time. While the order did affect the lives of citizens of German and Italian ancestry, the order had a more far-reaching effect on the Japanese Americans. For the duration of the war, more than 120,000 Japanese American families, both immigrants and American born, were held in internment camps in Colorado, Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona.

Civil Liberties Act of 1988

The Executive Order 9066 was rescinded in 1976, and in 1980 the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians was established to conduct a governmental study on the effects of Executive Order 9066. In 1983, the commission concluded that Executive Order 9066 was unjustified and that Japanese Americans were victims of discrimination by the federal government. As a result of the commission's recommendations, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 was passed by Congress and signed by President Ronald Reagan. The act, which granted reparations to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, consisted of an official government apology, $20,000 paid to surviving internees, and the creation of a public education fund to inform children and the public about this period in U.S. history. Although the Japanese American internment was legal during the war, it violated the principles of equality and private property. The money given to internment survivors did not cover the full value of lost property during internment, but it did serve as a symbolic acknowledgment of the loss. It also helped restore the dignity of Japanese Americans who had suffered through the disgrace of internment camps.

African American Slavery

The negative impact of slavery on African Americans was not only troubling but also far reaching. Slaves were denied the right to marriage, families were scattered when partners or children were sold to another plantation owner, and many masters sexually exploited enslaved women by forcing them to reproduce the enslaved population. African American labor was also exploited, as the enslaved worked under deplorable conditions without compensation. Evidence of their labor exploitation continued even after slavery was abolished in 1865, when 4 million newly freed African Americans were sent away from the plantations empty-handed, without payment for their services, and without land to cultivate in order to earn a living.

Forty Acres and a Mule

Immediately following the Civil War, reparations for slavery involved efforts to promote economic self-sufficiency through agricultural production, commonly referred to as "forty acres and a mule." Field Order #15, issued by Williams T. Sherman on January 16, 1865, was originally intended for two purposes. First, newly freed black families were to be given 400,000 acres of tillable land. This federally confiscated land stretched 30 miles inland from the coastlines of South Carolina to Florida. Working their own land, freedmen had an opportunity to gain economic security and wealth through land ownership, thus counteracting the poverty resulting from unpaid slave labor.

Second, Field Order #15 also encouraged freedmen to join the Union Army to maintain their newly won freedom. This move to help free black families was simultaneously a political move to strengthen the Union Army's ranks and also punish the South by attacking and harming the source of southern culture and wealth: the plantation system. Radical republicans who supported reparations argued that southern leaders who supported secession had no right to the land because the South lost the war. Freedmen were given the southern rebel leaders' land. Although the rebels accounted for less than 5 percent of white families, the impact of freedmen earning a free living apart from white plantation owners would be felt by most southern whites.

The new black land owners did well, making good profit, but President Andrew Johnson revoked the order in 1865. Without land, they could continue to serve as a ready source of very inexpensive labor. Thus, blacks' overall economic status changed little from their economic status during slavery.

Modern Slavery Reparations Claims

In recent years, some civil rights advocates have promoted reparations for the legacy of economic and political disadvantage caused by slavery. There are two types of reparations: public and private. Public reparations include a formal apology for abuse of human rights, direct payments by the government to descendants of slaves, and an investment in programs like education, jobs, and housing to benefit African Americans. Private reparations most often occur with public apologies by corporations who benefited from the institution of slavery, such as banks, railroads, insurance companies, and newspapers that ran advertisements for runaway slaves. There have been several lawsuits in federal and state courts since 2000. For example, in 2002, Aetna, an insurance company that issued life insurance policies on slaves to masters, expressed deep regret in a public apology.

Perspectives on Slavery Reparations

As a group, African Americans have historically and systemically been limited in their pursuit of upward mobility through access to equal education, opportunities for equal employment, and the accumulation of property and wealth. Progress made by the civil rights movement has been helpful in establishing African Americans' equal status in society; yet the legislation that resulted from the civil rights movement did not effectively address black people's legacy of economic disenfranchisement and disadvantage. Although civil rights legislation made it illegal to prevent African Americans from owning land and buying houses, without ensuring the money to do those things, the legislation was limited in effecting real change in social interactions. Thus several organizations rallied for financial support and even demanded reparations for slavery.

Proponents of reparations for slavery suggest that, much like Japanese American internment, slavery was legal at the time but nevertheless a violation of equality, with consequences that still resonate in contemporary society. Opponents to reparations for slavery acknowledge how grievous slavery and Jim Crow were for blacks who lived during those times but argue that the descendants of the enslaved have no claim to compensation. Opponents also note that the task of determining who should receive reparations and how it should be distributed would not only be challenging; the task would also be time consuming and expensive.

D. Chanele Moore

See also Civil Rights; Inequality; Race; Racism; Slavery

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REPATRIATION

The term *repatriation* refers to the return of individuals, human remains, cultural property, or other artifacts to their homelands or to their original owners. Repatriation applies to such processes as the return of the bodies of foreign soldiers after a war; the restoration of Native American artifacts from museums to their proper burial places; or the replacement or reimbursement of currency, art, and other items of worth to Holocaust survivors. Repatriation of refugees, displaced persons, and migrants involves the deportation of a populace from a country of residence and their resettlement in their country of origin. This may be a voluntary return or a forced return migration. In the United States, mass repatriation has occurred with Mexican migrants, especially during economic downturns. Internationally, repatriation has become the de facto policy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its approach to the issue of refugees and displaced persons.

U.S. Repatriation of Mexican Migrants

There are several periods of mass deportation and repatriation in U.S. history, most notably the repatriation of Mexican migrants in the 1930s. During the peak years of the Great Depression, the Hoover administrations adopted the policy of "American jobs for 'real' Americans." By means of social and political pressure, harassment, raids, and roundups, nearly one-third of the Mexican population in the United States was repatriated. Those repatriated included Mexican nationals as well as U.S. citizens of Mexican descent. Trainloads of returnees were left in unfamiliar towns in Mexico with little or no economic means. In 2005, California passed the Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program. While offering no reparations for the loss of properties, the divisions in families, and the death of an untold number in transit, the bill did offer an official acknowledgment of the harm caused by the policies of the 1930s.

Deportations and repatriation of Mexicans continue today. Since 2004, the United States has repatriated more than 14,000 Mexican nationals annually under a homeland security program aimed at limiting undocumented Mexican migration. This effort to reduce the number of illegal border crossings offers migrants the option of "interior" repatriation to their hometowns rather than apprehension and release at the border. These repatriations include flights from the United States to Mexico City or Guadalajara or bus transportation to the hometown of the migrant. In 2004, the program cost the U.S. government more than $15.4 million and has been criticized as largely ineffective in curbing undocumented migration.

Global Refugee Repatriation

During the past 15 years, the UNHCR has successfully assisted in the return of millions of refugees to their countries of origin. Largely displaced during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and as a result of civil wars, conflicts, and natural calamities in the global South, the refugee and asylee population peaked in the 1990s. Driven by political pressure of Northern countries, the policy of the UNHCR toward refugees has been that the optimal, "durable" solution is repatriation rather than asylum.

Former UN high commissioner for refugees Sadako Ogata referred to the 1990s as the "decade of repatriation." Mass repatriation of refugee Afghans, Bosnians, Cambodians, Croatian Serbs, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Guatemalans, Mozambicans, Palestinians, and Russians were documented during this period. In all, there were nearly 15 million estimated returnees during the 1990s, as compared to fewer than 4 million from the period 1975 to 1989. This policy of return and resettlement continues today, with between 1 and 2 million refugees repatriated each year since 2000. The majority of returnees in the past 5 years have been Afghans, displaced during the long civil war in which more than 20 percent of the population fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Since 2001, more than 4.6 million Afghans have returned with UNHCR

backing. As a result of the policy of repatriation and continued resettlement efforts, the world's refugee population dropped from its peak of nearly 17.8 million in 1993 to just over 8.3 million in 2006.

According to the UNHCR, return to the home country—even in situations in which the cause of the original flight may still be a factor—has been "voluntary" for the refugee. Yet, debate continues over whether the policy of repatriation has left the returnees without means in what remain as hostile countries to them. As with the mass deportation of Mexican migrants from the United States to Mexico in the 1930s, repatriation has involved resettlement to areas of the home country that are not considered "home" to the refugees. This internal displacement, as well as the varying amounts of assistance and monitoring provided by the UNHCR, has led to continued issues of economic and social disadvantages for some returnees and has severely limited the reintegration of repatriates in their homelands.

As a result of the documentation of problems in earlier repatriation and reintegration of refugees, the UNHCR initiated the "4Rs" approach in 2002. In collaboration with the UN Development Programme and the World Bank, the approach called for refugee repatriation and reintegration, followed by rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. While repatriation and reintegration efforts have been ongoing since the 1990s, officials recognize that, without the rehabilitation or restoration of the social and economic infrastructure, reintegration efforts would fail. Moreover, without support, the establishment of political order and economic institutions to maintain a long-term sustainable development would not be possible.

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See also Asylum; Bracero Program; Chicano Movement; Deportation; Immigration; Immigration, United States; Labor, Migrant; Nativism; Sanctuary Movement; Undocumented Immigrants; War; Xenophobia

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Resettlement

The *Oxford English Dictionary*'s definition of *resettlement*, to "settle or cause to settle in a different place," implicitly recognizes that moving can be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary movers are generally called immigrants; involuntary movers are called refugees.

Resettlement countries are typically preoccupied with selecting those immigrants most likely to make a contribution to the country and with establishing the legitimacy of refugee claims. They pay comparatively scant attention to what happens after opening their doors.

Resettling in a new country is ever-changing and, according to some authorities, a lifelong process. The process involves establishing economic and social independence, creating capacities to build a future, establishing family and community networks, and developing tools, such as language, that make participation in the larger society possible.

Although a general consensus exists that integration is the end goal of successful resettlement, differing definitions of the term create confusion. Governments, typically preoccupied with the economic and demographic benefits of immigration, define *integration* as

the realization of human capital. Canada's gross annual immigration level equals roughly 0.7 percent of its total population. The comparable U.S. figure is about 0.3 percent. Both countries experience net economic benefit: over the course of a lifetime, the average immigrant family pays more in taxes than it consumes in services and benefits. Economic class immigrants (to use the Canadian term, which corresponds to "employment-based immigrants" in the United States) tend to be remarkably successful: men achieve economic parity with native-born Canadians within 2 years, and women within 5. Selecting immigrants on the basis of human capital attributes such as education and employable skills is part of the explanation. However, selection is no guarantee of success. Despite their generally high levels of education and job skills, about one-third of immigrant families live in poverty for at least a decade before they begin to achieve economic parity with persons born in the United States and Canada.

About 1 in 4 new settlers enters the United States or Canada as an economic immigrant. Others, including "family class" immigrants and refugees, integrate more slowly and, on the whole, encounter even more bad luck and blocked opportunity than their economic class counterparts.

Service providers are more concerned about factors such as linguistic ability and health, not only because they are intrinsically important, but because they help ensure successful resettlement. Proficiency in a resettlement country's language is, for example, one of the most potent predictors of economic integration. According to the 2000 U.S. census, 21 million people did not speak English "very well." Language training is obviously important, but, in the United States, less than half the demand for English-language training is being met. On the whole, immigrants are in better health than native-born residents of Canada and the United States. However, the health of some immigrants deteriorates significantly over time, probably because of a combination of predisposition and exposure to unhealthy diets, new environmental pathogens, and adopting sedentary habits. Immigrants resettling in North American and Europe are at high risk for tuberculosis, a disease that compromises their own health and poses a significant public health challenge. Immigrants and refugees underutilize preventive and curative health services, thereby further compounding their health risks.

Civil rights advocates tend to focus on social integration, which encompasses topics such as equity, identity, and civic participation. About 1 in 5 visible minority immigrants reports significant encounters with discrimination during a five-year period. Blacks report an even higher rate: 1 in 3. Experiences with discrimination tend to increase ethnic identification and to militate against the development of national identification.

The politics of identity has assumed increasing prominence in a post–September 11 world. Concerns center on topics such as whether encouraging retention of heritage cultures and permitting more than one nationality militate against the evolution of civic nationalism. Canada, with its long-standing multicultural "mosaic" policies, and the United States, with an avowed "melting pot" ideology, are frequently cited as natural experiments for studying the effects of national values on integration. Immigrants in Canada are more likely than their U.S. counterparts to become citizens, more likely to acquire some knowledge of the country's official language(s), more likely to form friendships that cross ethnic lines, and more likely to participate in politics. These findings are, however, far from definitive statements about the relative benefits of multiculturalism. Below the level of official policies, immigrants and minority groups in Canada and the United States face similar public misunderstandings and challenging experiences.

Although poverty, lack of linguistic fluency, and discrimination are enormous resettlement challenges, a deficit model that focuses only on stresses cannot do justice to the complexity of the resettlement process, and it certainly cannot explain why resettlement stories are more likely to be narratives of success than of failed integration. As one example, poverty is probably the single most powerful social predictor of children's mental health and behavioral problems. However, despite the fact that immigrant and refugee children in Canada are almost 3 times more likely than their native-born counterparts to live in poverty, they have fewer emotional and behavioral disorders. New settlers' personal and social resources are an important, but poorly understood, part of the explanation. During the early years of resettlement, immigrants with access to a like-ethnic community of significant size enjoy better mental health than immigrants who lack this apparent advantage. Emotional support and the maintenance of self-esteem are likely explanatory mechanisms.

People everywhere are on the move. Existing research and knowledge can and should help make resettlement as painless as possible for immigrants and refugees and help ensure maximal benefit for

receiving countries. Newer trends, such as transnationalism, and concerns about how immigrants transform the societies in which they settle, together with the persistence of problems such as immigrant poverty and societal discrimination call for an ongoing interplay among research, enlightened policy, and informed public debate.

Morton Beiser

See also Acculturation; Assimilation; Cultural Capital; Discrimination; Ethnic Group; Ethnicity; Ethnocentrism; Immigration; Multiculturalism; Racial Profiling; Racism; Refugees; Transnational Families

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Resource Mobilization

During the 1980s, analysts developed the resource mobilization perspective to better understand and explain the emergence, significance, and impact of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Resource mobilization is at root a theory explaining how individuals and groups overcome resource inequalities and organize themselves to pursue desired social, cultural, or political change.

A social movement is a set of preferences for social change within a population. Individuals who share those social change preferences are called *adherents*, while those who contribute resources of support are *constituents. Bystanders* are those who watch from the sidelines. A key analytical issue for resource mobilization theory (RMT) is understanding how social movements turn bystanders into adherents, adherents into constituents, and constituents to active participation. Such tasks of mobilization are undertaken most often by *social movement organizations* (SMOs). Many SMOs have professional staffs and substantial resources. However, the vast majority are small, are voluntary, and operate locally. All the SMOs pursuing social movement goals are called a *social movement industry* (SMI). SMIs vary greatly in size and capacity, with some quite large, like the environmental or women's movements in the United States, and others much smaller, like the movement to abolish the death penalty or promote homeschooling.

SMOs gain access to resources in multiple ways, and RMT highlights four mechanisms. In *self-production,* social movements produce resources themselves by the efforts of existing organizations, activists, and constituents. They also *aggregate* resources by getting individuals and groups to contribute their separate resources that are then pooled to support collective actions. Social movements often *appropriate* or *co-opt* resources by utilizing previous connections to other groups and organizations. Finally, *patronage* refers to foundation grants or large private donations provided by specific individuals or groups.

Resource mobilization analysts conceptualize five distinct types of resources. *Moral resources* include things like legitimacy, integrity, solidarity, support, sympathetic support, and celebrity. For example, receiving awards like the Nobel Peace Prize confer legitimacy on an SMO and its leaders, while celebrity endorsements increase media coverage, generate public attention, and open doors to policymakers and resource providers alike. *Cultural resources* include relevant productions like music, literature, and humor, as well as "savvy" and "know-how" that facilitate the recruitment and socialization of new adherents and help movements maintain readiness for collective action. *Social-organizational resources* include social networks and formal organizations that enable movements to connect, communicate, and coordinate actions. *Human resources* include recruiting individuals to participate and the labor, experience, skills, expertise, and leadership they bring with them.

Material resources are money and physical property like office space, equipment, and supplies.

Currently, resource mobilization theory has three complementary branches. *Political process* theory focuses on how changes in political opportunity both influence social movements and are exploited by them. *Collective action framing* emphasizes how social movement actors conceptualize issues and communicate their concerns to both motivate adherents and draw in bystanders. The *organizational/entrepreneurial* branch examines how individuals who share preferences for social change gain access to resources to organize themselves and take action. Resource mobilization theory predominated in the rapidly growing sociological subfield of social movement research during the 1980s and 1990s and remains a vibrant perspective within the broader conflict paradigm in sociological theory.

Bob Edwards

See also Collective Consciousness; Social Movements; Social Networks

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Restorative Justice

During the past several decades, restorative justice has emerged as an important new approach to criminal justice theory and practice. It is based on the goal of repairing the harm of crime rather than the traditional criminal justice goals of assigning blame and imposing punishment for criminal transgressions. Advocates of restorative justice maintain that it is more than a program for reform; it is a new way of envisioning criminal justice that involves the victim, the offender, and the affected community in a search for solutions.

Restorative justice practice generally consists of informal, voluntary face-to-face encounters among the victim, offender, and relevant community members, in which the parties come to greater understanding and empathy, offenders express remorse, and a plan for repairing the harm of crime is negotiated, resulting in an agreement that emphasizes reparative solutions such as restitution, apologies, and community service rather than punishment.

Basic Principles

The critical difference between restorative justice and traditional justice is its focus on the offense as a source of harm to people and not simply as a violation of the law. Under traditional criminal justice theory, a criminal offense is against the state rather than the individual victim. The state, critics claimed, has "stolen the conflict" from those directly involved and established a system of coercive punishment dedicated to maintaining order rather than resolving conflicts, compensating losses, and reintegrating offenders. While numerous reforms in recent years attempted to redress the historic neglect of victims, the restorative justice approach takes this concern for the victim to a new level of involvement by positioning the victim as a central decision maker in cases in which the defendant admits criminal culpability.

The restorative justice alternative is essentially informal and nonpunitive. The offender becomes accountable for his or her conduct not through passive submission to punishment but by taking active steps to repair the damage she or he caused, including the damage to the victim's self-respect. In so doing, the offender not only redresses the losses to the victim and the community but advances his or her own social rehabilitation as well.

By offering itself as a radical alternative to conventional criminal justice, restorative justice has attracted a multitude of criminal justice critics and reformers in search of fundamental change. As a result, there is no "standard" definition of restorative justice. While some definitions emphasize a unique restorative justice *process* that requires the involvement of the victim, the offender, and the community in search of restorative solutions, a more expansive definition emphasizes the central *objective* of restoration: repairing the harm of crime.

Restorative Justice Programs

The essential tools of restorative justice consist of victim–offender mediation (VOM), family group conferencing, community circles, and victim–offender panels. Presently, 1,500 such programs exist worldwide, with more than 300 in the United States alone.

Private agencies, probation departments, or court personnel usually administer them. The vast majority of these programs involve juvenile offenders and property offenses, and, since restorative justice is not a system of adjudication, these programs are not applicable to contested cases.

The function of VOM is to enable the offender and the victim to meet with each other under the supervision of a trained mediator (or "facilitator") to search for a plan for reparation. The format typically involves several stages of encounter. In the first stage, the victim is encouraged to tell his or her story and communicate the full emotional and psychological extent of the psychological and emotional losses suffered, following which the offender tells his own story and, typically, expresses remorse. In the second stage, the participants devise a way to make things right to the extent possible, including the adoption of a plan of restitution, in-kind services, rehabilitation, and monitoring procedures. The mediator helps to reduce the agreement to writing, which is enforced through the court system.

While VOMs require only the presence of the victim and the offender under the guidance of a mediator, the aim of family group conferencing is to include as many interested parties as possible, including the victim, the offender, their friends and relatives, and representatives of the community, clergy, and schools. On occasion, family group conferences include the participation of the police, probation officer, and judicial personnel as well. Community circles, typically used in more traditional societies, such as Aboriginal and Native American groups, involve the participation of a number of community members to discuss both the interpersonal and the community-wide dimensions of the problem and to propose comprehensive solutions.

Evaluations performed on many of these programs during the past several decades have generally indicated positive effects on reducing recidivism, on compliance with restitution orders, and, perhaps most important, on victim satisfaction. Because the programs under consideration typically involve juvenile offenders and property offenses, it remains to be determined whether these positive effects can be demonstrated with respect to adult offenses and more serious offenses. Additionally, as restorative justice attempts to move into the mainstream of criminal justice practice, other issues to be considered include whether the goal of informal, personalized criminal justice can accommodate the values of proportionality, equality of treatment, due process, public safety, and adherence to the rule of law, and whether the goal of restoration can be reconciled with the use of punishment, which many citizens regard as a necessary component of criminal justice.

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See also Justice; Victim–Offender Mediation Model

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RETIREMENT

Retirement is an economic-based term that traditionally refers to the ending of paid work, often signaling the end of one's professional or work career. In the United States, retirement is usually accompanied by the receipt of Social Security to provide income, Medicare to cover some health care costs, and private retirement accounts or pensions to supplement savings.

One basic aspect of the retirement process is the question of a retirement age. Two concepts must be the mandatory retirement age and "full" or "normal" retirement age. Issues of a mandatory retirement age center around changes in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In 1967, passage of the ADEA addressed age-related issues in the workplace by preventing hiring and firing practices based on age. In 1978, the focus of the act expanded with an amendment to the ADEA preventing companies from enforcing mandatory retirement upon employees before they reached 70 years of age. More recently,

in 1986, an amendment to the act prohibited companies from setting a mandatory retirement requirement based on age.

Due in part to ADEA legislation, the United States currently has no mandatory retirement age. However, the Social Security Administration (SSA) does set an age for entitlement to full Social Security benefits. The SSA uses the term *normal retirement age* or *full retirement age* to describe the age at which a person can receive full retirement benefits. Retirement before such age incurs a penalty and deductions, while retirement after such age offers increased benefits. According to the SSA, as of 2006, the normal or full retirement age is 65 years of age for those born in the year 1937 or earlier. For those born after 1937, the normal or full retirement age increases by monthly increments. For those born in 1960 and later, the retirement age reaches 67 years.

Early Versus Phased Retirement

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, before the 1990s, the trend was toward early retirement; that is, people retiring before eligibility for full benefits. Now the trend has shifted toward *phased retirement*—simply reducing hours of work gradually and easing into the retirement role. According to the Employment Benefit Research Institute's (EBRI) 2006 Retirement Confidence Survey, although current employees favor more retirement options, such as phased retirement, companies are only beginning to offer phased retirement plans.

Although phased retirement may be preferred, obstacles such as laws and regulations prevented widespread access to phased retirement options. Early versions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prevented taking monies from one's pension while working. Also, if a retiree was working at a part-time job, Social Security benefits were reduced. In 2000, passage of the Senior Citizen Freedom to Work Act addressed these obstacles. It relaxed restrictions for collecting pension monies while working in retirement. Under the Senior Citizen Freedom to Work Act, individuals can work in retirement without a deduction taken from their Social Security benefits. In addition to phased retirement, the combination of all factors (pensions, laws, acts) is leading to what is now called "late retirement," where individuals retire well past age 67 and sometimes in their 70s and 80s. Also common are "bridge jobs"—those jobs that help one transition from a lifelong career into retirement.

Baby Boomers as They Retire

Issues of ways to retire have come to the forefront because a large segment of the U.S. population is reaching retirement age: the baby boomers, those born post–World War II during the years 1946 to 1964. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the first wave will reach 62 in 2008 and will reach 65 in 2011. In fact, the Census Bureau estimates that in 2020, individuals ages 60 to 64 will be double the number of those at that age in 2000. The number of those 65 and over in 2030 will be twice that of 2000, increasing in size from 35 million to 75 million. This sheer number of potential retirees has made lawmakers, companies, and individuals rethink the way they previously viewed retirement. The retirement of the baby boomer group is often cited as a drain or loss of a large percentage of the skilled and experienced labor force.

Retirement Uncertainties

Two trends are leading to uncertainties in retirement. The first is the sheer number of people or segment of the population reaching retirement age. The second is the trend toward increased life expectancy. The volume of retirees has led to questions about the ability of federal programs, such as Social Security, to sustain the current aging population financially. Those considering retirement are concerned that Medicare will not cover all their health care costs.

Second, as life expectancy increases and individuals live longer, many individuals feel they cannot retire and then afford to maintain their current lifestyles for an additional 20 or more years based on income gathered from Social Security, pensions, and savings. Retirees are often unsure of the terms of their employer-based pension accounts even when the terms have been explained to them. To cover these self-estimated costs, 70 to 80 percent of persons expect to work during their retirement, according to surveys of current workers.

Individual Views on Retirement

Literature tends to rate individuals' views on retirement initially as positive, hopeful, and favorable, despite the previously mentioned uncertainties. Some

theorists have long held that retirement (the end of the "Second Age") gives way to a period of increased renewal and personal growth (the "Third Age") in which personal achievement and development are possible. Activity theory, which suggests that retirement is a time when increased formal and informal social interaction can provide enhanced enjoyment because of the adoption of new and fulfilling social roles, can also apply to this period of the life course.

Qualitative studies reveal that attitudes toward retirement change after the individual retires. Many first see retirement as positive (when new or proposed), but due to postretirement changes, the positive attitude declines and some individuals experience an identity crisis due to the role change. In fact, some studies show that retirement is one of life's top 10 stressors. In other words, the initial positive views toward one's retirement are offset by the accompanying role change, isolation, and stress the retiree experiences.

Notably, most empirical studies mention this generally hopeful and optimistic view of retirement is strongly affected by the individual's social class, gender, race, and marital, occupational, and health statuses. The inequalities experienced over the life course carry over to the retirement period as well. Those of higher social class (with higher levels of education, income, and occupational prestige) carry additional income sources and higher social status over to their postretirement identity. Women, especially those in the early baby boomer cohorts, may not have worked outside the home because of the gender norms of the time and tend to be widowed—causing them to have less retirement security than their male counterparts. In terms of race, inequalities in pay for African Americans and Hispanics translate into less certain financial retirement outcomes. As for health status, poor health causes individuals to retire earlier with fewer benefits; those in better health report greater satisfaction during their retirement years.

Demographic changes, laws, private industry's retirement and pension plans, along with descriptive characteristics of the individual, provide insight into the variety of factors shaping the retirement experience.

Joyce Weil

See also Activity Theory; Ageism; Dependency Ratio; Disengagement Theory; Life Course; Medicare; Pensions and Social Security; Population, Graying of

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Riots

Riots arise when groups of people are committing, or may be about to commit, a variety of violent and/or unlawful acts in relation to an apparent grievance or complaint, and/or out of opposition to some form of authority or practice. Riots have occurred for many reasons: from poor working conditions, substandard living quarters, state domination and coercion, taxation, conscription, conflictual race relations, religious conflict, and the outcomes of sporting events. Sometimes riots are distinguished by type: race riots, police riots, prison riots, student riots, "hooliganism,"

and mass street fighting. Generally, a riot is known by acts of violence, property damage, arson, looting, assault, and even murder.

Riots are different from civil disobedience, as the latter is often directed at solving problems through nonviolent means. However, civil disobedience can transform into rioting. Riots can be distinguished from panic brought on by sudden terror or disturbances like disaster situations, such as a fire. Riots can also be distinguished from mobs. Mobs are crowds whose behavior is directed toward a specific, violent end, such as the mob violence of lynchings during the 19th and 20th centuries in the United States. Riots are also different than mass hysteria whereby people respond in similar patterns, such as the Salem witch trials or the "red scare" of McCarthyism.

Different kinds of explanatory and conceptual theories regarding riots have been introduced, developed, and fallen out of favor over the years. One of the earliest explanations for riots was "breakdown theory." This perspective held sway from the genesis of sociology under Auguste Comte to the functionalism of Émile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Neil Smelser, from the Chicago school of sociology of Robert Park and Herbert Blumer, and to the European tradition of Gustave LeBon and Gabriel Tarde. The "breakdown'' approach explains riots as the result of various social mechanisms failing to restrain the masses.

LeBon's explication of breakdown theory was slightly more specific. Introduced in 1895, "contagion theory" proposed that crowds exerted a hypnotic influence and that the frenzy of the crowd was supposedly contagious like a disease. This resulted in irrational, emotionally charged behavior constitutive of a riot. There are several problems with this theory. First, contagion theory presents individual rioters as completely irrational. Second, riots are seen as instigated and guided by sole individuals. Third, the theory grew out of elite responses to mass upheaval and social change and thus framed riots as illogical and inappropriate threats to the social order.

Developed by Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian in the late 1950s, "emergent-norm theory" argues that a combination of like-minded individuals, the anonymity provided by a crowd, and shared emotion lead to riots. This approach is couched within the symbolic interactionist framework that posits that people come together with specific expectations and norms, but in the interactions that follow in the development of the riot, new expectations and norms emerge, allowing for unexpected behavior. Rather than viewing riots as entities governed by randomness and primal "ancestral savagery" (LeBon), Turner and Killian saw riots as rational and norm governed. In trying to recuperate validity from "breakdown" theories due to rising critiques, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky offered "prospect theory" in the late 1970s. This idea maintains that people make decisions to revolt or riot based on their surmise of possible gains or losses from their status quo. The theory argues that the prospect of losses looms as a greater force than possible gains. However, the theory fell out of favor in the 1970s due to its inability to explain riots as they were unfolding.

A new perspective arose in the 1970s called "resource mobilization." This paradigm argued that riots occurred not from societal breakdowns but from groups vying for political positioning. This became the dominate theory of explaining riots by the 1980s. Its chief proponent was Charles Tilly, who argued that solidarity (i.e., networks and identity) within groups rather than insufficient social integration provides the necessary preconditions for riots. Resource mobilization theorists also tend to emphasize riots' "positive attributes" for bringing about social change.

In the early 1990s, Ernest Bormann developed "convergence theory." This paradigm argues that a riot is not an emergent property of the crowd but is a result of like-minded individuals converging in a single area. In other words, a crowd riots not because the situation encouraged or enabled violence, but because people who desired violence came together in the crowd. The primary criticism of convergence theory is that there is a tendency for people to do things in a crowd that they would not do on their own. Crowds have an anonymizing effect on people, leading them to engage in behavior only "normal" within the setting of a riot.

Recently, David Snow et al. advanced a new version of breakdown theory that incorporates ideas from prospect theory and cultural theory (drawing largely from the notion of "habitus'' vis-à-vis Pierre Bourdieu). The synthesis states that riots are more likely to occur in conditions of social breakdown when (a) losses are experienced as deeply felt deprivations in social actors' lives, and (b) when social actors' confidence in the accustomed routines of "normal" social life that provide a satisfying or retributive future is undercut.

In studies of riots as social problems, the following are often considered of great import: context (urban versus rural conditions), questions of a level of

"critical mass," the presence of pre-protest organizations, the role of counter-hegemonic ideology, lack of authoritative or official responsiveness, social cohesions and network solidarity, perceived threats and/or grievances, failures in the social order to provide to its citizenry, quality and quantity of social deprivation, and other factors such as political, religious, racial, economic, gender, sexual, or other actions deemed to directly "spark'' rioting.

The worst riot in U.S. history, with respect to lives lost (more than 100), was the "New York Draft Riot" that occurred from July 13 to July 16, 1863. Also known as "Draft Week," the riot was composed of a series of violent disturbances in New York City that was the culmination of discontent with new laws passed by Congress to draft men to fight in the ongoing Civil War. In the 20th century, the 1992 Los Angeles riots lasted 6 days; many regard them as the worst in recent U.S. history. Examples of other riots across the globe are the Sydney riot of 1879, over an international cricket match in Australia; the 1967 Hong Kong riots that took place over a labor dispute between pro-communist leftists and supporters of British colonial rule; the Stonewall riots in 1969 in New York City between police officers and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer community; the Brixton riot of 1981 in London, involving a confrontation between police officers and a spontaneously forming crowd; and the 2005 Paris incident in which the death of two teenage boys of African descent at the hands of French police sparked a riot that spread to major cities all over France and even to Belgium and Germany.

Matthew W. Hughey

See also Collective Consciousness; Violence; Violence, Collective

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Road Rage

Road rage is any spontaneous, assaultive behavior arising from instances of aggressive driving, traffic annoyances, and/or altercations that begin on roadways or parking lots. Examples of roadway annoyances can include, but are not limited to, arguments, threats, rivalry over parking spaces, inappropriate lane changes, tailgating, speeding, interference of lane changes, slow driving, and horn honking. In other words, road rage occurs when drivers perpetrate acts that annoy or threaten to injure or damage property of another driver or passenger as a result of a roadway incident. Road rage encompasses elements of violence or threats of violence as well as potential and real property damage to other motorists and passengers. Similarly, research on aggression contends that trivial matters have the capability to escalate into physical confrontations that could lead to serious injury of one of the parties involved.

Road rage refers to spur-of-the-moment violence between strangers, which is a salient dynamic between the aggressor and the victim. The reference to strangers highlights an important dimension: it filters out individuals who may have a violent outburst due to a preexisting relationship rather than a suddenly discovered dissatisfaction with each other's driving conduct. A central characteristic of road rage is that the aggressor's target is initially anonymous. Furthermore, the anonymity of the highway as well as the privacy of the car can stimulate further actions. The relative anonymity, ease of escape, and mobility of the automobile offers some drivers the temptation to victimize others on the road. Although the target of a road rage incident is not known initially, only one of the targets has to be the driver of a vehicle. The road rage incident may take place between (a) two drivers; (b) a driver and passenger(s) of either vehicle; (c) a driver and a pedestrian; and (d) a driver and a cyclist. Occasionally, it is passengers who take on the mantle of outrage.

The definition of *road rage* encompasses the dimensions of violence and anonymity of drivers (and/or passengers), and it also may include the threat or destruction of property. The drivers may use obscene

language or gestures, flash headlights at others, tailgate, change lanes, and/or steal parking spaces from other drivers. Because destruction of property is a potential result, it is important to note that not all road rage incidents occur on the road; some incidents may arise "off the road" in parking lots and continue on the roadway. However, violent altercations stemming from a dispute over a parking space also take place in parking lots. At this time, eight states have aggressive driving statutes.

Maria L. Garase

See also Assault; Drunk Driving; Traffic Congestion; Violence

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Role Conflict

Role conflict refers to a condition in which competing and incompatible normative expectations associated with the enactment of social statuses are imposed on an individual. The most noted, though not the only, condition under which this circumstance might occur is when an individual is required to enact simultaneously at least two roles, each of which has competing expectations. The results of such a condition may be psychological stress, role abandonment, or social change.

Though experienced by individuals occupying certain roles, the causes of role conflict may exist at the individual or societal level. At an individual level, role conflict results from a particular set of circumstances associated with an individual situation. At a societal level, role conflict may be symptomatic of underlying social problems or arrangements or the result of social change; it is best alleviated when these structural conditions are addressed.

Generally, social life is arranged so that individuals are called upon to enact one role at a time. This is achieved by either compartmentalizing roles or scheduling the enactment of roles so as to keep them from conflicting. To the extent that this arrangement is maintained, role conflict is avoided; however, there are times when this is not possible. For a particular individual, a change in circumstance may lead to role conflict. For example, a promotion at work may place an individual in a circumstance requiring the supervision of friends. Role expectations of a workplace supervisor, such as hiring and firing others, may conflict with role expectations associated with friendship, such as loyalty.

While experienced by individuals occupying certain roles, causes of role conflict may exist at a societal level as a result of social conditions or arrangements. Role conflict is then experienced by a category of people occupying certain roles affected by certain social circumstances. For example, the roles of employee and parent often conflict. Those occupying these roles are often torn between parental obligations such as staying home with a sick child and going to work. Such role conflict may be experienced by many working parents and may be the result of social conditions such as economic need, the nature of family arrangements, changes in gender expectations, or the absence of viable alternative arrangements.

Resolutions to role conflict are varied. Resolutions are most effective when they are formulated at the level at which the conflict is created. At the individual level, one may abandon one role to meet the requirements of another or recompartmentalize or reprioritize roles to avoid undue conflict. At the societal level, organizational change, collective action, or changes in social policy may need to occur to eliminate role conflict effectively. Often individuals are required to resolve role conflict on their own even when the conflict is created at the societal level. While role conflict is problematic for individuals, it is often the impetus for social change that leads to an improved social condition.

Barbara Feldman

See also Role Strain

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Role Strain

Role strain refers to a condition whereby an individual experiences unease in fulfilling role expectations. For various reasons, the expectations associated with a role may be mutually incompatible or undesirable, leaving a person with feelings of discomfort as she or he is called upon to fulfill role obligations. There are numerous causes of role strain, some avoidable and others inevitable. Feelings of stress and the sense that one is unable to fulfill role expectations are problematic for the individual and for society.

Sources of role strain may originate with the individual or with the expectations of a role. In some cases, an individual may feel unable to successfully meet role expectations because he or she does not accept or is not committed to the underlying values that justify the expectations. The role expectations may contradict an individual's values or call upon one to behave in an undesirable manner or at an unavailable time. For example, lawyers operating under the rules of confidentiality may be privy to information they are professionally required to keep confidential but personally feel compelled to reveal.

Role strain can be a consequence of social arrangements that create a situation in which an individual experiences strain. In this case, the source of the strain resides with the role expectations. An individual may experience role strain when expectations associated with a role are incompatible, competing, or ambiguous. In this case, an individual may want to fulfill expectations but is unable to do so due to a lack of clarity of expectation. For example, expectations associated with the role of parent are often ambiguous. In trying to be a good father, a man may be torn between earning a living to support his family and spending time with his children. Both are expectations of a good father, and both may be impossible to uphold. The ambiguity surrounding expectations of roles such as father creates the stress of role strain but also allows for individual expression of a role.

In some cases, individuals can resolve role strain by seeking clarification of role expectations, ordering expectations in a hierarchy, or adjusting one's own expectations of the fulfillment of a role. However, there is a certain amount of role strain that characterizes a society and its roles and is beyond the ability of an individual to eliminate. Role strain and attempts to reduce it may be the cause of certain problems experienced by individuals, but it may also be the source of change leading to solutions to problems. The processes of role strain resolution may result in innovative or alternative role expectations. A working father, for example, may negotiate an arrangement with an employer allowing for a work schedule that allows him to spend time with his children and still meet the work expectations of the employer.

Barbara Feldman

See also Dual-Income Families; Role Conflict; Second Shift

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Runaways

Runaways are children under the age of majority who leave home without the permission of their caretakers. The simplicity of this definition belies the complexity and diversity of the situations that are sometimes covered by this term. Disputes arise over such dimensions of runaway behavior as duration, distance, and root causes. For example, the concept of *homeless youth* has been introduced to distinguish children, usually older teenagers, who leave home for extended periods of time, sometimes permanently, from *short-term runaways* (who are usually gone a few days). *Chronic runaways* or *recidivists* describe youth who run away from home many times. *Shoveouts, pushouts, castaways,* and *throwaways* have been used to distinguish runaways who have been excluded from, locked out, or otherwise forced from their homes by their

caretakers from those who voluntarily leave their family residence.

In some studies, researchers substitute the label *thrownaway* for *throwaway* in order to focus on the action of an adult caretaker rather than on the characteristics of the child. *Street youth* has been used to describe teenagers who have become acculturated into a street subculture and are often involved in prostitution, petty crime, and other seemingly deviant behaviors. In framing the street youth problem, child advocates sometimes characterize them as being victims of their circumstances. They argue that children are driven to criminal acts because of lack of resources—for example, reframing prostitution as a matter of *survival sex*. Law enforcement agents and other authorities are more apt to recognize the agency of the child and characterize his or her behavior as delinquency. In spite of all the differences, these various terms are sometimes used interchangeably with *runaway youth*.

While these terms are used primarily by social scientists, in legal settings, running away falls under a larger rubric of behaviors known as status offenses. *Status offenders* describe youth who are engaged in a variety of behaviors that can be regulated only because of the youth's status as a minor. In addition to running away, status offenses include such activities as truancy, violating curfews, and disobeying parents. Status offenders are often described as being beyond the control of their parents, incorrigible or ungovernable, or, alternatively, in need of supervision. Since the mid-1970s, the preferred intervention with status offenders has been to divert them from the juvenile justice or child welfare systems whenever possible.

The reasons children run away from home vary. However, researchers have repeatedly documented common problems such as family conflict; physical, emotional, or sexual abuse; substance abuse by either the parent or the child; parental intolerance of the youth's sexual orientation, sexual behavior, or choice in friends; and difficulty in school. The severity of these problems can range from minor to significant.

Children who leave home briefly, do not travel far, go to relatives or family friends, and return home quickly are generally not considered in danger; however, serious problems have been associated with running away in the population of youth who leave home repeatedly or for longer periods of time. Since social scientists studying runaways often obtain study samples from high-risk environments, such as runaway youth shelters, drop-in centers, and street outreach units, runaway behavior has been correlated with a variety of negative outcomes. These include dropping out of school; being at risk for victimization and exploitation; engaging in sexual risk behaviors (resulting in HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases [STDs], and pregnancy); abusing alcohol and drugs; suffering physical health problems, including both acute and chronic disorders; experiencing mental health problems, including depression, suicide ideation, and self-mutilation; and incurring increased risk of adult homelessness and criminal activity.

Running away is sometimes characterized as a gateway behavior that can lead to increasingly problematic and risky activities. The primary concern is the cumulative effect of these assorted risk factors. For example, children who repeatedly run away are more likely to drop out of school, which can diminish their future employment opportunities, increase the likelihood that they will turn to criminal activity or be victimized on the street, and increase the likelihood of adult homelessness.

Current programs targeted specifically at runaway and homeless youth include crisis shelters, transitional living programs, drop-in centers, street outreach programs, and runaway hotlines or crisis phone lines (such as the National Runaway Switchboard). In general, the philosophy behind these services is to make them not only easily accessible by youth but also voluntary. Youth are not ordered into treatment by a judge or a parent but rather must request help themselves. Most runaway shelters are located in urban areas, although smaller communities sometimes set up "host homes" willing to take in a child temporarily. However, even in urban settings, research has shown that youth have trouble accessing basic services such as health or mental health care. One reason for this difficulty is that parental signatures are generally required for minors receiving treatment or entering into a contract (including one for a lease, loan, or employment), an impediment for youth who are on their own.

In addition to being at risk themselves, runaway children can pose certain risks to those adults who are inclined to help them. Most states have criminal laws against custodial interference, endangering the welfare of a minor, or harboring a minor. These laws make it a crime for adults to interfere with the parent–child relationship. Thus adults who provide shelter or aid to runaways can be subject to criminal prosecution. Many states make special provisions for runaway shelters or other short-term care facilities in order to circumvent these restrictions.

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See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Child Neglect; Family, Dysfunctional; Homelessness, Youth; Juvenile Delinquency

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S

Same-Sex Marriage

Same-sex marriage challenges the definition of marriage. Conservatives oppose it on moral grounds, claiming it threatens the structure of the Western institution of heterosexual marriage. Others identify the social problem as the institution of marriage itself. Supporters of same-sex marriage identify the social problem as heterosexual hegemony and discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people.

Although the institution of marriage versus same-sex unions has been critiqued for centuries, in the late 20th century criticisms began with the feminist and gay/lesbian rights movement and the sexual revolution of the late 1960s. Non-procreative sex and sex outside of marriage, particularly for women, redefined monogamous marriage. Radical feminists viewed marriage as an oppressive institution of patriarchy. The heterosexual monogamous lifestyle was challenged by the strengthening of alternative living arrangements. The focus moved to creating equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and transgender, and later intersexed, queer, and questioning people (LGBTIQQ). In recent decades, that focus changed to legalization of same-sex marriage.

Same-sex marriage differs from civil unions and domestic partnerships. *Domestic partnership* refers to policies passed by private businesses, local or state governments, and universities that provide legal protections such as health insurance benefits for same-sex couples and unmarried heterosexual couples. However, it doesn't provide constitutional rights such as a guarantee to due process, marriage as a fundamental right, freedom of association, and the right to equal protection. Some domestic partner benefits require that the employed partner pay taxes on the dependent partner's benefits.

Civil unions are legal partnerships recognized by local or state governments but do not carry the same weight as marriage. Only marriage allows for the 1,138 federal benefits such as Social Security survivor or spousal benefits, workers' compensation, and public assistance; the ability to file a joint tax return and other tax benefits; estate benefits; immigration rights; military and veteran's benefits; and coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The argument for same-sex marriage is likened to ending anti-interracial marriage laws in the United States in 1967 as evidenced in the *Loving v. Virginia* decision. Meanwhile, civil unions allow states to circumvent constitutional amendments that define marriage as a union between a man and a woman.

The current debate over same-sex marriage focuses on federal policies, court rulings, state laws, and city ordinances. The 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, creates an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which allows for enforcement of contracts and other state laws across state lines. DOMA defines marriage as a union between one man and one woman for purposes of federal law and allows states to refuse to acknowledge the legality of same-sex marriages performed in other states. DOMA passed in reaction to a 1993 Hawaii supreme court ruling stating it was gender discrimination to deny lesbian and gay couples the right to obtain a marriage license. In 1998, Hawaii

passed a constitutional amendment outlawing same-sex marriage.

The Federal Marriage Amendment seeks to further fight state efforts to legalize same-sex marriage by amending the U.S. Constitution. Introduced in 2003, it would make only different-sexed marriage legal. To date, it has not passed either house of Congress.

However, three 2003 landmark court rulings paved the way for the recent focus on same-sex marriage: (1) Ontario, Canada, granted same-sex couples the right to marry under the Charter of Rights; (2) the U.S. Supreme Court stated anti-gay sodomy laws violate the U.S. Constitution's right to privacy; and (3) the Massachusetts supreme court stated denial of same-sex marriage violates the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.

Mayors in several U.S. cities defied state law and issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Beginning in San Francisco in 2004, the mayors issued marriage licenses followed by civil ceremonies. These acts of civil disobedience renewed the national debate.

States passed constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage. Only 11 states had avoided anti-same-sex marriage legislative activity by 2004; several states passed "Super-DOMAs." Conversely, Massachusetts recently legalized same-sex marriages; Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont legalized statewide civil unions.

The lack of recognition of same-sex marriage is also a threat to heterosexual transsexuals. Prior to 2002, if a state allowed the marriage of a post-transition person to the opposite sex, the U.S. government honored it for immigration purposes. In 2002, the United States ended this practice. Rulings against this policy exist; however, it is still enforced.

In the United States, marriage is both a civil and religious institution. The legislation discussed applies only to civil marriage. Just as some religious bodies do not recognize divorce or interfaith marriages, some also do not recognize same-sex marriages. Some religious denominations—Reform and Reconstructionist Judaism, Unitarianism, select United Church of Christ congregations, and Episcopalian congregations—have sanctioned same-sex marriage as a religious contract.

Several countries have pro-same-sex couple laws, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Internationally, Mexico City legalized it.

Whether same-sex marriage violates the values of those who see it as mimicking a heterosexually privileged institution or those who see it as a threat to the foundation of traditional marriage and the nuclear family, or finds support from those who see it as denying equal rights to same-sex couples and their children, it has created a flurry of policy changes. This attention has changed the face of civil rights discourse for LGBTIQQ people.

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See also Adoption, Gay and Lesbian; Family; Hegemony; Homophobia; Homosexuality; Sexual Orientation

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Sanctuary Movement

The sanctuary movement was a religious and political movement of approximately 500 churches of different Christian denominations in the United States, during the years of 1982–92, that assisted in the sheltering of hundreds of Central American refugees from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities. The movement originated along the U.S. border with Mexico in Arizona but was also strong in Chicago, Philadelphia, and California. It flourished

among Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists, although various denominations of Jews, Quakers, and Mennonites were also involved.

The national sanctuary movement was originally conceived in 1981 by the collaborations of Rev. John Fife of the Southside United Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona, and Jim Corbett, a retired Quaker rancher. They were responding to an influx into the United States of Central American refugees who needed political asylum but were being deported by the INS. Corbett became involved with the Central American refugees in May 1981 after a friend picked up an El Salvadorian hitch-hiking refugee in the Nogales, Arizona, area. Fife became involved after a news story broke of a professional "coyote" (the Spanish name given to those commercial smugglers who help aliens cross the United States–Mexico border for a fee) abandoned a group of 26 El Salvadorians in the Sonora Desert of Arizona in summer 1980. Half of the refugees died of dehydration, and the other half were placed in detention by the U.S. Border Patrol and processed for deportation. For many people, this story was their first encounter with the INS's treatment of undocumented aliens, and also with the violent political culture of Central America and the U.S. government's support of repressive regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Fife's church started a weekly prayer vigil for the refugees, and the prayer meetings soon transformed into a gathering for immigration lawyers and refugees. In the spring of 1981, the Tucson Ecumenical Council (TEC) created a Task Force on Central America and began to raise money to bail refugees out of detention and to fund paralegals to help with the asylum application process. Yet, after $750,000 in bonds and $100,000 in legal expenses were raised and spent, the TEC declared the efforts futile.

Corbett and Fife began to challenge others to do more than help after refugees were arrested and to be more proactive. Noting that they had worked with the INS in a cooperative manner and exhausted all existing avenues, they began to advocate that church members should take in refugees and protect them from arrest. At first, refugees were taken into members' homes, but soon after church members were transporting refugees away from the border, from the border into the church, and even across the United States–Mexico border.

In the fall of 1981, a group of churches, including the University Lutheran Chapel from Berkeley, California (a sanctuary church for war resisters during the Vietnam War), the Sather Gate Churches, composed of Berkeley pastors, and others, gathered together to form the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant. In November 1981, St. John's Presbyterian Church in Berkeley secretly sheltered a refugee family, Southside United Presbyterian Church in Tucson publicly declared it would be a sanctuary, and University Lutheran Chapel publicly welcomed a refugee family into the church.

The sanctuary movement had its official beginning on March 24, 1982. By the end of 1983, there were nearly 70 public sanctuary sites, more than 600 supporting congregations, and 50 local organizing committees. At the height of the movement, more than 200 religious orders and more than 600 religious organizations (such as the National Federation of Priests' Councils) across the nation publicly declared themselves in favor of sanctuary. Key supporters, like the Reverend William Sloane Coffin Jr. issued a challenge to broaden the focus of the movement to include the poor and minority groups; he drew parallels between foreign and domestic U.S. policies and called for an end to "unexamined sloganism" of anti-communism. Another supporter, Professor Robert McAfee Brown of the Pacific School of Religion, made a striking connection between the call to action of religious believers and the repressive actions of the state by expressing that uncritical allegiance to the government is "idolatry of the state."

Refugees themselves did not directly criticize the movement, but they made it clear that they were opposed to any attempts to make them mere objects of interest for a political or religious mission. Many remarked that they were committed to telling their personal testimonies as public witnesses of suffering and human rights abuses, but they also maintained that they were physically and emotionally drained from these required retellings and often asked for clarification of the sanctuary movement mission. Many challenges arose, from churches being raided by the INS and refugees and members being arrested, a lack of sufficient communication and attention to the various churches for fear of arrest or prosecution, the screening of refugees as potential candidates that caused many divisions between Mexican and Central American aliens, to a tension in movement missions between the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America and the Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force on Central America.

In January 1985, a federal grand jury handed down a 71-count indictment (including conspiracy,

smuggling, harboring, and aiding "illegal aliens") against 16 movement supporters, including two priests, three nuns, Fife, and Corbett. The following year, in 1986, eight of the sanctuary workers were convicted; Corbett was acquitted, and Fife was sentenced to 5 years of probation. Southside Presbyterian Church took the U.S. government to court and later won a lawsuit on the basis that the government possessed no right to spy on church activities.

Over the following years, the movement dwindled in support due to reduced media coverage, internal conflicts over intensity and direction, government repression, failure to recruit new supportive members, and the notion that the movement "won" after a December 19, 1990, decision to cease all deportations of El Salvadorians and Guatemalans. Despite these tensions and critiques, a theology of the ministry of sanctuary seemed to emphasize four key themes: (1) the provision of physical security and services for refugees, (2) a new ministry under a platform of social justice, (3) an emerging role for the church as a domestic political protest vehicle, and (4) the church as a vehicle for protest of U.S. foreign policy in Central America.

Matthew W. Hughey

See also Refugees

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Sandwich Generation

The "Sandwich Generation" refers to those people who are simultaneously caring for family members at both ends of the life span—children and elders. The stress associated with being in the sandwich generation can constitute a social problem. Moreover, holding a job in addition to multiple family care responsibilities is a situation that affords its own set of challenges, and it is one that employers are beginning to recognize as a significant concern. At the same time, it is important to recognize that rewards result from caring for both children and elders, and that both the children and the elders can contribute positively to the well-being of the family.

Although being sandwiched between caring for children and elders (specifically aging parents) is not a "typical" situation, no official prevalence estimates exist. Although the U.S. Census details the characteristics of households, it does not include family care arrangements that occur outside of the household, as is the case with most sandwiched people whose aging parents or other elderly relatives tend to live independently or, in some cases, in a care facility. Estimates vary considerably, depending on the population sampled (e.g., the entire adult population, only women, only employees, only caregivers to elders), whether there is an age criterion for "elder" (e.g., 50, 60, 65), whether only aging parents or other elders are considered, how "elder care" is defined, whether there is an age criterion for either the caregiver or the child, or how child care is defined. Generally, taking all of these variables into consideration, estimates ranged from 10 to 20 percent of the population being "sandwiched" in some way.

Several factors contribute to the phenomenon of being sandwiched, thereby fueling the interest of public policymakers, employers, and researchers about this population. These include (a) the aging of the U.S. population, the aging of the workforce, and the increased care needs of an older population; (b) delayed and reduced childbearing in the U.S. population, the resulting increase in the ages of parents of young children, and the decrease in the number of siblings available to share in the care of aging parents; (c) an increasing number of women, the traditional caregivers of both children and elders, who have entered or returned to the labor force and the related increase in the number of families in which both the husband and the wife are working—that is, dual-earner couples; (d) an increase in multigenerational households; (e) rising health care costs and the increased pressures on families to provide care; and finally, (f) growing documentation of the dynamic interplay between work and family demands and the effects on individuals' health and well-being as well as on organizations' bottom lines in the form of absenteeism, turnover, and overall market performance.

In general, research shows that the stress associated with combining work and family care roles is related

to negative individual outcomes such as decreased mental health and increased stress and strain, both on and off the job. In addition, work–family conflict is related to negative work outcomes such as increased absenteeism, decreased job satisfaction, and increased turnover. Limited research, however, exists specifically on workers in the sandwich generation. That which does exist reveals higher levels of stress, absenteeism, and decreased mental and physical health among workers caring for both children and aging parents. At the same time, evidence also exists to show that the beneficial effects of multiple roles can buffer this stress.

In the United States, responsibility for addressing workers' and their families' needs is shared among individuals, employers, nongovernmental organizations, and, last, government agencies. This is in stark contrast to most other industrialized nations that view responsibility for addressing workers' and their families' needs as in the public domain, with the government assuming leadership and legislating provisions for family care.

Advocates argue that sandwich generation families need assistance in managing their work and family role demands to alleviate potentially negative associated health outcomes. This requires recognition that work–family stress is a major public health issue related to social problems. Thus, they contend, the U.S. government should assume a level of family support comparable to that of other industrialized countries. Furthermore, employers can help by increasing work schedule flexibility and job autonomy, minimizing long work hours, and training supervisors in family-supportive supervisor behaviors. By providing both governmental and organizational support to families caring for children and elders, improvements in family well-being should result that will ultimately have a positive impact on public health and social problems.

Leslie B. Hammer and Margaret B. Neal

See also Dual-Income Families; Family; Population, Graying of; Stratification, Age

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SCAPEGOATING

The most detailed definitions of scapegoating are in the literature on intergroup prejudice, family therapy, and group therapy. Simply, *scapegoating* can refer to a situation in which anger and frustration felt toward one person is displaced onto another, often someone less powerful than the person causing the frustration. In the first half of the 20th century, social psychologists tried to translate this idea (also known as *projection*) into one that would explain intergroup prejudice, but this analytical approach proved too simplistic to explain the complexities of prejudice.

However, scapegoating is a well-developed concept in family therapy and group therapy literature. Based on clinical case studies, psychoanalytic and systemic thinking usually underpins such work. Projective identification (a psychoanalytic concept) occurs when a person onto whom feelings are displaced comes to be regarded as actually *possessing* these characteristics or difficult feelings. For example, others may begin to see that individual as an angry or frustrating person. Triangulation (a systemic concept) occurs when a relationship between two people or groups is in danger of splitting apart because of unexpressed conflict. One or both of the parties may employ a third person or group to stabilize the relationship. They do this by displacing uncomfortable feelings onto this target until the original conflict is addressed directly. So, when tensions between two warring factions threaten group unity, a scapegoat may emerge and come to be seen as "the problem." In this way, the family or group is held together until the real problem—or power battle—is resolved.

Clearly, scapegoating can have a negative effect on its targets, ranging from feelings of anxiety, inadequacy, and insecurity to the experience of verbal abuse, discrimination, and physical harm. The difficulty is in knowing how best to prevent it and how to manage it when it happens. For example, group

therapists see it as an integral part of group development. Furthermore, therapy literature usually construes it as a process of which the attackers are not fully aware. Further research into this ubiquitous and painful process would be useful.

For example, could the displacement of anger felt toward one person or group onto another less powerful person or group explain the numerous examples of prejudice witnessed throughout world history, such as Christians in ancient Rome, Jews in 20th-century Europe, and more recently, illegal aliens in the United States? Past and present examples abound of political ideologues using propaganda to blame societal ills on some group. Over the years in major immigrant-receiving nations—such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States—a variety of racial and ethnic groups have been targets. One explanation might be that the true source of the frustration is too ill defined or too powerful, and consequently the frustrated individual or group redirects anger against a socially sanctioned target that is unable to strike back. Similarly, scapegoating might offer an explanation of sports events in which fans or commentators can be seen to single out an individual player as the cause for a loss.

Roz Dixon and Vincent N. Parrillo

See also Blaming the Victim; Family, Dysfunctional; Social Conflict

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School Dropouts

Since the mid-20th century, concern in the United States has escalated about students who leave the formal education system before completing at least a high school diploma. Recent high school dropout rates are often described as a "crisis," particularly in big cities, where the figures may be as high as 50 percent. Nationally, a common statistic is that around 30 percent of those who start high school never complete a regular high school diploma, although different methods of calculating the rate yield dramatically different estimates. The numbers also vary substantially by gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnic background.

Still, a large share of dropouts—upward of 50 percent—do eventually attain a high school–level credential, most often by completing the general education development (GED) credential. Since the 1970s, the percentage of young adults earning GEDs has gone up, statistically offsetting a small rise in the dropout rate during the same period. But GED preparation often is not as rigorous as ordinary high school curriculum, and experts do not consider it a true equivalent to earning a high school diploma.

Reasons for Concern

Most often the problem of dropping out is cast in economic terms. In the eyes of many sociologists and economists, the link between years of education and personal earnings is irrefutable, at least in aggregate statistics. Extending this logic, people who do not reach a certain level of education are relegated to the least desirable and lowest-paying jobs. A range of ideas have been put forward to explain why this is the case. For example, some consider education particularly important due to the rise of so-called knowledge work in white-collar jobs. Whatever the reasons, dropping out appears to drastically reduce chances for upward economic mobility; it is a decidedly negative factor in the U.S. opportunity structure—a factor all the more troubling because it disproportionately affects minority groups.

A related line of thinking ties education to U.S. competition in the world economy. Many people believe the U.S. education system plays a central role in ensuring the country's economic strength; the country cannot "afford" to have undereducated workers. Valid or not, this is an enduring argument and produces characteristic calls to increase both the quantity and quality of general education.

Historically though, rationales for formal education were not all economic. The public school movement of the 19th century emphasized education's role in shaping an informed public. Education was

perceived as a requirement of a healthy democracy. Another argument for compulsory education was to protect children from exploitative labor, and a related motive, to prevent adults from losing their jobs to low-wage young workers. At different times religion has also been a stimulus to education, as has the general wish for a "liberal" or well-rounded education. All these ideas are notable in their relative absence from the contemporary framing of school dropouts.

Research on Dropouts

Because the issue has held such a high profile, a large amount of research has been done on this subject. Much of this work attempts to identify subgroups of students who are likely to drop out, along with combinations of factors that increase or decrease their chances of doing so. Four themes emerge in the research:

1. *Social integration:* the relationships that a student has with teachers, other students, and administrators.
2. *Academic engagement:* the practices and norms of being a student, such as enjoying school, getting good grades, having good study skills, and participating actively. This might also mean having the "cultural capital" to know how to negotiate the arbitrary rules of school and behave in ways teachers expect.
3. *Family background:* attributes like socioeconomic status, the student's household composition, parents' interest in and support for schooling, and the general nature of the student's home life.
4. *Personality factors:* self-esteem, self-confidence, aspirations, sense of commitment, and whether the student feels in control and effective in life.

Each of these areas can have positive or negative effects on the chances of dropping out, and they may be closely intertwined. Students might be singled out for disciplinary actions because they are perceived as disruptive (low academic engagement), but the initial reason for the behavior might be lack of interest shown by the teacher (low social integration). Eventually this can lead to students being "pushed out" of school, where the "dropout" is effectively expelled or given onerous terms of attendance. No generally accepted explanation accounts for all these factors. In fact, most studies are quite specialized; social psychologists tend to look at personality issues, while economists and sociologists are more likely to study income inequality, school resources and management, and family patterns.

One issue drawing increased attention is the phenomenon of "stopping out," when students leave school for a spell but then return and finish at a later time. Sometimes those who go on to earn a GED are included in this category, and to understand the full picture, one must consider how students use adult education and community college programs either to complete a diploma or to embark on a vocational track. Less studied than dropping out, this pattern involves many of the same factors. Experts believe that employment among low-income students is a common reason for stopping out.

While college dropout rates have not drawn as much attention, research supports many of the same types of explanations at the postsecondary level. Parental factors are still important, and new problems arise concerning student finance since, unlike in public high schools, college students usually must obtain funding for tuition and possibly living expenses. Keeping exact statistics on college-level dropouts is also more complicated because multi-institution attendance is almost the norm; in this case figures like the percentage of 25-year-olds with a college degree can be more informative than a given institution's graduation rate.

Scott Heil

See also Cultural Capital; Education, Inner-City Schools; Education, Policy and Politics; Educational Equity; Illiteracy, Adult in Developed Nations; Income Disparity; Inequality; Racism; Social Capital; Social Promotions

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School Funding

In most jurisdictions, formal schooling does not operate within the market economy. Rather, it is provided, directly or indirectly, by government at negligible direct cost to students and parents. How this service is funded is largely a political decision.

Political responsibility for school systems tends to reside primarily with the level of government also primarily responsible for their funding. Countries with national education systems (e.g., France, Finland) fund schools primarily from national revenues; those with state or provincial systems (e.g., Germany, Australia) with a combination of national and state or provincial revenues; and those with local school districts (the United States, Switzerland) with a combination of national, state or provincial, and local revenues.

Local funding can be popular when it allows more local control of schools. But, the smaller the jurisdiction responsible for funding schools, the more likely there are to be equity concerns. Local jurisdictions with a strong tax base can more easily fund schools than can those with a weak tax base.

If, for example, school revenues come from property taxes, jurisdictions with large, wealthy property owners (e.g., industrial plants, shopping centers) and few students can fund their schools easily even with a weak tax effort (i.e., a low tax rate). By contrast, jurisdictions with high levels of poverty, many children of school age, and few wealthy property owners may be unable to adequately fund their schools even with a strong tax effort (i.e., a high tax rate).

This disparity is exacerbated in U.S. metropolitan areas where wealthier families have more residential options. School districts may compete to attract *net fiscal surplus* residents—highly employable, steady taxpayers, with few children in need of public services—and repel *net fiscal deficit* residents—marginally employable, unsteady taxpayers, with many children—through restrictive zoning regulations that raise the entry price for housing out of their reach.

Few school systems provide all educational goods and services completely free of charge to students and parents. The amount of private expenditure on schooling varies from small fees required for optional "extras" (e.g., expenses for sports equipment or field trips) to most of the cost at independent private schools in systems that receive no government subsidy. Generally, a tradeoff exists between government funding and independence from government rules and regulations. Some countries have three types of funding regimes: virtually complete government funding for government-run schools, some government funding for privately run schools that meet government rules and standards (i.e., charter schools), and no government funding for schools free of government rules and standards.

The proportion of school funding provided privately also tends to rise with grade level. This relationship acknowledges that some human capital is more socially beneficial and some more individually beneficial. Conventional wisdom holds that it is in society's interest to educate its young to that level at which they become contributors rather than burdens. But, past that point, the *returns to education* may accrue more to the individual, and many feel that education consumers should pay their own way for higher and professional education.

In the United States and elsewhere, the amount of government funding provided each school is determined largely by student headcount per formula—the most common type being a *foundation formula*. The "foundation" is the amount of funding provided a school for each regular student enrolled. Per-student funding then increases by some fractional increment above the foundation to accommodate the needs of students in special circumstances (e.g., those with disabilities, in vocational education, economically disadvantaged, non-native speakers) that require greater expense.

A popular indirect method of funding schooling is through tax expenditures—measured as the amount of potential government revenue forgone due to a tax exemption. For example, educational institutions, even those privately run, may be freed of some of the tax obligations imposed on non-educational organizations. For another example, student expenses for tuition or fees, or revenue from scholarships, may be allowed as income tax deductions or credits.

Education accounting nomenclature divides expenditures into *functions,* or activities, and *objects*—things and people. Total expenditures are also classified as *current* (i.e., recurring items) or *capital* (i.e., long-lasting items, such as buildings and furniture). *Debt service* is the periodic payment of principal and interest on bonds.

Richard P. Phelps

See also Charter Schools; Debt Service; Education, Policy and Politics; Education, Special Needs Children; Educational Equity; School Vouchers; Social Capital

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School Prayer

As a social problem, the term *school prayer* refers to the controversy surrounding the presence or absence of religious practices in U.S. public schools. The debate over the appropriateness of prayer in public schools stems from the "establishment clause" of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This clause is commonly interpreted to mean that U.S. society should feature a "separation of church and state," though this term does not appear in the Constitution and was coined later by Thomas Jefferson in his private correspondence. The inclusion of the establishment clause in the Constitution ensured religious freedom, in contrast to the persecution suffered by immigrants from England in their native country.

The U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with this issue repeatedly in recent decades. In 1963, the landmark case of *Abington Township v. Schempp* disallowed the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the Bible in public school classrooms. The case established the "secular purpose" and "primary effect" tests to determine whether a particular public school practice is compatible with the establishment clause. To be in accordance with the Constitution, a law or practice must be clear in its secular purpose and not promote or inhibit a particular religion. In the 1985 *Wallace v. Jaffree* case, the Court struck down the Alabama statute setting for students a daily period of silence for private prayer. Though conceding that a moment of silence for voluntary prayer is not itself unconstitutional, the Court ruled that this particular statute existed for the sole purpose of advancing religion and was therefore unconstitutional. In 1992, the Court barred prayers at public school graduation ceremonies, and in 2000 the Court struck down student-led prayers prior to school athletic events. The most recent school prayer controversy surrounds the Pledge of Allegiance and the inclusion of the phrase "under God" therein.

Despite these rulings, 58 percent of U.S. teenagers favor the presence of a spoken nondenominational prayer in school, and 84 percent support a moment of silence for voluntary prayer or meditation. Nearly half of U.S. teenagers (44 percent) support the presence of prayers that specifically mention Jesus Christ. Adults are less tolerant of these practices: 53 percent of the general public supports a moment of silence, about 20 percent favors a nondenominational prayer that mentions God, and only 6 percent advocates prayers that mention Jesus Christ. Nearly 1 in 5 adults believes that schools should avoid all types of prayer entirely, including the moment of silence. Interestingly, the main objection to school prayer is not the separation of church and state that concerns the Supreme Court, but rather the more emotional view that school prayer embarrasses and isolates students whose religion is different or who belong to no religion.

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See also Education, Policy and Politics; Religion, Civil; Religion and Politics

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School Segregation

School segregation occurs when minority or subordinated groups of individuals are separated from majority or dominant groups in formal schooling institutions. The segregation may occur between schools (interschool segregation) or within schools (intraschool segregation). A historically salient example of interschool segregation in the United States occurred during the period of Jim Crow (early 20th century) with the state-sanctioned formation of "colored" schools and "white" schools. Intraschool segregation occurs within a single schooling facility when students from subordinated or dominant groups are "tracked" or steered into particular classes based on their group membership, typically derived from ascribed characteristics such as gender, race, or class status, not interest or aptitude. Historically, the benefits and drawbacks of school segregation have been vigorously debated; the conclusions of such debates tend to reflect cultural belief systems, particularly beliefs regarding the dynamics of race, ethnicity, and gender and their relationship to social inequality in contemporary society.

Relationship of School Segregation to Inequality

Social theorists and researchers have long examined the relationship between formal education and social inequality. With the movement from agrarian economies to industrialized economies dominated by bureaucratic organizational structures, the role of formal education as a credentialing system steadily gained importance. Although education and upward social mobility are highly correlated in more industrialized societies, research consistently shows that schooling institutions in such economies tend to reproduce and maintain existing social inequalities. That is, although upward mobility is possible, most students improve their social standing little, if at all, as a result of their schooling experiences. The reproduction and maintenance of social inequalities is most evident in societies where historically subordinated groups are prevented from participating in formal schooling institutions or are subjected to inferior schooling opportunities as a result of segregation. Given the powerful relationship between schools and inequality, a historical examination of the political, economic, and social dynamics that resulted in de jure (mandated by law) and de facto (in reality or fact) school segregation is necessary to understand contemporary inequalities.

De Jure School Segregation

In many instances, formal schooling institutions have been forcefully segregated along race and gender lines for a variety of cultural reasons that are then substantiated when sanctioned by the state. A brief examination of U.S. schooling history that focuses on the causes and effects of interschool segregation along racial and gender lines reveals how political, economic, and social forces can converge to produce persistent social inequality.

Racial Segregation

In the United States, "colored" students were legally prohibited from attending "white-only" schools during the late 19th and early 20th centuries because of prejudicial cultural beliefs regarding the social roles and rights of "colored" citizens and freed slaves. In 1896, the Supreme Court sided with the state of Louisiana, which had ruled that Homer Plessy, a legally identified "colored" man, could not ride in a train car reserved for "whites" only. This landmark ruling ushered in the Jim Crow era, which manifested itself most visibly in the construction of "separate but equal" public facilities, most notably schools. From the beginning, these segregated schools were racially distinct but never equal. "Colored" schools received far fewer resources than their "white" counterparts, and because schools serviced specific neighborhoods, a by-product of most students walking to school, their construction helped propel and maintain the racialized neighborhood segregation already underway in many urban, suburban, and rural communities.

The doctrine of "separate but equal" persisted until 1954, when the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (*Brown I*) that separate schools were "inherently unequal." In 1955, the Supreme Court determined in *Brown II* that desegregation should occur with "all deliberate speed," although critics argue that this follow-up to *Brown I* failed to delineate how and when such desegregation should take place. Facing opposition from a number of southern political leaders, President Dwight Eisenhower in 1957 publicly demonstrated his support of the *Brown* decision by ordering the National Guard to escort nine black students attending a predominantly white high school in Little Rock, Arkansas. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, several Supreme Court cases clarified what *Brown II* did not, identifying the means by which desegregation might take place (*Green v. New Kent County*, 1968; *Alexander v. Holmes County*, 1969; *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg*, 1971; *Keyes v. Denver*, 1973).

However, beginning in 1968 with *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County* and in 1974 with *Milliken v. Bradley*, the Supreme Court's decisions have, in effect, resulted in undermining the goals of *Brown*. Although the intent of the *Green* decision was to end school segregation "root and branch," elements of the ruling were used in subsequent Supreme Court decisions that effectively exempted districts from complying with *Brown*. Essentially, *Green* outlined the criteria by which schools could determine their success or failure in achieving desegregation. Using these guidelines, subsequent Supreme Court decisions determined that a number of districts had achieved desegregation "to the extent practicable," therefore allowing them to declare "unitary" status and reclaim local control. As a result, schools that experienced only marginal desegregation in the Northeast, Midwest, and West have remained racially and ethnically segregated, and schools in the South, the only region that had significantly desegregated in the 1960s and 1970s, have slowly resegregated.

Gender Segregation

At one time or another, girls and women in nearly all cultures with formal schooling institutions were prevented from attaining a formal education. Cultural beliefs regarding the familial and occupational roles of women in society, which were then sanctioned by state policies and laws limiting girls' and women's access to schooling, fundamentally shaped their educational opportunities.

Historically, even when educational opportunities for men and women to attend college reached near parity, as they did in the early 1900s in the United States, rarely were men and women attending the same institutions. That changed in 1972 with passage of Title IX, an amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965. Title IX strictly prohibited elementary, secondary, and postsecondary schools receiving federal funds from denying students admittance into a program or participation in an activity solely on the basis of their sex. As a result, a number of male-only colleges and universities began to admit women in the 1960s and 1970s. Although much analysis of Title IX's influence has focused on sexual harassment rights and athletic opportunities for girls and women, it also impacted gender desegregation of colleges and universities by fundamentally altering and improving the educational experiences of girls and women in the United States.

De Facto School Segregation

Many of the cultural beliefs and laws that resulted in de jure segregation contributed significantly to de facto segregation, which has persisted long after laws and policies supporting segregation were overturned. Urban researchers have systematically revealed the social processes resulting in residential racial, ethnic, and class segregation in many industrialized countries. Tracing local histories, they describe how the disappearance of manufacturing in many communities resulted in a loss of jobs and local tax revenue, leaving pockets of concentrated poverty. Additionally, such regional poverty took on a racialized dimension when subordinated groups, including citizens who represented racial minorities or recent immigrants, were more likely than citizens comprising the racial majority to live in these areas due to their limited resources and the discrimination often faced from realtors, landlords, and bankers. Because schools service neighborhoods, the likelihood that school populations would reflect the reality of these impoverished racially and ethnically segregated neighborhoods increased. Educational researchers emphasize that segregation by race or ethnicity almost always involves issues of concentrated poverty and linguistic segregation as well, issues that contribute to the creation and maintenance of social inequalities. For

example, according to findings from the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, at the end of the 20th century, only 5 percent of U.S. students attending segregated white-dominated schools experienced concentrated poverty, whereas 80 percent of students attending segregated Latino/a- or African American–dominated schools were living in impoverished neighborhoods.

Furthermore, even in schools that successfully attract racially diverse student bodies, evidence of segregation along gender, racial, and ethnic lines frequently exists in the "tracks" or set of classes to which students are assigned by teachers and administrators. These differences are most evident in secondary schools, where, in most countries, students select or are steered toward a course of study to prepare them for employment, trade school, or college. Research consistently reveals that members of subordinated groups are more likely than members of the dominant group to be segregated into tracks preparing them for employment in the low- or middle-wage sector. Although de facto gender segregation is diminishing in many fields, it still exists in a number of schooling programs, most notably nursing, engineering, and early education.

A. Fiona Pearson

See also *Brown v. Board of Education*; Educational Equity; Gender Gap; Jim Crow; *Plessy v. Ferguson*; Segregation; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure; Segregation, Residential

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School Violence

Experts once defined *school violence* conventionally as a serious crime (i.e., murder, rape, assault, robbery, and theft) that occurred on school grounds. However, as social and political awareness focused more rigorously on investigating the phenomenon of school violence, the definition of school violence expanded. The broadened definition rested on research indicating that the threshold for injury for children is much lower than for adults. Compared to adults, children have less emotional maturity and physical ability to defend themselves, making them more vulnerable to emotional, mental, and physical injury. Therefore, even minimal exposure to violence in a school setting may have lasting detrimental effects on a child's development. Traditionally, peer harassment (physical and verbal), sexual harassment, bullying, and fear were accepted as school cultural norms. However, such behaviors are becoming less accepted as a normal part of the "school experience."

Detrimental developmental and educational outcomes occur for students who endure school violence. Exposure to school violence correlates with diminished educational attainment, mental health, general adolescent development, school attachment, and a negative impact on the overall educational process as well as the student's life course. Dropping out, suicide, drug use, and future involvement with delinquency and adult criminal behavior each correlate with school violence. Because school violence may severely impair a student's educational and life outcomes, an understanding of the individual and school environmental factors that make students more or less vulnerable to school violence is important.

Data and Trends

The best sources of data about violence in school come from government agencies. Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, publishes the *School Crime Supplement* to the National Crime Victimization Survey, one of the most comprehensive sources of data available about victimization.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics in cooperation with the National Center for Education Statistics also publishes an annual report on crime occurring in and on the way to and from school called "Indicators of School Crime and Safety."

Contrary to popular perception, most varieties of school violence declined in the past decade. Although multiple homicides in schools appeared in news media headlines, school-related homicides actually declined drastically. In fact, schools are among the safest places for children. Students ages 12 to 18 are more likely to be victimized outside of school than in school. In the past decade, the percentage of students carrying weapons to school and engaging in physical fighting also declined.

Despite popular conceptions of schools as violent places, the majority of crimes that occur on school grounds are property crimes such as theft. Like violent offenses, most varieties of property offenses have also declined. These declines in violent and property offense in schools were consistent across gender, grade, and race/ethnicity, although younger, male, and African American or Hispanic students continue to engage in a higher rate of delinquency than their older, female, and white or Asian American counterparts.

Stratification of School Violence

Evidence suggests that school and student characteristics structure a hierarchy of vulnerability to school violence. At the school level, findings illustrate that students attending larger, urban, relatively poorer schools, with predominantly a racial and/or ethnic minority student body, are more likely to be victimized. At the student level, grade, gender, and sexual orientation are individual factors associated with exposure to school violence.

Racial/ethnic and economic segregation remains a prevalent dilemma in the United States. Research shows that segregated communities have higher rates of crime, violence, and victimization. In turn, schools serving minority students report relatively higher incidences of violence, fear, and victimization. In addition, younger students are more exposed to school violence than older students, even within the same school. For instance, freshmen students in high school and incoming students in middle school report the highest rates of bullying.

Gender also plays an important role in determining risk of school violence, as male students are found to be more frequent victims and victimizers. However, research suggests that each gender is exposed to different forms of school violence. For example, male students are more likely to be exposed to physical violence, while female students are more likely to experience verbal harassment. Further, sexuality plays an important factor, as studies indicate a correlation between student sexual orientation and school violence. Regardless of gender or race/ethnicity, students who report being homosexual or perceived as gay by other students are more likely to experience both verbal and physical violence while on campus.

The Role of the School

Schools are a mirror of their communities because they reflect many of the social mechanisms, cultural values, and behavioral patterns occurring in the world at large. Faculty, students, staff, and administrators share common activities and routines, influence one another, and are ideally connected by the "ethos of caring." The collective relationships create a sense of trust and belonging to a larger community, and this in turn influences the school's overall effectiveness, efficiency, safety, and climate. Although schools are increasingly studied as community-like, the larger community served by the school also influences what goes on there. Research provides evidence that schools are influenced by a community's social stratification such as the nature and extent of crime, local economy, local culture, community organization, discrimination, unemployment rate, racial and ethnic composition and segregation, and poverty, all of which correlate with school violence.

Media and School Violence

In the past decade, the news media periodically focused on high-profile mass murders occurring in schools, such as the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre and the 1999 Columbine High School shootings in Colorado. School shootings are among the most salient of news events, and although they occur infrequently, they capture the public attention. The Columbine shooters erroneously personify the current generation of violent youth and serve as a starting point for public discourse about school violence and larger social problems such as delinquency and youth disaffection. The irony is that, while concrete evidence from the past decade indicates consistently declining rates of school violence and the relative safety of schools, the popular perception is that schools are increasingly violent places.

While mainstream America may suffer from the mistaken fear that the turn of the millennium has spawned a new breed of youth superpredators who now stalk our schools, another irony is that youth themselves do not report increased fear of victimization in school. In fact, even immediately following the Columbine shootings, researchers did not find an increased fear of victimization among youth ages 12 to 18. The popular press has suggested the existence of the "Columbine Effect," or increased fear of violence in schools, but this increased fear does not seem to have touched the students as much as adults.

Policies

There have been varying policy responses implemented to reduce school violence. Perhaps the most punitive approach has been the institution of zero-tolerance policies, such as suspension or expulsion following the first violence offense. Increasingly evaluated, these policies often are determined to be inflexible and ineffective. Another popular policy is placing in schools police school resource officers who work with students to prevent and deter violence. In addition, schools may rely on electronic means to control violence, such as installation of metal detectors and surveillance cameras. Besides punitive measures, many schools instituted other measures to combat the problem. Notably, school uniform programs have been effective, although they often raise legal issues related to students' right to free expression. Finally, many schools also institute educational programs, such as conflict resolution education and hiring additional counselors.

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See also Bullying; Crime, Fear of; Education, Inner-City Schools; Violence; Violent Crimes

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School Vouchers

School vouchers are government-funded tuition certificates that parents can use to fund their children's attendance at private educational institutions. Considerable debate surrounds the use of public funds for education in private institutions. A key issue of debate involves the effectiveness of school voucher programs for students, primarily students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Another major debate issue is whether the use of public funds for religious private institutions violates the principle of separation of church and state.

Economist Milton Friedman is credited as one of the key originators of the concept of school vouchers. The idea emerged from negative views on governmental intervention in the realm of education and the desire to empower people who use the education system. Friedman believed that a free market approach, which allowed competition from private markets, would increase both school quality and citizens' access to quality schooling. While Friedman proposed the school voucher system in the 1950s, general satisfaction with the education system stifled advancement of his idea. Increasing dissatisfaction with public education during recent decades, however, influenced the creation of such programs. While the discourse surrounding school vouchers is plentiful, the number of voucher programs is relatively small, particularly when compared to other reform programs such as

charter schools and homeschooling. Most current U.S. voucher programs target poor or disadvantaged families.

General support for school vouchers rests on principles of choice and free market forces that create competition between private and public school institutions to improve student outcomes and empower disadvantaged families. One of the principal claims of supporters is that private education provides superior educational outcomes for students in the form of increased grade point averages, graduation rates, and standardized test scores. These improved outcomes therefore greatly benefit disadvantaged families as they gain wider access to educational opportunities.

Voucher supporters are in general agreement about the failure of the current public education system, as illustrated by the introduction of the 2006 America's Opportunity Scholarship for Kids legislation to Congress. This legislation, which ultimately did not pass, sought to allow children in schools consistently failing to meet requirements to receive funds toward private education. Many voucher supporters believe problems with the current public school system stem from governmental and bureaucratic conflicts that ultimately limit the ability of teachers and administrators to create proficient programs. Supporters feel that the current educational system has fundamental flaws not likely to be changed through traditional reform programs. They feel that the only way any significant positive change of the education system will occur is through a radical shift in both thinking and organization.

For proponents, school vouchers represent the concepts of choice and freedom for families, allowing parents to pick schools that will potentially provide better opportunities and outcomes for their children. Parents can thus choose a school with sufficient resources, a strong organizational structure, engaged teachers, and smaller class sizes. In addition, supporters claim that vouchers empower parents to choose schools that more closely match their own values. These values may include the choice of a religious school that mirrors their moral values or, say, a school that emphasizes fine arts education. Ultimately supporters argue that the freedom to choose will greatly empower disadvantaged populations by allowing them to leave underperforming schools. Proponents believe that a school voucher system will equalize the playing field for families that do not have access to private education.

Choice not only provides parents with a better opportunity to meet their children's needs; supporters claim that the free market system will also benefit the entire education system. Free market competition will force public schools to enact change in order to compete with private schools for funding. Supporters argue that the absence of this competition suppresses innovation in public schools and ultimately leads to a lack of significant reform.

Overall, opponents of school vouchers question whether the free market approach will create greater outcomes for students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. They challenge the claim that private schools will increase student outcomes, noting that research is inconclusive regarding the relationship between private schools and academic outcomes. Additionally, opponents reject claims that the public school system is in a ruinous state requiring radical change and that the focus should be on making the public system better, not giving up on the schools or systems having problems. Furthermore, diverting funds away from public schools that desperately need them to private schools through a voucher program will cause further deterioration of public school systems.

Opponents also strongly challenge the assertion that voucher programs will help empower families who are most negatively affected by shortcomings in the educational system. They feel a voucher system will further hurt the disadvantaged by greatly increasing stratification and segregation that already exist in schools. Families that have greater access to resources, such as information about programs and transportation to schools, will benefit more than families that lack these resources. Families with greater resources will be more likely to seek out and participate in voucher programs, and this will reinforce inequality and stratification rather than empower the disadvantaged.

Opponents also point out that some voucher programs do not provide enough money to completely cover the tuition of the private schools. If families must cover the difference in cost, this may once again reinforce stratification by leaving disadvantaged families unable to equally benefit from voucher programs. Another factor that might lead to the reinforcement of stratification is the ability of private institutions to turn away student applicants. If private schools can eliminate the applications of troubled students, these students must attend public schools. Opponents argue that this will lead to private schools getting the "cream of the crop," leaving public schools to deal with the troubled students. Combined with earlier arguments of the harmfulness of the diversion of funds, critics believe this would leave public schools lacking

resources and catering to a population of students that need the most assistance. Students who would benefit most from claims of empowerment may be left behind in public institutions due to their lack of social capital, inability to make up tuition differences, and denied applications.

Last, the issue of the public funding of private schools with religious affiliations is a common concern in the debate over school vouchers. Some see such usage of funds as a violation of the principle of separation of church and state. Further, opponents fear that students may be excluded from certain opportunities because of a lack of religious agreement between the institution and the family. Some argue that empowering students requires equal access for all students to attend all participating institutions.

Beyond public and political discourse, issues regarding school voucher programs have played out in the judicial system. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case of *Zelman v. Simmons* regarding Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program. The challenge to this voucher program rested on the argument that the use of public funds to support private religious school organizations violated the establishment clause in the Constitution against laws supporting religion. The court ruled 5–4 that the program did not violate the establishment clause and was neutral in terms of religious and nonreligious schools, since the program gave parents freedom to select between numerous religious and nonreligious organizations. Furthermore, the religious institutions did not exclude participants based upon individual students' religious beliefs. The dissenting opinion argued that, since 96.6 percent of the vouchers went to religious schools, it was tantamount to funding religious programs with public funds. In addition, the dissenting opinion believed that conflict between religious sects would be a likely by-product of using public funds to support religious programs.

Yet, other rulings on the state level are mixed about the use of public funds for religious educational programs. In the 2005 case of *Bush v. Holmes,* the Florida Supreme Court ruled against a voucher program on the grounds that it violated the Florida state constitution. The court ruled that the program rerouted public funds away from the public education system. In addition, the court stated that the voucher program undermined the integrity of the public system by using public funds for a competing system. The 2006 case of *Anderson v. Town of Durham* challenged a Maine program that funded only nonreligious private institutions. The Maine Supreme Court ruled that the program, which provided funding for students to attend private nonsectarian institutions in situations where no public high school was available, was not a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. However, the Maine court also ruled that families could not use public funds for private schools in other situations, thereby restricting free choice and free market access.

Matthew Christopher Atherton

See also Charter Schools; Education, Academic Performance; Education, Inner-City Schools; Education, School Privatization; Educational Equity; School Funding

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Scientific Management

Scientific management involves study of the production process in an effort to discover means to eliminate waste of workers' time and effort. Evolving from research on conservation of production resources, the field surged in 1911, when Frederick Winslow Taylor published *The Principles of Scientific Management.* Here and elsewhere, Taylor critiqued traditional managerial roles for leaving responsibility for production methods to "wasteful" workers and advocated a more active role for management.

Taylor recommended that managers observe the most productive workers (usually with "time studies" of task elements), determine and standardize the "one best way" to perform each task, match workers to positions according to their capacities, train them in

procedures, and ensure their cooperation by providing help, supervision, and daily bonuses for meeting targets. Principally, Taylor encouraged managers to remove the "brain work" from manual labor and to concentrate it among a separate pool of production planners (to whom workers could make suggestions). In doing so, he noted that planners would invariably suggest further task segmentation and that managers would take over much or all of workers' decision-making responsibilities.

Comparatively, other pioneers in scientific management, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, were more concerned with the condition of workers—seeking to increase productivity by eliminating unnecessary fatigue. Their "motion studies"—accomplished first with descriptions and illustrations and then with "micromotion" films—illuminated a range of variables (in addition to time) with room for elimination of waste. In their most celebrated research, they reduced bending and lifting among bricklayers and tripled their hourly output.

Scientific management vastly increased productivity. However, the mutual economic benefit predicted by its earliest pioneers did not materialize, as employers received the bulk of economic rewards. In any case, social scientists have long argued that workers have desires apart from money and that scientific management techniques deny their needs. In the 1920s, Mary Parker Follett drew attention to workers' noneconomic needs and potential to contribute, and Elton Mayo's Hawthorne studies demonstrated that positive attention to these needs could enhance productivity—a topic subsequently taken up by the human relations school of management.

Since that time, it has become clear that scientific management has had overwhelmingly negative consequences for the experience of work. Optimistic confidence that the approach would engender mutual respect between workers and managers has given way to the realization that workers forced to "check their brains at the door" are often deprived of dignity at work and have little leverage to bargain for better conditions. The potential for negative consequences heightens when existing job structures do not allow all workers to rise to their level of ability as Taylor presumed. The result is often withdrawal of cooperation, including absenteeism, strikes, and withholding of information and effort—sometimes characterized as the irrationality of an overly rationalized system. Paradoxically, some of the solutions proposed and employed—including internal labor markets, quality of work life programs, job rotation, and worker participation regimes—include aspects of the work relationship proposed in the writings of Taylor and the Gilbreths.

Martha Crowley

See also Alienation; Job Satisfaction; Labor, Division of; Taylorism

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Secondhand Smoke

According to the U.S. Surgeon General, secondhand smoke, also known as "passive smoking" or "environmental tobacco smoke" causes disease and premature death for nonsmoking adults and children, because tobacco smoke contains toxic chemicals that increase health risks. With it widely recognized as harmful to an individual's personal health, smoking now constitutes a universal public health risk.

The U.S. Department of Human Services reports that nicotine is detectible in 43 percent of the nation's nonsmokers. It also notes the exposure of almost 22 million children to secondhand smoke. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Toxicology Program, and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) all identify passive smoking as a "known human carcinogen" (cancer-causing agent). Other health risks include asthma, stunted growth, coronary heart disease, and lung cancer.

Even brief exposure could detrimentally affect an individual's health. The American Lung Association states that secondhand smoke causes approximately 3,400 lung cancer deaths and 22,700–69,000 heart disease deaths among U.S. adult nonsmokers. These claims offer support to policymakers who want smoking bans, concerned workers in establishments

where smoking is prevalent, and politicians who respond to public concerns. While support keeps growing for tobacco control policies, many individuals and establishments nonetheless oppose antismoking legislation.

Secondhand Smoke as a Social Problem

Takeshi Hirayama published the first study that examined the relationship between passive smoking and lung cancer in 1981, concluding that wives of heavy smokers were more likely to develop lung cancer than wives of nonsmokers. This discovery spurred an increase in scientific research on secondhand smoke in the following decades. While many scientists supported Hirayama's conclusions, others countered his claim. The most notable opponents were those funded by the tobacco industry and related businesses.

Scientific findings often gained attention through news media. The sustained interest in secondhand smoke remained in media headlines following claims proposed by nonsmokers' rights groups such as Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights (ANR), the U.S. Surgeon General, and other advocates, in conjunction with counterclaims made by the tobacco industry. While scientific discoveries had an impact on public interest in secondhand smoke as a social problem, it was the media that often transmitted these discoveries, especially from the proliferation of conflicting claims. The argument of secondhand smoke as a public health issue convinced employees of smoking establishments as well as the general public that passive smoking posed a serious health risk. Shortly thereafter, they persuaded policymakers to take legal action against smoking in public places.

Despite the general public's contribution to tobacco control policies, many rejected the scientific findings and did not support public smoking bans. Antagonists presented their opinions through legal, moral, and economic frameworks. First, smokers were upset by bans because they believe smoking is a First Amendment right. Second, establishments that depend on a high proportion of smoking clientele argued that their businesses would suffer from the legal restriction. Similarly, the tobacco industry also fought smoking bans on grounds it would hurt their industry.

In particular, the tobacco industry challenged a 1993 report issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stating that 3,000 lung cancer deaths result from passive smoking each year. This report encouraged many private establishments and communities to pass smoking bans. Representatives of tobacco companies claimed that EPA manipulated scientific findings by selecting only cases that supported their hypothesis. In 1998, U.S. District Court Judge William Osteen sided with the tobacco industry, declaring that EPA did not follow accepted scientific procedures. Nonetheless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned this decision in 2002 on technical grounds.

Smoking Bans

The first smoking bans in the United States, in the late 1980s, restricted smoking on domestic flights. In the following decade, EPA, the U.S. National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, and other government agencies joined the U.S. Surgeon General in the fight against secondhand smoke. In 1995, New York City and California became the first major regions to enact tobacco restrictions in restaurants; several years later they extended the ban to other public places.

One of the strongest arguments that pushed public smoking bans was from the employees of smoking establishments. Workers argued that their health was in jeopardy from constant exposure to the secondhand smoke of others in their workplace or patrons of the establishment. Proponents for smoking bans argued that the removal of environmental tobacco smoke is necessary for several reasons. Aside from the danger in certain establishments, where smoking would interfere with flammable materials or general cleanliness, workers claimed that passive smoking increased health risks of heart disease, cancer, and respiratory-related problems. For example, in New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg supported employees who framed passive smoking as a safety issue. As a former smoker himself, Mayor Bloomberg advocated for the New York City Clean Air Act of 2003, which then expanded to a statewide ban several months later.

In the United States, each state has jurisdiction to enact smoking bans. Currently, 47 states have laws that restrict smoking in public places, which may include bars, restaurants, or workplaces. All 50 states prohibit smoking in government buildings, while 39 restrict smoking in private workplaces. Similarly, other countries such as Australia and Canada regulate smoking state by state. Other regions, like the United Kingdom, have countrywide regulations. Internationally, more

than two dozen countries presently ban smoking in public places.

In addition to public smoking bans, taxation, media campaigns, increasing law enforcement for underage users, advertisement restrictions, youth education, and cessation services also may contribute to reducing secondhand smoke. Other programs, laws, and policies focus on prevention and helping current smokers to quit. However, "clean air" acts or smoking bans specifically address *secondhand* smoke. These regulations ban smoking in public places such as restaurants, bars, hospitals, schools, and public transportation. Although smoking bans intend to benefit "passive" smokers, some research suggests that "clean air acts" also encourage cessation among current smokers. Proponents suggest that overall smoking rates decline from reduced opportunity and growing moral disfavor for smokers. Others argue that smoking rates do not change because tobacco users will simply find elsewhere to smoke.

Research Perspectives

Research on secondhand smoke covers a variety of perspectives. Chemical and biological scientists evaluate the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke and the chemical composition of emitted fumes. Policy analysts decipher the level of public support of smoking bans, if businesses comply with legislation, and what additional policies aid overall effectiveness (e.g., media campaigns, tobacco taxes). Social scientists study patterns of smoking use by social identities (e.g., age, race/ethnicity, gender, class, national origin, religion), psychological factors (e.g., mental history, addiction), or family and neighborhood characteristics. However, so far little research evaluates the effect of legislation on particular social groups.

Researchers find that smoking bans, taxation, and media campaigns have the greatest deterrent effect on smoking rates. They argue that states with smoking bans use cigarettes less per capita than states without similar legislation. Businesses that implement smoking bans report reductions in quantity and frequency of cigarettes smoked. Studies in countries outside the United States show similar usage patterns. Research also suggests that smoking bans affect youth smoking.

The effect of smoking bans varies by the strictness of legislation. Policies that do not ban smoking completely but include areas specifically designated for smokers affect smoking rates far less than total bans. Enforcement also influences policy success. Government involvement to enact legislation is more successful than private organization policies. Therefore, individual compliance is more likely under public laws compared to private rules. However, businesses do not always agree with government policy. Widespread legislation imposes policies that some private businesses often disfavor or zealously challenge.

After the implementation of smoking bans, studies found mixed results regarding their success. While the industry and related businesses feared economic losses, economic repercussions varied by cultural climate, type of business, and location. Areas that showed greater support for smoking bans generally did not result in declining patronage. Evaluations that reviewed compliance with the new legislation also found mixed results. Overall, claims from business owners did not support actual reactions to public smoking bans.

Secondhand smoke remains highly contested among anti-smoking advocates, scientists, smokers, the tobacco industry, and business owners. Empirical evaluations of the policy's effect on cessation, compliance, social acceptance, and economic effects are inconclusive because of the legislation's short history.

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See also Claims Making; Countermovements; Public Opinion; Smoking

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Second Shift

The concept of the *second shift* describes an unequal division of labor prevalent among heterosexual dual-earner couples in which women perform the bulk of unpaid household labor and child care in addition to their paid employment. Also referred to as the "double day," the second shift marks an important form of gender inequality brought about by changing gender roles. Over the past four decades, as women's labor force participation escalated, men's participation at home increased only slightly. Consequently, women's heavy responsibilities in paid and unpaid work expose them to role conflict and role overload, disrupt their attempts at leisure, and disadvantage their pay and promotion chances in the workplace.

Social scientists have researched the division of household labor through time diary studies, surveys that ask respondents to estimate the time they spend on various tasks (less accurate due to inflated responses), and in-depth fieldwork on women's and men's relationships in everyday life. Despite a cultural shift toward more egalitarian gender roles in the public realm, researchers agree that a "gender lag" exists at home: most routine household and childrearing tasks continue to be typified as women's work. Even though women now spend fewer hours per week on unpaid household labor and child care, their time commitment still doubles or triples what men do, on average. Moreover, traditional "male" tasks (mowing the lawn or taking out the trash) offer men far more discretion over their time than women. Time-consuming "female" tasks such as cleaning, cooking, and caring for children frequently demand repeated and simultaneous action. Even when couples pay others to do their household labor, they mostly hire women to do it. Many quantitative studies fail to measure emotion work (tending to family members' feelings) and the "invisible work" of planning and organizing family members' activities. Qualitative studies have clarified how these forms of unpaid household labor disproportionately fall to women.

Patterns in the division of household labor show that the second shift is greatest in heterosexual households where women's contributions to family income are low; under this condition, women trade their unpaid domestic labor for men's financial support. As women's incomes grow closer to their male partners', the gender gap in the division of household labor shrinks (women decrease and men increase their domestic labor) but does not disappear. Paradoxically, researchers find that in relationships where males earn less than females, men do not perform more unpaid domestic labor in exchange for women's financial support. When women earn all of the family income, men may perform even less household labor than males who out-earn their female partners. A crucial factor in these households is whether men depend voluntarily or involuntarily on women's income. In cases where men do so voluntarily, their household labor may exceed women's. But males who involuntarily experience extended unemployment may perform far less household labor, and their female partners may increase theirs in response. Although few qualitative and quantitative studies of the division of household labor adequately include lesbian and gay couples, researchers find that their arrangements are more likely to be egalitarian, especially among lesbians.

When examining couples' race and ethnicity, researchers find that men who reside in immigrant ethnic enclaves are more likely to support patriarchal gender arrangements and perform less unpaid household labor than men living in more heterogeneous communities. Among African American heterosexual couples, the overall pattern of women performing more unpaid domestic labor than men still holds, but the gender gap is smaller. African American dual-earner couples are more likely than white couples to share household labor, primarily because African American men spend more time performing a greater variety of household tasks than white men do, on average. Some studies of dual-earner Chicano/a couples report a similar pattern of Chicano males doing more household labor than Anglo males but less than African American males. Aside from the possibility of ethnic and class influences on couples' gender ideologies, members of minority dual-earner couples are more likely to earn comparable incomes and, out of financial necessity, operate more cooperative households.

Why does the gender gap in household labor persist? Cultural assumptions about gender matter more than any other factor. When men hold power in the public sphere (through their income), their public success translates into power at home. Many women honor men's breadwinner status by performing most of the household labor and child care, even if they also work full time outside the home. But, when women hold higher status in the public realm, they do not necessarily garner more power and privileges at home.

Their higher status may instead be regarded as a liability that undermines their male partners' traditional masculine role and renders the couple gender deviant. Only when male partners value the importance of women's paid contributions and occupational status do they willingly take on an equal or greater share of household labor.

Social constructions of masculinity also matter. In most Western industrialized cultures, men often accomplish masculinity by *avoiding being feminine*. By strategically avoiding or resisting domestic labor, men can reproduce heterosexual masculine status and preserve traditional privileges and power at home. As a result, men may define their household labor as optional, not required, in sharp contrast to women.

For women, the roles of wife and mother ideologically inform how they should demonstrate their love, care, and concern for others. Caring becomes a criterion for evaluating the moral worth of women who are mothers, spouses, and romantic partners; consequently, women who feel overwhelmed by the second shift and want to cut back their household labor face the accusation of being cold, bossy, neglectful, and unloving. The cultural weight of motherhood is such that, even in studies that exclude actual time spent caring for children, women's household labor increases far more than men's when young children are at home, regardless of income.

Overall, the consequences of the second shift confer more benefits and privileges to men and more obligations to women. Women, on average, pay a higher price in terms of lower compensation for their paid work, greater responsibilities at home, and a diminished amount of uninterrupted leisure.

Martha Copp

See also Dual-Income Families; Gender Gap; Gender Identity and Socialization; Labor Force Participation Rate; Role Conflict; Role Strain; Sexism

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SECULARIZATION

The term *secularization* entered formal discourse at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when territories transferred from religious to secular political authorities. Previously, the Latin word *saecularis* distinguished profane from sacred. The term *secularization* subsequently developed wider meaning as philosophers and then sociologists used it to assess social changes.

Secularization refers to the diminishing significance of the role of religious precepts and rites in the daily activities of individuals and groups. Early sociologists perceived a steady rise in secularization, while noting that religion in varying ways continued to possess social value. Their theories of society punctuated the view that religion was no longer meeting the concerns of modern living.

The modern secularist view stemmed from the 18th-century movement called the Enlightenment. Developments in science and technology, growing literacy, and progress in the articulation of individual rights gave rise to disparate voices challenging the worldview that extant social relations reflect a divinely inspired, ordered hierarchy. Voltaire (1694–1778) challenged the logic of religion and the political authority of the church. Adam Smith (1723–90)

provided an economically sound blueprint for arranging social relations. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) advanced the idea of inalienable rights. The ideas of these thinkers and many others, including G. W. F. Hegel's (1770–1831) conceptualization of progress in history, Auguste Comte's (1798–1857) positivist sociology, and Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844–1900) deconstruction of the history of morality, created fertile ground upon which to observe the workings of society.

Detaching from the machinery of society in order to observe it led to the dispassionate examination of religion. The rational nature of detached examination led to a form of thinking that made issues such as faith a matter of personal choice rather than an assumed aspect of reality. Building on the ideas of Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72), Karl Marx (1818–83) focused on religion as an ideology. By his oft-cited statement that religion is the opiate of the masses, Marx was primarily noting that religion can mask or soothe the sting of alienation and exploitation without ameliorating it. Marx's interest in religion centered primarily on its relationship to the political economy.

Contemporary examinations of secularization echo back to a number of observations made by early sociologists. Three theories dominate the literature on secularization. The first theory suggests that as scientific, technological, and individualistic thinking increasingly pervades culture, symbols and events formerly associated with sacred meaning become more rational, relative, and relegated to the background of everyday activities. If the social and individual orientations of people living in modern industrialized nations are compared to cultures that are not technologically advanced and are more sociocentric than egocentric, their sacred meanings appear to be more personal, private, and, for many people, configured around fulfilling secular responsibilities and enjoying secular activities.

The second theory of secularization advances the idea that changes in religious conceptions and practices do not necessarily indicate the decline of religion in society. While people in advanced industrial nations tend to pick and choose their religious orientation and have lost an immediacy of belief, religion still holds value in developed nations, and people are not any more or any less religious than earlier generations. While the social arrangements by which humankind lives may become more sophisticated, humanity's existential condition remains the same. Even if the form and content of religious beliefs and practices change—become more privatized and relative—religion continues to be important for people. In the process of change, religious beliefs and practices may ebb and flow. Sometimes secularization may appear to be advancing, while at other times it appears to be on the decline.

A third theory states that secularization is a self-limiting process that gives way to religious revival, such as the schismatic formation of new sects, or religious innovation, such as the formation of new religions or cults. Revivalism, or the rise and assertion of religious orthodoxy among people of many faiths, is occurring currently around the world. According to this theory, modernity has not stripped away the desire among people to affirm the reality of the supernatural. People of faith will allow their religious ideas and practices to mix with the secular world only so far before they feel a need to reassert the importance of the sacred.

Theories of secularization arrive at different conclusions depending upon whether the focus of analysis concerns the individual, social organization, or society. Worldwide comparisons suggest that, at the societal level of analysis, most Western European nations are secular states; however, at the individual level of analysis, interest in issues typically categorized as religious continues. Modernity's challenge to traditional religious structures may intensify individual interest in existential well-being.

Tensions between religious and secular orientations exist both within and between many nations, such as France and Turkey, which are secular states with growing populations of traditional Muslims. Israel not only contends with tensions that exist with some of its neighbors but also experiences tensions due to conflicting values between Orthodox and Reform Jews. Likewise, the United States contends with religious conflicts both within and beyond its borders. The United States is the most pluralistic and religiously oriented nation in the industrialized world. Its unique status may be due to its historical separation of church and state. While social and political tensions occur periodically because of this dividing wall, it nevertheless provides the space for such debates to be heard.

An ongoing debate in the United States concerns the role of religion in deciding public policy. A central aspect of secularization is the diminishing role among religious leaders to affect political decision making. Compared with Western Europe, the United States is

distinctive in its support of leaders who convey a traditional Christian message. A complex social issue concerns the assertion of traditional values and norms that may threaten the rational-legal procedures that underpin democratic freedoms.

Nathan Rousseau

See also Cults; Cultural Values; Culture Wars; Faith-Based Social Initiatives; Fundamentalism; Islam and Modernity; Modernization Theory; Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Religious Prejudice; Values

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Segmented Assimilation

Segmented assimilation as a middle-range conceptual perspective emerged in the early 1990s with the publication of "The New Second Generation" by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.* The theory is built on the empirical observations that the host society is highly stratified by class and race, that the host reception is more contingent upon circumstances than inclusive of all newcomers, and that immigrants arrive with different amounts and kinds of resources to cope with resettlement and incorporation, resulting in different rates of success.

Unlike the classical straight-line assimilation theories that posit an irreversible and unidirectional path leading to the eventual incorporation into an undifferentiated, unified, and white middle-class mainstream by *all* immigrants, the segmented assimilation theory conceives of the mainstream society as shaped by systems of class and racial stratifications. It emphasizes the interaction between race and class and between group membership and larger social structures that intentionally or unintentionally exclude nonwhites. It attempts to delineate the multiple patterns of adaptation that emerge among contemporary immigrants and their offspring, accounts for their different destinies of convergence (or divergence) in their new homelands, and addresses the ways in which particular contexts of exit and reception of national origin groups affect outcomes.

From this perspective, the process of assimilation may take multiple pathways, sometimes with different turns, leading to varied outcomes. Three main patterns are discernible:

1. The time-honored upward-mobility pattern dictating the acculturation and economic integration into the normative structures of mainstream middle-class America. This is the old-fashioned path of severing ethnic ties; unlearning "old world" values, norms, and behavioral patterns; and adapting to the culture of the Anglo-Saxon core associated with the white middle class.

2. The downward-mobility pattern dictating the acculturation and parallel integration into the margins of U.S. society. This is the path of adapting to native subcultures in direct opposition to the core Anglo-Saxon culture or of creating hybrid oppositional subcultures associated with native groups trapped in the host society's margins or the bottom rungs of the society's mobility ladder.

3. Socioeconomic integration into mainstream America with lagged and selective acculturation and deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and norms, social ties, and ethnic institutions. This is the path of deliberately reaffirming ethnicity and rebuilding ethnic networks and structures for socioeconomic advancement into middle-class status.

The unique contexts of exit and reception determine into what segment of society the immigrant or ethnic group assimilates. The context of exit entails a number of factors, including premigration resources that immigrants bring with them (such as money, knowledge, and job skills), the social class status already attained by the immigrants in their homelands, motivations, and the means of migration. The

context of reception includes the national origin group's positioning in the system of racial stratification, government policies, labor market conditions, public attitudes, and the strength and viability of the ethnic community in the host society. Segmented assimilation theory focuses on the interaction of these two sets of factors, predicting that particular contexts of exit and reception can create distinctive cultural patterns and strategies of adaptation, social environments, and tangible resources for the group and give rise to opportunities or constraints for the individual, independent of individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

While the unique contexts of exit and reception lead to distinct modes of incorporation for immigrant and refugee groups, different modes of incorporation explain variations in the *contexts* within which individuals strive to "make it" in their new homeland. For example, to explain why immigrant Chinese or Korean children generally do better in school than immigrant Mexican or Central American children even when they come from families with similar income levels, live in the same neighborhood, and go to the same school, one must look into the unique contexts within which these children grow up. Among the various contextual factors that may significantly influence academic outcomes, one stands out among Chinese and Koreans: an ethnic community with an extensive system of supplementary education, including nonprofit ethnic language schools and private institution in academic tutoring, enrichment, standardized test drills, college preparation and counseling, and extracurricular activities aiming mainly at enhancing the competitiveness of children's higher educational prospects. The ethnic system of supplementary education is built not only on the strong human capital and financial resources that Chinese and Korean immigrants bring with them to the new country but also on their experience with a competitive educational system in the homeland. In contrast, the Mexican or Central American communities lack similar ethnic social structures that generate resources conducive to education. Moreover, the children of Mexican or Central American immigrants who live in the same neighborhoods as Chinese or Korean immigrants are largely excluded from these ethnic resources.

Empirically, segmented assimilation is measured by a range of observable socioeconomic indicators, such as educational attainment, employment status, income, and home ownership. For the children of immigrants, indicators of downward assimilation include dropping out of school, premature childbirths, and being arrested or sentenced for a crime. These variables are strong predictors of future low educational attainment, low occupational status, low income, and low likelihood of home ownership. Numerous qualitative and quantitative works have produced evidence in support of segmented assimilation predictions—that the second generation is likely to assimilate upwardly, downwardly, or horizontally into an American society that is highly segmented by class and race and to do so in different ways.

From the segmented assimilation perspective, downward assimilation is only *one* of several possible outcomes. Curiously, the segmented assimilation theory is often misinterpreted as suggesting and predicting a single outcome—downward assimilation—and thereby is criticized as being overtly pessimistic about the immigrant second generation. Nonetheless, to refute the segmented assimilation theory or state that the second generation will sooner or later move into the mainstream middle class, one must demonstrate that both of the following cases are false: (1) that the proportions of those falling into the major indicators of downward assimilation—high school dropouts, teenage pregnancies, and arrests for breaking the law—are insignificant for each national origin or ethnic group; and (2) that the differences in outcomes are randomly distributed across different national origin or ethnic groups, regardless of the group's modes of incorporation.

Min Zhou

See also American Dream; Assimilation; Cultural Capital; Social Capital

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SEGREGATION

Segregation is the separation of groups based on social characteristics. These characteristics may be either ascribed, such as race, or achieved, such as economic status. In a segregated society, the separated groups may have little or no contact with each other. It is this lack of contact between groups that contributes to the social problems associated with segregation. This occurs primarily through two dimensions: lack of exposure and unequal access to resources.

The separation of groups limits contact between groups, potentially leading to the development of prejudices and the continuation of stereotypes. Segregation separates members of groups and in doing so may perpetuate stereotypes by denying them opportunities to interact. Social networks that exclude specific groups may be perceived as biased or discriminatory because networks integrate individuals into the greater social context and segregated networks limit the exposure of individuals to the "other."

When groups are segregated spatially, separate institutions also emerge, and this can lead to unequal access to society's resources. Following the U.S. Civil War, many southern states enacted Jim Crow laws enforcing previously informal norms of segregation of blacks and whites. These laws justified racial segregation using the argument that public facilities such as railroads and schools could be "separate but equal." The Supreme Court case of *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896 upheld this doctrine. It would not be until 1954 (*Brown v. Board of Education*) that public school segregation would be declared unconstitutional. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 signaled the end of the Jim Crow laws.

In the U.S. context, the civil rights movement of the 1960s explicitly addressed segregation based on ascribed characteristics of race and gender. Yet, even when legal support for equal opportunity exists, segregation in the form of social exclusion may occur. With social exclusion, individuals may experience not physical segregation but social marginalization that limits employment and earnings opportunities.

Dimensions of Segregation

Segregation has social, cultural, and spatial contexts and occurs as the result of law (de jure segregation) or by cultural practice (de facto segregation). Many dimensions of segregation, including age, gender, disability status, race, ethnicity, and economic status, can be identified in societies worldwide. In the United States and Europe, segregation in housing and segregation in education are two of the most commonly studied forms of segregation.

Researchers are increasingly focusing on segregation as a multilevel phenomenon. This reflects the reality that individuals are embedded in social contexts that shape their access to other individuals and resources in society. While individual and group-level characteristics are often the focal point of segregation, segregation occurs through social institutions such as schools, occupations, and residential communities. For example, the housing opportunities available to minorities are framed in the context of housing segregation, which is often examined from a neighborhood and community context; glass ceiling effects for women are framed in the context of gender segregation in the workplace and occupational context.

There are both voluntary and involuntary causes of segregation. Voluntary segregation often occurs at the individual or group level in terms of social networks. Involuntary segregation occurs when individuals and groups are denied opportunities because of one or more characteristics. At its most basic, voluntary and involuntary segregation can be cast in terms of individual preferences versus discrimination. For example, in the United States, minority residents may prefer to live in mixed neighborhoods, but whites may be unwilling to sell their homes to minority families.

Multiple dimensions of segregation may also interact. For example, residential segregation by race can be compounded by economic segregation. A longstanding debate continues about the relative importance of race and socioeconomic status. Increases in levels of segregation are often attributed to factors rooted in group tensions and institutionalized discrimination. Decreases in segregation reflect changes in social policies as well as social norms such as increasing tolerance and more egalitarian gender norms.

Measuring Segregation

An increasing number of indices measure segregation. Although the Index of Dissimilarity is the traditional measure of segregation, researchers now recognize that no single summary measure fully characterizes all dimensions of segregation. At the same time, different indices may produce different results, and researchers are increasingly turning to multiple measures in framing their studies. The preferred method depends on both the type of segregation being measured and the

focus of the particular study. To analyze spatial patterns of segregation, researchers increasingly combine segregation indices with the use of mapping techniques.

In examining residential segregation, Massey and Denton distinguish among five distinct dimensions of segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. The Index of Dissimilarity is a measure of evenness. It measures the extent to which different groups inhabit categories or areas of interest and ranges between 0 and 1 with values above 0.60 reflecting high levels of segregation. In the context of residential segregation, the Index of Dissimilarity can explain the proportion of one group that would have to move between areas to create an even racial distribution.

The Isolation Index and Correlation Ratio are examples of measures of exposure. The Isolation Index measures the extent to which a group has contact with another group in an area. Like the index of dissimilarity, the index of isolation ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values (0.30–1.00) indicating greater levels of isolation. The correlation ratio measures the degree to which an area is composed of homogeneous units. Values range from 0 to 1, with values close to 1 reflecting larger differences between areas. A variation on the correlation index applied to income segregation is the Neighborhood Sorting Index. Measures of concentration, centralization, and clustering are distinct but related concepts that represent the physical space occupied by a group, the centrality of that space, and the adjacency of a group's space to other groups, respectively.

Segregation as a Social Problem

Segregation, per se, may not necessarily be bad for a group. Many of the negative consequences of segregation stem from the embeddedness of forms of involuntary segregation in the social fabric. In the United States, institutions that have a history of segregation include education and housing. Many public school districts are based on neighborhoods that are racially and economically segregated. Inner-city neighborhoods may be populated by concentrations of poor minorities with little social capital or opportunity to move. In such involuntarily segregated communities, segregation can lead to negative outcomes such as lower levels of education, more unemployment, and single parenthood.

Yet, voluntary segregation may serve a supportive function for a group. Ethnic enclaves have internal economies that assist in adjustment for immigrant groups. They may offer support, social capital, and opportunities for upward mobility. In education, proponents of single-sex public education argue that single-sex schools may increase learning because they lessen the pressure to meet gender stereotypes.

Segregation can serve as a barrier for members of segregated groups that leads to social exclusion and a lack of opportunity for social mobility. Members of advantaged groups may protect their advantages by discriminating against nongroup members and excluding them. Policies such as affirmative action sought to explicitly address historic inequalities by gender and race. Some argue that affirmative action is no longer necessary and can be replaced with policies that promote "equal opportunity" in hiring and school admissions. Others assert that while minorities and women have made gains, they are still over-represented in service and lower-prestige occupations and under-represented in many high-prestige positions and occupations.

Understanding the basis of segregation can help better understand its consequences. Voluntary segregation may offer group members support they would not easily find in the larger society. Involuntary segregation can be based on either legal justification or socially condoned discriminatory behavior. In either case, differential status is assigned to groups based on their race, gender, age, or economic status. Since an individual's social networks are relatively homogeneous, individuals embedded in a segregated society have limited exposure to individuals unlike themselves. They live with people like themselves, attend schools with people like themselves, work with people like themselves, and are shielded from either the disparities that exist or the means to overcome them.

Regina M. Bures

See also Apartheid; *Brown v. Board of Education*; Discrimination; Hypersegregation; Index of Dissimilarity; *Plessy v. Ferguson*; School Segregation; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational; Segregation, Residential; Social Exclusion; Underclass Debate

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Segregation, De Facto

The term *de facto segregation* refers to the separation of individuals, typically based on a characteristic over which the individual has little or no control and that exists in fact as customary practice. It differs from de jure segregation, which has a legal basis. De facto segregation is also more widespread, encompasses a greater number of individuals, and is harder to eliminate. As with de jure segregation, the areas involving de facto segregation include employment, education, housing, and public accommodation.

Oppressive systems can, and often do, include both types of segregation. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation order in *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954 constituted the first major victory in the battle to end Jim Crow laws. Yet, the battle over the separation of individuals not required by law on the basis of such factors as race or sex, which first came to national attention during the civil rights movement, continues to this day.

At the height of the movement, the Supreme Court struck down numerous de facto practices in such cases as *Johnson v. Virginia* in 1963, *Hamm v. City of Rock Hill* in 1964, and *Griggs v. Duke Power* in 1971. In *Johnson*, the Court ruled that a black man could not be held in contempt for refusing to sit in the area of courtroom traditionally "reserved for Negros" and, in *Hamm*, that black people sitting at a department store lunch counter could not be convicted of trespassing. The justices concluded in *Griggs* that a company could not impose new job requirements (including IQ and personality tests) on black applicants seeking jobs historically limited to whites, since white applicants were never required to meet those requirements.

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued mixed rulings with respect to de facto segregation. Among the cases in which such practices were declared unconstitutional are *United States v. Fordice* in 1992 and *U.S. v. Virginia* in 1996. In *Fordice*, the justices found that Mississippi state colleges were still segregated with more than 99 percent of white students attending historically white campuses and 92 to 99 percent of black students attending historically black campuses. The policy contested in *Virginia*, which excluded all female students, had existed at the Virginia Military Institute since 1839.

Examples in which the U.S. Supreme Court did not eliminate de facto segregation include *Wards Cove Packing Co.* in 1989 and *Johnson v. California* in 2005. After noting in *Wards Cove* that the predominantly white noncannery workers and the predominantly nonwhite cannery employees live in separate dormitories and eat in separate mess halls, the justices determined that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient proof of racial discrimination. Also important was the Court's decision in *Johnson.* At issue was the policy of the California Department of Correction of racially segregating prisoners for up to 60 days each time they enter a new facility. Rather than ruling on the policy, the justices specified the standard that a lower court would need to adjudicate the case.

Dula J. Espinosa

See also Civil Rights; Jim Crow; Racism; Segregation, De Jure; Segregation, Residential; White Supremacy

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Segregation, De Jure

The term *de jure segregation* refers to the separation, imposed by law, of individuals, typically based on a characteristic over which the individual has little or no control. The application of such laws can include employment, education, housing, and public

accommodation. Implicit in the notion of de jure segregation are the following assumptions: that the characteristic in question separates people into members of superior and inferior groups; that inferior group members are entitled to few, if any, benefits; and that integration is detrimental to superior group members. Examples of de jure segregation include Hitler's ghetto and concentration camp policies, South Africa's apartheid system, and, in the United States, Japanese internment, the American Indian reservation system, and Jim Crow.

Among the most legally contested was Jim Crow. Shortly after the Civil War ended, the federal government granted former slaves and their descendants numerous rights and enforced them through military occupation of southern land. After the withdrawal of federal troops in 1877, southern states and local governments passed laws to undermine federal racial equality laws. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ability of states to take such action in *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896. The ruling affirmed a Louisiana law that required railroad passengers to be racially segregated since the segregation was deemed equal and occurred within state lines.

U.S. Supreme Court rulings issued in the aftermath of the separate but equal doctrine established in *Plessy* reveal variety in the laws that constituted Jim Crow. Some were located in provisions of state constitutions mandating racially segregated public schools, including one in Mississippi discussed in *Gong Lum v. Rice* and another in Georgia referenced in *Cumming v. Board of Education.* Others were found in legislative action such as the decision by state officials to reconfigure Tuskegee, Alabama, to exclude nearly all its black residents, challenged in *Gomillion v. Lightfoot.* Comprising a third type were city ordinances like the one disputed in *Buchanan v. Warley* that barred anyone who was not of the same race as the majority of people living on a city block from living in a house on that block. *Palmer v. Thomson* and *Watson v. City of Memphis* also involved city-mandated racial segregation. The former concerned parks in Jackson, Mississippi, and the latter parks and facilities in Memphis, Tennessee.

The first strike against de jure segregation in the United States occurred in 1954 with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education,* brought to the court by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The ruling was a major victory for the NAACP and other members of the civil rights movement. Among their attorneys was Thurgood Marshall, who later became the first person of color to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. The prohibition of de jure segregation in the United States, begun with the *Brown* case, occurred after passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968.

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See also Civil Rights; Jim Crow; Segregation, De Facto; White Supremacy

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Segregation, Gender

Gender segregation is the separation of individuals according to their gender or sex. It takes many forms in various social contexts, including schools, workplaces, religious organizations, sporting activities, and health facilities. The physical construction of public spaces, such as single-sex changing rooms and bathrooms, both reflects and reinforces gender segregation, as do cultural beliefs regarding the social roles of men and women. These divisions along gender lines result in part from historical and cultural assumptions about the meanings of *gender* (a term that emphasizes the socially constructed dimension of what it means to behave like a man or woman) and *sex* (a term that emphasizes the biological dimensions of designation as a man or woman).

As a result of these assumptions and beliefs, women and men may experience horizontal or vertical segregation. Evidence of *horizontal segregation* is the disproportionate number of women found in jobs or fields of study perceived as requiring nurturing qualities, such as elementary teacher or nurse, or of men disproportionately found in jobs or fields of study perceived as requiring manual labor or rational reasoning skills, such as construction or engineering. An example of *vertical segregation* is when men are more likely than women to hold leadership or supervisory positions within the same educational or job environment. Analysts frequently cite gender segregation as an influential determinant in maintaining contemporary

inequalities, particularly in the economic sphere. However, in some instances gender segregation may ameliorate social inequalities. For example, a number of women's colleges and historically black men's and women's colleges remain gender segregated as a means of countering prevailing norms imposed by dominant social groups.

Gender Segregation in Schools

In most cultures, girls at some point in history were denied access to institutions offering a formal education to boys. As a result of cultural beliefs regarding women's familial roles, girls with economic means were often dissuaded from pursuing educational goals and instead steered to finishing schools and seminaries that would provide an education in morals and etiquette. In the United States during the latter part of the 19th century, abolitionist and women's rights movements gained momentum, resulting in a number of colleges and universities opening their doors to women and racial minorities. Simultaneously, the number of women-only colleges steadily grew to accommodate the increasing number of women seeking higher education. However, during the mid-20th century, women's access to colleges and universities slowed until demands for gender equality increased again in the 1960s. Most notably, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 enhanced women's access to and within educational institutions. Title IX essentially prohibited schools from denying women both admittance and equal access to resources within publicly funded educational institutions.

In the United States, although girls and women have gained entry into most educational institutions, gender segregation continues in the subjects that students study and in how children play and work in schools. Researchers examining the social interactions of young children in traditional learning environments have long noted that boys and girls segregate themselves and that teachers or staff members sometimes encourage students to divide along gender lines. When in gender-segregated situations on the playground or in the classroom, boys and girls often differ in their actions and control of space, simultaneously fulfilling and creating gender "norms" in the process. Gender segregation also occurs in the later years, when students choose elective classes, sports activities, and programs of study. During the onset of adolescence, fewer girls than boys enroll in subjects such as math and science, and most sports activities are gender segregated (e.g., track, swimming, tennis) or single-sex (football, hockey, wrestling). In vocational programs, gender segregation is particularly visible, with a disproportionate number of girls studying child care and cosmetology and boys studying automotive repairs and woodworking. In colleges and universities, women have steadily enrolled in traditionally male-dominated programs, such as business and law, since the early 1970s. However, men are not moving as steadily into female-dominated fields, such as early education or nursing. Although more women than men currently receive postsecondary degrees, they remain underrepresented at prestigious colleges and universities in educational programs leading to lucrative careers. Understanding the interrelationship of gender segregation and educational institutions with the construction of students' educational aspirations is necessary to understand vertical and horizontal workplace gender segregation and gender inequality.

Workplace Gender Segregation

As with education, occupational gender segregation in the United States remained relatively stable until the 1970s, when it began to steadily decline, partly the result of changing cultural perceptions regarding women's and men's social roles and affirmative action policies and legislation. However, many researchers challenge the presumption that declines in occupational gender segregation represent substantial change in the gender segregation of the workplace. Women may have moved into all levels of occupations, but the jobs they attain within those occupational categories often remain divided along gender lines. For example, although many women are now entering the field of medicine, they tend to be clustered in lower-paying specialties such as geriatrics or general medicine. Additionally, men are more likely than women to have managerial authority and autonomy in the same workplace. Such horizontal and vertical gender segregation has dire economic effects for women, whose jobs often pay less than those traditionally held by men.

Although gender segregation, in part, may result from "supply side" or workers' actions and preferences, researchers within the past 30 years have focused their attention on examining "demand side" or employers' actions. Frequently, employers consciously or subconsciously make hiring and promotion decisions

based on employees' gendered personality characteristics or perceived family obligations (e.g., as breadwinner or caretaker). Such decisions frequently produce vertical and horizontal gender segregation. Even in countries with strong family policies, such as Sweden and Norway, workplace gender segregation persists, which demonstrates the deep-rooted processes producing both segregation and inequality. Consequently, recent theorists of gender segregation have focused on the gendering not only of individuals but of interactional and organizational processes at all levels of analysis—micro, meso, and macro. Understanding how processes and not just individuals are gendered provides important insights as to how social institutions play a role in the creation and reproduction of gender and gender segregation.

A. Fiona Pearson

See also Gender Gap; Gender Identity and Socialization; Glass Ceiling; School Segregation; Title IX; Women's Rights Movement

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Segregation, Occupational

Occupational segregation refers to the unequal distribution of positions in the labor force. It is historically associated with exclusionary practices that excluded women from men's jobs and people of color from whites' jobs, and with practices that relegated white women and racial ethnic groups to jobs subordinate, if not subservient, to white men. Indeed, occupations associated with women and/or racial and ethnic minorities are generally associated with lower social rewards than positions held by white men, as indicated by measures of prestige, autonomy, income, and other benefits.

For example, the *feminization* of an occupation describes changes in the gender composition correlated with lessening the value and prestige of that occupation. As women enter a predominantly male occupation, the work becomes more closely supervised and deskilled and relatively less rewarded, as documented with the change from male to female predominance in public education and clerical work. Scholars have documented trends that show the occupational pattern of gender segregation is from male-dominated to female-dominated occupations.

A racial caste system characterized occupational distribution in U.S. society through the mid-20th century. Occupations associated with the lowest racial status groups in society were the lowest paid, most segregated, and given the least regard, or occupational prestige, of all jobs. These occupations were often the "dirtiest" and most dangerous, least secure, and allowed some of the most virulent forms of abuse.

Conversely, the most prestigious and well-paid occupations in U.S. society are associated with the highest race and gender status group: white males. Although the civil rights movement led to new legislation that led to a decline in occupational segregation, patterns of race and gender dissimilarity persist. White males remain dominant in jobs associated with the best working conditions and remuneration both within and between social classes and remain at the top of the occupational hierarchy. For example, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in 2005 whites and Asians dominated professional managerial occupations, respectively holding 36 and 46 percent of the related occupational positions. In contrast, blacks and Latinos/as together held 48 percent of service occupations and 36 percent of production and other labor, and Latinos/as were more likely than any other group to work in occupations associated with natural resources, construction, and maintenance.

Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows more women are in professional and managerial occupations—up to 35 percent of women by 2004—the jobs they hold remain overwhelmingly female and are often considered "semi-professional" such as nurse, librarian, and teacher. Among professional and managerial workers, women were more likely than men to be employed in education and other lower-paid fields, while men—particularly white and Asian

American men—were more likely than women to work in high-paying fields such as computers and engineering.

Occupational segregation exists between and within occupations—such as the greater preponderance of men as physicians and women as nurses, and the gendering of particular types of physician or nurse as well. White-collar jobs dominated by women are called "pink-collar work"—lumping "semi-professionals" together with office-related occupations, or clerical work, and low-end retail sales. In 2004, only 6.3 percent of men worked in office and administrative support, in contrast to 23 percent of women. Sixteen percent of men worked in service-related occupations compared to 20 percent of women.

Occupational segregation is either *horizontal*, with clear race or gender notions attached to the job, or *vertical*, where promotional opportunities are blocked by gender and/or race, leaving the top positions to the top gender or race group. Scholars refer to a "glass ceiling" to describe workplace constraints that contribute to vertical occupational segregation by locking women into dead-end jobs such as secretary, while the positions available to white men are more often associated with promotional opportunities or what some call a "glass escalator."

Occupations appear to take on value based in part on the social value attributed to the groups who dominate their ranks. However, scholars remain divided in their explanations for how social value and occupational segregation are correlated and whether allocation to different jobs along horizontal lines necessarily promotes inequality.

Some scholars argue that occupational segregation reflects differences among social actors, as a result of our *socialization* and orientation toward particular roles in society, or, as *human capital* theorists suggest, perhaps it reflects differences in training and ability as well. In other words, they link the outcome to differences in workers—differences in work ethic, training, availability, education, and so on. Others suggest that it is not our "human capital," but *who we know* that affects our access to employment opportunities. *Social networks,* not just experience, training, and education, influence knowledge about job opportunities and promotions, as do employers' gender and race notions of who is appropriate for the position.

Other scholars argue that culturally embedded race and gender notions result in *discrimination* by employers, coworkers, and/or customers and clients who shape workplace culture and practices to reflect these cultural notions. However, for some, occupational segregation is one of the practices that emerge in the complex of race-class-gender oppression that need not require overt, intentional discrimination by any of the social actors. In this sense, occupational segregation is both the product of practices that maintain divisions of race and gender privilege, inequality, and oppression and a means for reproducing these inequalities. It may result in part from socialization and discrimination, but it is also produced by a complex of social practices tied to cultural representations that reconstruct raced, classed, and gendered realities in dynamic ways, changing together as part of the taken-for-granted social organization of work in a highly differentiated globalizing capitalist economy.

Sharon Elise

See also Affirmative Action; Comparable Worth; Discrimination; Gender Bias; Glass Ceiling; Pink-Collar Occupations; Stratification, Gender

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Segregation, Residential

Residential segregation most often refers to the separation of people into different neighborhoods based on their race and/or ethnicity, though neighborhood-level segregation can be computed using other characteristics of people, households, or neighborhoods, for example, social class, single-parent families, or home ownership. The association between the term *residential segregation* and race/ethnicity reflects the fact that segregation by race/ethnicity is far higher than segregation by other characteristics. Segregation is a social problem because where people live determines

other aspects of their lives: what schools their children attend, access to transportation, availability of municipal services, job opportunities, and so on.

Since residential segregation is based on neighborhoods, it is important to understand how *neighborhood* is defined. Neighborhoods are usually approximated by census tracts, non-overlapping areas that cover an entire city or metropolitan area and contain approximately 4,000 persons. With the exception of subdivisions to accommodate population growth, tracts have the advantage of changing relatively little over time, making comparisons across time easier. Researchers who argue tracts are too large to capture what most people mean by a neighborhood instead use block groups, areas of about 1,500 people, as proxies for a neighborhood, though these get redefined at each census. The larger the unit used to define the neighborhood, the lower segregation will be, because the probability of finding two different people, say a black and a white, increases as the total number of people examined increases.

In its simplest form, residential segregation is measured by the Index of Dissimilarity. This compares the population of each neighborhood to the overall racial composition of the city or metropolitan area in which it is located. Neighborhoods whose population more closely matches the overall racial composition contribute less to the index, those that do not contribute more. The index ranges from 0 to 100, where zero indicates no segregation and 100 indicates total segregation, with no groups sharing any neighborhoods at all. Values below 30 are considered low, those between 30 and 60 moderate, and above 60 high. The value of the index can be interpreted as the percentage of either group that would need to change their neighborhood so that each neighborhood would reflect the race/ethnic distribution of the city as a whole. The advantages of this index are that it is easy to compute and understand, takes the city's overall racial composition into account and does not impose an artificial definition of integration, is unaffected by the relative sizes of the groups, and has a long history of use. The main disadvantage of the index is that it compares only two groups at a time, a feature that is becoming more problematic as U.S. society becomes increasingly diverse.

Using the Index of Dissimilarity as the measure allows description of patterns of segregation for different groups in the United States in recent decades. First, African Americans are almost always the most segregated group, followed by Hispanics, and then Asians. In 2000, on average, African American segregation from non-Hispanic whites was 65.2, Hispanic segregation was 51.6, and Asian segregation 42.2. Second, the segregation of African Americans has been declining in recent decades, but that of Hispanics and Asians has been increasing, in part because of continued immigration of those groups; new immigrants tend to live near others of their group, thus replacing those who have moved out. On average, while black–white segregation declined 4.6 points between 1980 and 1990, Hispanic–white segregation increased 4.9 points, and Asian–white increased 2.1 points. Third, segregation tends to be highest in older, formerly industrial cities, in the Northeast and Midwest, with large black populations. For example, in 2000 the segregation of African Americans from whites in Detroit was 84.7, compared to segregation of 45.7 for Hispanics and 45.9 for Asians. Conversely, it is lower in newer cities in the South and West whose populations are growing. For example, in 2000 the segregation of African Americans in Phoenix-Mesa was 43.7, compared to 52.5 for Hispanics and 28.1 for Asians. Metropolitan areas that attract more immigrants also tend to have somewhat lower black segregation than those that do not. Fourth, the largest declines in black segregation are in smaller metropolitan areas with small black populations. Between 1980 and 2000, African American segregation declined by nearly 20 points in Dallas and Phoenix-Mesa, while it declined by less than 5 in Detroit and Newark, and increased by 0.2 points in New York City. Thus, in the larger metropolitan areas where more than half of metropolitan blacks live, segregation declines have been modest.

Social scientists also increasingly realize that the simple description of residential segregation as a matter of even distribution across neighborhoods is inadequate to fully describe the phenomena. Issues such as how much your group's percent of representation in different neighborhoods differs from your group's percent of representation in the city's overall population (uneven distribution), who shares your neighborhood with you (isolation), how the neighborhoods your group occupies are themselves distributed across space (clustering), whether you live close to the center city (centralization), and whether your neighborhoods are densely crowded (concentration) all refer to other important aspects of segregation. Each of these has a specific measure attached to it. Places that are highly segregated on four or all five of these measures are known as *hypersegregated* places. Until 2000, the only group in the United States that

lived in hypersegregated areas was African Americans. In 2000, Hispanics in New York and Los Angeles were also found to be hypersegregated. African Americans were hypersegregated in 29 places in 2000, including Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Newark, and Philadelphia, where they had scores above 60 on all five measures.

While people choose different neighborhoods for a variety of reasons, residential segregation is not simply the aggregate result of individual choices, but the result of actions on the part of government, realtors, bankers, and insurance agents to influence where specific groups live. At the extreme, apartheid, there are laws dictating where specific groups can live. Historical research on segregation has shown that the process of limiting where African Americans could live in northern cities moved from individual acts of violence and deed restriction to restrictive covenants that applied to whole neighborhoods, to a brief attempt by some places to pass apartheid laws that the Supreme Court promptly declared illegal, to the practice of redlining of certain neighborhoods that was developed by the Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC) and carried out on an extensive scale under the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) with the cooperation of bankers and realtors. The final act of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s was the 1968 Fair Housing Act, which forbade discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. Studies have found that discrimination since then has become more subtle and is now often the purview of loan officers and insurance agents, as denial of mortgages and insurance results in the same loss of access as discrimination by a realtor.

The importance of segregation lies in its consequences: living in highly segregated neighborhoods limits the opportunities a person and his or her family have in a myriad of different ways. One important limitation is financial: houses in segregated neighborhoods tend to be worth less and appreciate far more slowly than comparable houses in white neighborhoods, directly contributing to the wealth differential between whites and blacks as well as restricting money available to pay for college or help with the down payment on a house for a child. Other consequences of segregation include job and transportation access, safety issues, exposure to crime and higher rates of poverty, and receipt of poorer municipal services. The effects on both adults and children of living in segregated neighborhoods have been extensively studied, and while there is some inconsistency among the findings, it is clear that there is spatial differentiation of neighborhoods and many behaviors, and that these are interrelated and vary systematically. Residential segregation by race/ethnicity, especially for African Americans, is not benign in its effects.

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See also Hypersegregation; Index of Dissimilarity; Segregation; Segregation, De Facto; Segregation, De Jure

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Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Sociologist Robert Merton coined the term *self-fulfilling prophecy* in 1949 in *Social Theory and Social Structure* as "a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true." In other words, a person's expectations about a situation eventually lead that person to behave in ways that confirm the expectations. Merton illustrated his concept with the example of the fictional bank of Cartwright Millingville. Although the bank is financially secure, its assets are invested in numerous enterprises. When a large number of depositors all show up at once wanting their money, a rumor spreads that the bank is in trouble. Within hours, so many panicked depositors withdraw their savings that the bank, unable to meet the sudden demand of all its customers, becomes insolvent and declares bankruptcy. Thus, the original false rumor leads to behavior that fulfills the prediction.

Psychologists Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson further reinforced Merton's idea with the publication of *Pygmalion in the Classroom* in 1968. Their experiment showed that when teachers are influenced to have higher expectations for previously non–high achieving students, those expectations and the teachers' subsequent behavior improve the academic performance of those students.

Self-fulfilling prophecies occur in a cyclical process. To begin, an observer internalizes a stereotype about a group. This stereotyped belief leads the observer to act accordingly toward that group. The subject group, upon receiving such differentiated treatment (either positive or negative), will often react accordingly to reinforce that expected stereotype, thus "proving" that stereotype and reinforcing it. This justification serves to encourage the differential treatment toward other group members as the cycle continues and the stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination remain constant.

Self-fulfilling prophecies can easily affect schoolchildren. If a schoolteacher internalizes stereotypes that whites are above average, Asians are the brightest, and other minority and immigrant children are below average, those beliefs will most likely shape how the teacher treats those students. Often, due to the internalization of such stereotypes, teachers will act in a prejudicial manner toward students without realizing what they are doing, since motivation for such actions comes from the subconscious level.

The result of self-fulfilling prophecies has been the unequal treatment of ethnic, racial, religious, and gender minority students throughout history. Groups stereotyped as below average students typically do not receive the same amount of positive interaction with their teachers as students believed to be above average. The effects of the self-fulfilling prophecy in the classroom often carry into students' adulthood as they enter the workforce and face similar stereotypes and prejudices. The cycle continues, often contributing to the level of their productivity and success.

Self-fulfilling prophecies affect more than a person's academic experience and career. Stereotypes regarding which groups are "more prone to break the law," "better athletes," and "more competent leaders" can affect which groups do become more criminal (or interrogated and/or arrested based on suspicion because of their group membership), good athletes (because of extra encouragement to develop their "inherent skills"), or elected officials (because of the perceived characteristics of their group).

Whether positive or negative, the cyclical process of self-fulfilling prophecies can affect one's actions over an entire lifetime.

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See also Cultural Values; Discrimination; Prejudice; Social Constructionist Theory

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Senility

See Dementia

Sentencing Disparities

Individuals convicted of crimes are sentenced to a variety of punishments, including fines, treatment, supervision, and incarceration. Disparities, or differences, in these sentences correlate with both legal characteristics such as crime of conviction and prior record, and "extra-legal" characteristics such as race, employment status, sex, and age. Moreover, a thorough review of research reveals that race, employment status, and gender—especially child care responsibilities—all affect sentencing outcomes independent of legal variables. More particularly, even among offenders with the same legal characteristics, black offenders are punished more harshly than are white offenders, unemployed offenders are punished more harshly than employed offenders, and individuals who are not primary caregivers are punished more harshly than those who are. Compounding these disparities are others generated during other stages of criminal processing, such as arrest, pretrial processing, plea bargaining, release, and parole revocation.

History

Before emancipation, slave owners were legally free to punish their slaves for any offense without intervention

from the judiciary. This meant that punishment of blacks was generally inflicted on the body and that a conviction—or any legal process—was not necessary as a precursor to punishment. On the rare occasions when blacks were tried for their offenses—generally slaves whose alleged offenses affected the larger (white) community and free blacks—they were often subject to separate legal codes, especially in the South. The code that simply bore the state name was in fact only applicable to whites, and a separate code, often called "black codes," was applicable to blacks. These codes mandated different punishments for the same offenses. Blacks were subject to some punishments that whites were not. For example, in Virginia, it was typical for slaves who ran away to be sentenced to castration or hobbling, while no such status and thus crime existed for whites and there was no crime for which whites could be sentenced to either of these punishments. In addition, prescribed punishments for many crimes were lighter for whites than for blacks. For example, Virginia decreed imprisonment for whites but death for blacks convicted of a variety of felonies, from buying or receiving a stolen horse to rape. In addition, blacks were tried in separate courts without juries, comprised of county justices and sometimes slave-owning assessors. One remnant of separate legal codes is that noncitizen individuals accused of criminal behavior are still subjected to a different set of laws than citizens accused of criminal behavior.

Contemporary Punishment

Today, most discussions about sentencing disparities focus on the apparent disjuncture between race-neutral law and racially disparate punishment outcomes. In other words, scholars investigate why, despite legal codes mandating that individuals with the same legal characteristics receive the same punishment, the effects of the race, class, and gender on individual outcomes remain. Early studies, from the 1920s to the 1970s, generally looked only at men convicted of felonies and tested for race and socioeconomic effects. These studies found that black men and unemployed men received more punitive criminal justice outcomes than white employed men. However, these studies used inadequate statistical methods and often contained methodological flaws, rarely controlling for legally relevant factors such as prior record or seriousness of offense. In the 1970s, many scholars reanalyzed the data from these earlier studies, this time controlling for legally relevant factors and using more sophisticated statistical techniques. These analyses showed that little if any discrimination existed. Further, when later studies added variables for prior record and offense seriousness, the effects of race and class often disappeared or lessened. As a result, many scholars rejected the "discrimination thesis," arguing that what appeared to be effects of racial or class discrimination were actually the effects of legally relevant variables correlating with race and class, such as prior record.

Since then, several new developments helped to show where discrimination exists and why it was invisible in these earlier studies. First, scholars separated sentencing decisions into two parts: the decision to incarcerate and the sentence length. These studies find that while race or employment status rarely affects sentence length, both affect the decision to incarcerate. This probably occurs because judges have wider discretion when deciding whether or not to incarcerate an individual convicted of a crime, but sentencing ranges are often "recommended," if not mandated, leaving judges little room to adjust sentences for a given offense. Second, researchers began to test for interactions. While the main effects for race and class variables were often modest, their interaction, often with gender and particularly in young, unemployed black males, was consistently strong and significant. Studies show that the effects of gender are not constant across different racial groups.

Third, studies looking at the effects of race on sentencing by offense category found that being black or Latino/a is more harmful for offenders charged with some offenses than for offenders charged with other offenses. This is often explained by one of two competing, but not necessarily incompatible, theories.

The *liberation hypothesis* argues that during the criminal processing of cases that are more serious, the seriousness of crime and the defendant's prior criminal record strongly influence the outcome. In contrast, in less serious cases the features of the crime or the defendant's criminal record less clearly affect the outcome, allowing criminal justice actors more discretion and thus increasing the likelihood of discrimination.

Another perspective, often called *focal concerns*, argues that judges rarely have complete information about cases or defendants and, as a result, they often try to reduce uncertainty by relying not only on the defendant's present offense and prior criminal conduct but also on attributes linked to the defendant's gender, race, social class, or other social positions.

Studies that separate their analyses by crime type find that racial disparity is greatest both among offenders convicted of less serious crimes and among offenders whose offenses are most likely to conjure racialized stereotypes. For example, black people are most disadvantaged, relative to white people with similar legal characteristics, when charged with or convicted of violent offenses. Latino/as are most disadvantaged, again relative to white people with similar legal characteristics, when charged with or convicted of drug offenses.

Finally, recent studies include variables that look at county-level demographics, such as economic inequality between black and white populations. These studies find that sentencing disparities are more substantial and consistent in some counties than in others and that this is linked to the demographics of those counties. For instance, race affects sentencing decisions most in counties where the percentages of blacks and economic inequality are both low.

Employment

Some evidence shows that individuals with lower socioeconomic status receive longer sentences than individuals of the same race, sex, and legal characteristics but with higher socioeconomic status. In this instance, employment status often serves as a proxy for class. Empirically, studies generally examine differences in sentencing outcomes between those employed and those unemployed at the time of arrest. Most studies find that unemployed individuals receive more punitive sentences than employed individuals. In fact, it would be surprising if this was not the case, since many states have codified employment status—along with other class-correlated characteristics such as residential stability—as a legal characteristic to be considered during criminal processing. That is, while criminal justice officials are not supposed to base their punishment decisions on race or sex, many states recommend that criminal justice officials consider employment status and residential stability when making their decisions. These characteristics receive consideration most directly during pretrial decisions, including the decision to deny bail, the setting of bail amount, and the decision to grant a nonfinancial release. However, since incarceration during pretrial increases the harshness of offenders' post-trial sentences, it is no surprise that those unemployed at the time of arrest receive more punitive sentences than those employed at the time of arrest.

Sociologists also examine how changes in labor supply over time affect the level of punishment in a society. Some researchers argue that penal policy is used to regulate labor supply. If this is correct, then increases in unemployment rates should correlate with increases in imprisonment rates. Correspondingly, decreases in unemployment rates should correlate with decreases in imprisonment rates. Although some claim that the evidence is inconclusive, most longitudinal and many cross-sectional studies find significant associations between increases in labor surplus and incarceration rates. Moreover, unemployment appears to have the strongest effect on black incarceration rates, while the effect of unemployment on white male incarceration has diminished over time. Studies that do not control for race may thus be underestimating the unemployment–punishment link.

Paternalism Versus "Caregiver Effect"

Since the early 20th century, criminologists and other scholars have questioned the origins of gender disparities in the criminal justice system. While most scholars agree that gender differences in offenses explain some, perhaps most, of gender disparities in punishment outcomes, they nonetheless contend that decisions of criminal justice officials compound these "original" disparities. The most commonly espoused thesis states that "chivalry" or "paternalism" leads criminal justice officials to grant women more beneficial criminal justice outcomes than they do men.

However, many researchers criticize the "paternalism" hypothesis. One group argues that no actual difference exists between the criminal processing of men and women and that the apparent difference results from failure to control for legally relevant variables. A second camp argues that gender differences in processing result from racially disparate treatment that specifically targets black men. Here, scholars argue that the difference in the processing between black men and women—unlike that of white men and women, where little exists—is due to particularly harsh treatment of black men, not particularly lenient treatment of black women. Finally, a third camp of criminologists explore the impact of child care responsibilities on criminal processing and argue that criminal justice officials respond to child care responsibility, rather than gender per se, when making criminal justice decisions. These scholars find that both men and women defendants who are primary

caregivers to young children receive more beneficial criminal justice outcomes than do defendants who are not. Thus gender—specifically, childrearing—does affect criminal processing, but sex per se does not.

Research on gender disparities in criminal processing took a sharp turn beginning in the 1980s when gender disparities in arrest rates, conviction rates, admission rates, and time served all increased dramatically. Three dominant schools of thought on this phenomenon emerged. The first attributed the increases in women's rates of punishment to an apparent crime wave by female offenders. A second camp argued that increases in women's rates of arrest and imprisonment were due to a decline in chivalry on criminal processing. A third camp argued that changes in sentencing laws—in particular, the adoption of predetermined sentencing policies—undermined criminal justice officials' ability to take gendered behaviors into consideration when deciding punishment outcomes. Moreover, some scholars argue that non-incarcerated sentences are not necessarily less punitive than sentences of incarceration since these forms of punishment put women under intense surveillance while they maintain their roles in families and homes.

Racialization of Criminal Codes

Defendants with the same legal characteristics do not always receive the same criminal justice outcomes, and these different outcomes correlate with extra-legal characteristics such as race, gender, and class. However, even if every defendant with the same legal characteristics received the same sentence, only a small decrease in racial disparities would occur because criminality is race salient. White people, for example, are disproportionately arrested for tax fraud, embezzlement, insider trading, and many other types of white-collar crime. Further, although these crimes cost more money per capita than all street crime combined, sentences for these crimes are, on average, less than sentences for even nonviolent street crime. Black people are disproportionately arrested for street crime—violent and nonviolent. Thus, in addition to sentencing disparities that arise during criminal processing, some disparities are built into criminal codes. Even though some people arrested for white-collar crime are black and some people arrested for street crime are white, the laws do not classify on the basis of race and so are distinct from the separate codes for blacks and whites that were in place before emancipation.

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See also Black Codes; Crime; Judicial Discretion; Justice; Racism; Violent Crime; White-Collar Crime

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Serial Murder

Serial killing is defined as four or more homicides in separate events, in which there is a psychological "cool-down" period for the perpetrator, which may be weeks, months, or years. It is commonly distinguished from mass killing and spree killing, in which there is no "cool-down" period. Unlike mass and spree killers, who are usually killed by police or take their own lives at the scene of their crimes, most serial killers are taken into custody, tried, and convicted.

The historical record includes many cases of mass, spree, and serial killing since at least 1500. Some speculate that earlier legends such as those of Count Dracula and "Vlad the Impaler" from Romania and Transylvania in the 1600s may be interpreted as early serial killings. The accounts of "Jack the Ripper," who killed four London prostitutes in 1888, are often credited as the beginnings of contemporary urban legends

concerning serial killers. During the 20th century, serial killers stimulated a popular culture industry including movies (171 with serial killers during the 1990s), books (more than 300 books published since 1980), trading cards, comic books (by Boneyard Press), retro and costume clothing, and fan clubs. The 1991 Oscar-winning film *Silence of the Lambs* and its sequel arguably account for some of the contemporary craze, as does a socially constructed media image that is factually incorrect.

In reality, serial killing is rare, accounting for less than 1 percent of all homicides in the United States, the undisputed world leader in this area. Research shows that today most serial killers are white males, but about 20 percent are African Americans or blacks and about 17 percent are females. About 1 in 5 serial killings involves a team of two people who work together.

While respected Federal Bureau of Investigation profilers are insistent that there is no known "profile" associated with such a statistically rare phenomenon, clinical and in-depth case studies of surviving serial killers have revealed a credible set of generalizations about their behavior. The animus of the pattern begins very early in an individual's life, and some kind of profound child maltreatment is common, which some observers have called "child abuse plus." Problematic behaviors and acting out usually begin before adolescence, and this is commonly known to parents (if they exist) and others. More than 75 percent of known serial killers have prior juvenile and/or criminal records. The sexually motivated killers usually have patterns of adolescent sex abuse of some kind, usually beginning at low levels and escalating to more serious forms over time. Substance abuse is common, as it is with many other criminal behaviors in U.S. culture. Early uses of pornography are as common for serial killers as with all other adult males. A very distinctive part of the serial killing etiology found in most cases is an elaborate serial killing fantasy, which commonly evolves over many years.

Victims of serial killers tend to be individuals from stigmatized or marginalized groups, and the police response is often inconsistent because of the competition between law enforcement agencies. Serial killing is just one of many ingredients in the social construction of the U.S. culture of fear that has evolved over several decades.

John M. Johnson

See also Murder; Violent Crime

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Service Economy

The term *service economy* refers to those industries and occupations within the formal economy that provide various services. It is a broad, general term covering industries as diverse as insurance, transportation, and food, and occupations as diverse as lawyers, investment bankers, and bartenders. Rather than producing a material object for subsequent market sale, as manufacturing did during the industrial era, the contemporary service sector sells a less tangible service. For example, when parents put their children in day care, they are paying solely for the service of watching children. Today, the United States has a service economy; the provision of services is the main driver of the economy, rather than the industrial or agricultural production of earlier eras, although the latter two still play major economic roles. However, the recent shift to a mostly service economy has caused significant economic, social, and cultural change in U.S. society.

The service economy has numerous "sectors," or agglomerations defined by the types of services provided. Some examples are the fire, insurance, and real estate (commonly referred to as FIRE) service sector, the information sector, the legal services sector, the protective service sector (such as security and law enforcement), and the food and beverage service sector. Scholars often examine occupations within, rather than across, these sectors. However, comparisons across sectors do reveal much about the nature of the service economy as a whole. Complicating analysis, though, is the difficulty sometimes in categorizing an occupation as strictly a service occupation, since many occupations feature some manner of service and workers within the service economy generally deal with other people on a much higher level than those within an industrial economy. The key distinction is that today much of the U.S. economy is geared toward the provision of services of various sorts, resulting in the creation of new service occupations and a proliferation of existing ones.

The Rise of the Service Economy

Although the provision of services in some form has always been a part of the U.S. economy, only in recent decades did the service sector come to dominate economic growth. Several factors caused the overall decline in U.S. manufacturing and "blue-collar" jobs: increased levels of automation making workers obsolete for many tasks; increases in exporting labor overseas and the subsequent increases in foreign production; and overall international competition within the global market. Along with this decline were several economic and social changes in the past century that led to the proliferation of service jobs and rise of the service economy. One such shift was the increase in the number of households outsourcing needs such as food, child care, and home care as a result of increasing dual-income families and less weekday free time. More individuals thus rely on others to service them in various aspects of their lives than ever before.

Today, service is a commodity in itself that is bought and sold. A company's level of service carries considerable weight and often is the sole basis of competition for customers. As a result, businesses and individual entrepreneurs continually devise new services and/or new strategies for providing old services. The result is new social relations under a new economy with complex consequences.

Problems in the Service Economy

A major problem with the service economy is the bifurcation of employment. Despite the creation of a significant number of jobs and significant expansion of preexisting service jobs such as those in the FIRE and food and beverage sectors, most of these new service jobs are generally low-paying positions with little, if any, opportunity for upward mobility. These are jobs in sectors such as fast food, frequently filled by people with less educational achievement or opportunity than those in the higher-status service professions. The service economy, then, has a tendency to divide workers within it along class and educational lines, which often translates into issues concerning race, ethnicity, and gender. It creates a two-tiered system in which some get well-paid, high-status jobs, while others get low-paying, low-status, unstable employment. Those in the latter category are often ethnic and racial minorities. Sometimes this division of labor along various lines is visible within a single workplace. For example, restaurants often feature ethnic minorities (often immigrants) in the backstage, low-paying, and low-status roles of dishwashers and line cooks and whites as front-stage waiters and waitresses, dealing with customers and earning more money.

Another important problem with the service economy is the conditions that the service jobs produce, as the service economy tends to turn many everyday forms of social interaction into economic exchanges. Numerous scholars apply Karl Marx's classic concept of alienation to the conditions of the service economy. Although Marx was referring to industrial capitalism when he discussed how workers under capitalism are alienated from themselves, the work process, and what they produce due to material conditions and the relations of production, many scholars argue that service workers in diverse occupations are also alienated in these ways due to conditions of the service economy. One issue that these scholars point to is the existence of the managerial system, which limits autonomy that workers have over their work. Like factory workers, service workers often perform rote tasks that are easily rationalized, routinized, controllable, and calculable. Unlike factory workers, however, most service sector employees are not unionized or, more accurately, are not members of their industry's unions. This is a result of the transient nature of such jobs and the fact that many feature office conditions far removed from those of factories.

Similarly, many scholars also examine the concept of emotional work, or service work that requires employees to deal with customers and clients on a face-to-face basis or over the phone. In these occupations, workers use their abilities to control their own emotions as well as those of their customers or clients. These workers put on an emotional display that may or may not express their true feelings. Although emotional service workers sometimes have autonomy over how they display themselves to others, they are often exploited for their emotional abilities by management, owners, corporations, protocols, or some combination of these actors in order to provide a distinct service. In this way, service workers for whom emotional expression is an important part of their jobs are alienated (a) from themselves, in that they are not expressing themselves in a way they normally would; (b) from what they do, in that they are not performing tasks in a manner that they normally would; and (c) from what they produce, in that their emotional expression during their occupational performance is

not their own. Workers, then, in effect, become the commodity.

On the other hand, scholars also see the service economy as a liberating shift from the industrial era. These scholars show how the pendulum of service work and emotional labor also swings in the other direction to create more autonomy for workers to be themselves and to be creative. This is certainly true for many professions, such as waiting tables, in which workers use their emotional appeal to procure tips. Again, however, it must be kept in mind that this is often determined by position within the service economy, meaning not all occupations have the luxury of autonomy. As mentioned earlier, contemporary U.S. households are frequently dual-income and individuals frequently experience an intensification of time in their daily lives, leaving them with little time of their own for themselves. A large, stable service economy helps to free up time so that individuals can pursue leisure activities. Scholars also point to the increasing amount of occupational flexibility that comes with this economic shift. No longer tied down to a single company, region, or even industry, workers are freer to explore many options in the service economy.

Overall, the rise of the service economy has had a profound impact on U.S. society. As the service economy and service industries expand, as more and more areas of everyday life become outsourced to private business actors, and as public social interaction rests on economic exchanges based on the provision of a service, U.S. society will continue to experience such effects in ever-changing and dynamic ways.

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See also Economic Restructuring; Global Economy; Globalization; Multinational Corporations; Social Change; World-Systems Analysis

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Sex Education

Progressive, comprehensive sex education encompasses the myriad issues related to human sexuality, including birth control, disease prevention, sexual orientation, gender roles, relationships, and intimacy. Such programs provide age appropriate information throughout primary and secondary education and support student exploration and development of emotions, attitudes, values, and identity as well as interpersonal communication and decision-making skills.

Sex education developed in the early 1900s, most prominently out of crusades against gonorrhea and syphilis and spurred by a sense that the youth of the day were morally and physically endangered by loosening mores. Then as now, sex education faced the tension between its potentially immunizing effects against the dangers of sexuality and the possibility that such education would itself dangerously arouse those being educated. While most educators presented sex negatively, focusing on danger and fear, a few—such as Mary Ware Dennett—rejected this stance and emphasized the joy and beauty of sexuality.

The years following World War II brought a resurgence of Victorian prudery and new devotion to a sanitized ideal of the nuclear family. While the production of penicillin reduced fears of sexually transmitted disease (STD) infection, the Kinsey reports on sexual behavior gave evidence to some of society's slide into moral depravity. Though few, if any, of the study's participants had received formal sex education, detractors vilified such programs. In the 1950s, sex education largely yielded to family life education, which focused on dating etiquette and home economics more than anything sexual. Reacting to this reconstituted void in education, the Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS) emerged in 1964. SIECUS remains the only national organization dedicated solely to sex education and, with a membership that reads like a who's who of expert and professional organizations related to the field, it has become the clearinghouse for research and policy in the area.

Overwhelming public support exists for comprehensive sex education programs. The percentage of public approval varies with the contentiousness of the particular topic in question, the age of the students, and the specific population surveyed, but it ranges no lower than 60 percent and reaches near unanimity for junior and senior high school programs. The current U.S. debate centers on "abstinence-only" programs narrowly restricted to the biological basics that teach that the only acceptable sexual activity is within the context of heterosexual marriage, emphasize the dangers of any deviation from this norm, and exclude all information on birth control or STD prevention. While several laws specifically prohibit federal prescription of sex education curriculum, conservative Christian influence has enabled exclusive funding of abstinence programs since 1981. Renewed and expanded in the 1990s, this funding topped $100 million at the turn of the new millennium and exceeded $241 million in 2007.

In assessing sex education, mounting evidence reveals that comprehensive curricula both delay onset of sexual activity and increase the likelihood of the use of safer sex techniques. In contrast, few studies indicate that abstinence-only programs affect rates or timing of sexual activity, and some indicate that they decrease the use of safer sex techniques. A comparison of U.S. statistics with those from Western Europe, where comprehensive sex education dominates, supports the utility of the European programs. However, sex education is far broader than classroom activities, and the more positive, healthier attitude toward sex and sexuality found in Western Europe might be an even more important factor.

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See also Cultural Values; Gender Identity and Socialization; Norms; Sexuality; Sexually Transmitted Diseases; Sexual Orientation

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Sexism

Sexism is a system of oppression that privileges men and discriminates against women. Sexism requires prejudice plus power. Like racism, sexism is not about isolated incidents but about patterns. The institutions of government, law, religion, education, and the media—as well as language and social mores—long perpetuated sexism, keeping females inferior and subordinate. Even though a female can discriminate against a male and do him harm to the point of taking his life simply because he is a male, such discrimination is different from systemic oppression. The societal problem is sexism, not males, and the movement to end sexism, sex exploitation, and oppression is feminism.

History

Today discussions about the women's movement typically speak in terms of waves. The First Wave grew out of the anti-slavery movement and began as an organized movement with the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 and ended with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution granting women the right to vote in 1920. The Second Wave grew out of women working in the civil rights and anti–Vietnam War movements and started in the 1960s, following the publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963 and the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966. In 1968, the term *sexism* first appeared, giving expression to a previously unnamed reality in women's lives. The Third Wave began in the 1980s and continues still.

Patriarchy

Female or male status and roles are social constructions usually based on the ideology of patriarchy. Patriarchy grants males privilege and gives men power based on their gender identity. Males as a group obviously benefit the most from patriarchy. Females may benefit by attaching themselves to and identifying with males. Patriarchy thus is male-centered, male-dominated, and male-identified, and it functions by oppressing women.

Sexism often manifests itself in the workplace and in politics. For instance, it is not uncommon to hear judgmental comments about the appearance or personality of a female leader to an extent seldom heard

about a male. Strong female leaders cannot escape criticism about their "lack of femininity" or "overassertiveness" when they take strong positions on an issue.

Stereotypes

Gender stereotypes about females and males keep sexist thinking alive. Females who have the ability to incubate embryos, give birth to human beings, and feed infants and toddlers with their breasts are stereotyped as members of the "weaker" sex. Males who excel in upper body strength are stereotyped as members of the "stronger" sex. In addition to being stereotyped as "weaker," females are stereotyped as seductive and eager to please males. Racially tagged stereotypes portray black females as animalistic and hypersexual; Asian females as exotic and focused on catering to male desires; white females as bimbos and dumb blondes; Native American females as beguiling princesses or "squaws"; and Latinas as "hot mommas."

Sex-Role Socialization

The socialization process traditionally teaches females to be subordinate, passive, compliant, nurturing, emotionally expressive, vulnerable, cooperative, and accommodating. Males learn to be dominant, aggressive, tough, emotionally in control, logical, and assertive. Some researchers refer to the socialization of females and males as a component of sexual terrorism (a system whereby males frighten and by frightening dominate and control females). Such "voluntary compliance" essentially socializes females to be victims and males to be terrorists in the name of masculinity.

Media

Although some people argue that sexism ended in the 20th century, evidence of sexism abounds. Children experience sexist socialization in virtually every social institution. In the media, for example, a content analysis of children's television and print cartoons reveals that there are many more male characters than females. Spongebob, Barney, Big Bird, Snoopy, Garfield, Donald Duck, Mickey Mouse, Spiderman, and Superman are some examples. Some male characters do have female counterparts, such as Minnie Mouse, Daisy Duck, and Smurfette, but they are typically less important and very stereotypic, performing domestic duties and acting cutesy. Lucy and Peppermint Patty from the *Peanuts* comic strip are arguably strong female characters. Others have attempted to bring in strong female cartoon characters such as the Power Puff Girls, but most of the newer female characters are presented as "sexy" females.

Video games present males as very violent and females as very sexual. An early female character named Samus from Metroid, a Nintendo game, was a strong character, but her female identity only became known at the end of the game. The depiction of most females in video games shows them with large breasts and as both hungry sex fiends and helpless victims of male conquest. The many male characters compete and kill with impunity.

Advertisements reinforce stereotypes, with females often depicted performing domestic tasks and doing service work. In contrast, males play and watch sports, drive cars, and occupy management positions. Advertisements also contribute to female subordination by undermining female self-esteem by encouraging females to be critical of their bodies, to fear gaining weight and showing signs of age. Advertisers offer products that aid dieting, maintain youth, and make females attractive to males by smelling right and looking seductive. Since the average American sees thousands of advertisements each day, these gendered messages are very effective.

Saturating television, music videos, music, magazines, and film are countless stereotypic gender messages. Repeated images of women in domestic roles and catering to the sexual desires of males reinforce traditional sex roles. On most television programs males have the major roles, and they are the most successful hosts of prime time talk shows. It feels "right" to see males in the power roles. Music videos are particularly rife with images of females offering males sexual pleasure. Some popular music such as rap and heavy metal contain overt messages encouraging violence against women and homophobia. Magazines marketed to women feature articles telling women how to please their men. Magazines marketed to men show images of highly sexualized females. Most popular movies feature images of aggressive males and sexy young females.

These media images are extraordinarily powerful. They effectively reinforce and reflect patriarchal values.

Weapons of Sexism

The so-called weapons of sexism include violence against women, homophobia, and economics. Males can exercise their aggressive masculinity by committing violence against females to keep them subordinate. Feminists charge that the global proliferation of pornography and the pandemic of battering, rape, sex trafficking, and sexual harassment are evidence of patriarchy as an oppressive worldwide system.

Economics is another weapon of sexism. Keeping females less well off economically than males, even though they often have the responsibility of supporting their children or older relatives, ensures female subordination. Unlike in the past, women today are more likely to be financially responsible for children. Women's responsibility for children in a society that does not provide day care and other social services tends to leave them poor. U.S. females working full time earn about $.78 for every dollar earned by a male. Since the Reagan era, poverty has increased among women, a trend known as the feminization of poverty.

The Intersection of Sexism With Other Identities

Sexism is perhaps best understood in the context of other systems of oppression, such as racism, heterosexism, and classism. People hold multiple identities by sex, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, and other simultaneous social identities. The term *intersection* helps pinpoint these multiple identities. Since there are hierarchies of identities, a person can simultaneously be dominating and dominated. For example, a white rich female has two dominant (race and class) and one subordinate (sex) identities.

No hierarchy of oppressions exists, however. Sexism is the practice of male domination that all people experience as dominants or subordinates. It is problematic that domination and subordination are used to organize society. Another model of societal organization that could move society beyond sexism is partnership, the organizing principle of societies prior to the advent of patriarchy. In partnership societies, deities were conceptualized as female or as females with male consorts; in art, violent masculinity and warfare were not idealized; wealth was rather equitably shared; and there was equal partnership between women and men. Although some scholars argue that this model might be more of a fantasy than a reality, it can aid in envisioning a society free of sexism.

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See also Abuse, Intimate Partner; Feminist Theory; Feminization of Poverty; Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Gender; Identity and Socialization; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational; Sexism, Advertising; Sexism, Music; Sexual Harassment

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Sexism, Advertising

Americans see thousands of advertisements for products and services every week, and many of those commercial messages contain representations of women that are unflattering, demeaning, and offensive to many. Over the years, parents, teachers, religious organizations, feminists, media critics, and public interest groups have all voiced concerns over commercial messages that debase women. The images and narratives used to sell products frequently reinforce gender stereotypes, emphasize body-image anxiety, and objectify and hypersexualize the female body, even in advertisements directed toward the very female consumers they are targeting.

Emphasizing *The Look*

Because the design of so many of the products of the fashion, cosmetic, and beauty industries creates a "fashionable look" as a selling point, women are constantly bombarded with advertising messages that tell them to change or improve their appearance. The high-fashion models whose images sell everything from clothes to makeup, lingerie to perfume, become the cultural standards of perfection. Ads often promise or imply that through the use of the product, consumers can be more like the thin, flawless models in the ads. As consumer culture inevitably compels women to compare themselves to the hyper-thin, air-brushed icons of beauty, it is no wonder that many women, especially vulnerable teenagers, report high levels of anxiety about their appearance and body image.

Unrealistic standards of thinness and perfection rob young women of a sense of confidence in themselves, but the unique emphasis on appearance as a cultural measure of women's worth presents a significant problem for women as well. In the past, patriarchal Victorian society defined feminine worth primarily by appearance. Women were to be seen and seldom heard. Under patriarchy, social value resides in a woman's ability to present herself as a pleasing sight, one able to satisfy the male gaze. Cultural critics observe that consumer society also tends to measure a woman by her appearance and ability to achieve the look, not on her merits or success in the larger public and economic spheres. Feminists argue that recognizing a woman's social value requires going beyond appearance. Only then will society recognize a woman's social contribution and achieve gender equality.

Selling Sex

Using sex to make a sale remains a favored marketing strategy for many products, and ads that sell sex along with products are standard features in the world of advertising. Men and women are often targeted with different messages, and ads for men frequently present women in sexually available and vulnerable positions, especially in cigarette and alcohol advertising. Scantily clad models in alluring and sexualized poses draw the interest of male consumers and in doing so objectify women as little more than commercially designed male fantasies.

Images of sexually alluring models are also featured in ads targeted to women. These women present cultural ideals of feminine sexuality, for they are able to attract the opposite sex. Becoming the object of desire by emulating the image, wearing the product, or using the perfume promises to confer a degree of personal power to women, the power of attraction.

Images that use female sexuality to stimulate male desire and objectify women leave both sexes without representations able to affirm one another's full humanity, evoke mutual respect, or recognize shared emotional needs. In addition, sex is often associated with power, and images of objectified sexuality, together with vulnerability, reinforce cultural attitudes that condone force and even violence against women.

Violence

Whether selling makeup, sneakers, or high fashion, many advertisements depict women as victims of violence or feature the threat of violence toward them. Since many advertisements are primarily visual, these messages are often implicit, or implied by the photograph, not directly stated in the advertising copy. An ad for perfume featuring a nude woman pictured from behind, her hands bound across her back with an expensive bracelet, is an image of implied violence. The woman is constrained and helpless, and her nudity amplifies her vulnerable state. Through the camera's perspective, the viewer becomes a voyeur, catching her from behind. She does not look back at the viewer and, because her face is hidden, she expresses no emotion and cannot make her presence felt. Such visual qualities present women as objects, and in this case, a sexualized object, bound and vulnerable. Many other, more explicit images depict women who appear to be dead lying on floors. Others are being slapped or threatened, drugged or placed in submissive poses. Images of violence and the threat of violence against women exist across the visual landscape of consumer culture, and such imaging reveals, at least in part, how women are defined and imagined in our culture. The visual geography of advertising also reflects what types of behaviors toward women are acceptable in our society.

Marketing Women's Liberation

As women have struggled for equality over the years, many advertising campaigns have picked up on the themes of liberation and independence. Possibly the best example of marketing the idea of women's

liberation can be found in the long-running campaigns of Virginia Slims cigarettes. But critics charge that slogans like "You've come a long way Baby," appeal to women's desires for equality and independence, while selling them a harmful product that leads, ironically, to dependence on nicotine. Even as advertisements represent the hopes and desires of female consumers, purchasing a product rarely fulfills such aspirations.

Cultural critics and social scientists writing from many different perspectives argue that commercial images of women are important forms of social communication that contain influential messages affecting public attitudes about the place of women in society. Advertising images play on gender stereotypes, and as they do, they reinforce harmful gender biases. Calling for an equality of imagery is one step along the way to social and economic practices that treat women as full and equal partners with social standing in our society.

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See also Body Image; Patriarchy; Sexism; Sexuality; Sexualization of Mainstream Media

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Sexism, Music

Many people view sexism, defined as an ideology and practices that promote women's inferiority to men, as a significant problem in contemporary music. While some think of the latest offensive lyrics by some popular music artists as symptomatic of this issue, others believe that the sexism in music harms society by its effects on behavior, particularly that of children. However, both conceptions underestimate the scope of the problem.

Sexism exists in various forms of music, not just popular music, suggesting that almost everyone has listened to sexist music at some point, regardless of one's musical preferences. Moreover, sexism not only affects the content of the songs heard on the radio, but also the gender mix of artists selected for airplay. Sexism shapes popular conception of musical mastery, for instance, by prompting individuals to believe that women cannot master particular instruments or musical styles because of their gender, thereby minimizing women's contributions to music. Thus, only an examination of how sexism shapes the content, effect, and production of music allows for a full assessment of its impact on society. Another focus should be on how audiences and artists resist the sexism in music.

The sexism in music has its origins in the patriarchy, or male domination, of society, perpetuated by sexist ideology and practice. For example, men may protect their control of the production of music by limiting women's participation in production. Further, sexism even exists in the music that women perform. The male dominance of music extends to women often performing songs written by men, songs that reflect sexist ideas about what women want and feel, with emphasis on a romantic ideal of love that encourages women's passivity and dependency on men. The sexist practice of discounting women's contribution to music also promotes male dominance by ensuring that men are the ones that the audience views as exhibiting exemplary talent.

Given these factors, it is not surprising that researchers find sexism most commonly in music genres that display the most marked male domination, such as heavy metal and gangsta rap. Sexism, however, is perhaps most obvious in music videos, which often have little relationship to the content of the songs they supposedly enhance. Videos of even the most innocuous songs often portray women as the objects of men's fantasy, not as individuals with agency. As a visual medium, videos can amplify the physical differences between genders that underlie sexist beliefs about women's inferiority to men as well as powerfully strengthen the image of women as sexual objects.

Effect studies examining whether music influences behavior do not show that listening to sexist music causes people to be more sexist. Instead, research shows that music does not create sexist attitudes in

people who do not already have them; rather, sexist music helps reinforce these attitudes.

Another body of research finds sexism in the social organization of how music is produced. Sexist ideas about women's difference from men have contributed to gender segregation that limits the kinds of music women are perceived as being able to perform with legitimacy. For instance, one study shows that some women tend to specialize in playing the bass in rock bands due to the belief that their bodies and temperament are better suited to that instrument. Historically, women were less likely to perform Beethoven's works for similar reasons.

While the problem may seem intractable, individuals still find ways to resist the sexism in music. For instance, the Riot Grrls movement of the 1990s saw female rock artists starting their own bands, upsetting gender norms by wearing boots with dresses, and exhibiting an aggressive style of playing and singing that was typically associated with male rockers. These women deliberately challenged the allocated sexist role of the lead rock singer valued more for her beauty than her talent. More recently, women have highlighted affirming messages about black women's beauty hiding within the sexism of many rap music videos. Other research reports male and female alternative rock fans self-consciously seeking to distance themselves from the sexism in rock, with male fans admiring female artists' musicianship rather than their appearance. Such examples of resistance and challenges to sexism in music appear to be the vanguard of growing feminist actions to create lasting changes in music.

Antonia Randolph

See also Mass Media; Sexism

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Sex Trafficking

Sex trafficking refers to the trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation in forced marriages and forced prostitution. Generally, the trafficking flows from poorer countries to countries where the average person's living standard is relatively higher. Women are typically tricked and recruited with promises of well-paid legitimate work elsewhere and delivered to the employers through agents and brokers. Upon arrival, they quickly discover that the work they are expected to do is very different from what they had been told. Traffickers deceive, intimidate, threaten, and/or use physical force to control these women and children. It is extremely difficult and dangerous to escape the abusive situation they find themselves in.

Debt bondage is often used to maintain control of women. This entails women being made to work without wages until they have fully reimbursed their employers. This debt typically exceeds their travel costs and routinely increases with arbitrary fines and deceptive accounting. In some cases, it can never be fully repaid. Some indebted women are resold by employers; others are eventually released when their debt is paid, but this can take years. Women and children face constant surveillance, threats of retaliation, confiscation of passports and other documentation, and are often handicapped by their inability to speak the local language, unfamiliarity with the local surroundings, and fear of arrest and mistreatment by police.

The United Nations estimates that 600,000 to 800,000 men, women, and children annually are trafficked across international borders. Approximately 80 percent are women and girls, and up to 50 percent are minors. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that in West and Central Africa, up to 200,000 children are trafficked annually. Estimates by the International Labor Organization indicate that 200,000 to 250,000 women and children are trafficked each year in Southeast Asia alone and more than a million children are affected globally every year.

Many countries facilitate trafficking by issuing false documents to brokers and agents, ignoring immigration violations, and gleaning bribes from employers. Police are often bribed with access to the women in the brothels. Even in the cases where some trafficked women are freed by police raids, women

are often mistreated by the authorities and do not have access to services or redress. When confronted with evidence of trafficking and forced labor, officials tend to focus on immigration violations and anti-prostitution laws rather than on the human rights violations committed against trafficked victims. Women are thus punished as illegal migrants and prostitutes, while the traffickers routinely either escape entirely or face only minor penalties.

Controversies Over Sex Trafficking

Sex trafficking is a locus of debate between feminists and human rights activists. Some feminists advocate an abolitionist model, arguing that prostitution is tantamount to sexual slavery of women. For instance, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) contends that sex trafficking violates the sexual rights of female victims. Groups such as the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW) and the Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP) observe that trafficking is forced migrant labor that violates women's human rights. They contend that sex trafficking is exploitative and immoral because it involves commercial sex.

Other feminists feel that intensive anti-trafficking campaigns deprive sex workers of their rights and that many Western feminists use victim discourse to project a patronizing attitude toward non-Western women. To focus on forced prostitution ignores the larger context within which force is used. This also provides a pretext for moralistically inspired campaigns against non-procreative sex. These feminists argue that prostitution is a result of global inequities of capital and labor, where women are robbed of viable options, forcing them into sweatshop labor or lucrative sex work. They argue that the moralistic campaigns against sex trafficking are intended to eradicate all forms of sex work and construe sex workers as sexual victims. This allows campaigners to disregard the issues of economic deprivation, poor nutrition, and low income that can all be considered violence against women.

Some researchers offer examples of women and children who, while reported by news media to be "successfully rescued" from brothels, have in fact escaped the shelters and returned to work in brothels on their own volition. They have refused to be "rescued" from the "captivity" of prostitution into the "freedom" of low-pay employment. Indeed, sex workers' rights movements vehemently challenge the victim script in the trafficking discourse.

Anti-Trafficking Campaigns

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has embarked on an anti-trafficking cause, distributing more than $100 million to fight trafficking, including major grants to Evangelical groups. The State Department generates an annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which tracks U.S. and foreign reductions in trafficking. Countries are ranked by how much importing and exporting of trafficking victims is believed to occur within their borders. A three-tier classification is used to categorize each country: Tier 3 denotes countries with the poorest track records, Tier 2 refers to countries with borderline records, and Tier 1 is reserved for countries that are in line with the U.S. recommendations.

Some researchers criticize the Bush administration for placing certain countries on Tier 3 status only to fit its own larger foreign policy goals. Many also point out that the United States, as the major donor nation, forces other countries to crack down on brothels and prostitutes and formulate additional criminal laws against not only sex trafficking but against prostitution in general.

U.S. reports and policy documents brand sex trafficking with three characteristics. These include the brothel as prison, the female as victim, and rescuers as heroes. Some U.S. human rights organizations stretch beyond child exploitation and urge legislation criminalizing non-procreative sex and sex work in an attempt to save women. By emphasizing prostitution as a moral issue and emphasizing protection of women, critics claim such actions negate women's autonomy and the empowerment that comes through their sex work by providing income and labor. Thus these organizations criticize the Bush administration's seemingly inconsistent attempt to combat worldwide sex trafficking while at the same time refusing to support women's reproductive rights. For instance, condom use is not promoted as an effective contraceptive or disease-preventing tool. Critics argue that the Bush administration's endeavors to fight prostitution under the pretext of preventing sexual slavery are, in effect, endeavors to police non-procreative sex on a global level.

Tiantian Zheng

See also Human Trafficking; Prostitution; Prostitution, Child

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Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment in the workplace has existed since men and women started working. Yet the term *sexual harassment* and the problem of sexual harassment were not legally and publicly recognized until the 1970s in the United States and later in other countries. Historical accounts of sexual harassment in shipyards, factories, and department stores demonstrate that women and men experienced various forms of unwanted sexual behaviors at work, but there was no name for it nor any possibility of legal recourse. When the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed by the U.S. Congress, including protections for sex discrimination in Title VII, the door was opened for the creation of sexual harassment as a legal wrong. In the 1970s, sexual harassment complaints started to appear in the legal arena. Combined with the momentum of the women's movement, support from prominent feminist legal scholars, and media attention, sexual harassment became defined as a social and legal problem by the 1980s.

National surveys of sexual harassment estimate that approximately 20–50 percent of women will experience sexual harassment at work in their lifetimes. Behind these statistics is an enduring conundrum: many women and men who report experiencing unwanted sexual behaviors at work say "No" when asked if they experienced sexual harassment. Surveys show that people may experience behaviors that are legitimate forms of sexual harassment, but they may not label these behaviors as such. These statistics highlight some of the important issues around sexual harassment. First, what is sexual harassment? Second, why do so many people who experience sexual behaviors at work not define these experiences as sexual harassment?

Defining Sexual Harassment

Emerging from the groundbreaking work of legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon, sexual harassment in the United States is viewed as a form of sex discrimination. Legally, two types of behavior comprise sexual harassment: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. Quid pro quo harassment involves sexual threats or bribery that are made a condition of employment or used as the basis for employment decisions. Established by the 1980 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Meritor v. Vinson*, hostile environment harassment captures those behaviors, such as sexual jokes, comments, and touching, that interfere with an individual's ability to do her or his job or create an "intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment." This includes forms of gender harassment, such as gender-based hazing and putdowns. To be considered hostile environment harassment, it must be established that there was a single serious incident or a pattern of usually less severe behaviors occurring over time. Since the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Harris v. Forklift*, the law considers whether a "reasonable person" would find the behaviors unwelcome as well as the "subjective" experience of the person experiencing the behaviors. Some lower court decisions acknowledge that sexual harassment is a gendered phenomenon, with women more likely to experience harassment and to be adversely affected by it. These courts have adopted a "reasonable woman" standard when evaluating whether harassment occurred.

On the surface, the legal definition of sexual harassment appears straightforward, with its focus on men using their power over women to satisfy their sexual desires. Yet, this focus has limited what can be claimed as sexual harassment. Critics identify several shortcomings in the current legal framework of sexual harassment. First, the legal definition of sexual harassment overemphasizes (heterosexual) sexual acts and sexual desire at the expense of gender-based harassment. Research shows that most sexual harassment that occurs is hostile environment harassment that involves the denigration of women (and men).

This means that at its core, sexual harassment is often not about sexual desire but about letting women (and men) know they are not welcome in certain workplaces and that they are not respected members of the work group. There is some concern that the current legal definition of sexual harassment may end up only ridding the workplace of such "nonthreatening" sexual behaviors as flirting and joking while overlooking how gendered hostility can exclude workers from the most desirable jobs in a workplace and lead to sex segregation and inequality at work.

Second, the founders of sexual harassment law in the United States considered the sexual harassment of men to be a rare event. Yet does this mean that men cannot experience sexual harassment? Research that takes this question seriously shows that men do experience some forms of sexual harassment and identify some behaviors as harassment that are not identified by women. These behaviors include those perpetuated by women, such as verbal comments that negatively stereotype men (e.g., "Men are pigs"). Men also report being labeled as "unmasculine" or "not man enough" (e.g., being called "fag" or "pussy") when they do not participate with their male colleagues in jokes about women or other male-bonding activities. Due to the privileging of heterosexual masculinity, men are likely to be harassed when they step outside the traditional male role or are seen as less masculine compared to their peers. Sexual harassment of men, just like much of the sexual harassment of women, is not about sexual desire. Rather it most often occurs when a group (or individual) asserts power over those who violate traditional gender roles. In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court in the *Oncale* case ruled for the first time that same-sex harassment between men can be sex discrimination.

Because of the limits to the legal definition, some social scientists prefer to define harassment more broadly. Psychologist Louise Fitzgerald and colleagues have developed a three-tiered measure of sexual harassment, the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire: sexual harassment consists of gender harassment, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion. Measures such as these are based on "behaviorally based" survey items that attempt to capture the range of harassment experiences of women (and men). These survey items are useful for understanding the predictors and consequences of sexual harassment.

Some critics argue that survey measures do not adequately capture the subjective and ambiguous nature of what behaviors individuals define as harassment. This is also reflected in media and lay discussions of sexual harassment. From the 1991 Anita Hill–Clarence Thomas controversy to everyday discussions around the water cooler, debate has ensued as to when a joke is just a joke and when it is sexual harassment. Research demonstrates women and men sometimes have difficulty defining workplace sexual attention as sexual harassment. The concept of a "boundary line" is useful for understanding when sexual behaviors are harassing and when they are pleasurable or at least tolerable. For example, for some women, experiencing sexualized behaviors is institutionalized or considered part of the job, such as being required to wear a sexy outfit while working as a waitress in a restaurant. In workplaces such as these, women may view the sexual behaviors they experience as "disgusting" but inevitable since the behaviors are a normalized part of their job. Hence women may not define these behaviors as sexual harassment. Workers who experience more than one type of harassment and discrimination also may have trouble labeling their experiences as sexual harassment. Women of color who experience racial harassment alongside their sexual harassment may not see their experiences as fitting within the legal definition of sexual harassment. Sexual discrimination law in general is criticized for forcing women (and men) of color to choose which wrong they will pursue: race based or gender based. The sexual harassment law appears blind to the issue of how race intersects with men's and women's experiences.

Understanding Who Is at Risk for Harassment

Various theoretical perspectives exist for understanding why sexual harassment happens and who is at risk for being sexually harassed. Most perspectives have an underlying agreement that power, whether it be from such sources as gender or position in the organization, is at the core of most sexual harassment. At this point, though, there is no unifying theoretical perspective for explaining sexual harassment. Some of the approaches overemphasize certain types of sexual harassment while excluding others. The primary explanation for why sexual harassment occurs is based in the power derived from culturally legitimated power and status differences between men and women. This type of explanation fits with the "dominance" model that

emphasizes sexual harassment's origins in patriarchal society. This model predicts that women are most likely to experience sexual harassment because of the economic, physical, and other forms of power men hold in workplaces and society. Within this model, there is little room for explaining same-sex harassment.

A second approach points to a sociobiological source for sexual harassment. Women are the most likely targets because men harass women out of the "natural" outcome of their biological sex drive. This approach is not supported by recent evidence that most sexual harassment is not based in sexual desire. Rather it is based in hostility toward women or men. Similar to the power perspective, an emphasis on sociobiological factors also ignores same-sex harassment.

Sexual harassment is also perceived to be an outgrowth of the gender socialization process and is a mechanism by which men assert power and dominance over women both at work and in society. Within this perspective, some research demonstrates that numerically skewed sex ratios in work situations, such as female-dominated and male-dominated work groups, play a prominent role in explanations of sexual harassment. Some approaches focus on the gender roles associated with female- and male-dominated work situations, while others discuss the issue in terms of numerical dominance of males over females in certain workplaces. With much of the focus on male-to-female harassment, male-dominated workplaces pose the biggest threat of harassment, since men both numerically and normatively dominate. More nuanced approaches draw on theories of masculinity to explain sexual harassment. For example, recent research implicates heterosexual norms of masculinity in the way that male coworkers ignore the harm of watching or "checking out" their female coworkers.

Organizational culture and context is also theorized to explain the occurrence of sexual harassment. Research demonstrates that if an organization has a culture whereby management does not tolerate harassment, workers are less likely to experience unwanted sexual behaviors. Examinations of sexualized workplaces move beyond this work to emphasize how organizational culture contributes to how sexual behaviors are interpreted as harassing, tolerable, or pleasurable. By bridging both power and gender socialization approaches, this research demonstrates that the context of work matters for what it means to be sexually harassed. For example, female editors working for a male pornographic magazine experience a daily litany of sexual joking and pornographic material, yet they do not define these as sexual harassment. Only when jokes become directed at them personally are behaviors defined as harassment. Taking into account the context of where one works helps understand not only who is at risk of sexual harassment but who is likely to label their experiences as sexual harassment.

Sexual Harassment Beyond the United States

The U.S. legal definition has been the prime mover behind the development of sexual harassment as a legal construct and social problem in other countries. However, countries such as France and Austria, along with the European Union itself, have developed laws focusing only on the sexual abuse of power aspect that is now eschewed by feminist critics of the U.S. harassment law. The reasons for this are not simply that European lawmakers, feminists, and the public view U.S. law as a consequence of American "prudishness" about displays of sexuality in the workplace. For example, the harassment law in France emphasizes harassment as an abuse of hierarchical power, not as sexual harassment between coworkers. What is considered sexual harassment in the law and in society is bounded by the national and organizational context of workers.

Sandy Welsh

See also Blaming the Victim; Civil Rights; Claims Making; Discrimination; Feminism; Feminist Theory; Gender Identity and Socialization; Patriarchy; Race-Blind Policies; Racism; Rape; Segregation, Gender; Sexism; Sexuality; Sexual Orientation; Violence, Sexual; Women's Rights Movement

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SEXUALITY

Human sexuality is one of the few distinctive traits shared by all civilizations, although its cultural characteristics and nuances differ widely. Sexuality in its broadest sense is not easily definable, since it covers such a broad range of behaviors, interpretations, norms, and processes. Sexuality is a sociocultural and historical construct that involves more than the biological drive that enables the reproduction of the species. As a sensation process, human sexuality consists of the totality of socially, culturally, and politically embodied experiences and intimate behaviors (not necessarily sex acts) between human beings. These feelings are sustained and expressed through emotions, beliefs, values, and cultural norms that collectively regulate sexual behavior. The body, as a space, is a contested site of identity, where sexual norms are both exhibited and preserved, often through cultural constructions of masculinity, femininity, gender norms, and accompanying social roles.

Sigmund Freud is most credited with advancing the modern study of sexuality with the publication of his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.* These essays contributed to the notion of childhood sexuality and, perhaps more important, the development of sexuality in the unconscious. Recent research has explored the relation between lived experience, the lived body, and the institutional frameworks that prohibit and restrict this process. The private sphere, in which we may elect to exhibit sexuality, involves a space or capacity where a possibility develops to assume *states of sexuality;* however, these states are always inseparable from our bodies. Normative labels that accompany these states (behaviors), when attributed to particular sexualities, have resulted in the creation of previously nonexistent sexual "identities" understood through categorical distinctions like "homosexual" and "heterosexual"; social scientists recognize such categories as social constructions. Philosopher Michel Foucault best exemplifies this perspective in his seminal multivolume work on sexuality.

In *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction,* Foucault analyzes broad historical shifts over the course of centuries in an effort to address the various ways to understand sexuality as a historical construct. Foucault suggests that political power is manifested in sexuality through discourse and discursive formations, all of which constrain sex through socially constructed taboos that are usually, but not always, consistent with a system of *norms.* According to Foucault, these norms serve to maintain *arbitrary binaries* between two *nonexistences* (e.g., homo/hetero). A recognizable shortcoming in *The History of Sexuality* concerns Foucault's failure to systematically address the concept of a universal patriarchy and how a normative masculinity constrains subjective manifestations of sexuality. Emerging scholarship in philosophy, cultural studies, feminism, and gay and lesbian studies continues to offer new ideas and fresh insights into the realm of sexuality. It seems certain that this scholarship will direct our future understandings of the subject.

Christopher Schneider

See also Body Image; Feminism; Gender Identity and Socialization; Homosexuality; Queer Theory; Transgender and Transsexuality

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Sexualization of Mainstream Media

Sexualization of mainstream media refers to the way that sex has become more visible in contemporary Western mainstream media in recent years. Other interchangeable terms are *pornification*, *pornographication*, and *porno chic,* which more specifically describe a fascination in contemporary media with sexually explicit styles of representation and the use of pornographic content or style in popular cultural forms.

Sexualization takes a number of forms that can be categorized in the following way:

- The expansion of pornography and other sexually explicit media representations and their increased accessibility to a wider group of consumers, principally via the Internet.

- A corresponding increase in the visibility, accessibility, and acceptability of commercial sex products, services, and pursuits. In particular, sex toys for women are now available on the main streets in many places. Escort agencies, sex parties, sex tours, and lap dancing clubs are expanding, and older forms of sexual performance such as burlesque are being revived and mainstreamed. In some instances, this involves their repositioning as leisure pursuits for women. For example, pole dancing is now packaged as a form of exercise, and classes are available in burlesque dance and striptease, erotic writing and sexual techniques. Many sex shops actively court female consumers, often through the development of a "feminine aesthetic."

- The integration of media and communication technologies with sexual practice. The increasing accessibility of video and digital technologies has, for example, made it possible for people to make and circulate their own pornography or to include recording and viewing within their sexual encounters. New communication technologies have also become part of people's sex lives, often providing new types of sexual encounters such as phone sex, e-mail affairs, and cybersex. In these instances, sexual representation, communication, and practice are blurred.

- A growing public preoccupation with sexual values, practices, and identities, often in the form of sex scandals and moral panics around sex. Sex has become a staple ingredient in newspapers, magazines, films, and television programs, most notably in confessional talk shows and media coverage of celebrities.

Although a public fascination with sex and sexuality dates back to the 19th century, the more recent process of sexualization can be linked to contemporary concerns with image, lifestyle, and self-exposure. To this extent, sex is becoming a question of aesthetics rather than ethics and a means of public rather than private self-expression. While it retains many of its former cultural meanings, chiefly as an expression of desire and/or love between two people, it also takes on a new significance as a hedonistic practice, freed from reproduction, kinship, or close relationship—a form of recreation rather than relation. In this sense, contemporary sexuality is becoming a form of auto-sexuality, the purpose of which is self-pleasure and self-expression. Representations of and discussions about sexuality increasingly link to consumer culture, presided over by a range of cultural intermediaries who are joining, and in some cases replacing, the moral and medical experts who were previously the custodians of this kind of public expression. To some extent, the cultural, moral, and medical significance of sex combines in contemporary thinking, with sex emerging as a form of self-care and route to self-development.

Sexualization raises questions about the role of the media, technology, and popular culture in sexual practices, relationships, and ethics that are important for academics, researchers, educators, policymakers, and the general public. Often, the context of the use of the term indicates a perception of it as a social problem, most frequently the ways in which the sexualization of particular social groups works to endanger, oppress, or limit them in some way. The extent to which sexualization is a democratizing force is a matter of dispute.

Some see it as part of a broader process in which ordinary people gain access to the means of reproducing sexual discourse and in which sex becomes a matter of more democratic public debate, in the process circulating more diverse and liberating ideas about sex and sexuality. Others argue that the only real significance of sexualization is an increasing commodification of sex and bodies, particularly those of girls and women, and that this involves little real equality or diversity. Despite different views, the sexualization of mainstream media and popular culture, coupled with the increasing difficulty of regulating these, requires that we rethink our inherited notions of sexual representation, regulation, and ethics.

Feona Attwood

See also Feminism; Mass Media; Media; Pornography; Pornography and the Internet; Sex Education; Sexuality

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Sexually Transmitted Diseases

Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), also known as sexually transmitted infections (STIs), are infections spread primarily through sexual contact. More than 65 million people in the United States are currently infected with an incurable sexually transmitted disease such as genital herpes, and each year an additional 19 million people develop new cases of one or more of the 25 diseases categorized as STDs. More than half of all these new infections will affect young people ages 15–22.

A New Paradigm for Assessing STD Risk

Most *personal* health STD prevention programs focus largely on individual behavior as the basis for risk reduction. Many of these programs emphasize safer sex or abstinence from sexual intercourse as their preferred preventive approach. *Public health* STD prevention programs typically emphasize community health interventions such as free and confidential testing and treatment centers, needle exchange programs, and sociomarketing campaigns to promote condom distribution and family planning services. While both approaches have merit, each falls short of offering a comprehensive analysis of STD risks.

A more effective way to view STD risk is to conceptualize it as pyramidal in nature. A pyramid of risk model describes the interaction between personal and community risks and has four levels of risk factors: demographic, sexual/medical history, sexual lifestyle, and sexual behavior. Each level builds upon and is interpreted on the basis of risks associated with the previous one.

Level 1 Risks: Demographic Variables

Seven major demographic variables form the base of the pyramid and contribute to STD risk: age, gender, sexual orientation, injectable drug use (IDU), geography, socioeconomic status (SES), and race/ethnicity.

There are more cases of STDs distributed throughout the 15- to 25-year-old age group than in any other. Because more cases exist in this age group, the risk of acquiring an infection is greater for someone in this group or who has sex with persons from this age category. Sexually active teenagers have the highest rates of infection of most STDs. For example, teenage girls have the highest risk of becoming infected with gonorrhea. Rates for females in the 15- to 19-year-old age groups are 610.9 cases per 100,000 people. This is more than 5 times the national rate of 113.5 per 100,000. Young women in this age group are approximately 20 times more likely to be infected with gonorrhea than females 30 years of age and older. Young men have a similarly high risk compared to older men.

The risk of acquiring an STD varies by gender. Gender risks are related to the genetic, anatomical, and physiological differences between men and women. Women face a greater risk than men for both acquiring a sexually transmitted disease and developing complications for several reasons. Heterosexual women are receptive sexually—vaginally, orally, and anally. This greatly increases their risks for initial infection by exposing a greater surface area of mucosal tissue. Once infected with most STDs, heterosexual women tend to be asymptomatic more often than heterosexual men. Most heterosexual men notice initial symptoms of infection, whereas about half of women are asymptomatic. Because of the asymptomatic nature of most STDs in women, more women than men do not seek treatment during the initial stages of infection. This delayed access to treatment results in progression of the disease and a greater likelihood of developing complications. About 15 percent of women develop complications associated with gonorrhea or chlamydia, compared to less than 1 percent of men.

STD risks vary by sexual orientation. Gay and bisexual men, like heterosexual women, are receptive sexually and tend to have asymptomatic infections. In addition, certain diseases, such as HIV and hepatitis B, exist in endemic levels in the gay community and are incurable. Heterosexual men are at lower risk than heterosexual women and gay men because they are not receptive sexually, and female-to-male transmission of STDs is less efficient than male-to-female and male-to-male. Additionally, vaginal fluids are less likely to transmit infection than is contaminated semen. Lesbian women have the lowest rates of STD infection. Gay women tend to have fewer sexual partners over the course of their lifetimes, and they do not engage in vaginal or anal intercourse involving ejaculation.

STD risk is strongly associated with the number of injector drug users (IDUs) in a community. Injector drug use impairs users' ability to make good decisions regarding sexual behavior and often involves needle sharing between users. This facilitates the transmission of blood-borne infections such as HIV and hepatitis B. A vicious cycle of drug abuse, exchanging sex for money or other resources, unsafe sex, and infection with a variety of STDs has occurred since the mid-1980s and has led to the resurgence of syphilis in urban America.

STDs are not distributed evenly across America. They are disproportionately higher in urban areas than in rural or suburban locations. STDs seem to be much more common in pockets of urban populations called "core groups." Infected core groups are a major contributing factor for higher STD rates in urban communities *despite* individual behavior. For example, the risk of transmission of STDs among core group members and their sex partners is 300 to 600 times greater than among the U.S. population in general.

Level 2 Risks: Sexual and Medical History

A person's sexual and medical history greatly influences the partner's present level of risk for acquiring STDs. The number of different sexual partners a person has had over the course of a lifetime correlates to that person's current STD risk. In general, the greater the number of lifetime sexual partners a person has had, the greater the risk that individual poses for a current sex partner. One's contraceptive history also influences the present STD risk. Barrier contraceptive users have the lowest rates of infection. They are followed by other contraceptive users and nonusers, who have the highest risk. Persons with a history of IDU have an increased incidence of infection with blood-borne diseases, particularly HIV and hepatitis B. Last, persons who have been infected with STDs in the past are more likely to become infected again than those who have never been infected.

Level 3 Risks: Sexual Relationships

There are two dimensions of relationship risk: familiarity risk and exclusivity risk. STD risks decrease as sexual relationships move away from multiple, anonymous, sexual encounters toward monogamous (with uninfected partner) partnerships. Familiarity risk is synonymous with anonymity risk. Studies show that the less familiar individuals are with their sex partners (the greater the anonymity), the greater the risk. Anonymity influences one's ability to make informed choices about the STD risks posed by potential sex partners. Exclusivity is associated with monogamy and must be examined in both partners to measure it accurately. If one partner is monogamous but the other is not, the benefits of exclusivity are lost. Exclusivity only works when both partners are uninfected. Exclusivity can actually increase STD if one partner is infected. The highest-risk sexual lifestyle is one that is nonexclusive and anonymous.

Level 4 Risks: Sexual Behavior

In general, behaviors that incorporate unprotected penile insertion and ejaculation entail the most risk. The lowest risk behaviors are nonpenetrative and do not include ejaculation and the exchange of bodily fluids. Penetration of unlubricated tissue, such as that in the rectum, allows direct access of infectious agents to the bloodstream. Theoretically, STD risk is always greater for the receptive partners of any sexual activity, since they receive the contents of the ejaculate.

Implications for Risk Reduction

The pyramid of risk model shows that STD risk is multifaceted in nature and combines a person's current personal sexual behavior and lifestyle with past sexual history and demographic factors. Such a model demonstrates the futility of focusing prevention activities exclusively on current personal behavior while ignoring historical and community risks. Though individual personal behavior is crucial to the success of prevention activities, other factors affect personal risk *despite* the consistent and correct use of safer sex procedures. As mentioned previously, in certain core areas, individuals are 300–600 times more likely to become infected with an STD than their contemporaries living elsewhere. In such areas, engaging in *any* sexual activity carries a higher risk of becoming infected than engaging in more risky personal behavior in areas with less community risk. To be effective, prevention programs must take all four levels of risk factors into account when planning interventions.

Richard Blonna

See also HIV/AIDS, Reaching High-Risk Populations

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Sexual Orientation

Sexual orientation is the expression of sexuality enveloped by one's self-identification, including romantic, emotional, and/or sexual attraction. Sexual orientation can be problematic for those not conforming to mainstream societal norms.

Heterosexuals are people who are sexually and romantically attracted to people of the opposite sex. Because heterosexuals are the dominant group in society, those whose sexual orientation differ are sometimes overlooked, under-represented, or misunderstood. People who are attracted to their same sex are known as gay and lesbian. The term *gay* refers mostly to men who are sexually and romantically attracted to other men, and the term *lesbian* refers to women who are sexually and romantically attracted to other women. Sometimes the term *gay* serves as an umbrella word for all people whose sexual attraction includes attraction to people of their same sex. Historically, the word *homosexual* described people who had same-sex attraction. Because of its pathological history and the clinical implication of the word, many people have stopped using *homosexual* to explain a person's sexual orientation.

Bisexual people are people whose romantic, emotional, and/or sexual attraction is to both sexes. Many misconceptions exist about the bisexual orientation among the gay and lesbian population as well as the heterosexual population. Bisexuals are sometimes unfairly labeled as people who cannot "make up their minds" or as people who have sex with multiple partners simultaneously. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals all face possible stereotyping because their sexual orientation differs from the dominant culture. Additionally, people who are gay, lesbian, and bisexual (or perceived to be) often face prejudice and discrimination based on those stereotypes and society's misrepresentation of this group as "undesirable, deviant, and unnatural."

Sexual orientation also includes a person's sexual behavior, but the two are not always congruous. For example, some black and Latino men who have sex with men do not identify as gay, homosexual, or bisexual. Instead they are considered to be on the "down low." Many of these men are married with children and lead lives that most would consider heterosexual. It is important to note that sexual behavior does not define one's sexual orientation but is only one aspect of identity.

Asexual people are people who do not experience sexual attraction. Experts continue to debate whether or not asexuality is a sexual disorder or orientation. Most asexuals have the capability to be aroused, but the arousal is not in response to sexual attraction. In fact, asexuals find sexual behavior unappealing.

Sexual preference, a term that some believe to be congruent with sexual orientation, is favored by those who believe that individuals choose their sexuality. The "nature versus nurture" debate raises the question as to whether or not one is born gay. To say that a person chooses to be gay implies that she or he can change her or his mind and be "fixed" by therapy. Numerous programs in the United States operate on the premise that they can "make" a gay person heterosexual with the help of religion, normative gender role play, and psychotherapy.

Max Probst

See also Bisexuality; Homosexuality; Queer Theory; Sexuality; Transgender and Transsexuality

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SHOPLIFTING

Shoplifting, also termed *retail theft*, is a crime involving theft of goods or merchandise from a store. It also consists of altering or removing price labels, and in some jurisdictions, causing undercharging at the register to deprive the retailer the full value of the merchandise. Commonly included in penal code categories of theft offenses (usually termed *theft* or *larceny*), its listing joins other theft crimes, such as pick pocketing, purse snatching, theft from coin machines, and theft from motor vehicles. Depending on the dollar value of merchandise appropriated, the type of merchandise, and/or the criminal history of the offender, shoplifting offenses can result in disorderly person charges resolved with a payment of a fine, or misdemeanors, or even felonies carrying long terms of imprisonment. Shoplifting can be a felony in one state and a misdemeanor in another, even when the dollar value of the merchandise is the same. For example, Pennsylvania makes shoplifting a felony when merchandise valued exceeds $2,000, but shoplifting is a felony in New Mexico when merchandise value exceeds $250.

Shoplifting is one of the most common U.S. crimes, with more than 1.5 million shoplifting offenses occurring each year. However, most shoplifting goes undetected. Survey research reveals shoplifting is much more extensive, estimating that between 10 percent and 40 percent of all consumers shoplift. Economic losses from shoplifting affect consumers through increased prices to offset retail losses, well into tens of billions of dollars annually.

People shoplift for psychological, sociological, economic, and even biological reasons, including poor self-esteem, depression and anxiety, impulsivity, vengeance, and personality disorders. Other factors include resentment toward merchants, low self-control, drug abuse, antisocial attitudes and behaviors, economic stress, divorce or separation, and thrill seeking. Kleptomania, a psychiatric disorder, afflicts only a fraction (about 10 percent) of all shoplifters. Its essential feature is the recurrent failure to resist impulses to steal objects not needed for personal use or their monetary value. The kleptomaniac often discards or gives away merchandise rather than using or consuming it. For kleptomaniacs, shoplifting is impulsive and irrational. The kleptomaniac experiences an increasing sense of tension immediately before the act and then pleasure, gratification, or relief of tension during and after the theft. Theft is not committed because of anger, resentment, or vengeance, and not in response to a delusion or hallucination. Rarely is kleptomania used as a diagnosis for shoplifting.

Most shoplifters (about 90 percent) lead conventional lives and engage in shoplifting when opportunities present themselves, for thrill seeking, and in

situations of economic distress. Such individuals are nonprofessional or amateur shoplifters, unlike the remaining 10 percent of professional shoplifters who create an occupation or career of shoplifting for financial gain and are usually involved in other criminal behaviors. They may take "orders" and then carefully plan the shoplifting events (the place, time, and target) or steal marketable items in large quantities and return or resell the merchandise for profit. Some professionals are sole competitors while others are engaged in organized group shoplifting.

Gail A. Caputo

See also Property Crime; Theft

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Single Mothers

U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that the percentage of children living in single-mother families increased from 11 percent in 1970 to 23 percent by 2005. Although the percentage of single-father families also grew, rising from 1 percent in 1970 to 6 percent by 2003, the vast majority of single-parent households involve single mothers. Large race differences are evident: 50 percent of African American children live with a single mother, compared to 35 percent of Hispanic children, 16 percent of white children, and 10 percent of Asian children. Demographers project that half of all children will spend part of their childhood living with a single mother.

Single-mother family structure, however, does not necessarily mean that children live alone with their mother. Moreover, increasing diversity occurs in single-mother family living experiences. Grandparents play a significant role in many single-mother families; about 10 percent of children living with their single mother were the grandchild of the household head. Some single mothers also cohabit with a male partner, a trend that has grown in recent years, with about 11 percent of children in single-mother families living with their mother and her unmarried partner. In some cases, this unmarried partner is the child's biological father, and such family arrangements of unmarried parents and their children are often referred to as "fragile families."

Much concern exists regarding the consequences for children growing up in a single-mother family. Poverty rates differ dramatically by family structure, with nearly 6 out of 10 children in single-mother families living near or below poverty: about 45 percent of children living with a divorced mother and 69 percent of children living with a never-married mother. Consistent research findings indicate that children growing up in a single-mother family have, on average, poorer social, economic, and psychological outcomes compared to children growing up with two biological parents. Economic differences between single- and two-parent families explain about half of these differences.

When evaluating the consequences of growing up in a single-parent family, two important issues should be kept in mind. First, while we do have strong evidence of a *correlation* between family structure and child well-being, the direction of these effects is unclear. That is, the extent to which this relationship is causal (single-parent family structure causes poor outcomes) or due to selection (the findings reflect unmeasured factors that affect both the likelihood of growing up in a single-parent family and the outcomes associated with it) is unclear. Therefore, the causal ordering of effects requires careful attention. Studies that do not take these preexisting differences into account will overstate the effects of growing up in a single-mother family. Second, and more important, even though children growing up in single-mother families tend to experience poorer outcomes, the percentage of children actually experiencing these negative outcomes is far from overwhelming. One study, for example, compared depression rates among children growing up in one- and two-parent families, finding that 18 percent of children growing up in single-parent homes were clinically depressed compared to 14 percent growing up in two-parent families.

These findings suggest that the majority of children growing up with a single mother will not experience depression. However, in relative terms, the risk of experiencing depression was higher (.18 versus .14) in single-mother families, suggesting that living with a single mother increases the risk of mental health problems. The importance of this second point is that while single-parent family structure increases the risk for a variety of outcomes, not all children growing up in single-mother families will experience problems.

Single-mother families have increasingly moved into the policy spotlight. The 1990s represented a decade of substantial changes in government assistance programs used by single mothers and their children. Concern that welfare programs provided adverse incentives both to work and to maintain a two-parent family led Congress to implement a series of changes culminating in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, commonly referred to as "welfare reform." Because single-mother families made up the vast majority of welfare recipients, they were a specific target of these reforms. Welfare reform aimed to move single mothers from welfare to work, and a stated goal of the 1996 bill was to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Major changes in cash public assistance include a lifetime limit on how long a family can receive assistance (the federal guidelines state no more than 5 years) and work requirements. Other major policy changes largely impacting single-mother families include sharp expansions to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Available to working, low-earning parents, this work support program can raise the after-tax incomes of families by as much as 40 percent, and the EITC is now the largest anti-poverty program for the non-elderly. Welfare reform and a strong economy during the 1990s combined to increase the labor force participation rates of single mothers, but the poverty rate of working, single-mother families failed to decline between 1995 and 1999. Although welfare reform has dramatically reduced the number of families receiving assistance, debate over the long-term consequences of these policy changes continues, as does evaluation of the social and economic well-being of single mothers and their children.

Rukmalie Jayakody

See also Family; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; Welfare

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Situation Ethics

The term *situation ethics*, coined by Joseph Fletcher in 1966, is sometimes referred to as "situational ethics" or as "situationism." Fletcher and others argued that moral and legal absolutes are inflexible and do not allow for rational, thinking humans to make choices and decisions based on the specifics and characteristics of social events. In contrast, situation ethics refers to a definition of right and wrong rooted in the uniqueness and variability of social situations rather than according to absolute principle. Situation ethics thus emphasizes context.

Fletcher believed that people must have the freedom to define situations according to the unique and special circumstances that may occur in any human encounter. Central to this process is the idea that situational elements alter cases, which in turn alter the principles guiding behavior. For example, an absolute view would be that honesty is a moral principle and should be followed in all situations. Situation ethics would lead one to think that some situations are improved with dishonesty or that dishonesty is the better choice for some human interaction situations, usually with the argument that the truth would hurt someone needlessly. An absolute legal point of view would be that breaking the law is always wrong, and violators should be punished. Situation ethics would lead one to think that unique situations redefine law-violating behavior. For example, breaking a law to prevent a terrorist attack would invoke a higher, more important cause.

Opponents of situation ethics argue that it is moral relativism, with the result that no one set of ethics or

principles is any better than another. They argue that people need a firm set of moral principles to live by. Some critics argue that situation ethics philosophy is a version of the idea that the end justifies the means. Because situation ethics does emphasize contextual appropriateness, it leads to the notion that an action indeed may be considered acceptable if the end is defined as fitting or appropriate. However, Fletcher did not believe his concept of situation ethics was moral relativism. As an Episcopal priest, he argued that all behavior must be guided by the altruistic form of selfless love (*agape*), and that situational decisions should be made ultimately with *agape* in mind, as opposed to specific principles or specific laws.

In social science today, the term *situation ethics* has generally lost its connection to the philosophical idea of *agape*. Currently, it most often refers to situational definitions of right and wrong and that rules for behavior should not be rigid in social life but vary according to the circumstances involved. Situation ethics allows, for example, a social actor to say, "I think cheating is wrong overall, but in this case, it was okay for me to cheat because I had a special situation."

Emily E. LaBeff

See also Rational Choice Theory; Social Constructionist Theory

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Skills Mismatch

Skills mismatch refers to a labor market condition in which a significant proportion of the labor force is either over- or underqualified relative to the skill levels of jobs offered by employers. Job seekers and workers affected cannot obtain jobs that match their skill level at the level of pay and terms of employment that previous labor market conditions, educators, or their own conceptions of the labor market had led them to expect.

In the case of an overeducated workforce or skills glut, a larger than usual group of better-educated workers will (a) take jobs traditionally held by less-educated workers, (b) accept long periods of unemployment while searching or hoping for a job closer to their education level, or (c) accept such a job under worse terms of employment than traditionally considered normative (e.g., lower pay, part-time or temporary basis). Even though the total number of mismatched workers may remain stable over time, individuals may move into and out of this group, as some people usually succeed in eventually finding jobs that better match their skill level and new graduates enter the labor market.

In the case of undereducation or skills shortage, less-skilled workers bear the burdens of unemployment, underemployment, or declining terms of employment, while higher-skill jobs may remain vacant for long periods because higher-skilled workers are relatively scarce. This skills mismatch can lead to simultaneously high unemployment among the less skilled and persistent vacancies in high-skill jobs or to the absorption of unemployed less-skilled workers only after their wages decline sufficiently to induce employers to hire them.

Skills mismatches are medium- or long-term conditions because of the time lag required for the educational composition of the workforce to readjust to the changing demand for skill. Mismatch situations are different from frictional unemployment, which results from imperfect information in the labor market that delays well-matched job seekers and employers from finding one another in the short term. Skills mismatches also differ from cyclical unemployment, which reflects declines in the overall demand for labor during general business downturns.

Skills Mismatch as a Social Problem

In the 1970s, observers believed that U.S. workers were overeducated relative to the number of jobs that could use their high levels of education. This partly reflected the rapid rise in college attendance during the 1960s, some of which was a temporary effect of college student deferments for the military draft during the Vietnam War. The rapid increase in the supply of college graduates depressed the size of their earnings advantage relative to high school graduates. In addition, various social science theories, such as signaling theory, credentialism, class reproduction theory, and deskilling theory argued that educational attainment tended to rise faster than the technical demands of jobs, because of either inflated hiring standards or reductions in the skill content of jobs. Analysts expressed concern that job challenges were

not keeping up with rising education levels, contributing to declining job satisfaction.

With the exception of cultural capital theory, scholarly and policy thinking shifted in the opposite direction in the 1980s and 1990s, sometimes dramatically. More people believed that occupational, industrial, and technological shifts were transforming the United States into a postindustrial or information economy, resulting in a large group of undereducated workers. Poverty researchers argued that these structural changes limited opportunities for upward mobility among the urban underclass by widening the gap between the growing cognitive demands of available jobs and the relatively low skills of poor minority job seekers. The geographic redistribution of jobs to areas outside of central cities and the barriers to residential mobility among the poor further inhibited the ability of less-educated workers to find jobs that matched their qualifications. Most labor economists argued that the sharp rebound in the college–high school wage differential in the 1980s was evidence that the unprecedented rise in earnings inequality during this period was due to the growth in skill demand outrunning the growth in supply. Deepening concern with the state of U.S. education, which began with the economic competitiveness crisis in the early 1980s and continues today, also rests on the belief that the labor force does not have the skills required for the new economy. Economists, policymakers, and, increasingly, other social scientists share the view that inadequate skills and education are the main causes of rising earnings inequality and other labor market problems.

Problems With the Skills Mismatch Hypothesis

Despite its status as conventional wisdom, the view that the United States suffers from a skills shortage or mismatch has not gone unchallenged. Critics note that with the exception of a few occupations, such as nursing or fast-changing computer-related fields, the exact skills that are in short supply are rarely specified. Also rarely specified is whether skills mismatch is a highly general problem or restricted to narrower groups, such as the most disadvantaged. Employer complaints sometimes seem to be more about workers' low effort and motivation rather than their cognitive skills, particularly when referring to young workers, who are generally more computer-literate than are more experienced workers. Scores on nationally standardized tests for high school students and college applicants have been stable or rising since the early 1980s, with some significant gains for minorities, and a growing percentage of young people graduate from college. Several studies of trends in occupation-based measures of skill requirements have found growth but not the dramatic acceleration in the cognitive demands of jobs over time that would explain the growth in inequality since the late 1970s. In fact, inequality growth moderated since the end of the 1980s despite continuing rapid advances in computer technology. In addition, since the mid-1990s, the labor market absorbed large numbers of low-skilled former welfare recipients at prevailing wage rates that exceeded the minimum wage and continued to draw greater numbers of even lower-skilled immigrants from abroad, suggesting that the number of low-skill jobs is not shrinking as rapidly as often claimed.

However, opportunities for less-skilled workers are concentrated increasingly in the lower-wage service sector rather than manufacturing. Critics of skills mismatch theories believe that this and other structural changes in labor markets, such as declining unionization, outsourcing, employer pay policies, and declining real minimum wage, are more important explanations of inequality growth than the failure of individuals' human capital to keep pace with technological change.

Michael J. Handel

See also Economic Restructuring; Labor Market; Underemployment; Unemployment

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SLAVERY

African slavery is arguably the thesis for almost every aspect of black life in the Western world. Beginning in the 16th century, slaves became a major commodity for international commerce, with large numbers of blacks forced to migrate throughout the world via the African slave trade. Kept in a system of involuntary servitude lasting into the mid-19th century, blacks found that slavery provided the foundation for institutional life in the United States up through the present. In fact, scholars continue to debate the historical significance, extent, scope, and political and economic implications of slavery.

Today the African diaspora extends to every continent, resulting in black representation within nearly every ethnic group in the world. That diversity includes Hispanic, Native American, European, Caribbean, and/or numerous African ethnicities. Race, though, tends to serve as a symbol for black social life and identity. Blacks have been associated with the dark, untamed, and mysterious continent: Africa. Like Africa and African history, culture, and life, blacks are less understood.

Originally determining the status of blacks in the United States were forced migration and enslavement, generating a legacy of racism still existent today. As also true for Native Americans, few similarities exist to allow comparison between the status of blacks and the status of Asian or white ethnic groups. Blacks were the only group forced to struggle from the status of existing as property to quasi-citizenship. The stigma of slavery contributed to the disenfranchisement, exclusion, and hostility experienced by blacks, often forcing them to develop economically and socially under life-threatening conditions.

The slave plantation was a unique institution and a labor-intensive agricultural enterprise, with black slaves as the primary source of labor. Plantation life involved an extreme regimentation under the constant supervision of whites. Institutionalized into the role of subservient worker, blacks had virtually no hope of the freedoms afforded their masters. W. E. B. Du Bois, in *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade* of 1897, criticized any attempt to minimize the inhumane nature of slavery. Similarly, many have not fully appreciated the economic impact of black slave labor on the U.S. economy. What would the economic position of the United States have been in a fledgling capitalist society without slave labor? It may well not have become the economic force it did.

Slavery is indicative of man's inhumanity to man, joining the ranks of the Jewish Holocaust, the genocide of Native Americans, the internment of Japanese Americans, and the forced repatriation of Hispanic Americans. The abolition movement and later the civil rights movement relied heavily upon moral arguments in opposition to the institution of slavery. Legal arguments in opposition to slavery tended to dehumanize the issue, while moral arguments tended to appeal to the conscience of whites. These moral arguments provided a basis for the involvement of the white religious community in the abolition movement.

Gunnar Myrdal, in *An American Dilemma* of 1944, suggested that the treatment of blacks was "America's greatest failure," as well as its "incomparably great opportunity for the future." In hindsight, slavery was a contradiction to the ideals embodied in the Declaration of Independence and today remains a dark blot in the history of the United States. The remnants of slavery remain in the consciousness of Americans and the world. Despite all the civil rights legislation, there has been only limited resolution to put permanently to rest the consequences of slavery. Myrdal's challenge with respect to the future is still unrealized.

Black Americans are in a perpetual identity crisis rooted in slavery. Who are black Americans? Blacks tend to wrestle with the conflict of being black on the one hand and American on the other. Scholars have also wrestled with this dilemma. W. E. B. Du Bois posed that blacks were "transplanted Africans." For Du Bois, numerous aspects of African culture survived the institution of slavery, therefore providing a basis for black American identity. Du Bois assumed that Africa rather than America is the thesis of black life. In contrast, E. Franklin Frazier argued that blacks are a product of America. Slavery for Frazier stripped blacks of African culture. Today, native-born blacks have little in common with African language, culture, and life, as shown in the cultural divide between native-born and African-born blacks. The Afrocentric movement of the 1960s attempted to reconnect blacks with their African roots. However, much of black life links more closely with European culture than the continent of Africa.

As the thesis of black life in America, slavery has had a profound influence upon black institutional life. Characterizing the U.S. black experience has largely been racial segregation and stratification. Forced to live in two worlds—one black, the other white—blacks created their own parallel social institutions: black family structures, churches, schools, businesses, and community-based organizations. These institutions mirror the larger society in which they are embedded. Black life has been largely stratified due to its disadvantaged status in a capitalist economy.

Remedies to address the consequences of black slavery have been highly controversial and thus largely unsuccessful. The failure of these remedies has been due to the political concessions of white liberal and white conservative politics. Conservatives tend to oppose remedies that address atrocities against racial and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, white liberals tend to be openly supportive of remedies such as reparations. Proponents argue that reparations are a legal remedy for egregious acts inflicted upon citizens by government, but polls consistently show most Americans are against reparations. Until all blacks experience the same level of acceptance and life opportunities as all other groups, the shameful legacy of slavery remains a part of U.S. society.

David L. Monk

See also Discrimination; Race; Racial Profiling; Racism; Reparations

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SMOKING

Death from smoking remains the single most preventable cause of death in the United States today. A direct relationship exists between nearly all lung cancers and exposure to tobacco smoke, yet in 2005 an estimated 39 million Americans smoked. Smoking is currently responsible for a third of all cancer deaths in many Western countries. Health experts estimate that 1 of every 2 smokers will be killed by tobacco, a total of 3 million people worldwide dying annually of lung cancer. Lung cancer has surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of death in U.S. women, with more than 160,000 deaths for both sexes reported in 2004. Worldwide, the World Health Organization reports that China has the highest consumption of tobacco-related products and, consequently, the highest number of tobacco-related deaths.

Social epidemiological studies continue to claim that smoking is higher among blacks, blue-collar workers, the less educated, and teens. Although about 43 percent of smokers attempt to quit, the decline is slower for women than men, while it has increased at an alarming rate among teens and in developing countries. By education level, smoking decreases as education rises, and it is certainly higher among the poorest members in society.

In 1964, the U.S. Surgeon General issued the first major U.S. report on smoking and health, concluding that cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer in men and a suspected cause in women. Until then, early statements on the dangers of cigarettes and nonsmoking tobacco products were far from definitive, as legislators and public health officials were cautious in their assertions of the scientific proof on the ill effects of smoking. In reality, many legislators were loathe to lose the tobacco manufacturers' campaign contributions, and those with tobacco growers as a constituency feared the loss of jobs in the tobacco industry. After its report, though, the U.S. Surgeon General's Office acted diligently to implement public policy and establish statewide education and prevention programs. Continued scientific research further proved the case against smoking, justifying subsequent legislation, as attitudes and cultural norms changed.

Smoking Bans

Public smoking bans date all the way back to 1590, when Pope Urban VII banned it in all forms (chewing,

smoking, or sniffing its powder) on church property, under threat of excommunication. Smoking bans today are public policies, including legal prohibitions and occupational health and safety regulations that restrict smoking in public places. Their aim is to protect workers, citizens, and children from chronic and acute diseases caused by secondhand smoke.

The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, passed in 1970, banned radio and television advertising of cigarettes and mandated a stronger health warning on cigarette packages: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." In 1972, the U.S. Surgeon General warned against secondhand smoke, but smoking bans in federal buildings and on airlines were not enacted until the late 1980s.

The California legislature in 1994 banned smoking in the workplace and then extended this prohibition in 1998 to all facilities, including bars. Soon thereafter, other states or cities—including the nation's largest city, New York—enacted similar smoking bans. Since then, an increased number of states and countries have been banning smoking in various indoor public sites and workplaces, including bars, restaurants, and social clubs. A total of 35 U.S. states have some form of smoking ban on the books, and the countries of Bhutan, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are among the countries that have or will have laws enacted and effective by 2008.

Undoubtedly, the laws banning smoking resulted from sustained campaigns by several health and medical organizations. One of these, the Coalition on Smoking or Health, formed in 1982, was a three-way partnership of the American Cancer Society, the American Lung Association, and the American Heart Association to promote national legislation through coordinated lobbying activities on smoking prevention. To focus more sharply on smoking behavior research and interventions, the National Cancer Institute reorganized those efforts by creating its Smoking, Tobacco and Cancer Program. Shortly thereafter, in 1986, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Report claimed that conclusive evidence existed on the dangers of secondhand smoke, especially on the children of smokers. The public has come to accept the evidence; smokers' behaviors continue to change as smokers have become increasingly stigmatized when more citizens demand smoke-free environments.

Research Findings

Agencies, both public and private, have funded research with definitive conclusions as to the ill effects of tobacco use, including lung cancer, heart and circulatory disease, infertility, sexual dysfunction in men, pregnancy and newborn complications, respiratory disease, and dental problems. Given this enormous research effort during the past 30 years, few individuals doubt that cigarettes, chewing tobacco, cigars, and pipe tobacco contain harmful chemicals. For example, the Mayo Clinic in 2006 claimed that men who don't quit smoking lose 13.2 years of life, while smoking women lose even more—an average of 14.5 years.

Recent studies show increases in women smoking in general, although educated women and women over age 65 were more likely to quit. Other studies point to differences among men and women with regard to the motivational behavior patterns associated with smoking. For example, women are more likely to have such smoking styles as deeper breathing, higher amounts of rapid inhalation per cigarette, and the use of cigarettes to reduce boredom, stress, and depression. Both women and younger smokers see smoking as improving their self-images, seeing smoking as "cool" or "chic," perhaps reflective of advertising portraying the smoker as an attractive image.

By 1995, smoking became known as a "pediatric disease," given the alarming increase of smoking among high school teenagers and by the growing scientific evidence that children of parents who smoke had higher risks of respiratory and coronary disease, including lung cancer. A CDC report claimed that the earlier young people begin smoking, the more likely they are to continue as adults. Moreover, social scientists had long associated tobacco use with other adolescent problems, such as alcohol and drug abuse. Consequently, federal legislation was enacted in 1997 banning the sales of cigarettes to minors, with severe penalties against abusers.

A Harvard Medical School study of more than 10,000 students enrolled at 119 nationally representative U.S. colleges in 2001 identified 51 percent as "social smokers." Other studies focusing on age and gender reported that both girls and boys experienced pressure to drink and smoke at a young age. A 2001 National Institutes of Health study among 4,200 middle school teens found that peer pressure, particularly among one's five closest friends (more so for girls than boys), influenced smoking and drinking patterns. In contrast, parents who were more engaged in their

children's lives—conversing, listening to their problems, attending their after-school events—were more likely to have children who did not drink or smoke.

Sidestream smoke contains more than 4,000 chemicals, including 69 known carcinogens. In 2005, the CDC found that 3,000 people died every year in the United States from lung cancer and another 46,000 from heart disease, all caused by secondhand smoke. Another study concluded that lifelong nonsmokers with partners who smoke in the home have a 20–30 percent greater risk of lung cancer, and those exposed to cigarette smoke in the workplace have an increased risk of 16–19 percent. Involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke remains a serious public health hazard that can be prevented by making homes, workplaces, and public places completely smoke-free.

In spite of the progress made thus far, why do so many adults still smoke? Influencing factors might include the inability of the more seriously nicotine-dependent smokers to quit and also a reduction of federal funding for preventive programs. In contrast, tobacco industry advertising exceeds $15 billion annually. More than 100 million Americans ages 3 or older are exposed to secondhand smoke, and about 20 percent of today's high school seniors smoke cigarettes regularly.

Rosanne Martorella

See also Addiction; Secondhand Smoke

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Social Bond Theory

Social bond theory (sometimes called "social control theory") diverges from some theories of deviant behavior that try to explain why people deviate, as it focuses on explaining why people conform to the extent that they do. The theory assumes that without social control in effect, people would deviate from societal norms. The general principle permeating varieties of social bond theories is that bonds to conventional society can mitigate the power of negative influences. Largely credited to Travis Hirschi, the theory asserts that the social bonds to societal institutions, such as schools, teams, clubs, family, and/or religious organizations, exert some control over impulses. Stemming from Émile Durkheim's early thesis about the importance of social connections, Hirschi argued that the stronger a person's bonds or affiliations, the greater his or her "stake in conformity" would be. Investment in the opinions of significant others would prevent negative behaviors.

Social bond theory surmised that delinquent associations (best exemplified by Edwin H. Sutherland's "differential association theory") would not sway a juvenile into delinquency if the proper bonds to society were sufficiently strong. By implication, the best way to prevent delinquency would be to seek out aspects of conventional institutions to which juveniles could attach. Delinquency prevention programs, often in the form of team sports, are based on this premise.

Earlier incarnations of bond theory focused on the effect of personal controls, such as self-esteem, on the likelihood of being pulled into delinquent behavior. Later versions try to explicate the mechanisms by which attachments to society work to prevent delinquency. Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson refined the theory to explain the conditions in which youth would create bonds as well as explain why some youth do not. They attribute the lack of bonds to "impulsive personalities" among some youth; low self-control among impulsive individuals would lead to weakened attachments.

Social bond theory is still being tested and refined, although empirical support exists for the basic premise of the theory inasmuch as delinquent youth tend to have uneasy relationships with family members. Investment in school tends to mitigate delinquent influences as well. However, discussion continues about the ways in which social bonds work. For example, social bonds to conventional institutions, such as schools, may prevent delinquency variably, depending upon age of the child. In addition, engagement in delinquent behavior itself may diminish attachments. Attachment to law-breaking parents may not inhibit delinquency in the same ways that researchers expect. In addition, researchers have not fully addressed the interaction between the various elements of social bonds, such as how familial attachment works in the

face of weak school attachment or vice versa. In general, the complex webs of attachments that individuals experience in the social world make parsing out the relative influence of various bonds difficult but provide researchers plenty to refine for the foreseeable future.

Kathryn J. Fox

See also Deviance; Juvenile Delinquency; Labeling Theory; Social Control; Social Networks

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Social Capital

Social capital refers to the advantage embedded in relationships that enables individuals to achieve certain desired ends through networks and unites societies through trust and shared norms and values. Unlike other forms of capital—physical (material goods, possessions), financial (investments, money) and human (skills, education)—social capital can only be acquired and enhanced through relations with others, specifically in families, social groups, and formal institutions including churches, professional associations, schools, or the state.

Although the conceptual core of the term *social capital* dates back to the writings of Aristotle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Alexis de Tocqueville, its use in today's meaning begins in the early 20th century in Judson Hanifan's analysis of rural school communities, where he defined social capital as goodwill, fellowship, and mutual sympathy among a group of individuals and families.

Two key contemporary scholars instrumental in defining the concept are James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu. Coleman defines social capital as a consolidation of structural resources to pursue goals of an individual or institutions. Coleman argues that social capital can also accrue unintentionally or as a by-product of other economic and political activities. As such, social capital manifests itself in (a) reciprocal relations as social obligations and expectations, (b) norms and effective sanctions, (c) authority relations within groups, and (d) social organizations. For Bourdieu, social capital is one of the key elements in the reproduction of power relations in modern societies. Because social capital is rarely shared across the boundaries of social class defined by cultural habits and economic resources, individuals or groups cannot easily change their social standing.

Moving away from Coleman and Bourdieu's emphasis on the structural dimension of social relations, Robert Putnam redefines social capital as a generalized civic good built upon the engagement in common activities. Following Putnam, social capital is often used interchangeably with the concepts of "civil society," "civic participation," "civic health," and "social trust."

Critics argue that this latter definition of social capital does not take into account the exclusionary nature of social group interactions. In response to this criticism, two types of social capital—bonding and bridging—were proposed. *Bonding social capital* refers to strong ties within homogeneous social groups, while *bridging social capital* is the sharing of resources by members of external social networks. An example of bonding social capital is a street gang, while a bowling club generates bridging social capital. Bridging social capital is particularly important because it increases generalized social trust and, by so doing, enables the functioning of formal institutions and economic relations.

Throughout the 20th century, the term *social capital* occasionally surfaced in the works of sociologists, economists, and political scientists, and in organizational behavior scholarship. Since the published work of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam in the early 1990s, the use of the term *social capital* in scholarship as well as in political debates has been growing exponentially.

Diana Mincyte

See also Community; Cultural Capital; Social Networks

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Social Change

Social change can occur throughout an entire society or within parts of a society like groups, communities, or regions. It can have a variety of causes, including the efforts of individuals and groups to address social problems.

For analytic purposes, social change may be considered as any fundamental alteration in (a) the structure of existing relationships of a society or parts of a society, (b) the processes or common practices used in everyday life, (c) population composition (for instance, the size of a society or ethnic groups within a community), and (d) the basic values, ideas, and ways of thinking that prevail in a society or its parts. In actuality, when significant alteration takes place in one of these aspects, it is accompanied by change in one or more other aspects. For example, structural changes in U.S. race relationships during the 20th century were accompanied by alterations in discriminatory practices and in the idea of race itself. In Japan during the late 19th century, as new ideas and policies affecting national unification and relationships with world powers emerged, alterations in occupations and urbanization of the Japanese population also took place.

Types of Social Change

Social change may be categorized into three types: radical, reformist, and transient change. *Radical* (or *foundational*) change is made up of extensive transformations in the basic character or nature of a society, community, or group. Successful revolutions, for instance, sometimes bring widespread and profound transformations of many social institutions. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of 1949 brought such transformations in government, religion, education, and economic life. Later in the 20th century, in many societies the affordability of personal computers and sophisticated software contributed to profound alterations in modes of communication, entertainment, storage of information, research procedures, types of occupations available, and the curriculums of schools and universities. Sometimes, radical or foundational change occurs when people seek resolutions of what they consider important social problems. The elimination of the apartheid system in South Africa during the early 1990s encompassed foundational change resulting from initiatives to eliminate existing problems. In other cases, radical changes may follow as unanticipated consequences of natural events or new governmental programs.

Reformist social changes are modifications to a society, community, or group that are less extensive and less transformative. Reformist social change typically results from focused efforts to address specific social issues or problems. For example, individuals and groups in the women's movement that gained momentum in the United States during the 1960s found the situation of women unsatisfactory and through efforts achieved some reforms in gender relationships, the types of education and occupations available to women, and beliefs about women's abilities and rights. Persons seeking social justice goals frequently pursue social reforms. The efforts on behalf of better housing and health care for poor people in U.S. cities early in the 20th century by individuals like Jane Addams, Mary Kingsbury Simkovitch, and Lillian Wald were concerned with bringing about reforms, and these produced lasting changes.

Currently, individuals may become "change agents" who are trained and sponsored by private or governmental organizations to create reforms in groups or communities. In the United States, for example, agencies like the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development have provided field representatives with training for introducing changes in education and farming practices in developing societies. In other cases, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may place trained "community organizers" in localities to build or strengthen public support for social reforms. When many people become concerned with addressing complex social problems, individuals and groups committed to radical foundational changes and those seeking reforms may share some goals and cooperate in some actions. However, because the types and extent of changes

sought by each are different, cooperation is necessarily limited.

Unlike radical and reformist change, *transient* social change is change that may be expected to occur periodically and refers to variations that have a minor or temporary effect on the character of a society or its components. For instance, in societies where new production procedures are welcomed, the nature of work may be understood as changeable and people may expect retraining cycles during their careers. Societies can also experience variations as fashion changes and fads, which are passing enthusiasms that have little lasting effect on social arrangements and actions.

Sources and Causes of Change

The emergence of significant changes within a society is a complex process. In identifying sources behind a past change, or that might produce a future reform, it helps to be aware that multiple causes are usually involved. For example, social movements (collections of groups and individuals combining to produce change) have been behind many reforms. But understanding causes involved in these reform changes may require examination of specific variables within social movements—for instance, how movements coalesced, produced leaders, identified specific objectives, organized resources, and responded to resistance. Understanding may also require examination of conditions inside or outside a society that allow change to occur. Analysis of change often calls for identification of primary and secondary causes; it may also call for determining that factor or variable that operates as the immediate precipitant of change.

There are many possible sources of social change. As suggested earlier, new technologies (tools and procedures) may contribute to change. Historians and social scientists have written about the social effects of technologies including (to name a few) the printing press, steam engines, trains, assembly lines, light bulbs, movies, forestry techniques, automobiles, televisions, and programmable chips. Change can also result from new policies introduced by national governments (for instance, the immigration policy changes developed in the United States during the 1960s) or by actions of foreign governments or groups that threaten or actually invade a society. Environmental variables have also been important in bringing about social change; prolonged droughts, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions have contributed to social transformations in societies around the world. By the last decades of the 20th century, globalization (the establishment of elaborate transnational networks for finance, production, and marketing) became a powerful source of change in many societies.

Understanding Social Change

Social change has long received attention in a diversity of fields. Aristotle, writing in the fourth century BCE, inquired into the best form of social organization in which humans might live (the city-state, he concluded) and how this best form develops from changes in simpler forms of association. During the 19th and 20th centuries, social conditions in many societies inspired novelists, dramatists, and other writers to bring questions of change before the public. In various societies, such individuals (Charles Dickens, Jane Austen, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Mark Twain, George Bernard Shaw, Jacob Riis, Marcel Proust, Franz Kafka, Upton Sinclair, Alan Paton, Yukio Mishima, Michael Harrington, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Chinua Achebe, and Edna O'Brien) made issues of social change explicit or implicit parts of their work.

However, it was early 19th-century philosophers and social scientists like Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte who, influenced by major upheavals during their lifetimes and ideas of their Enlightenment predecessors, are credited with beginning modern efforts to understand social change. They saw change as progress and assumed that developmental dynamics governed change in all societies. Later in the 1800s, many social scientists and philosophers such as Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, and Lester Frank Ward made the phenomenon of social change a focus of attention and followed the same developmental assumption. By the opening of the 20th century, Spencer and his American followers had pushed Social Darwinism (including the ideas of societal evolution and the superiority of "more civilized" societies) into prominence, while anthropologist Franz Boaz and others were beginning to produce studies and articles countering evolutionary notions. Around the same time, the ideas of Marx about class conflict as the key source of change gained in influence; a few years later, the analysis of sociologist Max Weber concerning the causal importance of beliefs and values began gaining scholarly recognition. Around midcentury many social scientists were influenced by sociologists Talcott Parsons, Lewis Coser, and

other "structural functionalists" who explained social change as resulting from strains or inconsistencies within social systems. Soon after, other sociologists like Ralf Dahrendorf, William Domhoff, and Pierre Bourdieu brought attention back to the importance of conflict and power differences as sources of change. By the later years of the century, the assumption that social change was governed by developmental dynamics had been largely discarded, and the focus was on describing and understanding change in specific societies and situations.

Frank Naughton

See also Cultural Diffusion; Cultural Lag; Cultural Values; Culture Shock; Social Movements; Social Revolutions; Urbanization

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Social Conflict

The ubiquitous nature of social conflict often leads to an intuitive understanding that human beings are inherently conflictive by nature. Typifying this view was Sigmund Freud. Although he noted the importance of social processes in its unfolding, Freud thought that the fundamental causes of social conflict existed in a priori drives. Human beings, according to him, are not "gentle creatures" who always prefer to be at peace with one another. Rather they are endowed with a *death instinct,* the instinctual capacity to be aggressive at best or self-destructive at worst. Sociological understanding, on the other hand, transcending a person-centered approach that gives undue emphasis to intrapsychic dynamics, assumes that the sources of social conflict reside in social relations. The structure of these social relations render as inevitable the eventuation of conflict that ultimately leads to a major social change or alternatively, if the social mechanisms for properly managing it are available, the reproduction of the existing social order. In extreme cases, social conflict could be reduced to a benign level. By and large, human beings are not characteristically aggressive or amicable, for social structure has the capacity to enable or constrain members and groups of society to go either way.

Sources and Functions of Social Conflict

Although social scientists agree on the social nature of conflict, they differ on its source. Karl Marx was among the first modern social scientists who examined its causes, and according to him, social inequality, accompanied by social institutions that reinforce disproportionate distribution of resources, is the fountainhead of all conflicts. To the extent that processes reproducing social stratification are intact, social conflict remains steady and pervasive. However, conflicts between contending classes open only at critical historical moments. Insofar as superordinate groups do not exhaust their rulership role, social conflicts remain hidden until a *legitimization crisis* ensues. Such a crisis arises when a subordinate class turns itself from a "class-in-itself" into a "class-for-itself"; that is, a class aware of its interests that works toward attaining the historical mission of constructing an alternative social order.

Although not fully subscribing to Marx's view, Max Weber, like his predecessor, was deeply interested in the social causes of conflict. Going beyond Marx's economic theory of conflict, Weber added the dimensions of political and cultural factors to an understanding of social conflict, thereby suggesting a tripartite view of social stratification. From his perspective, social conflict arises when there is "status consistency." Whereas *status inconsistency* refers to a condition wherein groups fare differentially in the multiple areas of social organization, thereby forestalling the feelings of powerlessness, *status consistency* is a condition in which certain groups have disproportionate power, wealth, and prestige simultaneously. Conflict reaches a critical stage when some members—denied access to the cultural, political, and economic capitals of their societies—become indignant at the existing system of social arrangements.

However, Weber did not, like Marx, assume that acute conflicts ultimately lead to a perfect social order. Societies are full of historical accidents that detract a linear development of society from unfolding.

By synthesizing these arguments, Ralf Dahrendorf provided an alternative approach that addressed the contemporary sources of social conflict. In his dialectical conflict perspective, Dahrendorf assumed that the grounds for conflict reside in what he called "imperatively coordinated associations" (ICAs), organizations within which two antithetical roles with an unequal power differential exist.

In the ICAs, power is legitimated when it is viewed as an authority relation; that is, when the ruling are endowed with a "normative right" to exercise their domination over the ruled. This authority relationship does not remain permanent, because power and authority are scarce resources that rival groups seek. Whereas the ruling groups are interested in maintaining the social order, the ruled seek to alter the existing power and authority relations. The normative right of the ruling is challenged when the ruled, due to the availability of technical, political, and social conditions, transform themselves from a *quasi group* into a *conflict group,* a group aware of its interests and committed to the redistribution of power and authority. The tug of war between the contending groups ultimately leads to successful social changes as a result of which the institutionalization of alternative ICAs becomes possible. This in turn sets the stage for another organizational setup prone to conflict and change.

In addition to examining the sources of social conflict, sociologists have addressed the social functions of social conflict as well. Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser are among the most important thinkers who dealt with this issue in some depth. Simmel was the first sociologist to insist that we should not perceive conflict as a source of discordance that causes social disruption alone. Rather, conflict can have an important impact on society, such as creating *social solidarity* among members of a group. In a conflict situation, wherein individuals see a clear distinction between themselves and "others," cohesion among individuals who share the same perception is reinforced. Conflict also acts as a stabilizing mechanism by causing the centralization of authority and the management of disputes and deviance. Extending the insights of Simmel, Coser notes that, in addition to fostering collective identity among groups, in open societies the social functions of conflict lie in creating the condition for the emergence of *safety valve institutions* that allow the release of tensions. Most important, open societies, by permitting the expression of rival claims and through the constant adjustment of an existing system of social organization, are able to avoid catastrophic results that harm society. Moreover, through the process of revitalization of existing norms or by creating alternative ones, these societies deal with the demands of new social conditions.

Types of Social Conflict

Social conflict assumes various forms, ranging from micro- to macro-processes. The minutest type of micro-conflict takes place at an individual level, with role conflict (caused by the coexistence of multiple roles corresponding to different statuses) and role strain (caused by the contradictory expectations of the same status) among the most important ones. However, much sociological analysis has focused on middle-range as well as macro-conflicts that emerge as a result of the place groups occupy in the existing system of class, race, and gender relations. The system of social stratification related to these relations leads to collective reactions that focus on issues of economic justice and human, political, and cultural rights. The three social categories, however, do not operate disjointedly. Rather the social realm is an interlocking system in which the simultaneous functioning of all three takes place. In addition to this intersectional approach, a growing recent interest lies in the study of global conflict caused by processes that have far-ranging implications for economic, cultural, and geopolitical relations between nation-states.

There are diametrically opposite views on the nature of global conflict, with the perspectives of Immanuel Wallerstein and Samuel Huntington among the most notable ones. According to Huntington, the end of the cold war brought the movement of international conflict out of a Western context. The contending powers are now the West and "the Rest," and the new fault lines are rival civilizations and not ideologies or economic paradigms. The "clash of civilizations" is the latest phase of conflict in the history of modernity, preceded by conflicts that took place between princes, nation-states, and adherents of different ideologies. Despite its cultural emphasis, critics note that the fundamental problem in Huntington's argument lies in its mistaken assumption of civilizations as though they are compartmentalized cultural

monads. On the other hand, Wallerstein provided a more nuanced approach to the understanding of global conflict through his world-systems analysis, an analysis that benefits from a historicist and eclectic approach yet centered on conflict theory. Wallerstein views the world-system as a modern historical construct that evolved into three major politico-economic zones: core, periphery, and semi-periphery. *Core nations* have the advantage over the other two because of their economic and military might. *Peripheral nations* rank the lowest in the world economy. Often they are appendages to the core because of their least-developed economies that put them at an ill-fated position in the world market transactions. The *semi-periphery*—mostly acting as a go-between among the two zones—are on a higher plane than peripheral nations, although lower in rank than core nations. Global conflict, accordingly, is nothing but a manifestation of the dynamics of opposing interests and capabilities and balance of power of the three zones. Core nations certainly have more power than others in maintaining their hegemonic status.

Alem Kebede

See also Conflict Perspective; Social Movements: Social Revolutions; World-Systems Analysis

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Social Constructionist Theory

Social constructionist theory is a paradigm based upon uncovering the methods by which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived reality. The approach involves examining how social phenomena are created, institutionalized, and made into an agreed-upon tradition. Social construction is understood as an ongoing process, as reality is constantly being (re)produced through the interactions of people and their knowledge of that reality.

Social constructionist theory is most notably a critique of two significant assumptions in Western classic philosophy. First, the tradition of the individual knower (the rational, self-directing, and knowledgeable agent of action) is questioned. The notion of the individual knower is foundational to Cartesian dualistic thinking, most noted in the phrase *cogito ergo sum* ("I think therefore I am"). Social constructionist theory challenges this individualist tradition and invites an appreciation of knowledge as a communal agreement. Second, this communal view of knowledge represents a major challenge to the view of an essential "Truth," "Real," "Good," or the possibility that one way of viewing the world is more or less objective or accurate in its depiction of reality than another.

Social constructionist theory's implications for the study of social problems are that supposed problems are simply a construction relative to the structure of a specific social context. For instance, some believe social problems are straightforward factual issues concerning what is right or wrong or in need of address via a moral framework; however, social constructionist theorists suggest that social problems are never self-evident. For instance, C. Wright Mills once defined politics as the public construction of private troubles. The sociologist Herbert Blumer stated that social problems have no existence in some objective, a priori state but are instead produced in the process of collective definition of recognition: legitimation, mobilization, formulation of proposed responses, and implementation. Despite various strands of thought, social constructionist theories examine the meaning-making of both problems and solutions as fluid, changing, contextual, and often disputed.

Social constructionism varies in its strength: from weaker versions in which there is still some underlying objective factual elements to reality, to stronger renditions in which everything is socially constructed. Further, radical social constructionists are concerned with how social processes influence the very things thought of as most objective: science and technology. For instance, radical social constructionist theory claims that the meaning of science and technology, including facts about its proper working, are themselves social constructs. This strand of social constructionist theory has given rise to the development of postmodernism—the concept that stresses the ongoing building of worldviews that comprise the imagined worlds of human social existence and activity, gradually reified by habit into institutions, given

legitimacy by mythology, maintained by socialization, and subjectively internalized in one's identity.

Matthew W. Hughey

See also Cultural Relativism; Cultural Values; Theory

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Social Control

Social control refers to all the practices that contribute to social order. More specifically, it refers to all the ways in which a society establishes and enforces its cultural standards or group expectations.

The norms of a culture—that is, the "shoulds" and "should nots" that govern our behaviors—are the central ingredients of social control. Ideally, appropriate norms are instilled in us via socialization. Norms vary in type. *Folkways* govern our most routine interactions—expectations concerning the foods we eat, the clothes we wear, and so on. *Mores* instruct us in the areas of morality—the expectations regarding proper sexual conduct or regarding the sanctity of life. Many norms (folkways and mores) become formally stated as laws and are backed by the power of the state—laws prohibiting public nudity or laws prohibiting acts of violence. Society regards and responds to violations of the normative order as deviance, and its major social institutions—education, religion, business, the military, and others—work conjointly to encourage conformity and discourage deviance.

The enforcement of norms occurs via the use of positive and negative sanctions as well as formal and informal sanctions. Positive sanctions reward our conformity to norms (e.g., praising a child for saying "Please" or "Thank you" or giving an employee a raise for good job performance). Negative sanctions punish deviation from norms (e.g., scolding a child for using profanities or issuing a ticket to a speeder). A formal sanction is one carried out by officially designated agents of social control—the police, courts, prisons, and so on. Anyone in society can exercise an informal sanction, since no special training or credentials are required. Historically, social control has largely displayed a punitive face. In recent decades, however, an increase in therapeutic social control—reliance on medical experts to "treat" rather than punish deviant behavior—has evolved. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, use of electronic surveillance as a tool for social control increased significantly.

While a tendency exists for people to equate social control with its "formal" manifestation—such as with the work of police, courts, prisons, or hospitals—formal social control is *not* the primary tool for maintaining order in society; informal sanctioning is far more prevalent in our lives. Indeed, effective socialization guarantees the power of informal social control. Properly socialized individuals come to care about what others think of them and thus are good candidates for the influence of informal social control. The smiles, compliments, gestures, sighs, frowns, and harsh words we exchange throughout the course of a day all are part of the informal social control we exercise.

Despite its ubiquitous nature, social control varies across social space. Access to and use of the law, for instance, is often the luxury of the powerful and wealthy. Social subordinates have at times been legally prohibited from invoking the law against superiors. The poor lack the resources needed for economic awards and sanctions—that is, giving raises to deserving workers or withholding wages from the nondeserving. Yet the socially disadvantaged do not suspend their normative expectations of others; they too seek ways to bring offenders back into line. For example, they can engage in a variety of sanctioning tactics such as rebellion (open violence against social superiors), covert retaliation (secret payback by subordinates), noncooperation (refusal to perform for superiors), appeals for support (asking third parties to

intervene as allies), flight (avoiding further contact with superiors), and distress (employing illness or injury as a way to sanction an offending superior). Some of these tactics, particularly rebellion and noncooperation, may well provoke legal or violent responses from social superiors. Other tactics like covert retaliation, flight, and distress are more veiled (and thus safer) efforts to get others to fall into the normative line.

Ideally, the intent of social control is to create and maintain social order. Ironically, however, social control can often produce the opposite results. Escalation may result when the very process of exercising social control triggers further normative violation: for example, police efforts at crowd control might trigger further unruly crowd behavior. Non-enforcement produces further deviance when offenders see the lack of sanctions as a license to continue their deviant behavior. Covert facilitation occurs when efforts by legal authorities structure interactions or social opportunities in ways that favor the commission of a crime—for example, setting up sting operations. In each case, social control efforts contribute to the violations of norms, not to social order.

The irony of social control is also apparent with regard to the issue of terrorism. While the post–9/11 world seeks increasing control of terrorism, this seemingly straightforward policy is not without its problems. Arguably terrorism is itself a type of social control; it is "self-help" behavior that responds to and sanctions the perceived offenses of others. Taped statements by Osama bin Laden, for instance, assert that the 9/11 attacks were part of a holy war against the United States. If it is correct to view terrorism as a form of social control, the social control responses made to terrorism will likely exacerbate the conflict. Terrorists will regard repercussions as unjustified attacks and will feel justified in continuing to use terrorist tactics to redress any and all efforts at social control. Terrorism will beget social control that will beget terrorism, and the cycle will continue.

Clearly, social control is a fundamental of social existence—we can't have group life without it. It plays a role in both the production of conformity and the production of deviance.

Janet M. Ruane

See also Class; Norms; Social Constructionist Theory; Stigma

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Social Disorganization

Social disorganization theory refers specifically to the failure of a neighborhood's social institutions to develop cohesion, exert social control, and diminish crime. A departure from individual explanations of crime, social disorganization theorists examine how the structural characteristics of neighborhoods—residential stability, housing quality, economic opportunity, income levels, and social institutions—affect how residents realize common values and wield social control. In general, socially disorganized neighborhoods are characterized by high residential turnover, poverty, overcrowded living conditions, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and social isolation. Together, these conditions hinder strong social ties and trust among neighborhood residents, making it difficult to develop the informal social control that maintains conventional values and reduces crime.

In socially disorganized neighborhoods, residents often move, choosing not to invest in their communities and strengthen neighborhood institutions that preserve traditional values (e.g., churches, voluntary associations, youth clubs). Poverty also makes it difficult to address social problems; little funding exists to support social institutions, and most residents focus on daily survival. As a result, these neighborhoods never develop the social resources to deal with crime. Here, an alternative value system emerges, one supporting crime and competing with the conventional values of most residents. Isolated from mainstream

institutions and individuals, some adolescents become confused as to what constitutes appropriate behavior. Once criminality surfaces, it can sometimes flourish, especially when successful criminals earn respect through displaying material status symbols and violence. Thus, in socially disorganized neighborhoods, deviance and crime result not solely from the individual, but more from the breakdown of neighborhood social institutions that maintain conventional values and social control.

Social disorganization theory originates in the sociological studies of the early 20th-century Chicago School. During this period, Chicago was a growing city, with a booming manufacturing industry and a large influx of immigrants. However, crime and poverty accompanied this growth—social problems that sociologists from the University of Chicago would focus on for subsequent decades. To understand such problems, W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaiecki documented the hardships of Polish immigrants as they adjusted to Chicago in the early 1900s. Thomas and Znaiecki contended that new urban conditions (a dramatic change from rural and isolated living) disrupted immigrants' traditional family and community social control. Thus, Polish crime rates in Chicago rose to much higher levels than rates found in Poland.

Robert E. Park and Ernest Burgess were also interested in the relationship between people and place; they developed a social ecological approach to studying neighborhoods. In a spatial analysis, Park and Burgess divided Chicago into five concentric zones, finding that zones varied in physical and social characteristics, such as housing quality, income, and crime. The inner zones—characterized by new immigrants, poverty, overcrowding, and deteriorating housing—had the highest rates of crime. The outer zones—characterized by successively higher-income groups, single-family housing, and spacious environments—had lower rates of crime. Park and Burgess concluded that, because of the constant influx of immigrants and outflow of established residents, inner-zone residents cannot exercise sufficient social control over the neighborhood.

The two Chicago sociologists credited with developing the first comprehensive theory of social disorganization were Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay. Borrowing from Park and Burgess, Shaw and McKay analyzed Chicago's concentric zones, collecting more than 56,000 juvenile court records that covered three periods between 1900 and 1933. They found that, despite ethnic succession (the replacement of one ethnic group by another), inner-zone crime rates remained high. And when an ethnic group, en masse, left inner-zone neighborhoods for outer ones, their crime rates diminished substantially. For Shaw and McKay, this meant that ethnicity, or the cultural characteristics of groups, had less impact on crime than the neighborhood structure.

In analyzing inner-zone neighborhoods, Shaw and McKay consistently found high rates of poverty, residential instability, family dissolution, and overcrowding. The researchers argued that these factors created a collapse in informal social control, leading to high rates of crime. For instance, in these neighborhoods, stabilizing family traditions weakened because of immigrant encounters with American ideas and the new powerlessness of immigrant parents relying on their children to navigate the new language and environment. Racial and ethnic differences also hindered neighborhood organization by creating distrust among residents and making communication difficult. Furthermore, many residents sought better living conditions and moved to more stable neighborhoods. This continuous exodus of long-term residents hampered the growth of strong social institutions, leaving a disorderly neighborhood for new immigrants to inherit. Under these conditions, argued Shaw and McKay, informal social control is absent, allowing criminality to thrive and compete with conventional values. For some youth (certainly not all), criminal enterprises and gangs become viable, almost legitimate, alternatives to the legal world. Once criminal traditions solidify, they become difficult to undo. Thus, unconventional values become permanent fixtures of the neighborhoods rather than values of the people themselves.

To reduce crime, Shaw and McKay advocated the replication of social institutions found in organized, low-crime communities. Organized communities exert informal social control through institutions that protected and perpetuated conventional values and isolated children from criminal influences. They were mostly voluntary organizations, such as parent–teacher associations and social clubs and neighborhood clubs for children. In the early 1930s, Shaw put theory into practice, founding the Chicago Area Project, which still exists today. This project focuses on reducing delinquency through local organizations and activities: recreational centers for children; neighborhood associations; working relations among neighborhood residents, police, and school authorities;

adult–child mentor programs; and the improved physical appearance of neighborhoods. In short, Shaw and McKay's mission was explaining and reducing crime from a neighborhood perspective, from examining neighborhood structures and improving neighborhood organization, a decisive departure from individual-based explanations and reforms of crime.

Subsequent research during the 1980s and 1990s built upon social disorganization theory, providing theoretical improvements and methodological sophistication. In terms of race and crime, sociologists Robert J. Sampson and William J. Wilson emphasized how macro factors (economic shifts and discriminatory housing practices) interacted with community-level factors (local poverty, residential turnover, family disruption) to produce weak social institutions in urban areas. This outcome reduces the neighborhoods' social control over crime and eventually leads to a destructive culture. Sampson and Wilson's main focus was on how poor minorities experience "social isolation," a segregation that keeps inner-city residents poor and disadvantaged. Poor minorities are isolated not only from work, but also from mainstream institutions that teach youths the benefits of conventional roles and values. Sampson and Wilson concluded that the black–white difference in violence results from racial segregation, a crucial separation that limits minorities' options in work and social values and confines minorities within a space of destructive cultural adaptations.

In a multiple-level study of Chicago neighborhoods during the mid-1990s (using statistical analysis, surveys, interviews, and field observations), other researchers also found that although some inner-city neighborhoods appeared socially disorganized because of poverty and high crime rates, residents still displayed strong social ties. Such findings suggest that strong social ties alone cannot informally control crime. What matters is the neighborhood's level of "collective efficacy," a community's sense of needing to respond to neighborhood transgressions.

More recent community-level research, however, runs counter to social disorganization theory. Although social disorganization theory posits that increased immigration, especially a poor and low-skilled wave, disrupts social control, new research suggests that neighborhoods with large immigrant concentrations and high poverty establish high social cohesion and low rates of violent crime. This latest finding led the researchers to conclude that the 1990s crime drop, among many factors, partly resulted from the decade's large influx of immigrants to urban areas. However, violent crimes increase among second-generation immigrants and then even more among the third generation.

Throughout its development, social disorganization theory has also had other critiques. One criticism addresses how social disorganization assumes that crime and delinquency occur less in affluent communities, where offenders can escape notice or are dealt with informally. Another critique is that neighborhoods with high rates of poverty can exhibit strong social bonds between residents and maintain social order. Last, social disorganization cannot explain the low crime rates of some ethnic groups residing in poor urban areas, who, as some research suggests, maintain strong ties within the family and community.

Randol Contreras

See also Community; Community Crime Control; Social Control; Social Institutions

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Social Distance

Social distance is a term that refers to the degree of social acceptance individuals give to members of other racial or ethnic groups. Sociologist Emory Bogardus (1882–1973) devised a simple measurement tool to assess the closeness (or distance) individuals find personally acceptable. Choices included acceptance by

marriage into one's family, personal friendship, neighbor, coworker, speaking acquaintance, only as visitors to the country, or the extreme of barring even entry to the country. In national studies beginning in 1926 and spanning 50 years, researchers obtained responses from college students ages 18 to 35 about their preferences among 30 groups. Generally, the findings reflected a similarity-attraction bond, with Northern and Western Europeans in the top tier, followed by Southern, Central, and Eastern Europeans in the middle tier, and racial minorities in the third tier.

In 2001, sociologist Vincent N. Parrillo revised the Bogardus measurement scale to reflect demographic changes in the United States. He removed less currently visible minorities (Armenians, Czechs, Finns, Norwegians, Scots, Swedes, and Turks) as well as a two-generation representation of Japanese and Mexicans (keeping those groups but deleting Japanese Americans and Mexican Americans). The nine replacement groups were Africans, Arabs, Cubans, Dominicans, Haitians, Jamaicans, Muslims, Puerto Ricans, and Vietnamese. His national study, the largest social distance study conducted thus far (with more than 126,000 responses), otherwise replicated the previous studies in sampling and methodology.

Parrillo and Christopher Donoghue reported both expected and surprising findings. As Bogardus had predicted, the overall mean score for all groups continued to decrease, as it had in all previous studies, and so did the spread in social distance between the highest and lowest groups, indicating increased acceptance of diverse groups. Also, homogenized, non-ethnic white Americans were closest in social distance, as in all previous studies. Not surprisingly, given that the study was conducted just 2 months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, Muslims and Arabs ranked at the bottom. However, their social distance scores were actually lower than for 17 groups in the previous 1977 study by Owen, Eisner, and McFaul, suggesting Americans were less inclined to assign group blame to all for the actions of a few. Among the surprising findings were Italians ranking ahead of Canadians and British in the 2001 study and African Americans ranking in the top 10 for the first time. In both instances, their strong acceptance by Hispanic respondents, whose numbers were far less in previous studies, was a major factor.

Parrillo and Donoghue suggested that the dramatic decrease in social distance may bear witness to a "unity syndrome"—a coalescing of racial and ethnic groups against a common enemy in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Since any social distance study only captures social acceptance of groups at a given moment in time, future studies will determine how tolerant Americans remain in their ever-growing multiracial, multicultural society.

Vincent N. Parrillo

See also Assimilation; Ethnocentrism; Intermarriage; Pluralism; Racism; Segregation

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Social Exclusion

In recent years the term *social exclusion* has gained much popularity in political dialogues on social policy issues in developed countries outside the United States. In the late 20th century, the European Union adopted "social cohesion and social inclusion" as its theme; and "social exclusion" became part of the UN standard vocabulary to address the broad range of issues related to global inequality and injustice.

In Britain, Tony Blair's Labour government created a special interdepartmental branch of government, the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), in 1997. The SEU identified various social and economic problems associated with specific underprivileged population groups and proposed a series of policies to tackle these problems. As a result, this term became the main currency of public debate in addressing social policy issues ranging from unemployment to homelessness, from child poverty to health care.

Concerns about inclusion and exclusion have deep psychological and sociological roots. Psychologists view inclusion as a natural need, because the sense of belonging and membership is critical to one's physical and mental well-being. Since exclusion always exists in tandem with inclusion, the psychological impact of inclusion lies as much in the fact of being included as the fact of not being excluded.

Sociological scholars also recognize this innate, natural need of human beings. For instance, Max Weber identified exclusion as a form of "social closure" preserving the privilege of one group against competition from other groups. Also, Georg Simmel provided a vivid depiction of the outlook of the "excluded" in his portrayal of strangers in a society, those who are physically close yet socially distant.

Modern usage of this term traces back to Rene Lenoir's 1974 book *One in Ten French People,* where he invoked the term *social exclusion* to describe the social and economic divide in then-contemporary French society. Specifically, the "excluded" were administratively excluded by the state, the victims who fall through the social welfare safety net. He thought such exclusion was a threat to French national unity, since social cohesion is considered the essence of the society.

One view of social exclusion focuses on the lack of monetary resources and the material deprivation of individuals. Causes of poverty, joblessness, and economic hardship, as well as their resulting pathologies, receive primary attention. Some critics allege that often social exclusion is actually a euphemism to avoid the sensitivity of the "P" word for political convenience. For example, the initial adoption of the term in the United Kingdom was to highlight the failure of the Conservative Party to recognize the existence of poverty.

Lack of Participation and Access

Increasingly, application of the social exclusion concept goes beyond this conventional emphasis on deprivation to include also a lack of access and healthy participation in the community and society.

First, social exclusion represents the expansion of scope from the materialistic to the nonmaterialistic, such as access to information, services, and participatory activities in social and communal life. Such access and participation play nontrivial roles in shaping life experiences and could alleviate or exacerbate the impacts of materialistic deprivation.

Second, social exclusion increases the dimensionality of the existing concept. Going beyond the traditional focus of income and employment, social exclusion incorporates more aspects, such as welfare, housing, education and training, health care, public service and assistance, and so on.

Third, social exclusion also represents a shift from static state to dynamic process that involves multiple players engaging in constant conflicts, negotiations, and competitions at multiple levels. It highlights the relational features of deprivation and calls for specific examination of the relationship and interaction between the excluders and the excluded.

Fourth, social exclusion implies change of focus on levels of resources responsible for deprivation. Besides individual factors, social exclusion draws attention to broad impacts of the community environment on social and economic progress. This perspective shift from individual to community has profound implications for understanding the causal dynamics and mechanisms of various social problems.

Some scholars use the concept of social exclusion to illuminate a special feature of capability deprivation: the need to participate in community activities. They argue that social exclusion includes incapacity to participate in social and communal life. Restoration of this basic human right is the collective responsibility of the state and society. Any infringement of this right, as often occurred to certain vulnerable groups, diminishes their capacity for fully and effectively participating in their communities, which then contributes to other observable social problems.

Challenges to Research

Both the complexity and dynamic process of social exclusion pose significant challenges to data collection and analysis. Its multidimensional nature dictates multidimensional measurements to adequately represent multiple indicators at multiple levels. To go beyond any isolated concrete indicators, the measurements must also reflect its broadened perspective from micro to macro.

Further, the dynamic nature of the problem requires measurements that can capture the interactions of the excluders and the excluded in the process. This kind of analysis demands collection of large scale, in-depth, comprehensive, multilevel, and longitudinal data. Some critics argue that existing data—the readily available statistics collected in conventional methods for conventional purposes—may not be suitable for investigating social exclusion.

The relative lack of attention to this concept in the United States is intriguing, and social observers attribute various historical, political, and philosophical reasons to account for this. The most common explanation is that Americans tend to emphasize personal responsibility and oppose government assistance or intervention for the progress and development

of individual well-being. Since the concept of social exclusion carries with it a sense of innate rights and inherent obligations of state to individuals, some Americans find this concept difficult to accept.

Moreover, confusion and criticism exist regarding the meaning of social exclusion. Critics question its validity as a separate entity and useful concept with measurable properties to assist in studying and understanding such related issues as group relationships, social problems, inequality, unfairness, and social justice. Some characterize use of this term as overreaching, as an umbrella term more rhetorical than substantive.

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See also Culture of Poverty; Marginality; Poverty; Underclass Debate; Welfare States

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Social Institutions

Social institutions are organized patterns of beliefs and behavior that are centered on basic social needs. Examples of social institutions include the family, religion, the economy, education, health care, and government. Social institutions can be viewed as the locus of social problems as well as important players in addressing social problems.

All societies have social institutions; they may be thought of as cultural universals that were first described by the anthropologist George Murdock as general practices found in every culture, such as sports, food preparation, and funeral ceremonies. However, social institutions are more complex, dealing with broad areas of people's behavior, and they have much greater social impact than a single cultural universal.

Social institutions such as the government or the economy are such regular, ongoing elements of society that they are often regarded as "permanent" and that a situation is "just the way things are." However, taking a longer sociohistorical perspective will identify major changes in a social institution such as the family, reminding us, for example, that remarriage after a spouse dies, much less the notion of divorce, was not always socially acceptable or even legal. Students of social problems often try to rethink how social institutions can be organized to develop solutions to social problems and do not accept their current organization as static.

Functionalist View

One way to study social institutions is to examine how they fulfill essential functions using the functionalist (or structural-functionalist) perspective. To survive, any society or relatively permanent group must accomplish five major tasks, or functional prerequisites:

1. *Replacing personnel.* Any group or society must replace personnel when they die, leave, or become incapacitated. This function is accomplished through such means as immigration, annexation of neighboring groups, acquisition of slaves, or sexual reproduction.

2. *Teaching new recruits.* No group or society can survive if many of its members reject the established behavior and responsibilities. Thus, finding or producing new members is not sufficient. The group or society must encourage recruits to learn and accept its values and customs. Such learning can take place formally in schools (where learning is a manifest function) or informally, through interaction and negotiation in peer groups (where instruction is a latent function).

3. *Producing and distributing goods and services.* Any relatively permanent group or society must provide and distribute desired goods and services to its members. Each society establishes a set of rules for the allocation of financial and other resources. These rules must satisfy the needs of most members to some extent, or the society will risk the possibility of discontent and ultimately disorder.

4. *Preserving order.* Societies must defend themselves from threats from both without and within.

Contemporary issues, as well as controversies, of immigration, surveillance, terrorism, military build-up, private security, prisons, gated communities, disarmament, and treaties concerning nuclear weapons are all manifestations of the need to maintain order.

5. *Providing and maintaining a sense of purpose.* People must feel motivated to continue as members of a group or society in order to fulfill the first four requirements. Many aspects of a society can assist people in developing and maintaining a sense of purpose. For some people, religious values or personal moral codes are paramount; for others, patriotism or tribal identities are especially meaningful.

This list of functional prerequisites does not specify how a society and its corresponding social institutions should perform each task. For example, one society may protect itself from external attack by amassing a frightening arsenal of weaponry, while another may make a determined effort to remain neutral in world politics and to promote cooperative relationships with its neighbors. No matter what the strategy, any society or relatively permanent group must attempt to satisfy all these functional prerequisites for survival. If a society fails on even one condition, it runs the risk of extinction.

Conflict View

Conflict theorists do not concur with the functionalist approach to social institutions. Although theorists of both perspectives agree that institutions are organized to meet basic social needs, conflict theorists object to the implication that the outcome is necessarily efficient and socially desirable.

From a conflict perspective, the present organization of social institutions is no accident. Major institutions, such as education, help to maintain the privileges of the most powerful individuals and groups in a society, while contributing to the powerlessness of others. To give one example, public schools in the United States are financed largely through property taxes, an arrangement that allows people from more affluent areas to provide their children with better-equipped schools and better-paid teachers than people from low-income areas. As a result, children from prosperous communities are better prepared to compete academically than children from impoverished communities. The structure of the nation's educational system permits and even promotes such unequal treatment.

Social institutions operate in a social environment with a great deal of inequality by social class, race, gender, and age. From the perspective of conflict theorists, social institutions perpetuate inequality across society and from one generation to the next.

Feminist Perspective

Related to the conflict perspective as an approach to social institutions is the feminist perspective, which considers how the relative role of women has been ignored. Generally, this approach observes that social institutions establish the "rules of the game" that typically advantage men. Historically in most societies, men organized institutions and outlined the norms. Institutions are symbolically interpreted from the standpoint of men as reflected in men being "head of the family" or a male divinity figure serving as the focus of religious worshipers who are guided and directed largely by men.

Another aspect of women's subordinate status is that, more than any other group; they are confined to certain occupations. Some sex-typed jobs for women, such as nursing and teaching, pay well above the minimum wage and carry moderate prestige. Nevertheless, they are far lower in pay and prestige than such stereotyped male positions as physician, college president, or university professor. When they do enter nontraditional positions, women as a group receive lower wages or salary.

Male dominance of high-paying occupations such as corporate executive and financial manager is well documented. Women dominate in other occupations, but they tend to be lower-paying, such as secretaries, seamstresses, health care workers, and domestic workers. Trends show the proportions of women increasing slightly in the professions, indicating that some women have advanced into better-paying positions, but these gains have not significantly changed the overall picture.

How pervasive is segregation by gender in the workforce? To what degree are women and men concentrated in different occupations? U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics researchers have compiled a segregation index to estimate the percentage of women who would have to change their jobs to make the distribution of men and women in each occupation mirror the relative percentage of each sex in the adult working

population. This study showed that 54 percent of women and men workers would need to switch jobs to create a labor force without sex segregation. Despite a steady decline in such segregation, the decrease was not as great in the 1990s as in earlier decades.

Interactionist View

Social institutions affect our everyday behavior, whether we are driving down the street or waiting in a long shopping line.

Interactionist (or symbolic interactionist) theorists emphasize that our social behavior is conditioned by the roles and statuses we accept, the groups we belong to, and the institutions within which we function. For example, the social roles associated with being a judge occur within the larger context of the criminal justice system. The status of "judge" stands in relation to other statuses, such as attorney, plaintiff, defendant, and witness, as well as to the social institution of government. Although courts and jails have great symbolic importance, the judicial system derives its continued significance from the roles people carry out in their social interactions. As we approach social problems related to criminal justice, the relationships among and the social network of all these roles need to be considered.

No one perspective of social institutions is correct by itself, but taken together the four approaches help us understand social institutions and their relationship to social problems.

Richard T. Schaefer

See also Crime; Economic Restructuring; Education, Policy and Politics; Family; Family, Dysfunctional; Latent Functions; Manifest Functions; Religion and Conflict; Religion and Politics; Segregation, Gender; Segregation, Occupational

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SOCIALISM

Socialism, one of the leading ideologies of the 20th century, is a theory of social organization in which the means of production are collectively owned and managed, with goods collectively distributed. It also refers to a practice, whether a political movement or a type of governance, aspiring to implement such a theory.

Socialism in its modern form originated in the 19th century and is usually linked to Marxism. Although Karl Marx is one of the best-known theorists of socialism, he is not the originator. The term usually is considered to originate in the *London Co-operative Magazine* of 1826, where it referred to followers of Robert Owen, Marx's predecessor. Owen's followers adopted this name in 1841. By the 1840s though, socialism also referred to the schools of Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier in France.

Socialist ideals precede the 19th century. They can be found in Plato's *Republic* and in such Renaissance works as Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* of 1516 and Tommaso Campanella's *The City of the Sun* of 1623. They also relate to French Revolution notions of liberty, equality, and solidarity. Socialism also shares ideals of communalism, brotherhood, and altruism with Christianity.

Socialism was a reaction to the economic and social changes associated with the industrial revolution, beginning as a humanistic and economic critique of capitalism. Socialists sought to overcome poverty, inequality, and social conflict and to reach happiness, harmony, and justice. The major tenets of socialism generally include cooperation, public ownership, and equality as opposed to competition, individual profit seeking, private property, and social stratification, which are common to capitalism. Historically, socialist agendas differed, with some socialists disapproving

the abolition of private property (Saint-Simon) and others offering various visions of public ownership and ways to reach equality and progress.

Predecessors of socialism like Owen and Fourier saw it emerging in small socialist communities in agrarian settings or in advanced industrial ones, with a social order based on fellowship, harmony, and altruism. Marx called them "utopian socialists" and emphasized the need to understand the historical laws of society and economics. According to Marx's "scientific socialism," economic forces determine historical evolution, including social and political relations, ideology as well as culture. Marx argued that socialism will emerge out of the class struggle, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class (the proletariat), when inequality and exploitation will deepen in advanced capitalism. The class struggle would create a revolutionary class consciousness and would lead to proletarian revolution and the founding of a classless society. The final stage of history will be communism, characterized by absence of alienation, producers' control of the means of production, free and creative work, and goods for everyone's needs. The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, written by Marx and Friedrich Engels, marked the beginning of Marxism. Marx's thoughts on capital, alienation, class, value, and commodification continue to be important contributions to social theory.

Many varieties of post-Marxian socialism evolved in the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as gradualism or social democracy (Eduard Bernstein, the Fabian Society), Christian socialism (Frederick Denison Maurice and Charles Kingsley), and guild socialism in England (George Douglas Howard Cole) or syndicalism in France (Georges Sorel), the latter two associated with workers' control through trade unions. Eduard Bernstein, the gradualist and social democrat, was the principal revisionist of Marxism. Bernstein noted that Marx's predictions about the deterioration of capitalism did not take place. According to Bernstein, reforms, and popular support of the middle classes and the proletariat rather than revolution were to lead to socialism in Germany. In England, revisionist socialism was led by the Fabian Society, which like Bernstein, promoted socialism through gradual and democratic reforms.

In the 19th century a number of socialist communities were founded, including William Lane's New Australia in Paraguay, Etienne Cabe's Icaria in Illinois, Charles Fourier's Brook Farm in Massachusetts, and Robert Owen's New Harmony in Indiana. In the end all the communities failed because of, among other reasons, lack of financial support, agricultural skills, and commitment. After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union became the first socialist country. Unlike Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov or Lenin, the leader of the Bolsheviks, did not believe that the proletariat would develop class consciousness to stage the revolution. In his *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), Lenin suggested forming a vanguard party of intellectuals to lead the socialist revolution. Unlike Marxists, who thought that advanced industrial capitalism was a precondition for socialism, Lenin envisioned a proletarian revolution in Russia, a precapitalist country. Bolsheviks and later communists made Marxism an ideology of Soviet state power.

Until World War II, socialism was predominantly a European phenomenon. After the war it spread to Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Near East, in countries that modeled themselves after the Soviet example. These socialist countries could be identified by their public ownership of the means of production, one-party rule, centralized state economy, and unified ideology. Since the birth of socialism, the United States has been the only advanced industrial nation that lacked a durable, mass-based socialist or labor party.

Exploitation, inequality, and conflict did not disappear with socialism. In the Soviet Union, forced industrialization and collectivization transformed traditional ways of life and traditional values. In the major haven of socialism in the 20th century, the Soviet Union, territorial expansion, political oppression, economic exploitation, and mass killings were often carried out in the name of socialism.

Although many often assume socialism to be the ideology of the working class, it is not synonymous with workers, some of whom never supported the socialist cause. Socialist leaders, in fact, attracted various strata of people, sometimes forcing bourgeois values like temperance and birth control on workers. Although promoting humanistic values, socialism has been expressed in various forms of governance, such as totalitarianism, fascism, and parliamentary democracy, which enforced or undermined these values in different ways.

The collapse of the Eastern European and Soviet Union communist states in 1989 led many socialists throughout the world to revise their conceptualization of socialism, a process still unfolding.

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See also Class Consciousness; Conflict Perspective

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Socialized Medicine

The term *socialized medicine* refers to a publicly administered national health care system, also referred to as a "universal health care system." Versions of socialized medicine systems can range from programs in which the government runs hospitals and health organizations to programs in which there is a single-payer national universal health care plan.

Supporters of universal health care emphasize that single-payer systems save money when compared to multipayer systems in which health care is funded by private and public contributions. Germany and France use the latter. Denmark, Sweden, and Canada are some of the countries that employ single-payer financing of health care.

Health care systems can also be classified according to whether they provide universal coverage, provide portable and comprehensive benefits, have geographically accessible care, offer affordable coverage, are financially efficient, and provide reasonable levels of choice for consumers.

In the United States, the populist view associates these programs with communist-run countries, but most industrialized countries have some form of socialized medicine. The matter is important to the United States now more than ever, due to the high percentage of Americans without health insurance (44.8 million in 2007). The cost of health care and insurance premiums has risen dramatically in recent years, resulting in a high number of employers dropping health insurance benefits for their employees. The rising costs of health care insurance result from higher costs of prescriptions, doctors' fees, and hospitalization and administrative expenses.

The United States is the only industrialized country without a system of socialized medicine. The only health care programs subsidized by the U.S. government are Medicaid and Medicare, instituted in 1965. Medicare covers Americans over age 65 and some permanently disabled persons, while Medicaid covers a small portion of persons who are poor and aged, blind, disabled, pregnant, or the parent of a dependent child. These two programs are the closest to a socialized health care system plan within the United States.

Great Britain provides its citizens with a National Health Service (NHS), through which the government directly pays all health care costs for all citizens. Implemented in 1948, it was subsequently used as a socialized medicine model by other industrialized countries. Under national terms and conditions of service, doctors, nurses, and other specialists work as salaried employees at hospitals or health care facilities. Funding for the publicly owned hospital and community services comes from central taxation. Before the implementation of NHS, more than half of Great Britain's population—mainly women, children, and the elderly—had no health coverage.

To keep costs down, the NHS has relied on national and regional planning and shifted services to the private sector, severely undermining the fundamental bases of universal health care in Great Britain. The government shifted some costs and risks to patients and discouraged central taxation as the funding base of the NHS. Even with the erosion of the NHS in the past decades, compared to the United States, access to care is much greater and costs of care are far less.

Canada offers universal coverage through a National Health Insurance (NHI) program run by the government as a single payer. Canadian hospitals receive both an annual operating budget and a capital expenditure budget from the government. Hospital doctors are salaried; other doctors who own their practices submit their bills directly to the health insurance system, using a fee schedule negotiated annually between the provincial governments and medical associations.

Canada has one of the world's most successful health care systems. Canadians have greater access to

care than U.S. citizens, and Canadian doctors report higher levels of satisfaction than do U.S. doctors. Harvard Medical School researchers reported in 2006 that not only are Canadians healthier than Americans, but that the latter have more unmet health needs due to greater difficulty in getting care, despite the United States spending nearly twice as much per capita for health care. U.S. residents had higher rates of nearly every serious chronic disease, including arthritis, chronic lung disease, and diabetes. Canadians were 19 percent less likely to have an unmet health need, partly due to the fact that twice as many Americans went without a needed medicine due to its cost (9.9 percent versus 5.1 percent). Also, Canadians were 7 percent more likely to have a regular doctor.

Health care in Germany is organized through an entrepreneurial system, with primary health care provided by private practitioners paid on a fee-for-service basis by insurance companies. The system relies on social insurance groups: cities, occupations, or industries that provide insurance for their residents or members. These groups are known as "sickness funds." Premiums are based on community ratings (group rate premiums) and are paid jointly by employers and their workers. On the other hand, insurance companies in the United States use actuarial risk rating, which means that they insure low-risk individuals and/or high-risk individuals only if they pay high premiums.

Germany has been more successful than any other industrialized nation in limiting increases in health care spending. Nevertheless, costs continue to rise and affect patient services. One problem is that Germany's complex insurance system results in higher administrative costs compared to the Canadian and British health care systems.

In the United States, the most recent heated discussions about health care occurred in the early 1990s, when President William Clinton proposed the Health Care Security Act (HCSA). Because the HCSA proposal represented a liberal approach to health care reform, conservatives attacked it and the public expressed concern about its costs and implementation through the federal bureaucracy. As a result, the bill never made it to the floor of Congress.

It now seems more likely that reforms to the U.S. health care system will occur at the state level. For example, the Massachusetts legislature passed a new state health insurance law in 2006. This plan offers combined subsidized and low-cost insurance plans, expands Medicaid coverage, offers incentives for businesses to cover workers, and requires some form of coverage for everyone. The bill offered mechanisms for all citizens to have access to health care, mandating coverage for all by July 1, 2007.

Private businesses with more than 10 workers must provide insurance or incur a penalty per employee per year. People able to purchase private insurance must do so on their own; if they do not, they pay a fine when they file their state income taxes. The state government subsidizes private insurance plans, thereby allowing more of the working poor to buy insurance. Also, the law increases the number of children who are eligible for free coverage. Meanwhile, the federal government continued to provide Massachusetts with its annual Medicaid money for the first 2 years under the new law. Experts predict that the Massachusetts universal health care plan could serve as a model for the rest of the United States to achieve an equal system of health insurance coverage, thus approximating the systems of socialized medicines that other industrialized countries offer to their citizens.

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See also Health Care, Access; Health Care, Costs; Health Care, Ideological Barriers to Change; Health Care, Insurance; Medicaid; Medicare

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Social Mobility

In a stratified society, social mobility refers to the increase or decrease of the class or status of individuals or groups. This movement requires an open class system or social structure that provides opportunities for changing one's relative position in the society. In the United States, the system of advancement is perceived as a meritocracy, in which abilities or achievements determine mobility.

Social mobility may be measured in changes in income or occupational prestige. Movement between classes may be measured within one person's life course (intragenerational mobility) or may be measured across generations (intergenerational mobility). Thus, a parent working hard in a blue-collar factory job may save enough money to send a son or daughter to law school, or individuals may begin as the children of working-class parents and through their own excellence in academics may be accepted to that same school. In both cases, the meritocratic system would allow for upward intergenerational and intragenerational mobility. However, the reality is that there are numerous factors associated with one's chances of social mobility. Birth status (ascribed status) plays a significant role. Limitations such as parental socioeconomics, opportunities for educational attainment within the society, race/ethnicity, sex, and urban or rural residence have great influence on the individual's prospects for mobility. Moreover, analysts attribute most social mobility in the United States to structural economic and social changes rather than to personal effort.

Absolute Versus Relative Mobility

A common measurement of social mobility is tracking the income or occupation of individual families over time and evaluating the degree of mobility in absolute or relative terms. *Absolute mobility* refers to the inflation-adjusted change in a family's income over time, often measured as it crosses over a fixed standard such as the poverty line. *Relative income mobility* is typically measured in movement between quintiles (a distribution that has been divided into fifths). Most families experience some relative mobility, moving up or down one or more quintiles in mean income. Yet, the proportion of families to remain in the same quintile increased from about 35 percent in the 1970s to about 40 percent in 1990s. This indicates an increasingly less mobile class structure.

Opportunity and Structural Mobility

The degree of mobility is related to the rate of growth in an economy and the amount of opportunity the economy holds for individuals to move from one type of employment to another. Changing U.S. economic structures in the 20th century account for most of the documented social mobility. With increasing productivity resulting from technological improvements, living standards may improve from one generation to the next, though the class structure itself changes little. However, the growth of the economy resulted from the structural transition from agrarian to industrial, then to technology-based economies. This allowed for a great deal of upward intergenerational mobility, especially during the postwar period (1950s–1970s), as the occupational structure of the country changed. Yet, the changes in the relative class status from one generation to the next were modest. Few moved more than a few positions (up or down) within the class structure.

The United States has also become more "open" and "fair," affording opportunities to broader segments of the society and establishing legal rights and policies aimed at promoting a more meritocratic system. When compared to earlier time periods, ethnic minorities, immigrants, women, and the disabled have more opportunities for class mobility today. Nevertheless, these groups still face structural impediments and discrimination that limit significant upward mobility.

Postsecondary Education

Access to college education has also been a significant factor in promoting social mobility in the 20th century. Median incomes of those with a four-year degree are more than twice those of individuals with only a high school diploma. Attempts have been made to increase access to postsecondary education to lower-income families and thereby encourage intergenerational mobility. However, opportunities for college education are still greater for those from families

with higher socioeconomic status, especially in the elite colleges and universities.

Immigration and Social Mobility

In the past 40 years, the proportion of immigrants in the United States has increased to about 13 percent of the total population. The majority of migrants enter the United States today with lower levels of "human capital" than current U.S. citizens, placing them at a disadvantage in competing for fewer and fewer higher-prestige, higher-income jobs. For intergenerational mobility to occur, the children of migrants must overcome barriers to assimilation, their low ascribed status, and fewer opportunities in the economy. In particular, mass migration has created ethnic enclaves with their own independent economies that act to limit opportunities for upward mobility.

Stalled Growth

The rate of upward social mobility in the United States was steady until the late 1970s, then declined afterward as economic growth slowed or even stalled (principally in the late 1990s). This stalled growth led to a decline in the proportion of middle-income and high-skill workers in favor of a growth in the service sector, resulting in a decrease in the opportunities for upward mobility. In inflation-adjusted terms, men born after 1960 are earning less than their fathers' generation did at the same age. An increase in economic inequality during this period can be linked to a widening gap between wages of skilled and unskilled labor.

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See also Income Disparity; Inequality; Intergenerational Mobility; Poverty; Stratification

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Social Movements

Even though discussions of contemporary social problems rarely take up the topics of social movements, protest campaigns, strikes, riots, insurgencies, and other forms of collective action, in fact, a close relationship exists between these phenomena and social problems. Often precipitating riots, for example, is police violence, which is commonly identified as a high-priority social problem in poor urban communities. Also, given the statistic of several million U.S. homeless, one does not have to look far to find social movement organizations bringing the claims of the homeless to the public forum and offering solutions. Numerous environmental problems come to the public's attention and get on the political agenda through the protest and lobbying campaigns of environmental movement organizations.

Yet the social problem–social movement relationship is neither straightforward (a view that might propose that social problems automatically give rise to social movements) nor simplistic (that is to say, that social movements articulate practicable solutions to social problems). Social movements are complex phenomena made up of numerous and often very different social actors that propose variant—and sometimes conflicting—solutions to perceived injustices. Some social problems link more closely to social movements than others, and some widely recognized social problems would not have come into public consciousness at all if not for the efforts of social movement activism. For example, drunk driving legislation passed in many states largely through the efforts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), a particularly effective social movement organization. On the other hand, social problems do not always have social movements associated with them. For example, no groundswell of citizen protest against smoking tobacco or the corporations that produce tobacco products evolved, despite the huge social costs of tobacco-related illness. Rather, policy

change has come slowly and mostly through institutional channels rather than popular mobilization.

Although formal organizations (such as MADD) often play important—sometimes central—roles in social movements, they are not social movements per se. A social movement is a much broader phenomenon that typically encompasses many groups and organizations. Much like a social problem, a movement is a complex and diverse social phenomenon that includes various perspectives, strategies, and foci. For example, the environmental movement embraces numerous ways of thinking about environmental problems. Within the movement, constituent organizations and individuals focus on different facets of environmental claims, solutions, and activist strategies: degradation of rainforests versus alternative fuels, direct action versus lifestyle choices, Greenpeace versus the Sierra Club or World Wildlife Federation. The definitive characteristic of a social movement is that numerous and variegated actors—individuals, groups, and formal organizations—engage in collective actions over time to bring about social change. This recognition of a need for social change lies at the heart of the social problem–social movement relationship. To put this observation somewhat differently: Why change an aspect of society if there is not a problem?

Implicit in the idea that social movements represent efforts to bring about social change (or prevent it—although this is less common in practice) are three basic themes. First, social movements are organized attempts to solve social problems. This view must consider whether the assessments of the aggrieved population adequately provide solutions to social problems they face. It must also factor in the intermediate political and media-related processes by which a population's claims are negotiated and practically translated into policy decisions, thereby introducing other actors into the equation, such as politicians, interest groups, countermovements, and media gatekeepers. Second, social movements affect social problems by defining them in certain ways. This topic is related to the first, because how a movement defines a problem—or frames it—has much to do with how successful the movement will be in achieving its goals. Third, sometimes the state labels social movements as social problems and makes them the focus of repression or eradication. Although in the West, movements and protests are standard fare in the political process, elsewhere they pose challenges to the state—the most powerful and most salient arbiter of what is a social problem and what is not.

Social Movements Propose Solutions to Social Problems

Claim making is a process that is central to both social movement analysis and the analysis of social problems, but the relationship within the movement of the claims that it makes and the policy solutions that may result is neither straightforward nor obvious. About 50 years ago, when the study of social movements became institutionalized in the social sciences, scholars working in the collective behavior tradition claimed that social strain and widespread grievances—racial injustice, low wages, rapid price increases, for example—were the causes of social movements. A serious social problem experienced by enough people, under the right conditions, would generate enough popular discontent that a social movement proposing a solution would arise. In this view, the linkage of social movements and social problems was strong, and researchers focused on imbalances or strain in social structure as places where panics, riots, protests, and social movements were likely to occur. This viewpoint often saw social movements as collective responses to social problems and vehicles of proposed solutions. Social movements and protest campaigns were relatively uncommon, uninstitutionalized responses to social breakdown. Thus while some claims might be made through political channels and party politics, only a particular genre of social problems lent itself to social movement mobilization: grievances of those who did not have access to institutional channels, namely, marginalized and unintegrated members of society.

As a social movement research agenda progressed, it became clear that much more was involved in social movement development than individuals collectively acting upon the seriousness or scope of a social problem. In addition to the claims that mobilize core participants, the ability to bring the claim to the public forum in a way that draws a wider circle of supporters is critical for social movement success. Much like a social problem marketplace, where numerous claims compete for limited public attention, social movement scholars recognized that while society supports a wide array of aggrieved groups, each with their own set of claims and proposed solutions, only some groups can be successful. Research showed that the key

difference between success and failure was the level of resources that the movement could bring to bear: The greater a movement's resources, the more likely that its claims and solutions would find a place in the public forum. To put it another way, neither the seriousness of the movement's claim nor the practicality of its solution determined the course for a movement's development and the success of its agenda. Rather, its material resources (money, buildings, equipment), organizational resources (networks, official contacts, efficiency and commitment of participants), and cultural resources (reputation, media portrayal, slogans, and strategies) were critical elements of successful mobilization.

Insofar as social movements propose solutions to social problems, then, the success of solutions depends on intentional, goal-directed, planning and implementation of strategized courses of action by organizations, networks, and their leaders. These activities have the immediate objective of mobilizing broader organizational and material resources for the sake of collectively promoting a group's solutions within the public forum. Moreover, within a social movement, different groups have different proposals and different resource levels. These groups cooperate, compete, negotiate, sometimes defect or withdraw, and compete for media attention. Just as within the social problems marketplace, numerous groups within a social movement competitively promote their agenda. Each group's relative resource levels in part determine which emphases, foci, agendas, and solutions will be heard.

In addition to resources, social movement groups must contend with institutional actors in business, government, and—increasingly—at the transnational level. In democratic states, these are the key players by which all policy change is mediated. Also, in democratic states there are established channels for grievance articulation—political parties and interest group politics—and whether solutions to social problems come from social movements or from institutional political actors depends partly on the structure of political opportunities that are relevant for a given issue or problem. In the Jim Crow South, claims against the injustices of racial segregation could not be addressed via institutional political channels. Leaders of the civil rights movement were forced to take the path of protest and movement mobilization to win concessions, with many of their actions aiming at the federal level, where small political openings existed in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

The shape and accessibility of political institutions and the accessibility of political channels are key determinants of (a) who will be proposing solutions to social problems; (b) what social problems will enter the public forum; and (c) how those solutions to social problems will be codified into law, namely, how far will the final political solution deviate from the social movement's original proposals. The solutions that social movements offer to social problems and the policy responses, if any, that result from movement mobilization are the result of complex, negotiated interaction among many different institutional and noninstitutional actors.

Social Movements Define Social Problems

Social movement researchers recognize that how a social movement defines its claims is a key element in understanding its success or failure. Also, because social movements are often key players in public policy debates, how a social problem is defined, or—in the lexicon of social movement analysis—how it is framed, in part determines the shape and substance of the social problems marketplace and, eventually, the policies that result. Finally, among the various groups and organizations that comprise a social movement, the ones that show special talent for framing claims in ways that strike a resonant chord among the populace are more likely to have their particular slant on the problem aired publicly and therefore will have greater influence on policymakers.

The framing of a social problem functions much the same way as a frame around a picture: attention gets focused on certain elements and away from others. For example, the problem of across-the-board low wages among hotel service workers might be portrayed as worker exploitation by greedy hotel chains or as ethnic discrimination or as gender discrimination or as denial of union-organizing rights. All these are components of the larger problem and different groups—AFL-CIO, Latino/a community organizations, university anti-sweatshop groups, the Catholic Church—may emphasize one or another, depending upon their particular perspective (or, one might say, according to their own frame of interpretation). However, a particular mix of issues and foci may be able to attract greater public sympathy and increase the likelihood of wage increases. For example, one might frame the protests in terms of legal, first-generation

immigrants struggling to support families and pursuing the American Dream rather than class exploitation. For want of a better term, the analyst might trace how this "American Dream" frame (a) privileges certain constituent social movement groups over others; (b) gives them media access to promote their claims and—as a scarce commodity—closes media access to other groups; and (c) opens doors of access to officials and politicians who might be in positions to do something about the problem. Strategic framing does not define away the social problem or even cloak it as something else, although this may seem to be what occurs. Rather, strategic framing can take advantage of cultural and political predispositions of the public to increase the likelihood that the problem gets attention, both by the public and by those in power. There is, however, a delicate balance to be struck: a social problem can be eviscerated by a frame that seeks too broad an appeal. If a social movement's demands are watered down so much that the achieved concessions satisfy no one, the movement may not be able to count on the support of its members.

While social movements define social problems, and while there even may be internal contention—"frame disputes"—among social movement groups and organizations about the shape of a frame, other key players in the social problem marketplace typically offer up counterveiling frames. The state is always in a powerful position to have its counterveiling frames made public, and businesses, business associations, and interest groups often are players in the battle over framing social problems. But especially relevant to how social movements affect social problems is the role of countermovements—mirror images of social movements that actively oppose change-oriented claims and solutions.

Some analysts suggest that counterveiling frames fall into four categories: denial, disagreement over causes, debate over possible solutions, and discrediting claims and solutions by questioning the character of the claims makers. Because collective identity is a key element in movement unity and purpose, movement participants will likely not accept the attacks, but these can have adverse effects on how the larger public responds to the movement's claims.

Movement–countermovement debates over framing social problems do not end here. Several researchers have pointed out that social movements spend significant time and resources responding to their opponents' counterframes. The picture that emerges is a dark dance among key players in any social problems arena that goes beyond charges and countercharges typical of political contention in the party system. Rather, the keen observer will find that nuanced, strategized, and sometimes highly professional media campaigns come into play, as can be seen in the recursive framing and counterframing of the abortion debate over the past 30 years: abortion as a medical issue counterframed as taking a human life, which is reframed as a rights issue and a matter of choice, and then reframed again as "It's not a choice, it's a life." This sequence is but a gloss of the on-the-ground framing battles, not to mention how these rhetorical duels are played out via various media—television, public forums, print media, church meetings, flyers, documentaries, Web sites, and so on—such that high resource levels (e.g., Planned Parenthood versus the Catholic Church) and media expertise are important determinants of who wins. Although not as highly paid (and sometimes volunteering their skills), "spin doctors" are as much elements of social movement contention as they are in political contention and elections.

Social Movements as Social Problems

Media strategies aside, political elites are the main players in the processes that define social problems. Depending on the nature of the state, those in power can classify a social movement as a serious challenge to political authority—at one end of the spectrum—or a benign, taken-for-granted participant in the give and take of open democratic political contention—at the other end. The consequences of how political elites define a movement are much more serious than those of a framing debate. Indeed, the level of repression that a movement receives is probably the best measure of how political elites problematize a social movement. It is fair to say that, depending on the movement, the state can mete out repression that ranges all along the spectrum. Repression can be brutal or soft, situational or institutional, and occur prior to mobilization—as part of intelligence gathering and covert action—or occur in real time—when protesters are in the streets. The degree of state repression may reflect a combination of all these dimensions and depend on the openness of the state, the level of the challenge (local or national), and its intensity or scope (revolutionary or policy specific).

Two general factors interact to determine in part whether a social movement gets repressed. First, the

openness of the political process is directly related to whether the challenges from social movements are defined as legitimate. Open political systems, as in the liberal democracies in the West, allow space in the public forum for social movements. Second, the degree to which the movement threatens political authority is an important determinant of the repression it receives. In open political systems, a local movement that mobilizes against the construction of a huge superstore would most likely be seen as a legitimate expression of local interests. In closed, authoritarian systems, a similar movement might be repressed. For example, in the Baltic republics of the former USSR, local neighborhoods sometimes mobilized to oppose the siting of large factories or mines. Central economic planners in Moscow conceived these projects and mandated the immigration of a large, foreign labor force whose influx would change the ethnic and linguistic composition of the region. Opposition to these plans was seen as a challenge to the communist state's authority, and movement leaders were often arrested, marches prohibited, and media access denied.

Another dimension that determines repression is the size of the movement. Poland's Solidarity movement posed a clear and direct challenge to the dominance of the Communist Party and key tenets of its ideology, yet Solidarity's scope and popular support mitigated against its full repression—at least for a time. Conversely, in Western democracies, it is not uncommon that small political organizations espousing radical ideas and confrontational tactics are repressed, often through infiltration, agent provocateurs, and illegal "Dirty Harry" operations. Political elites in both democratic and authoritarian states have wide latitude in determining whether a social movement gets defined as more or less problematic, but as a general principle, a movement that challenges the political authority of the ruling elite or the legitimacy of the state is labeled a social problem. In authoritarian Burma, the democracy movement is labeled as a tool of Western neocolonialism and is repressed. Most likely, this occurs to a wider spectrum of movements in closed political systems. Yet in open systems too, movements are labeled problematic: in the United States and United Kingdom, Islamic charities—players in global Islamic radicalism—that channel money to Hezbollah, al Qaeda, or Hamas—are labeled terrorist threats, closed down, and assets seized. But even in this latter example, if violence is eschewed, Western democracies often give legal guarantees of free speech and association. Although these may offer protection against more draconian forms of repression, they are not guarantees against subtle (sometimes secretive) preventative state interventions, such as surveillance and limiting access to the public forum.

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See also Anti-Globalization Movement; Claims Making; Countermovements; Environment, Eco-Warriors; Labor Movement; Resource Mobilization; Vegetarian Movement

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Social Networks

A social network is a style of organization of social relationships characterized by highly mobile, interconnected links between individuals or groups. Such connections may take many forms, from business relationships based on status to relationships between friends. Social networks exist in flux as new nodal

connections are formed and those rarely used become weaker. No formal division exists between one network and another, nor does a network possess a center. Networks provide resources that may be emotional, material, informational, or financial in nature. A network can be utilized to obtain a job, get information, spread news, organize protest movements, or make romantic connections. One's positioning in the system of social networks, therefore, has a large effect on the span of an individual's power in a contemporary informational society.

Initial conceptions of social networks appear in the works of such early theorists of modernity as Émile Durkheim and Georg Simmel, who noticed increased instrumental interpersonal encounters at the turn of the 20th century. In the 1930s, social network analysis evolved as a means of quantifying and mapping emerging social networks, becoming a subfield of work on social ties in the social sciences. Decades later, the meaning and importance of the social network grew and changed dramatically when social scientists identified a qualitative and significant difference in the ordering of social connections in the postmodern era. This change occurred with the revolution in information technology, including the widespread use of the Internet, cell phone communications, and the "time–space compression" of the new global economy. As the speed and connection of social interactions increased worldwide, social relations increasingly took the form of the network.

Unlike traditional ties to local communities, networks exist not in terms of physical space alone, but they can continue uninterrupted between cyberspace and actual space. Because of the increased speed, mobility, and anonymity such a system provides, networked groups have an advantage in collective political activity. In the era of globalization, social networks are important in shaping the actions of transnational activists, who use this technology for communication and organizing across national boundaries. Networked telecommunications via cell phone and text message, for example, help protesters communicate information during political demonstrations, such as warning each other about the location of police. Likewise, terrorist groups rely on elaborate social networks to help spread messages below the level of government radar.

Networks also become increasingly important in a technological society because they provide access to remote and highly specified information from human, living sources often more trusted than official information sources. For example, an individual might ask friends if they know anyone who has ever lived in Portland when considering a move. This same individual might also check Internet chat rooms for Portland residents to find out what living in Portland is like. The social network can thus provide a level of information that other official sources, in this case, a guidebook to Portland or population statistics, cannot provide.

Social scientists, theorists, and activists are divided on the meaning and value of social networks. Some argue that social networks represent an increased superficiality in human relationships, that bonds between people have become more temporary, increasingly utilitarian, and less emotionally meaningful in contemporary society. To others, social networks represent a dangerous move away from the close, informal ties of civil society, instead creating more mobile bonds in which individuals weigh the potential benefits against the costs of each networked social relation.

Despite these serious concerns, the flexibility and potentiality inherent in a nodal model offer much to celebrate. Activists especially find social networks invaluable for communication purposes. Those studying cybernetics celebrate the immersion of the human in a web of the technical and biological networks of the information society, arguing that this technology produces and allows for an increasingly fluid sense of self.

Kimberly Cunningham

See also Social Capital

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Social Promotions

Social promotion refers to the practice within schools of allowing students to progress to the next grade level with their peers regardless of whether or not they have mastered the academic skills and content of the current grade level. A student may be socially

promoted even if not ready for the next grade due to complex social and psychological factors that make retention in the same grade equally undesirable.

No U.S. data exists on how many children are socially promoted each year. In fact, most teachers are reluctant to admit they ever participate in the practice. But the problem of social promotions was perceived to have reached such scandalous proportions by the 1980s that the problem was included in the famous "A Nation at Risk" report, and the Clinton administration banned the practice outright. In 2001, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act added a new focus on testing and accountability. Although NCLB's annual basic skills tests are designed to help educators learn how best to improve students' mastery of the curriculum, they also serve as a safeguard against social promotion.

Unfortunately, while new retention policies effectively raised student test scores, it is not clear that students most in need of help have benefited. Elementary-age children believe that retention is a punishment; they feel stigmatized by being left behind by their peers. Studies indicate that the trauma of this stigma damages a child's social and emotional development, as retained children typically demonstrate more behavior problems and lower peer acceptance. These difficulties may persist into high school, since some studies reveal a correlation between retention and high school dropout rate. Most important, when retained students relearn the same material through the same teaching methods, they do not catch up with their peers. On the contrary, they fall further behind because they face the same struggles again, while their peers move on to new material.

That said, social promotion is not a solution to this problem. Letting students move ahead when they cannot do the work frustrates them and contributes to their failure later in life, since success in any grade depends on skills learned in past grades. Social promotion sends a message to students that they do not have to work hard to achieve academic goals. This, in turn, decreases the individual student's motivation to achieve.

Society also pays an economic price for social promotion practices. Nationwide assessments consistently show that the majority of public school students cannot meet basic standards. Many employers and colleges spend time and money on remedial instruction. The combination of low self-esteem and dropping out of high school can lead to crime and violence in young adults.

With this debate in mind, policies to end social promotion need to be accompanied by concrete action plans for helping struggling learners. Retention alone does not solve the problem. Strategies for ending social promotion include high-quality universal early childhood education, early identification of students at risk for learning difficulties, and a focus on high-quality curriculum and instruction as well as interventions to help low-performing schools.

Marcy Zipke

See also Education, Academic Performance

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Social Revolutions

Social revolutions are the most extreme forms of collective actions. Where most social movements limit themselves to changes *in* the social system, social revolutions seek changes *of* it. Because they contest economic, political, cultural, and social orders with an involvement of a large number of people hitherto excluded from the domains of "public transcripts," social revolutions are distinct from political revolutions and coups. Political revolutions are upheavals that result in the reorganization of political society without eventuating changes in the social structure. Coups are political strokes (often involving the military) in which an incumbent government is stripped of its political power by way of meta-constitutional means. Hence, since they involve changes in the restructuring of both political and civil society, we have had very few instances of social revolutions. Some scholars identify the most classical social revolutions, often labeled as the "Great Revolutions" of the modern era,

as the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese Revolution of 1921–49. Other scholars argue that the American Revolution of 1776 also belongs on this list. Recently the world has witnessed different social revolutions in developing nations (Cuba, 1959; Ethiopia, 1974; Iran, 1979; Nicaragua, 1979) and the former socialist countries (1989) where state socialism and command economy came to an end.

Causes of Social Revolutions

Social revolutions and social problems are closely knit to one another. All the same, even the most critical social problems do not ipso facto lead to social revolutions. As Alexis de Tocqueville aptly noted, relative, and not absolute, deprivation—occasioned as a result of a gap between groups' experiences for an improved future and the means of attaining perceived expectations—fosters revolutions. More important, only a constellation of political and cultural opportunities, resource mobilization, organizational dynamics, and ideational processes have led to social revolution. Karl Marx was among the first modern social scientists to think of the cause of social revolutions along this line, although some political philosophers before him, such as John Locke, provided the ideological justification for political revolutions. According to Marx, social revolutions emerge when there is an intense dialectical tension between the productive forces and the production relations of a given society that ultimately manifests itself in the heightened tension between the contending classes.

Unlike Marx, who considered the state as a concentrated reflection of the mode of production that hardly sustains its self-dependence, Theda Skocpol, in her analysis of the Great Revolutions, viewed the state as an administrative apparatus with an independent logic of its own. This simple but important view of the state allowed Skocpol to provide what some call the most revolutionary view of social revolutions. On the basis of her structuralist approach, she noted that revolutions are caused by state breakdown; that is, the state's inability to manage the affairs of society induced by fiscal crisis or international pressures. Moreover, according to Skocpol, the state needs to be considered in an international world-historical context. From this geopolitical perspective, state breakdown comes in part as a result of the competition of multiple states working within the constriction of imbalanced world development. States less hampered by internal forces in their access to the resources requisite to resist the challenges posed by other states are less vulnerable than those states that have overextended themselves and encounter pressure from the dominant classes. Skocpol, accordingly, contends that social revolutions take place when the state is weakened by its inability to deal with extranational load effectively, when the dominant classes are capable of exerting their influence on the state that desperately seeks to maintain the compass of its authority, and when the lower classes are capable of mobilizing themselves and act accordingly. Only the combination of these three factors leads to social revolution.

Without abrogating the fundamentals of the Skocpolian thesis, Jack Goldstone spelled out his own version of the state-centered approach. Goldstone contends that in her analysis of the Great Revolutions, Skocpol overemphasized the role of war in undermining the smooth operation of states, although on numerous occasions wars have occurred without begetting state breakdown. Goldstone, accordingly, suggests an alternative perspective in which political crisis commingles with demographic dynamics. He contends that population growth can cause price inflation, fiscal crisis, lower wages, and elite competition, thereby leading to state breakdown, especially when the state lacks appropriate resources and has weak financial structures to deal with these pressures.

Serious criticisms against the Skocpolian approach have emerged from scholars who believe that Skocpol's approach is overly structuralist because it undermines the role of culture and ideational processes in the genesis and development of social revolutions. Even Goldstone acknowledges the relevance of ideology and culture in the latter parts of a social revolution, because revolutions, in his view, are not single events but long processes with multiple phases. Ideologies may not be effective during the phase of state breakdown, but they do play an important role during the phase of reorganization of social and political structures. Other analysts have gone much further in acknowledging the role of ideas and culture. For example, some note that the Enlightenment was crucial during the French Revolution in laying down the ideological basis for the abolition of monarchical rule and the reconstruction of a new social order. Most agree that revolutions are social constructs that surface on the social-political landscape

as a result of the "choices" made by the individuals involved in them.

Alem Kebede

See also Social Conflict; Social Movements

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Social Security

See Pensions and Social Security

Socioeconomic Status

Socioeconomic status (SES) reflects one's position in the social structure. Research clearly demonstrates that SES associates with individual behavioral, social, and psychological characteristics. Links between SES and individual mental and physical health outcomes often involve individual psychosocial and behavioral characteristics, including antisocial and health risk behaviors; marital, parental, and social relationships; and psychological resources. Health research findings show that decreases in SES associate with increases in health problems in a monotonic manner, producing an "SES–Health Gradient." Research also suggests that the influence of SES on individual characteristics and health outcomes is not only contemporaneous, but also persistent and cumulative over the life course. However, SES influences vary depending on the outcomes and life stages under consideration.

Several theoretical perspectives suggest ways to operationally define SES. For example, Marx's view sees SES as determined by social classes based on class production relations (e.g., the working class and the bourgeois). Alternatively, a Weberian perspective views SES as based on social stratification or employment relations. Accordingly, researchers typically define SES using markers that involve employment, income, and education and often employ these conventional markers either separately or jointly as indices of SES.

The validity and utility of any SES measure depends on whether the measure is predictive in relation to the outcomes of interest. Recent theoretical and empirical developments in this area suggest that operational definitions of SES should take into account both economic factors and other social and individual factors that influence individual functioning in the social system. For example, James S. Coleman defines one's SES as access to different types of capital. According to Coleman, SES is a function of material capital (e.g., income and property), human capital (e.g., skills and knowledge), and social capital (e.g., social status, social support, and power). Because of these important developments, recent research often uses composite measures or latent constructs of SES to combine multiple measures of SES dimensions.

SES is not limited to an individual characteristic. Rather, one can define and measure SES at different levels, including individual, family, and community. Research suggests that SES at multiple levels uniquely influences individual outcomes. For example, community research shows that community SES influences resident net health of individual or family SES. In addition, findings generally indicate intergenerational transmission of SES from parents to children in many societies. However, other limitations on social mobility to cross SES categories may exist. Empirical research has yet to explain completely the influence of race/ethnicity on individual outcomes of interest, suggesting the need to consider other potential markers of SES.

K. A. S. Wickrama

See also Class; Social Capital; Social Mobility; Stratification, Social; Urban Underclass

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Sociopath

The term *sociopath* refers to an individual who exhibits behaviors that are outside of society's norms and expectations. Sociopaths, as well as psychopaths, fall under the psychiatric umbrella diagnosis of persons with "antisocial personality disorder," although many in the mental health profession feel that sociopaths and psychopaths are distinct personalities and should not be grouped under the same diagnostic category. The two primary organizations responsible for diagnosing mental health problems—the American Psychiatric Association and the World Health Organization—define sociopaths differently, which illustrates the complexity and difficulty that diagnosticians have with this personality type.

The American Psychiatric Association refers to sociopaths as persons having a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring since the age of 15, and who possess three or more of the following criteria: (1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest; (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure; (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults; (5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others; (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain steady work or honor financial obligations; and (7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.

The World Health Organization's most recent version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, or ICD-10, refers to sociopaths as having "dissocial personality disorder," which is characterized by (1) disregard for social obligations, (2) callous unconcern for the feelings of others, (3) gross disparity between behavior and the prevailing social norms, (4) behavior that is not readily modifiable by adverse experience, including punishment, (5) low tolerance to frustration and low threshold for discharge of aggression, including violence, and (6) tendency to blame others or offer rationalizations for behavior.

This disorder is diagnosed much more frequently in males than in females and is often associated with criminality and alcohol and drug use. And while sociopaths may be difficult to diagnose, many exhibit three warning signs, known as the MacDonald Triad: bedwetting, pyromania, and cruelty to animals. However, critics note that these behaviors are only a repetitive finding in sociopaths and that some children who exhibit them grow up to be healthy, normal adults. Because there is a limited amount of insight into the symptoms for sociopathy, persons rarely seek treatment for it, and when they do, their treatment options are limited.

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See also Mental Health; Psychopath

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Special Interest Groups

A special interest group is a group that, in pursuit of its goals, lobbies for government assistance or against government interference. The U.S. founding fathers created separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism in order to keep such groups from gaining too much power or influence. However, concerns about the disproportionate influence of interest groups, as well as the unbalanced influence among those groups, remain despite the passage of various laws governing lobbying and the participation of special interest groups in campaigns.

Three primary theories address the role of interest groups in the United States. The *pluralist theory* holds

that enough interest groups should participate in the political process so that everyone's interests get represented, whether or not individuals participate. The *elitist theory* challenges the pluralist view, arguing not all groups are represented and the ones that are are not represented equally. It argues further that public policy is primarily influenced by a small elite group rather than by a wide array of interest groups or the general population. Although examples of elite success exist, other successful examples that elitists thought would not succeed have also occurred. *Hyperpluralism,* the third theory, notes the large number of interest groups in U.S. politics and says those who are against something have a better chance of success, because the government's structure makes change more difficult than maintaining the status quo.

Types of Interest Groups

Groups can be categorized in several ways, including by membership, organizational structure, and goals. Membership categories include groups run by members, groups with corporate or other types of entities as members, groups with pocketbook members, and groups without members that are run by their staffs. Pocketbook members are people who pay dues but do little else in the group, although they may occasionally write letters or call Congress if asked by the group. Some groups have a formal organizational structure while other groups are less formal, and some are not really structured at all. In terms of goals, private interest groups (i.e., businesses) primarily seek benefits that can be limited to their members. Public interest groups (i.e., civil rights) advocate for benefits that cannot be limited to their own members.

What Interest Groups Do

Interest groups seek to influence government policy and to obtain government benefits by lobbying the legislative and executive branches of government and sometimes by participating in election campaigns. After passage of a law, the lobbyists pressure the bureaucracy charged with creation and implementation of its regulations and/or the courts charged with interpreting the law.

Lobbying can be direct or indirect. *Direct lobbying* includes any activity intended to influence, which involves personal contact with government officials or their staff. Activities include meeting with, calling, faxing, or writing government officials and staff as well as giving testimony or speaking at public meetings, submitting position papers, engaging in relevant lawsuits, and writing amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs—statements written by nonparticipants in a case that supports the legal argument made by one of the participants.

Indirect lobbying seeks to influence government officials through a third party such as the media or a group's members. Staging events that obtain press coverage (i.e., press conferences and protests) and writing letters to the editor are two common methods of using the media. Also, groups ask their members to engage in various direct lobbying activities (rather than the organization doing so itself), perhaps by e-mailing or calling their congresspersons.

Interest groups participate in the campaign process by donating money to candidates and/or instructing their members to donate money to or volunteer for a particular candidate. They also engage in independent campaigns using their money and members to assist in getting out a message to their members and/or the public to vote for a candidate or party. Organizations may engage in all, some, or none of these activities.

Likelihood of Success

How successful a particular interest group is depends on its resources, which include knowledge, membership, money, and reputation, all of which can be maximized through coalitions. The first of these resources—knowledge—falls into four types: knowledge about the group's issue(s); knowledge about how the political process works and the people whom you are trying to influence; knowledge relating to effective organization building, leading, and maintaining; and general knowledge, particularly in the areas of writing and speaking in standard English.

The second resource—membership—involves five important characteristics: number, geographic dispersion, cohesiveness, intensity, and market share. All things being equal, larger groups have an advantage over smaller ones. A group with a large number of members in a small geographic area would have significant influence in that area but less broad influence in a larger area. On the other hand, a group such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which has more than 50,000 members in a significant number of congressional districts, is able to have a much broader impact nationally, since all representatives have constituents who are part of the group.

A small cohesive group will do better than a large divided group. A group unable to decide what it wants makes it easier for politicians not to respond. It also makes it harder for the group to act. Sometimes multiple groups represent the same group(s) of people. When all of these groups are unified, they are more successful than when there is division among the groups.

Intensity is a benefit because when members feel intensely about their group's cause(s), they are going to be willing to work harder, donate money, and vote accordingly. Intensity is one of the reasons the religious right is playing a significant role in U.S. politics.

A group's market share—the percentage of eligible people who join the group—may also affect its success. This is most significant for organizations such as the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association, where the total number of people eligible to join the organizations is known. An organization has an easier time representing a specific group of people the higher its market share.

Money is a significant resource because it can be used to purchase many of the other resources as well as to pay for communications and make campaign donations. It is also the resource that is at the center of much of the controversy over the influence of interest groups in a democracy. The concern is that small groups with significant financial resources can influence policy in ways that disadvantage the majority.

Reputation, the final resource, has two elements. First, politicians do not want to be associated with unpopular groups. Second, the groups who have a history of giving good information are more likely to be trusted and believed than the groups who do not.

Three aspects of goals affect success rates. Groups seeking to block change do better because the government is structured to make change more difficult to achieve than maintaining the status quo. Groups with narrow or technical interests also do better than those with broader or less technical goals because they are less likely to stir up substantial opposition. This is in part because narrow goals are less likely to be noticed or, if noticed, inspire opposition from a significant number of groups or individuals. Technical goals are hard to understand and thus tend to receive less opposition.

Also, if a group has no organized competition, it has a better chance of success. When there is a mismatch in the resources groups have, the group with the superior resources has an advantage. These realities raise concerns for both democratic theorists and citizens. The primary concern is that policy decisions favor groups because of their resources, not because of the merit of their positions or because their positions represent the majority. When groups are evenly matched, the outcome is either compromise or stalemate. Sometimes the result in the former case is incoherent and/or piecemeal policy. In the latter case the status quo wins.

Impact of Interest Groups

Interest groups provide information, new ideas, an opportunity to pool individual resources, and the ability to rely on others to participate in one's place. The recent explosion of interest groups driven by technology, changes in campaign finance laws, and the weakening of political parties has increased people's concerns about their overall influence. The mismatch in group resources and the focus of groups on their own interests leave many concerned that the public is not represented, thereby possibly overriding the majority will. Research suggests the influence of interest groups is greater for issues on which there is no intense public sentiment. Interest groups also have more influence on less visible votes such as those taken in congressional committees as opposed to the floor of Congress.

Cynthia Simon

See also Identity Politics; Political Action Committees; Political Fragmentation; Social Movements

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Split Labor Market

The term *split labor market* comes from Edna Bonacich's landmark study of how the differential price of labor for competing ethnic or racial groups plays a role in the creation of ethnic antagonism and

conflict. Within a capitalist market economy, the combination of key factors such as employers' imperative to maintain a cheap labor supply and competing ethnic groups who draw from diverse and limited resources, in turn, results in a multitiered labor market, ethnic antagonism, and sometimes violence between these groups. This important 1972 study moves beyond explanatory models of ethnic antagonism that focus exclusively on religious and linguistic differences, skin color, and cultural learning and examines instead how conflicts are produced by interactions between groups. Split labor market theory reveals how ethnic and racial social conflict is shaped by economic competition, unequal distribution of resources, and class strife and, therefore, fits within a neo-Marxist theoretical paradigm. This theory has been widely applied in historical and comparative sociological analyses that examine ethnic and racial conflicts in relation to the labor market and class stratification and, in particular, in studies of new contact situations with immigrant or migrant laborers as well as racial antagonism during the American postwar period.

Specifically, Bonacich outlines how a split labor market contains differences in the price of labor—that is, the sum cost of wages, recruitment, benefits, and worker strife—for the same occupation of at least two groups of workers. This difference, therefore, is not the result of a direct discriminatory response to a particular racial or ethnic group. Rather, this stratification emerges as an effect of long-term processes and/or social conditions that create inequalities in resource distribution between these groups. Group differences in resources (e.g., economic, political, general knowledge) and motives (e.g., workers' desire to obtain temporary versus permanent work, investment in labor disputes, and willingness to participate in unions) lead to a preliminary gap in the cost of labor. Ethnic groups new to the labor force may, for instance, be willing to accept low-paying or undesirable jobs and be less likely to engage in labor strikes. For the higher-paid labor group, the split labor market provokes fears of being displaced by the new ethnic group and/or accepting lower wages. The lower-paid labor group does not intentionally undermine the higher-paid laborers, but is more effectively exploited by employers because of their relative lack of resources with respect to the higher-paid group. In turn, growing hostilities between these groups produce further antagonism and violence and occasionally result in outcomes driven by the higher-paid group such as ethnic exclusion and the creation of caste systems. While ethnic exclusion policies draw divisions around ethnic members and severely limit their ability to participate in society (e.g., immigration caps), caste systems depend on the labor of ethnic members yet simultaneously exploit the group and debilitate their overall employment (e.g., South African apartheid). Other studies have investigated how employers play an active role in creating ethnic or racial divisions and examined alternative historical outcomes to the split labor market.

Noelle J. Molé

See also Conflict Perspective; Ethnicity; Labor Market

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STALKING

Stalking first became recognized as a crime in the United States in the late 1980s. After the highly publicized stalking and murder of television actress Rebecca Schafer in 1989, as well as several other stalking murders and attempts, stalking moved onto the public's radar. Legislation criminalizing stalking followed these tragic, and potentially foreseeable, events. California was the first state to adopt legislation defining stalking as a criminal offense in 1990. Other states followed in short order. Since 1994, all 50 states have similar classifications.

The National Center for Victims of Crime estimates that 1 out of 12 women and 1 out of 45 men will be stalking victims during their lifetimes. Thus, during any given year, nearly 1,000,000 women and 400,000 men experience an episode of stalking.

Despite the staggering prevalence of stalking, it remained relatively unnoticed until only recently, and even then, policymakers have had difficulty with its definition. Undoubtedly, some of these difficulties stem from the orientation of the criminal justice system: that one is innocent until proven guilty and one cannot be arrested without some type of justification.

Prior to stalking legislation, a victim might have reported her stalker to the police only to be told that they could not do anything because "he (she) hasn't done anything wrong (yet)." Now, while specifics vary across states, most statutes include definitions that convey that (a) the behavior is a course of conduct that is unwanted and harassing, causing substantial emotional distress and serving no legitimate purpose; and (b) the offender must pose a credible threat to the safety of the victim, her family, or friends. Most recently, lawmakers added *cyberstalking* to the growing ways in which stalkers threaten and frighten their victims.

The Problem of Definition

Interpreting the definitions and behaviors of stalking is problematic. For one, how many acts does it take to determine that certain behaviors create a "pattern" or "course" of conduct? Further, the terms *credible* and *threat* are complicated. For example, how serious does one have to be to be considered credible or reasonable? Presumably standards for reasonable fear could be different for males and for females; if so, which standard should we use, or should they be different? Further, must threats be verbal? Could threats be written? Do they have to be clear and direct, or can they be implied?

Similarly, typical or usual (and completely understandable) victims' responses often jeopardize their cases as well as their positions and significance as "victims" in the eyes of the criminal justice system. To illustrate, many victims engage in what are called "acquiescent strategies"; that is, assenting to their stalkers to some small extent so that "he would stay cool." Law enforcement personnel may see the victim as being unsure of what she wants or leading the stalker on. Another example is that many stalkers engage in "courtship"-like behaviors (e.g., leaving a rose on the windshield of the victim's car, professing love, begging the victim to return). While the victim is aware of the true meaning and threatening nature of these "romantic" displays, others, such as criminal justice personnel, may see these seemingly insignificant behaviors as no cause for worrying or being concerned. Such issues regarding the definition of stalking may negatively impact victims' experiences with the criminal justice system as well as the ability of criminal justice personnel to adequately protect the victim. As such, many victims of stalking do not report their harassment to the police or do so only minimally.

Stalking Offenders

Most scholars typify stalkers into three categories: simple obsessional, love obsessional, and erotomania. The *simple obsessional* is the type who stalks his or her ex-spouse, lover, or former boss. The *love obsessional* is typically a male who stalks a stranger (possibly a celebrity) and professes inappropriate romantic notions. Finally, the *erotomanic* is typically a female who stalks a man she believes loves her. She reinterprets his responses to her in order to support her delusions. Other typologies of stalkers include the *intimate* stalkers, who want to (re)establish a permanent romantic union; the *rejected* stalkers, who pursue their victims in order to reverse or avenge a rejection (e.g., divorce, separation, termination); and *predatory* stalkers, who spy on their prey so they can plan an attack—usually sexual—on the victim.

Stalkers use a wide variety of strategies. Depending on the type of stalker, she or he may use courtship behaviors like professing love or begging the victim to return. The offender may use surveillance techniques like following the victim, driving by the victim's home or place of work, spying on the victim, tapping phones, or otherwise listening in on the victim's conversations. Most stalkers utilize threats, either direct or implied, against victims. These may include threatening to kill the victim; breaking in or vandalizing the victim's car, home, or property; entering the victim's home without permission; verbally abusing the victim; threatening to harm the victim; threatening the victim with a weapon; or threatening suicide if the victim does not comply. Stalking often escalates into violent behaviors such as physical assault, preventing the victim from leaving some place, sexually assaulting the victim, or murder. Other types of typical behaviors by stalkers are showing up at the victim's home or work, repeatedly telephoning, contacting the victim's family, and leaving written messages.

Stalking Victims

Women are primarily the targets, and their stalkers are usually ex-partners who cannot accept the conclusion of the relationship. Typically, the stalking behaviors start soon after the conclusion of the relationship, one often characterized by abuse. The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates that about one third of female homicide victims were previously stalked by their killers.

Stalking victims are unique from many other types of crime victims. They experience an ongoing crime rather than one with a definite beginning and end. Many experience great confusion, because stalking often incorporates romantic gestures intermixed with threatening overtones, and the victim may once have even loved the stalker. Nonetheless, stalking is a crime that produces extreme stress, fear, and hysteria. The stalker may appear to be everywhere; she hides but he finds her. He may be whispering sweet nothings to her, but he may be ranting abuse as well. Victims try to get help, but often it is not particularly effective, and all the while he or she continues to experience stalking. Victims may experience denial and self-guilt, shock and confusion, irritability, fear, anxiety, phobias, panic attacks, anger, depression, flashbacks, difficulties with concentration, post-traumatic stress disorder, health problems, sleep disturbances, or alcohol or drug use or abuse.

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See also Crime; Domestic Violence; Violence; Violent Crime

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Standardized Testing

A common misconception equates the term *standardized test* only with those tests that use multiple-choice items and machine-readable ("bubble") answer sheets. To the contrary, if any aspect of a test—format, procedures, or administration—is standardized across test takers, it can be considered a standardized test. Thus, tests with written, oral, or otherwise "constructed" instructions or responses can be standardized. Physical tests, such as those conducted by engineers, can be standardized, of course, but most focus on the measurement of latent (i.e., non-observable) mental traits.

Both surveys and tests measure mental traits. *Surveys* typically measure attitudes or opinion, whereas *tests* typically measure proficiencies or aptitudes. Like surveys, however, tests are composed of *items* (e.g., questions, prompts).

Educators and psychologists are the most frequent users of standardized mental tests. Educators measure academic achievement (i.e., mastery of knowledge or skills), diagnose learning problems or aptitudes, and select candidates for higher academic programs. Psychologists measure beliefs, attitudes, and preferences; diagnose psychological problems or strengths; and select candidates for employment.

Good standardized tests tend to be *reliable*—producing consistent results across time, conditions, and test takers, when the characteristics of the test takers are held equal—and *valid*—measuring those traits that they are intended to measure. When used for *selection* (e.g., university admission, employment), an effective test has strong *predictive validity*—a high correlation between test scores and future performance—or *allocative efficiency*—a high correlation between test scores and the performance of a group as a whole when the separate individuals are organized in a particular structure of relationships.

When tests have consequences, or *stakes*, they can induce beneficial *washback* effects. A plethora of research studies demonstrates that students and candidates study more and take their studies more seriously (and, thus, learn more) when facing tests with stakes. Moreover, when test takers wish to perform well, and their teachers wish to help them, they tend to focus their preparation on mastering that knowledge or those skills they judge will be covered by the test. This has the indirect, but usually beneficial, effect of increasing efficiency by aligning educational or training program curricula with known standards, benchmarks, and goals.

Education Tests

In most of the world, systemwide education tests are based on common standards and curricula. Teachers align their instruction, and students their study, to them. Most of these tests have consequences and,

typically, are placed at the entry and/or exit points of levels of education. Most countries require both upper secondary exit and university entrance examinations as well as either lower secondary exit or upper secondary entrance exams.

In the United States, however, where education governance is more fragmented, common standards and curricula have been difficult to implement and enforce. In the place of standards-based (*criterion-referenced* tests) tests, many U.S. states and school districts purchased *norm-referenced* tests from commercial test publishers. The "norms" were constructed through field tests with national samples of students on a generalized curriculum of the publishers' own construction. In the absence of standards-based testing, aptitude tests were often used to make consequential decisions, such as assigning students to special programs, retaining them in grades, awarding them scholarships, or admitting them to selective schools or universities.

The courts, however, have since declared it unfair to impose negative consequences, such as retention in grade or diploma denial, on students who fail tests based on pseudo-curricula rather than the one to which they actually were exposed. This principle has since been written into the *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing,* which have become the de facto regulations governing legal uses of standardized tests in the United States. As a result, virtually all grade promotion and graduation examinations are now standards based, not norm referenced, and achievement, not aptitude, tests.

Test Development

Standardized tests evolve through a demanding and time-consuming process based on either classical test theory or item response theory. In *classical test theory,* every test is custom designed and relevant to a particular population. First, one develops a test content framework, or outline, and then validates it with reviews by experts or current job holders. Next, one drafts test items and field tests them with a representative sample of the test-taking population, which can be difficult to do without exposing that population to the test content.

Test development according to *item response theory* (IRT) requires large populations of test takers to produce reliable test statistics, but these statistics are not then dependent on any particular choice of respondent samples. Moreover, respondent scores are independent of any particular choice of test items.

Computer-adaptive testing (CAT) owes its existence and its increasing popularity to IRT. With CAT, test takers are presented an item at a level of difficulty determined by their performance on the previous item. Correct responses yield more difficult subsequent items. Those responding to all items correctly can finish the examination early by circumventing the need to respond to the less difficult items.

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See also Academic Standards; Basic Skills Testing; Education, Academic Performance; Education, Special Needs Children; Evaluation Research; IQ Testing; Minimum Competency Test

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STANDPOINT THEORY

Standpoint theory is a feminist epistemology with roots in Marxist ideology. Feminist scholars use the term *standpoint* in varied ways, making it difficult to think about standpoint theory as a unified project. A central premise of all feminist standpoint epistemologies is the idea that all knowledge claims are historically and socially situated. While dominant modes of scientific inquiry posit a disembodied knower, feminist standpoint theories treat all knowledge as bounded by the cultural position, historical place, and biography of the knower. Standpoint theorists propose a redesign in the generation and evaluation of knowledge claims.

Standpoint epistemologies begin in a critique of the standards of objectivity and claims of universality that dominate in the natural and social sciences. For standpoint theorists, claims of objectivity conceal the androcentric underpinnings of science and obscure the ways that men established the authority of scientific knowledge to serve their own interests. Standpoint theory challenges not only the idea that knowledge emerges from a position of nowhere—what standpoint theorist Donna Haraway has called "the god trick"—but also the idea that an essential truth in the order of things can be recovered. Against the claim of an absolute truth, standpoint theorists see only the possibility for partial and multiple truths that always begin with a situated and embodied knower. Taken together, the recovery of differing standpoints provides a more complete and less distorted representation of social reality.

Standpoint theories recognize the production of ideas as a central dimension of women's oppression. Standpoint epistemologies have problematized women's exclusion and alienation from and misrepresentation and objectification within the production of knowledge. Standpoint theorists, building from Hegelian and Marxist ideas, propose that marginal groups, because they are positioned outside the nexus of power, offer a unique and legitimate perspective on the social world.

Feminist standpoint theorists also see an implicit link between knowledge and emancipation. A central aim of standpoint theories is to recover women's experiences and the subjugated knowledge of other oppressed groups, seeing this as critical to ending systems of oppression and developing a transformative consciousness for historically subordinated groups. Emphasizing the link between knowledge and empowerment, feminist standpoint theorist Patricia Hill Collins, for example, seeks to make black women agents of knowledge about their own lives.

Early articulations of standpoint theories were often critiqued for being either too relativistic or for essentializing the category of woman as knower. Feminist standpoint theorists have countered the claims of essentialism by arguing against a universal feminist subject of knowledge, seeing women as differently positioned in society and therefore able to offer a set of diverse perspectives. Feminist standpoint theorists have countered the charge of relativism, seeing feminist standpoint epistemologies first, as a complement to other modes of empirical inquiry, and second, by refusing to concede that all standpoints are equally valid.

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See also Feminism; Feminist Theory; Theory

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State Crimes

State crime is any action that violates international public law and/or a state's own domestic law when committed by individual actors acting on behalf of, or in the name of, the state, even when such acts are motivated by their personal economical, political, and ideological interests. Crimes of the state have been one of the foremost social problems of the past 100 years, with wide-reaching costs and little in the way of potential controls.

During the course of the 20th century, the state crimes of Turkey, Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Pol Pot and the Khymer Rouge, and Maoist China were especially large-scale, dramatic examples. Crimes of the state involving weapons of mass destruction, genocides, and crimes against humanity have been all too frequent (e.g., Bosnia, Croatia, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia). Other charges of state crime occurring around the world involve Egypt, Israel, the United States, China, United Kingdom, Russia, Chechnya, and North Vietnam.

In the late 20th century, new major initiatives sought to bring perpetrators of crimes of the state to trial, including International Criminal Tribunals focusing on genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, and the establishment of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. As legal attention to such events increased, so has the scholarly community's attention toward description and analysis of these phenomena.

Costs of State Crime

Committing the most harmful of crimes (physical and economic) are entities and individuals acting on the behalf of, or in the name of, the state. Such acts have cost citizenries and the international society incalculable losses. Additionally, genocides, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have claimed millions of lives over the past century. Further, they produce an immeasurable amount of pain and suffering for the survivors. Crimes of the state also can lead to the destruction of infrastructures, resulting in additional devastating atrocities (e.g., the 2002 sinking of the Senegalese ferry *Le Joola*, with a loss of more than 1,000 lives).

State crimes can also result in environmental destruction, with devastating effects on generations of citizens (e.g., the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl). More important, state-committed crimes rip asunder the social trust between a state and its citizenry (e.g., Watergate) as well as trust between states (e.g., invasion and occupation of sovereign states, including most recently Iraq). When states violate such trust, domestically or internationally, they threaten the security of the global order, peace, and legitimacy of an international community. To maintain peaceful, productive, and respectful global interactions, nations must agree to, and abide by, the rule of international law that guides states' behaviors.

State Crime and Criminology

An outgrowth of Edwin Sutherland's 1939 call to expand the purview of criminology to crimes of the powerful, the subfield of state crime specifically traces its origins to William Chambliss's 1988 American Society of Criminology presidential address on state-organized crime. Exploring crimes such as piracy and smuggling, Chambliss showed how states can be crucial in the organization and support of activities that violate their own laws and international laws when doing so fulfills their broader political and economic objectives. Criminologists, particularly critical criminologists, quickly adopted the concept, broadening and enriching the field. Their early work focused not only on crimes tacitly supported or organized by a sovereign polity, but on actions committed by nation-states themselves. As this field evolved, it broadened the definition of state crime to include all actions committed by states that violated domestic, international, or human rights laws, as well as incidents of states or state agencies failing to take actions when obligated to do so.

Critics suggest that reliance on governmental or quasi-governmental agencies for the labeling of actions as crimes removes scholastic independence and mires the field within political struggles in national or international arenas. Others advocate a social harm-based definition. This position points out that laws are created by states within political processes, and therefore law is a non-objective definitional criterion. Rather, behaviors engaged in by a state or its agents that generate demonstrable social harm on a nation's citizens or the citizens of another nation are actually state crimes. Those who advocate this position claim that through the use of a nonlegal (and thereby nonpolitical) definition, independent scholars can

define and explore the phenomena in a more objective fashion. Critics of the social harm definition suggest that socially injurious actions, the main definitional criterion, are vague and open to individualistic political interpretation, even if they avoid the political constructions of states.

Other cognate areas of state crime include political crimes, political white-collar crimes, environmental crimes, finance crimes, and the recently added crimes of globalization. Crimes of globalization recognize the intertwinement of states and international finance institutions (e.g., World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that can result in forms of state crime.

International Controls of State Crime

The capacity of international law as a control for state crime can be both a potential deterrent and a guide for state behaviors. However, due to the problematic ways of international law enforcement (or non-enforcement), it does not hold the same deterrent power over states as domestic laws may have over the citizenry. Nonetheless, law can be a post hoc control to address states' and/or individual state actors' criminality. There are five main venues for such controls: states' domestic prosecution, the United Nations, international criminal tribunals, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court.

The United Nations exists as a mediating agency through which states can air their concerns and grievances before an international audience. Designed as a diplomatic clearinghouse, it has the ultimate goal of enhancing international peace and stability via dispute resolution. The International Court of Justice is essentially a global civil court where disputing parties seek either arbitration or a trial hearing. They can submit themselves to binding and nonbinding agreements when various treaties have been violated. The International Criminal Court is a permanent criminal court designed to investigate, prosecute, and punish genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It is a complementary court empowered to act when a given state is unable or unwilling to do so itself.

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See also Crime; Globalization; Transnational Activism; World-Systems Analysis

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Status Offenses

Status offenses refer to conduct considered illegal only when committed by a minor. These acts of "noncriminal misbehavior" include running away, curfew violation, truancy, underage drinking or smoking, and ungovernability. Understanding status offenses as a contemporary social problem requires us to contextualize them within a historical perspective. Changing conceptions of gender, race/ethnicity, social class, family, and urbanization play a fundamental role in shaping their construction.

History of Status Offenses

During the colonial era, the family served as the model for morality and social order. In this period, the family—particularly the father—had ultimate legal autonomy to maintain discipline of children. Domestic matters such as childrearing remained in the private domain, and families viewed government attempts to intervene with suspicion. This authority met its first systematic challenge in the early 19th century, however, with the identification of poverty as a particularly pressing social ill. A centralized system of public

and private institutions evolved to address poverty, and reformers worried about its nearly inevitable result—crime and vice.

As poverty, immigration, urbanization, and delinquency became inextricably linked in reformers' consciousness, the children of the "dangerous classes" became the targets for institutional reform. Following the writings of Thomas Malthus, reformers worked to alleviate poverty and delinquency by inculcating the children of immigrant families with the virtues of hard work, self-control, and individualism. The first House of Refuge was instituted in New York City in 1825, soon followed by Boston in 1826 and Philadelphia in 1828. The education provided by these institutions, and at reformatories opened in the latter half of the 19th century, emphasized the acquisition of skills for agricultural and industrial work for boys and preparation for domestic servant positions for girls. In addition to instilling middle-class values and preparing youth for a working-class existence, this work was a chief source of revenue.

The first juvenile court, established in 1899, created a dual system of justice for juveniles and adults. While the primary response for adult offending was punishment, the juvenile court saw its role as intervention and rehabilitation. Viewing youthful offenders as innately pure and especially amenable to change, reformers worked to intervene before they encountered the "slippery slope" of criminality. The legal concept of *parens patriae* allowed the juvenile court far-reaching authority to intervene in the "best interests" of the child and his or her community. Almost any behavior, particularly those associated with poor ethnic immigrants (e.g., loitering and general idleness, begging, frequenting pool rooms), could suggest the need for intervention. Juvenile judges viewed their power to remove children from the home and commit them to institutions for moral education as both a means to support families that were unable to control their children and a way to address the failure of some parents to properly raise their children. Because these facilities were rehabilitative, not punitive, in nature, reformers failed to view the similar treatment for status offenders and delinquent law violators as problematic.

This practice continued, unchallenged until the 1960s, when youth workers began to advocate for the separation of status and delinquent juvenile offenders. Charging that status offender laws were essentially "omnibus" regulations whose vagueness allowed the court too much discretion, these advocates argued that placing status offenders in detention and reform facilities was not only unfair but ineffective. Moreover, they expressed concern about the stigma resulting from involvement in the juvenile justice system and the potential for harmful peer associations with delinquent offenders. As a result of their efforts, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 made it illegal to house status offenders in secure detention. For the next 5 years, approximately 65,000 young people were held in custody for status offenses. Then, the proportion of status offenders in secure facilities declined dramatically, but the practice has not been completely eliminated.

Status Offenses Today

Since some states treat status offenders as dependency cases (often termed "in need of supervision") and others are addressed through the juvenile justice system, current counts of status offenders are difficult to ascertain. Of the more than 2 million juvenile court cases processed annually, 16 percent are status offenses. One-fifth of status offenses are handled formally, led by charges for underage drinking (28 percent) and truancy (24 percent).

In 2003, juvenile facilities held just under 5,000 status offenders, an average of 5 percent of the total number of juveniles in custody. Status offenders are more likely to be held in private than in public facilities, in contrast to their delinquent counterparts. These private facilities are generally staff-secure (instead of locked) and involve longer stays in custody. More than one quarter (27 percent) of status offenders in detention facilities and 42 percent in residential placement are there as a result of ungovernability. Just over half (52 percent) of status offenders in custody are racial/ethnic minorities, an increase from 41 percent in 1991.

Status offender laws disproportionately affect girls. Nearly one quarter of the girls housed in detention centers are there as a result of status offenses, compared to only 4 percent of boys. Most of these are runaways who have fled their homes as a result of sexual or physical abuse (60 percent of youth petitioned for running away are girls). Until better alternatives for females are widely available, however, secure detention facilities will continue to fill this service gap in the system.

Evidence suggests that the mental health system has become an alternative means of addressing the

problem of status offenders. Private facilities have increased their advertising for parents encountering difficulties with their children's substance abuse or other problem behavior. However, while the status offenders in the past were most likely referred by parents and schools, police are now responsible for half of the status offense referrals made to the juvenile court. As more major cities pass curfew ordinances and establish truancy courts, there will undoubtedly be continued shifts in the way status offenses are viewed and treated.

Jamie J. Fader

See also Class; Crime; Deviance; Homelessness, Youth; Incarceration, Societal Implications; Judicial Discretion; Juvenile Delinquency; Juvenile Institutionalization, Effects of; Juvenile Justice System; Labeling Theory; Moral Entrepreneurs; Runaways; Social Control; Stigma; Total Institution

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Stereotyping

Stereotypes are oversimplified generalizations used to describe a person or group. They can exist in virtually unlimited categories. Age, gender, race/ethnicity, religion, hair color, height, weight, residential locale, and occupation are but a few of the possibilities.

Stereotypes act as a means to simplify unfamiliar situations. In initial contact with an unknown person or group, one typically engages in *categoric knowing*; that is, classification on the basis of limited information obtained by visual and/or verbal clues. These quick judgments may well contain some elements of truth, since they rest on perceived characteristics. The problem is that, once assigned, these stereotyped characteristics virtually take on a life of their own, becoming difficult to eradicate. Moreover, when stereotypes get applied to an entire group, such perceptions ignore the wide range of individual differences within that group.

Another problem with stereotypes is that they affect others' reactions to the one stereotyped. For example, if an individual is labeled as "trouble," then others may either avoid her or him and/or prejudge that person. Similarly, members of a group labeled as "lazy" may well encounter difficulties in finding jobs.

Stereotypes often form as a response to a particular stimulus. Historically, common factors that initiated common stereotypes were economic and social competition, misunderstood cultural attributes, wartime panic, and fear of one's own group losing power as others gain power. Unsurprisingly, therefore, stereotypes are typically negative in nature, regardless of the group they are describing. The rare exception usually occurs regarding stereotypes of those who hold societal power.

One may argue that stereotypes have an almost instinctive role. When people must assess danger, their decision for flight, fight, or remaining calm must rely on some type of external factor. Usually individuals rely on the stereotypes of an individual's group to deduce whether or not the person is a risk. For instance, if a person were confronted by two strangers—one dressed in ragged, dirty clothes and the second nicely dressed—appearance will dictate the response. Despite the many variances of possibilities as to who these individuals actually are and what they are truly doing, typical stereotypes would lead one to believe the former is potentially dangerous and the latter is someone who is not a threat.

Since stereotypes vary from society to society (sometimes even within one society), one must question their true validity. For example, race is a biological reality, but it is also a socially contrived concept based on physical attributes. Thus, still influenced by its legacy of slavery, the United States has a more

rigid racial classification system and greater problems with racism than does Brazil. Similarly, the social construction of gender leads to different stereotypes, perceptions, and social interaction patterns from one society to another. Although male and female are biological concepts, what is considered masculine or feminine varies greatly among societies.

Although stereotypes may be useful at times, they are not always beneficial and are frequently degrading. The problem with the quick assumptions one makes based on stereotypes is that they are often derived from prejudicial beliefs and have little or no merit. Therefore, as these stereotypes are perpetuated, so is the prejudice (i.e., negative feeling) toward that particular group.

The existence of stereotypes affects academia. If stereotypes exist that a certain race, ethnic group, and/or gender academically performs either well or poorly, then students are more likely to be treated with bias and either favored or disfavored based on their membership, or lack thereof, in the stereotyped group. Even if the perceived unintelligent student was actually smarter than the perceived intelligent student, the biased treatment from the teacher could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the former student performs poorly and the latter student performs well. If this phenomenon continues to occur throughout the students' academic careers, the stereotypes will continue to perpetuate self-fulfilling prophecies and contribute to the cyclical process of keeping minorities without power in society. For example, poor performance in school leads to the likelihood of low-paying jobs. In turn, this will keep these individuals in low-income neighborhoods that are likely to have poor educational systems more likely to give their children a below-average-quality education. Therefore, stereotypes can play a key role in continuing the cycle of poverty.

Further affecting minorities are criminality stereotypes, an all-too-often label they receive. This results in racial profiling, when minorities of a particular racial or ethnic group are more likely to be questioned by police and hence more likely to be charged with a crime. This can be particularly troublesome in court: if the defendant is of a minority group typically stereotyped as "criminal" and the jury is familiar with that stereotype, the issue of how likely that minority person would receive a fair trial arises. Stereotyping can help us understand why crimes committed by the lower class and minorities are seen as more wicked and immoral than white-collar crimes, which are typically committed by the upper class of society.

Even positive stereotypes can have negative consequences for a particular group. Consider Asian students stereotyped as excelling in math and science. If an Asian student does not do well in these subjects, that individual could feel inadequate and have emotional distress, perhaps even severe depression.

Additionally, if only members of a group are stereotyped and perceived to be good at a particular task (such as playing a sport or taking a science test), then others may not perform at their true level because they believe they will not do as well. Also, when members of a particular group are obviously or subtly made aware that their group generally performs poorly on a task, they are much more likely to perform more poorly on that task. This effect has obvious consequences in the classroom as well as on the athletic field and workplace.

The media portrays and reinforces stereotypes. One latent function of the media is to both teach and reinforce cultural norms and values. Therefore, the stereotypical depictions of gender and/or minority roles vary through time and reflect present-day societal norms. Conflict theorists argue, however, that the upper class or elite of society rule the media and are more apt to project the norms, values, and stereotypes that keep them in power. Since the owners of media are often white males, they are more likely to favor programs that portray and stereotype white males powerfully. This transmission of stereotypes through media leads to their legitimization and continuation in a society.

Another drawback with stereotypes is that they are often long lasting. Once a person has learned a stereotype about a particular group, it is difficult to erase or forget that belief. Even when meeting individuals of that group who do not fit the stereotype, one often dismisses those individuals as "exceptions to the rule." Therefore, if a member of the minority group (stereotyped as criminal) stops a crime from occurring, one may view that person as "one of the few good minorities." Additionally, if a member of the majority commits a crime, one may view that person as being deviant and acting out of character.

One does have the ability, however, to overcome learned stereotypes and to judge others on a more individual basis. The ability of a person to do so relies on three factors. First, as the amount of *personal information* known about another increases, the stereotype loses relevance. Second, a person's *cognitive ability* affects how likely one will rely on stereotypes; a person without the time or mental clarity to correctly

assess another will be more likely to make quick judgments based on stereotypes. The third factor that enables someone to overcome a stereotype is *motivation;* if someone were to be rewarded (financially or otherwise) for making an accurate judgment about someone, this could encourage a more accurate impression rather than a reliance on stereotypes. Ironically, research shows that the more people try not to use stereotypes, the less they are able to not use them; even if they can suppress using stereotypes for the short term, afterward the stereotypes often rebound more strongly than before, resulting in greater prejudice.

Although stereotypes simplify situations for people and allow them to make quick judgments based on limited information, they can also have serious negative consequences for all members of society. Due to the tendency for stereotypes to disproportionately affect minorities negatively, it is important for one to use stereotypes with caution and to make an effort to judge people based on individual characteristics and less on stereotypes of the group to which they belong.

Jennifer M. Koleser

See also Discrimination; Labeling Theory; Prejudice; Racial Formation Theory; Racial Profiling; Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

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Stigma

A stigma is any social marker that refers to a deviation from the norm. It can be a trait that the general population deems unacceptable or undesirable or a mark of disapproval based on undesirable beliefs, ideas, behaviors, or even personal characteristics. Individual societies determine what is acceptable or "normal." Anything that deviates from the acceptable is stigmatized. What may be a stigma in one society or community at a particular moment in time may be an acceptable attribute in another. The stigmatized are sometimes thought of as deviant, since their stigmas may have caused them to deviate from what are considered to be societal norms.

Stigmas are often based on race, ethnicity, culture, social and economic status, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and even educational attainment. For example, racial/ethnic minorities, people from non-Western cultures, the poor and/or working class, women, non-heterosexuals, non-Protestant Christians, and people with less than a college education (as that often signifies class) are more likely to be stigmatized in U.S. society. Physical appearance often leads to assumptions made about people. Stigmas can even be based on physical features such as skin, eye, and hair color; hair texture; body size and type; and height. Often people with darker skin and eyes, dark hair that is not straight, the overweight (or sometimes even the underweight), and people who are short or too tall can all be stigmatized, and so can people with perceived physical and mental disabilities. Most important, understandings and perceptions of stigma are socially constructed. Stigmatizing attributes change depending on time and/or location. For example, 200 years ago in the Western part of the world, a tanned, white, muscular male was considered undesirable because his tan and muscular frame alluded to the fact that he was probably part of the working class, possibly a farmer or someone who worked with his hands.

Markers of identity and/or physical attributes are stigmatized along with behaviors, beliefs, and even political affiliations. For example, criminal or deviant behavior and even some illness or sicknesses can be stigmatized. People with belief systems different from that of the dominant group can face ridicule and stigma, as experienced by communist sympathizers during the 1950s in the United States.

Probably the most well-known work on stigmas in the social sciences is Erving Goffman's *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity.* Published originally in 1963, *Stigma* examines the experiences of both the individual and the society when a person is considered to not be "normal" for some reason or another. According to Goffman, there are three types of stigma. The first type of stigma is physical in nature; this includes deformities such as missing limbs or obvious physical disability. The second type of stigma is based on ideas or beliefs. Examples of this form of stigma include everything from homosexuality to political beliefs. The final type of stigma, as described by Goffman, involves issues around family and lineage. Such stigmas are concerned with religion,

caste, and race—things passed on from one generation to the next.

Goffman argues that forming stigmas about an individual can be somewhat beneficial to those who apply the stigma to different groups, because it serves to psychologically protect them from the idea that they could easily become inflicted with the stigmatizing characteristics. Goffman maintains that we look for a way to blame the individual, and this serves as a justification for ways in which people without the stigma treat her or him.

An example of this occurred during the early 1980s and still exists today with HIV/AIDS. AIDS, a disease that occurs when the HIV virus weakens the immune system, leaving the body prone to infection, was highly stigmatized when it was first discovered. AIDS symptoms were originally noticed among gay men, which led to the identification of the gay-related immune deficiency syndrome or GRIDS. GRIDS later became AIDS, or acquired immune deficiency syndrome, when heterosexuals became infected. However, it soon became apparent that heroin addicts, sex workers, and other more deviant populations were also becoming infected due to increased at-risk behaviors that involved the sharing of bodily fluids. With the exception of hemophiliacs and babies born to AIDS-infected mothers, AIDS was associated with people on the fringes of society, and as such, AIDS became a stigmatized illness. Since a number of people did not consider themselves at risk for HIV infection because they were not homosexuals or drug addicts, rates of HIV infection increased among non-intravenous-using drug addicts.

The relationship between the stigmatized and society becomes important in examining what a stigma may mean. Frequently, stigmas contribute to discrimination and prejudice. Societal reactions to stigmas have an incredibly negative impact on the stigmatized individual. Stigmas tend to be influenced by the perceived threat the individual may pose to others. This devalued attribute leads to a number of stressors for the targeted individual. The prejudice and discrimination that people experience as a result of their stigma increases their levels of stress and can affect everything from where they live to where they attend school and work. This can also negatively impact the self-perception of the stigmatized individual. They may devalue themselves or perceive themselves as worthless or less than attractive, and this can be especially problematic in the teenage years, when self-perception relies heavily on acceptance by others.

Though social scientists focus on the impact that stigma has on the individual, they are most often concerned with the impact the stigma has on society. Stigmas are frequently based on stereotyped beliefs individuals have about people associated with a particular stigmatized attribute. The discrimination that people experience as a result of their stigma has many large-scale societal implications. Racism and racist social policies, such as those in the South after the Civil War—for example, Jim Crow and the notion of "separate but equal"—forced a legal separation between blacks (and other people of color) and whites. Today, people of color still experience employment and housing discrimination, even harassment.

Angelique Harris

See also Differential Association; Discrimination; Scapegoating; Social Exclusion; Stereotyping; Stressors; Victimization

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Strain Theory

Strain theory states that the experience of strains or stressors increases the likelihood of crime. *Strains* refer to events and conditions that are disliked by individuals. Examples include the inability to achieve valued goals, such as economic success; breakup with a romantic partner; and verbal and physical abuse. Individuals sometimes turn to crime in an effort to cope with their strains. For example, they sell illicit drugs or engage in prostitution in an effort to achieve their economic goals. Strain theory describes those types of strains most likely to lead to crime, the reasons why strains lead to crime, and the factors that influence the effect of strains on crime.

The initial versions of strain theory, such as that of Robert Merton, focused on that type of strain involving

the inability to achieve economic success. Merton argued that all people in the United States are encouraged to pursue the goal of economic success, but many people—particularly lower-class people—are unable to achieve this goal through legal channels. More recent versions of strain theory examine other types of strains, with Robert Agnew's version of strain theory being the most general.

Agnew focuses on three major types of strains: (1) the inability to achieve positively valued goals, including economic, autonomy, and masculinity goals; (2) the loss of valued possessions and relationships, such as the death of a close friend; and (3) the experience of noxious events and conditions, such as being bullied at school. Agnew argues that strains are especially likely to result in crime if, among other factors, they are serious and seen as unjust. For example, individuals are more likely to respond with crime if they are subject to an unprovoked punch by another versus an accidental bump while walking down the street.

Research suggests that several strains increase the likelihood of crime, including the inability to achieve goals; parental rejection; harsh or erratic parental discipline; child abuse and neglect; partner abuse; negative school experiences, such as low grades; chronic unemployment; work in low-paying, dead-end jobs with unpleasant working conditions; homelessness; peer abuse; criminal victimization; and experiences with prejudice and discrimination.

The experience of strains increases the likelihood of crime for several reasons. Strains contribute to a range of negative emotions, such as anger, frustration, and depression. These emotions create pressure for corrective action, and crime is one possible response. Crime may allow people to reduce or escape from their strains. For example, individuals may engage in theft to achieve their economic goals or they may run away to escape abuse by their parents. Crime may allow people to seek revenge against the source of their strains or other targets. For example, individuals may assault the peers who insult or bully them. And crime may allow individuals to alleviate their negative emotions. For example, individuals may use illicit drugs in an effort to make themselves feel better.

Strains may also lead to crime because they reduce the individual's ties to conventional others and institutions. Individuals who are mistreated by their parents, for example, may come to dislike their parents. And individuals who receive low grades in school may come to care little about school. People with weak ties to conventional others and institutions have less to lose by engaging in crime. Further, strains may increase crime by fostering beliefs favorable to crime. Individuals who are regularly bullied by others, for example, may come to believe that violence is justified if one is provoked. Finally, strains may increase crime by causing individuals to associate with other criminals, who encourage and reinforce crime. Individuals who cannot achieve their economic goals through legal channels, for example, may join criminal gangs in an effort to make money through illegal channels—such as selling drugs.

Most individuals who experience strains, however, do not turn to crime. Rather, they cope in a legal manner. For example, they negotiate with the people who mistreat them or they exercise to relieve their stress. Strain theory devotes much attention to those factors that influence the likelihood that people will respond to strains with crime. A criminal response is said to be more likely among people with poor coping skills and resources. This includes people with low IQs, low self-control, poor social and problem-solving skills, and limited financial resources. A criminal response is said to be more likely among people who are low in social support; that is, people who cannot turn to others, such as family members and friends, for help in coping. Crime is said to be more likely among people who have little to lose by engaging in crime, such as people who lack close ties to family members and do not have good jobs. And crime is said to be more likely among people who are disposed to crime, such as people who have criminal friends and believe that crime is sometimes justified. Research provides some support for these predictions, although more research is needed on those factors that increase the likelihood of a criminal response to strains.

Strain theory has not only been used to explain why some individuals are more likely to engage in crime than others, but also why some groups have higher crime rates than others. For example, males are said to have higher crime rates than females because they are more likely to experience strains conducive to crime, such as criminal victimization, and they are more likely to cope with strains through crime, partly because they are lower in self-control and are more likely to have criminal friends. Strain theory, in sum, constitutes one of the leading explanations of crime.

Robert Agnew

See also American Dream; Anomie; Relative Deprivation; Stressors

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Stratification, Age

Stratification is the process of dividing members of a society into *strata*, or social groups; when this is done by age, it is termed *age stratification*. The various age strata form age cohorts that encompass those born within a particular time period. One of the largest and most well-known age cohorts in contemporary society is the baby boomers, those born after World War II between 1946 and 1964. These cohorts age together across the life course and share common history, experiences, norms, and role transitions while changing from "young" to "middle-aged" and "old" statuses.

In addition to the relationship of the members within a stratum, and unlike stratification by social class, groups of different age strata interact in society. For example, those in the young group may interact with those in the middle-aged and old groups in a family setting or by participation in the workplace. While the similarities of members within a stratum are thought to provide cohesion within that stratum, age stratification theories suggest that interstrata conflicts also exist.

Conflicts may arise between strata, typically structured around competing group interests such as young versus old. One example of how these conflicts play out in society would be institutional battles over the allocation of economic resources, such as spending on Social Security programs for older persons versus federal aid to families with young children. Terms like the *generation gap* and *age war* imply competition and accentuate differences between the strata. The idea that older persons place an excessive burden both upon their families and upon the health care system also implies conflict, pitting the interests of younger groups against those of older persons.

Some suggest lessening conflicts by forming positive connections among the strata through common interests. Some theorists argue that the role of intergenerational exchange—the exchange of time and resources among groups of different generations—promotes solidarity. The exchange buffers the negative views of old groups by young groups through positive social interaction. Some argue that although models of intergenerational conflict are promoted, the degree of conflict between young and old groups is overstated. Theories of the intergenerational exchange, the merits of the strata working together, and conflicts among the strata find frequent debate in empirical and theoretical work. This debate on the nature of the relationship among the strata will continue in the United States as the 65-years-and-older segment of the population continues to grow into an increasingly larger segment of society.

Joyce Weil

See also Ageism; Baby Boomers; Dependency Ratio; Life Course; Population, Graying of

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Stratification, Gender

Gender stratification is the stratification of individuals based on biological sex and the socially derived gender roles attached to sex. Stratification based on gender has existed in human society from the beginning of recorded history, if not before. In the United States, such stratification has traditionally existed in the institutions of education, work, and family, with men in the privileged position. Although great changes have occurred since the women's rights movement, men and women still remain stratified from each other in these three domains.

Education, one of the main conduits to upward mobility and increased status in the United States,

experienced change in recent decades, with girls increasingly reporting liking traditionally male subjects in school such as math and science. Girls have also surpassed boys in obtaining higher grades in both elementary and secondary school. At the collegiate level, women have made great inroads, now comprising over half the population of undergraduates. Additionally, the Census Bureau reports that women graduate from college at higher rates than men. However, despite these substantial inroads in the educational domain, women do not experience the same benefits as men in occupational upward mobility.

According to recent Census data, the female-to-male earnings ratio among full-time, year-round employees has increased since 1960, from roughly 61 percent to 77 percent. Such differences persist regardless of education. The gender gap in wages tends to be the largest for women in the highest-paying jobs, which often require the most education. In addition to obtaining less for the same work, women often face other barriers to upward mobility. Research indicates that women in high-status jobs often face a "glass ceiling" beyond which they can no longer advance in a company, an invisible barrier that their male counterparts do not encounter.

Gender stratification in the work domain often reinforces traditional distinctions between men and women within the family. Although biological justifications for women as homemakers and men as breadwinners are often employed to ensure women's dependence on men, the desire to maintain a decent lifestyle has helped create many dual-earner families. Indeed, at least 58 percent of women have full-time, year-round employment. Such numbers might influence traditional gender stratification in the home, since many women now have an independent source of income. However, many women must take on a "second shift," in which they perform their traditional tasks in the home in addition to working a full day in the paid workforce, a trend that reinforces traditional gender stratification in the family.

As society evolves, women will likely continue expanding their presence in the educational and work domains. However, unless cultural change in the status of men and women additionally occurs, gender has the potential to remain a stratifying characteristic in the United States.

Laura Auf der Heide

See also Gender Gap; Glass Ceiling; Second Shift; Segregation; Stratification, Social; Wage Gap; Women's Rights Movement

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Stratification, Race

Race stratification, which exists worldwide, is the ranking of individuals in groups based on perceived innate differences and the socially derived beliefs attached to these differences. In the United States, individuals of European extraction generally enjoy greater privileges and outcomes in comparison to many minority groups that enjoy fewer rewards on average. Although race stratification has become less prominent in the United States over the past century, large racial differences still exist in a variety of areas.

The United States is a racially diverse society, encompassing African Americans, various Asian American and Hispanic groups, American Indians, and Anglo Americans. Life outcomes vary both between these groups and within them. For the most part, Asian Americans have similar, or more positive, life outcomes to whites, and as such have been dubbed the "model minority." In contrast, African Americans, many Hispanic groups, and American Indians often face greater levels of discrimination, have lower educational achievement, and attain lower levels of wealth than their white and Asian American counterparts. It must be stressed that between-group observations are general trends based on socially constructed categories. Additionally, systematic variation often occurs within particular minority subgroups (i.e., Japanese

and Vietnamese Americans, or Cuban and Puerto Rican Americans).

Racial stratification can be clearly observed in the segregation of different groups. Although racial segregation in housing or education is no longer sanctioned by law, de facto segregation still remains in these two areas. This is especially prevalent among African American and Hispanic American groups, who often live in racially homogenous locations that also tend to have lower average income levels. This informal segregation is highly problematic because individuals living in lower-income areas often attend schools of lower quality, face discrimination in housing (i.e., less access to home loans), which leads to lower wealth accumulation and lower overall quality of life.

These differences become more tangible when examining problems such as the persisting "education gap" in test scores between different racial groups. In standardized test scores at all education levels, African Americans consistently perform most poorly, followed closely by Hispanic and American Indian youth. Asian groups, on the other hand, often perform as highly as, or higher than, their white counterparts. Some authors claim that the education gap is at least in part due to resource differentials derived from de facto segregation. Others argue that structural disparities and continuing discrimination are factors that have led African American and Hispanic students to avoid "acting white," which is often correlated in their minds with having high educational achievement.

In addition to education, race stratification is also embedded within the institution of work, where median income levels vary by race. In 2006, non-Hispanic white households earned $52,423. In comparison, African American households earned $31,969 (61 percent of non-Hispanic whites) and Hispanic households earned $37,781 (72 percent of non-Hispanic whites). Further reflecting the educational trends previously discussed, Asian American households earned $64,238 (123 percent of non-Hispanic whites). Both educational and work disparities perpetuate systemic differences among racial groups in the United States by limiting earning potential. In a country in which wealth and education lead to upward mobility, minority groups who live in segregated areas and have differing educational achievement face higher hurdles, which serve to perpetuate stratification.

Fifty years after the civil rights movement, groups in the United States continue to challenge existing racial stratification. However, without alteration of structural features and cultural beliefs affecting race, it will likely remain a stratifying characteristic in the foreseeable future.

Laura Auf der Heide

See also Discrimination; Discrimination, Institutional; Education, Academic Performance; Income Disparity; Inner City; Segregation; Stratification, Social; Wage Gap; Wealth Disparities

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Stratification, Social

Social stratification is a structured ranking of categories of people who receive unequal amounts of wealth, power, and status from generation to generation. It is a cultural universal found in almost every society from the past to present. However, the basis upon which stratification rests may vary through time and from one society to another. In order to be accepted by all members of society, including those of low rank, every system of stratification must have a legitimizing ideology. This legitimizing ideology typically justifies inequality through claims to transcendental ideas, usually from religion. Examples of major systems of stratification include caste, slavery, estate or feudal, and social class.

While the British monarchy is a remnant of a European caste system, the oldest worldwide example that most closely approximates the type based on ideas is that of India. India's caste system has four primary divisions (*varnas*), each one with multiple subcastes (*jatis*). About 160 million people considered "untouchables" and known as *Dalits* (or as *harijans*—"children

of god," Gandhi's term) are at the bottom of this caste system, which has been rigid (although this is breaking down now), with little if any mobility between castes. Ascribed at birth, caste position determines virtually all aspects of life, including, for example, the type of work one is allowed to perform, marriage partners, rights, and obligations. Here, caste has determined social status that then determined one's wealth, in contrast to a class system in which wealth largely determines social status. Finally, this extreme system of inequality has persisted partly because the internalization of the system's legitimizing ideology rests on the Hindu religion.

Slavery is another ancient system of stratification still found in various forms in some parts of the world. The distinguishing characteristic of slave systems is that a person can legally own another human being as property. Individuals have usually become slaves in one of three ways: ascription by birth, military conquest or capture, or debt. In ancient societies, slavery was mostly ascribed or the result of military conquest. Slaves could obtain their freedom by purchasing it from their owner. Slaves also held a variety of social positions, including some with high prestige or authority. In the United States, slavery was based on capture (among Native Americans) or ascription (children of African slaves were themselves slaves). Although possible, most slaves would rarely have opportunities to obtain their freedom legally. In the latter case, a legitimizing ideology—this time racism—justified this practice of white superiority.

The estate or feudal system is characteristic of agrarian societies. The best approximation to the ideal type occurred in medieval Europe, where feudalism existed through ownership of land by militaristic nobility that provided protection to the peasants or serfs in exchange for their labor to cultivate the land. Around the 12th century, this system evolved into the estate system, comprised of nobles, priests, soldiers, craftsmen, and commoners. As the system matured, it became increasingly rigid, with class positions defined by ascription. Originally based on tradition and custom, during the estate period the legitimizing ideology became increasingly based in law, as religious leaders argued that the nobility represented "God's" will to govern in his name. Under this system of stratification, social inequality was high.

Social class is historically the newest form of stratification, one essentially derived from capitalist industrialization. Under a class system, ascribed status is still a major determinant of one's social position, but it is possible to experience social mobility and change position based on merit and effort. Income and wealth primarily define social class, while the system's legitimizing ideology is the belief that equal opportunity exists for all. Karl Marx viewed class stratification as determined exclusively by ownership of the means of production that generate wealth. However, other theorists such as Max Weber argued that class position is determined not exclusively by wealth but also by status and power. For example, Weber argued that a high rank in one category such as wealth did not necessarily imply high rank in status or power, although normally that was the case. Rather, some people could experience status inconsistency, such as a college professor who may enjoy high social status but a lower level of wealth.

The Davis and Moore Hypothesis

Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore exemplify the functionalist sociological approach to stratification. They argued that every society requires the performance of important jobs that require certain levels of skill, training, and innate ability. To induce those capable of performing these jobs to undertake the necessary training, they must receive higher rewards, thereby justifying social inequality. Although their argument sounds rational, it does not explain why the salaries of some highly valued jobs, such as clergy and teachers, have low rewards. It also fails to explain why the salaries of movie and rock stars far exceed those of people considered more valuable, such as doctors or accountants. Finally, their argument does not address why some jobs are valued more than others in the first place.

Conflict Theory

According to conflict theorists, stratification is the result of the capitalist system that exploits those with little to no power. They argue that those who have wealth and power shape laws in a manner that protects their own class interests. For example, stealing a loaf of bread is the punishable offense of theft, even if the thief is a poor hungry child. In his essay, "Labor Theory of Value," Marx argued that the capitalist class (*bourgeoisie*) exploits the working class (*proletarians*) through its ownership of the means of production, such as factories. This allows the capitalist class to offer workers wages below their fair value. Capitalist

business owners keep the difference between what they pay workers and the full value of their work, thus making the owners wealthy. In addition, Marx argued that the capitalist system of work leads to workers experiencing alienation from their products, society, and even themselves.

Marx believed that the only way to end exploitation would be through a social revolution by the working class. He also believed that the absence of a workers' revolution was because of their false class consciousness. Working people are unaware of their class exploitation because they have accepted capitalism's legitimizing ideology produced by the upper class to secure everyone's conformity to the system.

The Classless Society

The only society with no stratification would be a communist one, as advocated by Marxists. Historically, such a society existed in prehistoric times with human groups that were hunters and gatherers and where little distinction existed between members as they enjoyed basic equality with one another in primitive communal societies.

Nineteenth-century utopian idealists and hippies in the 1960s also experimented with classless communes, many of them short lived. No large-scale, modern communist society has ever existed; the former Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and North Korea do not fit the true definition of communism. Instead these societies are better described as socialist dictatorships that base stratification on Communist Party affiliation rather than wealth. Authentic communism may never occur on a large scale, given the necessary idealistic preconditions to make such a society possible. Perhaps this is why theoretical communist societies are also called utopian, which means to some "admirable but impractical in real life."

John Asimakopoulos

See also Alienation; Class; Class Consciousness; False Consciousness; Gini Coefficient; Inequality; Power Elite; Slavery; Socioeconomic Status; Wealth Disparities

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STRESSORS

More than 50 years ago Hans Selye, a Canadian endocrinologist, defined *stress* as "the nonspecific response of the body to any demand." In laboratory experiments, Selye exposed rats to a variety of noxious chemicals and extreme environmental conditions that he labeled "demands." The environmental demands included freezing temperatures, constant light, deafening noise, and nonstop exercise via motor-driven treadmills and constant swimming to avoid drowning. Selye found that when these demands threw the rats' normal operating systems (respiration, circulation, digestion, and temperature regulation) too far out of their normal range of functioning, they adjusted by initiating a complex pattern of physiological changes that he called the "stress response." Not only did the rats initiate this life-saving response, but the response was the same regardless of the type of demand that triggered it. Selye called this phenomenon the "nonspecific response to any demand." Besides rats, Selye replicated the response with mice, rabbits, dogs, cats, and other laboratory animals. The *nonspecificity* of the response to *any* demand was the key factor in the development of Selye's stress theory.

What Are Stressors?

Researchers since Selye often refer to demands as *stressors.* Stressors are the people, things, and situations that create unusual or excessive demands on people, leaving them feeling threatened and unable to cope. Most people suffer from social stressors associated with work, school, relationships, family life, and

world events rather than extreme environmental demands like those created by Selye in the laboratory.

Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe, pioneers in the study of life events and their link to stress, identified a relationship between stressful occurrences and susceptibility to illness. They examined the past medical records of their subjects and discovered that the development of serious illnesses often followed major life changes. They used the term *life events* to refer to these life-changing experiences. Some of these events were positive (*eustress*)—marriage, the birth of a child, a new job—while others were negative (*distress*)—the death of a loved one, the loss of a job.

Holmes and Rahe found that exposure to these positive and negative life events throws the body's systems out of balance, triggering the stress response. Like Selye, they believed that the stress response was the body's way of readjusting to stressors. Additionally, they believed that the body had a finite amount of energy available to make these readjustments to adapt to stressors. Exposure to too many life events in a short a period of time increased one's risk for the development of disease.

The Role of Perception in Stressors

In the 1970s and 1980s, researchers in the field of cognitive psychology took issue with the notion of the comparability of eustress and distress. They also questioned the belief that the life events identified by Holmes and Rahe were universal stressors for everyone under all circumstances.

Richard Lazarus, a pioneer in this research, found that people responded to life events differently, depending on how they perceived them and on their ability to cope with them. Lazarus and his colleague Susan Folkman established that some subjects perceived life events such as divorce as very stressful, while others didn't view them as stressful at all. Such events are stressful only if people appraise them as threatening and feel unable to cope with them. Until that determination, life events and other demands are *potential stressors.*

Threat implies a state of anticipating a confrontation with a harmful condition. Whether the stressor is real or imagined is immaterial. One's *perception* of the threat associated with the potential stressor determines whether or not it becomes an actual stressor that triggers a stress response. One's perceived ability to cope with the potential stressor plays a key role in determining how threatening it is. If one feels that he or she can cope with a potential stressor, regardless of how threatening it might actually be, it is not very likely to turn into an actual stressor.

Another key element of the stress appraisal process is that it is always influenced by space and time. One may evaluate the same potential stressor differently the next time exposure occurs. Not only will the context be different (different time and different circumstances), but so will be the person (a little older and wiser, maybe more rested, perhaps traveling home from a wonderful vacation).

A New Way of Looking at Stressors

A key aspect of viewing stress as a transaction is the process of appraising the threat posed by potential stressors. Viewing stressors as potential stressors instead of actual stressors reduces their ability to trigger a stress response. This subtle language shift reaffirms the principle that demands are not inherently or universally stressful for everyone under all circumstances. Potential stressors must be transformed by individuals into actual stressors. Essentially, they are neutral until perceived as threatening and beyond one's ability to cope with them.

This is a quantum leap from the outdated belief that certain demands (divorce, marriage, loss of job, starting a new job) are inherently stressful for everyone, under all circumstances. The major implication of viewing demands as potential stressors instead of actual stressors is empowerment. Understanding stressors as having the potential to cause stress leads to the realization that stress is no longer something that just happens and is beyond one's control. Stressors become more than just "bills" or "traffic" or "the government." They transform into demands that people can play an active role in understanding and managing. This empowerment means that the progression from potential stressor to stress response need not happen automatically. Coping with stress thus begins with viewing demands as potential stressors and understanding that the leap from potential stressor to stress response is not automatic.

Richard Blonna

See also Alienation; Anomie; Bankruptcy, Personal; Divorce; Job Satisfaction; Unemployment

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Subculture of Violence Hypothesis

The subculture of violence hypothesis refers to a theoretical perspective that argues that violence is a result of a system of accepted norms and beliefs that condone violence in interpersonal relationships. This perspective claims that societal groups statistically associated with high rates of violence hold these norms and beliefs. Traditionally, these groups have been minorities (particularly African Americans), the poor, and those who reside in the South.

Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti first articulated this perspective in their 1967 book, *The Subculture of Violence.* They connected the statistical association between poverty and numbers of African Americans and violence with a subcultural normative system that is reflected in psychological traits, resulting in an individual's greater likelihood of using violence. Transmitted through cultural learning, this pro-violence normative system appears most prominent among younger men. Although others later applied the subculture of violence thesis to lethal and nonlethal forms of violence, this original research addressed homicide specifically.

In a highly influential analysis, Raymond Gastil and Sheldon Hackney observed an association between violence and southern states. In addition to claiming the existence of a normative acceptance of violence there, they delineated several historical features that shaped this cultural orientation toward violence, arguing that the South showed a greater propensity toward violence even prior to the Civil War. Evidence for this conclusion included the persistence of the duel for settling interpersonal matters, the greater numbers of guns owned, and the notion of defending honor with violence. Further arguments included the institutions of slavery and lynching—both pre– and post–Civil War—as indicators of an acceptance of violence.

Empirical support for the subculture of violence has been mixed. Most research does not find the South more violent. In fact, in recent decades the West has become the most violent region. Poverty continues to be a consistent factor in violence, though the reasons for this association generally lack specificity. Similar findings exist for the impact of race, although here a clear confounding effect of poverty on the race and violence relationship does exist.

Criticism of the subculture of violence thesis occurs on several grounds. First, little strong empirical support for the theory exists from a macroanalytical perspective, due largely to imprecise measures of subcultures of violence using demographic groups as a proxy for a set of subcultural values. It is difficult to state what actually causes the observed associations between poverty, minority groups, and/ or the South and violence. Other explanations such as social disorganization and frustrations because of disadvantage and discrimination are also possible connections. However, there is an indication that institutional legitimization of violence—separate from race, socioeconomic status (SES), or geographic location—does impact violence. Directly examining manifestations of a legitimization of violence offers much stronger support for the connection between institutionalized cultural values accepting violence and the rates of violence. These measures, however, reflect a belief system that is not bound to race, SES, or geographic location. Second, the thesis rests on the premise that the observed associations between violence and minority groups, the poor, and the South have a cultural base. In other words, these demographic groups comprise groups with a shared set of identifiable beliefs and norms that include violence. This led to the presumption that (a) individuals within these groups are more violent, and (b) group membership means an adoption of those violent beliefs. This, however, implies a greater homogeneity among those who belong to a subcultural group than most likely exists. Furthermore, when race and violent beliefs are directly examined through survey data, the research finds that whites, not African Americans, are more likely to espouse beliefs in the use of violence in

defensive situations, with no difference in the acceptance of violence as an instrumental strategy to solve problems. Research examining offenders such as batterers and rapists, for example, indicates that a strong relationship exists between an individual's acceptance of violence and the willingness to use violence. Therefore, violent belief systems may, in fact, help us understand violence, but evidence is lacking that these belief systems occur in greater numbers in the groups identified as violent subcultures.

Currently, researchers continue to test specific tenets of the subculture of violence thesis to further elucidate the mechanisms through which violent beliefs may link to particular subcultural groups and how those beliefs translate into acts of violence. In addition to examining minority groups, the South, and the poor, researchers also examine whites (especially white power and white hate groups) to explore the connections between subculture and violence. The strongest contribution of the subculture of violence perspective has been in its application to direct measures of acceptance of violence, both institutional and attitudinal, that are promising in their contribution to our understanding of the causes of violence.

Vickie Jensen

See also Cultural Values; Norms; Vigilantism; Violence; Violent Crime

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SUBCULTURES

In the social sciences, the term *subculture* most often refers to a group in conflict with or segmented from its dominant society. For anthropologists, who define *culture* as a complex system of beliefs and behaviors that characterize a particular group of people, subculture refers to parts of the whole. Most anthropologists have emphasized the continuity of culture: as having a single ethos, as "coherent wholes," or as patterns of behavior that characterize a people. Subculture, as a concept within the social sciences, is more often used as a term to discuss large modern societies in which there is cultural variation among people. Scholars thus discuss subcultures in the context of looking at groups of people in opposition with or rebellion against a larger societal norm.

Subculture also denotes a social group that is distinct and distinguished from a larger cultural identity. Definitions of a subculture can be along lines of nationality, class, ethnicity, ancestry, generation, background, stereotype, or underclass, to name only a few of the many possibilities. A subculture can also be a group that may be stigmatized or a minority relative to the dominant culture. Additionally, a subculture can be a counterculture, a social identity that exists in response or reaction to a dominant culture. Such a countercultural response operates as rebellion against the cultural norms of mainstream society.

Sociologists such as Max Weber believe that a subculture is an outcome of society's inequality and a consequence of economic exploitation and social stratification. Seeing social divisions as the outcome of modern life and as part of the structure of society led to discussions of subcultures as the outcome of such societal tensions as youth frustration, minority identity, artistic temperament, and socioeconomic struggle. In the realm of socioeconomic struggles, the anthropologist Oscar Lewis analyzed the impoverished classes as belonging to a "culture of poverty." He thought that poverty perpetuated itself in subsequent generations (a view rejected by many social scientists) and that people in poor communities had similar characteristics. The characteristics of the culture of poverty were marginality, dependence, helplessness, a sense of not belonging, powerlessness, inferiority, unworthiness, lack of history, and a lack of class consciousness.

While subcultures may grow from such socioeconomic divisions, they may also arise from group

cohesion. An example of such a subculture of cohesion can be found in ethnic identity, one based on ancestry or kinship. People in distinct ethnic groups see themselves as having a certain amount of shared history (real or imagined).

Ultimately, whether created through the operations of division or cohesion, self-imposed or defined by others, subcultures are fundamentally defined as subsets of the dominant society.

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See also Cultural Capital; Cultural Relativism; Cultural Values; Culture Wars; Values

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SUICIDE

Suicide is a health, family, institutional, political, and social issue of tremendous significance, and the field of suicide prevention is a significant priority for both public and mental health. Federal initiatives, consumer advocacy, clinical efforts, and empirical work have significantly advanced the field. While great strides have been made in the area of suicide prevention over the past two decades, the morbidity and mortality related to suicide remains significant. The short- and long-term impact of the death of one person by suicide is far reaching.

Epidemiology: Suicide Morbidity and Mortality

Suicide rates can be examined from many perspectives—internationally, nationally, regionally, temporally, racially, by gender or age cohorts. More than 30,000 suicides occur every year in the United States and more than 80 suicides each day, or approximately 1 suicide every 16.7 minutes. In 2004, suicide was the 11th leading cause of death, while homicide was 15th. The rates are highest in persons over 80, and suicide is the third leading cause of death for youth ages 15–25 years. The rates are increasing for youth ages 10–14 years. Males and Caucasians are more likely to die by suicide than are females and other races. Firearms are the major method (50 percent) for completed suicide (hanging is second). In fact, each year there are more firearm suicides than firearm homicides. And sadly, U.S. soldiers involved in the Iraqi Freedom conflict are dying by suicide in increasing numbers, beyond average rates for military persons.

The Surgeon General's Report on ethnicity, race, and mental health underscored the significance of suicide in the major racial and ethnicity groups, including Asian, black, Caucasian, and Hispanic persons. The suicide rate for Native Americans is the highest next to whites, and suicide was the second leading cause of death for American Indians/Alaskan Natives in 1999–2004. Suicide is the eighth leading cause of death for Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, in particular the elderly. The highest rates for blacks are among young males ages 20–24.

Somewhere between 8 and 25 suicide attempts occur for every death by suicide. The ratio of attempts to suicide deaths in adolescents is approximately 1 to 100–200. Females have the highest rate of suicide attempts, and the ratio of attempts by females versus males is 3:1. Approximately 650,000 persons receive treatment following an attempt each year. The most common method for attempts is overdose. The rates of attempts increase in the elderly. The risk for attempting suicide in blacks is highest among 15- to 24-year-olds. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System surveyed high school students and determined the rates of suicidal behavior were highest in Hispanic youth, particularly Hispanic females.

Risk and Protective Factors Framework

The risk and protective factors framework helps explain, assess, and intervene with suicidal behavior. Risk or protective factors are characteristics or conditions that, when present, increase or decrease respectively the likelihood that persons will develop suicidal behavior. Risk and protective factors include individual, familial, psychological, or environmental domains.

Examples of common suicide risk factors include the following: *individual factors,* such as gender, genetic vulnerability, chronic physical illness, and poor coping skills; *family factors,* such as severe marital discord, psychiatric disorders, suicide of a family member, and abuse and neglect; *psychiatric factors,* such as depression, substance use or abuse, and limited access to mental health services; and *environmental factors,* such as violence, poverty, racism, lack of social support, and access to highly lethal means of suicide. Protective factors include resilience, family ties, cultural and religious beliefs that discourage suicide and support self-preservation, culturally sensitive programs that strengthen family ties, tribal spiritual orientation, and specialized mental health and addictions treatment.

The majority (90 percent) of persons who die by suicide have a psychiatric illness (most often depression); however, one particular risk factor increases the probability but is not necessarily the cause of suicidal behavior. It is the accumulation and interaction of risk and protective factors that contribute to mental health problems (like suicide) or illness and mental health, rather than a single risk or protective factor. *Resilience,* or the capacity to bounce back from adversity, has received considerable attention in mental health promotion. Resilience stems from the interaction of an individual situation with protective factors from the environment. In the clinical application of the risk and protective factors model, the modifiability of a risk or protective factor is a prerequisite for the development of interventions targeting such factors.

Nomenclature for Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behaviors

There is much confusion and misuse of words related to suicidology. A newly revised nomenclature seeks to increase the ability of clinicians, epidemiologists, policymakers, and researchers to communicate more clearly and study similar types of suicidal behavior. The essential components of this nomenclature include suicide-related communications, suicide–related behavior, and suicide-related ideations. *Suicide-related communications* is defined in this nomenclature as any interpersonal act of imparting, conveying, or transmitting suicidal thoughts, wishes, desires, or intent (explicit or implicit), including threats or plans. *Suicide-related behavior* is a self-inflicted, potentially injurious behavior for which there is evidence that the person wished to use the appearance of intending to kill himself or herself in order to attain some other end or the person intended at some undetermined or some known degree to kill himself or herself. These behaviors include self-harm, self-inflicted unintentional death, undetermined suicide-related behaviors, self-inflicted death with undetermined intent, suicide attempt, and suicide. A suicide attempt is self-inflicted, potentially injurious behavior with a nonfatal outcome for which there is evidence (explicit or implicit) of intent to die. A suicide attempt may result in no injury, injuries, or in death, defined as suicide.

Clinical Suicidology

Suicidology refers broadly to the study, prevention, and intervention of suicide. Suicide assessment measures include screening tools, risk assessment instruments, and assessment of clinical characteristics of suicidal persons. Reviews of suicide assessment tools for adults and youth are available from the National Institute of Mental Health. No single best instrument yet exists; the gold standard for assessment is the clinical interview.

The American Psychiatric Association recommends the following components of suicide assessment: identify specific psychiatric signs and symptoms; assess past suicidal behaviors, including intent of self-injurious acts; review past treatment history and treatment relationships; identify family history of suicide, mental illness, and dysfunction; appreciate psychological strengths and vulnerabilities of the individual patient; and specifically inquire about suicidal thoughts, plans, and behaviors (suicidal ideation, suicide plan, suicidal intent, lethality of plan, and means). Recently an American Association of Suicidology study of imminent (current or immediate) risk for suicide revealed empirical evidence for the following warning signs: ideation, substance abuse, purpose, anxiety, a feeling of being trapped, withdrawal, anger, recklessness, and mood changes. The acronym for these warning signs is IS PATH WARM. Clinical researchers also developed various structures for suicide risk assessment and intervention and underscored the need for systematic and repeated assessments. Risk level is typically rated as mild or nonexistent, moderate, or severe, with interventions based on the severity of risk. Moderate or severe risk is considered a psychiatric emergency.

An Institute of Medicine report on reducing suicide summarized many evidential aspects of clinical interventions, including psychoactive medications, electroconvulsive therapy, psychotherapies, inpatient

care, after-discharge risk, treatment adherence, and follow-up care. Suicide risk is the most common precipitant for hospitalization. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) has also acknowledged that suicide is the most frequent sentinel event in health care facilities, as approximately 5–6 percent of suicides occur during hospitalization. About 1,500 inpatient suicides occur each year, most often during the first week of hospitalization. As a result, the 2007 National Patient Safety Goals for Hospitals and Behavioral Health include the safety of persons at risk for suicide. Furthermore, the American Association for Suicidology published "Recommendations for Inpatient and Residential Patients Known to Be at Elevated Risk for Suicide," while forensic experts in suicidology have proposed clinical and legal standards of care for suicide prevention.

Research in Suicidology

Following the 1992 recommendation of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for strategies for youth suicide prevention, a strong push followed for evidence-based practice in suicide prevention. A series of reviews of youth programs, primarily by Canadian groups, focused mostly on school-based programs. One such review emphasized the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for suicide prevention, most particularly CBT with a problem-solving component. A significant increase in biological research took place, such as postmortem brain autopsies of persons who die by suicide. Only two psychopharmacological agents, Lithium and Clozaril, have thus far demonstrated a direct reduction of suicide symptoms. However, research does show that increased suicide risk relates both to failure to medicate certain psychiatric illnesses and to client adherence issues.

One of the leading science reports in suicidology is the Institute of Medicine report on reducing suicide. Another resource is the Best Practices Registry (BPR) for suicide prevention, a collaboration between the Suicide Prevention Resource Center (SPRC) and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP), funded by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).The purpose of the BPR is to identify, review, and disseminate information about best practices that address specific objectives of the National Strategy for Suicide Prevention.

The National Institute of Mental Health has a Suicide Prevention Consortium that oversees the suicide research portfolio, including studies that underscore such findings as 70 percent of elderly suicides saw a primary care provider in the month before they died. Other significant studies have included a surveillance study of adolescent attempters seen in emergency departments in Oregon, psychological autopsy studies of teen suicide, and the community evaluation of the Air Force plan. Several journals are also devoted to suicidology.

Policy and Suicidology

In the early 1990s, a shift to the public health for suicide prevention from the mental health approach occurred, sparked by the 1984 Task Force on Youth Suicide. A series of national meetings and policy reports reflected this shift in attitudes, science, and funding priorities. Then, in 1999, Surgeon General David Satcher issued the Call to Action to Prevent Suicide, a blueprint for addressing suicide that succeeded through awareness, intervention, and methodology based on the recommendations of the national Reno Conference that same year. After public hearings, a federal steering group drafted the National Strategy for Suicide Prevention.

The national strategy now informs funding priorities, research, and state and local plans. Every state has a suicide prevention task force, developed by regional health departments to implement the national strategy. Most states have a suicide prevention plan that may or may not have funding appropriated for the activities in the respective plans.

Society and Suicidology

The Suicide Prevention Resource Center has outlined the history of suicide prevention. Significant events included the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center, opened in 1958 and funded by the U.S. Public Health Service. Edwin Shneidman was the director of that center and is often referred to as the "father of suicidology." His prominence rests on numerous contributions to the field, particularly his elucidation of the phenomenon of *psychache,* the unbearable pain experienced by suicidal persons.

The consumer movement in suicide prevention has had a major influence on shifting the federal priorities. Perhaps the consumer exemplar is the Suicide Prevention Action Network (SPAN USA), founded in

1996 in Marietta, Georgia, by Jerry and Elsie Weyrauch (parent survivors) with the goal of preventing suicide through public education, community action, and advocacy. Survivors are family members, significant others, or acquaintances who have experienced the loss of a loved one as the result of suicide. The Weyrauchs and SPAN USA efforts have had a dramatic impact on policy advances, such as the passage of Senate Resolution #84 and House Resolution # 212 for suicide prevention during the 105th Congress. Public acknowledgment by well-known persons of either their own suicide experience or survivorship has also done much to increase awareness and decrease stigma.

Another significant part of societal impact is education. Several professional organizations focus on suicide prevention. The primary organizations in suicidology are the American Association of Suicidology (AAS), American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP), the International Association of Suicide Prevention (IASP), and the Suicide Prevention Resource Center (SPRC). An exemplar in training is the SPRC and AAS training, "Assessing and Managing Suicide Risk." This competency-based training has been delivered to mental health professionals across the nation.

With increased suicide rates among minority groups**,** cultural competency has become a vital design and implementation criterion for suicide prevention activities. Suicidal youth or those at risk for suicide often require emergency room treatment. An ideal program demonstrating cultural competence is the emergency department adherence program for Hispanic adolescents. Included on the SPRC Best Practice Registry, it incorporates an orientation video for families, an on-call bilingual crisis therapist or crisis manager, and an interdisciplinary training program for emergency department personnel.

Another cultural adaptation demonstrated that when staff in a rural emergency department provided education in means restriction (decreasing access to lethal means of suicide) for parents of youth at risk for suicide, parents were more likely to lock up medications and firearms.

A famous pioneer in suicide prevention, Robert Litman, warned those in suicidology that the field is risky and dangerous and one must anticipate casualties. Although we will never be able to save every person from suicide, if consumers, professionals, researchers, and policymakers continue to build partnerships, we can make a difference, one life at a time. Every life saved is significant.

Janet A. Grossman

See also Alienation; Anomie; Mental Health; Stressors

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SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance technologies and practices have become increasingly developed and diffuse. In a generic sense, *surveillance* refers to the process of observing behavior. In contemporary usage, surveillance refers to the use of electronic devices to expand the reach and depth of traditional sensory observation and knowledge. For example, a video camera may serve as the extension of the eye, and a listening device may serve as an extension of the ear. Similarly, data-mining methods may deepen the boundaries of what is knowable, allowing information to be detected well beyond what is normally accessible. Characteristics of emergent surveillance technologies contributing to their increased use are their often unobtrusive and cost-effective nature.

The dominant academic metaphor for understanding surveillance in contemporary society is known as the "panopticon," derived from 18th-century utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham's (1748–1832) architectural design for a prison that allowed for continual supervision of inmates. Given the design of the panopticon, prisoners were aware that they might be observed at any time, causing them to control their own behavior. This self-control stemmed from the perception that one might be under observation, which was reinforced by the periodic supervision of prisoners by hidden guards. Although Bentham designed the panopticon as a prison house, he also suggested its use in orphanages and poor houses. While contemporary persons do not literally live in a panopticon, scholars of surveillance argue that they nonetheless live and behave as if they are potentially under observation in an electronic web of surveillance technologies. In this sense, many scholars argue that the contemporary surveillance society is analogous to a broad-reaching panopticon of social control.

Varieties of Surveillance

In the past, surveillance concentrated on individuals determined to be suspicious. Increasingly, scholars argue that a "new surveillance" is developing, one that focuses on categories of suspicious persons. Under the new surveillance, individuals may be disproportionately subjected to observation based on group membership. For example, all members of groups with higher rates of criminal offense, such as urban minority males in the United States, or who are perceived as possible perpetrators of serious offenses, such as Arab Muslims, may disproportionately fall under police surveillance. In a criminal justice context, this process may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which groups who are more heavily surveilled will in fact be determined to have a higher rate of offense. Such an outcome may rest more in the detection of criminal behavior than in true underlying differences in rates of offense.

Similarly, under the new logic of surveillance, private organizations such as corporations may collect information about members of market segments in the advancement of profitability. This means that those members of less desirable market segments, such as the poor, will not be proportionally targeted for marketing surveillance. Ironically, while the poor are more likely to be the subject of surveillance by the criminal justice system, they are more likely to be ignored by corporate surveillance. Both tendencies may lead to the further disempowerment of the poor in relationship to public and private institutions.

Problems Associated with Surveillance

Surveillance occupies an interesting position in relation to social problems in general, in that it is often interpreted as both a problem in itself and a solution to numerous other problems. Although surveillance practices may relate to numerous social arenas, they are particularly relevant for legal and criminal justice dimensions. Technologies of surveillance are developing rapidly, and the future impact on legal landscapes is yet to be determined. In common law systems such as the United States and Canada, the development of legal precedent to deal with emergent problems tends to be case driven. Therefore, the development of legal positions related to emergent technologies of surveillance is likely to lag behind the emergent

technologies themselves. There is likely to be a continued tendency for legal stances related to surveillance practices to develop only when they arise as legal problems for the courts. Given the widespread and increasing use of surveillance, this presents a future crisis for the judicial system. In particular, the relationship of surveillance practices to rights of personal privacy and personal information may increasingly arise as a legal conundrum.

Similarly, the increased use of surveillance may cause problems for the criminal justice system. Although there may exist some optimism about the use of surveillance technologies to detect and deter criminal behaviors, the increased ability to detect criminal behaviors in suspect groups may lead to higher rates of arrest of group members. In turn, this may lead to a higher rate of conviction and incarceration, which may put a strain on the criminal justice system's ability to process and house offenders. While many scholars already point out a racial bias present in the criminal justice system, the increased use of surveillance technologies to monitor suspect groups may ultimately exacerbate this bias, with suspect groups more heavily policed. In practice, the criminal justice system has yet to deal with the practical and juridical complications caused by the new surveillance in its violation of the presumption of innocence. That is, developments in surveillance may complicate the right of an accused to enjoy the legal position of innocence until proven guilty in court. A related issue is that the extensive use of surveillance practices by criminal justice agencies may complicate long-standing debates related to Fourth Amendment issues of search and seizure. While the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from search without probable cause of suspicion, the criminal justice system has yet to resolve the constitutionality of putting all individuals within a subpopulation under surveillance.

Glenn W. Muschert

See also PATRIOT Act; Reasonable Suspicion; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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Sustainable Development

The concept of sustainable development first emerged on the international stage in 1972, when the United Nations sponsored the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. This conference was, in part, an outgrowth of the global environmental movement. It was the first global conference to focus on the growing impact of humanity on the environment and the need to protect and preserve biospheric integrity to produce sustained improvement in living conditions for all. Although the term was not stated explicitly, the Stockholm Declaration laid the foundation for global environmental governance and brought the concept of sustainable development to the international lexicon.

The term *sustainable development* was popularized in 1987, when the World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the Brundtland Commission, released the report *Our Common Future.* This report provides the most frequently cited definition of sustainable development. It defines the term as "development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." This definition contains three core elements: (1) it recognizes that human beings affect and are affected by the environment; (2) it acknowledges that human interactions with the environment must be sustainable in the long term; and (3) it implicitly accepts the interconnections among the environment, social development, and economic development.

More broadly, this definition highlights two fundamental themes inherent in the concept of sustainable development. First, sustainable development emphasizes the integration of social, economic, and environmental policy. As action in one policy area affects other policy areas, sustainable development requires a holistic approach to economic, environmental, and social policy development and implementation. For example, environmental policies must protect natural resources and ecological systems yet still promote economic and social development. Social policies should address issues such as health and education, so that the economy and environment remain fit. Economic policies should address social issues such as poverty

and inequality and promote trade and industry that encourages social and environmental health.

Second, sustainable development requires intergovernmental and intersectoral cooperation that traverses traditional geopolitical boundaries. The full range of environmental, economic, social, and other issues that impact sustainable development cannot be addressed by a single organization but rather depend upon the engagement of numerous organizations at all levels of government and in all sectors of society working in concert with each other. Thus, to achieve sustainable development, international, national, subnational, and regional governments must work in partnership, as well as with private and nongovernmental organizations.

In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Earth Summit, renewed the world's interest in sustainable development. Although the conference had several notable achievements, it is perhaps best known for the creation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

Agenda 21 emphasizes the need to foster cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among the numerous agencies and actors involved in sustainable development and to develop strategic links and integration among major sustainable development initiatives. To do so, it calls for the establishment of National Councils for Sustainable Development to operate as focal points or mechanisms to oversee the coordination and implementation of the Earth Summit agreements at the national level. Agenda 21 also calls for broad public participation in decision making and implementation as a prerequisite of sustainable development. It recognizes nine major groups of civil society from whom participation is needed: women, children and youth, indigenous people, nongovernmental organizations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological communities, and farmers.

The Rio Declaration puts forth 27 general principles agreed upon through a series of difficult and significant compromises among industrialized and developing countries. Although the principles are general, many have become core elements in international law. For example, principle 2 recognizes a nation's sovereign right to exploit its own resources in accordance with its own policies as long as it does not harm the environment elsewhere. Likewise, principle 3 recognizes the right to development, while principle 4 requires environmental protection as an integral part of development. To support this, principle 16 promotes the "polluter pays" principle and principle 15 endorses the "precautionary" principle. Each of these efforts is further supported by principle 27, which calls for nations to cooperate to develop further the international law in the field of sustainable development.

In 2002, the United Nations hosted the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. Participants of this conference reaffirmed their commitment to the Stockholm and Rio Declarations and to full implementation of Agenda 21. The conference produced a political declaration, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, and a range of partnership initiatives.

Today, sustainable development is a major component of international law, affecting environmental, trade, renewable and nonrenewable resources, human rights, social, and other international agreements. Numerous areas fall within the scope of sustainable development, including but not limited to agriculture, atmosphere, biodiversity, climate change and ozone depletion, consumption and production patterns, debt service and restructuring, demographics, disaster reduction and management, education, energy, finance, forests, hazardous waste, health, human settlements, industry, land management, oceans and seas, poverty, sanitation, solid waste, technology, toxic chemicals and waste, trade, transportation, and water. With such breadth, sustainable development is intrinsically complex and complicated. Nevertheless, many leaders, scholars, scientists, activists, and everyday people see sustainable development not only as a sound public policy but also as an important concept necessary for humanity's survival.

Tina Nabatchi

See also Acid Rain; Deforestation; Desertification; Economic Development; Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Pollution; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Justice; Environmental Movement; Global Warming; Nonrenewable Resources; Ozone; Water Quality

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SWEATSHOP

Once thought a nasty relic of history, sweatshops have reemerged in both advanced industrial and newly industrial economies. Sweatshops are production sites where workers are subjected to multiple violations of their respective nation's labor laws regulating occupational safety and health, wages and work hours, child labor laws—the institutionalized reforms won in hard-fought struggles waged in the 19th and early 20th centuries by labor and consumers unions. The struggle continues even today. Sweatshops occur because they are easily hidden from public view and because they are loosely tied to larger, name-brand manufacturers. While apparel manufacturing is often associated with sweatshops, the "sweating" model also operates in other light manufacturing industries such as toys, small appliances, and even service industries.

Sweatshops arise in industries where little capital investment in physical plant and equipment is required and where the production process can be subdivided and some functions contracted out. Segmenting jobs and reassigning pay for those jobs reduce labor costs because firms can keep their research and development jobs in house while farming out assembly work to contractors and their subcontractors. When prejudice and institutionalized discrimination create lower-cost labor pools like immigrants (especially undocumented), women, children, the disabled, and the elderly, the conditions are ripe for the "sweating system." Piecework and extra-high production quotas force workers' earnings below the society's established wage and hour laws, and worksites are small, cramped, dangerous—and out of sight of government regulators.

Consumer pressure for low-priced consumer goods also contributes to the reemergence of sweatshops, because the locus of control over the production process has moved from the manufacturers to mega-retailers such as Wal-Mart. Instead of retail products and prices determined by the costs of manufacturing, the process is reversed: the retail price sets the manufacturing costs. Since retail corporations often control access to raw materials or components used in the manufacturing process, the only area of flexibility for manufacturers is control of labor costs. The pressure to squeeze more labor out of workers to meet production demands means ever-increasing use of the sweating system of contracting and subcontracting in both developing and developed economies.

Finally, as retailing spills over into services, sweatshops even appear in service-related industries. Workers in call centers for banking, billing, and reservations increasingly work to quotas, and face outsourcing of jobs (probably off-shore), and the "business model" increasingly infiltrates the formerly "safe" professional industries of medicine and health care, law and legal services, and lower and higher education.

Joyce N. Chinen

See also Conflict Perspective; Human Trafficking; Underground Economy; Undocumented Immigrants

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SYNTHETIC DRUGS

See CLUB DRUGS

T

TAYLORISM

Taylorism is a set of ideas regarding factory management developed by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States under the name of "scientific management." The core of Taylorism is a system of task management in which managers and engineers are responsible for planning and task optimization, primarily through motion and time study, while workers are responsible for carrying out discrete tasks as directed.

The so-called scientific management movement, which began in earnest in the late 19th century, drew on some earlier ideas, most famously those of Charles Babbage (1791–1871) and W. S. Jevons (1835–1882). Babbage emphasized how the division of labor within the factory contributes to operational efficiency by subdividing work into distinct tasks that could be completed by specialists. Both Babbage and Jevons advocated the systematic analysis of work, including collection and use of data obtained by observing work processes.

Toward the end of the 19th century, managers began to encounter new problems as the size of factories grew due to increasing consolidation of operations under newly formed joint-stock companies. Managers and engineers began to focus on problems of "shop management," such as plant layout, production processes, and incentive and wage systems. During this time Taylor began to develop his ideas, first at the Midvale Steel Company in Pennsylvania from 1878 through the 1880s, and later when it became the Bethlehem Steel Company. Taylor sought to remedy a number of problems he saw with traditional management, which left workers to complete the work as they pleased—using "rules of thumb"—and encouraged "systematic soldiering," or the restriction of output by workers.

In Taylor's *The Principles of Scientific Management* of 1911, he outlined and illustrated four main principles of scientific management: (1) the development of "scientific knowledge" or standard procedures to replace rules of thumb; (2) the systematic selection of and training of workers for the correct jobs or tasks; (3) inducing them to work to standard through "watchfulness" and a "large daily bonus"; and (4) "an almost equal division of the work and responsibility between the workman and the management." The last point is part of Taylor's emphasis on "harmonious cooperation" between labor and management, where managers take on all responsibilities for the planning of work and workers simply follow the prescribed routine.

Another important element of Taylorism is the ideas of Frank B. and Lillian Gilbreth (1868–1924 and 1878–1972) on motion study and industrial psychology. The Gilbreths focused on the best method to perform an operation and reduce fatigue by studying body motions, attempting to eliminate unnecessary ones and simplify necessary ones to discover the optimal sequence of motions.

The content of Taylorism has shifted over time, moving somewhat away from the ideas Taylor and the Gilbreths originally articulated. Taylor argued that other important elements of scientific management included extra pay for the extra hard work and rigid

standardization of the system, careful attention to not overextending workers, listening to workers' ideas and compensating them for adopted improvements, a system of functional foremen, and study of worker motivation. Much of this has been lost in the subsequent development of Taylorism into a management system. Both Taylor and the Gilbreths were careful to warn against overwork. However, as the system was diffused and elaborated, Taylorism commonly came to be understood primarily as an emphasis on breaking down work into discrete tasks that can be analyzed for waste through motion and time study. In addition to sharply limiting worker autonomy, the system has often been experienced by workers—and denounced by unions—as a form of work speedup, leading to many problems in the workplace, such as increased worker stress, resentment, and dissatisfaction, often resulting in labor–management conflict, individual forms of resistance like work sabotage, and organized forms of resistance.

Taylorism is an important part of the model of traditional mass production often referred to as "Fordism," which was developed in the United States and became the dominant form of production in most industrialized countries, particularly after World War II. As a model of work organization, Fordism refers to the supply-driven, mass production of standardized goods using semi-skilled workers. Taylorism is key to Fordism because it contributes to efficiency improvements via scale economies through the separation of conception from execution—often understood as a process of deskilling—as managers and engineers in the planning department are responsible for breaking down tasks into their simplest operations and determining standards, while workers are expected only to execute their tasks as directed.

Taylorist methods have been used widely in all manufacturing sectors in developed and developing countries and were also embraced by the Soviet Union under Lenin. However, the ideal of complete separation of conception and execution was not fully realized in most places. One reason for its imperfect realization was resistance by workers and unions. Perhaps more important, in order for many factories to operate smoothly on a daily basis, workers had to retain and exercise some amount of discretion to deal with problems in the planning process.

Though the Fordist model is increasingly being replaced by post-Fordist forms of production, such as the demand-driven model of lean production, the status of Taylorist methods in the post-Fordist labor process is debated among scholars. Taylorist methods are widely used in service industries today, as exemplified by the extreme task division and standardization in the fast-food industry as pioneered by McDonald's. Another example of Taylorist standardization in services is scripted talk required in a wide range of industries in which workers must interact with customers, from restaurants to retail stores to call centers. In the manufacturing sector, however, some argue that post-Fordist models like lean production have initiated a reintegration of conception and execution, hence overturning the Taylorist model. However, as many observers have noted, although lean production methods explicitly aim to induce workers to contribute ideas for continuous process improvement, work remains highly regimented into discrete tasks, and a primary goal is to develop new and improved work standards through, among other things, detailed motion and time study. Thus, many see lean production methods as a form of neo-Taylorism that engages workers in setting and developing new standards.

Matt Vidal

See also Alienation; Job Satisfaction; Labor, Division of; Labor Unions; Scientific Management

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Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting

In 1976, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reported that the rate of pregnancy for 15- to 19-year-olds was 101.4 per 1,000 adolescents. This rate peaked in 1990, at 116.8 pregnancies per 1,000 adolescents. This means that, in 1990, 11.7 percent of U.S. teenagers were pregnant, compared to 7.6 percent in 2002. Overall, about three-quarters of a million teens become pregnant over a one-year period,

and approximately 8 in 10 of these pregnancies are unintended. Between 5 and 6 out of 10 of these pregnancies end in birth, while about 3 in 10 end in abortion, and the rest end in spontaneous miscarriage.

Pregnancy rates have historically been higher among racial and ethnic minority teens than among white teens. For example, in 1990, the pregnancy rate for non-Hispanic white teens was 86.8 per 1,000 adolescents. In contrast, it was more than 2.5 times as high for non-Hispanic blacks (at 232.7) and nearly twice as high for Hispanics (at 167.4). Since 1990, rates have fallen for all groups; however, the rate for non-Hispanic blacks is still more than 2.5 times higher than for whites (138.9 vs. 49.0); and the rate for Hispanics, which has not declined as quickly, is similarly high (135.2).

U.S. teen pregnancy rates have historically been higher than those for other developed countries. For example, research conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute shows that, in the mid-1990s, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden had teen pregnancy rates in the range of 20–25 per 1,000 adolescents. Also, Canada and England and Wales had rates in the range of 45 per 1,000 adolescents. Part of the reason for higher pregnancy rates in the United States is thought to be lower levels of contraceptive use among teenagers in the United States, perhaps due to cultural norms and greater restrictions on access.

Teen birth rates followed a pattern similar to that of pregnancy rates. However, after falling 34 percent between 1991 and 2005, in 2006 birth rates for this age group rose by 3 percent. Trends by race and Hispanic origin varied somewhat: 5 percent for non-Hispanic black teens, 2 percent for Hispanic teens, 3 percent for non-Hispanic white teenagers, and 4 percent for Native American teens, with no change for Asian teens. Race/ethnic differences in the probability of having a first birth by age 20 are also significant; in 2006, 22 percent of non-Hispanic white teens had their first birth under age 20, compared to 50 percent of non-Hispanic black teens and 65 percent of Hispanics.

Even when the rate of teen births declined, the proportion of all teen births that occurred to unmarried teens increased significantly. For example, according to NCHS statistics, in 1960 the percentage of teen births that were nonmarital was 14.8; this increased to 40.3 percent in 1976 and to 84.4 percent by 2006. This trend is due to a drop in the likelihood that young women marry during their teens (in connection with a pregnancy or not), as well as a drop in the birth rate for married teenagers. Also, although a high proportion of teen births are nonmarital, teens do not account for the majority of all births to unmarried women. In 2000, 72 percent of nonmarital births occurred to women ages 20 and older.

Finally, similar to pregnancy rates, research conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute shows that the U.S. teen birth rate is high compared to those of other developed countries. In the mid-1990s, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland had rates of under 10 per 1,000 adolescents, while Canada and England and Wales had rates of 24.2 and 28.5, respectively. In contrast, the rate for the United States was 54.4.

Consequences of Teen Motherhood

To what extent should we be concerned about the relatively high rates of teen childbearing in the United States? Early research on the consequences of teen childbearing suggested that adolescents who gave birth were less likely to graduate from high school, more likely to have low earnings as an adult, and less likely to marry than women who delayed childbearing. However, these studies did not fully account for the fact that young women who bore children early were more likely to be disadvantaged to begin with than those who did not. As a result, it was not clear whether poor outcomes in adulthood among teen mothers stemmed from prior disadvantages, or whether they were, at least in part, a result of the childbearing itself.

More recent research shows that when the disadvantaged backgrounds of adolescent mothers are more fully accounted for, the negative effects of early childbearing are substantially smaller and in some cases erased. Thus, poor outcomes in adulthood appear to be more the result of the social and economic disadvantages of teen mothers than the result of the early childbearing. Put another way, the new research implies that delaying childbearing among these young women would not result in increased educational attainment or adult earnings or a higher likelihood of marrying. However, researchers have not yet fully investigated whether family income levels moderate the long-term impacts of teen births.

What about the children of teen mothers? Some have speculated that teen mothers may lack parenting skills and provide less than adequate home environments for their children, resulting in lower cognitive skills and more behavioral problems for their children when compared to those of older mothers. Indeed,

early research showed that, on average, children of teen mothers score lower on measures of cognitive and socioemotional development, and are at higher risk of poor school achievement, than the children of older mothers. However, later research, which more thoroughly controlled for the background disadvantages of teen mothers, showed that these background factors explained the lower cognitive and socioemotional scores, at least among children through the pre- and early teen years. Fewer studies have been conducted on the outcomes of older children of teen mothers. While some research shows that children of teen mothers may be less likely to graduate from high school, or more likely to be incarcerated, it is not yet clear whether these differences remain when fully accounting for the background characteristics of teen mothers.

Overall, the accumulation of research evidence suggests that teen childbearing does not have the substantial, deleterious consequences for mothers and their children that it was once thought to have. In addition, rates of teen pregnancy and births have fallen significantly in the past three decades. Despite this, many continue to view teen motherhood as a significant social problem. Forty years ago, concerns about teen pregnancy first arose in concert with concern over the increasing proportion of children born out of wedlock, particularly among poor African Americans. Since that time, rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing have increased for all groups, and it is likely that religious and moral opposition to nonmarital childbearing—as well as entrenched beliefs regarding the primacy of the two-parent household for the well-being of children—will continue to fuel public concern about, and efforts to reduce, teen (now largely nonmarital) childbearing. In addition, as some sociologists argue, the continued preoccupation of Americans with teenage pregnancy and parenting might also be explained by American adults' attitudes toward, and discomfort with, teenage and premarital sexual activity and contraceptive use.

Lauren M. Rich

See also Birth Rate; Family; Single Mothers; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

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Temperance Movement

Temperance, most notably associated with alcohol use, refers to moderation or restraint in one's consumption of alcohol. Temperance movements are social movements that attempt to convince others, either through morality or law, to refrain from drinking alcohol or at least moderate their alcohol consumption. These movements, some of which are still active today, have a long history. The thought of moderation regarding alcohol consumption was evident in the earliest American colonies; these ideas eventually resulted in the creation of the Eighteenth Amendment and Prohibition.

Colonists generally practiced moderate drinking throughout the 18th century. However, by the beginning of the 19th century, people began to recognize an increase in the use of alcohol. Founded in 1826, the American Temperance Society began gathering

pledges calling for abstinence from alcohol. By the mid-1830s there were more than 8,000 local temperance societies in the United States, establishing temperance reform as a national movement. These organizations viewed the ever-growing immigrant-laden cities as the epicenters for moral weakening and wickedness, attributing alcohol use as the foundation for their purportedly deviant lifestyle. As a result, temperance groups and the movement itself continued to grow in popularity through organized church efforts, pamphleteering, and lectures, all of which attracted a wide range of supporters.

A major part of the temperance movement was the national Prohibition movement, also referred to as "the noble experiment." The prohibitionists directing this movement believed that alcohol was a dangerous drug that disrupted the moral order within the family and community and destroyed lives. As a result, they believed that it was the responsibility of the government to prohibit the sale of alcohol. Between 1880 and 1890, the National Prohibition Party, the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), and the Anti-Saloon League of America put pressure on their local politicians to amend the Constitution.

In January 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, banning the sale and manufacture of alcohol with the sole exception of industrial use, marking the beginning of the Prohibition era. The means for its enforcement followed with passage of the Volstead Act. The law marked a triumph for the moral order, although enforcement was spotty at best and it sparked considerable public opposition. In 1933, the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition, after which the temperance movement began to fade.

Since the movement's heyday, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) has been the best-known contemporary temperance effort. Although this organization promotes total abstinence from alcohol, it primarily focuses on alcoholism as a disease and has no interest in the government shutting down the liquor industry. Other modern organizations that reflect some elements of the temperance movement are Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD). These organizations have had a great impact on drinking and driving laws in the United States, such as increasing penalties, lowering the amount of alcohol required to be considered drunk, and raising the legal drinking age.

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See also Alcoholism; Binge Drinking; Drunk Driving; Prohibition

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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is the means-tested income support program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996. Unlike AFDC, TANF is behavior rather than benefits oriented, has multiple goals and targets and a dynamic, longitudinal, and complex focus with an emphasis on outcomes.

TANF replaced the entitlement for low-income children and their caretakers with block grants to states for income support, services, or job training. It established a five-year federal lifetime cap on receipt of benefits. Although states retained their authority to determine eligibility requirements and benefit levels, they must meet work participation requirements or lose part of their block grants. States must deny benefits to families in which a member is a fugitive felon, probation or parole violator, or has been convicted of a drug felony; operate programs to reduce out-of-wedlock births; encourage the formation of two-parent families; set aside at least 10 percent of their grants for "faith-based" organizations; and restrict services to immigrants. Considerable variations among states persist in benefit levels and earnings disregards (the amount of wages that public assistance recipients could earn without having that amount deducted from their public assistance—e.g., AFDC grant) and in the strictness of sanctions, time limits, and overall work incentives. States also differ significantly in the nature and extent of support services.

TANF's effects have been decidedly mixed. Supporters point to dramatic declines in caseloads as evidence of success. Critics counter that caseloads

began to decline before 1996 and continued to drop in the late 1990s. They argue that poverty rates have not declined since 1996 and that extreme poverty has increased, especially among African Americans. A family that receives a TANF grant and food stamps (the amount of which varies depending on the size of the family and the family's income) will receive combined assistance whose total value ranges from 37 to 71 percent of the official poverty threshold established by the federal government. The reason for the wide variation is that different states provide vastly different amounts of aid to families who are eligible for TANF. Critics also assert there is no way to determine whether recipients left welfare for employment or are still employed.

By terminating entitlements and restricting benefits, TANF undermined the concept of assistance in the Social Security Act. It further devolved policy responsibility from the federal government to the states and, within states, to local governments and the private sector. In many states TANF's implementation increased the burden on community-based nonprofit organizations without providing them with needed resources. Many small organizations, which primarily serve TANF recipients or persons of color, are at risk of closing.

TANF also had a serious impact on states' budgets. During the late 1990s, states benefited from TANF's funding formula, which linked block grants to 1994's relatively high caseloads. When caseloads fell and tax revenues surged in the late 1990s, some states used surpluses to expand services. Since 2001, increasing caseloads have exacerbated states' fiscal crises. In the future, it remains unclear how states will respond to more stringent work requirements and sanctions, caseload increases during future recessions, the impact of lifetime benefit caps on the growing proportion of African American and Latino recipients, and the deterioration of community support systems.

Michael Reisch

See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Culture of Dependency; Culture of Poverty; Poverty

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Terrorism

Terrorism is a fluid and adaptable form of political behavior that defies precise definition. It typically involves the illegal use or threatened use of violence against individuals unable or unprepared to defend themselves in order to elicit fear and advance a political, ideological, or religious cause. Attacks can range from isolated events perpetrated by "home-grown" terrorists such as Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber, who engaged in nearly 2 decades of bombings from the late 1970s to early 1990s) and Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (who bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995) to synchronized mass casualty events such as the September 11, 2001, attacks (9/11) or the Madrid train bombing in 2004. Weapons of terror can include chemical or biological agents (i.e., bioterrorism), radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), and nuclear devices (the so-called weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs). Sometimes terrorism can involve self-sacrifice (i.e., suicide terrorism) and martyrdom.

Catastrophic terrorism raises the specter of numerous casualties and open-ended religious or cultural battles, while other forms of terrorism have been linked to ethnic conflicts, environmental concerns, and criminal activities. Terrorism can impose very high costs, create massive disruptions, and create a generalized condition of fear that may have wide-ranging social, political, psychological, and economic consequences. Thus, terrorism can enable micro-actors to have macro-impact.

Analysts are divided on the utility of theorizing terrorism as a permanent feature of political life or as a distinctly modern phenomenon. Certainly, it is possible to identify in antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages individuals and groups that used violence to instill fear in order to advance political goals, such as the Zealots of Judea during the Roman Empire or the Assassins during the medieval period. But these examples do not allow for a clear criterion for deciding who is a terrorist and who is simply a combatant or agent of legitimate political power. Facilitating this distinction is the idea that the legitimate use of violence is limited to a government formed through a social contract, which is a modern concept associated with writers such as Thomas Hobbes.

Indeed, for well over 300 years after Hobbes wrote his state-defining study, *Leviathan* of 1651, the image of the world as an anarchic system, in which the

governments of sovereign states monopolize violence within a defined territory and then engage with other states in a competition to survive that frequently leads to war, was favored by the security community. After the enormous devastation of World War II, analysts and policymakers concluded that the great challenge was to find ways to prevent a third world war involving nuclear weapons while working under the condition of anarchy. A number of concepts were devised or adapted to investigate and explain the problems of the cold war world, such as the security dilemma (actions taken to enhance one state's security may make other states feel less secure, leading to conflict or countermeasures that offset the initial actions), balancing (promoting regional or global stability by forming and reforming alliances to counter states and other alliances of states perceived as threatening), the spiral model (when actions taken by one state lead to countermeasures by another state, triggering further measures by the first state, and so on), and deterrence (when one actor attempts to influence the behavior of another actor by communicating that a given action will lead to a response that will inflict unacceptably high costs). Defense policy was constructed on a platform of realist theory animated by estimates about other states' military expenditures, weapons development programs, alliances, and intelligence capabilities.

Late in the 20th century, real-world events began to erode this image. Global processes such as rapid technology diffusion greatly empowered nonstate actors, who often organized themselves into transnational networks. Problems that once paled alongside the threat of world war—such as global terrorism and transnational crime—evolved as serious national security concerns. Over the past several decades, major shifts in global power and technology ushered in a period in which individuals seeking to influence the global political and economic landscape moved beyond territorial boundaries to form transnational networks capable of impacting traditional power structures within and among nation-states. As part of this trend, global terrorism became a significant national security concern. Small groups now have the motivation and capacity to do great harm. Promoting elections and expanding free trade may not be enough, at least in the short term, to neutralize them.

Moreover, in some instances the threats posed by terrorists have been depicted as not only the most urgent threats facing the United States and many other countries, but also as virtually immune to traditional defense strategies. Reflecting this attitude, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States explicitly rejected the utility of the concept of deterrence in understanding or responding to terrorists. Reinforcing this alleged discontinuity with past approaches to security are claims about decisive shifts in the structure and character of network threats such as terrorism.

The contemporary terrorists epitomized by Al-Qaeda, some experts suggest, do not have the clear political agendas of their ancestors, and, most unsettling, they are not averse to causing mass casualties. In particular, weapons of mass destruction are not off limits for them. The 21st-century terrorist, many experts believe, is as likely to welcome the possibility of mass casualties and suffering as be constrained by it. Nonetheless, this is not a universal position, as other experts maintain that WMDs, while possible, are improbable (although, of course, devastating if successful).

Contemporary global terrorism is widely perceived as an explicitly malevolent threat currently focused on attacking the United States, its allies, and its interests on many international fronts. These terrorist activities threaten to bring the problem of weapons of mass destruction, disruption and effect into an entirely new and highly destructive arena. Global terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda do not raise money from taxes or operate under the control of a government that can be defeated or bargained with. To raise funds, they often engage in criminal acts or ally with criminal organizations. They are bolstered by religious fervor that can accommodate many different agendas. They strategically align themselves with real grievances or strong perceptions of real grievances. They artfully manipulate mass media to promote sympathy, if not downright support, for their "courageous" struggle against a vast, wealthy enemy. They draw recruits from the angry, terrified, and disenfranchised—and from the well-educated, privileged youth of middle-class suburbs around the world. To both they offer a sense of meaning as well as a sense of identity from membership or affiliation with the terrorist group. They reach people by assuming the guise of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) or by radicalizing the curriculum of an elementary school. They utilize both highly sophisticated technologies as well as crude but destructive weapons cobbled together from hardware stores and rental agencies. They frequently utilize the Internet to enlist recruits, communicate among themselves, and train in techniques.

While the catastrophic global terrorism associated with Islamic extremism is not the only form of terrorism

evident in the world today, because of its open-ended agenda, its desire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction and effect, and its hostility toward the United States and its allies, it is the most alarming (and perhaps well-studied) contemporary form of terrorism. Other extremists target more localized grievances and have more limited aims.

Because terrorist activities appear fluid and shifting as global responses to terrorism unfold, understanding the motivations and operations of terrorism demands simultaneous investigation of the impact terrorism has on individuals, communities, and whole societies. In addition to targeting the physical well-being of the populace, the ultimate goal of terrorism is often to instill fear and create ongoing anxiety. On that score, terrorism is often remarkably effective—and it is assumed that terrorists monitor the consequences of their actions and adjust accordingly.

Studies conducted in the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that fear and anxiety were widespread—and not merely on the direct targets of the actions. Indeed, widespread media and press coverage of major terrorist attacks has expanded geographically the psychological impact of these events and turned the psychological impact of localized attacks into a global issue that can ripple beyond the immediately affected communities. For example, perhaps more than 100,000 individuals directly witnessed the events of September 11, but millions of others across the world viewed the attacks and their aftermath via the media. When framed within this context, these attacks did far more than destroy buildings and kill thousands of innocent people. They shattered a sense of security and perceptions of invulnerability among residents of the United States and the Western world. They interrupted the rhythm and social fabric across the entire United States, not simply in New York City, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C.

The randomness, unpredictability, and uncontrollable nature of ongoing terrorist attacks ensures maximum psychological impact. Individuals exposed to terrorism (either directly or indirectly through the media) often experience a number of emotions: shock or emotional numbness in the immediate aftermath, intense fear or anxiety about the future, and a sense of sadness or depression about the losses incurred. Stress-related symptoms (acute and post-traumatic stress symptoms, such as repeated memories, thoughts and mental pictures of the attacks, hyperarousal, and avoidance of reminders) as well as somatic symptoms (headaches, chest pains, nausea) are also quite common. Moreover, research has demonstrated that the degree of individual response is not explained simply by the degree of exposure to or loss from the trauma.

However, beyond post-traumatic stress symptoms, positive personal and social consequences are also possible in response to terrorism: a new appreciation of the value of life, closer relationships with family members, recognition of increased altruism, kindness, and solidarity among others, and the perception of political benefits, such as increased patriotism and an increase in national security. In the absence of ongoing attacks, psychological symptoms typically diminish over time, and most individuals and communities are quite resilient and adaptable. Individuals and communities exposed to repeated and prolonged terrorist attacks often develop mechanisms to cope with the chronic stress.

It appears that global terrorist organizations monitor closely media representations of their behavior, the social responses to threats and attacks, and the countermeasures that are implemented. This can lead to a revision in attack strategies, development of new tactics, and acquisition of new targets. The consequences, in turn, depend on risk communication, preparedness, and perceptions of who the terrorists are and why they have selected a given target and attack plan.

Understanding the causes of terrorism can best be facilitated by recognition that the causes and consequences cannot be examined in isolation. They constitute a dynamic system, and each part plays an integral role in how the other is realized. Moreover, while much of the impact of terrorist attacks is psychological, losses of infrastructure (e.g., transportation, communications) and resources (e.g., water, food, livestock) due to weapons of mass destruction can have very real material effects that significantly disrupt both individual- and community-level functioning. In addition, responses to the actual and perceived future threat may evoke political responses that in the aggregate can influence democratic values, institutions, and practices. For example, recent research suggests a strong association between perceptions of an ongoing threat of terrorism and support for increased diplomatic, military, and domestic action in response to the perceived threat, as well as a willingness to sacrifice personal liberties in support of anti-terrorist policies.

The future of terrorism is unknown, and terrorists' plans are undoubtedly shaped by the actions taken to defend against their success. A government's or

public's efforts to defend against one means of attack undoubtedly leads to a search by the terrorists for additional vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, little evidence suggests that terrorism is decreasing in frequency or intensity as a technique as long as terrorists perceive the success of their mission.

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See also Ethnic Cleansing; Mass Murder; PATRIOT Act; Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon with many dimensions that vary in intensity and scope across time periods and have varying degrees of impact and significance in different regions of the world. Counterterrorism approaches, in consequence, are likewise multifaceted in kind to offer appropriate responses to the threat and reality of terrorism on a local, national, and international level. Although political objectives lie at the heart of most terrorist violence, enactment of counterterrorism strategies not only occurs at the government levels of nation-states and their international unions but also extends to many other institutions and organizations.

International Law and Politics

Historically, counterterrorism strategies have at least two important precursors. First, in the middle of the 19th century, autocratic political regimes in Europe responded to political dissent of a more or less violent nature by organizing national and international police and surveillance practices. Among these efforts were police activities involving covert surveillance practices as well as cooperation activities, on a bilateral and multilateral scale, to exchange information on wanted political opponents of established autocratic regimes. Police institutions conducted these activities and, in the course of their activities, gradually gained professional expertise and autonomy to focus attention on more distinctly criminal rather than political enforcement objectives. Second, developments in the area of international law occurred to outlaw and institute appropriate practices against politically motivated violent activities. Most distinctly, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, governments signed treaties that led to organized international efforts against anarchist

movements. Similarly, the first international treaty specifically dealing with terrorism was in 1937, when the League of Nations drafted a convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. However, only one country, India, ratified the agreement, testifying to the ideological difficulties within and across nations to enact measures and foster collaboration on a matter as politically volatile as terrorism.

During the remaining decades of the 20th century, government policies and legislative actions against terrorism evolved slowly and in piecemeal fashion, typically focusing only on specific violent and criminal activities often associated with terrorism, such as hijackings and bombings, rather than on terrorism as such. For instance, the United Nations adopted a convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons in 1973 and on the Taking of Hostages in 1979. Similar international treaties against terrorism were adopted by other international governing bodies, such as the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States, as well as at the bilateral level between nation-states. International treaties, however, could not lessen terrorism as an often contentious issue in the global field of international relations.

In the United States, legal and policy efforts against terrorism developed even more slowly than in the international arena, primarily because of a prevailing view that terrorism was a foreign problem. During the Reagan administration emerged the Act to Combat International Terrorism of 1984 and an Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act in 1986. Yet, it was not until certain high-profile terrorist incidents, such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, that the Clinton administration stepped up legislative efforts against terrorism, leading to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

The Centrality of September 11

Despite the gradual increase in legislative and political responses to terrorism during the late 20th century, the enormous impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on counterterrorism approaches was unpredictable, as counterterrorism efforts expanded considerably on both the national and international levels. The United States took the lead in passing the USA PATRIOT Act, allowing the detention and trial of terrorist suspects in military tribunals, and creating a new department, the Department of Homeland Security, specifically designed to respond to the terrorist threat. Furthermore, counterterrorism measures expanded to the military field when the United States and selected North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations undertook military operations in October 2001 against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which was offering support to Al-Qaeda members.

The military invasion in Iraq in March 2003 was politically incorporated in the so-called war on terror, thereby giving that expression more than mere metaphorical meaning. Although revelations about the decision to invade Iraq showed it less clearly related to the terrorist threat, ongoing conditions in Iraq as well as the internationally contentious struggles over the war's relationship with terrorism have influenced the debate over the proper response to terrorism. Most remarkable is that many nations across the world and a variety of international governing bodies instituted new legislative and political policies similar to those implemented in the United States. For instance, new anti-terrorist laws expanding policing powers against terrorist suspects passed in many nations also considered under the threat of international terrorist groups. International governing bodies, such as the United Nations and the European Union, similarly adopted new measures to ensure international cooperation against terrorism. What these developments show is a trend toward the treatment of terrorism as an issue of national and global security.

Dimensions of Counterterrorism

In spite of the growing significance in counterterrorism of matters related to security, warfare, and military might, counterterrorist activities are comprised of a multitude of political, legal, military, economic, and cultural efforts, which are not always in complete harmony with one another. Most conspicuous at the level of formal state institutions are the extended counterterrorist powers granted to law enforcement institutions. Strikingly, police organizations conceive of terrorism as a distinctly criminal enforcement problem requiring response with technically sophisticated means of policing. Police counterterrorism responses, both within nations and at the international level, thus demonstrate the relative autonomy of police to determine the proper means and to specify the objectives of their counterterrorism activities.

The reorganization of police power under conditions of an intensified concern with terrorism may lead to structural adjustments that will have effects long after the more immediate repercussions of the terrorist threat have faded. Moreover, police institutions might pay relatively less attention to other enforcement tasks and thus exacerbate criminal conditions unrelated to terrorism. Furthermore, because police organizations are not alone in conducting counterterrorism activities, they increasingly confront the counterterrorism operations of other state institutions, such as rival police organizations (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security), intelligence organizations, and military institutions. For example, police and intelligence efforts in counterterrorism do not always neatly harmonize, as policing activities focus on suspects in criminal cases, while intelligence work involves the routinized collection of information irrespective of a criminal incident. The new realignments of police, intelligence, and military brought about by the intensified focus on terrorism pose important problems of jurisdictional authority, the appropriate methods and means of interagency cooperation, and the relationship between civilian police and military power from a functional and organizational point of view.

Besides interagency cooperation within nations, moreover, the international nature of the current terrorist threat also places a premium on international counterterrorism cooperation. The centrality of international cooperation applies to various levels of counterterrorism, including treaties of international law, diplomatic efforts, police cooperation among nations and participation in international police organizations such as Interpol and Europol, coalitions in military operations, and the imposition of economic sanctions against nations that harbor or support terrorist groups. Interestingly, growing international cooperation in matters of terrorism has not yet fostered a truly global climate of counterterrorism inasmuch as national interests, concerned with the more locally confined implications of terrorism, remain paramount.

Again showing the multifarious nature of counterterrorism, international counterterrorism activities also include attempts to build public support against terrorist groups and practices and, relatedly, to foster the spread of democratic values across the globe. Presumably not unimportant in this respect are also the efforts taken in the academic research community to study the mechanisms, causes, and effects of terrorism and counterterrorism as well as the activities undertaken by civic groups to ensure a climate to obtain a sufficient degree of effectiveness in counterterrorism strategies without sacrificing civil liberties and human rights.

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See also PATRIOT Act; Surveillance; Terrorism; Terrorism, Domestic Spying

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Terrorism, Domestic Spying

Domestic spying is a cultural construct that is used, especially among civil libertarians and the media, to refer to internally directed surveillance programs initiated by a variety of formal agencies of social control and intelligence. In the current U.S. context, domestic spying primarily refers to the debate that erupted following several revelations about surveillance programs set up, without court approval or congressional oversight, to aid in the fight against terrorism. Although the debate on domestic spying is recent, internal surveillance programs have considerable historical antecedents.

Domestic Surveillance Programs

U.S. domestic surveillance programs date back to the 1930s, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt secretly ordered the Bureau of Investigation (renamed Federal

Bureau of Investigation [FBI] in 1935) to investigate the American Nazi movement. On September 6, 1939, 3 days after the British and French declaration of war on Nazi Germany, Roosevelt formally placed the FBI in charge of all surveillance activities relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and violations of U.S. neutrality laws. During World War II, the FBI was responsible for all domestic intelligence work and foreign intelligence in South America, while the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the leading intelligence agency for all other regions.

Domestic surveillance in the United States remained primarily in the hands of the FBI after the war. Most distinct amongst these efforts was the Bureau's COINTELPRO or counterintelligence programs from the 1950s onward that acted against communist groups and a wide range of other organizations, including leftist groups, civil rights organizations, and the Ku Klux Klan. In the early 1970s, COINTELPRO was formally abolished, leading to passage of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978, which permits electronic surveillance within the United States on foreign agents and international terrorists on the condition that a judge in a specialized FISA court issues a warrant.

Presently, several partly interacting and overlapping surveillance agencies handle domestic intelligence duties, including the FBI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and various federal and local law enforcement agencies.

In the current context of counterterrorism, domestic spying debates erupted following several revelations reported in the popular media about domestic surveillance programs, conducted by the NSA, that were secretly authorized by the president following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition to these NSA surveillance programs, debate also raged over the expanded opportunities afforded to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community under provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, a federal bill passed in 2001 that broadened police powers against terrorism. In November 2005, the *Washington Post* disclosed a rapidly growing practice of domestic spying under the provisions of the PATRIOT Act by the FBI seeking information on the basis of so-called national security letters. Such letters enable the FBI to secretly review the private telephone and financial records of suspected foreign agents. However, the letters program also included U.S. citizens and residents who were not suspected of any wrongdoing.

Most important in the recent debate on domestic spying, *The New York Times* on December 16, 2005, reported on a secret domestic surveillance program conducted by the NSA. This so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program, initiated in early 2002 on the secret authorization of President George W. Bush, allows the NSA to intercept, without a court-approved warrant, communications that involve one overseas and one domestic party or at least one party suspected of holding ties to Al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist group.

The response to this revelation was intense. In January 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed lawsuits, arguing that the NSA eavesdropping program violated Americans' civil rights. That same month, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a class-action lawsuit against the telephone company AT&T, accusing it of providing the NSA with unfettered access to customer phone calls and Internet communications in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well as federal wiretap and communication laws. On a political level, two Senate Judiciary hearings held in February 2006 discussed the status of the NSA program. Another revelation about contemporary domestic surveillance programs came when the newspaper *USA Today* reported in May 2006 that the NSA had kept logs of billions of domestic calls, a program that began, without court approval, soon after 9/11.

The Domestic Spying Debate

The debate on domestic spying contains important considerations of both a legal and normative nature. From the legal viewpoint, the Bush administration insisted that it had the power to authorize the wiretapping program under both the U.S. Constitution and the congressional resolution of the Authorization of Military Force that authorized use of wartime powers against those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The constitutional powers of the U.S. president as commander-in-chief would allow President Bush to pursue, without explicit congressional permission, any enemy operating inside the United States. Additionally, the wartime powers of the president would allow him to bypass the courts to spy on Americans without warrants, a presidential power that not even Congress can restrict, as the president not only has the authority but also the duty to protect the nation. The administration further argued that the congressional resolution on the Authorization of Military Force that passed shortly after 9/11 also granted the president the right to use all

"necessary and appropriate force," thereby effectively suspending the FISA requirements that are considered outdated and inappropriate in view of the contemporary war on terror. When President Bush in a televised address admitted that he had authorized domestic, warrantless monitoring of calls involving an overseas party, he defended his actions as crucial to national security.

Opponents argue that the president's expansion of executive power violates constitutionally framed mandates for judicial and congressional oversight. Congress and the courts have a constitutional right and obligation to provide a check against extra-legal activities in the executive branch. The uncovered domestic spying programs, they claim, violate Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure. The Supreme Court has likewise held that most surveillance by government agencies must be based on a judicial finding of probable cause of criminal wrongdoing.

Other arguments against domestic spying invoke concerns over two specific federal acts. First, critics say the program violates provisions of the 1978 FISA Act that require warrants. The PATRIOT Act only allows for the collection of data for up to 72 hours before a warrant must be requested from the courts, and the Authorization of Military Force resolution does not give the president the power to bypass this law. Second, because only eight members of the House and Senate were briefed about relevant developments, the NSA program violates the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that intelligence oversight committees of Congress be kept informed of U.S. intelligence activities. Absent such congressional approval, prosecutions of captured terrorists may be jeopardized by defendants' claims that the evidence against them was collected illegally. In August 2006, a U.S. District Court ruled the NSA surveillance program to be unconstitutional. At this writing, an appeal is still pending.

Underlying the legal debate on domestic spying are conflicting positions about its normativity. On the one hand, proponents suggest that special surveillance programs are necessary because of the severity and nature of the current terrorist threat and, moreover, that they have effectively prevented other terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Under present-day circumstances, they claim, most Americans would agree that some of their rights have to be sacrificed in order to preserve national security. On the other hand, opponents argue measures implemented against terrorist groups should not curb civil rights, which are an essential part of a free and open society. Making exceptions on constitutional restrictions on presidential power in the area of counterterrorism might lead to wrongly justify other special provisions, such as on the use of torture and the indefinite detention of citizens. Modernizing the rules of counterterrorism surveillance in the United States could allow for the use of new means but only within proper limits that prevent innocent citizens from being investigated.

Given the continued anxieties over the terrorist threat and the likewise persistent concerns over civil rights, the debate on domestic spying is likely to stay in the public consciousness for some time in the foreseeable future.

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See also Civil Rights; PATRIOT Act; Police; Surveillance; Terrorism; Terrorism, Counterterrorism Approaches

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Tertiary Sector

See Service Economy

Theft

Theft is the act of taking property (physical or intellectual) from someone (including businesses and corporations) with the intent of keeping the item permanently. Various criminal codes throughout the United States subdivide theft into different areas, although the primary theme is identical: taking property, thus depriving the rightful owner of his or her goods. Within English common law, two precise

categories of theft existed: *petit larceny* and *grand larceny.* A thin line separated the two, with the deciding factor resting on the value of the goods stolen. Grand larceny is a felony, while petit larceny is a misdemeanor.

In common law, for theft (used interchangeably with *larceny* and *stealing*) to occur, specific circumstances had to be met: (a) the thief deliberately took the property into his or her possession, thus securing control of it; (b) the goods were "moved" from their rightful place; (c) a trespassing occurred when the merchandise was removed from the rightful owner's possession; (d) the property was tangible; (e) the property belonged to someone else (one cannot steal land that lacks an owner); and (f) the intent to steal was evident.

Other areas of theft include using false pretenses—meaning that an individual makes false representations, either spoken or written, with the intent to cheat or defraud the victim. A similar crime, but generally more serious, is a confidence game or "con game," where the falsehoods must be tangible; mere words are not enough. Embezzlement is often a definition of theft, but there are subtle differences. In embezzlement, the property is legally possessed or accessed by the embezzler, whereas in theft the goods are in another's possession. Embezzlement commonly occurs in businesses, with an employee "borrowing" money from the employer but not repaying it before detection.

Robbery is a particularly violent form of theft, often viewed as a hybrid of assault and battery plus larceny, thus the title "aggravated larceny." Burglary is the act of entering into any building or structure as a trespasser with the intent to steal something of value. Passing bad checks is considered theft in all states, with special statutes detailing checks in which the giver does not have an account in the bank in which the check was drawn, and "short" checks in which an account is held but contains insufficient funds; thus, when a check is made out, it "bounces."

As the 21st century unfolds, the two most common forms of theft are identity theft and the theft of intellectual property. Identity theft is a crime that occurs whenever someone steals another's personal, identifying data (charge cards, Social Security number, and so on) without consent, with the intent to commit fraud and/or other criminal acts. The theft of intellectual property occurs whenever an individual plagiarizes another's work, whether it is music, words, ideas, or other work and uses it as his or her own without acknowledging the rightful owner. The ubiquity of Internet access has caused this problem to skyrocket, causing billions of dollars in lost revenue. Until better security measures are available, identity theft and the theft of intellectual property will remain common hazards in the information era.

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See also Burglary; Carjacking; Identity Theft; Piracy, Intellectual Property; Plagiarism; Property Crime

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THEORY

Theory has multiple meanings in regard to its context in both field and method. In everyday use, the word *theory* generally means an assumption or inference, to denote a status less than something that can be certifiably known as a fact. Following this, "theory" is often juxtaposed against "fact." However, both are mutually exclusive or opposed: an action can be empirically verifiable, and the theory as to why the action has occurred either falsifiable or verifiable (e.g., an apple falls and the theory of gravity explains why).

As sociology developed out of a positivist scientific system in the tradition of Auguste Comte, it is based in a scientific, as opposed to a hermeneutic (interpretative), approach to theory. However, this is by no means exhaustive, as many traditions in sociology are explicitly based on the discovery and evaluation of meaning and qualitative enterprises. Scientifically, "theory" is often described as an anticipated and/or projected interaction within and between natural or social phenomena. That is, theory is a hypothesized explanation of empirical evidence. This means that theory generally (a) is consistent with, or falsifiable of, preexisting theory; (b) is sustained by pieces of evidence opposed to a solitary, unified body of thought; (c) makes forecasts

that could be used in the future to falsify the theory; (d) is hesitant and provisional; and (e) is the most parsimonious explanation (often known as "Ockham's Razor").

Following, there are several types of theory. First, *metatheory* (also referred to as "epistemology" or the philosophy of knowledge and/or science) specifies the nature and goals of science, sets standards by which it is evaluated, defines what methodology will be used to obtain data, and sets the research goals. Second, *conceptual theory* provides the perspective and language with which a science addresses reality. Third, *explanatory theory* orders the subject matter and proposes why phenomenon and variation occur. This type of theory is able to predict phenomena of a similar ilk and is capable of being tested.

Within general sociological purview, and within the subdiscipline of the study of social problems in specific, there are various forms of sociological theory, but these are often boiled down to three distinct approaches. First, *functionalist theory* is the oldest perspective and rests upon two endeavors: the first is the application of the traditional "scientific method" to the social world, and the second is the understanding of the individual and society as continually involved in a (dys)functional relationship. Notable functionalists are Émile Durkheim, Robert Merton, and Talcott Parsons. Second, *conflict theory* is predicated upon the work of Karl Marx, who stated that society is in constant conflict among groups vying to maximize their interests. The theory attempts to refute functionalist paradigms that leave little room for explaining the operations of power. Other notable conflict theorists are Georg Simmel, Lewis A. Coser, and Ralf Dahrendorf. Third, *symbolic interactionism* (its later derivation is known as "cultural sociology") explains how individuals and groups interact, focusing on the creation of personal identity through interaction with others. Drawing from the sociology of Max Weber, symbolic interactionism examines how individuals create the symbolic structures that make life meaningful. Reality does not impose the names and definitions of things, but rather people must define things and give them meaning in order to make them socially real. Notable theorists in this tradition are Herbert Blumer, Erving Goffman, and George Herbert Mead.

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See also Postmodernism

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Therapeutic Communities

Although the model of drug misuse treatment called the "therapeutic community" (TC) traces its American roots to Synanon, it has quite an ancient pedigree. At the dawn of the Christian era, Philo Judaeus wrote of *communitae therapeutrides*, the art of which was to "heal the souls which are under the mastery of terrible . . . incurable diseases of pleasures and appetites. . . ."

Thus, it appears that the struggle with uncontrolled appetite was a challenge then, as it is now, and the ancients embraced similar principles to ensure spiritual health. These principles have been present in mutual help communities from early monastic splinter groups to the much later Methodist congregations that espoused a "return to first principles" and morphed into the early Oxford movement. They can be summarized as follows:

- Concern for the state of our soul and our physical survival
- Search for meaning: transcending truths
- Challenge and admonish with love
- Be invasive—accountable to the community
- Public disclosure of acts, fears, hopes, guilt
- Public expiation for wrongs done
- Banishment is possible—done with concern for survival
- Leadership by elders—by models

In the 17th and 18th centuries, religion-based mutual help societies emerged in Western Europe.

Responding to the widespread overuse of alcohol, they launched temperance efforts in Europe that spread to America. Many of these early attempts at "appetite control" included temporary residential support and pledges of abstinence. Key principles embraced by these mutual help groups, including disclosure (confession), admonition, commitment, and conversion of others, spread and, by the 1800s, influenced development of the Oxford Groups.

The term *therapeutic community*, however, does not reemerge until World War II. At Northfield Hospital in England, a facility dedicated to the treatment of traumatized United Kingdom troops, two psychiatric innovators, Maxwell Jones and Tom Maine, sought to reapportion authority and decision making between staff and patients. They called their effort a "therapeutic community," and "patients" in their psychiatric units became the active decision makers, taking on increasing responsibility for ward management. Early discussions among these pioneers resulted in five basic assumptions: (1) two-way communication at all levels; (2) decision making at all levels; (3) shared leadership; (4) consensus in decision making; and (5) social learning by social interaction with emphasis on the here and now. This horizontal, open system of communication was itself assumed to result in healing, eliminating the need for individualized treatment plans. This notion would later become doctrine in U.S. drug treatment TCs.

But the drug treatment TC was not introduced by any of the nurses or psychiatrists who, inspired by Jones, sought to develop similar models. It emerged in Venice Beach, California, in 1959, when an Alcoholics Anonymous member, Charles Dederich, began an organization called Synanon, embodying the mutual help principles of AA and characterized by hierarchical structure, a semi-open communication system, small-group encounters focusing on behavior change, and encouraging members or residents to become leaders. This clear progenitor of what later became known as TCs enjoyed early success working with heroin users, but it is best known for its slow decline into a controversial cult.

The next major residential community to utilize similar techniques for drug treatment was Daytop Village, established in New York in 1963. While adopting the treatment strategies of Synanon, this organization rejected that group's notion of becoming an alternative, utopian community, referring to itself originally as a "humanizing community."

In 1966, New York City's mayor, John V. Lindsay, recruited Efren Ramirez, M.D., a San Juan psychiatrist, to coordinate the city's narcotic treatment programs. Ramirez had already developed systems of community engagement, protracted client induction processes, and treatment approaches similar to those of Daytop Village. Daytop staff became a resource for Ramirez as he set out to expand the city's response to a growing heroin epidemic. It was Ramirez, trained in the Jones model, who persuaded Daytop to use the term *therapeutic community* to describe itself.

Ramirez was soon joined by Mitchell S. Rosenthal, M.D., who had headed an alcohol and drug treatment unit at the U.S. Naval Hospital in Oakland, California, where he had introduced many structural and group characteristics of Synanon. Ultimately, Ramirez made Rosenthal his deputy commissioner for treatment.

The convergence shaped by Ramirez became a major force for expanding the TC model in New York City. Daytop lent staff to each of the treatment leaders in Ramirez's group. This rich mix led to the development of Odyssey House (Judy Densen Gerber), Phoenix House (Rosenthal) and the expansion of Samaritan (Richard Pruss). By the end of 1968, Daytop staff had also contributed to a second wave of TC development with Gateway in Chicago, Gaudenzia in Philadelphia, and the Village in Miami.

Further expansion followed: Marathon House in New England, Integrity in New Jersey, Walden House in San Francisco, the Mendocino Family, and Abraxas. Participation in marathon therapy as TC training in authenticity, expiation, and commitment inspired many visitors to the Intensive Training Institute, developed at Daytop's Swan Lake facility, to emulate part, or all, of this early TC model.

Subsequently, TCs spread to Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain. By the mid-1970s, the World Federation, led by Msgr. W. B. O'Brien of Daytop, had started programs in Italy, the Netherlands, and Southeast Asia, which, in turn, influenced further expansion into Spain, Portugal, and Brazil.

During the 1960s, leading researchers, such as O. Hobart Mowrer and Abraham H. Maslow, applauded early TC initiatives and contributed ideas as well as methods. At the start of the 1970s, outcome and follow-up studies done at Phoenix House by George DeLeon and others provided an academic and research base to the movement, bringing increased credibility and recognition.

By the end of 1974, 15,000 persons were being treated in TCs. In 1976, a Therapeutic Communities of America (TCA) planning conference sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) brought first, second, and third wave post-Synanon groups together. Discussions focused on such issues as size, fidelity, working with various different populations, and the discreet needs of women with children.

In the 1980s, training in drug abuse treatment methods, supported by the U.S. State Department, brought the TC to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Central Europe. TCs were developed in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland. The TC approach is now found not only throughout the Americas, but also in such Muslim countries as Malaysia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh and in Lebanon, Israel, China, South Africa, India, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

Key enduring principles have survived, along with certain features of program structure, daily schedule, small-group work, and the development of social responsibility and compassion. In most programs, the role of the leader—regardless of the size of the unit, program, or system—still influences what principles are emphasized or downplayed, although many European programs and some American ones have adopted a far more egalitarian Jones-like approach.

Not so curiously, the older leadership bemoans many current practices, the dilution or drift from earlier models. Newer practitioners, educated more broadly and with less doctrinaire backgrounds, applaud the utilization of new science-driven practices. To remain relevant, the movement must applaud history, use the key enduring principles, and also embrace new practices. It is no longer a belief system with some techniques found wanting, or at worst destructive. It is and can proudly refer to itself as a model of value, proven in the treatment of addictive disorders, and capable of developing character and survival competencies for many, regardless of the culture in which it is found.

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See also Addiction; Alcoholism; Drug Abuse; Twelve-Step Programs

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Think Tanks

Think tanks are independent, nonpartisan, non-university-based organizations that conduct policy research. More than 300 think tanks in the United States and thousands of others around the world focus on domestic and foreign policy issues such as the economy, environment, welfare, social security, education, health care, governance, military technology, and global trade. The primary purpose of think tanks is to educate the public and policymakers through research relating to current policy issues. As 501(c)(3) nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations, U.S. think tanks cannot endorse political candidates or legislation. In practice, however, many newer think tanks walk a fine line, operating more like advocacy organizations than research institutes. The increasing politicization of think tanks and the shift toward advocacy and marketing has been a focus of current research on think tanks.

U.S. think tanks are guided by their mission statements and are focused on national, regional, or state issues. Varying widely in size and scope, think tanks can be run by a staff of two to five people on a small budget or house dozens of researchers with a budget in the tens of millions. Single-issue think tanks dedicate their efforts to the study of one topic, such as the environment or tax policy. However, the majority of think tanks focus on multiple issues, with several divisions dedicated to specific research areas. The funding for think tanks comes primarily from philanthropic foundations and donations from corporations and individuals, while a far smaller number of think tanks accept government grants.

Political scientists generally differentiate think tanks based on the nature of their work. Several different "ideal types" of think tanks are academic, contract research, and advocacy. Often referred to as "universities without students" *academic think tanks* are largely staffed by individuals holding doctorate degrees and

have their agenda set by their researchers and funding source. Examples of academic think tanks include the Brookings Institution, Public Policy Institute of California, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. *Contract research think tanks* are also staffed largely by Ph.D.s with their agenda set by the agency that contracts their work, in many instances federal or state government. Their work often involves the evaluation of existing policies and programs. Examples of contract think tanks include the RAND Corporation, Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, and the American Institutes for Research. Both academic and contract think tanks have a "muted ideology" and as such tend not to have a mission affiliated with a particular political perspective.

Advocacy think tanks, on the other hand, have staff with philosophical, political, or ideological leanings. Research positions are less likely to be filled by academics with Ph.D.s, and its directors set the think tank's agenda. Examples of conservative think tanks include the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and Hudson Institute, which generally advocate for limited government, free markets, private enterprise, and individual responsibility. Examples of liberal or progressive think tanks include the Economic Policy Institute, Center for American Progress, and the Center for International Environmental Law, which generally advocate for economic and social justice, racial equity, reproductive rights, and increased environmental protections.

Lengthy research reports and books are more typical of the publications produced by academic and contract think tanks, while advocacy think tanks put more emphasis on producing policy briefs, summary reports, thought pieces, and newsletters. This more condensed style of policy research is typical of think tanks that are interested in marketing their publications to policymakers and the media. Think tanks additionally hold conferences, give briefings to legislative committee staff, and testify as policy experts.

The earliest think tanks, founded at the beginning of the 20th century, include the Russell Sage Foundation in 1907, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910, and Brookings Institute in 1916. These policy institutes, which would not be referred to as "think tanks" until decades later, were backed by Progressive Era reformers who believed that society could be improved through social scientific inquiry. Business interests often joined these "scientific reformers" in an attempt to direct government management away from corrupt politics and toward rationality and efficiency, while at the same time asserting their interests.

In the past several decades, a dramatic growth in the number of U.S. think tanks occurred, going from approximately 50 in 1970 to well over 300 by 2005. With this growth came a shift toward a "new guard": think tanks more directly focused on affecting policy and more partisan in nature. Although this growth occurred among all types of think tanks, the most dramatic increase was among conservative think tanks. Scholars attribute this growth to the expansion of business in politics, the rise of neoconservatism, a new paradigm of neoclassical economics, and the political mobilization of fundamentalist Christians.

Research on think tanks largely focuses on defining these institutions, their activities, historical growth, relationships to foundations, increased politicization, and role in the policy-making process. A common measurement of the influence of think tanks is tracking their media citations, congressional testimony, visibility, credibility, marketing strategies, and access to policymakers. Other think tank research takes a more global dimension, focusing on the activities of these policy organizations internationally.

Lauren McDonald

See also Claims Making; Conservative Approaches; Identity Politics; Social Movements

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Three Strikes Laws

Three strikes laws are statutes that mandate state courts to impose a mandatory extended period of incarceration to individuals convicted of a felony on the third offense. The name originates from baseball, following the model of the "Three strikes, you are out" theory. Its intent is to combat recidivism by mandating lengthy sentences to deter criminals from repeat offenses.

These laws prescribe that felons found guilty of a third serious crime should face an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. The first two "strikes" would accrue for serious felonies, while the third committed offense triggers a life sentence that could be applied for any felony, whether serious or general. Additionally, the law doubles sentences for a second strike, requiring extended sentences be served in prison (rather than in jail or on probation), and limits "good time" earned during prison to 20 percent of the sentence given rather than the 50 percent prescribed under previous law.

The practice of increasing the length of incarceration for repeat offenders dates back to the 19th century but was not a precedent for the subsequent three strikes laws. New York State, for example, had a *Persistent Felony Offender* law that sought to combat recidivism, but the sentences were set on a case-by-case basis, thus affording judges more discretion. Washington State first established the strict application of the three strikes law in 1993, when voters approved Initiative 593. One year later, California adopted the law, and by 2007, 26 states and the federal government had laws following the three strikes criteria, although the laws vary considerably in their application by state.

The greatest difference lies in the sentencing, by which California imposes a mandatory sentence for *any* third felony conviction, whereas other state laws prescribe that all three felony convictions must be for violent crimes in order for the mandatory sentence to be applied. Efforts to change the stricter third general-felony rule in California failed in 2004 when the voters rejected an amendment to the statute (offered as Proposition 66). The amendment would have required the third felony to be either violent and/or serious in order to result in a 25-years-to-life sentence.

Criticism surrounds the law's application, since some states label their laws differently and some offenders have been "victims" of the law for crimes such as shoplifting. In some states, possession of a small amount of cocaine or marijuana is treated as a felony, so three convictions for possession would carry longer imprisonment under the three strikes laws. Some minor white-collar crimes and burglaries also marginally qualify as felonies and thus invoke application of the three strikes laws.

Critics of the three strikes law, citing numerous instances of the punishment not fitting the crime, point to the notorious case of Kevin Weber, a homeless and unemployed man sentenced to 26 years to life for the crime of stealing four chocolate chip cookies from a restaurant (his previous strikes were burglary and assault with a deadly weapon). Other critics point to the fact that defendants may be charged and convicted with two "third strikes" for a single case, which many believe invokes double jeopardy. In some cases, both strikes may arise from a single criminal act which may subject a defendant to two sentences that run consecutively, resulting in a 50-years-to-life prison sentence.

Critics also believe that criminals may choose to commit more serious offenses since the punishment is the same albeit a serious or minor third offense. Cost-effectiveness is also a point of contention for critics, who point to the notion that imprisonment of older career criminals will exceed their criminal activity if and when released, thus incurring costs with no crime-reduction benefits.

Despite the debate, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. In a landmark case *Ewing v. California*, 538 U.S. 11 2003, challenging the three strikes law, Justice Sandra Day O'Conner opined that the Supreme Court does not seek to super-legislate state policy choices and that it was enough for the justices that the State of California had a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhancing sentences for habitual felons advanced the goals of its criminal justice system.

Some amendments to the original law have passed after its enactment. In November 2000, about 61 percent of California voters supported an amendment to the statute (offered in Proposition 36) that scaled back punishment of those convicted for possession to mandate drug treatment instead of life in prison. In November 2004, California voters considered another reform (Proposition 66) to eliminate several crimes, such as residential burglary, from the three strikes rule, but narrowly rejected it. Proposition 66 would have released approximately 37,000 people from state prisons, which proved to be a major voters' concern.

Research showed that as of June 2005, 60 percent of the state's 7,700 third strike inmates had committed a nonviolent or less serious third strike.

Undaunted, critics offered other amendments to reduce the penalty imposed by the three strikes laws against nonviolent criminals. *People v. Cluff,* 2001 87 Cal.App.4th 991, and *People v. Garcia,* 1999 20 Ca1.4th 490, 493–494, both dealt with courts' discretion to remove strikes and offer sentences proportionate to the crimes at issue. In *Garcia,* the Supreme Court held that a trial court may exercise its discretion when applying the three strikes law and dismiss prior conviction allegations. This ruling does not force judges to dismiss prior strikes but instead affords them the opportunity to limit the damage potentially caused by the strict application of the three strikes law.

As with many laws, the three strikes law remains under challenge. Law enforcement officials believe that the law affords some flexibility and that judges have discretion in sentencing criminals. Some mitigation of extreme application of the three strikes sentences has occurred over the years and may continue.

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See also Crime; Crime, Fear of; Felony; Justice; Prison; Prisons, Overcrowding; Violent Crime

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Title IX

Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Act stipulates that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance" (20 U.S.C. § 1681). Designed to eliminate discriminatory treatment at all levels of education and applying to both students and employees, Title IX paved the way for equal treatment of girls and women in career counseling, vocational training, admissions, athletics, extracurricular activities, and employment and promotion decisions. Title IX also assists in creating a climate of intolerance for sexual harassment and tracking on the basis of gender in educational programs. Though the letter of the law mandates gender equity in educational institutions and much progress has occurred since its initial passage, additional enforcement efforts still remain to achieve gender equity. Title IX has been most successful in responding to and further facilitating a shift in societal expectations for greater gender equity and providing individuals and groups with a limited number of remedies when educational institutions fall short of gender equality.

While Title IX mandates gender equity in all educational programs receiving federal funding, enforcement has been sketchy at best and in the 30-plus years since its passage, no institution has lost federal funding as a result of noncompliance. Persons hurt by institutions' noncompliance have three options. They can file an in-house complaint with the employee designated as the official Title IX officer; lodge a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the federal agency that oversees Title IX; or file a lawsuit. In-house complaints are the least effective and carry considerable risk of social ostracism and other forms of retaliation within the organization for the complainant. Complaints lodged with the OCR also usually result in limited remedies for the complainant, the program, and the larger educational institution. Instead of withholding federal funding, the OCR typically responds to meritorious complaints by admonishing institutions to remedy the discriminatory treatment. Successful lawsuits, however, have the potential both to admonish institutions to remedy discriminatory practices and inflict financial punishment for such discrimination. Since the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, *Franklin v. Gwinnett,* which held that plaintiffs successfully demonstrating intentional discrimination under Title IX were entitled to collect compensatory and punitive monetary damages, educational institutions now have significant financial incentive to comply with Title IX. Nevertheless, more recent Supreme Court rulings have the potential to scale back or erase these financial incentives.

Despite these limited enforcement efforts, Title IX has been successful in reducing or eliminating barriers

to higher education for girls and women, such as the previously widespread practices of withholding financial aid and scholarships from women, holding women to more stringent admissions requirements than men, and setting sex quotas on women's, but not men's, admissions. As a result of Title IX, women and men now face more equitable admissions and scholarship processes. Despite women's slight majority over men in percentage of earned bachelor's degrees, women still trail men in percentage of earned doctorates and professional degrees. Though women have made considerable inroads as teachers, faculty, and administrators, they are still under-represented in the highest levels of education (i.e., as principals, superintendents, deans, provosts, and presidents), signifying a persistent "glass ceiling" for women. Moreover, women's representation in math and science still lags, due to both blatant and subtle discrimination in these traditionally male disciplines—disciplines that tend to offer greater financial rewards than traditionally female disciplines. The dismantling of affirmative action programs in many colleges and universities across the United States has also negatively affected women's entrance into and advancement in male-dominated disciplines.

More than any other issue covered by Title IX, effecting gender equity in athletics has been the most contentious and litigious. Detractors claim that boys' and men's sports have been hurt by the increase in girls' and women's sports as limited but arguably more gender-equal funding is spread thinly across a larger number of teams. Detractors also allege that because interest in girls' and women's sports is limited, requiring equitable offerings, funding, and facilities for girls' and women's athletics is both difficult and unnecessary.

Yet since the passage of Title IX, women's and girls' participation rates in both high school and collegiate athletics have grown considerably faster than boys' and men's, an indication that interest in athletics is indeed high among girls and women. Still, women's and girls' overall participation rates lag behind boys' and men's and do not yet equal the rates of boys and men just prior to passage of Title IX. Though women now constitute a slight majority of all college students, funding for collegiate sports still disproportionately favors men, with men's basketball and football receiving the lion's share of funding. Scholarships to male athletes in both Division I and II athletics far exceed those to female athletes. Women still comprise a small minority of high school and collegiate athletic directors, and since 1972, the percentage of head coaches who are women has actually decreased substantially for both girls' high school and women's intercollegiate athletics teams, a trend not offset by gains in women coaching men's sports. Moreover, with few exceptions, a persistent pay gap exists between men and women coaches at all levels. Like men, women benefit physically and emotionally from greater sports participation, and Title IX is often credited with facilitating a groundswell of support (as both players and fans) for the burgeoning number of women's collegiate and professional sports teams.

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See also Discrimination; Educational Equity; Gender Bias; Gender Gap; Glass Ceiling; Hostile Environment; Sexual Harassment; Stratification, Gender

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TORTURE

The practice of torture is so ancient that its origins are lost in the distant past. However, recorded history shows that all major civilizations practiced it, either as a form of punishment or as a means of obtaining information. The ancient Egyptians, Assyrians, Greeks, Persians, Romans, and Chinese left records of it, and the Bible recounts many examples.

During the 15th and 16th centuries in Europe, the Holy Inquisition used torture to elicit confessions of heresy or other beliefs or actions contrary to the

dogma of the Catholic Church. During the 17th century, suspected witches were subjected to tortures for essentially the same purpose, with those found guilty of heresy or of witchcraft burned alive.

Examination of ancient castles reveals areas reserved as prisons and designed to be as unpleasant as possible. Some spaces were simply deep pits below the lower floor of a castle tower, where a prisoner was literally dropped and then left until such time as someone cared to retrieve him. Such spaces are called "oubliettes," after the French word *oublier,* meaning "to forget." Sometimes formal detention facilities were in basement areas with barred entrances. These were usually too low for a person inside to stand upright, and their location permitted frequent flooding from ground water or the castle moat. In general, the quarters reserved for housing prisoners were themselves a mode of torture.

Modern practices of torture have several possible goals: extraction of information, incitement of fear or terror, inflicting pain to punish, obtaining a confession pursuant to a criminal investigation, or, in rarer instances, application of pain for perverse sexual pleasure.

Legal Barriers to Torture

Among Western nations, legal barriers to torture became universal between 1750 and 1820, partly as a result of the Enlightenment and partly in recognition that torture was not an effective method of obtaining confessions or information, since the victim would say anything to make the torture stop. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment," thereby outlawing torture.

International efforts to end torture by legislation resulted in a number of conventions. Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture defines torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official." The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment also prohibit torture. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War also specifically prohibits torture and mistreatment of prisoners. This is but the latest in a series of Geneva Conventions beginning in 1864, all of which prohibited torture. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

Despite this apparent universality of legal bars to torture, resistance to its abandonment was remarkably stubborn, and local police routinely brutalized prisoners to elicit confessions well into the 20th century. Many nations still allow their police to beat and torture prisoners, especially throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Torture Methods

Generally, torture attempts to obtain compliance from the victim by inflicting or threatening severe pain or mutilation or through psychological methods, where one is deprived of sleep, disoriented, isolated, and in some instances subjected to sensory deprivation and the application of drugs. Threats or displays of torture of others may also be used.

Torture methods vary by culture and utilize available technology. The ancient Greeks wrote about the use of a brazen bull in which victims were roasted to death. The Romans practiced crucifixion and flagellation (whipping with a special multistrand whip weighted with lead at the ends). In the Middle Ages, the state and/or the church used mechanical devices in torture. The thumbscrew, rack, and iron maiden are a few of the best known of these tools of torture.

Modern torture methods vary by country. For instance, Latin American countries favor using *la capucha,* placing a hood filled with noxious fumes over the victim's head, and *submarino,* suspending upside down by the ankles and submerging in a barrel of water until the victim nearly drowns. Many Arab states practice *falanga,* beating the soles of the feet with a narrow hard object, inflicting excruciating pain and leaving the victim unable to walk. Strapping may be part of other torture methods, or a torture by itself, and involves immobilizing the individual in unnatural positions by means of ropes or other restraints.

In the United States, where the law prohibits torture, intelligence agencies practice forms of psychological torture and teach them to agents of other nations. The CIA has run a training program for decades at the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, teaching many interrogation techniques, including those defined as forms of torture, as illustrated by the acts committed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Rape and sexual abuse are common methods of torture worldwide. Both men and women may be subjected to sexual abuse and mutilation to humiliate them and break down their will to resist questioning. Societal taboos about sexuality often work in favor of the torturer, so that the victim becomes a social outcast as well as a traumatized torture survivor. Soldiers, insurgents, guerilla fighters, and paramilitary forces routinely use severe beatings and rape to torture and terrorize the civilian population.

Implements of torture can be ordinary tools or utensils, or sophisticated techniques, including drugs, behavioral conditioning, and acupuncture. Electronic immobilization devices (stun guns), which emit high-voltage shocks, are other implements of torture.

Most arguments justifying the use of torture tend to be pragmatic, such as the "ticking bomb" scenario proposed by legal expert Alan Dershowitz. However, modern interrogation techniques are far more effective than torture in extracting factual information. When laws prevent security agencies from using torture within their home countries, they sometimes resort to involuntary removal of prisoners to countries where torture is still practiced.

The Torturers

Little sets torturers apart from other people. Some become torturers out of political or social conviction or a religious belief. Child soldiers engage in torture because they are themselves terrorized by their commanders, or because they are trying to impress their fellow troopers with their "toughness." Some members of security forces regard it as routine job performance. Some torturers may be sociopaths, but in other instances the government trains people to perform torture and commit atrocities. In societies where torture is traditionally used, no shame or guilt attaches to its performance, and therefore police, security, and military personnel will act as torturers without compunction, even though the practice may be unlawful. In many instances, torture techniques may be developed and practiced with the assistance of health care professionals, in violation of ethical standards.

Results of Torture

The individual torture survivor suffers many consequences of the torture, some physical, some mental. These can be acute or chronic and come at great cost to the individual, the family, and society, with the possibility of long-term disabilities resulting from the torture and related maltreatment.

Psychological consequences of torture include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, sleep disorders, phobic reactions, guilt feelings (especially survivor guilt), sexual dysfunction (especially in rape victims), and personality changes. Torture survivors often turn to substance abuse in an attempt to self-medicate their trauma. Family members may even develop PTSD vicariously or suffer ambiguous loss when individuals are abducted by security forces or militias.

Another consequence of torture to society is the loss of educated and skilled individuals. Wherever torture and atrocities were committed against the civilian population, the bulk of the middle class disappeared. These individuals were some of the first targets of rebel forces, and those not killed often fled the country entirely, their potential contribution to their nation lost forever.

Treatments for Torture Victims

Treatment of survivors of torture varies with the availability of facilities within the society, the willingness of victims to access treatment, and the training available to health care professionals. While the prevalent method of treatment worldwide has been psychodynamic, evidence shows that other methods are more effective and efficient. Cognitive-behavioral therapy, pharmacological treatment, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), and conjoint marital and family therapy have all successfully reduced symptoms and improved the long-term functioning of torture survivors. Especially needed is family therapy in cases where entire families were terrorized as a result of the torture or disappearance of a family member.

The Abolition of Torture

Several nongovernmental agencies attempt to combat torture worldwide through monitoring, publicity campaigns, public education, and humanitarian efforts. These include Amnesty International, the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights in Geneva, the International Red Cross, Physicians for Human Rights, and the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims in Copenhagen, Denmark. These organizations also train professionals and paraprofessionals in how to deal with trauma and publicize the consequences of torture and trauma for

society. Recently, commissions of truth and reconciliation served a role in raising public awareness of torture and its use in armed conflicts within some societies.

Eugene R. Packer

See also Groupthink; Rape; Values; Violence

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Total Fertility Rate

Total fertility rate (TFR) is among the most commonly used fertility measures. As a *period* measure, TFR usually examines fertility cross-sectionally. TFR represents the average number of children a woman would have, assuming that current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) remain constant throughout her childbearing years (ages 15–49) and she were to survive to the end of her reproductive cycle.

ASFR is calculated by dividing the number of children born to women in an age group by the number of women in that age group. The equation for ASFR is

$$nFx = nBx/nWx$$

where F = fertility, B = births, W = women, x = age at the beginning of the interval, and n = number of years the age interval spans (usually 5-year intervals). TFR builds on ASFR by summing the rates for each age group and multiplying by the length of the age interval:

$$TFR = n \times \sum_{x=0,\,n}^{\infty} nFx$$

Another way to measure TFR is through *cohort* reports of Children Ever Born (CEB). CEB tracks a cohort of women's reproductive histories from the beginning of their childbearing years through completion, resulting in a measure representing the average of all children each woman *actually* bore. Usually data for AFSR, TFR, and CEB come from surveys or midyear population estimates combined with vital statistics on the number of births. When information about births is collected retrospectively, there is the danger of missing children who died shortly after childbirth.

TFR varies widely throughout the world today and has changed significantly over time. Levels range from well above *replacement fertility* (TFR = 2.1, an average of two children replacing one's parents, plus a one-tenth factor allowing for under-age-15 child mortality) to *below-replacement fertility.* In the early 1970s, TFR for the world was 4.5; by 2005, it had fallen to 2.6. For the same periods, in Latin America and the Caribbean, TFR dropped from 5.1 to 2.5. In 2005, Asia, excluding China, had a TFR of 2.8 (it was above 5.0 in the 1970s), with Taiwan and South Korea having among the lowest TFRs in the world at 1.1. European fertility levels were already reaching replacement in the 1970s, but now have dropped significantly below replacement to 1.4. TFR in the United States has remained stable since the 1970s at 2.0. TFR in sub-Saharan Africa has gone from 6.8 to 5.4 during this period; but in 2005, it ranged from a high of 7.9 in Niger to a low of 1.8 in Mauritius. Regional and national TFRs often hide substantial ethnic and racial variation.

Historical changes in TFRs often relate to new contraceptive technologies, access to services, and policies. In China, for example, TFR was close to 6.0 in the early 1970s, prior to the "later-longer-fewer" family planning campaign and the more widely known one-child policy. In 2005, TFR was 1.6; many scholars speculate that this drastic, rapid fertility decline is having significant effects on China's economy, marriage market, and care for the elderly. Changes in fertility across space and time have important

context-specific influences on social and demographic processes.

Enid Schatz

See also Birth Rate; Demographic Transition Theory; Fertility

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Total Institution

Erving Goffman defined *total institutions* in 1961 as places of residence and work where individuals lead together an enclosed, formally administered life cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time. Total institutions are a departure from basic modern social arrangements where members sleep, play, and work in different places and with different people, under different authorities and without a unified rational plan. Unlike traditional social institutions, total institutions are distinct in four ways: (1) all aspects of life are conducted under the control and regulation of a single authority; (2) individuals are in the company of similarly situated people; (3) individuals are under a rigid schedule; and (4) all activities are designed to satisfy the goals of the institution. Prisons and mental hospitals are the most frequently explored examples of total institutions, but the concept may also apply to military bases, boarding schools, religious institutions, and concentration camps.

Goffman's concept of the total institution represented the evolution of his early work on the construction of identity and concept of self as a product of social interaction, shaped by the roles and relationships accorded an individual by the social order. His consideration of the concept of total institutions represented an extension of this early work, in that he went on to study the constraining aspects of this construction. He examined the effects of institutionalization on an individual's construction of social, personal, and ego identities, such that it becomes difficult for individuals to forge definitions of self distinct from the definitions imposed on them by the structure, authority, and goals of the institution itself.

Goffman's interest in the total institution reflects his interest in how institutions place enormous constraints on identity construction such that they strip an individual from any existing conceptions and impose a new self that is reflective of the institution. He refers to the stripping of identity as the mortification of self or "civil death" and suggests that it occurs through several stages. Individuals come to total institutions with a concept of self previously established through interaction with the social world. Upon entrance into the institution, the recruit is stripped of any social support and is subject to what Goffman called the "abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self." Locked doors, high walls, and barbed wire provide physical and symbolic barriers to the outside world and isolate the inmate from the social interaction and support that previously allowed for the construction and maintenance of one's identity. Further stripping identity are admission procedures and "programming" designed to shape an inmate into an object assimilated into the routine operations of the institution. The loss of personal clothes, control over one's own appearance, and any trappings associated with the inmates' "identity kits" further accomplishes what Goffman refers to as "role dispossession."

Inmates must also share space and interact with others in a way that further abases and challenges the preexisting self-concept. Here Goffman speaks of *contaminative exposure*: in the social world, individuals have control over the physical space, circumstances, and social relationships that expose them to foreign and contaminating things. In a total institution, however, inmates lose control over any boundaries between themselves and such contamination; they must participate in indignities incompatible with their conception of self.

Once inmates are stripped of their former identity, the total institution attempts to rebuild a new identity by bestowing privilege, or access to desirable good and assets. These items, such as coffee, cigarettes, and control over television program selection, may be of little value outside the total institution. Goffman advises that the privilege system does as much to maintain role dispossession as it does to build the new self-concept.

Critics attack Goffman's concept of the total institution on a number of counts. Most prominently, they characterize his conceptualization of the total institution as vague, which led to loose application of the

term, both in his own work and in that of others. Recent literature from sociology, criminology, and penology shows a less structured conceptualization of the total institution frequently used as shorthand to characterize an oppressive environment that, to varying degrees, isolates its inhabitants from the social world. Many current applications emphasize individuals' responses to life in a total institution—the development of an "underlife" and coping mechanisms for retaining self-concept—rather than focusing on the concept of total institution itself.

Sarah Bacon and Patricia Y. Warren

See also Deinstitutionalization; Mental Health

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TOTALITARIANISM

Totalitarianism in its simplest sense designates the all-embracing total state. In its narrowest application it refers exclusively to Nazi Germany and to the Stalinist period of the Soviet Union. As a concept, however, it emerged originally in connection with Mussolini's Fascist Italy, and its frame of reference historically expanded to include the diverse range of communist regimes that evolved in the post–Second World War era. More recently, some commentators have sought to bring Islamic-inspired political extremism into the same orbit. Totalitarianism, arguably, represents a continuing problem for society insofar as the conditions for its emergence are modern: they are a combination of technological possibilities and radically future-oriented political aims. Its event also discloses uncomfortable questions about the character of human nature, the status of moral progress, and confidence in science as an unmitigated good for the improvement of human affairs.

The meaning of *totalitarianism* is usefully understood in contrast with *authoritarianism*. The latter term became, in the course of the 20th century, increasingly inadequate to cover the kinds of political regime standing in need of a more specific typology. Totalitarianism came to refer not only to absolute power, but to the attempt to mobilize entire populations in the service of an "ideology," an end requiring the regulation of both public and private behavior and issuing ultimately in the use of terror and acts of mass murder. The contrast with authoritarianism also illuminates more recent attempts to refine the concept. The earliest literature on totalitarianism sought to enumerate the whole range of all its institutional features. This typically clustered together the combination of traits displayed by all polities plausibly described as totalitarian. Most prominently, these were the single-party system; the deployment of sophisticated methods of propaganda and surveillance; the state's control of all public associations, including the churches; and the controlled economy. Such a model was, however, open to criticism. Where control, in practice, fell short of being complete, or where purported cases of totalitarianism failed to meet the definitional requirements in each and every detail, the scope of both its purchase and its utility became considerably reduced.

One tack taken in the light of this was, for some, to argue for a clearer conception in Max Weber's sense of an ideal type, an abstraction to which no real-world polity actually corresponds. More lately, the original model has instead been revised according to a twofold contention. The first aspect of this is the limitation of the earlier understanding by an overemphasis on mechanisms of rule. The second is that it is in thrall to a false image of totalitarianism that still views it as the commitment, on the part of elites, to increase the power of the state as an end in itself. Rather, an increasing consensus affirms that it is the *ideological*

dimension in which resides the real source of commonality between regimes with a valid claim to being both identified as totalitarian and conceptually distinct from authoritarianism. In part this is paradoxical. A long-standing grievance with the totalitarian thesis is that it is wrong-headed to bracket together (right-wing) fascist and (left-wing) communist systems. Nonetheless, the new consensus centrally highlights the historically unprecedented attempt to use the available apparatus of a modern state to fabricate a new form of society. On this view, whether the regime succeeds in mobilizing its citizens to actively participate in this effort, or whether it is obliged simply to impose it by force, does not disrupt this definitional core. In this sense, totalitarianism is a composite blend of diverse intellectual elements that may be identified, most minimally, as *utopianism*, *scientism*, and *revolutionary violence*. In practice, its legitimation draws on all of these diverse currents of thought, and equally each frames the project of transformation that it seeks to enact. The two things are in fact inextricably linked: the claim to legitimacy turns on the promise to bring into being the glorious new dawn.

Totalitarianism of both the right and left draws selectively on utopian ideas. From one direction it derives from a specific vision of the community imagined via a blueprint, proposed with the aim of exposing the degeneracy of contemporary society, and intimately linked with a belief in the need for a complete transformation of human nature. Communism, for instance, conceived class oppression as the root of all wrongs and accordingly sought to eliminate all class differences, while National Socialism saw the corruption of the present as being embedded in racial impurity and was thereby animated by the quest to achieve racial unity. In this connection, some commentators have observed a millenarian variant of utopianism at work, located in the aim of realizing a kind of earthly paradise.

In its second composite element, totalitarianism embraces the modern scientific worldview. The historical destiny that the projected utopia is predicated upon rests on (pseudo)scientific laws of social and political change that grant a privileged status, as determinants of progress, to class, race, or nation. Typically, the single totalitarian party poses as the interpreter of these historical forces that, conceived as inevitable, are in principle beyond human control. Yet, in "acting out" the struggle envisaged, totalitarian regimes vigorously set out to remake social and political reality in line with this conception, finally by murderously removing from the community the entire range of its socially and racially defined enemies. In so doing totalitarianism meets with a last strand, that of revolutionary violence. The earliest intimation of this possibly appeared in the Terror of the French Revolution and, while characteristically evident in totalitarianism in its initial phase on taking power, violence is also intrinsic to its dynamic and often perceived in almost religious terms as a cleansing source.

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See also Democracy; Genocide; Power

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Toxic Waste

Every year, industrialized nations—via their industries, consumers, and cities—produce millions of tons of toxic waste. These hazards directly and indirectly contribute to high rates of human morbidity and mortality and to ecosystem damage on every continent and ocean system. Since the end of World War II, industrialized nations have generated increasing volumes of hazardous chemical wastes—a result of technological developments across all industry sectors. Reinforcing this trend is a culture of increasing acceptance of such risks in this late modern era.

Every living thing on the Earth has been exposed to some level of human-made toxic substances. Toxic chemicals and their residues pervade our environment and reside in all of our bodies. For example, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a study in January 2003 in which they tested a sample of more than 9,000 individuals across the United

States and found pesticides in 100 percent of their bodies.

This is a relatively new phenomenon, as the production and use of hazardous substances increased exponentially in warfare, agriculture, electronics, and a range of industries in the past six decades. Since that time, the industrial and consumer economies have come to rely heavily upon products made of chlorinated hydrocarbons. The size of the industries associated with these substances (plastics, oil, pharmaceuticals, and pesticides and chemicals) grew in response to increased demand from related industrial sectors and increased consumer demand for related products. The associated by-products were thus intensely toxic and increasingly ubiquitous. Today's hazardous wastes are the perilous physical and cultural residues of industrial production with deep historical roots, as the rise of urbanism and industrialization in the West went hand in hand with pollution.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is a federal U.S. law that defines as "hazardous" those materials that may present a significant threat to human health or the environment when treated, transported, disposed of, stored, or managed improperly. While this definition is technically correct, the emphasis on the idea that such wastes only present a danger when "improperly" handled is misleading, since the very existence of these materials is hazardous. Moreover, the designation of materials as hazardous suggests they lie at the extreme end of the production spectrum when, in fact, they are at the core of any industrial society. The numerous industries that generate hazardous wastes are at the center of industrialized nations, producing employment, revenue, and social benefits. Hazardous wastes are generated by nearly every industry, and those industries that themselves generate few hazardous wastes nonetheless use products from hazardous waste-generating industries. Societies in the global North are particularly implicated in this process because they tend to be the largest producers of such toxins.

There is a general absence of rigorous, longitudinal, and definitive data on the health and environmental risks of our chemical intensive lifestyle. Despite Rachel Carson's own research and dire warnings in her classic book *Silent Spring,* we continue to produce and use even more chemicals today and have taken few steps to understand their potential effects before doing so. This is why many scientists, policymakers, and environmental activists are calling for the adoption of the "Precautionary Principle"—the policy that if there is a reasonable indication that a chemical may be unsafe, then we should refrain from using it, even if there is not yet conclusive scientific evidence to that effect. This is a regulatory approach that shifts the burden of proof that chemicals are safe onto the producers rather than allowing them to essentially test these materials on an unwitting public. The current regulatory framework in the United States presumes chemicals are innocent until proven guilty and simply releases them into widespread use until there is reason to believe they are unsafe. The consequences have been disastrous. We have scarcely any toxicological data on the more than 80,000 chemicals in use today. The extent of toxin production and its associated risk in the United States is staggering. The United States produces nearly 6 trillion pounds of chemicals annually. Toxic materials exposure can cause genetic defects, reproductive disorders, cancers, neurological damage, and the destruction of immune systems.

The evidence of risk and disease associated with the production and use of toxic chemicals is mounting. In February 2004, scientists with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated that 1 in 6 pregnant women in the United States has enough mercury in her blood to pose a risk of brain damage to her developing child. This new estimate is double that of a previous calculation. Mercury is a heavy metal and, when ingested or spilled in the environment in tiny amounts, can wreak havoc on the nervous system of humans and other living beings. Effects include brain, lung, and kidney damage and death. Mercury is released into the environment primarily by power plants and waste incinerators polluting the air, and it is then deposited into oceans and other waterways, where humans and other animals ingest it and it bioaccumulates throughout the food chain.

Polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) are a little known class of neurotoxic chemicals found in computers, televisions, cars, furniture, and other common products used by consumers every day. PBDEs are ubiquitous not only because they are contained in so many consumer products but because they also leak into the environment during production, use, and disposal. As a result, they are found in household dust, indoor and outdoor air, watersheds, and the body tissues of dozens of animal species around the world, including humans. Women's breast milk in the United States, Europe, and Canada has been found to have high levels of PBDEs, and most residents in the

United States are believed to carry this chemical in their bodies at unsafe levels.

European Union (EU) nations continue to pollute at an alarming volume as well. One in five persons employed in the EU is exposed to carcinogenic agents on the job. Cancer, asthma, and neuropsychiatric disorders are some of the illnesses associated with the 100,000 chemicals and biological agents marketed in the EU, according to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. Approximately two thirds of the 30,000 most commonly used chemicals in the EU have not been fully tested for their potential health effects on humans or the environment.

Nonetheless, European environmental organizations have successfully pressured states and industries to pass legislation that would mandate the risk evaluation of chemical substances, such as the REACH policy—the Registration Evaluation Authorization of Chemicals—and the requirement that electronics manufacturers produce their goods with fewer toxic substances and take back those products for recycling at the end of their consumer life—such as the Restriction on Hazardous Substances and the Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive.

Unfortunately, affluence among nations is highly correlated with the production of toxic waste. In the early 1990s, the 24 richest and most heavily industrialized nations collectively produced 98 percent of all hazardous wastes. Today rich nations in general are *not* reducing the level of hazardous wastes produced. Industrialized nations produce 220 pounds of hazardous waste per person each year. This figure is expected to rise to 320 pounds by the year 2020.

Given the high level of toxicity of everyday life in industrialized nations of the global North, if states and corporations are not planning to reduce toxic inputs into production, then it makes sense to seek outlets for dumping some of the most hazardous substances elsewhere, to reduce exposure to these dangers. A logical approach, then, would be to export these wastes to global South communities.

Toxic Waste Trade and Dumping

Today, it is estimated that nearly 3 million tons of hazardous waste from the United States and other industrialized nations cross international borders each year. Much of this waste is being shipped from wealthy nations in Europe, the United States, and Japan to poor nations in Latin America, the Caribbean, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa. This is what scholars call “environmental inequality” and it is a global problem.

Four factors explain this shift of toxic burdens to the global South. First is the exponential increase in the production of hazardous waste and the emergence of more stringent environmental regulations in northern nations. These changes increased the costs of waste treatment and disposal in the global North, which are magnitudes greater than in most southern nations. Similarly, the typical legal apparatus found in industrialized nations is much more burdensome when compared to the lax regulatory regimes in many nations in the South, which allow for dumping at a fraction of the cost. This is due partly to a comparatively more influential environmental movement sector in industrialized nations, which contributed to building regulatory structures that provide a minimal level of oversight over polluting firms. The unintended consequence of this environmentalist success in the North is to provide an incentive for the worst polluters to seek disposal sites beyond national borders.

A second factor pushing hazardous waste beyond northern borders is the widespread need for fiscal relief among southern nations. This need—rooted in a long history of colonialism and contemporary loan/debt arrangements between southern and northern nations—often leads government officials in the South to accept financial compensation in exchange for permission to dump chemical wastes in their borders. Many observers have described these transactions as economically efficient, while others prefer the term *garbage imperialism*.

The third driving force behind the international export of hazardous materials is the seemingly inexorable power of economic globalization, which has a logic that dictates that industries must cut costs and increase profits or simply fail. Economic globalization allows and requires firms to access global consumer and commercial markets and labor forces, increase automation, and improve efficiencies in a 24-hour economy that is more interdependent than ever. The same logic applies to those industries that manage the hazardous wastes that market economies produce: they must access markets and buyers where the prices allow for increasing profits and reduced costs. This means those wastes will be traded and dumped in nations and regions where, as a result of unstable states and vulnerable economies, pricing will be more profitable to waste management firms and brokers.

The fourth reason for the global waste trade is a racist and classist culture and ideology within global North communities and institutions that view toxic dumping on poor communities of color as perfectly acceptable. This ideology is best exemplified in an infamous internal World Bank memo authored by Lawrence Summers, then chief economist and vice president of the World Bank, in which he argued that the World Bank should encourage the migration of polluting industries to poor nations because such a practice would be economically efficient.

In 1989, the world's nations came together via the United Nations and created the Basel Convention to regulate the international trade in toxic wastes. A few years later, they reconvened to pass an amendment—called the Basel Ban—that bans the flow of hazardous waste from rich to poor nations.

A Theoretical Perspective

German social theorist Ulrich Beck offers a productive way to think about toxic wastes in the late modern era. He argues that we live in a risk society—a stage in human evolution marked by a fundamental transformation in the relationship between society and the environment where we witness an exponential increase in the production and use of hazardous chemical substances. These practices elevate the level of social and physical risk to scales never before imagined. Ecological risks are deeply embedded in society and are extremely harmful, yet frequently are difficult to measure.

Beck argues that the politics of the distribution of environmental degradation favor more powerful communities over others. Thus advanced capitalism creates wealth for some and imposes risks on others, at least in the short term. In the long run, the problem of widespread global ecological harm, however, ends up returning to impact its creators in a boomerang effect. That is, the risks of modernity eventually haunt those who originally produced them. This generalization of risks unlimited in time or space is experienced by all persons, all groups, across the divides of social class and ethnicity. One example is the spread of health problems that result from exposure to pesticide residues. The risk society thesis puts forward the position that modernity is a fundamentally anti-ecological endeavor.

If toxic waste is an ordinary by-product of industrialization, then this raises serious questions about the way we define and achieve progress within human societies. Toxic waste is therefore part of a much broader problem rooted in the proliferation of toxic jobs, toxic industries, and toxic communities that constitute the risk society.

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See also Ecosystem; Environment, Hazardous Waste; Environment, Pollution; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Environmental Degradation; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Movement

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Trade Deficit

See Current Account Deficit

Traffic Congestion

The social problem called *traffic congestion* results when the number of vehicles using the existing transportation facilities and systems serving a country, city, community, or other area (infrastructure) exceed that infrastructure's carrying capacity. Characterizing traffic congestion are a decrease in the actual speed a vehicle may travel regardless of posted speed limit, increased travel time, and/or an increase in the amount of time it takes to enter an existing flow of traffic. The amount of traffic congestion depends on both recurring (regular rush hour traffic) and nonrecurring (congestion due to special road construction) variables.

According to the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), since 1982 traffic congestion has increased in all cities across the United States. In 2003, the Texas Transportation Institute studied 85 U.S. urban areas and found that traffic congestion caused an estimated 1.9 billion hours of delay and cost an estimated $63 billion in wasted time and fuel. Solutions to this overall increase in traffic congestion include building more roads and highways, using the existing infrastructure more efficiently, and a more controversial measure, the privatization of U.S. highways.

Measures of Traffic Congestion

The FHWA officially measures traffic congestion in terms of a *travel time index* and *delay.* The travel time index consists of the ratio of the time it takes to travel during peak infrastructure use to the time it takes to travel the same distance when traffic flows freely. For example, if a commuter must spend 35 minutes traveling from point A to point B during a holiday, but only spends 20 minutes traveling that same distance on a regular weekday, that travel time is calculated by dividing 20 by 35, and travel time is 1.75 in the travel time index. This measure accounts for both reoccurring (i.e., late afternoon commuter traffic) and incidental (i.e., traffic accidents) travel interruptions. The Texas Transportation Institute found that the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, California, urban area had a travel time index of 1.84, while the Corpus Christi, Texas, urban area had a travel time index of 1.04, indicating that the former urban area experienced more congestion than the latter.

The *delay* measure consists of annual hours of delay (hours of extra travel time due to congestion), annual delay per capita (hours of extra travel time divided by area population), and annual delay per road user (extra travel time hours divided by peak period road users). For example, the Texas Transportation Institute's regular analysis of traffic congestion in the largest 85 urban areas demonstrated that American travelers lost 47 hours in annual hours of delay, up from 16 annual hours of delay in the 1982 traffic congestion survey.

In addition to the time travel index and delay, recently the FHWA began measuring *travel time reliability,* a measure of variation in travel time taking into account unpredictable congestion (i.e., a traffic light malfunctions, leaving cars backed up at an intersection until police arrive to direct traffic). Travel time reliability varies over time because conditions such as the weather and work zones vary over time. Traveling in an area with highly variable travel time causes travelers to leave extra time, or *buffer,* in their schedule for possible delays; even though at worst this may result in a traveler arriving early instead of on time, this is still time the traveler might have used more productively elsewhere.

Officials measure travel time reliability in terms of how travel time varies hour to hour or day to day. For example, a traveler might report that it takes 30 minutes to reach a destination with no traffic or construction, but with an active work zone on the road it takes 1 hour and 30 minutes. Travelers must consider this unpredictable event when planning their journey or risk arriving at their destination late.

Underlying Causes

Many variables, including season of the year, day of the week, and time of day may affect the number of vehicles attempting to use existing infrastructure. Additionally, the weather, work zones, slow-moving vehicles, poorly timed traffic signals, special events such as parades, emergencies such as evacuations, and traffic accidents (among others) may affect an infrastructure's carrying capacity as well as the number of vehicles attempting to utilize the infrastructure. According to the FHWA, the most common cause of traffic congestion is a *bottleneck,* a point where either the roadway shrinks to fewer lanes or regular traffic demands cause traffic to stop (approximately 40 percent of all traffic congestion). Any infrastructure may experience traffic congestion at any time as demand increases. At times, traffic congestion may develop into a *traffic jam,* a condition in which a number of vehicles impede the movement of other vehicles to the extent that no vehicles are moving.

Solutions

The FHWA suggests that the country can decrease its traffic congestion by focusing on improving service on roads, increasing the price of road usage, increasing available infrastructure, improving efficiency of work zones, managing travel demand through interagency coordination, and providing travelers with accurate, up-to-date traffic information. Many of these same strategies also improve travel time reliability, thus reducing traffic congestion due to travelers leaving a time buffer in their schedule.

Improved service on existing roads can result from managing traffic more efficiently. Some Department of Transportation suggestions to improve road service and reduce congestion include updating traffic signal equipment and/or timing devices to improve traffic flow, improving the accessibility of major roadways from secondary roadways, and responding more proactively to adverse weather by reducing speed limits and posting weather advisories on roadside electronic signs. Other suggestions involve charging a higher toll price during periods of increased infrastructure use and improving work zone traffic efficiency through developing transportation management plans to guide work zone behavior, limiting the number of lanes closed for work zones, and timing lane closures for minimum traffic disruption (for example, overnight instead of daylight land closures).

As part of efforts to increase travel time reliability, engineers and urban planners suggest several practical strategies. First, they suggest constructing more or larger highways in order to increase overall infrastructure while simultaneously redesigning roadways and others areas with a history of bottlenecks. Additionally, they suggest improving the efficiency of the existing infrastructure and working on *travel demand management*, finding alternatives to commuting alone. An example of travel demand management is the use of high-occupancy vehicle lanes that channel carpooling (multiple occupancy) commuters into an area of the highway with less traffic, and encouraging more efficient use of existing infrastructure by offering an incentive that decreases the total number of vehicles using the highway.

Privatization

Globally, several industrialized nations allow private companies to own and/or build or operate highways, for example, Canada, India, and Italy. Privatizing U.S. highways is a controversial method of decreasing traffic congestion, with some arguing that government involvement in U.S. infrastructure is impractical, resulting in a high cost to the public as well as inefficient maintenance. Others suggest that the government should develop comprehensive infrastructure, for example, in the form of mass transit that takes into account not only efficient transportation but also the effects of infrastructure use on communities and urban areas.

The primary argument by proponents for privatizing U.S. highways is that privatization will improve overall highway efficiency and durability while decreasing overall infrastructure cost by promoting competition. Opponents focus on the risk that, rather than decreasing consumer cost, privatization will result in increased cost to the consumer through government overregulation over who can purchase highways, their maintenance, and measurements of the quality of their performance.

The Dulles Greenway, opened for travel in Virginia on September 29, 1995, is an example of an existing for-profit road operating in the United States. It consists of a 14-mile extension connecting the Washington Dulles International Airport with Leesburg, Virginia. The company that operates the road publicizes the reduction in travel time, claiming that, prior to the road's construction, a trip from Leesburg to Dulles took 30 minutes, but once the highway opened, the same trip takes less than 15 minutes.

Heather M. Griffiths

See also Accidents, Automobile; Environment, Pollution; Road Rage; Urban Infrastructure; Urban Sprawl

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Transgender and Transsexuality

Transsexuality is a term used to describe individuals who desire to change their sex and/or gender presentation. Transsexuals may also self-identify as male-to-female (MTF), female-to-male (FTM), preoperative, postoperative, or nonoperative transsexuals. For example, the experience and visibility level of MTF

transsexuals may be dramatically different than FTM transsexuals, because they are transgressing different gender boundaries.

Since the late 1980s, *transgender* has come into common use as an umbrella term for individuals identifying as transvestites, transsexuals, gender queer, no gender, or multiple genders. Although some transsexuals identify as transgender, the two identities are not interchangeable; indeed, transgender-identified individuals tend to have a history within the lesbian, gay, and bisexual social and political communities. Social problems faced by transsexuals and transgenders may include difficulty with state recognition of sex or gender changes and discrimination in employment, insurance access, and housing, along with violence and suicide.

Most difficulties faced by transsexuals and transgenders are rooted in the legal and social ambiguity of changing gender or sex status, which varies by country and culture. For example, in the United States, many states either require expensive medical procedures in order to change legal documents or do not allow individuals to change the sex listed on their birth certificates or driver's licenses. Because many social interactions and structures are organized based on gender, transsexuals and transgenders may face discrimination if they are perceived as gender ambiguous or transgressive. This daily discrimination may include refusal in public accommodations, violence on the street, and hate speech. Some cultures have space for "third gender" or gender transformative roles, such as the *berdache* tradition in Native American culture or *hijras* in India, that may alleviate this discrimination. Other cultures may include roles for gender transformative individuals, such as prostitution, that may intensify this discrimination.

In the past two decades, transsexual and transgender activists have organized through support groups and the growing transsexual and transgender movement to advocate for social justice. After World War II, well-known transsexuals such as Christine Jorgenson, British actor Jan Morris, and American tennis player Renee Richards raised public visibility of issues facing transsexuals. Contemporary activists such as Pat Califia, Kate Bornstein, and Leslie Feinberg have continued this education and activism. Transgender activism within the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement has led to the increase in local and statewide protections against discrimination for transsexuals and transgenders. Both transsexual and transgender activists have also been involved in various local and national activism around access to medical insurance and health care, street violence, police harassment, and shelter accommodations for homeless transgenders.

Amy L. Stone

See also Bisexuality; Sexuality; Sexual Orientation

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Transition Living

Young adults with disabilities are less likely than their nondisabled peers to be employed full-time, enroll in postsecondary education, earn a bachelor's degree, and engage in recreational activities such as going to the movies with their friends. Unlike their nondisabled peers, upon leaving school and entering the real world, young adults with disabilities tend to be more reliant on society and are less likely to engage in meaningful employment, postsecondary education, and independent living. In an effort to increase the ability of individuals with disabilities to become contributing members of society and to have a better quality of life, transition planning has become part of school programming. Coupled with the need for school programming to better prepare individuals with disabilities for postschool life is the need to provide appropriate education to a growing number of adolescents with disabilities. In 1974, federal legislation mandated public education, equal to their nondisabled peers, for all students with disabilities. As a result, a greater number of individuals with disabilities remain in the school system through middle and high school. However, a larger percentage of students with disabilities fail to graduate than do their nondisabled peers.

Outcome research indicates that many students with disabilities are not obtaining the same quality of life as their nondisabled peers. They are more likely to

leave school before completing high school, be socially isolated, live with their parents, and be unemployed. Research shows that 22 percent of students with disabilities do not complete high school, compared to 9 percent of students without disabilities. Between the ages of 18 and 64, individuals with disability experience a 32 percent employment rate while their nondisabled peers experience an 81 percent employment rate. Sixteen percent of students with disabilities who enroll in postsecondary education earn bachelor's degrees, while 27 percent of their nondisabled peers earn bachelor's degrees. Approximately 60,000 individuals with disabilities ages 18–24 annually qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Income (SSDI). Once enrolled, fewer than 1 percent ever leaves. These statistics illustrate that many individuals with disabilities lead a dependent life rather than a life as an independent, engaged, and contributing member of society.

Defining Transition Living

Responding to these poor outcomes, federal legislation mandated schools to provide transition planning to students with disabilities beginning no later than their 16th birthdays. The law defines *transition* as a results-oriented process focused on improving the functional and academic achievement of students with disabilities. Transition planning focuses on assisting students who are leaving school to move successfully into vocational education, integrated employment, postsecondary education, adult services, continuing and adult education, independent living, and community participation. Transition planning and services rest on individual student needs, strengths, preferences, and interests. The range of services includes instruction, related services, community experiences, employment, and other adult living objectives, and daily living skills and functional vocational evaluation, when appropriate. Each student's interests and needs on an individual basis through the Individualized Education Program (IEP) determine development of transition services. A team that meets on an annual basis develops this document. Through IEP meetings, the team determines the student's desired postschool outcomes (where the student wants to live, work, and play), determines the student's present levels of educational performance and priority educational needs, evaluates progress toward meeting previous measurable annual goals and short-term objectives or benchmarks, and develops new measurable annual goals and short-term objectives or benchmarks for the coming year. The content of the IEP determines the transition programming and services provided.

As the field of transition developed, so did transition service delivery models. The initial transition model depicts high school with three bridges crossing to employment. These bridges represent the levels of services that students need to transition successfully from high school into employment. The three levels are (1) no services, (2) time-limited services, and (3) ongoing services. This first model since expanded to incorporate competencies learned prior to and throughout high school, such as self-determination, communication, academics, health and fitness, and relationship building. Expansions of the first model also include additional outcomes such as postsecondary education, residential living, social and interpersonal networks, leisure and recreation, and community membership. In addition, the expanded models address the needed systems change to support transition services and programs, including interagency collaboration, integrated community participation, and transition planning and services.

Best Practices

Identified best practices addressing skills needed by students include competencies in self-determination, academic and vocational education, relationship building, consumerism, and self-maintenance. Best practices in processes needed to support transition programming include community experiences, individualized planning, family involvement, and interagency coordination. One example of a curriculum addressing skills needed for transition and life is comprised of 22 competencies grouped under the three headings: daily living skills, personal and social skills, and occupational guidance and preparation skills. The competencies include such skills as maintaining personal relationships, obtaining specific occupational skills, making adequate decisions, getting around the community, managing personal finances, and exhibiting responsible citizenship. Another curriculum for life skills instruction lists six domains: employment and education, home and family, leisure pursuits, community involvement, physical and emotional health, and personal responsibility and relationships. Examples of competencies listed within these domains are the ability to seek and secure a job, maintain a budget, prepare

to go on a trip, understand legal rights, plan a nutritional diet, and establish and maintain friendships. Although both these curricula were developed for use with students with diverse learning needs, they are appropriate and easily adapted for all learners.

Transition and life skills are taught through infusion into existing curriculum as well as in separate career-related classes and lessons. Learning takes place in schools, in the community, and on work sites. Students receive individualized transition services based on their interests and needs as outlined in their IEP. Some students will require minimal transition supports and services. Their programs occur in fully integrated high school settings with a college preparation course of study leading to entrance into a 4-year university. These students graduate with standard diplomas, are able to function in the community, and hold jobs without supports. In school they may need limited academic or behavioral supports. Other students will need a higher level of supports and services, receive more intensive specialized services focusing on daily living skills and community-based instruction, and are less likely to enter general high school programs. Upon leaving school they receive nonstandard diplomas or certificates. In both work and the community, they are able to function independently or semi-independently with ongoing necessary supports. Between these two ends of the continuum are programs with various levels of independence and supports within the school, community, and employment settings.

School-based and community-based supports and services are crucial to successful transition programming. Within the school system teachers, transition specialists, and related personnel work with the students to provide academic and vocational education, transition assessment, life skills education, and on- and off-campus job training. Community-based personnel from agencies such as vocational rehabilitation and children's medical services provide services to eligible students as designated by the mission of the agency. These might include support to clientele in integrated employment, vocational evaluation, living arrangements, physical or mental health, and adaptive equipment. Linking students with these agencies while they are still in school aids in a smooth transition into these services when they are adults.

As students with disabilities reach the age of majority, changes occur in their legal rights and the provision of agency and postsecondary educational services. Changes include, in part, issues related to guardianship, lessening of services received as a child, provision of services based on eligibility, not entitlement, and self-identification of disability in order to receive accommodations in employment or education. It is important for young adults with disabilities and their families to be aware of these changes before they occur to ensure a smooth transition. An interagency council comprised of individuals with disabilities, family members, secondary and postsecondary educators, employers, community-based organizations, and agency representatives help facilitate the provisions of these services.

Evaluation of transition programming and services is ongoing. One method of identifying best practices is looking at student outcomes and evaluating the impact of the services and programs students received on these outcomes. As the field grows, it is crucial to use these evaluations to identify and support needed changes.

Jeanne B. Repetto

See also Education, Special Needs Children; Educational Equity; Life Chances

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Transnational Activism

In an era of accelerating globalization, social and political activists increasingly operate beyond and across state borders. Their activities, commonly referred to as "transnational activism," reflect broader changes in the global political economy. New communication technologies play an important role in fueling this type of activism and expanding it across

diverse institutional realms. Social problems scholars increasingly focus on the prominent role that transnational activists play in the emergence of global social movements and their importance in understanding the larger dynamics of contemporary social change.

Confrontations with the existing order posed by such movements, depending on the nature of changes sought and the degree of militancy, eventually draw a response by state agencies and other private forms of organized social control. For social problems specialists, a daunting set of analytical issues results from the increasingly transnational character of this social process. As the theater of operations of social activism expands, its complexity deepens in a directly proportional manner. This makes transnational activism both challenging and exciting for critical analysts who must direct their attention to local, national, and global arenas of protest and response.

Types of Transnational Activism

Transnational activism spans a broad range of social movements, including labor internationalism, youth group federations, international feminist networks, pan-indigenous movements, global environmental coalitions, religious social activism, and alter-globalization forums. Their ideological orientation crosses the entire political spectrum from fundamentalist conservative to radical revolutionary, with no inherent link to any particular one of the numerous strategies available. From politicized consumer activities such as boycotts to mass protest, direct action, and even armed struggle, the forms that such activism can assume seem to expand continually.

Just like other kinds of activist activity, however, transnational activism tends to fall into some general behavioral patterns. Determining its relationship with social movements as an organized expression of resistance are responses to local, national, regional, and global social forces and to unacceptable institutionalized practices. At the same time, the broader political economy substantially conditions the landscape of transnational social movements and tends to structure or delimit their fields of operation. For example, a global trend toward energy and natural resource shortages can result in a global tendency to relax environmental protection standards. This in turn can generate transnational activism by global alliances of environmental groups in protest of the ecological consequences.

The dynamic of opposition and resistance is both a product of existing social forces and an active shaper of future institutionalized practices. Given the uneven character of social mobilization, structural upturns and downturns of the global economy, and political swings in the social control strategies of state and supra-state authorities, transnational activist activities tend to ebb and flow at uneven rhythms. At any given moment, however, transactional activism possesses the potential for unity and effectively coordinated actions, making it an essential focus for studying social change.

For example, in the less-developed regions of the global South, the world superpowers implemented policies in the 1970s as a response to a global recession, seeking to restore previous rates of growth and profit through greater liberalization and penetration of transnational corporations into developing economies. Emphasis on free trade agreements, opening up new markets, and expanding investment from the North adversely affected the most vulnerable sectors of the developing South. This in turn yielded a dramatic increase in poverty, unemployment, and numerous social inequalities, resulting in an inevitable crescendo of protest by those so affected.

Soon the resurgent demands of organized social movements transformed into a groundswell of support for demanding greater global justice. Beginning from loosely knit, transnational coalitions of protest groups, the movement gradually coalesced into an ever-more-consolidated clamor for social justice under the umbrella of a global mobilization. This transnational activist movement manifested a diverse social composition of many feeling the brunt of neoliberal-style globalization, including public sector workers, peasant farmers, students, oppressed national minorities, women, and even portions of a newly impoverished middle class.

As the global, elite-dominated media establishment sought to label the movement an expression of "globalphobia," transnational social justice activists proved resilient in developing their own label of "alter-globalization," showing that its struggle aimed to confront a specific kind of globalization; that is, a neoliberal project designed in the interests of certain national elites in collusion with foreign hegemonic powers.

Transnational global justice activists developed new slogans and distinctive forms of protest, taking advantage of new communications technologies to construct increasingly more complex networks and

alternative media networks. Their visibility quickly expanded with the consolidation of the World Social Forum, whose central unifying slogan, "Another World Is Possible," took hold. An important part of this struggle consisted in leading protests against a new generation of commercial schemes designed to make neoliberal policies self-perpetuating through their enshrinement in international trade laws. The World Trade Organization (WTO), created in 1995, is the best example, just as the 1999 protests in Seattle against the WTO marked intensification of popular resistance against it.

Sociological Approaches

To capture fully the dynamics of transnational activism, social problems research must confront the theoretical challenges of conceptualizing social movements in relation to nation-states and the transnational legal order developing within a larger and historically evolving political economy. To this end, two broad bands of methodological approaches toward transnational activism presently do so. Social constructionism (with its more subjectivistic roots in critical labeling theory), symbolic interactionism, and postmodernist critical theory focus on the "claims" that activists make in "framing" the overarching social problem fueling their protest and the various social forces shaping the life cycle or "rise and fall" of their activist activities. In contrast, structural approaches (with their more objectivistic roots in political sociology), resource mobilization, and political economy emphasize national, regional, and global trends that affect material social conditions, political power relations, and social class inequalities, all of which fuel dynamics of resistance against the existing distribution of wealth and power, prevailing social control agencies, and an emerging transnational legal order.

Modest attempts to bridge these two camps mostly emphasize the uneven manner in which transnational activism emerged, making it decisive in some areas while more nation-based social movements continue to predominate in others. This favors a more eclectic approach by looking both at political opportunity structures and framing processes as potentially key components of transnational activist activity. A more integrated, dialectical approach will eventually need to root transnational activism in the global political economy, the dynamic logic of social movements, and the expanding role of the legal order as a mediator of local, national, and supra-national power relations.

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See also Claims Making; Global Economy; Globalization; Social Movements; Transnational Social Movement

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Transnational Families

Transnationalism refers to the web of cultural, social, economic, and political relationships, practices, and identities built by immigrants between their country of origin and their country of settlement. Contrary to conventional wisdom, many immigrants do not sever their ties to their homeland but rather deepen them over time. Immigrant transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, but contemporary transnationalism involves more rapid and denser linkages between immigrants and the countries of origin than the experience of immigrants at the beginning of the 20th century. The intensity of transnational connections is made possible by the emergence of new communication and transportation technologies, including air transport, long distance telephone, facsimile communication, and electronic mail.

Transnational ties involve different levels of transaction and interaction with the country of origin. Transnational families often engage in a high rate of repeat or return migration to the country of origin. Families travel there regularly to visit with relatives or

attend to an emergency such as illness or death in the family. The frequency of these travels may depend on the distance between the countries and the cost of travel. Sustained transnational connections also result in the constant flow of goods and money, as transnational families send food and money back home to provide both material and financial support for relatives; their cash remittances amount to billions of dollars annually. Remittances provide financial support for parents, siblings, and relatives in the country of origin, paying for medical care, funerals, home improvement, tuition for siblings, or other family needs.

In addition, transnational families tend to maintain local business interests in their country of origin or even transnational entrepreneurship. Indeed, abundant evidence shows that cash remittances to the country of origin finance a variety of economic activities. In many cases the primary motivation for the migration itself may be the need to accumulate capital for investment in the country of origin. Often, that investment may be to build or buy a house, as many transnational families harbor plans to return permanently to the home country.

Transnational families may create not only social and economic ties but also political links with their country of origin. They may establish institutions and organizations that transcend the political boundaries of the countries of origin and settlement and seek to participate in the political landscape of their homelands. They may even demand the right to hold dual citizenship as well as the right to exercise all political rights that citizenship implies, including the right to vote and the right of representation, even while living abroad.

One of the main institutions shaping transnational ties and connections is the government of the country of origin. In many cases, the government of the sending country has created policies that encourage immigrants to maintain long-term attachments to their country of origin. The governments of the sending countries attempt to tap into the loyalty of the immigrant community in order to access their socioeconomic resources, guarantee the continuous flows of remittances, and promote or accommodate diasporan capitalism (the transfer of financial resources and other forms of capital by the diasporan population [i.e., immigrants] to their homeland for investment in economic activities). In an effort to promote or strengthen transnational ties, many governments either allow or are considering allowing dual citizenship.

Thomas Y. Owusu

See also Migration, Global; Transnational Activism; Transnational Social Movement

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Transnational Social Movement

Transnational social movements are movements whose members, organizations, or actions involve more than one nation. Some examples of contemporary transnational social movements are the global justice movement, the women’s movements, the human rights movement, and the indigenous people’s movements. Many social movement scholars link the emergence of transnational social movements to the contemporary processes of globalization, in particular the spread of information and communication technologies that enable people, ideas, finance, corporations, and organizations to move across borders with great ease. Transnational social movements actually hark back to the 19th century and even earlier. Anti-abolitionist, women’s suffrage, anti-colonial, and socialist movements are some earlier examples.

Four different kinds of transnational movements exist. The first are those that spread through diffusion as movement ideas, frames, and issues move from one country to another. Second are transnational movements resulting from external issues playing out on the

domestic level, such as protests in specific European countries against European Union policies. Another type involves supra-national bodies responding to local issues, such as trying former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in the International Criminal Court as he could not be tried in his own country. The fourth type is collective actions, such as simultaneously staged protests in different countries, for example, the protest marches that took place in many countries against the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003. In all four kinds of transnational movements, local states and political opportunity structures, as well as local activists and their local networks, are equally important. In addition, international bodies and resources can facilitate the spread of transnational social movements, such as the UN World conferences in the 1990s.

What is characteristic of contemporary transnational social movements is that even social movements based in one nation (local movements) are aware of how their issues, identities, strategies, methods, targets of protest, and worldviews can become transnational and how other transnational movements shape their own agenda. Thus, in contemporary transnational social movements, the identities, networks, and communities are as likely to be global as local and global dynamics and audiences constrain and facilitate movements.

The dominant organizational form of transnational social movements is the network or coalition of groups from several different countries. Often, these networks do not have a physical presence but exist solely in cyberspace. Members of networks might meet face to face at international protest events or conferences, but they accomplish most of their work through the Internet. Hence, the dominant protest repertoire of transnational social movements includes education and mobilization, symbolic framing, and strategic use of information. Advocacy, lobbying, support, and direct action are secondary, though increasingly becoming more important. Furthermore, the major targets of most transnational movements are policy mechanisms of local, national, regional, and multilateral international institutions. Such strategies favor educated, middle-class activists or "knowledge experts."

While there are transnational grassroots social movements as well, such as the Slum and Shack Dwellers International or Women in the Informal Economy Globalizing and Organizing, middle-class knowledge experts comprise most transnational social movements. This has led to transnational social movement skeptics who focus on the uneven geography of such movements. For example, in most transnational social movements, activists and organizations of northern countries are over-represented, with few collaborative relationships among social movements across geographic divides. In addition to geographic unevenness, most southern movements are financially dependent on northern movements. Furthermore, education is a necessary cultural capital and this sometimes leads to friction between those with formal education and those without, reproducing other inequalities within and across countries. Finally, working in transnational social movements sometimes takes away from local organizing and issues, thus creating fragmentation between those who are funded by global agencies and can work transnationally and those who work locally with local resources.

In contrast to these skeptics are transnational social movement boosters who focus on the advantages of transnational organizing. These include international attention to issues, pooling of resources and expertise across nations, and transnational solidarity, which makes a stronger, wider opposition to injustices that are global in scale. The boosters also focus on how the flow of information and resources is no longer just from the privileged North to the underprivileged South, but from South to North as well as from South to South, as activists work across many different borders. Transnational social movement boosters also point to the increasing transnational collective action and its potential for global-level changes.

Many scholars today see transnational social movements as permanent, but the past teaches us that transnational movements are neither inevitable nor irreversible. For example, the international labor movement had its heyday in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but received major setbacks after World War II. Also, while the global and local shape each other, tensions between local needs and international concerns are often difficult to reconcile. Despite their uncertain future, contemporary transnational social movements have been successful in multiple ways. For example, the transnational women's movement led to legislative and policy changes for gender justice in many countries, including a global gender equality regime via the United Nations. Similarly, the transnational environmental movements succeeded in bringing world attention to global warming and through the UN system to pass the Kyoto Protocol. The global justice movement highlighted the contradictions of corporate globalization and the growing inequalities that resulted from it and the need for

alternatives, as epitomized by the World Social Forum motto: "Another World Is Possible."

Manisha Desai

See also Collective Consciousness; Community; Globalization; Social Movements; Social Networks

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Trickle-Down Economics

Trickle-down is a political-economic term used to describe certain economic theories and policies. It implies that policies to help the wealthy directly will also have a positive impact on the middle and lower classes and the poor, with a trickle of the original largesse.

The intent of so-called trickle-down policies is to help the wealthy; it is fine if benefits trickle down to the poor, but the point is to help the wealthy. Hence, these theories are criticized by opponents *as* trickle-down; it is a negative label and one that no one would use for their own theory. The proponents of these theories and policies insist that "trickle-down" is simply not an accurate description of what is going on. They would argue, for example, that Reagan's supply-side tax cuts, an oft-cited instance of trickle-down economics, expanded the economy, benefiting all economic classes. Rather than a trickle to lower economic classes, steady economic growth occurred in which everyone significantly participated.

The supposed impact of a tax cut for a wealthy corporation is the classic example of trickle-down economics. If the government lowers taxes for a wealthy corporation, then this corporation receives immediate, direct benefits in the form of higher profits. "Trickling-down" occurs when this business then expands output and hires more workers who then receive monetary benefits in the form of wages; the tax cut dollars thus "trickle-down" to the workers in an analogy to water trickling down a series of steps to finally arrive at the bottom.

In an interesting disavowal of views that he had earlier championed, Reagan-era director of the Office of Management and Budget, David Stockman, described Reagan's supply-side policies as trickle-down. Reagan's idea was to cut tax rates significantly for wealthy individuals while also cutting the capital gains tax. The idea behind this was to increase the wealthy's incentive for investment, which would then lead to greater economic growth. Rather than a trickle ending at the lower economic classes, there would be a torrent of goods and services for everyone. Stockman, however, derided these policies, saying that the real intent was to lower the top marginal income tax rates (i.e., benefit the wealthy directly) and that pointing to whatever may trickle down to the lower income classes was only a crude attempt at justifying these essentially pro-wealthy policies.

President George W. Bush's 2003 tax cuts on investments have also been called trickle-down economics, with the majority of the savings going to those whose annual income was greater than $1 million. Similarly to Reagan, Bush justified these cuts by saying that they would boost investment spending and economic growth. Critics, however, simply saw this as a cynical effort to garner widespread support for what was essentially a pro-wealthy policy by claiming that it would benefit those at the other end of the income distribution.

Paul A. Swanson

See also Conservative Approaches; Wealth, U.S. Consumer; Wealth Disparities

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Twelve-Step Programs

Twelve-step programs include the namesake organization, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), and other mutual help programs that are modeled on the 12 steps of AA. Their unifying assumption is that the most effective and efficient path to recovery from alcoholism, addiction, and other problems is the dynamic of mutual help—one addict helping another. AA's primacy and influence make detailed knowledge of its approach essential to understanding twelve-step programs in general.

Since the founding and development of Alcoholics Anonymous in the United States during the late 1930s, numerous programs representing a broad range of maladies have utilized the general principles of AA, the 12 steps. Initially concentrated in North America, AA and its spin-offs have progressively been adapted and implemented in significant areas of the world.

Alcoholics Anonymous

History

On May 11, 1935, a failed, middle-aged New York City stockbroker, William Griffith Wilson, was in the lobby of the Mayflower Hotel in Akron, Ohio, facing a decision of whether to drink or maintain his 5 months of sobriety. Drawing upon knowledge of what would later be called "12 stepping," the recovering alcoholic decided to reach out and try to remain sober by working with another alcoholic. Through a series of telephone contacts, ending with Henrietta Siberling, he was put in touch with Robert Holbrook Smith, an alcoholic and a practicing surgeon. Although not immediately successful, Dr. Smith did achieve sobriety a month later, thus laying the cornerstone upon which an association of alcoholics premised their recovery on the concept that one alcoholic working with another was an effective method of becoming sober and maintaining sobriety.

The moral tone and fundamental traditions from which Alcoholics Anonymous evolved were prevalent in American and European religious and philosophical thought in the 1800s in organizational forerunners, including the Washingtonian Society and the Oxford Groups. Bill Wilson, in particular, was strongly influenced by the philosophy and theology of William James and by currents of popular psychoanalytic thought that led AA to combine a spiritual, scientific, and medical approach to the treatment of alcoholism.

Description

A brief description of AA is provided each month in the *Grapevine*, AA's international journal. Typically, this description is read at the beginning of AA meetings:

> Alcoholics Anonymous is a fellowship of men and women who share their experience, strength, and hope with each other that they may solve their common problem and help others to recover from alcoholism. The only requirement for membership is a desire to stop drinking. There are no dues or fees for A.A. membership; we are self-supporting through our own contributions. A.A. is not allied with any sect, denomination, politics, organization or institution; does not wish to engage in any controversy; neither endorses nor opposes any causes. Our primary purpose is to stay sober and help other alcoholics to achieve sobriety.

The core of the AA program and the basic dynamics of recovery are best conveyed through the organization's 12 steps:

1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God, *as we understood Him.*
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure them or others.

10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God *as we understood Him*, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs.

The 12 steps provide a systematic and pragmatic regimen as well as a broad philosophy of life. Members of AA and other twelve-step programs use phrases like "working the steps" or "working the program." Whatever the malady (alcoholism, drug addiction, gambling), the beginning of recovery starts with admission of the problem and the commitment to cease the behavior "one day at a time." Group participants strive to "transcend" their problems and themselves by becoming other-centered rather than self-centered. Specifically, they come to trust and depend on others—whether it be God or a Higher Power, the group itself, a sponsor, or other addicts. In group jargon, "In order to keep it, you have to give it away." Dependence on others and the belief that by helping others one helps oneself defines twelve-step programs as mutual-help rather than self-help groups.

The basic activity of twelve-step programs takes place in meetings at which participants share their experience, strength, and hope. In some meetings, participants provide personal testimonials; in other meetings participants discuss aspects of the program (e.g., one of the steps) or topics of interest or issue for specific members. In all meetings, the central dynamic is to highlight the value and the benefit of the new or sober life versus the old, addicted life and to attribute these changes to successfully working the program. In addition to meetings, working the program takes place in informal settings (open houses or club houses), in relationships between members and sponsors, and through helping others (twelve-step work).

Membership and Growth

AA initially grew slowly through personal contact and word of mouth in Akron/Cleveland, Ohio, and in New York City. With the publication in 1939 of the "Big Book" (*Alcoholics Anonymous: The Story of How Many Thousands of Men and Women Have Recovered from Alcoholism*), an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* by Jack Alexander in 1941, and endorsement by influential people, membership reached 100,000 by 1950. Membership climbed to a million by the late 1970s and stands at more than 2 million today. These figures are estimates—probably conservative—since the organization maintains no official membership list or files.

Other Twelve-Step Programs

The AA program has spawned satellite, copycat, and spin-off organizations. Al-Anon and Alateen, both satellite organizations founded in the 1950s, focus their attention on family and friends. Copycat organizations include Narcotics Anonymous and Gamblers Anonymous, founded in the 1950s, and Co-Dependents Anonymous, founded in the late 1970s. More recently formed and less well-known groups include Debtors Anonymous, Spenders Anonymous, Emotions Anonymous, and Sexual Compulsives Anonymous. Spin-off organizations take selected aspects of AA ideology and practice and specifically reject others. For example, Rational Recovery and Secular Organization for Sobriety, founded in the 1980s, and the Society of Links in Sweden, founded in the 1940s, reject the spiritual and religious implications of AA while accepting repentance, restitution, and transcendence.

Popularity and Effectiveness

Anecdotal and popular data abound, but definitive empirical data remain limited. The 1990 U.S. National Alcohol Survey indicates that 13 percent of adults ages 18 and older, approximately 24 million, reported having attended a twelve-step meeting. While many of these were seeking help, some were likely supporting family members and others attending as part of an educational experience or requirement. The 2000 National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey (NLAES) found that of individuals who had sought help because of drinking, nearly 76 percent also reported having attended a twelve-step meeting. Research generally shows that these programs are as effective as, and sometimes more so than, professional treatment. Twelve-step programs have other advantages. Among others, they are anonymous, usually free and voluntary, with the added benefit of 24-hour-a-day guidance and support as needed from group members and a personal sponsor.

From a humble beginning, two men, Bill Wilson and the aforementioned Robert Smith, became the founding fathers of the Fellowship of Alcoholics Anonymous and began a revolution in alcoholic recovery, which, in turn, has been applied to many walks of life. As a consequence, AA principles and philosophy have gained widespread, if not universal, acceptance, and their program of recovery has been adapted for usage in nearly every category within the world of addiction treatment.

David R. Rudy and Hugh Everman

See also Addiction; Alcoholism; Binge Drinking; Therapeutic Communities

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Underclass Debate

The underclass debate refers to a scholarly and public debate during the 1970s through the 1990s about the origins, character, and appropriate response to the problems of concentrated urban poverty in the United States, particularly among African Americans. The sociologist William Julius Wilson brought attention to this issue in the 1970s and became a central figure in the debate that ensued between those who emphasized the values and choices of low-income people and those who emphasized economic conditions and government policy. This debate helped shape three major policy changes in the United States: the cutback in funding for federal social programs in 1984, the 1996 reform of welfare policy, and the initiation of the HOPE VI mixed-income housing policy by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1992. This debate also spurred a substantial body of empirical research that showed how national and metropolitan-wide processes affect the lives of inner-city residents.

Origins of the Underclass Debate

The word *underclass* first appeared in English in a 1963 book by Gunnar Myrdal, who adapted the Swedish term for lower class (*underklass*) to loosely describe people who were underprivileged and poor. At the time, the term was largely ignored in the U.S. press, in favor of language from a report written by New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan about the "tangle of pathologies" associated with the conditions of urban "female-headed black families," as well as language about the "culture of poverty" from the writings of Oscar Lewis about families in Mexico and Puerto Rico. Although Lewis only presented case studies, he made strong claims that children growing up in slums become psychologically incapable of taking advantage of opportunities for upward mobility that might occur later in life.

Meanwhile, the achievements of the civil rights movement and the federal War on Poverty in the1960s led many Americans to expect that racial inequities would decline substantially and rapidly. They did not anticipate that class inequalities might simultaneously increase. In 1978, Wilson argued that middle-class blacks benefited more from the new opportunities than did underclass blacks, who remained persistently poor. His use of the word *underclass* touched off controversy. Some people felt that it deflected attention from an unfinished agenda of institutional reform, whereas others felt that brought needed attention to a new agenda of personal responsibility. Nonetheless, the term quickly gained currency. For instance, in August 1977, *Time* magazine featured a cover story on poor urban blacks titled, "The American Underclass: Destitute and Desperate in the Land of Plenty."

Intensification of Underclass Debate

Following the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency, author Charles Murray crystallized a conservative critique of federal social programs. He argued that public assistance to single mothers had undermined traditional norms about work and marriage, and largely created the problems of the urban poor. His book, used to justify deep cuts in anti-poverty programs in the 1984 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, was called "the Reagan budget-cutter Bible" in

a *New York Times* editorial. In a similar critique, Lawrence Mead compared the experience of immigrants, women, and native-born blacks in the labor market. He reasoned that blacks were more likely to be unemployed because they were more likely to refuse the available, low-wage jobs accepted by others.

In 1987, Wilson sought to explain the rise in joblessness and single-parent families in black urban communities, which were located mainly in the Northeast and Midwest. He argued that black male joblessness had increased because deindustrialization had resulted in fewer blue-collar jobs that could support a family. Consequently, Wilson argued that race-specific remedies could not address the underlying problems of economic dislocation, and he advocated for universal federal programs to promote tight labor markets and support child well-being.

Throughout the 1980s, the popular press frequently used the term *underclass* without definition or analysis. As a result, in his 1990 presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Wilson announced that he was dropping the term *underclass* and replacing it with *ghetto poor* in order to differentiate his analysis from ideas he did not espouse. Although the story appeared in all three newsweeklies and major national newspapers, the term *ghetto poor* did not become widespread.

Subsequent Research and Public Policy

Christopher Jencks put social trends in poor neighborhoods in context by examining national trends from 1970 to the late 1980s. He noted that worsening poverty was not linked in a simple and direct way to other social problems and that sexual mores had changed across U.S. society, not just in the inner city. Whereas wages and employment had declined for workers without higher education and single-parent families had become more common, welfare dependency had not increased since the early 1970s, and illiteracy, teenage motherhood, and violence had declined somewhat. Jencks urged researchers to distinguish the particularities of each social problem rather than to assume that they are all symptoms of a single, distinct, homogeneous underclass.

Other researchers examined the intersections of race, poverty, and place on a metropolitan or national scale. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton showed that continued racial segregation in metropolitan housing markets maintained neighborhoods that were majority black; Massey and Denton advocated integrated housing as a fundamental way to improve the life chances of African Americans. Paul A. Jargowsky investigated the distribution and spread of poor people in poor places nationwide from 1970 to 1990. Overall, he found that the number of poor people in high-poverty neighborhoods almost doubled from 1.9 to 3.7 million, largely because more places became poor. However, economic booms in the Southwest in the 1970s and in the Northwest in the 1980s sharply reduced concentrated poverty in those regions. Jargowsky concluded that neighborhood poverty resulted from metropolitan-wide processes, not from the character of the residents. He recommended metropolitan and national policies to increase productivity, lower inequality, and reduce segregation.

Despite research findings like these, public opinion still tended to fault deficient personal motivation and debilitating public assistance for the social ills represented by the idea of an underclass. In 1996 the Clinton administration passed the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. This legislation abolished federally guaranteed support to low-income families, set a 5-year lifetime limit on the receipt of such assistance, and mandated that mothers move into the paid labor force as quickly as possible. Consequently, many mothers entered the labor force, and the number of families receiving public assistance dropped dramatically, although many had only entered the ranks of the working poor. At the same time, public policy began to shift toward support of working families through the Earned Income Tax Credit. What began as a very small program in 1975 expanded, with bipartisan support, with each major tax bill in the 1990s and has become an important federal anti-poverty policy, although it does not address job creation or support for unemployed persons.

In 1992, partly in response to concerns about concentrated poverty, the Department of Housing and Urban Development began the HOPE VI Program, promoting the demolition of public housing for low-income residents and the construction of some mixed-income housing. During the buoyant economy of the 1990s, many U.S. cities prospered, and the number of poor urban neighborhoods declined nationwide. A few cities, such as Portland and Minneapolis–St. Paul, harnessed these market forces to link suburban and urban development and promote mixed-income development.

In the wake of September 11, 2001, public attention shifted to national security and immigration issues, although the term *underclass* was used in connection with the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005. In the future, the term may continue as a modern synonym for the "undeserving poor," just as it has in the past, or perhaps it may be dropped as an outmoded way of framing race, poverty, and urban issues.

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See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Culture of Dependency; Culture of Poverty; Housing; Inner City; Poverty; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

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UNDEREMPLOYMENT

Underemployment refers to employment that is inadequate, inferior, or of low quality, relative to some standard. Researchers—mostly economists, industrial-organizational psychologists, and sociologists—agree that there are several distinct types of underemployment, although there is less agreement on exactly what counts as underemployment or how many types there are. Nevertheless, the following experiences are regularly classified as underemployment:

Overqualification: These workers possess surplus (a) formal education, (b) work experience, and/or (c) knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs), relative to the job demands or requirements.

Involuntary Part-Time and/or Temporary Employment: These workers are employed in part-time and/or temporary jobs because they cannot find full-time and/or permanent positions.

Underpayment: The worker's wages are significantly less than a certain standard. Standards include (a) the worker's wages from a previous job, (b) typical wages for someone with the worker's educational background, and (c) a livable wage.

Other types of work experiences occasionally identified as underemployment include *unemployment, intermittent (un)employment* (workers who either have experienced recent periods of both employment and unemployment or work on jobs that are seasonal or otherwise sporadic), *sub-employment* (workers who are not currently employed and have ceased the job search process because they do not believe that jobs are available), *involuntary educational mismatch* (workers employed in a field outside their area of education), *status underemployment* (workers who receive less occupational prestige from their jobs than expected based upon their background), and jobs providing *few opportunities for skill development.*

Involuntary Mismatch

In general, a key prerequisite for defining a work situation as underemployment is that it be involuntary. For example, an individual who moves from full-time work to part-time work as part of a transition to retirement is not underemployed, whereas someone who would prefer a full-time job but can only find a part-time job is underemployed. This is an important distinction, as researchers have begun to show that employees who voluntarily choose a given work situation (e.g., part-time work) experience more positive job attitudes than employees who find themselves in the same work situation despite preferring something more (e.g., full-time work).

Each type of underemployment, by definition, represents a discrepancy between the actual work situation and an alternative situation that is preferred by

the employee. Recognizing this, researchers are beginning to utilize person–job fit and related models to frame underemployment research and generate hypotheses. In essence, each type of underemployment can be viewed as an instance of poor person–job fit. For example, overqualification reflects poor fit between worker abilities and job demands, whereas underpayment reflects poor fit between worker needs and job supplies.

Measurement

Researchers may measure underemployment by using either personnel data or self-report measures. For example, overqualification may be assessed by comparing one's level of education and experience (as stated on a resume or job application) to a job description. Alternatively, the employee could be asked to complete a questionnaire with items designed to tap perceptions of overqualification. In addition to these strategies, some researchers measure underemployment by culling data from databases containing labor statistics, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Importantly, self-report measures have the advantage of accounting for whether one's current work situation is voluntary or involuntary. Unfortunately, measurement of underemployment is currently idiosyncratic to each research project; no valid self-report measures have yet gained widespread use.

Prevalence and Demographic Correlates

Estimates vary, but it appears that at least one in five U.S. workers currently experiences underemployment in one form or another. This rate is significantly higher than the typical unemployment rate, which has remained below 8 percent in the United States for the past 2 decades. Other developed nations seem to have similar levels of underemployment. Not surprisingly, the proportion of individuals who may be classified as underemployed fluctuates along with the status of the economy, with the experience being more common in times of economic recession. However, some have argued that, even in more prosperous times, most newly created jobs are low-paying, low-skill positions that effectively keep unemployment rates low (the rate typically used as an index of labor market health) while channeling job seekers into employment situations that are inadequate for most of them.

Several groups of workers are particularly likely to experience underemployment. Researchers consistently find that females are underemployed at higher rates than males. Cultural norms place the primary responsibility for child care and elder care upon women. This results in geographic and time restrictions, forcing some women to choose jobs that are flexible over ones that may best utilize their education or offer the greatest career opportunities.

Ethnic minorities are also prone to underemployment. In the United States, underemployment is especially prevalent among African Americans and Latin Americans. Discrimination, lower educational attainment, and cultural differences may contribute to underemployment of minorities. For minority immigrants, language problems and limited social networks create additional barriers to adequate employment.

Several other personal characteristics may also put a person at risk for particular types of underemployment. Those with low levels of education tend to be involuntarily employed in temporary or part-time positions, whereas highly educated workers are more likely to experience overqualification. Research findings are inconsistent about age, although recent college graduates (who are highly educated but often have little work experience) and older white-collar workers (who are among the most common victims of downsizing) commonly experience underemployment. Finally, underemployment may be more prevalent in some job sectors (e.g., manufacturing) and regions (e.g., rural) than in others.

Consequences

Researchers consistently hypothesize a variety of negative consequences associated with underemployment, from dissatisfaction with one's job, to higher rates of absenteeism and turnover, to poor physical and psychological health. Managers tend to avoid hiring applicants who appear overqualified because of similar predictions.

Underemployed individuals report lower levels of job satisfaction than non-underemployed individuals, particularly for facets of satisfaction that are relevant to the type of underemployment. For example, overqualified workers seem most unhappy with the work itself but are not necessarily dissatisfied with their coworkers or supervisor. Some have argued that higher education promotes lofty expectations for one's career, making underemployment even less

satisfying. Some evidence also exists that underemployment may also be associated with a relatively weak emotional attachment to the organization (called "affective commitment").

Researchers posit that, because of a lack of motivation or commitment, underemployed workers may perform their tasks at a lower level and engage less in organizational citizenship behavior (such as working late to help a coworker finish a project). In some cases, however, the reverse could be true. For example, temporary workers who prefer a permanent work arrangement with the organization may be highly motivated to perform at a higher level and/or engage in citizenship behaviors to maximize the chances that they will be offered a permanent position. Unfortunately, practically no data exist on the relation between underemployment and either type of job performance.

Some early evidence suggests that underemployment correlates with higher rates of absenteeism, intentions to quit one's job, and job search behavior. Other research has found that local levels of underemployment may discourage some groups from seeking work or changing jobs. However, at this time, the proposition that underemployment will predict actual turnover behavior remains untested. This is surprising, as researchers and managers commonly predict that the underemployed (particularly overqualified workers) are particularly likely to search for more adequate employment and leave their present jobs.

Research shows that underemployment, whether it is involuntary part-time employment, underpayment, or intermittent employment, has negative psychological and behavioral effects, including low self-esteem, stress, substance abuse, health problems, and depression. In fact, being underemployed may be as traumatic and damaging as being out of work entirely. Also, in some cases, the relationship between underemployment and mental health may be bi-directional, with factors such as low self-esteem placing the individual at greater risk for underemployment, which then may produce further negative psychological effects.

Potential Solutions

Underemployment is a complex phenomenon, prevalent across the globe and influenced by myriad factors at the personal, organizational, and societal levels. Many researchers argue that the problem is due largely to the lack of skilled, full-time, and permanent jobs, rather than an underskilled workforce. Organizational practices, such as regular layoffs and the shipping of manufacturing jobs to countries where labor is less expensive, may play a role, as might industry restructuring toward service-sector jobs. The many potential causes of underemployment require solutions at every level, from vocational programs, which aid job seekers in identifying appropriate positions, to government initiatives, which promote the creation of high-quality jobs.

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See also Discrimination; Downsizing; Economic Restructuring; Gender Bias; Labor Market; Mental Depression; Service Economy; Skills Mismatch; Unemployment; Working Poor

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Underground Economy

The term *underground economy* refers to economic activities that circumvent the formal system of rules and regulations that organize the processes of production and exchange. Underground economies are classified depending on either the particular set of rules that such activities violate or the nature of production, distribution, and the final product.

Within the first classification, four types of underground economies can be distinguished: the illegal economy, the unreported economy, the unrecorded economy, and the informal economy. *Illegal economy* refers to the production and exchange of prohibited goods and services, such as drugs or the sex trade. *Unreported economy* denotes activities that evade tax laws. The *unrecorded economy* consists of all activities that, under existing rules and regulations, should be recorded in national accounting systems (national income and product accounts) but are not. Finally, the *informal economy* comprises economic activities that circumvent the administrative rules covering property relationships, commercial licensing, labor contracts, social security systems, and so forth.

Within the second classification, the underground economy consists of "informal" economic activities carried out through illicit means of production and distribution but leading to a licit final product (e.g., a textile firm producing T-shirts and jeans by using informal labor) and "criminal" economic activities, carried out by either licit or illicit means (usually the latter) but necessarily leading to an illicit final product (e.g., drug trafficking).

Methods of Measurement

Because activities in an underground economy defy the law in one way or another, they do not easily lend themselves to observation, so any attempt to study, measure, and classify them remains fraught with problems. The measurement problem becomes even more pronounced when attempting to make cross-national comparisons. Because nations differ in political, legal, and economic structures, nations' underground economies are organized differently and are composed of different activities; all of these factors pose a comparability problem for the researcher.

Despite these problems, scholars capture underground economies' composition, size, and growth rates by one of three methods: the survey approach (also known as direct micro observation methods), the discrepancy approach (also known as the indirect macroeconomic methods), and the qualitative approach. Each of these methods has different strengths and weaknesses.

Direct micro observation approaches involve amassing data on underground activities through conducting surveys, auditing tax returns, or reviewing census reports. Although these methods yield detailed and firsthand information about the underground economy, they have several weaknesses. First of all, they lead to point estimates and fail to capture the big picture, giving little information about the underground economy and its historical development at large. Second, these methods remain costly and time consuming. Third, the lack of uniformity between surveys conducted at different points in time often makes it impossible to draw comparisons, thus decreasing their usefulness in uncovering temporal causes and consequences of underground economic growth. Moreover, because parts of these activities are illegal, survey response rates often remain low, leading to the problem of biased sampling.

Economists generally use indirect macroeconomic methods, also known as discrepancy approaches, to measure the underground economy's size and development over time and across nations. These methods follow the traces that the underground economy leaves behind in the labor, money, and product markets. The difference between spending and savings accounts, the dissonance between official labor participation rates and the general growth trend, or the amount of currency in circulation above and beyond what is used in official transactions form the indicators of the underground economy. Among the macro approaches' explicit benefits are their low costs, their objectivity (i.e., their insusceptibility to deliberate misrepresentation on the part of respondents), and their ability to provide temporal estimates of the size and growth of underground economic activities. On the downside, these methods do not provide information on the underground economies' inner mechanisms, and because they are based on some a priori assumptions regarding the relationship between macroeconomic indicators (such as labor market or monetary market measures) and underground economic activity, their robustness depends on the reasonableness of the assumptions that underlie them.

The third major method, the qualitative approach, is preferred by anthropologists or ethnographically oriented sociologists interested in uncovering the mechanisms and the norms of exchange, trust, social capital, and reciprocal relations that underlie the underground economy. It entails assembling information on underground economic activities through ethnographic research and participant observation. Like the micro observation methods, the qualitative approach yields detailed information about the underground economy but fails to capture its overall trends.

Theories of the Underground Economy

Three major schools of theories explain the development of underground economies. These are the modernization/development approach, the structural approach, and the institutional economics approach.

The modernization/development approach, which became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, viewed the underground economy's development as a symptom of a traditional, backward economy. In this view, the underground economy consisted of marginal activities not linked to the official sector or to modern capitalist development. A central assumption was that the underground economy would become extinct once underdeveloped nations attained sufficient levels of economic growth via the advance of modern capitalist development.

The structural view of the underground economy, which emerged in the 1980s, challenges the mainstream view of the informal sector as primarily a third world phenomenon and sees the rise in underground economic activities in highly developed and institutionalized European and North American economies as indicative of a reconfiguration of production and employment relationships under advanced capitalism. According to this view, by providing firms with flexible production and cost reductions, the underground economy constitutes a permanent feature of capitalist development, most likely to expand due to profit squeeze, increased labor costs, or increased competition from cheaper foreign goods.

The institutional economics approach attributes underground economies' development to the state's over-regulation of the economy. In this view, the underground economy provides the economic actors with the possibility of escaping the high bureaucratic and legal costs of operating in the formal economy. This view sees that underground economic growth can be limited or eliminated if a state reduces the bureaucratic requirements and the costs associated with operating in the official economy.

Policy Implications

The underground economy has significant implications for a wide range of policy issues. First of all, without a profound understanding of the underground economy, governments lack a reliable estimate of overall economic conditions, and key economic indicators such as unemployment rates, saving rates, productivity, and price levels may well be biased, leading to suboptimal outcomes. This harms governments' ability to make informed policy decisions, leading to less than desirable outcomes.

Another oft-cited result of underground economic growth concerns the loss of tax revenue. Taxes are how states finance their services to citizens. When people or enterprises do not pay taxes, the state loses some of its tax base and hence its ability to effectively provide its citizens with services.

A third concern is the emergence of unfair market competition. Because businesses that operate underground avoid some or all regulations, such as taxes and labor benefits, they enjoy cost advantages over enterprises that operate formally. This leads to unfair competition between formal and underground businesses. Unless the state addresses this unfair competition, over the long run more and more businesses will go underground, leading to an increasingly informalized economy.

A fourth concern is the degree of exploitation that prevails in the underground economy. Workers in the underground economy do not enjoy the rights, benefits, and protections that their counterparts in the official economy have. This exploitation in underground economy remains a profit mechanism for companies operating in it. Also, more exploitation of female labor occurs than of male labor, further contributing to society's gender inequality.

Furthermore, the underground economy illustrates an unhealthy relationship between citizens and government. At the core of this relationship in a modern democratic polity rests a system of rights and duties recognized and upheld by laws. The underground economy functions by, and thrives upon, undermining this institutional relationship. Over the long run, this might lead to an erosion of trust between states and citizens and to a further extension of law-evading behavior into other realms.

In response to these oft-cited drawbacks, some scholars note the underground economy's positive implications. They argue that the underground economy can be beneficial because it responds to the economy's demand for urban services and small-scale manufacturing. The underground economy thus provides a dynamic and entrepreneurial spirit and can lead to more competition and higher growth; it also may help create markets, increase financial resources, and help transform the legal, economic, and social

institutions necessary for wealth accumulation. Moreover, some scholars have found that large portions of the money earned by informal means return to the formal first economy. They also note that during an economic crisis, the underground economy can serve as a buffer zone that allows enterprises to operate with low costs to help meet people's needs.

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See also Conflict Perspective; Ethnomethodology

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Undocumented Immigrants

The term *undocumented immigrants* is one that amnesty advocates prefer instead of the term *illegal aliens,* which is used by those who oppose both their presence and any official approval such as amnesty. Both terms refer to foreigners who either enter a country without authorization to do so or enter on temporary visas but remain after the time limit. Such actions are most often matters of choice but may also include victims of sexual or labor exploitation, smuggled into countries to work as prostitutes or in factories, on sugar plantations, or elsewhere.

Usually, the push–pull factors that drive legal immigration are the same ones spurring people to bypass the prescribed processes for entry. Among the common push factors are negative elements such as persecution, repression, poverty, and war. Conversely, the most common pull factors are positive elements such as freedom, opportunity, higher living standards, and/or joining family members already there.

Europe

Although the democratic nations of Western Europe have long experienced undocumented immigrants in their midst, the situation evolved into a social problem in recent decades with the fall of communism to the east and quality-of-life issues resulting from burgeoning populations to the south. With the collapse of an artificial economic interdependence system under communism, the resulting factory shutdowns, lost jobs, and the sudden opportunity to cross borders no longer guarded to prevent emigration, tens of thousands sought a better life without bothering to obtain any formal approval to do so.

England, France, and Germany attracted many of these clandestine migrants. Italy, though, became the main conduit into the European Union. Italy still attracts more illegal immigration than other European countries because its long coastline and close proximity to other countries make it especially vulnerable. The most popular clandestine sea route for Africans is from Libya or Tunisia to the Italian island of Lampedusa (closer to Africa than to Italy) or to Sicily. A second underground gateway is a 60-mile speedboat ride by smugglers from Albania across the Adriatic Sea. Albanians, Afghans, Kurds, Turks, and Chinese are the most frequent arrivals this way. A third route is by truck over the Slovenian border into Milan.

Because of Italy's limit of 20,000 to 30,000 legal immigrants per year and an estimated 2 million others waiting for transit to enter, the "back door" of illegal entry has become the only viable choice for many. About 2.5 million (4.3 percent) of Italy's 58 million people in 2007 were foreign born, about half of them beneficiaries of four amnesties between 1986 and 1998. Rather than solving the problem, however, these amnesties attracted even more illegal migrants. Each year hundreds drown in unsafe, overcrowded boats in attempts to reach Italy.

United States

Nativist reaction against the entry of unprocessed immigrants is practically as old as the United States itself. Late 18th-century Americans bristled at English ships approaching U.S. shores and dumping Irish rebels into the water to swim ashore. Late 19th-century Americans, who had barred Chinese laborers with passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, resented their illegal entry through the unguarded northern border with British Columbia. Late 20th-century Americans sought to stop the flow of

undocumented immigrants from Mexico, still a problem in the 21st century.

What fuels public debate about immigration is the rising number of unauthorized foreign-born people in the United States. Some critics claim that more immigrants arrive illegally than through legal means. The Pew Hispanic Center, a nonpartisan research organization, estimates a growing influx each decade, from about 8.4 million unauthorized migrants in 2000 to about 12 million in 2006. About two thirds have been in the United States for less than 10 years, with the largest share (40 percent of the total) for less than 5 years.

Mexicans comprise the largest segment of undocumented migrants (about 56 percent), a proportion that has remained steady for a decade. Other Latin Americans constitute an additional 22 percent. About 13 percent come from Asia, 6 percent from Europe and Canada, and 3 percent from other parts of the world. Most of these arrivals are people from foreign lands slipping across U.S. borders, but others (about 165,000 annually) first arrive legally as visitors (tourists, students, or businesspeople) and then overstay their allotted time and become visa violators.

Benefit or Burden?

The more developed countries are the ones most likely to have an issue with undocumented immigrants and to take countermeasures, particularly when the native population perceives the growing numbers of immigrants to be a threat to their own economic welfare or to societal cohesion and national identity. They fear lower-wage workers will take away their jobs, not pay their fair share of taxes, and thus place an unfair financial burden on tax-paying citizens who must provide education, health, and other social services for them and their families. In addition, they fear that too many foreigners—not motivated to assimilate because their legal status prevents them from full participation in society—will lead to ethnic tribalism and undermine the core culture. Furthermore, the horrific terrorist actions of the 21st century—in New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2001; in Madrid in 2004; and in London in 2005—raised the concerns of many about their safety and security if potential terrorists can slip across their country's borders without detection.

Issues of security aside, Americans remain divided over whether undocumented immigrants are a boon or drain to the economy. Reliable studies on the financial impact of illegal immigrants do not exist. In fact, most studies on this topic do not differentiate between illegal and legal immigrants. Whereas critics charge that illegal immigrants are a drain on public coffers, supporters claim that they pay more in taxes than they receive in services. Usually, the findings depend on the accounting methods used.

Many undocumented immigrants, for example, pay social security taxes but never collect benefits. However, most work in low-wage occupations, so they do not generate large tax revenues. Still, their illegal status makes them ineligible for many government services anyway. Although some argue that the expense of educating the children of undocumented immigrants is a substantial drain on public funds, others contend that most of these children are U.S. born, and as U.S. citizens, they are entitled to a public school education. Even most U.S. native families with children typically receive more in publicly funded services (especially education) than they pay in taxes. One large public expense area would be if undocumented immigrants' U.S.-born children became eligible for social programs, including welfare (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families).

Pressure for Reform

Public Agenda, a nonpartisan opinion research center, reported in 2006 that three quarters of Americans said they worried that it is too easy for illegal immigrants to enter the United States, and half said making their entry tougher should be a top priority for Congress. In the Southwest, the problem draws the greatest amount of public attention and generates the most apprehensions of undocumented aliens (about 1.2 million in 2006). Mexicans dominated the list of those apprehended, at 88 percent of the total. Other major source countries of those apprehended are El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Colombia, and Jamaica.

Public pressure mounted in 2006–07 to do something about securing U.S. borders and dealing with those undocumented migrants already in the country. Political debates—over legislative proposals for amnesty as granted in 1986; calls for a crackdown on illegals, even a 700-mile wall along the border; cantankerous congressional hearings; and mass demonstrations in many U.S. cities—illustrated the fundamental disagreements about how to deal with the situation. A divided Congress has been unable to pass any immigration reform bill and, as of this writing, any resolution remains elusive.

Calls for reform come at a time when parts of the U.S. economy are dependent on the labor of undocumented migrants. Mostly Latinos/as, these unskilled workers have spread to a wide range of industries. Experts estimate the number of undocumented workers in the U.S. economy at about 1 in 25. Working mostly in low-skill occupations, they are heavily concentrated in agriculture, construction, manufacturing (especially textiles and animal processing), retail trade (especially restaurants), and services (especially landscaping). Moreover, about 10 percent of the labor force of Mexico—as well as of several other Central American and Caribbean countries—are now working in the United States, and their sending monies to their families back home is a major source of financial support there.

Vincent N. Parrillo

See also Assimilation; Deportation; Human Trafficking; Immigration; Labor, Migrant; Nativism; Repatriation; Sex Trafficking; Sweatshop; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

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UNEMPLOYMENT

Economists reserve the concept of unemployment for people who are *involuntarily* unemployed. That is to say, people are unemployed if they are actively seeking jobs but unable to find them, as opposed to people who have *voluntarily* opted out of the labor market to pursue activities like raising children, going to school, or traveling.

Some economists follow A. C. Pigou and his 1933 argument that unemployment does not exist. Their argument rests on the following two premises: (1) There is a real wage low enough to make it profitable for employers to hire every person actively seeking a job, and (2) people are in a position to offer to work at that real wage.

If these two premises are valid, then unemployment does not exist. For everyone could have a job if only they were willing to work at a real wage low enough to make it profitable for employers to hire them. Instead, people who appear to be unemployed voluntarily opt out of the labor market by deciding that the utility they derive from activities like raising children is greater than the utility they would derive from the consumption of the goods and services that could be purchased with such a low real wage.

In 1936, J. M. Keynes and his followers undermined Pigou's argument against the existence of unemployment on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The theoretical reason for rejecting Pigou's argument is that its second premise is invalid. Rather than being in a position to offer to work at the real wage low enough to make it profitable for employers to hire them, people are only in a position to offer to work at a lower money wage. As equation 1 shows, the relationship between the money wage (W_m) and the real wage (W_r) is mediated by the price level (P):

$$W_r = W_m/P \quad (1)$$

For the second premise of the argument against the existence of unemployment to be valid, it must be the case that people who offer to work at a lower money wage (W_m) are also invariably offering to work at a lower real wage (W_r). But equation 1 shows that a lower money wage (W_m) only results in a lower real wage (W_r) if the price level (P) does not fall proportionately with the fall in the money wage (W_m).

The second premise of Pigou's argument is invalid, because once the macroeconomic effects of a lower money wage (W_m) are taken into account, it is most likely that the price level (P) does fall proportionately with the fall in the money wage (W_m), so that the real wage (W_r) is not affected. The money wage (W_m) is the major determinate of aggregate demand. By offering to work for a lower money wage (W_m), people

reduce aggregate demand. As a result, inventories pile up, causing firms to lower prices (P), so that the price level (P) falls as part of the effort of firms to get rid of unplanned inventory accumulations. In short, the price level (P) tends to fall in tandem with a falling money wage (W_m), with the result that it is not likely that the real wage (W_r) will be affected.

Social scientists have developed two empirical methods for measuring the adverse effects of unemployment. One method estimates the output forgone because people actively seeking jobs were unable to find them, and the other method estimates the deleterious effects of unemployment on the psychological well-being of the unemployed. As an example of the former, A. M. Okun estimated in 1970 that every percentage-point increase of unemployment above the full-employment level causes total output to fall 3 percentage points below the amount that could have been produced with full employment.

Until quite recently, the methods used by social scientists to estimate the deleterious effects of unemployment on the psychological well-being of the unemployed led to more ambiguous results than their methods for estimating the output forgone because of unemployment. The ambiguity resulted from two design flaws in their empirical methods. One design flaw was overly narrow definitions of psychological well-being. The other design flaw was the effort to distinguish between the two relevant sets of jobless people—those who are involuntarily unemployed and those who have voluntarily opted out of the labor market—by comparing their psychological well-being with the psychological well-being of a set of people that included all of the employed. For example, in 1979, K. B. Clark and L. H. Summers followed Pigou in arguing that there is no meaningful distinction between the psychological well-being of these two sets of jobless people, and in 1983 C. J. Flinn and J. J. Heckman followed Keynes in arguing that a meaningful distinction can be made between their psychological well-being, as compared with the psychological well-being of the set of all employed people.

More recent studies have corrected these two design flaws and, consequently, come down unambiguously on the side of Keynes. For example, in 1998 I. Theodossiou developed a comprehensive measure of psychological well-being that includes indices of anxiety, depression, self-confidence, self-control, and self-esteem. He also segregates, out of the set of employed, the subset of employed people with comparable skills and experience to those who are jobless, either because of involuntary unemployment or voluntary opting out of the labor market. Theodossiou then demonstrates that the set of people who have voluntarily opted out of the labor market do not have statistically significant differences in psychological well-being from the subset of employed people with comparable skills and experience, as compared with the psychological well-being of the set of employed people with greater skills and experience. But the set of people who are involuntarily unemployed have significantly less psychological well-being than the subset of employed people with comparable skills and experience, as compared with the same control group of employed people with greater skills and experience.

In short, there are both theoretical and empirical grounds for the argument that unemployment not only exists but is a fundamental social problem in wealthy modern societies. Because people actively seeking employment can do no more than offer to work at a lower money wage, and a lower money wage tends to cause a lower price level, it is of no help to the unemployed that there is a real wage low enough to make it profitable for employers to hire every person actively seeking a job. To the degree that there is unemployment, there are monetary costs to society as a whole in terms of output forgone, and there are also deleterious effects on the psychological well-being of the people who cannot find jobs, as compared with the psychological well-being these people would enjoy if they were able to find employment.

Edwin Dickens

See also Labor Force Participation Rate; Labor Sectors; Split Labor Market; Working Poor

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Uniform Crime Report

The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) is the basis for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) annual publication *Crime in the United States*. The UCR is the only official, standardized, police-based crime reporting program in the United States. The report measures the level and distribution of both serious and less serious crimes (including felonies and nonfelonies) as well as the responses by local law enforcement agencies. Three major types of data include crimes reported to the police, arrest data, and clearance statistics for more than 25 different types of offenses.

UCR data are considered more reliable from the mid-1970s onward, but there remain a significant number of problems currently plaguing the system. These include poor coverage of rape offenses, low reporting rates for arson, lack of full details on incidents, and undercounting offenses due to the hierarchy rule (i.e., the practice of only the most serious crimes being recorded, even with multiple-offense incidents). The FBI is promoting the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) because of its ability to overcome these limitations, but cost constraints have limited its adoption. The annual UCR publication mostly presents aggregate data on offense categories and ignores the richness of data available on subcategories of offenses through NIBRS.

The police are heavily dependent on the reporting of crimes by victims and witnesses, which limits the ability of the UCR program to provide an accurate and complete count of all crimes. Crime counts are also selectively created in a nonrandom manner as a result of police discretion in recording. Considerable controversy exists about the ability of the UCR program to report less-serious offenses. Arrest data are available only for offenses that include incidents of simple assaults, vandalism, and gambling; yet the number of arrests far exceeds offense counts of felonies.

The program is unlikely to mismeasure serious offenses, with the exception of rapes and related sexual offenses; many experts consider the reporting and coverage for serious violent offenses as relatively good. Despite the historical issue of manipulation of UCR crime statistics by local agencies, the reporting to police for more serious crimes, involving severe injuries, use of lethal weapons, and high-value stolen property, is mostly valid and reliable.

Most definitions of crime as a social problem rely on these reports as media, policymakers, and academic analysts of crime and violence incorporate UCR data, whose official status gives these reports more legitimacy than other sources. Although the social dimensions of crime and violence are not directly captured, any meaningful use by analysts invariably involves linking UCR data to social factors to be able to explain patterns and distributions of these offenses. UCR statistics include policing actions, which allows for the analysis of law enforcement behavior and the influence of police in labeling individuals and events as criminal. Police are the primary formalized social control agency that may be critical in determining the visibility of crimes and related social problems. Police have considerable discretion in enforcement and response, especially at the municipal and county levels, in how incidents are treated and processed.

The geographical, temporal, and offense coverage of the UCR program is the most comprehensive of any crime data set. One of the major advantages of the UCR is reporting by local law enforcement agencies, which allows for more focused understanding of crime problems and their diversity. Victimization surveys, in contrast, are at the national level, with limited information on the spatial distribution of crime. The process of compiling data has been facilitated and improved by the establishment of state UCR programs. At this time, the UCR remains the most comprehensive and practical source for crime data despite identified weaknesses, and reliance on UCR data will no doubt continue.

Sanjay Marwah

See also Crime; Crime Rates; Crime Waves; National Crime Victimization Survey; Property Crime; Violent Crime

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Urban Decline

Urban decline refers to a process that includes population loss and the concentration in cities of major social, economic, and environmental problems, such as high levels of unemployment and poverty and the deterioration of housing and public infrastructure. Sometimes used interchangeably with the terms *urban decay* and *urban distress*, urban decline is frequently measured by changes in population (particularly in relation to middle- and upper-income residents), unemployment, and poverty rates; changes in median household income; and changes in property values, housing tenure, and vacancy rates.

While many metropolitan areas in the United States experienced significant population increases in the second half of the 20th century, the growth was not even, either across or within regions of the country. In general, cities in the South and West experienced significant growth, whereas older, industrialized cities in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest experienced significant declines in population. Part of the decline in the Rustbelt cities reflects the migration of people from these regions to the Sunbelt, but more generally, much of the decline in the older city reflects the decentralization of the population from central cities to suburbs. In 1950, 63 percent of the total U.S. population lived in metropolitan areas. Of this population, 57 percent lived in the central city and 43 percent lived in suburban areas. By 2000, 80 percent of the total U.S. population lived in metropolitan areas, but only 38 percent of those people lived in the central city.

Many of the older cities reached their population peaks in 1950 or 1960 and have shrunk considerably since then. For example, the population of Baltimore was 31 percent smaller in 2000 than it was in 1950. Other major cities in the East and Midwest also had significant declines: Cleveland, 46 percent; Boston, 26 percent; Chicago, 20 percent; Detroit, 49 percent; and Philadelphia, 27 percent. New York City, the largest city in the United States, is an exception in that its population has increased slightly over this time. The demographic characteristics of the central city populations also changed significantly during this time. The large numbers of residents who left the city were disproportionately white, middle and upper classes.

The growth of suburban developments tends to draw middle- and upper-income residents because only they can afford the housing in these areas. Many of the suburbs adopt zoning regulations that prevent the construction of low-cost housing, particularly multifamily housing. At the same time, African Americans continued their migration from the rural South to the cities of the North and Midwest. By 2000 African Americans had become the majority of city residents in Baltimore, Detroit, Newark, and Gary (Indiana) and over one third of the population in Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Cleveland, Chicago, and numerous other cities.

Along with the decline of residents, older cities also experienced significant job losses. There has been a major decline in the basic manufacturing industries, including steel and automobiles, which dominated the local economies of these cities. These industries, which offered thousands of well-paid jobs to city residents, underwent major transformations due to changes in technology and the expanding global economy. Since the 1970s, New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, and Baltimore all lost more than 70 percent of their manufacturing jobs. Although the economy also created new jobs, in most of these cities, the transformation to a service economy did not replace the number of jobs or the pay of these manufacturing positions. This is due to at least two factors: the location of the new jobs and the skill requirements for the service jobs. Many businesses that were formerly located in the central city relocated to the suburban communities. Most new businesses, including offices and retail stores, were established in the suburban fringe. Many of the service jobs that remained or were created in the central city require advanced skills, training, and education, which many of the city residents do not possess. This is referred to as a "spatial mismatch." While unemployment rates vary across areas and time periods, urban unemployment rates are generally higher than suburban rates. For example, the unemployment rate for large cities in the United States in 2000 was 35 percent higher than that of their suburbs. Without jobs that pay good wages, urban residents experience much higher poverty rates than do suburban dwellers. While the ratio of urban-to-suburban poverty rates varies over time, in 2000 the poverty rate in central cities was more than double the rate in suburban areas.

The loss of population and jobs has significant consequences on cities. The tax base of central cities declines as people and jobs leave. Revenue from both property taxes and income taxes drops for central city governments. This lessens the ability of the city government to serve the needs of the remaining residents and to develop strategies to reverse the processes of urban decline. Economic problems and the struggle to address human needs affect the overall quality of life in urban areas. School systems that rely heavily on local taxes in trying to maintain quality educational programs and staff for their students face serious shortfalls. While crime rates in many cities have declined in recent years, the likelihood of being a victim of crime is still 37 percent higher for city residents than for suburban residents. The older housing stock of the central cities requires more upkeep and repair than does the newer suburban housing.

Numerous efforts have been, and are being, made at several levels to rejuvenate central cities. These range from efforts of the federal government to the efforts of local grassroots groups. As early as the 1950s, the federal government sponsored urban renewal programs that cleared away slums and blighted areas of central cities. In the 1960s, federal efforts turned to promoting economic development through support for downtown office buildings; hotel, convention, and tourist enterprises; and upscale housing units. Many state governments seek to improve job opportunities in urban areas by enacting legislation relating to urban enterprise zones. These programs offer grants and tax incentives to private businesses that locate in certain areas. The federal government endorsed and expanded this concept in the 1990s with its empowerment zones. This program encouraged local communities to develop plans to focus on not only job creation but also better coordination of social services and educational programs. Local governments, strained by the lack of resources, seek to develop plans that are consistent with federal and state priorities. They also seek to recruit new businesses to their communities by offering whatever limited resources are available to them. Other cities have adopted living wage ordinances tied to the actual cost of living in that city as opposed to the federal minimum wage. Other cities require companies receiving government contracts or any kind of city support to hire a certain number or percentage of city residents. Finally, nongovernmental organizations are also involved in city rejuvenation efforts. Community and neighborhood development corporations are local groups that seek to address community needs. Community development corporations (CDCs) are typically not-for-profit organizations that try to raise capital and outside assistance to provide for a range of activities and programs. CDCs are locally controlled organizations that may draw resources from foundations, hospitals, universities, and other private and public institutions. They are frequently involved in establishing home construction and rehabilitation programs, credit unions to offer low-interest loans to neighborhood residents, job training programs for residents, and other educational and social programs. Many local groups also form neighborhood associations that most often focus on the specific needs of their particular communities that may include housing, crime, or youth programs.

Efforts to address urban decline are constrained by the inability of the various actors and groups to control the factors that precipitate the decline. The transformation of the global economy continues to be a primary source of many urban problems. Many cities that were in decline in the 1960s and 1970s continue to show signs of distress. Yet, many cities have marshaled their local resources and assets to adapt to the broader social forces to bring about some successes. In cities across the United States, there are numerous success stories of both downtown and neighborhood revitalization.

Patrick Donnelly

See also Globalization; Skills Mismatch; Urban Infrastructure; Urban Renewal; Urban Sprawl

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Urban Infrastructure

Urban infrastructure is a broad term used to describe the civil engineering, architectural, and urban-planning projects undertaken in cities to provide inhabitants with the structures that are necessary for sustainable life. These interconnected structures

provide the framework to sustain an entire urban area. They include transportation and communications systems; educational and health facilities; water, gas, and electrical supplies; waste removal; and diverse systems such as prisons, asylums, housing structures, and additional urban undertakings. Poor urban infrastructure directly affects city inhabitants and often contributes to distressing societal problems. Further, urban growth without the proper infrastructure in place results in countless social problems.

Social science literature focusing specifically on urban infrastructure is sparse but growing. The term *infrastructure* originated in France during the 1800s and was later used in the United States in reference to military facilities. By the 1920s *infrastructure* described public works required for an industrial economy. The term gained popularity in the mid-1970s and emerged as an area of academic interest during the 1980s, after works such as *America in Ruins* of 1983 and *Rebuilding America's Infrastructure* of 1984 sparked public-policy discussions about America's decaying urban infrastructure.

Today, more than half the world's population lives in rapidly growing cities. The UN Population Division forecasts that by 2025 more than two thirds of humanity will reside in urban areas. About 90 percent of this population boom is largely the result of the rural-to-urban migration and high birth rates in developing countries. Most of these urban areas cannot keep pace with population growth. City budgets are inadequate to expand the needed infrastructure, and consequently the majority of world poverty has also shifted from the country to the city.

Many of society's most pressing issues are now in urban areas. However, because the means available for building and financing housing and urban infrastructure in many cities are too limited to meet basic needs, more than 1 billion people worldwide live in urban slums. Most slum dwellers have neither sufficient nor consistent access to the basic infrastructures and services, creating the potential for disillusionment and hopelessness among slum dwellers, especially youth. Urban slums risk becoming spaces void of influence when neglected by governments. Increasingly filling these power vacuums are organized gangs and other criminal/terrorist factions that dominate daily life within these impoverished communities.

Water and sewage are also urgent infrastructural concerns. Forty percent of urban dwellers worldwide have no access to safe drinking water or adequate sanitation, and the proportion increases to over 50 percent when considering only developing countries. In Brazil, 51 percent of city residents have no connection to sewerage networks and 90 percent of the sewage collected receives no treatment whatsoever. Similarly, in Shanghai, China, 86 percent of household waste goes untreated. In these two cities, and hundreds more globally, human waste ends up in oceans, rivers, and lakes, severely harming the natural environment and increasing human health risks. Not surprisingly, water-related diseases kill hundreds of thousands every year.

Transportation is another pivotal concern for today's cities. Many roads in and around poor cities are dangerous, particularly at night. Large cities often lack properly maintained roads with sufficient lighting. Busy roads are usually too narrow and only serve one lane of traffic in each direction. To pass slow-moving vehicles, drivers often must enter oncoming lanes of traffic. This inevitably leads to soaring traffic congestion and high rates of serious and often fatal traffic accidents. This is evident in Brazil, plagued by one of the world's highest vehicle mortality rates. Transportation infrastructure is also a challenging issue for rich cities. Frequently, financing of enormous superhighways for private motor vehicle transit rather than for efficient means of public transportation leads to traffic congestion, air pollution, and road rage, among other problems.

Until recently, funding for urban infrastructure was through the public or private sector. Now, a growing "third sector" of civil society—that is, public–private partnerships—increasingly shares the costs and risks involved in such funding. However, this financing can be a contentious topic. For example, some suggest that powerful international institutions, governments of rich countries, and multinational corporations have disproportionate influence on local level urban infrastructure projects and priorities in developing countries.

Cities in wealthy countries are not without their share of challenges. In prosperous urban areas when infrastructure projects are not planned well, the poor often suffer the consequences. Robert Moses, New York's master builder during the mid-20th century, was criticized for developing infrastructure projects that were careless and intentionally discriminatory. For example, on the highways leading to middle-class beaches he designed overpasses too low for public buses to pass underneath. This blocked working-class bus riders' access to the beaches. Critics also blame Moses for contributing to urban decay by tearing down housing and separating large swaths of neighborhoods with large highways.

Many social and environment problems can be avoided if urban infrastructure projects are properly implemented and nondiscriminatory. Good infrastructure often provides the framework for positive and sustainable economic growth in urban areas. The problems of urban infrastructure are very complex, however, and directly linked to larger processes of urbanization, globalization, and the global economy.

Marcos Burgos

See also Global Economy; Globalization; Population Growth; Urbanization; Urban Renewal

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Urbanization

Urbanization is the process by which a large number of people over time become concentrated in cities. However, cities, as permanent settlements where heterogeneous groups of people live, have existed since time immemorial. The existence of cities is extensively interrelated to the expansion of an efficient agricultural system and technology that makes possible surplus products beyond the immediate requirements of survival. This condition, together with the existence of complex social organization and favorable geographical environment, plays a critical role in the continued existence of cities. Yet due to, among other things, inadequate technology and agricultural and transportation systems, premodern cities were relatively undersized and few in number compared to modern cities. Hence, the true development of urbanization is a recent phenomenon. Just 200 years ago, the number of people living in urban areas throughout the world was under 4 percent. Currently, that number is 47 percent; soon it will hit the 50 percent mark. By the year 2025, demographers predict that two thirds of the world's population will live in metropolitan areas.

Modern Urbanism and Beyond

The industrial revolution made a marked difference in the development of modern cities. The revolution played an important role in drawing people to cities, where diverse nonagricultural occupations were available. Most importantly, however, the industrial revolution laid the infrastructural basis for the expansion of communication between distant areas and the transportation of people and resources from one place to another. Hence, preindustrial cities and modern cities were dissimilar from one another not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Economically modern cities allowed elaborate specialization together with an open system in which achievement rather than ascription played an important role in social mobility. Politically, modern cities became social spaces wherein the notion of citizenship, replacing premodern subjecthood, found full-fledged expression. Culturally, modern cities not only served as centers of cultural intermixing but acted as places wherein diverse subcultures flourished. These processes allowed modern cities to grow exponentially. Some modern cities evolved into *metropolises,* central cities surrounded by towns and suburban areas with relatively integrated economies. Sometimes continued urbanization created a *megalopolis,* a continuous stretch of urban area forming a cluster of metropolises, such as from Boston to Washington, D.C.

Modern cities are also distinct from their premodern counterparts because of a unique form of social behavior that emerged within them. Urban sociologist Louis Wirth designated this emergent behavior as *urbanism,* a distinctive way of life eventuated by the social patterns of modernity. Because urbanites are

exposed to an increasing social differentiation of the urban environment, they tend to be anonymous, superficial, and selectively sensitive to social matters while at the same time exhibiting strong ties with their primary groups. Before Wirth, Georg Simmel also remarked on the inimitable features of the urbanite. Unlike some modern social thinkers who lamented the disappearance of community life, Simmel underscored the positive dimensions of the urban experience without glossing over its problems. In place of excessive parochialism and surveillance characteristics of the traditional way of life a good deal of freedom is provided by urban centers to urban dwellers. Anticipating David Harvey's notion of "time-space compression," Simmel was able to describe the intense feeling that urbanites experience. According to Simmel, to the extent that they develop a unique attitude that protects them from the overstimulations of urban life, urbanites experience an intense crash of people and events hitherto unimagined. In their blasé attitude, an indifference to manifold but selective situations, urbanites might sound cold and calculating. Yet, the blasé mind-set is nothing but a survival mechanism through which urbanites focus on what is indispensable to the process of coping with the encounters of city life.

Recently social scientists extended the process of overstimulation that takes place in urban settings to its ultimate conclusion that a new type of self, the postmodern self, has emerged as a result. Postmodernists assert that this new self is markedly different from the selves that preceded it. Unlike the romantic and the modern selves—whose fundamental nature centered on passion and reason, respectively—the postmodern self, despite the residues that it inherited from the past, lacks essence and is decentered. To the extent that the self is at the verge of dissolution, social structures have lost their constraining impact on the individual. However, the self has not disappeared; it has become relational instead, augmented by the opportunity for social connectedness. The proximate cause of this development is technological. In a postindustrial age in which communication technologies dominate, the self is constantly bombarded by signs, images, and varied experiences that knock at its door with no end in sight. Consequently, individuals have a hard time committing themselves to a single master identity. With social saturation undermining "coherent circles of accord," as Kenneth J. Gergen calls them in *The Saturated Self*, individuals have no option but to be skeptical of prevailing viewpoints. Ironically, according to some analysts, the process of social saturation—far from enfeebling communalism—reinforces amicable relationships among members of society.

Urbanization and Social Problems

Despite cities acting as platforms for the notable accomplishments of modernity, urbanization's picture is not all rosy. Urban centers are plagued by many social problems. These problems are most vivid in the developing world, where millions of people are concentrated in few cities. Unprecedented urban growth in these countries is caused by natural population increase and the migration of people from rural to urban areas. In the developing world, more than 70 percent of the urban population lives in poverty; yet rural residents flock to metropolitan areas, attempting to flee from the pulverizing impact of poverty in their own areas. The migration is also, in part, the function of an uneven policy of development that buttresses urban growth at the expense of the agricultural sector. As a result, cities in the developing world must deal with daunting social problems that become increasingly difficult to overcome. Most of these problems are associated with employment, pollution, and housing, just to mention a few. Due to the availability of "surplus labor," many people in the cities of the developing world are not only unemployed but underemployed and "misemployed" (engaged in undignified activities such as prostitution) as well.

Where attempts to resolve the problems of urban unemployment take place, the result has been the unintended consequences of industrialization and urbanization, with pollution the most salient one. Cities of the developing world are noisier and more polluted than cities of the developed world. Despite the fact that quality of life in urban areas has qualitatively improved compared with quality of life in rural areas, inadequate housing is one of the chronic problems in developing world cities. More than 75 percent of the urban population in these cities lives in overcrowded slums, squatter settlements, and shantytowns where life is extremely precarious. Consequently, as the problem of cities of the developing world is the presence of too many problems without the accompanying social means of prevailing over them, many social scientists fear that the breakdown of urban giants of the developing world may take place unless a social miracle of sorts comes to pass.

In spite of the colossal number of resources at their disposal, highly industrialized nations have not spared themselves from urban problems either. Although the types of chronic problems that Friedrich Engels described in his ethnographic work on Manchester do not exist today, cities of the highly industrialized nations still suffer from "old" (poverty, violence) and "new" (pollution, traffic congestion) social problems. In the United States, for instance, poverty—mainly caused by the loss of manufacturing jobs due to globalization processes, the migration of white-collar corporations and manufacturing firms to the suburbs, and the retraction of investment from inner cities—is one of the "old" problems that afflict urban dwellers, especially inhabitants of the inner city, a significant number of whom fall under the social category of the underclass. Members of the underclass are not just at the bottom of social hierarchy, but they are beneath the class structure. Consisting of single mothers on welfare, teenagers, and the homeless, the underclass have virtually no social and economic capital and are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which they are incapable of escaping.

Alem Kebede

See also Community; Crime; Environment, Pollution; Homelessness; Postmodernism; Underclass Debate; Urban Underclass

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Urban Renewal

In theory, urban renewal is any effort to direct city planning toward the improvement of the physical infrastructure. In practice, in the United States it has often meant the seizing of "blighted" property by the federal government and its redevelopment by private enterprise, underwritten by federal grants or loans. Many of the largest public works that shape urban landscapes are urban renewal initiatives, including expressways, bridges, parks, stadiums, and housing projects. While urban renewal promised better low-income housing and citywide improvements to slow "white flight" to the suburbs, its execution remains controversial. Critics charge that renewal projects further marginalize the poor and minorities and destroy communities while subsidizing facilities for the upper classes. Public housing projects—a keystone of urban renewal—are today almost universally seen as a failure and are being torn down. Their destruction symbolizes changes in approach to urban renewal, where structural rehabilitation and selective demolition are now favored over wholesale "slum clearance."

The Early Stages

By the mid-1800s many Western cities that expanded rapidly during the industrial revolution were replete with dilapidated and dangerous buildings. Entire neighborhoods had become slums, with overcrowded and deteriorating homes lacking basic facilities such as plumbing. These predominantly immigrant and minority areas were epicenters of crime and delinquency. Narrow streets made garbage collection difficult and were a fire hazard. In the first modern instance of what would later be called "slum clearance," between the 1850s and 1870s, Baron Haussmann destroyed many poor neighborhoods in Paris and replaced them with wide boulevards, parks, plazas, and new houses. He also installed sewage systems, streetlights, and other modern amenities.

In late 19th-century America, social reformers like Jacob Riis argued that the immorality of slum inhabitants resulted from the physical degradation of their environment. Thus, reformers promoted improved living conditions and the creation of settlement houses, which would act as the social and recreational center of a neighborhood and provide social services. Riis argued that such improvements would compel slum dwellers to become responsible citizens. Although some settlements and housing laws were initiated as a result, a 1929 government survey of 64 cities found that 15.6 percent of all dwellings needed major structural repairs and only 37.7 percent were in "good" condition. By the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt's depression-era presidential inauguration, conditions

had worsened. Roosevelt declared that one third of the nation lacked proper nourishment, clothing, and housing. His establishment of the Federal Housing Authority marked the nation's first foray into government-sponsored slum clearance and low-rent public housing.

The Housing Act of 1949 allocated federal loans and grants for slum clearance and redevelopment; utilizing a wide interpretation of "public interest," the government authorized property seizure for private redevelopment under eminent domain. Often, the land was resold to developers who constructed higher-priced housing. The money designated for finding satisfactory housing for those evicted was minimal, with the frequent result that slum dwellers were merely relocated to other slums. Additionally, slum-razing left a dearth of low-rent units, instigating a housing crisis for the poor.

Projects

In an effort to eradicate slums, the government embarked on a massive program to construct public housing projects for the poor across urban America. A low-income ceiling was enforced for admission; those with a higher income were refused or evicted. These "projects," usually placed in depressed areas where private developers were unwilling to invest, concentrated large numbers of buildings and people in a "superblock" that disrupted the street grid. This application of Le Corbusier's modernist "garden city" plan resulted in giant concrete and brick towers placed on large tracts of land left otherwise undeveloped ostensibly to provide open space for recreation. One of the biggest such projects was Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes. Completed in 1962, the complex contained 27,000 people in 28 high-rise buildings that collectively occupied only 7 percent of the land. Projects funneled some of the city's poorest residents—usually minorities—into buildings that were often surrounded by ghettoes, barren land, or highways.

Large-Scale Urban Renewal

The scope of urban renewal projects reached its broadest during the era of Robert Moses in New York City. From the 1930s to the 1960s, Moses—as the city park commissioner, construction coordinator, and planning commissioner—seized on the opportunities made possible by the Housing Act of 1949 more than any other entity in the country, spending twice as much federal money as all other U.S. cities combined in 1957. Every expressway in New York but one was built by Moses, in addition to seven major bridges, 416 miles of parkways, venues such as the Lincoln Center and Shea Stadium, and large-scale middle-income housing developments like Stuyvesant Town. He increased the number of playgrounds from 119 to 777 and also developed a network of state parks. By 1968 the total cost of urban renewal projects personally conceived and executed by Moses had reached $27 billion.

The Human Toll

Moses's projects required slum clearance on an unprecedented scale, including the eviction of 500,000 people and the erasure of dozens of neighborhoods. As is the case around the country, many of the evicted were minorities, and the new housing was beyond their means. Thus the benefits of such projects went disproportionately to nonpoor whites, while institutionalized discrimination practically forced minorities and the poor into other slums or, increasingly, into projects.

One infamous slum clearance was the leveling of Boston's West End in 1959–60, which evicted over 20,000 poor residents. Hoping to revitalize downtown, luxury apartments were built, along with a shopping center and a new government complex. Few resources were provided for those displaced by the bulldozer. In the razing of the West End, critics saw the destruction not only of homes but also of a social system that left psychological scars and grief reactions for years after displacement. Many West Enders landed in areas later slated for slum clearance, the majority wound up paying significantly more rent for their new dwellings, and the community dissolved as its members were dispersed throughout the city.

Public housing, saddled with the most disadvantaged Americans, isolated from white and middle-class areas of the city, and faced with constant funding cuts that ran especially deep during the Reagan era, was in crisis. Within only a few decades of their construction, most projects were over-run with crime and gang violence and were in such disrepair that they were deemed dangerous and even uninhabitable. Those living in projects seemed doomed to an environment of fear and despair, and activists argued that public housing was never given a chance to succeed, as it was given low priority and little funding.

Resistance and the End of an Era

Jane Jacobs spearheaded opposition to a downtown highway proposed by Moses in the 1960s and put forth her philosophical justification in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities.* Jacobs and others contended that the "towers in the sky" and "superblocks," so central to urban renewal, destroy the social fabric and vitality of the city and thus are designed to fail. Increased protests against such public works, and the race riots and civil rights protests of the 1960–70s that were partially a reaction to segregation and slum clearance, forced the government to rethink urban renewal.

In 1995 the Chicago Housing Authority declared that the Robert Taylor Homes were uninhabitable and would be demolished. Across the United States, the towers that once symbolized hope and a promise to the underprivileged were now seen as failures and eyesores, and most cities began rapidly pulling them down. As cities relocated those displaced from the projects and the federal government contemplated a new approach for housing the poor, there evolved a near-consensus that large-scale, concentrated housing projects should never be built again. Many in Boston lament the vibrant West End that was lost, and city planners seem to have learned from failed experiments with large-scale slum clearance and public housing projects to focus instead on redevelopment and rehabilitation, selective demolition, and vouchers to subsidize the relocation of the poor to middle-class areas.

Many recent urban renewal schemes focus on commercial development and sports arenas. Baltimore's downtown baseball stadium—built over a railyard in 1992—is credited with revitalizing the area. Other cities have scrambled to construct downtown arenas, often couching them in larger mixed-use projects that broaden their appeal. One of the most ambitious examples is Brooklyn's proposed Atlantic Yards. The $3.5 billion plan calls for building a basketball arena, yet it also includes affordable and market-rate housing, a park, hotel, retail shops, and office buildings. As with urban renewal in decades past, the project's backers argue that it will revitalize a downtrodden area, while opponents claim thousands of lives will be destroyed by the bulldozer. The rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is also testing the government's commitment to more equitable urban renewal, as debates rage over what to do with the many displaced poor black residents and whether to rebuild their lost neighborhoods.

Colin Jerolmack

See also Eminent Domain; Gentrification; Redlining; Segregation, Residential; Urban Decline; Urban Sprawl

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Urban Sprawl

In the early 21st century, urban sprawl continues to be a source of considerable controversy and political debate, yet many Americans quietly accept sprawl. They express their acceptance by moving farther away from central cities into housing and business developments on land that was formerly rural and undeveloped. While a significant number of suburban communities have existed in the United States since the late 19th century, the greatest growth in suburbs occurred after World War II. At the dawn of the 20th century, the suburban population represented less than 12 percent of the total U.S. population. By 1950, that figure doubled, and it doubled again by 2000, so that 52 percent lived in suburban communities. While the U.S. Census does not officially define *suburban area*, the term generally refers to the territory within metropolitan areas that is outside of the central city.

The term *sprawl* refers to a pattern of metropolitan growth characterized by low-density, primarily single-family residential development, low-density commercial and employment establishments, and the resulting heavy dependence on the automobile for travel. These developments occur on the periphery of the metropolitan area. In the early 20th century, many affluent and middle-class families moved out to the

suburbs deliberately to escape the large and dense city populations. Following the Great Depression and World War II, several U.S. government programs further encouraged and facilitated this exodus. These included the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration GI Bill, which provided low-cost mortgages for more than 11 million new single-family homes. With many central cities already developed and thus with little land available for large, new housing developments, most new construction occurred in suburban areas. Strongly supported by the automobile industry, the federal government also established the Interstate Highway System in 1956. The federal government paid up to 90 percent of the cost of the new highway system, which resulted in over 40,000 miles of new highways. The highways enabled people to travel more easily, including traveling from suburban homes to jobs in the city. The growing economy and more widespread prosperity of the period provided more Americans with the means to purchase their homes and automobiles. Retail businesses followed the populations to the new areas, and by the 1970s, many corporations were closing their city offices to move to business parks in the suburbs.

The sprawl phenomenon continued as most metropolitan areas expanded their land areas at rates that far surpassed their population increases. Between 1982 and 1997, the amount of urbanized land in the United States increased by 47 percent while the nation's population increased by only 17 percent. The population density of metropolitan areas, which is one quantitative measure of sprawl, declined by 15.7 percent during the same period. Sprawl generates several problems, including environmental damage, cost inefficiency, quality-of-life changes, city decline, and economic and racial segregation.

Sprawl significantly affects the natural environment, each year claiming more than 2 million additional acres of land for development. Over half of this land is farmland, with the rest divided between forests and other undeveloped land. The loss of this land disrupts small town and family farming operations, threatens wetlands that protect residents from damaging floods, and threatens wildlife by destroying their natural habitats.

The automobile makes sprawl possible, and in turn, sprawl makes us increasingly dependent on the automobile to get to work, school, stores, and other numerous destinations. The low-density developments make walking or public transportation inefficient methods of transit. Between 1980 and 2003, an 11 percent increase in the number of private and commercial automobiles occurred, as well as a 187 percent increase in private and commercial trucks registered in the United States. Between 1970 and 2003, there was a 22 percent increase in the average number of miles traveled each year by each of those automobiles and a 100 percent increase in annual miles per truck.

Despite efforts to make automobiles more energy efficient and to use cleaner, less polluting gasoline, the increased use of motor vehicles reduces the benefits of these efforts. Motor vehicles are a major source of air pollution, particularly in the sprawling metropolitan communities. They account for most of the carbon monoxide and many of the hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides in major urban areas. These pollutants have serious effects on human health. Among the diseases known to be related to motor vehicle pollution are asthma, bronchitis, upper respiratory tract infections, and various types of cancer. Automobiles and light trucks are responsible for about 20 percent of the nation's carbon dioxide emissions, the gas that causes global warming.

The dependency on the automobile also affects people's quality of life. The length of time that people must travel to get to work has increased from 22 minutes in 1980 to 25 minutes in 2000. This increase adds 25 hours a year to the average commuter's travel time, raising the total time spent commuting to about 208 hours per year. Because other services, including schools, shopping, and recreational centers, tend to be more spread out in sprawl communities, families spend more time in cars than do families in more densely developed areas. The increased use of the automobile leads to further traffic congestion, which exacerbates environmental damage.

Considerable research documents the increased cost of service in sprawled communities. When sprawl occurs, new schools, roads, water and sewer lines, and other physical infrastructure must be added. The sprawling communities must add police, fire, and other personnel to provide the necessary services. The distance between developments in these communities makes providing these services more costly than in higher density areas. While the private developers of these new areas frequently pay a fee to cover some of these new expenses, the fees do not cover the full costs of the projects. Residents in the new areas, both the new and long-term residents, frequently experience

significant tax increases to cover these costs. Because much of the infrastructural support is paid by state and federal agencies, taxpayers outside the area also support these sprawled developments.

It is ironic that city residents are among those who pay state and federal taxes that support the development of sprawling communities. As cities lose residents to the new communities, the cities are left with a smaller tax base. The vitality of downtown areas is diminished as cities lose their population and jobs as well as their retail, entertainment, and corporate presence to the new suburbs and their malls and office parks. Houses and buildings in the city are abandoned and public services decline.

Cities are also harmed by sprawl because those who move from the city to these new developments tend to be from upper- and middle-class households. City residents who are left behind are disproportionately poor and minority. Thus, cities are left to serve needier populations with less revenue than in earlier decades when they had more revenues and wealthier populations. The degree of economic segregation has increased because the sprawling communities tend to offer housing that is accessible only to wealthier households. The economic segregation is now reinforced by the physical separation of the social classes. The withdrawal of the wealthier groups from the city saps the neighborhood and civic groups, churches, community centers, and other cultural, social, and recreational organizations of the social and financial capital that once maintained them.

Broader changes in the economy combine with the phenomenon of sprawl to aggravate the challenges of the inner-city poor. The significant loss of manufacturing jobs in cities after 1960 and the increase of jobs in the higher-end service sector, including the information exchange and high technology areas, have a dramatic effect on those without higher levels of education. A spatial mismatch developed, such that the less-educated populations live in the less expensive housing of the central city while the growth of lower-end service sector jobs, including retail, restaurants, maintenance, and landscaping that service the middle and upper classes, has occurred in the outer suburbs. Many city residents have difficulty reaching the suburban jobs because they do not own cars and public transportation systems are absent or inadequate.

Across the nation and in particular cities, numerous efforts are under way to address urban sprawl and it related problems. The smart growth movement consists of planners, developers, community and environmental activists, nonprofit groups, and political leaders. The movement encourages a range of development and design patterns, including a mix of land uses, viable public transportation systems, preservation of open space and farmland, the creation of walkable communities and communities with a strong sense of place, greater regional cooperation in planning and revenue sharing, the revitalization of central cities to make them more desirable places to live and work, and policies to ensure that development decisions are fair to all parties and cost-effective.

Patrick Donnelly

See also Skills Mismatch; Urban Decline; Urbanization

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Urban Underclass

Over the past 2 decades, the urban underclass has become one of the most controversial topics in the social sciences. As a sociological construct, the notion of an underclass can be traced to Marx's *lumpenproletariat,* which he identified as occupying the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, beneath the working class. However, journalist Ken Auletta first popularized the term *underclass* in the early 1980s in writing about criminals, hustlers, and welfare dependents. This modern conceptualization involved two interlocking elements of the underclass: poverty and self-defeating or pathological behavior.

One of the more controversial aspects of the "underclass debate" is whether the existence of this group was a new phenomenon or simply another term to describe the persistently poor. For William Julius

Wilson, the underclass was the ideal way to characterize the emergence of a disenfranchised class of individuals resulting from changing labor market conditions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Wilson, the sociologist who has advanced the clearest articulation of the underclass, U.S. cities experienced an economic transformation characterized by the disappearance of jobs that paid well but required little education (i.e., manufacturing), the division of the economy into high- and low-wage sectors, and the shift from a goods-producing to a service-producing economy. The tenuous position of central-city blacks in the labor market, he argued, made them particularly vulnerable to these changes. The new economy, heavily reliant on technology and information processing, created a "skills mismatch," whereby poor blacks did not meet the educational criteria for well-paid work. The decentralization of jobs into nonurban areas also generated a "spatial mismatch," whereby inner-city blacks were further disadvantaged by losing their proximity to jobs.

Moreover, as the black middle class flowed out into the suburbs, they removed an important social buffer that may have lessened the effects of these transformations. Their absence further concentrated the effects of poverty as the ghetto poor became socially isolated, losing the social ties needed to hook them into job networks. Finally, without working role models, a milieu developed in which joblessness prevails and work is no longer a defining feature of life. This environment fosters behavior, such as tardiness or absenteeism, which hinders success in the formal economy, making the underground economy a more attractive alternative for many inner-city men of color. In this way, the concentrated disadvantage that characterizes poor black and Hispanic neighborhoods tends to reinforce pathological behavior.

A secondary concern of Wilson's work addressed changes to family structure that grew out of these economic shifts, particularly a dramatic increase in female-headed families and the related tendency of the ghetto poor not to marry. For example, between 1960 and 1980, marriage rates among black women ages 14 to 24 declined by half (26 percent to 13 percent), and among those ages 25 to 44 it declined from 65 percent to 45 percent. Wilson attributed these changes to the labor market, arguing that the marriageable pool of employed black men had shrunk. In sum, Wilson's conceptualization of the underclass is primarily structural, but one that contains a cultural component. Joblessness is the key to understanding urban poverty, but he also seeks to explain ghetto-specific behavior that reinforces poverty. His treatment of the topic re-appropriated both culture and family as legitimate avenues of theory and research by liberal scholars.

Wilson's work spurred a tremendous volume of literature documenting the size and cultural features of the underclass, including the work of his former student, Elijah Anderson. Over time, however, the meaning of the concept became more diffuse and so conflated with race that *black* and *underclass* were often used interchangeably. Wilson and others were criticized for perpetuating an image of poor blacks as a monolithic group completely cut off from mainstream society. Liberals quickly critiqued the cultural aspect of Wilson's argument as victim-blaming and reacted harshly to his assertion that, for the first time, class more than race structured the life chances of inner-city blacks. In 1991, Wilson abandoned the use of the term *underclass* in favor of *ghetto poor,* largely because the concept had lost its meaning in the political debate surrounding it.

From the 1990s onward, the labor market continued its transformation. Jobs continued to move out of cities and increasingly relocated to other countries where labor was a fraction of the cost. Advanced technology widened the gap between unskilled laborers and available jobs. Immigration patterns present a new challenge for the urban poor who are seeking work, as employers who employ racial stereotypes often prefer undocumented workers who work for lower wages. Ultimately, greater numbers of people are failing to make an effective adjustment to these transitions. U.S. society is increasingly moving toward two societies marked by dramatic cleavages in wealth. As the middle class shrinks, urban areas experience a polarization of the upper class and the ghetto poor, who have limited human and social capital. Crime and violence, drug use, and other social problems are the outgrowth of their inability to find a place in the new global economy.

This new ghetto poverty is particularly structural, and it is increasingly difficult to blame the group most affected for its plight. As the weakest element of the social structure, poor black and Hispanic men are disproportionately marginalized. With few economic resources to effectively sustain relationships with women and establish stable roles as husbands and fathers, the gap between women and men of color

continues to grow. Black women's labor market participation, educational attainment, and earnings have begun to outpace those of their male counterparts, deepening already profound changes in family formation patterns. Moreover, while the system has received former welfare recipients and the elderly through universal anti-poverty policies and welfare-to-work programs, the prison-industrial complex is the primary institution addressing the problems of poor men of color. As incarceration rates continue to skyrocket, more find themselves separated from the labor market, alienated from mainstream institutions, and among the growing ranks of the ghetto poor. In the tradition of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, who struggled with the lasting significance of industrialization, today's students of social problems must now address deindustrialization and globalization, uncovering the configuration of social classes in this new social order.

Elijah Anderson and Jamie J. Fader

See also Blaming the Victim; Deindustrialization; Economic Restructuring; Globalization; Hypersegregation; Inequality; Inner City; Labor Market; Life Chances; Poverty; Skills Mismatch; Social Capital; Split Labor Market; Stratification, Social; Underclass Debate; Underemployment; Underground Economy; Unemployment

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V

VALUES

Values are constructs that guide human behavior, helping people distinguish between the desirable and undesirable. On the individual level, they are conceptions that motivate personal action. On the aggregate level, they reflect collective experience and provide general orientation to a society. Values have emotional connotations. We *feel* when something is unacceptable and undesirable even when we don't *know* what is wrong with a situation. Values cannot be simply empty axioms. To have directive force, they must be embodied in concrete individual and social practice. We can talk of "family values," but these are meaningless unless actualized in living experience. Researchers cannot observe values, but they can study their behavioral impact.

Virtually all disciplines concerning human affairs use and propose definitions for values because evaluative standards are fundamental to human existence. *Homo sapiens* are evaluative animals that exhibit few innate, invariant, complex behavioral patterns. Our species has a very open biogram (the biological substrate that supports/sustains our humanity; i.e., what is essentially shared by all humans) and is able to override basic biological predispositions and capacities. We may be predisposed to eat, reproduce, and protect our lives, activities that make perfect sense from an evolutionary angle, but we can also choose to starve ourselves, not procreate, and seek martyrdom. Equally important, our words or deeds have arbitrary and multiple significances because the human brain supports symbolic thought and action. Symbols allow us to refer to the nonimmediate and nonexistent and to propose imaginary scenarios. Biology thus predisposes us to make judgments of what is, what could be, and what ought to be in the realms of both ideas and actions. The evaluation and transformation of the conditions of existence is the main adaptive strategy of *Homo sapiens.*

Social scientists have debated extensively the nature of value systems and what value systems contribute to individuals and societies. Because all human societies hold standards concerning what is acceptable, good, and desirable, many have postulated functional explanations that emphasize behavioral or mental aspects. Those favoring the phenomenal (behavioral) viewpoint tend to focus on the problems of choice. Values reduce the ambivalence of choice by suggesting preferred states of affairs. When individuals confront decision-making situations, preferential standards limit the possibilities for action, reduce the cognitive load created by diverse alternatives, and possibly make the individuals more efficient actors. For example, if a woman *feels* that honesty is important, she will be less hesitant to report there is some uncharged item left in the shopping cart. If honesty is not an issue, the decision-making process will be more prolonged and complex. Values can reduce the burden of choice frequently experienced in ordinary living.

Values can also promote a general collective order by increasing behavioral predictability. Human plasticity at the ideational and phenomenal levels can create chaos on the organizational plane. When individuals share few fixed patterns of action, their coordination potential diminishes substantially. Values motivate individuals to choose certain options over

others and to pursue the most acceptable path in a particular context. Furthermore, they offer standards by which to judge the actions of others and provoke sanctions that help induce conformity and promote order. The best way to understand the relevance of a value is to observe closely its transgressions and their corresponding responses.

Researchers stressing the functions of values from the mental viewpoint implicitly focus on the elusive quality of symbols. Our symbolic capacity creates a chasm between *self* and *other:* We cannot know what others are doing until we know what others are thinking. Values help bridge the gap between "what is" and "what could be" by fostering shared sentiments and postulating "what ought to be" in a situation. Common standards of preference and appreciation help uphold reciprocal expectations and reduce the ambivalence of significance that characterizes human relations. For example, if one accepts aid from a stranger, it is because one feels goodness in the situation and believes there is mutual understanding and coincidence of expectations. Values help forge and lubricate the bonds of trust required to establish enduring interpersonal relations.

Because societies display a certain level of coherence in the arena of values, researchers occasionally use the terms *value system* and *value orientation.* Values tend to appear in association, possibly in configurations that involve ranking orders. Some values seem to prevail over others and permeate most aspects of social life (core values); others seem to relate to specific domains of activity (focal values) or have idiosyncratic roots and private influence (personal values). In the United States, for example, regard for individual rights pervades nearly every facet of life (core value); the appropriateness of competitive achievement, however, may be questioned in the family context (focal value). Notwithstanding postulated rankings, it is crucial to remember that values must be linked to contexts of practice and that values guide us even when we are unable to perceive them or articulate them (implicit values).

When scholars draw attention to the functions of values, they overlook myriad problems associated with values and value-oriented research. Values may reduce ambivalence of choice and significance and promote collective order, but they also amplify differences between groups. Humans learn to understand and respond according to the preferential standards shared by members of their group; they acquire values transmitted and enacted in their socialization contexts. Variations in preferential standards create opportunities for misunderstanding and conflict. When we visit an exotic culture, for example, we are likely to experience disorientation and discomfort. And when unfamiliar groups come in contact, dominant groups are likely to impose their values on subordinates. Whereas some disciplines lay emphasis on absolute, panhuman (*universal*) standards, others stress the diversity of evaluative patterns and obstacles to cross-cultural analyses. To compare, we must de-contextualize values and disregard the patterning of different value systems. Equally important, we must assume that the mental constructs, relations, and activities of distinct systems of values have identical significance.

Albeit apparent integrative functions, value systems are not perfectly congruent or coherent. Standards of preference may come into conflict in particular contexts. When values clash in actual instances, individuals tend to invoke core values to justify their claims and to challenge opposing views. Although these moral axioms permeate all domains of activity, they never eliminate the possibility of disagreements. For example, if a man robs a woman to secure better comfort, few Americans would hesitate to condemn his action because respect for others stands above personal satisfaction. If, on the other hand, a career-oriented woman decides to end an early pregnancy, the verdict would be less conclusive because the rights of the fetus and the woman stand in direct opposition. Coercive measures might be used to settle conflicts when core values cannot be reconciled.

Standards of preference may be enduring, but they are not eternal. Values and value orientations change as cultures change, with transformations in social productions and the conditions of living. All values, however, do not change at the same rate, and values cannot be imported from another social system. The Japanese strongly prefer teamwork, yet Americans who recognize its utility face colossal difficulties to promote such views and ways. Because systems of values (like cultures) are generally integrated and coherent and intimately linked to action, societies resist value change. Those who attempt to import or export values ignore a fundamental human reality: Values must be embodied and enacted through lived experience; they cannot exist apart from contexts of action even though they are easily articulated as ideals or ideologies.

In the domain of values, doing is as important as, or possibly more important than, verbalizing standards. Thanks to our symbolic capacity and behavioral flexibility, we can easily become masters of deceit. We can

say what we don't mean and mean what we don't say. We can fool others into believing what is not, and we can even believe such pretenses ourselves. In *Homo sapiens,* only embodied standards of preference close the gap between word and deed and the chasm between what is, what could be, and what ought to be.

Maria de Lourdes Villar

See also Cultural Diffusion; Cultural Imperialism; Cultural Relativism; Cultural Values; Globalization

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VANDALISM

Vandalism is the purposeful defacement or destruction of public or private property without permission. Because it does not usually materially profit the perpetrator or physically harm the victim, it is generally considered to be a crime of anger, alienation, protest, or statement. The term *vandalism* can refer to everything from carving initials in school desks; breaking windows; scrawling threats on churches, synagogues, and mosques; painting graffiti on buildings and subway cars; to overturning tombstones or ruining school or business property. Accordingly, reactions to vandalism vary widely.

Although often connected to today's cities and to gang territoriality or even computer hacking and the spreading of viruses, vandalism goes back to early civilizations. For example, what is thought to be graffiti can be found on ancient Greek ruins. Throughout the 20th century, opinions on vandalism have ranged from seeing it as art, a hate crime, or inevitable juvenile mischief. Recently, arrest-driven policing policies have caused more police actions against vandalism.

Vandalism is inevitably linked to the concept of private property and the control and ownership over things and spaces. Therefore, some scholars question the validity of vandalism as a crime and focus on the social construction of vandalism as criminality. For example, food riots in England or France in the early modern period often combined with the destruction of private property and the theft of flour or other food. While this may be considered vandalism, it obviously occupies a more complicated emotional and political terrain than other kinds of crime.

Graffiti, in particular, has been subject to as much valorization as concern by scholars. Indeed, many art historians and social scientists alike consider graffiti to be an important conduit of public art. At the same time, others have recognized the pivotal role of destruction of property and hateful language painted on homes and businesses of those integrating neighborhoods or in other ways transgressing racial hierarchies. Thus, a crime like vandalism is very much in the eye of the beholder and varies widely by the type of marking or destruction, the victim, and the message of the vandal.

Since the 1990s, police officers in many U.S. cities have been pressured, through the dictates of zero-tolerance policing, to arrest suspects of vandalism along with other nuisance offenders. Vandals, who at one point may have been sent home (particularly if juvenile) even if police officers caught them in the act, are now more likely to be arrested and thus conceptualized and labeled as criminals. As well, the popularity of zero-tolerance ideas has made it seem that what once may have been seen as an inevitable product of neighborhood use is now seen as a symptom of a neighborhood in disarray.

Stacy K. McGoldrick

See also Property Crime; Zero-Tolerance Policies

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Vegetarian Movement

The vegetarian movement in the United States and Canada encompasses local, national, and international organizations that promote vegetarian practices and lifestyles. These organizations identify meat as a social problem for a variety of reasons, including threats to personal health, destruction to the environment, and the pain and suffering caused to animals in the factory farming industry. The concerns of the vegetarian movement overlap with those of the environmental and animal rights movements.

Vegetarians are individuals who do not consume any meat, poultry, or seafood; vegans extend these prohibitions to all animal products (including leather, wool, and sometimes honey). Efforts to count the actual number of vegetarians in the United States have been daunting, particularly because many people who identify as vegetarians do not exactly follow the vegetarian definition. For example, some vegetarians might occasionally eat fish or sometimes eat turkey on Thanksgiving. According to a 2003 Harris Poll, about 2.8 percent of the U.S. population does not eat meat, poultry, or seafood. However, due to the statistical margin of error, the actual percentage could be lower or higher.

While it is difficult to determine the actual number of vegetarians, only a small percentage participates in the vegetarian movement by joining and participating in vegetarian organizations. Some join national and international organizations, such as the Vegetarian Resource Group, the North American Vegetarian Society, and the International Vegetarian Union, while others participate in one of the dozens of state and local vegetarian groups. Such groups are found in all major U.S. and Canadian cities, as well as in such smaller cities and towns as El Paso, Texas (the Vegetarian Society of El Paso); Canton, Ohio (the Vegetarian Club of Canton); and Salem, Massachusetts (the Salem Vegan Society).

Local vegetarian groups typically hold meetings that feature potluck vegetarian meals, dine-outs at area restaurants, recipe sharing, and educational speakers; many of these groups center on providing social support to people making the transition to vegetarianism or veganism. Most of the national groups engage in efforts to make the culture more "vegetarian-friendly," for example, by working with the restaurant and food industries to make more vegetarian options available. Some also work to enact more structural changes, for example, by changing the U.S. guidelines for school lunch programs to increase vegetarian options and by working with nutrition and medical professional organizations to increase public acceptance of vegetarian diets as healthy.

Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the size and visibility of action-oriented groups, such as Vegan Action and Vegan Outreach, which engage in leafleting and other activities to increase awareness of meat as a social and personal problem, particularly among college students.

Donna Maurer

See also Environmental Movement

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Victimization

The term *victimization* refers to a process whereby an external force comes in contact with a person, causing that person to feel pain, sometimes causing injury, either of which can be short-lived or which might cause extended suffering and sometimes death. That force can be legal or illegal, natural or human caused, biological or chemical, expected or unexpected, social or individual, civil or uncivil, intended or unintended; the list of possibilities is endless.

Those persons who are the direct recipients of the external force are the primary victims, the ones who suffer first, feel pain the most severely, and are usually injured the worst. Other persons who are related to, or acquainted with, the primary victims and are negatively affected (usually emotionally) are the secondary victims. This group can feel an intense sense of sympathetic suffering in proportion to the severity of the injury and the nature of their relationship to the primary victim. Both primary and secondary victims

can become traumatized by the original victimization and consequently need some degree of psychological treatment to diminish their pain and to recover.

Persons familiar with the original victimization but not related or acquainted to the primary victim (usually neighbors or members of the same community or in the broader social audience) are tertiary victims. They can be influenced emotionally, financially, or socially. These persons can be those who received news of the original victimization via conversations, via the news media, or as witnesses to the event. In some cases even these tertiary victims will become traumatized and will need treatment.

The study of victimization and its victims is part of a relatively new science. A Romanian lawyer, Beniamin Mendelsohn, first coined the word *victimology* in 1947 and promoted its concept as the science of "victimity," the study of all victims. He referred to his concept as "general victimology" to distinguish it from "crime victimology," which is concerned only with crime victimization. He also proposed the establishment of a society of general victimology, the establishment of victimological research institutes, victim departments in all national governments, a journal of general victimology, the creation of victim clinics, and national societies in each country.

All of these proposals came to fruition. The World Society of Victimology, founded in 1979, is open to all forms of victimization (although most of its activities focus on crime victimization). At least six victimology institutes exist worldwide, some limited to crime victimization and others to general victimization. Many governments have established special offices dedicated to victims of crime and concern themselves with distributing information about victims, monitoring a wide range of victim support activities. In the United States, this office is the Office for Victims of Crime located within the Department of Justice. At least five international journals dedicated to victims actively publish works about all aspects of victimology. Tens of thousands of victim assistance centers function across the globe, especially in most of the developed countries but also in many of the developing countries as well. Finally, there are about 20 national victim societies across the globe. Consequently, it is understandable that Mendelsohn is called the "Father of Victimology."

In the United States, the first official measurement tool on the extent of crime and victimization was the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), created by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1927. Compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with data submitted voluntarily by police departments from all over the United States, these statistics unfortunately gave information mostly about the offenders, focusing on eight index crimes, but had little information about victims.

Because of the growing evidence about a sizable "dark figure" of victims (those who do not report their victimization) and the recognition that the UCR had been providing insufficient information about victims, a new national survey on victims appeared in 1966. This survey, now known as the National Crime Victimization Survey, confirmed that actual victimization rates exceeded UCR data, roughly double the number reported to the police. The survey provided a wealth of new information about victims and victimizations that has, for almost the past 4 decades, given victimologists details about victims and their behaviors never before available. In recent years, both of these surveys have become more expansive and sophisticated sources of statistics and information about victimization.

Beyond collecting survey data about crime victims, victimologists also conduct research to measure the cause-and-effect relationships that surround victimizations. These studies explore topics such as victim vulnerability, victim–offender interactions, victim impacts, victim trauma, victim blaming, victim needs, victim recovery, and many other topics that help victimologists better understand victim behaviors.

The last general category of research used in conjunction with victims is evaluative research used to measure the efficiency and efficacy of victim service programs. These studies focus primarily on victim services for such programs as those dealing with child abuse, sexual assault, elder abuse, victim advocacy, victim/witnesses, spouse abuse, burglary victims, accident victims, and victims of drunk drivers. The results of these studies help determine what aspects of services are valuable to keep, so as to better reduce victims' suffering and facilitate their recovery.

The main concerns of contemporary victimology are crime victims (persons injured as a result of an illegal act), disaster victims (persons injured as a result of either natural or human-caused catastrophes), and a special category referred to as "abuses of power victims" (persons injured as a result of genocide, apartheid, racketeering, inquisitions, torture, or ethnic cleansing).

The response to victimization has become a permanent part of 21st-century culture, especially in the United States. Currently, there are victim's rights in all states; service programs that help all types of victims; victimization research studies, which are major components of many scientific endeavors; universities that offer related academic degrees at the bachelor's, master's, and doctorate levels; professional victim advocates; and major parts of national and state budgets dedicated to providing assistance to a wide range of victims. Today, the concepts of victimization, victim rights, and victim assistance are familiar to most Americans, and sociologists believe that these changes have made a significant contribution to the improvement of the human condition.

John P. J. Dussich

See also National Crime Victimization Survey; Uniform Crime Report; Victim–Offender Mediation Model

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Victimless Crimes

The term *victimless crimes* and its alternative phrasing *crimes without victims* refer to illegal acts that involve behavior that the participants engage in voluntarily. For example, the prostitute and the prostitute's customer both view their interaction as a business transaction in which, as in other commercial arrangements, both parties achieve what they desire. The prostitute obtains money and the customer has the desired sexual experience. Though the behavior is criminal, neither party will file a police report, unless, perhaps, the transaction involves theft or physical violence.

Similarly, narcotic dealers and their patrons voluntarily agree to a transaction much the same as that involving the purchase of alcohol or shopping for groceries. Abortion, which was illegal in the United States until 1973, poses a more complicated situation. Both the person performing the abortion and the woman undergoing it do so voluntarily. But the burning issue is whether the aborted fetus is a person, a victim deserving legal protection. No scientific evidence can adequately support whatever position is taken on this question; thus pro-life and pro-choice campaigns become, as does so much in the realm of victimless crimes, a matter of ideology, theology, and the exercise of political power.

The term *crimes without victims* entered the realm of social science when Edwin Schur of Tufts University employed it in 1965 as the title of a monograph. Schur, a Yale Law School graduate with a doctorate from the London School of Economics, had conceived the idea of victimless crimes when writing his dissertation on British drug policies. The term had precedents in Anglo-American law, including "sumptuary laws," which forbade people of lesser social standing to dress themselves in elegant clothing. There also were "inchoate crimes," such as loitering, catch-all statutes typically enacted to provide the police with the power to arrest persons they deemed to be suspicious. Similarly, the crime of drunk driving (driving under the influence) does not always involve a victim, but the behavior is outlawed on the presumption that the likelihood of an accident increases when a driver is intoxicated.

Consensual acts also exist that are forbidden by law because of religious principles, social abhorrence, or both. Polygamy, entered into willingly by all parties, and physician-induced suicide exemplify the first category, while riding a motorcycle without a helmet fits into the second category.

A fundamental issue about so-called crimes without victims is whether, though consensual in regard to the participants, they inflict harm upon others, such as spouses and families of compulsive gamblers and residents in a drug-trading neighborhood, or whether they injure society in regard to its moral traditions. Proponents argue that for its well-being, a society has to uphold standards of decency, as generally defined, or risk disorganization and disintegration. Victimless crimes also involve financial costs that must be borne by innocent taxpayers, for instance, when an uninsured motorcyclist not wearing a helmet suffers severe injuries and incurs medical costs that he or she cannot afford. Or when a motorcyclist without a helmet is struck on the head by a stone in the roadway

and loses control of the vehicle, killing or maiming motorists on the same highway.

Critics maintain that the idea of victimless crimes essentially is a political and ideological construct, embraced as a rallying cry in an effort to eliminate a variety of controversial behaviors. In its heyday, the idea of victimless crime was joined with the theoretical construct of labeling. Some argued that, say, marijuana users who are prosecuted are thereby defined and come to define themselves as outcasts and as a result may enter into a career of crime. Both labeling theory and the concept of crimes without victims have largely gone out of favor today, the former because evidence shows that the consequences of labeling can be manifold, some enabling, others unfortunate.

Many feminists are among the more prominent forces aligned against the idea of victimless crime. They maintain, for instance, that the typical street-walking prostitute is herself the victim of her calling because she is the product of an exploitative patriarchal society. On the other hand, pornography tends to split the feminist movement, with some arguing that it insults all women and others insisting that the First Amendment right of free speech should take precedence over the speculative idea that women in general are endangered by pornographic depictions of such things as sex degradation.

The most pronounced development over the past decades with regard to crimes without victims has been the success of campaigns to remove many of them from the statute books. Gambling, once outlawed throughout the United States because of religious doctrine and fraud in the operation of lotteries, is now a prominent fixture on the U.S. scene, with a proliferating array of slot machines and lottery tickets marketed even at convenience stories. Homosexuality, now buried in the criminal law closet, today centers on the dispute over whether couples of the same sex can legally marry. Once outlawed, abortion became permissible in the first trimester of pregnancy, though intense controversy continues to divide people on the issue. And some states and countries have moderated drug laws, particularly in regard to marijuana.

Only prostitution remains absolutely interdicted, very likely because prostitutes do not have the political power that was brought to bear to overturn laws against other so-called victimless activities. One could argue that in the cases of abortion and drug legalization, for example, prominent women campaigned for legal abortions, young drug users moved into positions of power, and elite parents refused to see their pot-smoking children risk long prison terms. Likewise, it could be argued that gambling became acceptable when states found themselves desperate for revenue, and legislators dared not risk political suicide by increasing taxes.

Gilbert Geis

See also Abortion; Crime; Decriminalization; Drug Abuse; Drunk Driving; Feminism; Gambling; Homosexuality; Labeling Theory; Marijuana; Pornography; Prostitution; Same-Sex Marriage

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Victim–Offender Mediation Model

Victim–offender mediation is a process that provides interested victims of primarily property crimes and minor assaults the opportunity to meet the juvenile or adult offenders, in a safe and structured setting, with the goal of holding the offenders directly accountable for their behavior while providing assistance and compensation to the victim. With the assistance of a trained mediator, the victims are able to let the offenders know how the crime affected them, receive answers to questions they may have, and be directly involved in developing a restitution plan for the offenders to be accountable for the losses they incurred. The offenders are able to take direct responsibility for their behavior, learn of the full impact of what they did, and develop a plan for making amends to the person(s) they violated.

Although certain procedural differences and differences in terminology exist in implementing

victim–offender mediation in juvenile versus adult courts, the overall approach and procedure is quite similar in both settings. In some programs, cases are referred to victim–offender mediation as a diversion from prosecution, assuming the agreement is successfully completed. In other programs, cases are referred after the court accepts a formal admission of guilt, with the mediation as a condition of probation (if the victim is interested). Some programs receive case referrals at both the diversion and the post-adjudication levels. Officials involved in the juvenile justice system refer most cases, although some programs also receive referrals from the adult criminal justice system. Judges, probation officers, victim advocates, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or police can make referrals to victim–offender mediation programs.

Victim–offender mediation programs were initially referred to as "victim–offender reconciliation programs (VORPs)" in the mid-1970s and 1980s. Some programs still go by the name of VORP. Today, most programs throughout the world identify themselves as victim–offender mediation (VOM). In the United States some programs are also called "victim–offender meetings" or "victim–offender conferences." Recently, an increasing number of VOM programs have periodically worked with cases involving severe violence, including homicide. This requires advanced training and far more preparation of the parties over many months prior to ever meeting face-to-face. Most programs that focus on victims of severe violence are called "victim offender mediation/dialogue" or simply "victim offender dialogue." By far the most widespread application of VOM is in property crimes and minor assaults, in thousands of cases in numerous countries throughout the world.

Whereas many other types of mediation are largely settlement driven, victim–offender mediation is primarily dialogue driven, with the emphasis on victim healing, offender accountability, and restoration of losses. Contrary to many other applications of mediation in which the mediator would first meet the parties during the joint mediation session, in most victim–offender mediation programs a very different process occurs, based on a humanistic model of mediation. This model involves reframing the role of the mediator from being settlement driven to facilitating dialogue and mutual aid; scheduling separate premediation sessions with each party; connecting with the parties through building rapport and trust, while not taking sides; identifying the strengths of each party; using a nondirective style of mediation that creates a safe space for dialogue and accessing the strengths of participants; and recognizing and using the power of silence.

Most victim–offender mediation sessions do, in fact, result in a signed restitution agreement. This agreement, however, is secondary to the importance of the initial dialogue between the parties that addresses the emotional and informational needs of victims that are central to their healing and to development of victim empathy in the offender, which can lead to less criminal behavior in the future. Studies consistently find that the restitution agreement is less important to crime victims than the opportunity to talk directly with the offender about how they felt about the crime.

Since its inception in Kitchener, Ontario, with the first victim–offender reconciliation program in 1974, many criminal justice officials have been quite skeptical about victim interest in meeting the offender. Victim–offender mediation is clearly not appropriate for all crime victims. Trained practitioners present it as a voluntary choice to the victim and as voluntary as possible for the offender. Victim–offender mediation now works with many thousands of cases throughout North America, Europe, and other parts of the world. Experience shows that the majority of victims presented with the option of mediation choose to enter the process. A statewide public opinion poll in Minnesota found that 82 percent of a random sample of citizens throughout the state would consider participating in a victim–offender program if they were the victims of a property crime. A multistate study found that, of 280 victims who participated in victim–offender mediation programs in four states, 91 percent felt their participation was totally voluntary.

Victim–offender mediation is the oldest, most widely developed and empirically grounded expression of restorative justice. Restorative justice is a movement that is promoting active involvement of individual victims, victimized communities, families, and offenders in the justice system in ways such that offenders are actively involved in repairing the emotional and physical harm they caused; victims receive far more support, assistance, and input; and positive relationships within communities are strengthened. While restorative justice consists of a wide range of policies and practices and is ultimately a very different

way of understanding and responding to the real human impact of crime, the core of restorative justice is anchored in processes that allow for direct dialogue between those affected by crime and those who committed the offense. Examples of the more widely known restorative justice dialogue interventions include victim–offender mediation, family group conferencing, and peacemaking circles.

After a quarter of a century of VOM experience, more than 50 empirical studies in several countries have consistently found it to have a positive impact upon victim and offender satisfaction and perceptions of fairness, higher rates of restitution completion, and significantly lower rates of recidivism. Victim–offender mediation and dialogue programs currently work with many thousands of cases annually through several hundred programs throughout the United States and Canada and more than a thousand programs in other parts of the world, including throughout Europe, and in Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, South America, and Ukraine. A recent national survey examining to what degree formal public policy in the United States supported victim–offender mediation found a considerable amount of legislative backing. A total of 29 states had legislation, in one form or another, that addressed victim–offender mediation. Of these, 14 states had specific legislation that spoke to various issues related to the use and development of victim–offender mediation and 15 states had a briefer reference to victim–offender mediation.

The American Bar Association (ABA) has addressed restorative justice through the practice of victim–offender mediation, its most widely used and empirically validated practice. The ABA has played a leadership role over many years in promoting the use of mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution in civil court–related conflicts, yet for most of that time remained skeptical and often critical of mediation in criminal court settings. That changed in 1994 when, after a yearlong study, the ABA fully endorsed the practice of victim–offender mediation and dialogue. The association recommended its use in courts throughout the country and provided guidelines for its use and development.

The United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Union have been addressing restorative justice issues for a number of years. In 2002, the United Nations adopted the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programs in Criminal Matters. These principles encourage the use of restorative justice programming by member states at all stages of the criminal justice process, underscore the voluntary nature of participation in restorative justice procedures, and recommend establishment of standards and safeguards for the practice of restorative justice. The Council of Europe focused more specifically on the restorative use of mediation procedures in criminal matters and adopted a set of recommendations in 1999 to guide member states in using mediation in criminal cases. In 2001, the European Union adopted a policy in support of "penal mediation," otherwise known as victim–offender mediation, asking its member states (nations) to promote mediation in criminal cases and integrate this practice into their laws.

Another clear expression of the growing U.S. support for restorative justice is the National Organization for Victim Assistance endorsement of "restorative community justice." During the early years of this movement, most victim advocacy groups were quite skeptical, and some still are; however, a growing number of victim support organizations are actively participating in the restorative justice movement.

Mark S. Umbreit

See also Justice; Restorative Justice

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VIGILANTISM

Vigilantes are those who take enforcement of the law or moral code into their own hands. The term developed in ancient Rome, and today it applies to citizens carrying out frontier justice when they perceive established authorities as weak, corrupt, and/or insufficient. The word *vigilante* originated in Spain. Where no established law exists, private citizens may find it necessary to impose the values of their group. Lawyers call vigilantism "extra-judicial self-help," and many often equate it with vengeance. However, vigilantism becomes vilified when it leads to such criminal behavior as lynching.

Historical Background

Although a worldwide activity, vigilantism found fertile ground in the United States, beginning in colonial times and extending into the early federal period. By the late 1700s into the 1800s, groups that took matters into their own hands formed committees to identify and punish immigrants suspected of crimes. After fading for a while, its renaissance as an urban phenomenon began in California in the mid-1850s when members of the community started a vigilante movement for law and order. Such vigilantism led to situations where large crowds took prisoners from authorities and beat them severely before lynching them. Postcards recording lynchings showed proud participants, as well as residents (including children) dressed up to watch. The event became a cause for celebration.

Interestingly, local officials seldom revealed the identities of mob leaders because they viewed lynching as acceptable, necessary, and understandable. The violence reached an all-time high in the period from 1890 to 1902. Though the trend slowed after 1909, it continued into the 1930s. Vigilantism later resurfaced with the Guardian Angels (a New York City volunteer group founded in 1979 to combat subway crime), anti-abortionists, border security groups, and bounty hunters. One notable controversial case of vigilantism occurred in 1984, when Bernard Goetz—dubbed the subway vigilante—shot four young black men on a subway in anticipation of their intending to rob him. In the 1980s, vigilantism took the form of death squads in Central America, and in the 1990s, cyber hackers went after sexual predators, terrorists, and spammers on the Internet.

Characteristics

Other criminal acts often accompany crimes of vigilantism. Depending on the severity of these other acts, the sentence for vigilante behavior will vary. Most offenders get probation for their actions, after a negotiated plea bargain.

Although characteristics vary, the typical vigilante is a middle-class male. Unlike self-defense (which is spontaneous), vigilantism is usually premeditated. It most often occurs as a group act by concerned citizens who share a common goal. Participation is voluntary, and offenders are most likely to be private citizens. Vigilantes are not just members of the community; many are retired police and military personnel. Some of these groups are quite organized and violent. Others only threaten to use force. There are two main types of vigilantes. Lone wolves are disorganized and easily caught, sometimes deliberately so, such as "suicide by cop." Conversely, instigators are well organized and tend to involve others (a close associate or small group) in their plans. A distinction also exists between crime control vigilantes (e.g., bounty hunters) and social control vigilantes (e.g., community members or concerned residents).

Vigilantism is a subtype of political violence. Unlike domestic terrorism, vigilantism seeks to help the social order. For example, a widely tolerated vigilante activity in Islamic societies is the practice of "honor killing," when female members of the household shame the family name. Similarly, many Western nations and some U.S. states had laws justifying the homicide of a spouse if caught in the act of adultery in the conjugal home.

Recent Examples

Since 2000, hate crimes and murders have occurred against Mexican immigrants along and near the southern U.S. border. Members of the Minutemen vigilantes, the Ku Klux Klan, Ranch Rescue, and certain Mexican-hating elements of the Jewish Defense League have been accused of committing these unsolved murders. Violent activities by these similar groups are unacceptable but continue to occur. The Minutemen vigilantes, in particular, like to portray themselves as neighborhood watch groups assisting Border Patrol agents.

Examples of vigilante films include *Dirty Harry* of 1971, *Death Wish* of 1974, *Batman* of 1989, *Spiderman* of 2002, and their sequels. A more recent

movie is *V for Vendetta* of 2006. Literature, comic books, and television series (e.g., "Dog: The Bounty Hunter") have also portrayed vigilantes, who see themselves as friends of society. Indeed, some Web sites depict vigilantes as necessary and positive forces in the community.

Some laws support vigilante justice. For example, Good Samaritan laws provide protection to those who intervene when someone needs emergency assistance. The "right to resist arrest" law grants citizens freedom from restraint or control, and the self-defense doctrine allows citizens to shoot another person to protect their lives, property, or the lives of their loved ones. In fact, allowing law-abiding citizens to carry a concealed handgun is another example of a law that supports vigilantism. Some research demonstrates that carrying a concealed weapon deters criminals.

Road rage is another form of vigilantism, as many drivers try to make traffic violators pay when they break the rules. A newer example of vigilantism includes those who attempt to get back at Internet deviants. They are called "digital vigilantes." Further, some vigilantes fight criminals via the Internet (called "cyber vigilantes").

The aforementioned Guardian Angels, formed as an unauthorized anti-crime patrol, epitomized vigilantism. Interestingly, as they became more visible (wearing red berets) and more respected, the police began to resent them. Currently, a vigilante group patrols a Colorado highway for litterers, and in one neighborhood, a vigilante committee forcibly evicted a neighbor. A more recent example of vigilantism involves members of the community attacking former sex offenders. Because they are able to use the Internet to track down offenders, who are required to register their addresses, these vigilantes can locate and attack their victims. Vigilantism remains a serious problem that needs to be dealt with strongly, but it is important to look at the causes. Vigilantes usually act after a period of simmering frustration over lack of protection. Minutemen, who claim to be protecting our borders, and sex offender attackers, who claim to be protecting our community, might have good intentions, but they are still acting without legal authority. Vigilantes want punishment, or just deserts, swiftly. If they continue to believe that current law enforcement efforts are ineffective, their behavior will likely continue, however unacceptable it may be.

Today, more action is being taken against certain types of vigilantes, especially anti-immigration offenders. Public pressure is building on governments to deter this behavior, especially with more public awareness of vigilantism. In addition, a focus on the needs of those victimized by vigilantes is developing. Recommendations have been made to develop case intake and assessment forms that can record all necessary information to evaluate what services victims of vigilantism require. Recommendations have also been made for an access-secure Internet database to capture complete information about vigilantism. Further, suggestions have been made for the development of training manuals on procedure for the prosecution of vigilantes.

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See also Community Crime Control; Groupthink; Violence; Violent Crime

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VIOLENCE

Violence is an injurious force exerted to cause damage to people or things. Shaped by a multitude of social, political, and economic forces within families, neighborhoods, nation-states, and the broader international community, violence is a complex problem related to patterns of thinking and behavior. It embodies an expression of power often used to demonstrate authority or repression, or to persuade others to behave in particular ways. Also characterizing violence is an element of intent by its perpetrator. Intention is obvious in physical forms of violence but is minimally evident or even nonexistent in its structural or symbolic

forms. Finally, discussions about violence often take on a moral tone, classifying it as just or unjust.

Violence, therefore, is an amorphous phenomenon that defies easy categorization as it surfaces in numerous shapes. Still, it is useful to consider three broad forms: physical, structural, and symbolic. This entry describes all three formations of violence but focuses upon physical violence as a social problem.

Three Forms of Violence

Physical violence is the material manifestation of harmful aggression with the intent to injure others. Examples include beating, burning, bombing, torturing, raping, or shooting. Violent occurrences characterized as social problems include wars, homicides, suicides, school shootings, production and sale of weapons, capital punishment, terrorism, sexual assault, and domestic violence such as child abuse and wife beating. Under the umbrella of physical violence, three nuanced typologies exist: self-directed, interpersonal, and collective violence. *Self-directed violence* includes self-mutilation and suicide. *Interpersonal violence* is violence manifested between individuals or communities, whether known to one another or not. *Collective violence* is the instrumental use of force by people who self-identify as members of a particular group who oppose another group. In such a case, they engage in violence to achieve political, economic, or social objectives. Examples include armed conflicts between states, genocides, and terrorism.

Structural violence refers to economic and political structures that constrain human capabilities. This type of violence is often called the violence of hunger, poverty, or humiliation. While not directly imposing manifestations of physical force, structural violence involves policies and institutions that indirectly cause harm and constrain opportunities for individuals or groups. An example of structural violence is a World Bank/International Monetary Fund policy called "structural adjustment," which did not directly mandate physical force against people but did impose regulations on governments. These policies constrained access to lifesaving social services for millions of civilians living in developing countries.

Symbolic violence is the imposition of perceptions and groupings of thought upon a marginalized social agent who accepts this social order as just, thereby perpetuating the dominant structures. An example of symbolic violence is gender inequity. Specifically, symbolic violence is at play when a woman sees it as her role to take on an unequal share of burdensome work. Yet in her actions, she is also upholding an economy that men dominate.

Violence as a Social Problem

As a social problem, violence is pervasive globally. More than 1.6 million people die every year from violence. In addition, the wake of violence causes injury to millions more and has numerous health, social, and economic consequences. The harmful effects of violence on health include physical symptoms such as bruises and serious brain injuries, psychological consequences such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, and behavioral consequences such as alcohol and drug abuse. Social consequences of violence include strained relationships and social isolation, which can impact school performance and employment opportunities. Violence also places a sizeable burden on economies through exorbitant health care and legal costs as well as lost productivity.

Increasingly, people perceive violence as a public health concern because of its related physical, sexual, reproductive, and mental health ramifications. In some countries, health care expenditures due to violence have accounted for up to 5 percent of the gross domestic product. Yet violence cannot be understood solely in terms of its physical and material scars. It also involves serious assaults on the dignity of people and has the potential to create a pervasive sense of insecurity and fear.

According to the World Health Organization, of the more than 1.6 million fatal victims of violence worldwide in 2000, nearly one third (520,000) were homicides, about half (815,000) were suicides, and an estimated 310,000 (19 percent) died as a direct result of war. The highest rates of homicide exist among men ages 15 to 44 years, mostly from low- and middle-income countries, and the highest suicide rates are among men age 60 years and over.

Often associated with its liberal gun policies, U.S. homicide rates are particularly high when compared with homicide rates in other industrialized countries. Every day, more than 80 Americans die from gun violence. Nevertheless, the U.S. homicide rate is still lower than in most developing nations.

Violence and Conflict

When a conflict arises—whether between individuals or groups—a social actor can choose to avoid or

engage in the conflict nonviolently or violently. A social actor may choose to take up arms to defeat his or her opponent. In this sense, violence is an offensive strategy for asserting and gaining power. Violence can also be a defensive strategy, a behavior conducted to protect oneself, allies, and/or property in the face of acute aggression. In this manner, violence is utilized to neutralize the encroaching enemy. Overall, violence has led to an estimated 191 million lives lost directly or indirectly as a result of conflict in the 20th century, over half of them civilians.

The Importance of Understanding Violence

Violence has been central to defining and characterizing the social world. Max Weber defined a nation-state as the legitimate monopolization on the use of physical force or violence within a given territory. Thomas Hobbes argued that humans in a state of nature had a right to everything in the world, which justified the use of violence against everybody else. Yet, in the interest of personal survival, humans renounced this right to use violence and instead respected the authority of a state (with its monopoly on violence) to maintain peace.

The role of violence in the record of human history is disputed. Some scholars assert that humans are innately violent and violence has always been part of the human condition. Others point to archaeological evidence that suggests that violence is a more novel aspect of humanity, taking a prominent role only when war became a regular practice after the transition to sedentary existence (around 6000 BCE).

Experts maintain that violence is regenerative, that it can give birth to itself. Perpetrators of violence such as child abusers often were victims of violence themselves. Revolutionary militants who overthrow repressive dictators often exercise violence later to command obedience of the populace. This notion that "violence begets violence" is critical to effectively planning and implementing various violence prevention programs and policies.

Violence Prevention

Individuals and collectives invest in violence prevention to reduce both the likelihood of violent occurrences and their harmful ramifications. Unfortunately, these efforts often only become a concern after the violence has already occurred. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict identified several factors that put states at risk of violent conflict: (a) lack of democratic processes, (b) gross social inequalities, (c) control of valuable natural resources by a single group, and (d) rapid demographic changes that surpass a state's capacity to provide services to the populace. Monitoring states for these factors and taking action to curb them if they arise are helpful contributions to diminishing the prevalence of violence.

Other forms of violence prevention include encouraging healthy behaviors and attitudes in individuals through therapy programs and psychological support. Violence prevention can also be part of training on conflict resolution, active communication, and relationship building. Finally, some seek to prevent violence by instituting various policies that address the social and economic forces leading to violence. The 2002 World Health Organization report on violence and health offered the following succinct recommendations for violence prevention: (1) create, implement, and monitor a national action plan for violence prevention; (2) enhance capacity for collecting data on violence; (3) define priorities for, and support research on, the causes, consequences, costs, and prevention of violence; (4) promote primary prevention responses; (5) strengthen responses for victims of violence; (6) integrate violence prevention into social and educational policies, and thereby promote gender and social equality; (7) increase collaboration and exchange of information on violence prevention; (8) promote and monitor adherence to international treaties, laws, and other mechanisms to protect human rights; and (9) seek practical, internationally agreed responses to the global drug trade and the global arms trade.

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See also Conflict Resolution; Domestic Violence; Road Rage; Violence, Collective; Violence, Sexual; Violent Crime; War

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Violence, Collective

Collective violence is the handling of a grievance by group aggression against persons or property. Although states engage in violence in wars, police operations, and the punishment of criminals, most social scientists regard collective violence as aggression by civilians.

Forms of Violence

The universe of collective violence is large and diverse and includes such major forms as warfare, feuding, rioting, lynching, vigilantism, and terrorism. These phenomena are often loosely defined, but fundamental differences distinguish them from one another. First, violence may occur between groups or between groups and individuals. It may be a unilateral (one-sided) attack by one group against another, as when an ethnic majority attacks an outnumbered and possibly defenseless minority. Examples would include anti-Catholic, anti-black, and anti-Chinese riots in the 19th-century United States, as well as more recent riots aimed at ethnic minorities in places such as South Asia and Africa. Although covert rather than public, terrorist attacks usually are unilateral attacks by one group against another as well. Reciprocal, tit-for-tat violence also occurs between groups, typically when the parties are largely equal in status, numbers, and other resources. Warfare in simpler, tribal societies is one example of reciprocal group-on-group violence, as is feuding between modern street gangs. All of these forms of violence involve a logic of collective liability by which a group holds everyone in a social category accountable for the conduct of everyone else. Groups subject to violence because of the behavior of one member might include such categories as families, clans, tribes, racial and ethnic groups, nationalities, and political or religious organizations.

Collective violence might also involve the aggression of a group against an individual without implicating or involving other members of his or her social category. The avenging group may be small and covert in its attacks, or large and highly visible. It is possible to distinguish forms of collective violence according to their pattern of liability (whether collective or individual) and their degree of organization (whether high or low).

Rioting

Rioting involves collective liability and little organization. It is an informally organized unilateral attack on members of a social category in retaliation for the offense of one or more of its members. In cities in the northern United States in the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, alleged misconduct by a single African American resulted, on numerous occasions, in mass violence by whites against entire black neighborhoods. Historically, minorities such as Jews in Europe or Muslims in India likewise faced similar attacks. Each riot typically lasts no more than a day or two, however, and participants disperse immediately afterward.

Lynching

Lynching also is informally organized group violence, but unlike rioting, only the alleged offender is punished or killed. During the years of the relatively frequent lynching of African Americans by whites in the American South, for instance, white crowds would rarely beat or kill more than a single black offender. Crowd violence seldom, if ever, spreads to the larger black community in the form of rioting.

Vigilantism

Vigilantes are formally organized groups that punish a series of offenders. Whether vigilantes operate swiftly and secretly or deliberately and openly, the guilt of each offender is weighed, and each is punished as an individual. In 19th-century American frontier areas, for example, vigilantes tracked down and punished cattle thieves and other deviants beyond the reach of

legal officials. In the American South, the Ku Klux Klan once operated as a vigilante organization as well.

Terrorism

Terrorists also have formal organization, but their adversaries are usually large and powerful groups with superior resources. Moreover, unlike vigilantes, terrorists employ a logic of collective liability: They launch covert attacks on civilian populations, such as bombings of restaurants or airplanes and indiscriminate shooting in public places. Guerilla warfare also involves organized civilians who may operate covertly, but guerillas typically limit their attacks to governmental targets, such as the military and police.

Explanations of Collective Violence

Some social scientists trace collective violence to social tensions such as those resulting from competition for scarce resources, poverty, or real or threatened domination by one group over another. Others focus instead on the social characteristics of the parties involved in a specific incident of conflict, such as the amount of closeness between those in conflict, the number of cultural differences between them, the extent of status differences between them, or the degree to which they depend on one another economically or otherwise. Regardless of historical period or particular setting, more collective violence can be expected when those in a particular conflict are strangers, culturally different, and highly unequal in status. The ultimate goal of collective violence theory is to predict and explain when a conflict will result in group violence, in what form, and with what level of severity.

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See also Lynching; Riots; Terrorism; Vigilantism; War

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Violence, Intimate Partner

See Abuse, Intimate Partner

Violence, Sexual

No universal definition of sexual violence exists because cultural and social norms and laws define the act; however, many professionals agree on several underlying concepts of sexual violence. Sexual violence includes any unwanted or unlawful behavior perpetrated with the use of coercion and/or force against one's sexuality by a person either known or unknown to the victim. Sexual violence is a global problem with many consequences for the individual(s) involved, the larger community, and society as a whole.

Although sexual violence is often perceived as an extreme form of violence, a wide range of behaviors constitutes sexual violence, from harassing verbal comments and gestures to physical touching and penetration. While the act of sexual violence is often characterized by physical and verbal behaviors, a large component of sexual violence is mental. Sexual violence is a display of subordination whereby an asymmetrical balance of power and control is present between the perpetrator and the victim. Power may be attributed to one's physical properties, such as a person's body size and strength, or it may be attributed to social, financial, or political properties. The perpetrator uses this imbalance of power to coerce or force the victim to surrender to the perpetrator's control.

A majority of sexually violent incidents occur between acquaintances, contrary to the common belief that strangers often perpetrate sexual violence. Sexual violence is one of the most under-reported incidents for a number of reasons, depending on individual factors, belief systems, and cultural expectations. Many victims may fear retaliation from the perpetrator, may be too embarrassed or humiliated by the episode(s) to report the incident(s), may not feel the authorities can ameliorate the situation, may not perceive themselves to be victims of sexual violence, or it may be socially and culturally unacceptable to inform others about the incident(s), potentially bringing shame to their families. Because sexual violence is grossly under-reported and has no single definition, it is a difficult subject on which to compile accurate statistics.

Women and children are at greatest risk for sexual violence victimization, but other groups are vulnerable, such as the elderly, the disabled, and inmate populations. Other vulnerability factors have been correlated with sexual violence victimization, including a prior history of sexual violence, drug and alcohol use, high-risk sexual behaviors, and poverty. Individuals with lower socioeconomic status typically lack economic and educational resources for survival and for responding to sexual violence, thus placing them at greater risk for victimization. Women living in poverty are also at risk for intimate partner violence, in which sexual violence is a component. Many such vulnerability factors are often consequences of sexual violence, too.

Males are at greater risk for perpetrating sexual violence. No single explanation for the cause of sexual violence exists, but there are many factors associated with the perpetration of sexual violence. Individual factors placing a male at risk for perpetration include drug and alcohol use, hostility toward women, and childhood sexual and physical abuse. Relationship factors placing a male at risk for perpetrating sexual violence include association with delinquent and aggressive peers, unstable and violent family environments, and patriarchal family and community structures.

Other community factors that increase the likelihood of sexual violence include weak sanctions against, and tolerance for, perpetrators of sexual violence; a lack of economic means, such as employment; and a lack of support from law enforcement. Larger social factors affect the likelihood that males will sexually violate others, including poverty and a lack of policy addressing gender inequality. A tolerance for the subjugation of women and male superiority and sexual entitlement continue to influence sexual violence perpetration in many countries.

The consequences of sexual violence for victims are widespread, including immediate and long-term costs for the victim, the community, and society. Consequences may be physical, psychological, social, and health related, depending on the victim and perpetrator relationship and the type, frequency, and severity of violence endured.

Physical injuries may be sustained during the incident of sexual violence. For example, bruising and lacerations may result from the perpetrator's use of force or use of weapons. Injuries to the victim's sexual organs may also result from forced penetration. Sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies are also potential physical repercussions of sexual violence.

Psychological injuries will vary among victims depending on various factors. Short-term problems include shock, denial, anxiety, and a loss of trust of others. Long-term consequences include post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and a fear of revictimization. Health-related consequences, including engaging in risky sexual behaviors and drug use and abuse, not only are potential short-term and long-term consequences of sexual violence but also place the victim at risk for being revictimized.

Many other crimes, such as prostitution and sex trafficking, entail the potential for sexual violence to occur, particularly rape. Increased use of technology, particularly the use of the Internet, provides new domains for sexual violence and propaganda to occur, such as pedophilia and stalking. Female genital mutilation is a cultural practice that has been outlawed or restricted in several countries. Finally, rape has been used as a tool of warfare against women in countless wars spanning countless periods of time. All these implications entail a different perspective of a global problem.

Sexual violence is a complex phenomenon with a wide range of risk factors and consequences for all individuals involved, particularly the victim. Regardless of the victim's culture and background, the consequences of sexual violence lend insight into why such violence is a social problem on numerous levels, leaving a host of problems to be mitigated and overcome.

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See also Abuse, Child Sexual; Abuse, Intimate Partner; Domestic Violence; Female Genital Cutting; Hate Crimes; Incest; Pedophilia; Pornography and the Internet; Prostitution, Child; Rape, Acquaintance or Date; Rape, Marital; Rape, Statutory; Sex Trafficking; Stalking; Victimization

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Violent Crime

Violent crime is a crime involving force or the threat of force against a person or persons. It includes crimes such as robbery, murder, rape, and assault. Crimes of violence account for slightly more than 20 percent of all crime. According to both the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), which tallies the crimes known to the police, as well as the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which reports victimization rates from surveys of victims who may or may not have reported the crime, violent crime rates have been decreasing for over a decade. Since 2000 the rate of crime has decreased more than 8 percent. Murder rates in 2005 were down more than 25 percent compared with 1995 figures.

Different regions of the United States experienced somewhat different trends, with the greatest reduction in the Northeast and the smallest reduction in violent crime rates overall in the South, a region with historically high crime rates and, more specifically, higher violent crime rates. In 2004, 90 percent of violent crimes occurred in metropolitan statistical areas. In 2004, according to the NCVS, most victims of violence were between the ages of 12 and 24. Moreover, males are much more likely to be victims of violent crime and also much more likely to be the perpetrators. African Americans have the highest rates of violent victimization as do individuals living in households with the lowest incomes.

Media Misperceptions and Violent Crime

Many Americans believe that violent crime is becoming more of a social problem despite the decline in violent crime rates. In fact, violent crime rates in the past 2 decades peaked in 1994 and have been steadily declining ever since then. One of the main reasons for this misperception is that the media focus on violent crimes, in both television crime dramas and news coverage. Crime is the fourth largest category of news coverage, after sports, business, and general interest/ entertainment categories. Some studies show that about one fourth of crimes that are reported in the news are murders, although its percentage of total crime is quite low (generally under 0.1 percent) and it constitutes only 1 percent of all violent crime.

The UCR Crime Clock in 2006 revealed that every 30.9 minutes a murder occurred, every 5.7 minutes a forcible rape, a robbery every 1.2 minutes, and an aggravated assault every 37 seconds. Clearly, murder is the least common of the aforementioned crimes. Although murder grabs the newsmakers' attention, not all murders are equally likely to show up in the news. Rather, homicides involving unusual victims, like children or the elderly, or homicides involving celebrities are more likely to make the news. Additionally, even though about 90 percent of all homicides are intraracial, the media are more likely to report on a homicide wherein an African American kills a Caucasian.

Generally, when people think of violent crimes, they think of crimes committed by strangers. Again, this is based on media portrayals of crime in which the media focus on the rarer, more sensational crimes involving strangers. Yet crimes like child abuse, sibling abuse, elder abuse, and intimate partner abuse are much more common than assaults by strangers, and the violence committed by a loved one is often more likely to have a longer-lasting negative effect on the victim. Further, even in the most violent of crimes—murder—perpetrator and victim are more likely to have known one another.

The Politics of Violent Crime

The social construction of crime leads to changes in policies that are not necessarily focused on reducing violent crime. Rather, the perception of violent crime as a significant social problem can lead to policies that increase governmental control over certain subpopulations for the manifest purpose of fighting crime but with the latent intent on keeping certain population segments in greater check by increasing surveillance. For example, many people assume that the primary aim of the USA PATRIOT Act was to reduce terrorism, but some of its applications have dealt with numerous types of crimes and criminals.

The definition and interpretation of violent crime are also at issue. For example, corporate crimes resulting in a conscious decision to do something (or not do something) that leads to numerous deaths does not constitute murder under any statutes. White-collar crime that causes a great deal of devastation usually results in shorter prison sentences than do street crimes. Additionally, the politics of violent crime often include treating violent crimes

differently, depending on the victim–offender relationship. For example, marital rape is often taken less seriously in the criminal justice system than is stranger rape. Even robbery, where the victim and offender had some kind of prior relationship, receives less serious treatment than if the victim and offender are strangers.

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See also Assault; Crime; Crime, Fear of; Crime Rates; Domestic Violence; National Crime Victimization Survey; PATRIOT Act; Rape; Social Constructionist Theory; Terrorism; Uniform Crime Report; Victimization

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Voter Apathy

Voter apathy is a lack of interest on the part of individuals in the electoral process generally or in political campaigns during an election period. Apathy is an abstract concept and is therefore difficult to measure. Individual-level measures of voter apathy usually assess the level of interest individuals have in politics, in a contemporary political campaign, or in both. Although findings vary in describing recent trends in voter apathy in the United States, experts agree that voter apathy has increased (while voter turnout has decreased) over the course of the past 100 years. For example, 74 percent of the voting age population in the United States turned out, on average, for presidential elections between 1888 and 1904. Between 1988 and 2004, that number dropped to 52 percent. Voter apathy is a concern in democratic nations because establishing a democracy's legitimacy requires that citizens consent to the political leaders who make policy, or to policies directly, by participating in elections. Therefore, citizen interest in those who govern and in the options available in the voting booth is a necessary first step in securing the consent of the governed.

Causes of Voter Apathy

To establish a democracy's legitimate claim to govern, some form of citizen engagement in the political processes is necessary. Fundamentally, citizens' participation is a civic obligation (i.e., citizens understand that they have a civic responsibility to vote). However, scholars note that in the absence of other forces, civic obligation by itself is not an effective mechanism for drawing citizens into the political process. Factors such as the complexity of politics, the lack of political efficacy on the part of citizens, the increase in negative campaigning, and problems with many popular party systems contribute to high levels of voter apathy in many democracies.

To have an interest in politics (at least one that goes beyond the entertainment value that politics sometimes offers), one must have a feeling of political efficacy; that is, one should believe that he or she understands politics effectively and that government and other political institutions are responsive to citizen demands. Yet many potential voters perceive politics as a complex process that they cannot understand and believe that government officials are not influenced by what individual citizens think. Thus, it is difficult for them to participate in politics and difficult to feel that their participation matters. In turn, they become alienated and decline to be a part of political society.

Some blame negative campaigning in elections for increases in apathy among potential voters. Negative campaigns serve to discourage citizens from feeling positively about any of the candidates from whom they must choose, and they can lead many to conclude that engagement and participation are not worth the effort. Countries with multiparty systems, which provide more options when voting, have decidedly higher citizen participation rates. This suggests that engagement in the election process increases when voters feel that they have a wider variety of options in the voting booth. It thus stands to reason that in a country with a two-party system, voters are likely to feel less enthusiastic about the options they are offered. They are more likely to have the perception that it does not make any difference which one of the two parties is in power. In multiparty systems, voters—offered an array of policy positions—are more likely to find

a party with policy positions that more closely match their interests.

Apathetic Nonvoting

Perhaps the most important consequence of voter apathy is nonvoting. In fact, when many people propose reforms to address the problem of voter apathy, they really intend to address the problem of nonvoting. However, nonvoting is not the same thing as voter apathy, because although nonvoting often results from voter apathy, nonvoting can also be the result of other, unrelated factors such as anger with the political system, the failure to find a suitable candidate for whom to vote, or even contentment. Engaged, informed, and politically interested citizens may therefore decide not to vote and hence should not be labeled as "apathetic."

Of all the causes of nonvoting, however, apathetic nonvoting is perhaps the most troubling form because in most other cases the act of nonvoting is a real statement of a citizen's preferences. Not voting because there is not a satisfying option on the ballot, for example, is a sensible expression of a citizen's preferences. Those nonvoters provide interested candidates and political parties with information, and those parties have the incentive to adjust to accommodate those nonvoters' unmet preferences. Apathetic nonvoters, however, reveal nothing about their preferences, providing no useful information to parties and candidates and therefore are not in a position to react to party proposals and appeals. The difficulty in telling the difference between apathetic nonvoters and other nonvoters has led some to advocate the use of a "none of the above" option on ballots. This would give politically interested citizens a way to express their lack of preference for the available options, and it would distinguish that group from the apathetic who do not participate because of a lack of interest.

Apathetic nonvoting does, indeed, have the potential to distort election outcomes. If the apathetic are systematically alike in terms of their (unrealized) candidate or policy preferences, then those preferences find expression in a disproportionately low voter turnout. On the other hand, if the apathetic are diverse enough to not alter the outcomes of elections, then their nonvoting has no impact on election outcomes. Though most commentators are critical of voter apathy, one might argue that voter apathy actually has positive consequences. Apathetic voters are those who do not invest the necessary time and effort to participate meaningfully in the political process. People who do not gather and process the information required to participate meaningfully in politics, some maintain, should disengage from the process and leave decision making to those who do make the effort. The removal of apathetic voters from the elections might, as a result, lead to better collective choices.

Reforms Aimed at Reducing Voter Apathy

Most reforms aimed at nonvoters focus on improving the main symptom of voter apathy: low voter turnout. Many of these reforms seek to make the process of registering to vote and the act of voting itself easier or more convenient. Examples include new "motor voter" procedures, which offer to register citizens to vote when they apply for or renew a driver's license. Another innovation is early voting, which opens the polls before Election Day, allowing voters to cast a vote several days before the official day. Many of these reforms have been less effective than hoped. For example, voters who registered as part of a motor voter process were unlikely to cast a vote; this reform increased the rolls of registered voters but did not increase engagement or voter turnout on Election Day. Some reformers even proposed a mandatory voting system, which would issue fines to nonvoters, a system currently used with much success in Australia. However, because none of these reforms address the unwillingness to engage in the political process on the part of citizens, they do not address the problem of voter apathy.

Other attempts seek to alter the electoral environment with the goal of drawing in voters who might not otherwise participate. Several media campaigns run by interest groups package political information and advocacy in more exciting or popularly accessible forms (which often have dramatic, eye-catching slogans such as "Rock the Vote" or "Vote or Die"). Another recent attempt to package political information in a more palatable form is the introduction of the "town meeting" debate format in presidential elections. Rather than have candidates address questions formulated and posed by professional journalists, town meeting–style debates involve an audience of citizens asking questions of the candidates directly. The idea is that the questions and questioners will be of more interest to those watching the debate and will increase the level of interest in the debate and the

election. Similarly, candidates now regularly appear in less traditional, and more popular, media outlets. Presidential candidates, for example, now typically appear on daytime and night-time talk shows during the course of an election campaign. Presumably this is an attempt to reach an audience that may not follow the normal channels for political information and thus is an attempt to engage difficult-to-reach, apathetic potential voters.

Richard N. Engstrom and Attasit Pankaew

See also Alienation; Political Action Committees; Political Fragmentation; Religion and Politics; Social Exclusion; Values

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W

Wage Gap

Women, on average, make less than men, a differential commonly known as the wage gap. Although significant changes in the status of women in society occurred since the phenomenon was identified, the gap still persists in the 21st century. Currently, women earn about 77 cents for a man's dollar.

Causes for the continuing gap include continuing discrimination on the part of employers (and schools and training programs); differential socialization patterns leading to constrained choices of occupations by men and by women; differential, patriarchal family responsibilities of men and women; and, to a waning degree, different human capital.

Social and individual consequences to this continuing inequality can be grave. Women may not be able to support themselves and any children they have, and so may be dependent on men (who may be abusive) or dependent on the state. Women and their children are the largest proportion of the poor, including the working poor.

In 1979, the ratio of women's earnings to men's was 62.1 (median weekly earnings of full-time workers 25 years and older). Presently, it is 81.0. In dollar terms, that is a gain of 19 cents in 27 years, closing about half the gap. The wage gap also shows itself by race. African American women earn about 88 percent of what African American men earn, but only about 70 percent of what all men earn. Union members typically have a smaller male–female wage gap than do non-union members.

Some scholars point to differences in human capital as an explanation of the wage gap. Although women significantly increased their education and employment experience in recent decades, even for college-educated women, the gap remains although it too has improved. In 1979, female college graduates earned about 67 cents for every dollar a male earned; that figure is now approximately 81 cents. For those with only a high school education, the figures respectively are about 60 cents and 74 cents. Ironically, female high school graduates gained more relative to men than female college graduates, so increased education appears not to reduce the gap. Some analysts suggest that much of the decrease in the wage gap is due to the decreasing real wages of men, especially high school–educated men. Well-paid jobs for male high school graduates in manufacturing are disappearing.

In 1963, the federal Equal Pay Act became law, forbidding employers to pay different wages to men and to women doing the same job. However, by and large, men and women did not then, and do not today, do the same job. High levels of occupational sex segregation persist. Women still work largely with other women doing "women's work," whether professional-level work or unskilled labor. Men still work largely with other men. Even where there has been significant gender integration, ghettoization often occurs within the occupation. For example, female physicians are more likely to be pediatricians than surgeons, and pediatricians make less.

Women's work pays less, regardless of who is doing the work. Men doing women's work, although paid less than men doing "men's work," are paid

more, on average, than women in the same occupation. This lower pay exists even when holding constant the skills, responsibilities, and adverse working conditions that the job requires. Considerable research exists showing that *comparable* jobs pay less if they are dominated by women workers.

What accounts for occupational sex segregation? Women learn what work is appropriate for them, partly by observing what women do in the world. So, existing segregation feeds segregated expectations and occupational aspirations. Stereotypes of gender-appropriate work remain strong, and women hold them as well as men. Further, school guidance counselors and employers also hold these stereotypes. Women employed in male-dominated occupations frequently experience sexual harassment by supervisors and peers. Women are often not mentored to the same degree as men. Thus, women tend to leave male-dominated occupations even when they initially gain access.

Women and men—and employers—still have expectations about women's family responsibilities; women still have the greatest burden for child care, thereby limiting their occupational choices by that responsibility. Mothers may look for part-time work, may have their work careers interrupted by childbearing, and may look for work that coincides with the school day or school year. Even if women do not "choose" such work, it may be chosen for them. Women may not be offered training or promotion opportunities if employers perceive them to be more attuned to the needs of the children/family than the needs of their careers. This phenomenon has been termed "the mommy track."

The existence of a "glass ceiling" is well documented. Much research shows that employers (and other citizens) value male over female applicants for many positions, particularly those that require leadership skills. Discrimination against women at work may be more subtle than it was in the 1960s and before, but it persists.

Both the 1963 Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the 1964 Equal Rights Act have been successfully used to sue specific employers for discrimination and wage disparities. However, this is a costly and time-consuming effort. Such legal remedies have not been entirely effective in changing the social structure of gender inequalities that led to the wage gap in the first place.

Much of the work on this issue, both scholarly and political, was done in the 1980s and 1990s when U.S. activists initiated pay equity studies in cities and states across the country. However, the implementation of such studies and the remedy of discovered inequality were often incomplete. In Canada, a stronger labor movement and richer history of social reform led to more proactive efforts to address the wage gap. There, too, results were mixed and often incomplete. At the present time, that reform fervor of the past has largely waned.

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See also Glass Ceiling; Mommy Track; Segregation, Occupational

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War

War is a form of social conflict between two or more collective political actors, involving the organized use of physical violence, with the central aim of coercing one political actor to comply with the will of another. In broader terms, war is a complex and highly contingent set of events and processes requiring the mobilization of power, human beings, resources, and technologies of production and communication, which dramatically interrupts routine social life and generates a new social dynamic. When political disputes over territory, resources, sovereignty, or ideology cannot be settled by negotiations, threat, hegemony, or compromise, they often lead to violent attempts to establish political will—that is, in warfare. At the most general level, war is a socially recognized violent intergroup conflict that profoundly transforms social life.

Anthropological research corroborates that, with the possible exceptions of a few tribal groupings such

as the Semai of Malaysia, Andaman Islanders of India, Copper Eskimos of north Canada, and Mbutis of Congo, all known societies have been involved in warfare. Although war is a near-universal process, a consensus exists among most sociologists and anthropologists that this has little to do with the biological or psychological makeup of human beings and a great deal to do with their social and political relations. Although some primates seem capable of engaging in organized and protracted lethal conflicts, they lack collective intentionality, systematic use of weapons, sophisticated linguistic coordination, and the ritualism that characterizes human warfare. In this respect war is a distinctly human activity.

Such a view was already familiar to classical philosophers of warfare such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz, for whom war was a predominantly political instrument, by which distinctly human-made, political goals could be pursued. These early studies focused on strategic and logistical matters—the ability of leaders to be successful on the battlefield and the practical arts of combat—without questioning the logic or necessity of war. In contrast, contemporary social science examines war as a particular social and sociological problem, attempting to explain its social origins, political functions, and historical transformations. Above all, this research focuses on the intrinsic relationships between war, state, and modernity.

The Transformation of Warfare

With modern history of warfare so tightly bound up with the development of the state, it is no accident that some researchers argue that small tribal societies were unable to fight real wars, as this allegedly requires large-scale organization and pitched battles with more than 1,000 fatal casualties. Furthermore, influenced by Rousseau's myth of the noble peaceful savage, traditional views tended to agree that primitive warfare was sporadic, mostly ritualistic, rarely lethal, and limited to small groups of tribesmen. However, recent research challenges such perceptions, demonstrating not only that primitive warfare was extremely frequent but also that it was highly violent and particularly homicidal, entailing the recruitment of proportionally more combatants than most mobilized modern states such as Germany in World War II or France in World War I. What distinguishes primitive war from its modern counterpart is the birth of the state and its gradual monopolization of violence, which radically transformed the nature and scale of warfare.

As the availability of food set limits on military expansion—both the size of the armed population and the maintenance of substantial army—war in antiquity was dependent on periodic pillages and hence was often no more than organized robbery. In this context, a small technological discovery, such as the invention of war chariots, or an organizational innovation, such as the emergence of an orderly and loyal cavalry, as in the case of the nomadic tribes led by Genghis Khan, provided an overwhelming advantage in conquering large swaths of land. Notwithstanding military inventions such as crossbows and heavy armored cavalry, medieval warfare remained technologically static, essentially continuous since the time of ancient Greece or Rome. However, the newly found strength of ideology compensated for the lack of technology, as common religious beliefs became a potent source of group mobilization for Christian and Muslim warlords. Whereas Islam provided unity and social discipline for Arabian tribes, the Roman Church granted spiritual legitimacy to the European warrior caste to fight the crusades. However, in both cases war remained the preserve of a wealthy, hereditary nobility and involved lifelong specialist training.

The radical transformation of warfare began with the gunpowder revolution in the 16th century, which gave a clear advantage to the armed infantry over cavalry, as improved cannons and newly invented muskets easily overpowered pikes, swords, and crossbows. More importantly, these military changes significantly increased the cost of war, which in turn led to the centralization of power by giving birth to the modern sovereign territorial state. The gradual development of fiscal systems of effective taxation and the growth and professionalization of state bureaucracy, together with the 1648 Westphalian principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states, brought the military under the control of a centralized authority. In Charles Tilly's famous phrase, this was the period when states made war and war made states. The 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries saw the state thoroughly transformed from being the sole property of royal dynasties with little popular support to acquiring a semi-divine status for the great majority of its inhabitants. It was nationalism that proved the most potent glue of state legitimacy, and it was nationalism that

mobilized large armies of conscripts to confront the remnants of aristocratic militias. Though the armies of Napoleon and Frederick the Great had almost identical armaments, it was the nationalist zeal of France's revolutionary army that proved to be the tipping point that ultimately won the war between them that ended with the Treaty of Basel in 1795.

War and Modernity

Beginning in the mid-19th century, the second military revolution industrialized warfare and cemented its institutional bond with the nation-state, thus penetrating even further into society. The rapid development of science, technology, and industry radically transformed the conditions of warfare. The invention and mass production of steamships, telegraphs, canned food, railways, and automatic weapons made armies well fed, well equipped, well organized, and highly mobile. The nation-state emerged as a powerful territorially compact machine, reinforced by technological and industrial developments and capable of sustaining massive conscript armies. World Wars I and II were the epitome of industrialized total wars where the resources of the nation-state, including all healthy men and women, transport, trade, industrial production, and communications, were at the disposal of the nation-state at war. The war became a conflict not just between two armies but between entire populations. Mass production, mass politics, and mass communications mobilized for mass destruction, as total war eliminated the distinction between state and society, military and civilian, and public and private spheres. Nevertheless, not only did the nation-state and mass armies appear together but also mass participation in total wars had a direct impact on the development of citizenship rights. It is no accident that a more inclusive society, together with the extension of suffrage and the development of the welfare state, emerged after two total wars, with military obligations intrinsically linked to citizenship rights.

Although nuclear weapons and the Soviet and American hegemonic geopolitical balance made war more or less safely cold for most of the latter half of 20th century, the collapse of communism triggered structural instability, creating conditions for the new forms of warfare. These new wars, linked to the processes of globalization, are two dominant types: predatory warfare and risk transfer war. Predatory war emerges in the context of failing post–cold war nation-states where new political elites rely on identity politics to mobilize ethnic and religious sentiments among the population. Employing paramilitaries and remnants of the collapsing state structure, these nation-states politicize cultural difference and wage genocidal wars on civilians while at the same time acquiring personal wealth and maintaining a hold on power. Wars based on the transfer of risk are waged by the most technologically advanced countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Their focus is on minimizing life risks to Western military personnel and consequently on minimizing electoral and political risks to the state leadership by transferring these risks directly to the weaker enemy. From the Falkland war of 1982, to the Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, the reliance on technologically sophisticated weapons helps create the systematic transfer of risks from elected politicians to the military personnel and from them to the enemy combatants and their civilians. When the choice is between (foreign) civilian lives and the lives of Western soldiers, soldiers always have priority. These two forms of warfare are deeply interlinked by the forces of globalization as they erupt in the empty space that separates the coordinated machinery of global markets from the incoherent and disconnected forms of localized politics.

Siniša Malešević

See also Arms Control; Citizenship; Militarism; Social Revolutions; War Crimes

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War Crimes

War crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law during an armed conflict. Armed conflicts may be either international or internal (noninternational). International armed conflicts are

between two or more states, whereas internal armed conflicts occur within one state (e.g., a civil war). International humanitarian law, which is also referred to as the law of war, developed over many centuries through customary international law (i.e., law established from customs) rather than conventional international law (i.e., law established by international treaties ratified by states).

Historically, international humanitarian law is based on three principles that govern the conduct of military personnel during armed conflicts. The first principle is necessity, which states that what is necessary to achieve a military objective may be done. The second principle is humanity, which states that acts that cause unnecessary harm and suffering are unlawful. Whereas the principle of necessity states what may be done to achieve a military objective, the principle of humanity states what may not be done unless otherwise done by necessity. For example, it may be necessary to kill the enemy who is firing his weapon at you; however, it is unnecessary and inhumane to kill a prisoner of war or a person who has surrendered and is no longer a threat. The third principle is chivalry, which requires military personnel to fight honorably and respect each other during combat (e.g., respecting military and religious symbols as well as signs of neutrality). For example, if military personnel use the white flag, which means surrender, to draw their enemies closer to attack them, chivalry has been violated. Chivalry is also violated when religious symbols such as the star, crucifix, biblical text, or church are attacked or used to gain a military advantage. A sign of neutrality signifies nonparticipation in the armed conflict, therefore, not favoring one side over the other. The Red Cross is a universal symbol of neutrality, which is not to be attacked or used in favor of or against participants to achieve a military objective.

The first codification of international humanitarian law was the Lieber Code, named after its codifier Francis Lieber, in 1863, which was authorized by the U.S. War Department under President Abraham Lincoln in response to reports of atrocities committed during the American Civil War. The Lieber Code consisted of 157 articles defining how military personnel were to conduct themselves in the field.

Since the Lieber Code, there have been many international conventions that drafted treaties defining unlawful conduct and use of weapons during armed conflict. Most notably are the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which are referred to as Hague Law, and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which confirmed Hague Law, in addition to formulating many other rules and principles based on or expanding upon customary international law.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions were one result of the historic International Military Tribunal and its subsequent trials—the Nuremberg Trials—that prosecuted Nazi war criminals for their unlawful conduct during World War II. At Nuremberg the defendants were charged with war crimes defined as "namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. . . ." At this time in 1945, there was only Hague Law and customary law to consider in determining if war crimes were committed. After the success of the Nuremberg Trials, the Trials for the Far East were established to prosecute Japanese war criminals for their egregious acts during World War II. Subsequent to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the 1949 Geneva Conventions updated and modified the law of war, which if violated was considered to be a war crime.

The first international criminal tribunal to prosecute war crimes since the 1949 Geneva Conventions was the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993, which was established by the UN Security Council for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

In 1994, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by applying Common Article 3. Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies certain offenses to internal armed conflicts. The conflict in Rwanda was internal, and therefore Common Article 3 was necessary to prosecute certain violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were temporary courts established in response to particular conflicts. The International Criminal Court, established on July 1, 2002, is a permanent court that prosecutes individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

The two basic elements of war crimes are that the violation is serious and that it occurs during an armed conflict. The latter is to include that the serious violation has a connection to the armed conflict. No war, no war crime. For example, if a murder is committed in a state that is at war with another state, but the murder has no connection to the war itself, then a war

crime has not been committed; thus, the result is a murder that is to be prosecuted by the state with jurisdiction of crimes as such. Conversely, if a crime is committed in connection to a war but does not constitute a serious violation (e.g., a military personnel taking a loaf of bread from a village that has much food), then a war crime has not been committed, as the offense is not considered serious.

Harry M. Rhea

See also Crime; Genocide; Human Rights; War

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Water Organization

When water moves from rivers and reservoirs through canals and pipelines to fulfill crop consumptive needs, when it moves through urban water treatment plants to serve household and industrial requirements, when it is left in-stream for recreational and ecological purposes, it is because people have socially organized to make such things happen. How water organizations are socially constructed to capture, distribute, and dispose of any given society's water resources has everything to do with human productivity, distributional equity, and environmental sustainability. Various forms of water organization critically impact a wide range of social problems, most obviously those in the domains of food, energy, health, land use, environmental quality, concentration of social power, and citizen participation in—or exclusion from—civic life. Careless water management has been associated with everything from disease transmission in a neighborhood to the demise of entire civilizations.

Water and Organized Collective Action

The organized control over water that has sustained all civilizations has been a product of various combinations of central state bureaucracies and local water providers that empowered individual citizens to do things collectively that could not be accomplished by individual producers and consumers in private marketplace exchange. Water organizations are necessitated in any state-level society and culture (as distinguished from a clan/folk level society) by a most fundamental need to manage human interdependence across large landscapes. Individual self-seeking rationality must somehow be reconciled with encompassing community requirements that can be fulfilled only by well-designed organizational effort.

Consider an example. Two individually rational farmers ponder the possibility of building an improved water course for channeling irrigation water to their adjacent fields. The total cost of improvement is $600. However, the benefits to farmer A equal only $400, whereas those to farmer B amount to $500. From the standpoint of their private rationalities, as disconnected unorganized social atoms, neither will build the improvement. Each individual does better not contributing while hoping that the other—in an economically irrational move—will build the improvement and thereby allow the noncontributing member to enjoy benefits of increased water supply and control; that is, take a "free ride" on the investment of the other party. They will fall into an equilibrium with each other that is much worse when compared to what they could gain together by organized cooperative action. From the standpoint of their collective joint benefit, the watercourse improvement should be made because together they will enjoy benefits worth $900, well in excess of the $600 cost.

The study of water organization, therefore, brings into sharp relief an age-old problem confronted by people in all cultures; that is, although people possess and act upon their private rationalities, they live not as disconnected social atoms but in continuous interdependence. People, in interaction, modify each other's prospects. What one does, or is expected to do, conditions the actions of another. Social science research on water organizations permits systematic study of alternative ways in which human beings representing many water cultures manage their interdependence. If farmers A and B can devise organizational means of

holding each other accountable for making a "fair-share" contribution, if they can mutually ensure that the other will not defect from agreed-upon cooperative action, they can collectively transcend their private self-seeking rationality and empower themselves to do things together on behalf of themselves and the community of which they are a part.

Themes

There is a vast social science literature on the uses and limits of alternative ways human beings have organized their water resources. It may be roughly sorted into five categories: (1) water policy, (2) law, (3) large central bureaucratic organizations for capture and administration of water across large landscapes, (4) local organizations that take water wholesale from the large state-funded and -operated supply systems and then retail it to (5) individuals, farms, and firms. Of the many hypotheses that have been examined, some of the most important have had to do with the configuration of, and linkages among, local water organizations (category 4) that function between large supply-side state bureaucracies (category 3) and demand-side water users (category 5). Some specific forms of local water control organizations are seen as having the potential to provide the social and political space where people can blend principles of generalized science and technology with local site-specific circumstances, where people can be most effectively empowered to rapidly respond to local changes (e.g., climate and weather, shifting marketplace demands, facility breakdowns). Furthermore, such local water organizations have been found to be most effective at enforcing policy, law, and regulations essential to controlling would-be "free riders" to sustain cooperative actions. In at least some systems around the world, local water organizations have been cradles of participatory democratic civic life.

However, analysts have also been witness to many cases where local water organizations are not well designed and operated, where generalized science is not fitted to local site-specific realities, where locals are not enabled to be rapidly adaptive to challenges, where "free riding" runs rampant, and where there has been little effective citizen participation in water governance. The social science question becomes: "What factors explain the difference between productive, equitable, and ecologically sustainable water organizational systems and those which fail in these respects?" Such inquiry has led analysts to better comprehend a critical facet of the human social development project. There is nothing more social and political than water molecules in bulk because human beings in all cultural traditions have had to cope with the problem of how to manage their interdependence in and around water.

David M. Freeman

See also Ecosystem; Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Nonrenewable Resources; Water Quality; Water Supply

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Water Quality

Water quality is a general term to describe the purity of water, usually in a natural setting. Water that contains low concentrations of impurities or pollutants is generally said to be of high quality; water with many impurities or high concentrations of impurities is considered to be of low quality. Evaluation of water quality most often considers its suitability for a particular use. As a result, a body of water may be considered high quality for an industrial application, yet at the same time, be of too low a quality to serve as a drinking water source.

What Are the Sources of Water Pollution?

Degradation of the quality of a body of water most often results from pollution, defined here as an undesirable

change in the physical, chemical, or biological state of a system. Sources of pollution can be human-made or natural and are classified as either point sources or nonpoint sources. A *point source* is one that discharges pollution from specific locations, such as industrial discharge pipes, drainage ditches, and sewer outfalls. Because they are discrete and easily identified, point sources are relatively easy to monitor and regulate.

Nonpoint pollution sources, however, are much more problematic. They are diffuse sources, having no discrete discharge location into a specific body of water; some of them are also intermittent, discharging only after a major precipitation event. Because of this diffuse nature, they are much more difficult to identify. This makes them much more difficult to monitor and regulate. Nonpoint sources include farm fields, golf courses, construction areas, parking lots, and the atmosphere.

How Are Water Pollutants Classified?

In general, the lowered quality of water can have two major, often overlapping, effects: (1) disruption in the functioning of a natural ecosystem and (2) health problems for humans. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified eight major categories of water pollutants based, in part, on their effects. The first category, oxygen-demanding wastes, includes materials such as animal manure and plant materials. The most common sources of these are agricultural runoff, food processing, paper manufacturing, and sewage.

Plant nutrients such as nitrates, phosphates, and ammonium are most often from fertilizers and manure used for agricultural purposes, urban use of fertilizers, and sewage. Sediment washed into a body of water as a result of land erosion can also degrade the quality of the water. Although erosion is a naturally occurring process, the rate of erosion can be greatly increased by human activities like construction. Heat, specifically hot water, can also seriously degrade the quality of water bodies into which it is discharged. The source of this hot water is the cooling water from power plants and other industrial facilities.

The remaining four categories of water pollutants can cause health problems for humans as well as disrupting natural ecosystems. The first group, pathogens, includes bacteria, viruses, and parasites. Usually introduced into water from human and animal waste, they have caused numerous outbreaks of serious illness throughout human history. Inorganic chemical pollution is most often the result of industrial discharges, surface runoff from developed areas, and improper disposal of household cleaners. This category includes materials such as salts, acids, caustics, and metal compounds.

In industrial societies, organic compounds are a major source of pollution to natural waters and are probably the single group with which people are most familiar. They can be discharged industrial and household sources as well as released as a result of agricultural use. This very large group includes pesticides, plastics, detergents, and petroleum products (oils, gasoline). Radioactive materials such as radon, iodine, cesium, and uranium can be discharged from a number of sources, including ore mining and processing, power plants, and natural sources.

How Is Water Quality Regulated?

At the federal level, water quality is regulated by the Clean Water Act and by the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Clean Water Act and its amendments regulate discharges from point sources through an enforceable permit system. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) established a way to control and eventually eliminate discharges of pollutants from point sources into U.S. surface waters. In many states, the state agency has taken over the day-to-day administration of the NPDES program, but EPA retains oversight authority and maintains the database of submitted water quality data. Nonpoint sources remain unregulated.

The Safe Drinking Water Act was passed to protect public water systems from chemical, physical, and biological contaminants. It does not address discharges but rather regulates the quality of the water provided by public water systems, defined as at least 15 connections, or greater than or equal to 25 people, or one that supplies water for more than 60 days per year. The development of drinking water standards is an ongoing project at EPA.

What Are the Effects on Humans from Decreased Water Quality?

A reliable source of high-quality water is a basic human need. When that source is destroyed or compromised in some way, the results can be devastating

to individuals and to society as a whole. Perhaps the best-known recent U.S. example is Love Canal in upstate New York. The canal, originally built in the 1890s, was used during the 1940s and 1950s to dispose of tons of hazardous chemicals. After the landfill was closed, the area was covered over and the property sold and developed. By the 1970s, many homes were having problems with chemical odors and residues in the basements. More importantly, residents reported high incidents of miscarriages, birth defects, and chronic illnesses. In 1978, the New York State Department of Health evacuated residents in the area. Several hundred homes were demolished and cleanup activities begun. Although the area is now considered safe, few of the original residents have returned there. Because many of the chemicals found at Love Canal are carcinogens, many former residents live in fear of long-term health effects, even today.

Karen A. Swanson

See also Environment, Pollution; Environment, Runoff and Eutrophication; Environment, Sewage Disposal; Water Organization; Water Resources

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Water Resources

Water is an essential resource. It is also a nonrenewable or finite resource: While water supplies can be regenerated by creating new water molecules from their elemental beginnings (hydrogen and oxygen), the energy required to create large usable pools of water is currently too energy costly to be feasible. Threatening water resources are scarcity, overuse, and pollution. Variations in weather oscillations between wet and dry periods can result in periods of drought, increasing population demands can result in overuse, and continued multiple uses of water resources for industry, irrigation, drinking water, and wastewater can reduce the usability of the water resource for one or many of its needed uses. As we are inherently dependent upon our water resources, protecting and maintaining usable water supplies are critical to sustaining our ecological, cultural, social, and economic well-being.

The value of water as a resource is dependent upon the water's intended use (function), supply, demand, and cost.

Use

Off-stream use occurs when water is diverted away from its natural source (e.g., irrigation, thermoelectric power, industry, and public drinking water), while *in-stream* is the use of water in its place (e.g., boating and transportation, hydroelectric power, and recreation). In 2000, the generation of thermoelectric power accounted for 48 percent of off-stream water usage, followed by irrigation (34 percent); public water supply (11 percent); industry (5 percent); and domestic, livestock, aquaculture, and mining (3 percent). For most off-stream uses, water is consumed or not returned to the natural source. U.S. water consumption amounts to approximately 100 billion gallons daily.

Supply

Water exists in two forms: seawater (97.5 percent) and freshwater (2.5 percent of the world's water supply). Of the 2.5 percent of freshwater, 1.5 percent is in the polar ice sheets, 0.65 percent is in groundwater, and 0.35 percent is surface water (streams and lakes). U.S. water supplies include seawater, surface water (streams and lakes), and groundwater. Because seawater requires desalination before most of its off-stream uses, only Texas, Florida, and California consider seawater a viable water resource. The major sources of U.S. surface water are five major watersheds: the Columbia River Watershed (Northwest), the Mississippi River Watershed (Great Plains and Midwest), the Colorado River Watershed (Southwest), the Rio Grande Watershed (Southwest and Texas), and

the St. Lawrence River Watershed (Great Lakes and Northeast). U.S. lakes and reservoirs hold approximately 26,550 cubic kilometers of water, with 22,573 cubic kilometers just in the Great Lakes. U.S. rivers hold approximately 250 cubic kilometers of water. U.S. groundwater comes from the many aquifers that underlie the landscape. The most heavily used aquifers are the High Plains or Ogallala Aquifer (Great Plains), the Central Valley aquifer system (California), the Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer (Mississippi River Valley), the Basin and Range basin-fill aquifers (West and Southwest), and the Floridan aquifer system (Florida).

Demand

The demand for water continues to grow along with the population: In 1960 in the United States, total withdrawals were an estimated 175 billion gallons daily when the population was 179 million; in 2000, total withdrawals were an estimated 408 billion gallons daily for a population of 281 million. In the past 30 years, the U.S. population has grown 52 percent while total water usage has tripled. On average, Americans use 100 gallons per day for everything from drinking, bathing, laundry, and watering lawns. Water demand is greatest in the western United States where per capita use is roughly 50 percent greater than in eastern states. This disparity is due mostly to the large volume of water used for crop irrigation in California. Crop irrigation in California, Idaho, Colorado, and Nebraska accounted for more than half the total withdrawals for irrigation in 2000.

Cost

With increasing demand, the cost of using and maintaining the nation's water resources has increased. From the enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972 to the year 1998, estimates from the U.S. Department of Commerce show that federal and local government expenditures for wastewater control increased from approximately $5 billion per year to $13 billion per year (in 1996 adjusted dollars). Overall, estimates place federal and private expenditures at over $540 billion on end-of-pipe water pollution control since 1972. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also spent over $1 billion (1990–2000) to address nonpoint source pollution.

While these expenditures protect water resources, additional costs affect water usage. For instance, drinking water providers must constantly upgrade their plants with new technologies to remove a growing list of water contaminants regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act. Advanced analytical methods make detection of other contaminants possible, such as pathogenic *E. coli*, human and veterinary medicines (e.g., antibiotics, steroids, and birth control hormones), personal care products, caffeine, pesticides, and herbicides—all found in both surface water and groundwater. Water treatment techniques such as ozonation, ultraviolet light treatment, activated carbon, or any combination of the three become exponentially costly as these systems also require upgrading to handle larger and larger demands. Plant upgrades can cost hundreds of millions of dollars. To assist with this need, EPA began the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund in 1997, which has since provided more than $9.5 billion worth of assistance to sustain the nation's drinking water infrastructure. However, this is only a fraction of what is needed: EPA's 1997 Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey projected the necessity of a $138.4 billion investment over the next 20 years to ensure the continued source development, storage, treatment, and distribution of safe drinking water. Additionally, not only are our source waters threatened by scarcity and pollution, but distribution systems for clean and safe water are under growing security threats (e.g., terrorism). In 2006, EPA had a budget of $33 million to protect drinking water from terrorist attacks. The cumulative effect of these costs is reflected in the national per gallon cost of water. On average, U.S. consumers pay $2.00 for every 1,000 gallons of water. On the whole, 4 percent of the nation's energy goes to treating and moving drinking water and wastewater.

Denise Lani Pascual

See also Water Organization; Water Quality

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Wealth, U.S. Consumer

Consumer wealth is simply the value of assets less the debt that consumers owe. Major wealth categories are real estate, consumer durable goods, and financial assets such as checking and savings accounts, bonds, stocks, and the equity in noncorporate businesses.

Every 3 months the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System publishes the "Z.1" release, the Flow of Funds. These tables contain balance sheet and income data for all major parts of the U.S. economy.

Figure 1 shows how the total assets of the "Household and Nonprofit Organizations" have grown over the past 54 years. In their December 7, 2006, release, the Board reported that these assets had reached a record $67.1 trillion on September 30, 2006.



Figure 1 Total Assets: Households and Nonprofit Organizations

Source: Federal Reserve Board.



Figure 2 Total Liabilities: Households

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Figure 2 shows the pattern of liabilities of the segment. Total liabilities were not quite $13.0 trillion on September 30, 2006.

Figure 3 shows the net worth (assets less liabilities) of the sector. The stagnation in 2000–02 represents the impact of the crash of the stock market in 2000, which wiped out some $6 trillion of wealth. That has been more than made up with the increased value of residential real estate, which was worth $20.5 trillion as of September 30, 2006.

Total net worth of consumers on September 30, 2006, was a record $54.1 trillion. This is about 4 times the gross domestic product (GDP), the total value of goods and services produced for final demand with the borders of the United States. Total GDP was running at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $13.3 trillion in the third quarter of 2006.

Figure 4 shows consumer wealth as a percentage of disposable personal income. Once again the impact of the big swings in stock prices in 1999 and the subsequent crash is obvious. Still, on September 30, 2006, Americans had a net worth 563.8 percent or 5.6 times greater than incomes after taxes.

The huge issue for the next 40 years or so is how will U.S. owners dispose of this wealth? Will it go to charities and universities, to the children of the wealth owners, to the government in taxes, or where? The only thing we know for certain is that the amounts transferred will be the largest in history.

The two richest people in the United States and the world are Bill Gates, who made his money as the cofounder of Microsoft, and Warren Buffett, who made his fortune through very astute investing. Both have announced they plan to give away most of their billions.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is now the largest foundation in the world, with assets of $31.7 billion. In 2006, Warren Buffett announced he was giving the bulk of his fortune to that foundation as well, because he thought its goals were admirable and that it



Figure 3 Net Worth: Households and Nonprofit Organizations

Source: Federal Reserve Board.



Figure 4 Net Worth as a Percentage of Disposable Income

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

very efficiently funded good causes. His first installment of $1.6 billion was paid on August 24, 2006.

James F. Smith

See also Income Disparity; Socioeconomic Status; Wealth Disparities

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Wealth Disparities

Wealth disparities exist both within and across societies. The distribution of income and wealth within any given society is a reflection of its class structure. Individual wealth is the total accumulated value of people's assets or property, commonly referred to as their "net worth." Specifically, net worth is the value of all cash-convertible assets minus the value of all debts. Wealth is distinguished from income in that it includes assets that have a market value and that can generate income, such as dividends from stocks, bonds, or real estate. In contrast to income, which tends to be spent on living expenses, wealth generates more wealth via interest and dividends and is a phenomenon that endures over generations. Thus, wealth allows the rich to get richer. Even though income and wealth are clearly related, the distribution of wealth reflects more inequality than that of income.

In the United States, more so than in any other industrial democracy, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a very small segment of society. Statistics on wealth disparities show how much of the total wealth in a society accrues to each quintile of the population, ranked from highest to lowest wealth. Complete equality would exist if each population quintile owned 20 percent of wealth. According to recent U.S. government statistics, the wealthiest fifth of the population held about 85 percent of all wealth while the lowest fifth held –1.5 percent; in other words, the lowest fifth were in debt. The second richest quintile held 12 percent, the next lower one about 5 percent, and the one below that 1 percent of total wealth. The gap between

the wealthiest segment of the population, measured as the top 1 percent, and everyone else has grown tremendously since the 1980s. Official statistics reflect that until 1972, the top 1 percent held about 24 percent of total U.S. wealth and that by 1998 that proportion had risen to 38 percent. The wealth gap appears to be increasing in times of economic growth, mainly because most of the benefits of a booming economy accrue to the top quintile of the wealth distribution.

The redistribution of income and wealth via the tax system is not as dramatic in the United States as it is in other advanced nations. The tax rates for both the highest and the lowest income group have declined in the past few decades, through a strategy intended to reduce poverty and increase investment from the top. Nevertheless, sales taxes are regressive, which means those with lower incomes spend relatively more of their income on necessities than do the rich. Overall trend data show that the average U.S. family is in increasingly large debt relative to their assets, mainly due to mortgage and credit card debt. The Federal Reserve reported the median net worth of U.S. families in 2004 at $93,100, that of white families at $140,700, that of nonwhite families at $24,800, and that of African American families at $20,400. Since 1995, white net worth has increased by 50 percent but nonwhite wealth, especially that of African Americans, has stagnated and remained at only about 14 to 18 percent of white wealth.

The United States currently has 269 billionaires, compared with the next highest of 29 in Japan and 28 in Germany. Five of the ten richest people in the world are U.S. citizens, and none are women. Among the top 20 billionaires, most are educated white men, who accumulated their wealth from technology, banking, and retailing. According to *Forbes,* in 2006 the top billionaires in the United States were Bill Gates ($50 billion, Microsoft), Warren Edward Buffett ($42 billion, investment banking), Paul Gardner Allen ($22 billion, Microsoft), followed by the five Waltons of Wal-Mart. The advantages of wealth clearly go beyond gaining economic leverage. Social scientists have documented that wealth also generates social status and political power. The wealthy are part of an elite able to convert wealth into political decision-making power via lobbying, campaign financing, funding of various causes, and gaining political office. In fact, a high proportion of U.S. senators and members of Congress come from wealthy families, and almost all presidents were born into wealth. In addition, wealth can buy other benefits associated with a privileged lifestyle, including living in a safe neighborhood and enjoying superior health care, leisure activities, and education for the children.

Social science theories explaining the persistence of wealth inequality in Western democracies focus mainly on social stratification systems and cultural processes legitimizing the unequal distribution of resources. Both the norms of distributive justice (fairness principles) and increasingly individualistic Western values, combined with global free enterprise economics, reinforce the perception that the wealth distribution is just—the rich have earned their wealth and the poor are to blame for their poverty.

The degree of wealth disparities within societies varies across nations. Cultural norms about what constitutes acceptable levels of inequality and poverty also vary among the nations. Compared with European countries, the gap between the richest segment and the rest of the population is much larger in the United States. The Scandinavian countries have the lowest wealth disparities, mainly due to their welfare states' strong redistribution efforts. Inequality is greatest in the least economically developed regions of South America, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to varying cross-nationally within countries, wealth disparities also exist at the global level. The United Nations estimated that in 2001 the combined wealth of the three richest billionaires in the world exceeded the combined gross domestic product of the 48 least developed countries. When comparing countries according to their national wealth, the poorest nations are East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Somalia with a gross domestic product per capita of only $500 each; the richest nation is Luxembourg with $55,100, and Norway ties with the United States at $37,800. Although there is evidence that the globalization of industrial technology has helped the economic development of some Asian nations, transnational corporations, trade liberalization, and international debt relations often affect developing economies negatively. Depending on how globalization is defined and measured, social scientists conclude that globalization processes have had a mixed impact on global wealth inequalities.

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See also Class; Income Disparity; Inequality; Poverty; Power Elite; Stratification, Social

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Welfare

Welfare policy in the United States is controversial. Given the country's ethos of individualism and self-reliance, the public often blames the poor for their misfortunes and views those who receive public aid with distrust. Historically, both cash aid and publicly supported poorhouses reflected the philosophy that aid was meant mainly for widows with children and the indigent. The government's approach to aid rests on a delineation of those who are worthy and unworthy.

The first welfare programs emerged following widespread unemployment during the economic downturn of the 1930s. Triggered by the stock market crash of 1929, the Great Depression was an era of rampant poverty; working-class families and the elderly were the hardest hit. President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal programs sought to provide relief to unemployed workers and their families. One of these was the Social Security Act of 1935, which marked the beginning of sustained U.S. welfare programs. This act created three programs: Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children, providing means-tested entitlements to low-income elderly, the blind, and poor children with absent fathers, respectively.

Other welfare programs were subsequently added since the 1935 Social Security Act. Between 1939 and 1943, the U.S. Department of Agriculture administered the first food stamps program. The U.S. food stamps program expanded throughout the 1960s and 1970s. By 1974, 15 million Americans were participating in this program. In 1965, Title XIX of the Social Security Act was passed, allowing low-income individuals access to a health insurance program now known as Medicaid.

Changes to the welfare system have occurred since these programs were enacted. For example, the Old Age Assistance and Aid to the Blind in 1974 later became known as Supplemental Security Income. Aid to Dependent Children later became known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which was a federal program administered to provide financial assistance to needy families. AFDC later expanded its services through the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act by providing services around community development, job training, and housing. AFDC and other programs expanded in the 1970s due to increased activism among the poor and to changes in household composition. The program significantly reduced the number of poor Americans, especially among the elderly. The poverty rate dropped to a low of 11 percent in the 1970s, from a high of over 25 percent before the War on Poverty began in the 1960s. AFDC was subject to state-level funding and gave discretion to local service providers. The program continued the tradition of subjecting U.S. welfare aid recipients to public controls through means-tested measures.

Why Is Welfare Controversial?

The values and beliefs held by Americans often influence their opposition to welfare. Thus passage of welfare reform in the mid-1990s was due in part to the unpopularity of welfare and the feeling that those on welfare should become self-reliant. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's presidency, myths of welfare queens (those who misuse the system) driving Cadillacs helped to drum up support for welfare cutbacks. During the first Reagan administration, between 1981 and 1985, federal spending on welfare dropped 19 percent. With opponents socially constructing welfare recipients in a negative fashion, policymakers argued that public assistance contributed to multiple generations relying on cash assistance. They charged that AFDC eroded recipients' work ethic, causing family breakups and discouraging fathers from providing for their families. During the 1996 welfare reform debate, politicians of varying perspectives echoed these sentiments.

On August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, also known as welfare reform. President Clinton's electoral campaign was to "end welfare as we know it." With the new legislation, no longer are poor families entitled to a federal safety net, as the program switched benefits from an entitlement

to temporary assistance. Overall, this act saved $70 billion over the following 5 years. Welfare reform brought changes to the food stamps program and Supplemental Security Income and barred all legal immigrants from eligibility to receive federal means-tested programs until they became U.S. citizens.

Under welfare reform, AFDC no longer became a federal entitlement but a block grant, called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Federal law limits eligibility to TANF to a lifetime limit of 5 years and bars cash assistance to unwed minor mothers or children born to mothers on welfare. Because of welfare reform, state and local officials are now accountable for meeting work participation rates and ensuring that recipients are in work activities within several years of their initial receipt of assistance. Federal rules limit to 12 months the amount of vocational education that can be used toward work requirements. TANF requires that recipients must work as soon as they are job ready or no later than 2 years after coming on assistance. Single parents must participate in work activities for at least 30 hours per week, and two-parent families must participate in work activities 35 or 55 hours a week, depending upon circumstances. Failure to participate in work requirements can result in a reduction or termination of benefits to the family. However, states cannot penalize single parents with a child under 6 for failing to meet work requirements if they cannot find adequate child care. The program requires that states must ensure that 50 percent of all families and 90 percent of two-parent families are participating in work activities. States may extend assistance beyond 60 months to not more than 20 percent of their caseload.

States may use their federal TANF funds for the following: (a) to provide assistance to families so children can be cared for at home, (b) to provide job training, (c) to encourage formation of two-parent families, and (d) to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies. Furthermore, TANF requirements include not only work but also paternity disclosure.

Challenges of Welfare Reform

Since the passage of federal welfare reform, the welfare rolls have dropped dramatically. The challenge of welfare reform now rests with the states, which focus on moving welfare recipients to work. The 60-month time limits in TANF have major implications for low-income U.S. families. Because the design of TANF is to move recipients from welfare to work creating self-sufficiency, those who face time limits without employment can encounter homelessness and other hardships. These time limits were put into effect so that recipients would not become dependent and would instead seek employment and become self-reliant. Despite the intent of welfare reform to move individuals off welfare, the Administration for Children and Families has documented that moving recipients from welfare to work also involves working with personal and family challenges of welfare recipients, such as low levels of social and human capital, low education attainment, few work skills, lack of work experience, poor access to transportation, health problems, drug dependence, major depression, incarceration, and experiences of perceived workplace discrimination.

Overall, welfare rolls declined 57 percent for families and 64 percent for individuals from 1996 to 2005. According to the Administration for Children and Families, the four barriers to employment are substance abuse problems, mental health problems, learning disabilities, and domestic violence situations. Studies reveal that one out of three people drawing welfare are unable to find sustainable jobs or make enough to leave welfare dependency. Studies reveal that average wages for former recipients are less than $8 an hour and only one in three had health insurance in 2002. By 2000, a number of poorer states extended the 5-year limit as people were unable to find work. During the recent economic downturn, rolls began to rise again. In addition, advocates point out that as many as two thirds of welfare-eligible women experience abuse from a partner during their lifetime.

Structural and institutional barriers, such as the lack of access to job training programs, long-term employment, health care benefits, quality child care, and transportation assistance, prevent self-sufficiency. Child care is the largest state expenditure after cash assistance. Because TANF and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act are subject to state budget crises, the funding of child care and transportation varies from state to state and budget to budget.

Studies reveal that most recipients are on welfare for less than 2 years and that 90 percent of TANF recipients are women with an average age of 31.1 years. The early success of TANF directly related to the booming economy of the Clinton era. More recent TANF changes include attempts to decrease spending on TANF through the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which requires states to engage more TANF cases in productive work activities leading to self-sufficiency.

Subsequent initiatives by the George W. Bush administration included the Healthy Marriages Initiative, which focused on early intervention, helping young adult couples establish stable and healthy relationships before the conception and birth of a child.

Critics of welfare reform point out that the conditions many women and families experience after exiting the welfare rolls are detrimental to their success and even survival—specifically, women's vulnerability to low-wage, dead-end jobs, domestic violence, and poverty. They often continue to lack child care, health care, and other benefits most often missing among those in the low-wage labor market. Concerns also arise around domestic violence and welfare reform. Although TANF has measures for battered women (the Family Violence Option), advocates for victims of domestic violence suggest this policy has not been effectively implemented and does not address domestic violence. Overall, those who focus on getting individuals and their families off welfare rolls see TANF as a success. However, for those interested in the long-term success and mobility of those families, TANF has failed to pull many of them out of working poverty. Critics also point to TANF's spotty record on child care, job training, and transportation.

Besides the reduction in case loads, supporters of the program also emphasize the slowing unwed birth rate, reduction in child poverty, and increased employment of young single mothers. Trends in public policy since the Reagan administration reflect legislation cutting back on public investments and the resorting to private and volunteer approaches to welfare. Welfare policy in the near future is likely to maintain the same course. Approaches to welfare under the George W. Bush administration were to increase work requirements. Further research needs to explore the institutional barriers that hinder low-income individuals from finding meaningful employment as well as a discussion on how to facilitate aiding hard-to-reach populations. In addition, more research needs to examine whether those who are working are able, or not able, to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

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See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children; Culture of Dependency; Culture of Poverty; Poverty; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Working Poor

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Welfare Capitalism

Welfare capitalism is a term that social scientists employ to define a specific form of regulating industrial relations and of controlling class struggles. With the onset of industrialization, advanced economies faced several problems and restrictions. At a more general level, constant revolutionizing of production and increasing degrees of urbanization and proletarianization undermined the previous socioeconomic foundations of these societies and led to social unrest, uncertainty, and poverty. *Proletarianization* refers to a social process by which an increasing number of the population, who were previously small producers or self-employed, lose their control over the means of production and become absorbed into the working class; that is, they have to sell their labor power to an employer. Deteriorating work conditions, increasing exploitation, and alienation caused dissatisfaction at work; these things in turn resulted in high turnover rates, absenteeism, indifference, drunkenness, violence, strikes, militancy among workers, and unionization,

followed by a significant decline in productivity. While the Western European response to these consequences of industrialization was to develop government-operated welfare programs and to establish a corporatist form of collective bargaining, in the United States the private sector took the lead. The main motive behind the American approach was to regulate social problems, and thus industrial conflict, without any state intervention and without the mediation of trade unions. In this regard, *welfare capitalism* evolved as a generic label for the liberal U.S. welfare system; more concretely, it refers to a collection of ideas and methods designed to improve capital-labor relations in the United States at a particular period, extending from the 1880s until the 1930s.

Welfare capitalism had five main components. At first, it aimed at maximizing surplus value production through reducing the reproduction cost of labor power. During a period when reproduction conditions were scarce, welfare capitalists employed various tools, ranging from company-sponsored housing, well-lit cafeterias, and company stores to schools, theaters, churches, libraries, recreational facilities, and musical groups; from profit sharing and stock ownership plans, to insurance programs, medical care, pensions, and social work. Companies also supported interaction between workers and village-level administrators (i.e., teachers, welfare workers, medical personnel) and encouraged religious ties in worker communities. The classic example of this is the first company-town led by Pullman Palace Car Company. Built within the city limits of Chicago in 1880, Pullman Village hosted 6,000 company employees and their dependents. The residents were required to live along the lines set by the company, which rested on thrift, neatness, cleanliness, family values, sobriety, good morals, and the like. This model town survived until 1894 when a bitter strike ended its existence.

On the other hand, company-led residences also facilitated the transformation of a rural population into an urban industrial workforce. In this relation, the existence of a high number of agrarian and craft-oriented workers within the labor force allowed employers to utilize various motifs such as noblesse oblige, paternalism, and moral individualism. In other words, they emphasized that every individual has a responsibility toward the needy and the poor, so that the large corporation could become a home of solidarity. Then, it was the moral duty of employers to share some of the profits with workers in the pursuit of common goals. Stripped of its dominant paternalistic veneer, these provisions extensively addressed the organization of the workers' lives outside as well as inside the workplace. These measures also dealt with the second and third problems; that is, how to bind workers to the jobs in order to increase efficiency and how to socialize and integrate foreign workers—many of whom had only recently immigrated from Southern and Eastern Europe-—into the disciplined and Americanized labor force.

The problem of underconsumption in the U.S. economy at that period led to the fourth concern. In response to this, Henry Ford (Ford Motor Company) announced a Five Dollar a Day program in 1914. The program was a combination of a cut in the workweek from 6 to 5 days, a reduction in the length of the workday from 9 to 8 hours, and a raise in minimum daily pay from $2.34 to $5. To be eligible for this program, however, workers had to meet certain conditions. To control and direct the needs and habits of workers, Ford set up a "social department" in his company. Indeed, inspectors went to workers' houses to observe how they conducted their lives and to teach them how to budget their money. For the latter, a special Ford bank was set up to encourage savings and loans for workers. Ford assumed that higher wages and cheapening of wage goods would raise the standards of living of the industrial worker and, in turn, would increase the levels of social consumption. The company recorded a success. Indeed, the rate of turnover fell down, absenteeism and incidents of disease decreased, and productivity increased. Although the program was cancelled after a few years, its basic principles became a part of a macro-social regime of accumulation usually called Fordism. This involved specific forms of production, as well as social consumption norms, and became a dominant paradigm for social and economic development in Western industrial countries at a later period.

Last but not least, welfare capitalists were strongly intent on keeping workers away from unionization. To this end, they established company unions and distributed most welfare programs through them. Hence, the employee representation system became a core mechanism for airing workers' grievances and negotiating labor contracts. In spite of a relatively union-free environment, however, spy networks, blacklists, and strikebreakers prevailed, even in the heyday of welfare capitalism. Controlled unionism helped employers to build employee loyalty and inhibited the right of

workers to organize and strike and to demand higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions. Moreover, despite its all-encompassing discourse, welfare capitalism widened the gap between the skilled and the unskilled worker. To illustrate, in company towns while mass workers contended with mean row houses, skilled employees benefited with better residential conditions. Far from alleviating racial, ethnic, and/or gender inequalities, those programs actually aggravated them. Studies of Pullman and some other industries showed that allocation of jobs on the basis of these differences during the period strategically undermined the collective strength of labor.

During the interwar period, welfare capitalism took hold as the railroads and the largest industrial corporations such as Standard Oil, International Harvester, United States Steel, and Western Electric Company adopted it, in addition to Pullman and Ford. A 1926 survey revealed that 80 percent of the 1,500 largest companies had adopted at least one type of welfarism, and almost 50 percent of them established comprehensive welfare schemes. Some corporations even considered providing unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, it was still a practice limited to a number of large corporations and, at most, 14 percent of workers were covered by these pension plans according to a 1929 survey. More importantly, these programs, once adopted, were not implemented without interruptions. During crisis periods such as 1893–94 and 1921, most companies cut back or postponed their welfare schemes, although the U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics recorded that the total cost of these programs never went beyond 2 percent of the total wage costs of these companies.

Despite widespread agreement that the Great Depression led to the end of welfare capitalism, some analysts state otherwise. One argument is that the New Deal of the 1930s did not replace welfarism, but instead welfarism evolved and survived in the post-depression era. The explosive growth of private pensions or health and disability insurance program in the United States is simply the continuation of private welfarism. Furthermore, studies also differ in their interpretation of its decline. Whereas some argue that welfarism was waning even before the Great Depression, others hold the Great Depression as mainly responsible for the demise of welfarism.

Another perspective is that its collapse was due to its inability to include workers successfully in the decision-making process; that is, the terms of industrial relations. Broader analysis, however, focuses on economic, political, and social developments that irrevocably altered the relationship between capital and labor in the late 1920s. On the one hand, destruction of craft work and increasing mechanization altered the patterns of labor control over the production process. On the other hand, the end of the overinvestment boom, unused industrial capacity, and debt obligations led to insecurity, uncertainty, and high unemployment. As a result, workers turned to trade unions in search for solidarity and to the government for a different paradigm that would go beyond company-level solutions. Hence, transformation from competitive to monopoly capitalism gave life to a new stable system of industrial relations in the United States. The New Deal, in general, and the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) of 1935, in particular, brought a virtual end to welfare capitalism and laid down the foundations for unionization, collective bargaining, and the right to strike.

Evren Hosgor

See also Americanization; Automation; Immigration, United States; Labor Unions; Social Conflict; Taylorism; Welfare States

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Welfare States

The term *welfare state* is strongly associated with socioeconomic policies adopted in advanced capitalist economies particularly after 1945, which rested on the conviction that societies can be shaped by conscious policies designed by state institutions to eliminate abuses resulting from the market process within a capitalist economy. Nevertheless, both the idea and

various welfare practices existed before the postwar period. The oldest of these traces back to social insurance programs in Germany in the 1880s. While the French government set up similar pension plans in 1910, the British government introduced a national insurance system, old-age pensions, and health and compulsory unemployment insurance systems in 1911, and the Swedes initiated the first compulsory and universal pension system in 1913. The only national program in the United States was the old-age insurance program initiated by the Social Security Act in 1935, leaving implementation of other welfare plans to individual states. However, these early programs were limited in scope, and after World War II the government transformed them into more comprehensive programs of universal benefits.

A growing literature examines why welfare states expanded after 1945, and the most comprehensive variations of these studies begin with a theory of advanced capitalism. Prior to this period, the leading capitalist countries experienced high unemployment levels, severe inflation rates, government deficits, productivity declines, and increasing inequality. Although various combinations of public and private solutions attempted to prevent social unrest, broader developments irrevocably altered the economic, political, and social environment after World War II. Therefore, these countries reconsidered their idolization of the market and put greater emphasis on state intervention in the economy. On the one hand, the welfare state was to ensure the reproduction of all conditions of production. State regulation, then, emerged as an essential basis of economic process as well as the precondition for the maintenance of an adequate labor force for new patterns of production. On the other hand, the idea behind the welfare state depended heavily on a compromise between social actors in the face of a powerful material and ideological competitor, socialism, which threatened the very existence of the capitalist system. The state's role, then, would be to mitigate class conflict and to balance the asymmetric power relation between labor and capital. Labor unions were recognized as the legitimate economic and political representatives of working class both in collective bargaining process and public policy formulation.

Within this context, ideas of John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) provided the ideological justification and theoretical basis of welfare states at a time when the Great Depression still had its hold on industrialized economies, and neoclassical economics offered no clear solutions. Keynes argued that public expenditures could maintain a certain demand level without affecting profits and smooth out the fluctuations of the market. Moreover, he claimed that monetary expansion, by controlling the level of interest rates, would result in investments that would create new jobs. With the widespread acceptance of Keynesian assumptions after 1945, government fiscal and monetary policies ensured an environment for a nonhostile labor force and favored the growth of mass markets and standardized patterns of consumption. Indeed, the period between 1945 and 1960s is generally referred to as the "Golden Age" of capitalism.

Welfare expenditures in Western democracies included various practices such as labor protection legislation, minimum wages, unemployment benefits, and other comprehensive compulsory insurance programs. The growth of the welfare state also contributed to increases in other public expenditures such as education, health, state-subsidized housing, and so on. The public sector undertook necessary infrastructure investments; that is, railways, telecommunications, water, coal, gas, and electricity supply. Moreover, because the idea of the welfare state rested on the principles of equal opportunity, adequate distribution of wealth, and public responsibility, it also aimed at constituting a broader safety net that would protect its subjects from risks such as lifelong disability following a workplace accident and/or risk of loss of spouse or parent and being left without support.

Although most modern industrial societies instituted at least some of these measures, countries developed their own national versions. This led analysts to distinguish these variations. Most influential and widely used is Gøsta Esping-Andersen's threefold categorization: the social democratic model (Scandinavian countries); the liberal model (United States, Canada, Australia, and United Kingdom); and the conservative model (Germany, France, Austria, and Italy). The main criteria behind these different welfare regimes were their degree of de-commodification; that is, the relative independence of the system from the compulsion and risks of the market. These differences emerged from the nature of class mobilization, class-political coalition structures, and regime institutionalization in each country and decisively affected the articulation of political demands, class cohesion, and the scope for labor-party action. Recently, a fourth, "familialistic" type evolved for late-developing; peripheral southern European or Mediterranean

economies, since similar social-demographic trends, economic constraints, and patterns of public policy exist among these countries, such as large agrarian sectors, traditional social structures, and family capitalism.

However, after the 1970s, the world economy experienced serious challenges: Productivity slowed down, inflation rates rose, the international monetary system broke down, competition among national economies increased, and foreign debt ratios exploded. Although debate continues, some experts called the welfare state a major drain on economic growth and competitiveness. Critics contended that the high involvement of government with welfare expenditures was a misallocation of resources that might otherwise have gone into more productive investments. These arguments found their intellectual culmination in neoliberal and monetarist doctrines and their political support from New Right governments, such as those of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States. Since then, governments in many countries have implemented significant reductions in welfare state expenditures. Nevertheless, their pace and degree depend heavily upon which of the three welfare regimes existed in the previous period.

Evren Hosgor

See also Class; Deregulation; Economic Restructuring; Globalization; Labor Movement; Mixed Economy; Socialism; Welfare

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White-Collar Crime

White-collar crime encompasses overt and hidden misconduct and transgressions by corporations, professionals, and political officials who engage in a wide variety of regulatory, civil, and criminal wrongdoing. The broad categorization of white-collar crime may involve anti-trust conspiracies, insider trading, defective products, insurance fraud, dangerous medical devices, unwanted surgeries, or political bribery. In the late 1970s, for example, the Ford Motor Company released the Pinto, a car that the company knew might explode upon impact because of a defective part. Ultimately, company officials were charged with reckless homicide. The savings and loans scandal that erupted in the 1980s, a time period referred to the "decade of greed," resulted in widespread fraud and embezzlement after the U.S. Congress deregulated the industry to promote a more competitive marketplace. Religious leader Jim Bakker created a Ponzi scheme under the auspices of Christianity and bilked followers of millions of dollars in bogus real estate deals. In 1995, a serious case of medical fraud emerged when doctors were accused of stealing eggs and embryos from patients at a fertility clinic in California. More recently, the implosion of Enron and WorldCom resulted in intense scrutiny over corporate crimes, with investigations and indictments pursued against chief executive officers who had played fast and loose in their business practices.

Historical Perspectives

Edwin H. Sutherland first called attention to "crime-in-the-suites" versus "crime-in-the-streets" in his 1939 presidential address at the then-named American Sociological Society meeting in Philadelphia. He followed up with the publication of the first scholarly book devoted to the subject, *White Collar Crime*, in 1949. Sutherland believed that scholars and officials had long overlooked crimes of the elite and that existing criminological theories on the nature and causes of such crimes were woefully inadequate to explain white-collar misconduct. His theory of differential association posited that the causes of crime were closely tied to involvement with deviant peer groups and the acceptance of an excess of definitions favorable to law-breaking. Sutherland's early research examined criminal convictions, civil judgments, and regulatory violations against major corporations in the United States, finding that all 70 entities he researched had engaged in one or more illegal activity.

Other early influential scholars in the field include Marshall B. Clinard and Donald Cressey. Clinard's 1980 book, *Corporate Crime*, revealed that the 582 largest corporations in the United States had engaged in 1,553 violations of federal law, averaging 4 per

company. Cressey's in-depth interviews with convicted embezzlers found that offenders tended to have a nonsharable financial problem and, when presented with the opportunity, rationalized their illegal behavior as borrowing. Current research shows that, like other varieties of criminal behavior, certain large companies could easily be labeled habitual offenders or career criminals.

Gilbert Geis, a prominent criminologist, has championed the continued exploration of white-collar crime in his extensive writings and research. His work "Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Case of 1961" is heralded as a classic in the field. The case involved extensive violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 that prohibited price-fixing. General Electric and Westinghouse Electric executives engaged in criminal offenses that restrained free trade by conspiring to fix prices that would undermine or eliminate competition. The case resulted in a 20-count grand jury indictment that included 45 individual actors and 29 corporations. A guilty plea resulted in fines of almost $2 million and 7 convictions with jail terms of 30 days with time off for good behavior. Some, however, viewed the punishment as extraordinarily lenient, as General Electric easily could consider a $500,000 loss as no more punitive than a man with an annual income of $175,000 might consider a $3 parking fine. Geis's analysis thus offered many insights into the specific nature, techniques, and offender characteristics involved in corporate deviance.

Definitions: Offense or Offender?

Initial debates between Sutherland and legal scholar Paul Tappan set the stage for controversies over definitions of white-collar crime that remain unresolved. Sutherland's definition of white-collar crime emphasized the respectability and social status of the offender who, abetted by occupational position, engaged in illegal or unethical acts. In contrast, Tappan argued that conviction of a crime denoted the real criminal. Offense-based definitions emphasize the criminal act or specific regulatory violation, leading to the development of numerous typologies delineating elite crime. A primary distinction is the difference between corporate and occupational crime. Corporate crimes include illegal acts committed on behalf of the organization, whereas occupational crimes denote an individual level involvement, such as doctors or lawyers who engage in fraud for personal gain or embezzlers who take advantage of their employers.

Gendered varieties of white-collar crime have emerged as an increasing number of women move into positions that afford them the opportunity to engage in large-scale embezzlement and fraud. Martha Stewart, for example, became enmeshed in a stock trading scandal that included accusations of insider trading and, ultimately, her imprisonment for lying to federal investigators, engaging in a conspiracy, and obstructing justice. The Stewart case called attention to the misdeeds of women in the corporate and professional realms who have moved from pink-collar crimes, such as check kiting, shoplifting, and small-scale embezzlement, to major acts of fraud. Historically, their limited opportunity resulted in fewer women involved in white-collar crime, but, with the elimination of the traditional boundaries between the private and public spheres, gendered varieties of white-collar have become more common.

Motive and Opportunity

White-collar crimes often go undetected and, if they are detected, offenders are likely to have enough financial and political clout to circumvent arrest, conviction, and punishment. The difficulties of detecting and investigating often relate to the complexity of the accounting schemes, the lack of a substantial paper trail, and the victim's reluctance to step forward. In many cases, a whistle-blower is responsible for calling attention to the wrongdoing and providing evidence against an organization or individual, despite the serious reprisals and labels such as "tattle-tale" or "ratfink." Frank Serpico, a former New York police detective, reported deep-seated corruption in the agency and became an enemy among his peers because of his role as a whistle-blower. In contrast, Sherron Watkins, Cynthia Cooper, and Coleen Rowley were named *Time* magazine persons of the year in 2002 for their roles in reporting accounting problems and cover-ups by Enron, WorldCom, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

One reason why trusted, well-paid employees jeopardize their livelihoods and reputation by committing white-collar crime, more often than not, develops from the need or desire for money. In many known cases, gambling, extravagant living, and costly personal problems or the mere desire for more money and material possessions serve as strong motivators. The pursuit of the American Dream (the acquisition of success, wealth, and material goods) and the "culture of competition" (win at all costs) play important roles

in helping explain why prominent companies and executives engage in wrongdoing.

Costs and Consequences

Estimates of the costs of white-collar crime exceed those of street crime and, though difficult to determine, reach as much as $250 billion annually. Taxpayers suffer many of the losses and pay hundreds of billions of dollars to cover the costs of white-collar crimes. The estimated bailout for the savings and loan scandal cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars. The cost of insurance fraud against private and government providers is estimated to be $100 billion a year. In addition to the financial costs, white-collar crime presents physical dangers that result from toxic chemical dumping, unsafe products, or workplace hazards. Unsafe working conditions at a North Carolina chicken processing plant killed 25 employees after a fire erupted because managers ignored government safety regulations. So widespread is this form of white-collar crime that experts place the number of deaths above the number of actual homicides.

Past convictions resulted in lenient treatment of offenders, often hindered by the inability to incarcerate a corporation. In fact, executives once viewed fines for misconduct as just another cost of doing business. In the 21st century, however, greater public awareness has resulted in increased concern, less tolerance for white-collar crime, and more vigorous state and federal prosecution of elite deviance, leading to more convictions, larger fines, and imprisonment.

Mary Dodge

See also American Dream; Corporate Crime; Corruption; Deregulation; Differential Association; Environmental Crime; Medical Malpractice; Monopolies; Occupational Safety and Health; Pink-Collar Occupations

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White Flight

The term *white flight* refers to the phenomenon of whites, usually upper and middle class, rapidly moving out of cities and into suburbs as blacks and other minorities move in. The result is residential segregation that leaves cities poorer and minority residents stranded in the city center. This demographic change strains the fiscal resources of central city governments, leaving inner-city residents with the prospect of increased taxes, diminished public services, and higher levels of unemployment.

While white flight may also occur when the newcomers are Latinos/as, other immigrants, and on rare occasions, Asians, white flight happens more often, more rapidly, and more completely when the incoming group is black. First used to describe the massive demographic shifts that took place in the period just after World War II, white flight has also occurred since then, particularly in cities throughout the northeastern, midwestern, and western United States.

From 1914 to 1960, millions of blacks left the U.S. South in search of better job opportunities and greater racial tolerance in other parts of the country. Many settled in cities such as Chicago, and the overcrowded conditions created by the influx of blacks prompted many whites to seek housing elsewhere. A post–World War II housing boom made it possible for many whites to move into newly constructed homes in the suburbs, leading to what has been called "suburbanization." Suburbanization peaked during the period from 1950 to 1960, when the total suburban populations increased by well over 60 percent. During the same period, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, central city populations rose by only 3 percent.

Residential change in Chicago during the postwar era offers a classic case of white flight, as whites

moved beyond the city limits in a pattern of concentric circles, resulting in population loss and economic decline in the central areas. In a few short years, the population of vast areas of Chicago became virtually all black. Other cities, including Detroit, Memphis, St. Louis, Cleveland, Philadelphia, New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, also experienced noticeable population shifts, with the first three losing more than half of their white populations to white flight. Residential segregation thus became a prominent feature of the spatial organization of U.S. cities in the years after World War II.

The factors contributing to white flight have been hotly debated, but the effectiveness with which the color line remained in many cities despite massive population shifts led many to cite racism and discrimination as important factors. African Americans were routinely and systematically barred from purchasing homes in predominantly white neighborhoods by practices such as blockbusting, redlining, racial steering, and racist real-estate covenants. Whereas blacks faced such restrictions, whites wishing to make the transition to the suburbs benefited from such incentives as federally subsidized home mortgages.

Some researchers also claim that the increase of blacks and other minorities in public schools contributes to white flight. In 1954, *Brown v. Board of Education* called for the desegregation of public schools. Many whites who had remained in the city decided to move to the virtually all-white suburbs to ensure that their children would not have to go to school with black children. Racial tensions and riots were also a key factor influencing white flight, and the outbreak of race riots in many major cities during the 1960s confirmed for many that cities were increasingly hostile places to live. In the summer of 1967, President Johnson created the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also known as the Kerner Commission, which warned that the nation was moving toward two societies: "one black, one white—separate and unequal." The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. on April 4, 1968, set off another wave of riots nationwide, resulting in even greater white flight to the suburbs.

Some researchers question the role that racism and discrimination play in white flight and propose that this process may not have occurred because of prejudice toward blacks but because of "unpleasant" conditions in cities, ranging from noise and congestion to a lack of job opportunities. Others claim that whites (just as other racial groups) simply prefer to live among those who are racially similar and that the observed changes in residential patterns are due to simple neighborhood succession. These explanations, though, do not account for the rapid rate of change or for the racial disparity between those who live in cities and those who live in the suburbs. Other researchers determined that although suburban whites did not cite racist feelings toward blacks as reasons for moving out of cities, many of the reasons that they did cite—including decreased land values, higher crime levels, lower-quality public schools, and a decline in the prestige of a neighborhood—are rooted in racism and its consequences.

Recently, interesting cases of what some are calling "black flight" have occurred in cities such as Detroit and St. Louis, with middle-class blacks leaving the cities in search of better social and educational opportunities in suburbs and parts of the U.S. South. Traditional cases of white flight occur internationally as well, with British cities such as London, Manchester, and Birmingham experiencing a decline in their white populations and an increase in their black and South Asian populations. Domestically, white flight from public schools in cities such as Boulder, Milwaukee, and Chicago continues to create challenges for policymakers. These examples, in addition to the persistence of racial segregation in many U.S. neighborhoods, affirm the need for ongoing evaluations of racial prejudice, economic trends, and social policies and their impact on residential preferences and mobility.

Danielle M. Jackson

See also Discrimination; Invasion-Succession; Racism; Redlining; Segregation, Residential; Urban Decline

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White Supremacy

White supremacy has two different overlapping meanings, resulting in somewhat distinct literatures. The more all-encompassing literature deals with "cultural studies" and "critical race theory" and views white supremacy as an *endemic* part of Western culture and society. The other, more traditional approach narrowly focuses on white supremacy as primarily an *activist* phenomenon, a social movement and/or ideology; its studies focus on organized groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.

Endemic White Supremacy

In this perspective white supremacy is so historically infused into Western culture and embedded into social structure that to speak of "society" in the U.S., European, or postcolonial context is, practically, to speak of white supremacy, as well as "racism," "white privilege," and "Eurocentric domination" on a global scale. All are parts of the whole, sometimes called "racialized social structures"—political and cultural systems that perpetuate inequality across racialized groups of people.

Proponents hold that to understand white supremacy, one must understand, or at least acknowledge, the roots of these social structures in European (white) colonialism. "Race" itself was invented through colonizers' efforts to understand and rationalize the differences between themselves and the people they subjugated. Thus, "race" explains and maintains inequality, and to this day we live in a fundamentally unjust world built by race.

Individual attitudes, utterances, or discriminatory acts are rarely at issue in this literature, except in reinforcing assumptions that "white is right," or that whites' cultural ways are normative and proper. For example, whites often see their styles of social interaction as "normal" (rather than culturally white), and nonwhite Christians sometimes uncritically absorb images of a white (Europeanized) Jesus.

Scholars say white supremacy has changed over time, evolving particularly in terms of strategies for its self-preservation. As domination by repression and terror ended in the mid-20th century, white supremacy metamorphosed into "domination by seduction." Thus, many recent scholars focus on how it continues without overtly racist whites, often invoking the term *color-blind racism* to characterize political ideologies that ahistorically champion property and individual rights yet deny the racial history of collective repression, thereby ensuring policies that do not threaten white control over most of the power and wealth in the world.

Activist White Supremacy

The second approach to white supremacy involves active white supremacists who overtly proclaim, in one way or another, that there exists a distinct race of people ("whites") who have a special place in humanity, are in many ways superior to nonwhites, and require segregation to avoid social, cultural, and biological contamination by nonwhites. These include a diverse set of groups who maintain that white interests must be actively protected and advanced: the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, Aryan Brotherhood, Christian Identity, Skinheads, and some militia groups, for example.

Researchers study these organizations and subcultures, also focusing on a burgeoning cyberculture. Similarities include almost universal antipathy toward Jews, blacks, and homosexuals. Nevertheless, white supremacists remain ideologically fractured, with many differences in ideology regarding religion, the use of violence, or even who is "white."

White supremacists instill fear not only because of their past terrorism but also because of recent hate crimes and proclamations ranging from dismantling welfare programs to terrorist "racial holy war" ("RAHOWA"). Weakened after World War II and again in the wake of the 1960s civil rights movement, organized white supremacists have since rejuvenated, according to watchdog organizations, such as the Intelligence Project and the Anti-Defamation League, who monitor white supremacist activities and harbor concerns that these groups might successfully tap into incipient racial hatred, especially among impressionable white youths.

Keenly aware of their socially marginal status as cognitive deviants, white supremacists try to overcome their stigma. Rarely do they refer to themselves as racists or as white supremacists; they are more likely to use more nebulous terms like *racialist* or *white separatist* or, in the U.S. context, *patriots*. Their public rhetoric places less emphasis on genetic superiority (while never denying it) and more on white cultural and individual rights, especially rights to live

separately from nonwhites (in "white" countries). They present themselves as less rabid and more rational, less ignorant and more sophisticated. Impression management also involves portraying whites as victims of a government supposedly manipulated by Jews with black assistance, feeding into a defensive rhetoric of preserving both a cultural heritage and the white race itself. They vilify whites who disagree as "race-traitors," their racial consciousness subverted by "multicultural" propaganda, often traced to the media and Hollywood, both allegedly run by Jews for this very purpose of mind control.

While highly diverse, white supremacists tend to come from the lower or working classes, rural areas, and low educational backgrounds. However, their situations may simply result in racially homogeneous social networks, and therefore they may have little ordinary social interaction with blacks, Jews, or gays. Similarly, as with religious cults, most join as a result of ordinary social networks in which they find themselves, not through formal recruitment. Those who remain involved do so in part because the subculture provides them with a sense of identity and meaning. Of course, some members also grew up in white supremacist families. Some researchers argue that members' racial hatred is often more an outgrowth from these social settings than a cause.

White supremacists consistently oppose immigration (of nonwhites), and their rhetoric—once concerned with "states' rights" and communism—now focuses more on opposing affirmative action, welfare, and foreign aid (especially to Israel). Although women have long been actively involved in white supremacist organizations and never merely passive and uninvolved followers of their men into the movement, white supremacist subcultures have tended to be strongly patriarchal and anti-feminist. White supremacist men are as concerned with white masculinity as with whiteness. They often express particular concern about racial miscegenation, coupled (verbally or in print) with images of black males as violent sexual predators seeking white women.

Marginalized, activist white supremacists have created parallel institutions within which they can interact without nonwhites, such as at annual conferences and racist music concerts. They have also been very active on the Internet, using it to create social networks that are increasingly international in scope.

Mitch Berbrier

See also Hate Crimes; Hate Groups; Hate Speech; Nativism; Prejudice; Racism

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WIDOWHOOD

Widowhood is the common term for the loss of a spouse, either male or female. This altered marital status requires life adjustments by the surviving partner to maintain a meaningful and fulfilled life after the loss. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 11.3 million widows overshadow the 2.6 million widowers and 50 to 70 percent of women over the age of 65 are widowed, while their male counterparts constitute only 12 to 20 percent.

Whereas widowhood issues were once dominated by the elderly, due to rising population rates and world instability (i.e., accidents, war, illness, civil unrest) widowhood rates are significantly increasing in all age and gender cohorts. No matter the age, widowhood represents a life transition to singlehood, including managing life's complexities and unfamiliar responsibilities formerly borne by two individuals but now delegated to the sole survivor.

Although both widows and widowers may experience grieving equally in depth, gender issues in grief studies suggest diverse areas of differentiation. In general, women seem to grieve more publicly and intensely, whereas males bear grief more passively

and privately, thus resulting in slower emotional recoveries. Contributing factors of age, familial responsibilities, finances, and familial support, along with the strength of social and emotional connections, become important elements of the intensity and the duration of widowhood bereavement.

Grieving factors are distinctive and individualistic in practice. Generally, women tend to perceive the loss with greater emotional anxiety. In contrast to the emotional significance of the funeral for a widow, for example, widowers often desire to make peace with the loss and move on, thus placing less emphasis on the milestone that this rite represents. Men tend to be control and reality oriented, displaying less tendency toward sharing, perhaps due to a lifelong pattern of restraining their emotions, contrasted with women, who seek out support, camaraderie, and channels of communication, thereby connecting therapeutically with other widows experiencing the same circumstances. The aftermath of spousal bereavement includes many psychological, emotional, and social upheavals for both genders. Grief symptoms may include eating and sleep disorders, preoccupation, malaise, physical ailments, confusion, communication difficulties, social ineptitude, depression, and loneliness. Combining these already existing symptoms with difficult external influences could heighten grief and often require medical attention.

Widowhood encompasses more than just the death of a partner. The aftermath effects extend to the lives of all surviving familial members. The welfare of the family unit now rests on the newly widowed person. Responsibilities once shouldered by both partners, such as daily living issues and tasks, finances, and social demands, now require the sole survivor to make major decisions. In many cases role reversal responsibilities become overwhelming for the grieving spouse.

Younger widows and widowers have initially shown stronger psychological distress due to the unanticipated death of their spouses. However, it appears that younger cohorts reinvest in life's activities faster and move on to other marital relationships. Older persons may display less grief due to their experiences with other devastating losses, thereby being armed with coping skills accumulated over the years. Marital relationships may no longer hold the importance to the older widow or widower, and many choose to remain single.

In addressing the personal and distinctive needs of widowhood, support groups become advantageous for encouraging acceptance of a loss, maintaining sociability, and commiserating with widowed peers who have already experienced the multiple dynamics of sorrow and loss. Acceptance of one's involuntary role as a single person may be the first step in recovery. The availability of a flexible yet stable social network can be crucial in how bereaved spouses adjust. Recuperation, effective coping, and reinvestment in life become important goals as well as resiliency and positive morale for a successful transition to self-sufficiency and personal efficacy.

Margaret I. Chelnik

See also Bereavement, Effect by Race

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Women's Rights Movement

The women's rights movement (WRM) seeks women's equality with men in all aspects of society, with full access to the same rights and opportunities that men enjoy. Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* of 1792 first introduced the concept of rights for women. Previously focused on abstract notions of women's equality, women slowly progressed to battle for constitutional and legal rights, like property rights and suffrage. Early 19th-century intellectual leaders of the American WRM were Lydia Maria Child (1802–80), who wrote the *Ladies Family Library,* 1832–1835, a history of women; Margaret Fuller (1810–50) and her seminal work, *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* of 1845; and Elizabeth Ellet (1818–77) who wrote *The Women of the American Revolution* of 1848.

Women's Status in Colonial America

Ninety women came to the Virginia colony in 1619, followed by 18 women and 11 girls who landed in Plymouth, Massachusetts, in 1620. The first women

colonists were often indentured servants kidnapped from cities or sold from prisons in Europe. Later, African women, forced to endure the Middle Passage, came to America as slaves. In contrast, the Quakers, who brought the principle of women's equality to America, were singular in their support of women's rights, allowing women to preach and enter into the government of the church. Quaker women frequently suffered religious persecution; Mary Dyer refused to recant her religion to the Massachusetts authorities and was hanged in Boston in 1660. Undeniably, women in the colonial period had many duties but not many rights.

The Seneca Falls Convention, 1848

In the early 1800s, U.S. women organized politically on their own behalf. Interested in social problems and their reform, women advocated temperance and gave aid to prisoners, prostitutes, unwed mothers, and widows. Female factory workers went on strike alone for the first time in Dover, New Hampshire, in 1828, but these first attempts to unionize failed. Similarly, Maria W. Stewart, a black woman who spoke out from 1831 to 1833 on the necessity for girls' education and the abolition of slavery, finally gave up in frustration.

Lacking organizational experience and not permitted to speak in public, women gained experience in political organizing through their activism in the anti-slavery movement. Through this abolitionist work they gained awareness of their inequality and began to change their organizational focus from anti-slavery to women's rights. Lucretia Mott, an ordained Quaker minister, helped establish the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society in 1833 and organized the first Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women in 1837. An important catalyst for the WRM occurred when Lucretia Mott met Elizabeth Cady Stanton at the World Anti-Slavery Convention in 1840. Lamenting that as women they were not allowed to be delegates, they vowed to organize a convention on women's rights.

In 1848, the Married Women's Property Bill became law in New York State, and on July 19–20 of that year, a convention held in the Methodist Church in Seneca Falls signified the beginning of the WRM in the United States. Resolutions passed unanimously were appeals for women's rights to equality in divorce, child custody, inheritance, property rights, and the right to an education, but some opposed the call for women's right to vote. State conventions and grassroots organizing on women's rights continued until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861.

The Women's Suffrage Movement

Close association of the abolitionist cause and the suffrage movement, as well as divisions within the suffrage movement itself on strategies, complicated the achievement of suffrage for women. From its first mention at the Seneca Falls Convention, women's suffrage took 72 years to accomplish and involved voting rights drives at the state level, battles to persuade state parties to include women's suffrage in their platforms, congressional fights, and the final movement to ratify the bill in 1919–20.

Ratification of the 13th Amendment in 1865 outlawing slavery quickly led to a proposed 14th Amendment giving former slaves citizenship rights and, by implication, the right to vote, leaving the two movements—abolition and women's suffrage—in competition with each other. Its ratification in 1868 in turn led to the 15th Amendment to give black males the right to vote. A division of the women's suffrage movement followed, and Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton established the National Woman Suffrage Association in May 1869, arguing for women's inclusion in the 15th Amendment. That November the newly established American Woman Suffrage Association worked for its ratification and suggested a 16th Amendment for women's suffrage. While the schism existed, women's suffrage made few political gains, but in 1890 the two groups joined to form the National American Women's Suffrage Association. In 1920, Tennessee ratified the 19th Amendment, named after Susan Brownwell Anthony, and it became federal law.

American Feminism From 1955 to 1965

After 1920, the public profile of women's rights diminished over the next 3 decades until Simone de Beauvoir published *The Second Sex* in 1949. Her book was considered "too radical for America in the fifties," and she was suspected of Marxist tendencies. Published during the McCarthy era, *The Second Sex* had difficulty gaining acceptance; feminists like Betty Friedan were not willing to acknowledge its influence.

The second wave of women's rights, or the women's liberation movement, was the outgrowth of

women's activism that persisted from the early to mid-1950s. The rebelliousness of the "Beat Madonnas" in the 1950s, the example of black women in the civil rights movement, the resistance of middle-class white women against the oppressiveness of domestic labor, the activism of working-class women in Ohio during the Un-American Activities Commission hearings, and the welfare rights movement in the early 1960s combined to shape a more powerful, widespread, and factionalized women's movement.

The Second Wave of Feminism

By the mid-1960s, women's rights once again came to the forefront, enabled by three events. First, in 1961, John F. Kennedy established the President's Commission on the Status of Women, at the urging of Esther Peterson, Director of the Women's Bureau. Second, in 1963, Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique* and validated the everyday experience of women by identifying their situation as "the problem that has no name." Third, the National Organization for Women (NOW) formed in 1966, petitioned to stop sex segregation of want ads, and by 1968 had initiated the fight for legalized abortion. In 1968, the Women's Liberation Front protested the Miss America Pageant, by crowning a live sheep as Miss America and setting up a "freedom trashcan" to dispose of oppressive symbols, such as bras, girdles, and false eyelashes. Although there was no fire, the media transformed it into the infamous "bra burning" incident, which never occurred, creating a fictitious stereotype of women's liberation.

The women's liberation movement quickly achieved remarkable success. Following nearly half a century of struggle, Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and on January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court upheld the *Roe v. Wade* decision, making the right to an abortion a legal alternative to an undesired pregnancy. However, a coalition of anti-feminist, New Right groups—in particular, Phyllis Shafly's STOP ERA and later the Eagle Forum—undermined ratification of the ERA. That campaign had a unifying effect on feminist organizing and, led by NOW, gained unprecedented financial and political support. Under the leadership of Ellie Smeal, NOW successfully lobbied Congress to approve an extension of the deadline for ratification of the ERA. In 1982, despite last-minute militant efforts of women chaining themselves inside the Capitol building in Springfield, Ohio, the ERA failed to win the two-thirds majority necessary, and its defeat signaled the emblematic ruin of a unified women's movement and a decline in popular support for women's rights. Other crises further weakened the movement: political infighting, factional divisions, trashing, and accusations of exclusionary practices such as racism, homophobia, classicism, and elitism.

The New Feminism

Since the early 1990s, the term *third wave of feminism* has gained currency. This new group of young feminist thinkers and activists, defined loosely as women born since 1970, resist the "victim feminisms" of the second wave. Naomi Wolf, in *Fire with Fire* of 1994, coined the term *power feminism* to refer to middle-of-the-road politics rather than militancy. Wolf argued that women should use their leverage as shoppers, voters, and taxpayers to achieve equality. Those who advocate do-it-yourself/grrrlpower use a less conventional approach, making extensive use of the Internet to disseminate their message. They view anger as a feminist mechanism, espouse independence and confident sexuality, and are often depicted as overly assertive. Those who adopt the term *third wave* are perceived as less rigid than second-wave feminists around issues of dress and sexuality and are concerned with diversity and cultural expression. The new feminisms are less likely to focus on activism around women's rights per se than on the larger spectrum of human rights in a globalized context.

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See also Collective Consciousness; Feminism; Sexism; Social Change; Social Movements

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Working Poor

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the categories most associated with the working poor are (a) people who work, but who nevertheless fall under the official definition of poverty; (b) people who are in poverty and have at least one working family member; or (c) people who may not necessarily be "in poverty," according to the official measure of poverty, but who fall below some percentage of the poverty level (e.g., 200 percent of poverty). The working poor are defined as those who have spent at least 27 weeks in the labor force during a year. To be classified as working, individuals must be employed or actively searching for work. The number of individuals under the poverty line was 37 million, or 12.7 percent, of the population in 2004. Of this population the U.S. Department of Labor estimates that 7.8 million individuals were classified as working poor, which represents an increase of 1.8 million since 2000. Three out of five individuals classified as working poor work full-time. Overall, 5.6 percent of individuals in the workforce were classified as working poor in 2004.

Dropping out of high school increases the likelihood that an individual will be classified as working poor. For high school dropouts, 15.2 percent, as opposed to 1.7 percent of college graduates, fell into the category in 2004. Women are more likely than men to be defined as the working poor. The census shows that 6.2 percent of women and 5.0 percent of men are working and still under the poverty line. Race is also an indicator of working poverty. While 7 in 10 of the working poor are white, blacks and Latinos/as are twice as likely to fall into that category. Black working women are almost twice as likely to be working poor (12.5 percent) as black working men (7.2 percent). Family composition is also important in defining the working poor, with 8.8 percent of married couples, 13.1 percent of single men, and 22.6 percent of single women so classified.

Labor Market Problems

The plight of U.S. families under the poverty line became a policy focus in the 1960s. The War on Poverty reduced the number of people in poverty significantly, along with providing poor families means-tested assistance. Since that time the term *working poor* more often has been associated with low-wage workers. Economic, social, and labor market changes in the past 30 years have left unskilled, low-wage workers vulnerable, as average wages have declined and welfare reform has reduced supplemental resources. Concurrent trends negatively affecting the working poor include the growth of wealth and income inequality, deindustrialization, and increasing technology and educational requirements in the workforce.

In the past 30 years, real wages for workers who do not have a high school degree declined 19 percent and increased 16 percent for workers who have a college degree. Low wages are the most common problem of the working poor, with 62 percent not making sufficient income to raise them above the working poor threshold. Overall, 24 million jobs, or 20 percent of the total, cannot keep a family of four above the poverty level. The working poor are the most affected by wage stagnation. Stagnant average wages and a low minimum wage are causes of working poverty in the United States. The nation's minimum wage remained unchanged at $5.15 an hour from 1997 to 2006. In 2007, Congress passed legislation to increase it to $5.85, with provisions for further increases to $6.55 in July 2008 and $7.25 in July 2009. Some fields of labor, such as tipped labor, remain exempt.

Other important changes affecting work include the relative decline of unions. Many of the working poor are in jobs with historically low levels of unionization. These trends reduce the value of unskilled and less-educated workers. In addition, automation, deindustrialization, and outsourcing have reduced the need for low-skilled industrial workers. This decline in unionized industrial jobs negatively affects less-educated and low-skilled workers particularly. Unskilled workers also fare worse in the temporary labor market, which has grown to almost one in three new jobs.

Prominent characteristics of the working poor include underemployment and involuntary part-time employment. The labor market segment most often classified as working poor are service industry workers, although two out of three individuals classified as working poor fall into three occupational categories: services, production, and transportation. The nation's farmworkers also are more likely to be working poor. With the count limited to documented workers, there are an estimated 4 million farmworkers.

Other societal-level factors shaping the working poor include a lack of health insurance, benefits, and child care. The 1996 Temporary Assistance for Needy

Families (TANF) legislation limited lifetime benefits to 5 years for cash assistance for welfare recipients. TANF has increased the number of working poor families who are struggling with child and health care. Welfare reform reduced the number of families on welfare from 5.1 million in 1996 to less than 2 million in 2004, but the average wage of individuals who have left welfare is $8 an hour.

Problems related to the access of sustainable employment, such as working poverty, are most acute in certain areas. Overall, poverty in rural areas is characterized by a greater concentration of working poor families than is poverty in other areas. While the working poor are dispersed throughout the United States, regions characterized by historical pockets of poverty such as Appalachia, the South, and Native reservations are more likely to contain concentrations of poverty and working poor households. Constricted opportunity structures and multiple social problems partially explain this situation. Generally, rural areas exhibit lower levels of educational obtainment and chronic underemployment than other areas. The percentage of families classified as low income ranges from 35 percent in Mississippi to 15 percent in Massachusetts.

Working Poor Households

Studies chronicling the lives and conditions of the nation's working poor reveal a diverse population exhibiting numerous social problems ranging from bad personal choices to low levels of educational obtainment, poor health, disability, substandard housing, and limited opportunities. Many families classified as working poor exhibit a constellation of problems that have far-reaching impacts on families and children. Social problems faced by the working poor include domestic and sexual abuse. Social theorists point out that sexism and racism play a prominent role in those characterized as the working poor, especially for female-headed households. Most evident are concentrations of women and minorities in low-wage service jobs.

More than half of low-income working families pay more than a third of their income for housing. Nearly six of ten working poor families lack decent, affordable rental housing. Still, social observers are proclaiming the decline of the underclass as the concentration of poverty has changed because of a stronger economy, abortion and the reduction in unwanted pregnancies for poor women, welfare reforms reducing dependency, and greater dispersal of low-income housing. All of these causes have reduced the concentration of poverty in certain areas but have not offset low wages as a significant cause of poverty.

Chris Baker

See also Feminization of Poverty; Housing; Labor Market; Labor Sectors; Living Wage; Skills Mismatch; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; Underclass Debate; Underemployment; Urban Underclass; Welfare

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World-Systems Analysis

The world-systems perspective is a strategy for explaining social change that focuses on whole intersocietal systems rather than single societies. The main insight is that important interaction networks (trade, information flows, alliances, and fighting) have woven polities and cultures together since the beginning of human social evolution. Thus explanations of social change need to take intersocietal systems (world-systems) as the units that evolve. But intersocietal interaction networks were rather small when transportation was mainly a matter of humans carrying loads on foot. Globalization, in the sense of the expansion and intensification of larger interaction networks, has been increasing for millennia, albeit unevenly and in waves.

The intellectual history of world-systems theory has roots in classical sociology and Marxian political

economy. But in explicit form, the world-systems perspective emerged only in the 1970s when Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein began to formulate the concepts and narrate the analytic history of the modern world-system.

The idea of the *whole system* means that all the human interaction networks small and large, from the household to global trade, constitute the world-system. It is not just a matter of "international relations" or global-scale institutions such as the World Bank. Rather, at the present time, the world-system is all of the people of the Earth and all of their cultural, economic, and political institutions and the interactions and connections among them. The world-systems perspective looks at human institutions over long periods of time and employs the spatial scales required for comprehending these whole interaction systems.

Structurally, the modern world-system is an intersocietal hierarchy composed of economically, culturally, and militarily dominant core societies (themselves in competition with one another) and dependent peripheral and semiperipheral regions, a few of which successfully improved their positions in the larger core/periphery hierarchy, while most have simply maintained their relative positions. This structural perspective on world history allows the analysis of the cyclical features of social change and the long-term patterns of development in historical and comparative perspective. The development of the modern world-system can be seen as driven primarily by capitalist accumulation and geopolitics in which businesses and states compete with one another for power and wealth. Conditioning competition among states and capitals are the dynamics of struggle among classes and the resistance of peripheral and semiperipheral peoples to domination and exploitation from the core. In the modern world-system, the semiperiphery consists of large and powerful countries in the developing world (e.g., Mexico, India, Brazil, and China) as well as smaller countries that have intermediate levels of economic development (e.g., the East Asian newly industrialized countries). The history of social change cannot be understood without a consideration of both the strategies and technologies of the winners and the strategies and forms of struggle of those who have resisted domination and exploitation.

It is also difficult to understand why and where innovative social change emerges without a conceptualization of the world-system as a whole. New organizational forms that transform institutions and that lead to upward mobility most often emerge from societies in semiperipheral locations. Thus all the countries that became hegemonic core states in the modern system had formerly been semiperipheral (the Dutch, the British, and the United States). This is a continuation of a long-term pattern of social evolution that Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall called "semiperipheral development" in 1997. Semiperipheral marcher states and semiperipheral capitalist city-states had acted as the main agents of empire formation and commercialization for millennia. This phenomenon arguably also includes organizational innovations in contemporary semiperipheral countries (e.g., Mexico, India, South Korea, and Brazil) that may transform the now-global system.

This approach requires that we think structurally. We must be able to abstract from the particularities of the game of musical chairs that constitutes uneven development in the system to see the structural continuities. The core/periphery hierarchy remains, though some countries have moved up or down. The interstate system remains, though the internationalization of capital has further constrained the abilities of states to structure national economies. States have always been subjected to larger geopolitical and economic forces in the world-system, and as is still the case, some have been more successful at exploiting opportunities and protecting themselves from liabilities than others.

In this perspective many of the phenomena that have been called "globalization" correspond to recently expanded international trade, financial flows, and foreign investment by transnational corporations and banks. Much of the globalization discourse assumes that recent, separate national societies and economies have now been superseded by an expansion of international integration driven by information and transportation technologies. Rather than a wholly unique and new phenomenon, globalization is primarily international economic integration, and as such, it is a feature of the world-system oscillating as well as increasing for centuries. Recent research comparing the 19th and 20th centuries shows that trade globalization is both a cycle and an upward trend.

The Great Chartered Companies of the 17th century were already playing an important role in shaping the development of world regions. Certainly the transnational corporations of the present are much more important players, but the point is that "foreign investment" is not an institution that only became important since 1970 (nor since World War II). Finance capital has been a central component of the commanding heights of the world-system since the

14th century. The current ebb and flow of world money are typical of the late phase of very long "systemic cycles of accumulation."

World-systems scholars contend that leaving out the core/periphery dimension or treating the periphery as inert is a grave mistake, not only for reasons of completeness but also because the ability of core capitalists and their states to exploit peripheral resources and labor has been a major factor in deciding the winners of the competition among core contenders. And the resistance to exploitation and domination mounted by peripheral peoples has played a powerful role in shaping the historical development of world orders. Thus world history cannot be properly understood without attention to the core/periphery hierarchy.

The abandoning of Keynesian models of national development led to a new (or renewed) emphasis on deregulation and opening national commodity and financial markets to foreign trade and investment. The term many prefer for this turn in global discourse is *neoliberalism*, but it has also been called "Reaganism/Thatcherism" and the "Washington Consensus." The structural basis of the rise of the globalization project is the new level of integration reached by the global capitalist class and the crisis of overaccumulation that emerged in the 1970s when Germany and Japan had caught up with the United States in the production of high-technology commodities.

The world-system has now reached a point at which both the old interstate system, based on separate national capitalist classes and states, and new institutions, representing the global interests of capital, exist and are powerful simultaneously. In this light each country has an important ruling class fraction allied with the transnational capitalist class. The big question is whether or not this new level of transnational integration will be strong enough to prevent competition among states for world hegemony from turning into warfare as in the past, during a period in which a hegemon (now the United States) is declining.

The insight that capitalist globalization is a cycle as well as an upward trend and that periods of deglobalization follow these waves of integration has important implications for the future. Capitalist globalization increased both intranational and international inequalities in the 19th century and did the same thing in the late 20th century. Those countries and groups left out of the "beautiful époque" either mobilize to challenge the hegemony of the powerful or retreat into self-reliance, or both.

Globalization protests emerged in the non-core with the anti–International Monetary Fund riots of the 1980s. The several transnational social movements that participated in the 1999 protest in Seattle brought globalization protest to the attention of observers in the core, and this resistance to capitalist globalization continued and grew despite the setback that occurred in response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001.

An apparent tension exists between those who advocate deglobalization and delinking from the global capitalist economy and the building of stronger, more cooperative and self-reliant social relations in the periphery and semiperiphery, on the one hand, and those who seek to mobilize support for new (or reformed) institutions of democratic global governance. Self-reliance by itself, though an understandable reaction to exploitation, is not likely to solve the problems of humanity in the long run. The great challenge of the 21st century will be the building of a democratic and collectively rational global commonwealth. World-systems theory can be an important contributor to this effort.

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See also Global Economy; Globalization; Multinational Corporations; Social Change; Transnational Social Movement

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X

XENOPHOBIA

The term *xenophobia* derives from the Greek words *xénos* ("foreign") and *phobos* ("fear"), literally meaning a fear of foreigners. This origin is reflected in dictionary definitions, which almost inevitably describe it as a fear or hatred of strangers or foreigners. Despite a clear parallel between xenophobia and prejudice, the former refers solely to an emotional reaction to the other, while the latter is typically defined in ways that suggest both cognitive and emotional components. To the extent that this is the case, *xenophobia* has a more restrictive usage than *prejudice*. On the other hand, xenophobia and ethnocentrism are essentially two sides of the same coin, the latter referring to an excessive love of one's own "people"—be they defined in ethnic, racial, religious, national, or civilizational terms.

Given the word's origin, in the premodern world certain visceral reactions to the "other" appeared to be, if not typical or universal, at least very common. Contact with strangers within and foreigners from outside accelerated with the advent of the modern age, and a considerable literature developed in Europe that addressed this reality. In the case of strangers within, the classic example was Jews on a predominantly Christian continent. From a relatively early point in time, intellectuals were divided between those who harbored virulently anti-Semitic views and those who promoted tolerance. Anti-Semitism had deep roots in Roman Catholicism, and in this regard there was a remarkable continuity between Catholicism and Protestantism. Indeed, many experts consider Luther's notorious screed against the Jews, after it became apparent that they did not plan to convert to Christianity, as one of the foundational statements of European anti-Semitism. The Jews he despised, forced to reside in segregated ghettos, were physically close but socially distant. Given that their religion constituted the formative grounding of Christianity, it would be reasonable to assume that they would not be perceived as the stranger within, but clearly this was the predominant sentiment among both intellectuals responsible for the ideological basis of anti-Semitism and ordinary people.

At the same time as Europeans began to venture into heretofore uncharted areas of the globe, thus beginning the era of colonialism, a fateful encounter with the other commenced. The image that emerged to characterize the other was to contrast civilized Europeans to savage or barbarian others. When Montaigne published his famous essay "Of Cannibals" in 1577, his contention was that Europeans offered evidence that they, and not the exotic outsider, were more capable of barbaric acts. His argument clearly presented a position that ran against the current of opinion in Europe. Likewise, in the famous Valladolid debate that pitted Bartolomé de Las Casas against Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, the former argued that the indigenous people of the Americas indeed possessed souls and thus shared with Europeans a common humanity. His was a minority position at that time.

Since the 19th century and the emergence of mass immigration, the newcomers came to represent the other. This was evident during the earliest wave of immigration in the United States, when the Irish were singled out for contempt. Hostility, fueled by anti-Catholicism, shaped the belief that the Irish represented

both a social problem and a threat to democracy due to their presumed willingness to obey the authoritarian dictates of the Vatican. In the following wave of immigration, all Eastern and Southern European immigrants were the victims of xenophobia, but none was hated and feared more than Jews. Accused of being both ruthless capitalist exploiters and, paradoxically, as responsible for fomenting a communist revolution, they were depicted as being intent on world domination. Nowhere was this more on display than in the circulation of the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion.*

In the current wave of migration from the world's poor nations to the rich ones, the closest counterpart to this earlier instance of xenophobia is what has become known as *Islamophobia,* a phenomenon more in evidence in the nations of Western Europe than in North America, in no small part because the former nations have absorbed far larger numbers of Muslim immigrants. Shaping the animosity directed at Muslims is the claim that the cultures they bring to their new setting are antithetical to liberal democracies and pluralist societies, and therefore they are both incapable of, and uninterested in, becoming incorporated into the larger society. Such views have been exacerbated since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London intensify the fear factor, according to public opinion research.

Given that the evidence suggests xenophobia extends throughout recorded history, some scholars argue that it is a universal feature of the human condition. This thesis has been especially evident among those who seek to locate in human biology the key causal factors producing it. This was apparent in the past in eugenics and more recently in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. However, if hostility to outsiders is a universal condition, it would lead to the maladaptive situation in which individuals were limited to interacting only with ingroup members. Moreover, the record indicates that attitudes toward the stranger vary depending on time and circumstance. Nowhere is this more vividly and tragically on display than in the genocide campaigns in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In both cases, the deeply rooted tensions between groups—Serbs and Muslims in the former case, Hutus and Tutsis in the latter—did not lead to persistent conflict and violence. On the contrary, for extended periods of time these groups peacefully coexisted and in fact often interacted in positive ways (including intermarriage). The potential for xenophobia increases during times of societal crisis, which appears to be a necessary but not sufficient reason for xenophobia to lead to violence. The additional essential ingredients include a leadership committed to inciting mass hatred and a mass media prepared to serve the interests of those elites.

The reverse is also true. Political leaders committed to multiculturalism, with Canada being the most successful example at present, have managed to reduce levels of xenophobia. Thus, new immigrants in Canada confront considerably less hostility and fear than in many other immigrant-receiving nations. Moreover, although tensions between separatist nationalists in Quebec and the rest of Canada are a reality, they do not manifest themselves in terms of hatred or fear. The result is that intergroup conflict has the potential of being managed in constructive ways. Xenophobia, in short, should be viewed as socially constructed and not as an inevitable feature of the human condition.

Peter Kivisto

See also Anti-Semitism; Ethnocentrism; Genocide; Multiculturalism; Prejudice; Racism

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Z

Zero Population Growth

The concept of zero population growth (ZPG), first used by Kingsley Davis (1908–97), is a condition in which the number of children born, combined with the number of people who immigrate, is equivalent to the number of people who die, combined with the number of people who emigrate. Under this condition, the population neither expands nor contracts. It is more simplistic, but less accurate, to calculate the ZPG using a country's total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 or lower as a benchmark. The TFR, or number of children a woman has in her lifetime, however, is only one indicator of population growth. Demographers, environmentalists, and ecologists often advocate policies that promote zero population growth at a global level to avoid problematic conditions associated with uncontrolled global population increase, such as pollution, drought, and famine.

Many industrial and postindustrial nations experience a gradual increase of their populations due to both low birth rates and low death rates. At the same time, less developed countries experience high birth and death rates, and their population increases outpace their food and water production capabilities. For example, China, a country with an estimated 2006 population of more than 1.3 billion, has instituted policies that favor single-child families with the eventual goal of substantially reducing its total population.

During the industrial revolution, a period of great social and economic change in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, economist Thomas Malthus predicted that population would grow faster than its food production capabilities, resulting in widespread famine, war, and disease, as nature itself culled the population to a sustainable amount. Paul Ehrlich, a neo-Malthusian, suggested that zero population growth might avert the kind of environmental disaster that uncontrolled population control is likely to cause.

The best-known organization promoting policies that support population control leading to zero population growth is the Population Connection, founded in 1968 as Zero Population Growth. The goal of this organization is to decrease birth rates by educating the population of less developed countries while simultaneously empowering and providing family planning information to women of those countries.

However, zero population growth is not a universally accepted approach to population control. Greatly reducing the birth rate to achieve zero population growth would result in a disproportionate number of elderly citizens. Economists and other researchers argue that a state of zero population growth would result in a stagnant economy as well as an unfavorably low ratio of working to dependent members in the population. Additionally, demographers suggest that continued economic development in less developed countries and continued improvement in the status of women worldwide will result in slower world population growth, a trend already underway. For example, the rate of global population increase slowed from 2.04 percent in the late 1960s to 1.24 percent in 2000.

Heather M. Griffiths

See also Birth Rate; Population Growth; Total Fertility Rate

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Zero-Tolerance Policies

The term *zero tolerance* refers to a government or private employer's nondiscretionary enforcement policy that requires fixed penalties to be imposed on any violators regardless of extenuating circumstances. Zero-tolerance policies emerged from several federal- and state-level drug enforcement initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. They have been applied in public schools, the military, and the private sector.

During the Reagan and Bush administrations (1981–93), the War on Drugs campaign utilized a zero-tolerance policy to prohibit the illegal sale of drugs across U.S. borders. U.S. Customs and the U.S. Attorney's office in San Diego initiated the policy for this "war." Any individual crossing the United States–Mexico border arrested for possession of drugs received a mandatory prison sentence upon conviction. The U.S. Customs Service found this policy so effective in deterring future drug trafficking across the border that it recommended its national adoption. By 1988, the National Drug Policy Board and the White House Conference on a Drug-Free America required that all federal drug enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, adopt and enforce zero-tolerance policies. From this point onward, zero tolerance became a criminal justice approach to the war on drugs, given the rigid punishments and penalties accompanying the policies.

In the late 1980s, zero-tolerance policies expanded to encompass school-based violence in response to several school shootings across the country. In 1989, schools in Orange County, California, and Louisville, Kentucky, were the first to adopt zero-tolerance policies for any students violating rules on drug possession and/or involved in gang activity. A 1991 study found that 1 in every 18 students carried a gun to school at some time during his or her high school years. Furthermore, studies showed that, across the country, approximately 100,000 guns are brought to school each day. By 1993, many states were adopting school zero-tolerance policies. In 1994, Congress passed the Gun Free Schools Act, bringing zero-tolerance policies to the national level. The Gun Free Schools Act required every school that received government funding to expel students bringing to school any object that could be considered a weapon or any illegal drugs or prescription drugs. This mandatory expulsion for one calendar year also required the school administrators to send a referral regarding the student's behavior to the juvenile justice system.

In addition to the zero-tolerance policies on drugs and school violence, zero-tolerance policies have been adopted in a wide array of public and private sectors, including among most *Fortune* 500 companies. Perhaps the most stringent of such policies are those on sexual harassment and racial extremists as addressed in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The military policy on sexual harassment requires the immediate response to any incident of sexual harassment through the appropriate chain of command. The zero-tolerance policy on racial extremists gives U.S. military officials the authority to adopt zero tolerance of racial extremists' speech and/or activities, even though such action is unconstitutional in civilian life.

Although zero-tolerance policies have been adopted nationally in many areas of public and private life, much controversy still remains surrounding these policies. Many critics compare zero-tolerance policies to mandatory minimum sentencing in the criminal justice system, stating that in many instances such policies are too harsh for the crimes. Critics argue that the zero-tolerance policies on drugs deplete much-needed resources of federal agencies because they are too concerned with identifying individual drug traffickers rather than focusing on the massive flow of drugs into the United States. Even with zero-tolerance policies in effect in the military, a 1995 study released by the Department of Defense indicates that nearly 52 percent of female personnel and 9 percent of male personnel experienced some type of sexual harassment.

Perhaps the most significant controversy surrounding zero tolerance is in schools. Many critics believe that too many children are unfairly punished for minor offenses. Statistics show that the number of school suspensions nearly doubled from 3.7 percent of students (1.7 million students) in 1974 to 6.8 percent of students (3.2 million students) in 1998, with an additional 100,000 expelled. Critics argue that the

vast majority of these suspensions and expulsions were for minor offenses that did not warrant such harsh punishment.

Recent trends of zero-tolerance policies indicate that crimes of all types are down, by as much as 30 percent, in public schools across the country. Furthermore, less than 1 percent of all violent crimes involving juveniles occur on school grounds. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the number of school homicides, suicides, and nonfatal crimes decreased significantly during the years 1992–2002. Another trend is the many alternatives to zero-tolerance policies proposed as more appropriate methods of enforcement. Such alternatives favor prevention rather than punishment and focus on known risk factors to address and overcome.

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See also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; Drug Abuse; Militarism; School Violence

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